Computable bounds for the discrimination of Gaussian statesResearch Paper
Motivation
By combining the Minkowski inequality and the quantum Chernoff bound, we derive easy-to-compute upper bounds for the error probability affecting the optimal discrimination of Gaussian states. In particular, these bounds are useful when the Gaussian states are unitarily inequivalent, i.e., they differ in their symplectic invariants.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of Computable bounds for the discrimination of Gaussian states (arXiv:0806.1625v2). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
6 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Minkowski spectral bound for Gaussian-state discrimination (Theorem 4, Eqs. (60)–(62), PDF p. 5). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Optimal cloning of unitary transformationsResearch Paper
Motivation
After proving a general no-cloning theorem for black boxes, we derive the optimal universal cloning of unitary transformations, from one to two copies. The optimal cloner is realized by quantum channels with memory, and greately outperforms the optimal measure-and-reprepare cloning strategy. Applications are outlined, including two-way quantum cryptographic protocols.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of Optimal cloning of unitary transformations (arXiv:0804.0129v2). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
10 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Optimal universal one-to-two unitary cloning, with attaining channels (Theorem 1; Eqs. (8)–(10), PDF p. 3). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
1 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
Paragraph following Theorem 1, controlled-swap realization: Consistent controlled-swap Stinespring realization of Eq. (8) in the stated +/- memory basis (source-ambiguity)
On Differentiable Vectors for Representations of Infinite Dimensional Lie GroupsResearch Paper
Motivation
In this paper we develop two types of tools to deal with differentiability properties of vectors in continuous representations πG→\GL(V) of an infinite dimensional Lie group G on a locally convex space V. The first class of results concerns the space V∞ of smooth vectors. If G is a Banach--Lie group, we define a topology on the space V∞ of smooth vectors for which the action of G on this space is smooth. If V is a Banach space, then V∞ is a Fr'echet space. This applies in particular to C∗-dynamical systems (\cA,G,α), where G is a Banach--Lie group. For unitary representations we show that a vector v is smooth if the corresponding positive definite function \laπ(g)v,v\ra is smooth. The second class of results concerns criteria for Ck-vectors in terms of operators of the derived representation for a Banach--Lie group G acting on a Banach space V. In particular, we provide for each k∈N examples of continuous unitary representations for which the space of Ck+1-vectors is trivial and the space of Ck-vectors is dense.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of On Differentiable Vectors for Representations of Infinite Dimensional Lie Groups (arXiv:1002.1602v3). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
10 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Hilbert-valued smoothness and the inner-product kernel (Theorem 7.1, PDF p. 21). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
42 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
Information - Disturbance Tradeoff in the Estimation of a Unitary TransformationResearch Paper
Motivation
We address the problem of the information-disturbance trade-off associated to the estimation of a quantum transformation, and show how the extraction of information about the a black box causes a perturbation of the corresponding input-output evolution. In the case of a black box performing a unitary transformation, randomly distributed according to the invariant measure, we give a complete solution of the problem, deriving the optimal trade-off curve and presenting an explicit construction of the optimal quantum network.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of Information - Disturbance Tradeoff in the Estimation of a Unitary Transformation (arXiv:1006.5665v2). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
6 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Attained optimal information–disturbance frontier (§IV C, Eqs.(30)–(34); abstract on PDF p.1, PDF p. 7). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Selected references
Information - Disturbance Tradeoff in the Estimation of a Unitary Transformation, arXiv:1006.5665v2, https://arxiv.org/abs/1006.5665v2
We analyze quantum algorithms for cloning of a quantum measurement. Our aim is to mimic two uses of a device performing an unknown von Neumann measurement with a single use of the device. When the unknown device has to be used before the bipartite state to be measured is available we talk about 1 -> 2 learning of the measurement, otherwise the task is called 1 -> 2 cloning of a measurement. We perform the optimization for both learning and cloning for arbitrary dimension of the Hilbert space. For 1 -> 2 cloning we also propose a simple quantum network that realizes the optimal strategy.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of Cloning of a quantum measurement (arXiv:1103.5709v2). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
16 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Optimal one-to-two measurement cloning fidelity (§V, Eq.(61): optimal one-to-two cloning fidelity (seed announced in abstract), PDF p. 7). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
3 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
§V, Eqs.(62),(63), p.8 replica formula: printed optimal cloners: Operational optimality of the two printed Eq.(62) block arrays (source-ambiguity)
§VI final paragraph and author note [17]: estimate-and-prepare comparison: An operationally specified optimal-estimation-and-prepare strategy (source-ambiguity)
The Schmidt number and partially entanglement breaking channels in infinite dimensionsResearch Paper
Motivation
A definition of the Schmidt number of a state of an infinite dimensional bipartite quantum system is given and properties of the corresponding family of Schmidt classes are considered. The existence of states with a given Schmidt number such that any their countable convex decomposition does not contain pure states with finite Schmidt rank is established. Partially entanglement breaking channels in infinite dimensions are studied. Several properties of these channels well known in finite dimensions are generalized to the infinite dimensional case. At the same time, the existence of partially entanglement breaking channels (in particular, entanglement breaking channels) such that all operators in any their Kraus representations have infinite rank is proved.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of The Schmidt number and partially entanglement breaking channels in infinite dimensions (arXiv:1110.4363v3). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
20 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Proposition 9B: exact k-PEB channels with only infinite-rank nonzero Kraus operators (Proposition 9B: exact k-PEB channels with only infinite-rank nonzero Kraus operators, PDF p. 12). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
1 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
Proposition 2: Source-pinned infinite-dimensional LOCC class, specifying deterministic versus selected outputs, measurable outcome instruments, round limits and topology. (source-ambiguity)
Selected references
The Schmidt number and partially entanglement breaking channels in infinite dimensions, arXiv:1110.4363v3, https://arxiv.org/abs/1110.4363v3
Quantum learning algorithms for quantum measurementsResearch Paper
Motivation
We study quantum learning algorithms for quantum measurements. The optimal learning algorithm is derived for arbitrary von Neumann measurements in the case of training with one or two examples. The analysis of the case of three examples reveals that, differently from the learning of unitary gates, the optimal algorithm for learning of quantum measurements cannot be parallelized, and requires quantum memories for the storage of information.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of Quantum learning algorithms for quantum measurements (arXiv:1103.0480v2). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
14 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Three-example qubit learning requires adaptation (Abstract; §V.C and Remark 1: optimal three-example qubit learning requires adaptation, PDF p. 1). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
7 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
§V.A: strict inferiority of estimating then preparing the estimated measurement: An unrestricted one-use estimate-and-replay-projective-measurement domain with its measurable joint outcome law and actual replica contraction. (hard)
Eqs.(82),(A14): printed final two-use scalar formula: Eqs.(82),(A14): printed final two-use scalar formula (source-ambiguity)
§VI: general statement that examples after the second must be sequential: §VI: general statement that examples after the second must be sequential (source-ambiguity)
Abstract / §I: requirement of coherent quantum memory: Abstract / §I: requirement of coherent quantum memory (source-ambiguity)
§VI: optimal learners for different N do not share initial steps: §VI: optimal learners for different N do not share initial steps (source-ambiguity)
The Functional Calculus Approach to the Spectral TheoremResearch Paper
Motivation
A consistent functional calculus approach to the spectral theorem for strongly commuting normal operators on Hilbert spaces is presented. In contrast to the common approaches using projection-valued measures or multiplication operators, here the functional calculus is not treated as a subordinate but as the central concept. Based on five simple axioms for a "measurable functional calculus", the theory of such calculi is developed in detail, including spectral theory, uniqueness results and construction principles. Finally, the functional calculus form of the spectral theorem is stated and proved, with some proof variants being discussed.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of The Functional Calculus Approach to the Spectral Theorem (arXiv:2003.06130v2). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
49 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Theorem 7.6 (Spectral Theorem: General Case) (Theorem 7.6 (Spectral Theorem: General Case), PDF p. 35). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
2 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
Example 6.2: Concrete subsequence-tail characters on l-infinity, their bounded diagonal representation on l2 of all increasing subsequences, and the common-kernel anchor-set predicate. (hard)
Remark 6.8: arbitrary Borel product analogue: Exact hypotheses and regularity predicate for an arbitrary product of Borel calculi. (source-ambiguity)
We consider three different communication tasks for quantum broadcast channels, and we determine the capacity region of a Hadamard broadcast channel for these various tasks. We define a Hadamard broadcast channel to be such that the channel from the sender to one of the receivers is entanglement-breaking and the channel from the sender to the other receiver is complementary to this one. As such, this channel is a quantum generalization of a degraded broadcast channel, which is well known in classical information theory. The first communication task we consider is classical communication to both receivers, the second is quantum communication to the stronger receiver and classical communication to other, and the third is entanglement-assisted classical communication to the stronger receiver and unassisted classical communication to the other. The structure of a Hadamard broadcast channel plays a critical role in our analysis: the channel to the weaker receiver can be simulated by performing a measurement channel on the stronger receiver's system, followed by a preparation channel. As such, we can incorporate the classical output of the measurement channel as an auxiliary variable and solve all three of the above capacities for Hadamard broadcast channels, in this way avoiding known difficulties associated with quantum auxiliary variables.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of Hadamard quantum broadcast channels (arXiv:1611.07651v3). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
7 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Theorem 2: exact classical capacity of a Hadamard broadcast channel (Theorem 2, §3.3: classical capacity of a Hadamard broadcast channel (seed paper result), PDF p. 4). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Approximate recovery and relative entropy I. general von Neumann subalgebrasResearch Paper
Motivation
We prove the existence of a universal recovery channel that approximately recovers states on a v. Neumann subalgebra when the change in relative entropy, with respect to a fixed reference state, is small. Our result is a generalization of previous results that applied to type-I v. Neumann algebras by Junge at al. [arXiv:1509.07127]. We broadly follow their proof strategy but consider here arbitrary v. Neumann algebras, where qualitatively new issues arise. Our results hinge on the construction of certain analytic vectors and computations/estimations of their Araki-Masuda Lp norms. We comment on applications to the quantum null energy condition.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of Approximate recovery and relative entropy I. general von Neumann subalgebras (arXiv:2006.08002v1). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
3 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is A support-dominating state in a closed convex family (Lemma 2: support-dominating state in a closed convex set, PDF p. 8). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
31 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
Appendix E footnote 7 Eq.(249): proposed sufficient derivative formula: Unproved derivative and spectral-log domains (source-ambiguity)
Section 2.3 Eq.(42): closed convex sets admitting universal recovery: Nonfaithful universal recovery construction for the selected support-dominating state (source-ambiguity)
Learning to predict arbitrary quantum processesResearch Paper
Motivation
We present an efficient machine learning (ML) algorithm for predicting any unknown quantum process E over n qubits. For a wide range of distributions D on arbitrary n-qubit states, we show that this ML algorithm can learn to predict any local property of the output from the unknown process~E, with a small average error over input states drawn from D. The ML algorithm is computationally efficient even when the unknown process is a quantum circuit with exponentially many gates. Our algorithm combines efficient procedures for learning properties of an unknown state and for learning a low-degree approximation to an unknown observable. The analysis hinges on proving new norm inequalities, including a quantum analogue of the classical Bohnenblust-Hille inequality, which we derive by giving an improved algorithm for optimizing local Hamiltonians. Numerical experiments on predicting quantum dynamics with evolution time up to 106 and system size up to 50 qubits corroborate our proof. Overall, our results highlight the potential for ML models to predict the output of complex quantum dynamics much faster than the time needed to run the process itself.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of Learning to predict arbitrary quantum processes (arXiv:2210.14894v3). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
37 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Corollary 3 (Norm inequality for general 𝑘-local Hamiltonian) (Corollary 3 (Norm inequality for general 𝑘-local Hamiltonian), PDF p. 7). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
17 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
Theorem 1 (Learning an unknown quantum process): The advertised sample bound for the actual first-regime learner, uniformly under the pinned quantifiers (source-ambiguity)
Corollary 1 (Optimizing general 𝑘-local Hamiltonian): A fixed randomized output law with the claimed mean-energy and cost guarantee (source-ambiguity)
Corollary ∑︀ 2 (Optimizing bounded-degree 𝑘-local Hamiltonian): A fixed randomized output law with the claimed mean-energy and cost guarantee (source-ambiguity)
Theorem 4 (Learning an unknown observable): The advertised sample bound for the actual first-regime learner, uniformly under the pinned quantifiers (source-ambiguity)
Fact 3: A specified uniform geometric Hamiltonian class (source-ambiguity)
Theorem 5 ∑︀ (Random product states for optimizing 𝑘-local Hamiltonian): A fixed randomized output law with the claimed mean-energy and cost guarantee (source-ambiguity)
Theorem 6 (Random product states for optimizing 𝑘-local Hamiltonian; alternative): A fixed randomized output law with the claimed mean-energy and cost guarantee (source-ambiguity)
Theorem 7 (Approximation ∑︀ guarantee from [43] for optimizing 𝑘-local Hamiltonian): A specified randomized output law with the printed absolute-of-mean guarantee (source-ambiguity)
Corollary 5 (Optimizing arbitrary 𝑘-local Hamiltonian): A fixed randomized output law with the claimed mean-energy and cost guarantee (source-ambiguity)
Corollary 6 (Optimizing bounded-degree 𝑘-local Hamiltonian): A fixed randomized output law with the claimed mean-energy and cost guarantee (source-ambiguity)
Theorem 8 (Approximation guarantee from [44]): A source-pinned graph/term degree model and scalar-case convention for the A17-A18 coefficient restatement (source-ambiguity)
Lemma 4 (Khintchine inequality for polarized observables): Correct cross-dimension Frobenius normalization in the literal lemma (source-ambiguity)
Lemma 12: Consistent scaling and positivity hypotheses for the hard-state ensemble (source-ambiguity)
Theorem 13 (Learning to ∑︀ predict an unknown observable): The advertised sample bound for the actual first-regime learner, uniformly under the pinned quantifiers (source-ambiguity)
Theorem 14 (Learning to predict a quantum evolution): The advertised sample bound for the actual first-regime learner, uniformly under the pinned quantifiers (source-ambiguity)
Section II.B–C / Appendix E.2: product training transfers to every locally flat input law: The advertised sample bound for the actual first-regime learner, uniformly under the pinned quantifiers (source-ambiguity)
Lie wedges of endomorphism semigroups of standard subspaces in admissible Lie algebrasResearch Paper
Motivation
Let g be a real finite-dimensional Lie algebra containing pointed generating invariant closed convex cones. We determine those derivations D of g which induce a 3-grading of the form g=g−1⊕g0⊕g1 on g such that the (±1)-eigenspaces g±1 of D are generated by the intersections with generating cones of the form W=Of∗, where Of is the coadjoint orbit of a linear functional f∈z(g)∗ and Of∗ is the dual cone of Of. In particular, we show that, if g is solvable, no such derivation except the trivial one exists. This continues our classification of Lie algebras generated by Lie wedges of endomorphism semigroups of standard subspaces. The classification is motivated by the relation of nets of standard subspaces to Haag-Kastler nets of von Neumann algebras in Algebraic Quantum Field Theory.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of Lie wedges of endomorphism semigroups of standard subspaces in admissible Lie algebras (arXiv:2007.13445v1). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
25 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Theorem 3.17 (Non-degeneration Theorem); precise result selected for the seed (Theorem 3.17 (Non-degeneration Theorem); precise result selected for the seed, PDF p. 23). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
23 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
Theorem 2.8 (Spindler’s Construction), complete printed statement: A uniquely specified valid full source statement on its printed domain. (source-ambiguity)
Theorem 2.11: admissibility criterion: Complexified ordinary roots, adapted positive systems, and the real central minimal root cone with its dual interior. (hard)
Theorem 2.14: convex symplectic module structure: Symplectic isotypic decomposition with actual multiplicities, form-level equivalences, and compact/hermitian ideal actions. (hard)
Theorem 2.22, complete printed statement: A uniquely specified valid full source statement on its printed domain. (source-ambiguity)
Theorem 2.22(a),(c): generalized Jacobi admissibility: Generalized sp as an actual Lie subalgebra and its generalized Jacobi Lie algebra for all dimensions. (hard)
Lemma 3.4: A uniquely specified valid full source statement on its printed domain. (source-ambiguity)
Proposition 3.10: Actual Jacobi and conformal Jacobi Lie algebras with inner-derivation restriction. (hard)
Corollary 3.11: Concrete Jacobi grading derivations, antisymplectic involutions, and their exact bidirectional coordinate classification. (hard)
Theorem 3.14 (Classification Theorem): Transported derivations in structural coordinates, real spectral isotypic data, and all continuation clauses (a)–(c). (hard)
Corollary 3.15: A uniquely specified valid full source statement on its printed domain. (source-ambiguity)
Lemma A.2: Algebraic subgroups of GL(V), tangent Lie algebras over arbitrary characteristic-zero fields, and their algebraic hull. (hard)
Lemma A.3: Algebraic hull of ad(g), actual derivation-subalgebra embedding, and algebraicity of the hull plus RD. (hard)
Example 2.4: symplectic grading elements: Concrete sp(2n,R) matrix action with its standard Cartan involution, diagonal maximal abelian space, and antisymplectic grading operators. (hard)
Example 2.17: sl(2,R) convex modules: Standard sl2 module copies with a common global symplectic sign and compatible H/U block representation. (hard)
Example 2.20: normalized Jacobi/Poisson model and cone: Concrete all-dimension Jacobi Lie algebra and its normalized degree-at-most-two polynomial Poisson isomorphism. (hard)
Remark 3.2: transport under a change of complement: Inner conjugation and canonical quotient-defined transport between two prescribed complements, intertwining Phi and transporting cones. (hard)
Remark 3.12: Jacobi eigenspace cones generate: Jacobi positive cone and the exact eigenspaces of its Levi-preserving nonzero derivation. (hard)
Example 3.19: two-copy grading with mixed central signs: A uniquely specified valid full source statement on its printed domain. (source-ambiguity)
Example 3.20: canonical exterior-square central extension: Actual exterior-square Lie module, fixed/effective splitting, canonical projection, and invariant central extension. (hard)
Example 3.20(a): claimed universal grading construction: A uniquely specified valid full source statement on its printed domain. (source-ambiguity)
Example 3.20(b): centralizer description: Canonical exterior-square beta and the symmetric-module-automorphism centralizer. (hard)
Example 3.20(b): intermediate convexity assertion: A uniquely specified valid full source statement on its printed domain. (source-ambiguity)
Remark 2.10, continued on PDF p.8: A valid source-scoped fixed/effective symplectic splitting from weak convex type. (source-ambiguity)
Selected references
Lie wedges of endomorphism semigroups of standard subspaces in admissible Lie algebras, arXiv:2007.13445v1, https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.13445v1
Weak Schur sampling with logarithmic quantum memoryResearch Paper
Motivation
The quantum Schur transform maps the computational basis of a system of n qudits onto a \textit{Schur basis}, which spans the minimal invariant subspaces of the representations of the unitary and the symmetric groups acting on the state space of nd-level systems. We introduce a new algorithm for the task of weak Schur sampling. Our algorithm efficiently determines both the Young label which indexes the irreducible representations and the multiplicity label of the symmetric group. There are two major advantages of our algorithm for weak Schur sampling when compared to existing approaches which proceed via quantum Schur transform algorithm or Generalized Phase Estimation algorithm. First, our algorihtm is suitable for streaming applications and second it is exponentially more efficient in its memory usage. We show that an instance of our weak Schur sampling algorithm on n qubits to accuracy ϵ requires only O(log2n) qubits of memory and O(n3log2(ϵn)) gates from the Clifford+T set. Further, we show that our weak Schur sampling algorithm on n qudits decomposes into O(dn2dlog2p(ϵn2d)) gates from an arbitrary fault-tolerant qudit universal set, for p≈4, and requires a memory of O(logdn) qudits to implement.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of Weak Schur sampling with logarithmic quantum memory (arXiv:2309.11947v1). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
4 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Streaming weak Schur sampling with logarithmic quantum memory at fixed local dimension (Abstract; III and III.A, PDF p. 1). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
3 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
Theorem 2; Algorithm 2; Eqs.(46)-(47): An explicit history-dependent padded Algorithm-2 unitary compiler, with fixed spin/GT coordinate encodings, rearranging permutations, Clifford+T list semantics, and accumulated nuclear-trace-norm local error. (hard)
III.B, Eqs.(48)-(51): A corrected quantitative general-d irrep-dimension and qudit gate/memory analysis replacing III.B Eqs.(48)-(51). (source-ambiguity)
IV, claimed classical simulation corollary: A specified classical input-access, output, accuracy and bit-cost model for simulating arbitrary correlated quantum streams. (source-ambiguity)
Competition and Opacity in the Financial System: Intense Competition Lowers Disclosure Precision Exactly When Investors' Private Information Is PreciseResearch Paper
Motivation
Banks and other financial institutions are notoriously hard to see into: their loan books are complex and their public reports are coarse. A long-standing policy question is whether competition among financial institutions makes them more or less transparent. One view holds that competition for funding disciplines institutions into disclosing more; another that competitive pressure rewards opacity. G. Zhang, Competition and Opacity in the Financial System (SSRN 3428683; Management Science 2020, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2019.3512), gives an answer inside a coordination model in the tradition of Morris and Shin (2002) and Angeletos and Pavan (2004): competition lowers disclosure precision exactly when investors' own private information is precise.
The model belongs to the literature on public information in beauty-contest economies, where public reports serve both as information about fundamentals and as a focal point for coordination. The paper adds a second force, competition between two institutions for the same investors, and asks how the institutions' chosen precision of public disclosure responds.
Setting
Two financial institutions (FIs) i∈{1,2} raise funds from a continuum of risk-neutral investors j∈[0,1]. FI i's project has fundamentalsθi∼N(θˉ,1/q), independent across i, with prior mean θˉ>0 and prior precision q>0. Its return is
Ri=2(θi+aKi),
where Ki is the aggregate investment in FI i and a∈[0,21] is the FI's rollover-risk exposure: the more others invest, the higher the return.
Before learning θi, FI i commits to a disclosure precisionmi≥0 and pays 2cmmi2. It then publishes zi=θi+εi with εi∼N(0,1/mi). Each investor j also observes private signals xij=θi+ηij of precision n>0, and invests
kij=Ej[Ri/2]−bEj[R−i/2]
in FI i, where b∈[0,1] is the intensity of competition (b=0: none; b=1: the intense case analysed in the paper's main result). Here Ej is investor j's posterior expectation; for Gaussian signals Ej[θi]=(mizi+nxij+qθˉ)/(mi+n+q). A linear equilibrium of the investors' game is a strategy kij=βixij+γizi−b(λix−ij+ωiz−i)+hi that satisfies this rule when every investor uses it.
FI i's payoff is Πi=E[2RiKi−21Ki2]−2cmmi2. A disclosure equilibrium is a pair (m1,m2) of precisions, each a best response to the other given the investors' linear equilibrium. Write mNC for the equilibrium precision without competition (b=0) and m∗ for the one with competition.
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 4
For cm sufficiently large:
if a=0, then for every b∈(0,1] the disclosure equilibrium is unique and m∗=mNC;
if a∈(0,21), then at b=1 there is a unique threshold n^>0 with
m∗≤mNC(strictly if mNC>0)⟺n>n^.
The goal fixes no constants: n^ is only asserted to exist.
Milestones
Investor equilibrium. Lemma 1 (the unique linear equilibrium at b=0, in closed form) and Proposition 3 (the unique linear equilibrium at b>0, whose responses to every signal exceed the no-competition ones by multipliers greater than 1).
Marginal payoffs. (33) and (44): the derivative of FI i's payoff in mi at b=0 and at b=1, in closed form.
Disclosure without and with competition. Proposition 2 (mNC>0 iff a>85−8116q/n+9), the monotonicity of mNC in n, and (46)–(47) (m∗>0 iff n<q/(1−2a)).
The comparison. (50)–(53): the difference of the two marginal payoffs is a positive multiple of a quartic L(n/(q+m)); and L has a unique positive root Δ, with L(x)<0 iff x>Δ.
Significance
Proposition 4 is the paper's main result. It separates two channels through which competition acts on disclosure: competition amplifies investors' reaction to every signal, which both reduces the coordination problem that disclosure is meant to solve and raises the value of a precise report for allocating funds between the institutions. Which effect dominates depends on the precision of private information, and the result pins this down to a single threshold. Without rollover risk the two channels vanish and competition is neutral. The paper's policy discussion of opacity in the financial sector (§3.3–§4) and its welfare analysis rest on this comparison.
The result is proved in the paper by hand computation; it has no machine-checked proof. Formalizing it requires the Gaussian payoff computation, a linear fixed-point argument for the investors' game, an optimization argument for the institutions' disclosure choice under a large-cost assumption, and a sign analysis of an explicit quartic.
Difficulty
The payoff Πi is an expectation of a quadratic in four independent Gaussians whose coefficients are themselves the solution of the investors' fixed point. Differentiating it in mi means differentiating through the equilibrium coefficients, and at b=1 the coefficients of FI i depend on both precisions; the closed form (44) holds only after cross terms cancel.
The comparison is global in n. Reading off the sign of the marginal payoff at mNC gives a condition on n/(q+mNC), not on n, and mNC itself moves with n. A threshold on n exists only because n/(q+mNC(n)) is monotone and the quartic changes sign once. The "sufficiently large cm" must be uniform in n: a bound that depends on n does not give a single threshold.
Formalization scope
Representation. FIs are Fin 2 (FI 1 of the paper is 0), the other FI is i.rev. The law of (θ1,θ2,ε1,ε2) is a product of Mathlib gaussianReal measures; precision q is variance q−1. At mi=0 the noise is a point mass, and the equilibrium puts no weight on zi.
Expectations. Investor j's expectation is the posterior-mean formula (27)–(28). The paper prints xij where x−ij is meant in the terms about FI −i of (25), (27), (28); the formalization uses x−ij.
Equilibria. Investors' equilibria are linear (uniqueness among all strategies, the paper's footnote 10, is not formalized). The payoff is evaluated at a linear equilibrium chosen by Classical.epsilon; Lemma 1 and Proposition 3 show it is determined in every coefficient the payoff uses. A disclosure equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in mi≥0.
Added hypotheses.a<21 wherever b=1 (at a=21, b=1 positive disclosure precisions have no linear investor equilibrium); in Proposition 3 also a>0, m1,m2>0 and b≤1. "cm sufficiently large" is ∃c0∀cm≥c0; in Proposition 4 part 1 the bound is chosen for each b,n, while in part 2 it is chosen before n.
Ruled out. The equilibrium coefficients, mNC and m∗ are never defined by their closed forms; the payoff is the expectation (9) under the model's law, not a function whose derivative is (44); and in Proposition 4 part 2 (and in the milestones Proposition 2, (46)–(47) and the monotonicity of mNC) c0 is chosen before n and before n^.
Infrastructure. Second moments of Gaussian products, differentiation of parametric expectations, Descartes' rule of signs (in Mathlib) and the intermediate value theorem. A reusable lemma computing E[(α⊤ξ+c)2] for independent Gaussians ξ would serve other information-design missions. Contributions of any milestone are welcome; the polynomial milestones (50)–(53) and the root of L are self-contained.
G.-M. Angeletos and A. Pavan, Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities, American Economic Review 94(2), 2004, 91–98. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828041301641
I. Goldstein, E. Ozdenoren and K. Yuan, Trading Frenzies and Their Impact on Real Investment, Journal of Financial Economics 109(2), 2013, 566–582. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.03.011
Intertemporal Choice with Continuity Constraints: On a Finite Horizon, Eight Axioms Characterize Preferences over Continuous Trajectories Admitting a Discounted Utility Integral RepresentationResearch Paper
Why continuous time matters
Intertemporal choice compares outcomes received at different times. A familiar model assigns each instantaneous outcome a utility and aggregates those utilities with a time weight. That model is useful in economics and operations research, but its meaning depends on what choices are feasible and how a preference over one stretch of time relates to a preference over another. When outcomes must vary continuously, an agent cannot freely paste two trajectories together at a chosen instant. Pivato's 2018 preprint asks which observable properties of preferences still force an integral representation under that constraint. The resulting theorem concerns a finite horizon; the paper also develops distinct infinite-horizon representations, which are outside this mission.
Earlier discounted-utility models often begin with an integral or a discounted sum and then study its implications. Here the integral is the conclusion. This changes the formalization problem: the preference structure, the permitted trajectories, and the relation between preferences on overlapping time regions must be defined independently of any utility or discount function. Theorem 1 on p. 13 is the paper's finite-horizon characterization. The Appendix A and B results selected as milestones connect its structural axioms to a content-based representation and then to an integral.
Trajectories, spans, and preferences
Time is the compact interval T=[0,T], with T>0. The outcome spaceX is connected, and a trajectoryα is a continuous map from T to X. A set A of feasible trajectories includes every constant trajectory κx, which gives outcome x at every time. Feasibility is substantive: a trajectory obtained by pasting arbitrary continuous pieces may fail to be continuous at the join.
A time interval⌊r,s⌉ is relatively open in T. It includes 0 when r=0 and T when s=T, but excludes any interior endpoints. A time spanS is a finite union of disjoint such intervals with distinct endpoints. The empty span is allowed. Relative interior and closure give the Boolean operations ¬S=int(Sc) and Q∨R=intcl(Q∪R). These operations can bridge omitted boundary instants.
For every time interval I, a primitive preference order ⪰I compares restrictions of members of A to I. Each such order is complete, transitive and nontrivial. The order ⪰ on the whole horizon is ⪰T; its comparison of constant trajectories induces the synchronic preference⪰sy on outcomes. Preferences ⪰S on general spans are induced through the paper's limited-separability construction: representatives agree with the compared trajectories on S, are indifferent on each component of ¬S, and are then compared on the full horizon. The representatives must belong to A.
The axioms constrain this primitive structure. Richness (R) permits preference-preserving insertion of a middle trajectory between fixed outer restrictions. Minimal equicontinuity (MinEqn) requires interiors of synchronic contour preimages to be time spans. The eight characterization axioms are interval separability (ISep), limited separability (LSep), static equivalence (StEq), continuity of synchronic preferences (C), dominance (Dom), continuity of intertemporal preferences (CIP), tradeoff consistency (TC), and ephemerality (Eph). Their definitions refer only to preferences and feasible trajectories.
Formalization target
A discounted utility integral representation consists of a continuous utility u:X→R and a continuous, strictly increasing map ρ:[0,T]→[0,1] with ρ(0)=0 and ρ(T)=1. For every time span S and feasible restricted trajectories α,β, it satisfies
α⪰Sβ⟺∫Su(α(t))dρ(t)≥∫Su(β(t))dρ(t).
The goal is Theorem 1 of the preprint: under the standing preference assumptions, (R), and (MinEqn), the eight axioms hold if and only if such a representation exists. The theorem also says that the normalized ρ is unique and that any two representing utility functions differ by u′=au+b for some a>0 and b∈R. The milestone list includes the structural equivalences of Lemmas A1, A3 and A4; the compatibility and separability results of Lemma A5 and Proposition A6; the richness result of Lemma A9; the comeasurability claim of Lemma B1; and the content-utility characterization in Theorem B2(b).
What the result supplies
The characterization identifies when local comparisons, continuity, and consistency of tradeoffs across regions of time determine one common utility scale and one normalized time weight. The uniqueness clauses prevent two different discount profiles from representing the same structure, while allowing the expected positive affine freedom in utility. Without the characterization, an integral can be used as an example of a preference rule, but the stated axioms would not certify that every admissible rule has that form.
The paper gives a mathematical proof, but this mission records open Lean statements rather than verified proofs. A completed development would make the time-span algebra, the induced intermittent order, and the content integrator reusable for related representation results. It would also expose precisely where the finite-horizon assumption is used before adapting the framework to the paper's later infinite-horizon theorems. The cited preprint relies in part on companion results about contents and their measure representations; formal proofs of those results are welcome groundwork.
Main obstacle
Continuous trajectories cannot generally be pasted at a time boundary while remaining feasible. This blocks the immediate finite-product argument often used for separable preferences. The paper's richness conditions replace that maneuver with preference-equivalent trajectories whose restrictions can be coordinated across component intervals. A second difficulty is that a finitely additive content on regular-open spans is not automatically a Borel measure: the representation needs a way to account for boundary behavior before the integral formula follows. The source treats this in its appendices and invokes companion work.
Formalization scope
Lean uses the subtype [0,T] with its relative topology, continuous maps for feasible trajectories, and sets of subtype times for spans. A member of A(S) is represented by a full member of A, so comparisons never range over arbitrary functions on S. The intermittent order is existentially induced from whole-horizon comparisons; a universally quantified extension rule could be vacuous when no extension exists. The axioms are stated directly on preferences, without mentioning u or ρ.
The integral is represented by integration against the Lebesgue–Stieltjes measure of a continuous StieltjesFunction. This is the paper's Riemann–Stieltjes expression on bounded continuous integrands, using its equation (B12). Integrals are restricted to the image of the span in R. The representing function is normalized at both horizon endpoints; uniqueness compares its values on [0,T]. Both the final integral representation and the intermediate content representation require agreement with primitive interval orders, in accordance with their identification with induced orders in Lemma A5. The intermediate utility also represents synchronic preference.
The strict clauses of (Dom), (TC), and (CIP) range over nonempty spans; at the empty span their literal unqualified forms become contradictory. Condition (R) is stated for a nonempty middle interval, q≤r<s≤t: with r=s as printed, continuity would force the two outer trajectories to agree at r, which no set containing two distinct constant trajectories in a Hausdorff outcome space can satisfy. These domain choices and the specialization of Appendix B's Theorem B2 to [0,T] are recorded in the moderation notes. Definitions of time spans, preference orders, contents, simple-function integration, and the measure connection are reusable contributions. Machine-checked proofs of the listed milestones and of the final equivalence are the intended contributions.
Selected references
Marcus Pivato, Intertemporal Choice with Continuity Constraints, SSRN preprint 3232014, August 10, 2018. Preprint. The later journal version appeared in Mathematics of Operations Research (2021), DOI; the mission's page and theorem citations use the 2018 preprint.
Alfred Horn and Alfred Tarski, Measures in Boolean Algebras, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society64 (1948). DOI. The paper cites its extension theorem at Lemma B4.
Bonus Season: A Theory of Periodic Labor Markets and Coordinated Bonuses: A Periodic Equilibrium Exists if and only if the Importance of Match Quality Lies Between Two ThresholdsResearch Paper
Motivation
Large bonuses in some industries are paid within a few weeks of each other across firms: banks in a given region announce bonuses in the same months, and top-tier US law firms announce theirs almost simultaneously. Van Wesep and Waters (SSRN 3124536, published in Management Science, 2022, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.4076) explain this coordination with a search model of the labor market. If many workers leave their employers at the same time of year, the labor market is deeper at that time, which makes it a better time to replace a worker who has become a poor match. Firms then have reason to make dissatisfied workers stay until that time, which a bonus at the end of the cycle achieves, and the bonuses in turn concentrate quits at that time. The question is when this self-reinforcing seasonality is an equilibrium.
The model builds on the search-theoretic labor market with an aggregate matching function (surveys: Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001; Rogerson, Shimer and Wright, 2005) and on wage bargaining with transferable utility.
Setting
Time is discrete; periods alternate between odd (index 1) and even (index 2). A continuum of firms of mass M>0 and of workers of mass N>0, N=M, are either matched in pairs or searching. A match produces revenue 1 per period. A new worker is satisfied, with per-period disutility xL; at the end of each period a satisfied worker becomes dissatisfied, with disutility xH, with probability p, and stays so; matches separate exogenously with probability δ; workers may quit at the end of any period. Here 0<xL<xH<1 and β,δ,p∈(0,1), β the discount factor. The importance of match quality is
α=1−xLxH−xL.
If M0 firms and N0 workers search, m(M0,N0) matches form, where m is homogeneous of degree one, increasing in each argument, differentiable, and m≤min{M0,N0} (Assumption A1). A vacant firm matches with probability f=m(M0,N0)/M0 and an unemployed worker with probability g=m(M0,N0)/N0; these depend only on the labor market depthn0=N0/M0.
In the periodic turnover plan, a dissatisfied worker quits at the end of even periods and stays at the end of odd periods. Under it the masses searching at the start of each period solve a fixed system of flow equations, which yield matching likelihoods f1,f2,g1,g2. A newly matched pair bargains over pay with worker weight θ∈(0,1) (generalized Nash bargaining); the resulting values Js (firm with a new hire), Vs (vacant firm), Ws (new hire, gross of pay), Us (unemployed worker) and the bargained present value of pay Ps solve a linear system together with the Nash conditions. With hs=θgs+(1−θ)fs and β^=β(1−δ) the paper defines two thresholds
A periodic equilibrium consists of a labor-market state solving the flow equations, with depth differing between odd and even periods; Nash-bargained values; Pareto optimality of the periodic plan for every newly matched pair (no other turnover plan yields a larger joint value); and a periodic contract{b1s,b2s,w1,w2} (a signing bonus depending on the hiring period, a wage w1 in odd and w2 in even periods) that makes the periodic plan incentive compatible and delivers the bargained present values P1, P2.
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 2
With α,α computed from the solution of the flow equations,
Lemma 1: f increases and g decreases in labor market depth.
Lemma 2: the flow equations have a unique solution; f2<f1<g1<g2 if N<M and g2<g1<f1<f2 if M<N.
Equations (24)–(25): the Nash transfer is P1=βU2−W1+θS1, P2=βU1−W2+θS2, with Ss the match surplus.
Lemma 3: closed forms for S1,S2,P1,P2.
Equations (78)–(79), (84)–(85): Us and Us+Vs in terms of the surpluses.
Lemma 4: incentive compatibility of a periodic contract reduces to three linear inequalities in w1,w2; the bonuses are determined by P1,P2.
Lemma 5: an incentive-compatible periodic contract with present values P1,P2 exists.
Conditions (i) and (ii) of the proof of Proposition 1: retaining a dissatisfied worker after an odd period is optimal iff α≤α; releasing her after an even period is optimal iff α≥α.
Proposition 1: for α∈(α,α) the periodic plan strictly beats every other plan; for α∈/[α,α] it is not Pareto optimal.
Significance
Proposition 2 is the existence result on which the paper's account of coordinated bonuses rests: the subsequent results on equilibrium contracts (that rising wage profiles, i.e. end-of-cycle bonuses, always implement the equilibrium and are sometimes necessary) and on the stylized facts of compensation in finance and law presuppose a periodic equilibrium. It shows that seasonality of labor markets can be self-sustaining, with no exogenous seasonal shock, exactly when match quality matters neither too little (then dissatisfied workers are never released) nor too much (then they are released at once).
The result is proved in the paper by hand algebra over a dozen coupled equations. No part of it is machine-checked, and the platform has no search-and-matching labor market, no aggregate matching function and no turnover contract. The mission produces a checked version of the existence characterization, of the closed forms behind it, and a reusable formal model of a two-period search market with Nash-bargained, incentive-compatible contracts.
Difficulty
Lemma 2's existence and ordering do not follow from monotonicity of m alone: the flow equations couple both periods, and the natural scalar reduction evaluates m outside its domain when N>M, so the interval on which an intermediate-value argument runs must be chosen with care. The closed forms of Lemma 3 come from eliminating ten unknowns from a linear system whose coefficients are themselves the matching likelihoods; the paper's own equation (21) contains a typo that makes (29) false if taken literally. The thresholds of Proposition 1 require turning two inequalities on joint values into inequalities in α, where the sign of each denominator has to be controlled. Finally, the equilibrium compares the periodic plan with every alternative plan through their joint-value recursions, not through the closed forms.
Formalization scope
All quantities are real. Periods are indexed 1 (odd) and 2 (even); firm masses are derived, Ms0=Ns0+M−N. Assumption A1 is stated on the closed quadrant, with "increasing" read strictly, which Lemma 2's strict inequalities require. Equation (21) is used with δ restored, W2=−xL+β((1−δ)(1−p)W1+[1−(1−δ)(1−p)]U1). Nash transfers are defined as maximizers of the Nash product, not by (24)–(25). Definition D3 is imposed as N10=N20. Pareto optimality compares the four turnover plans that are stationary across periods of the same parity, with satisfied workers never quitting, through their joint-value recursions. Present values of contracts are infinite sums. The goal leaves the endpoints α=α,α open: the paper's statement excludes them while its proof includes them. Proposition 1's printed interval [α,α] is read as [α,α], as in its proof.
The periodic equilibrium is not defined through α, α, conditions (i)–(ii) or the closed forms, which would make the goal a tautology; it is built from the market equations, the bargaining problem, the plan comparison and the contract.
Corollary 1, Proposition 3, Lemmas 6–7 and §5–6 are not part of this mission. Contributions to the infrastructure (Nash split, geometric tsum evaluation of periodic present values, contraction arguments for the value recursions) are welcome and reusable for other search and bargaining models.
B. Petrongolo and C. A. Pissarides, Looking into the black box: A survey of the matching function, Journal of Economic Literature 39, 390–431, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.39.2.390
R. Rogerson, R. Shimer and R. Wright, Search-theoretic models of the labor market: A survey, Journal of Economic Literature 43, 959–988, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1257/002205105775362014
Beta and Coskewness Pricing: Perspective from Probability Weighting: The Rank-Dependent Equilibrium Pricing Kernel and the Three-Moment CAPMResearch Paper
Motivation
Asset-pricing models relate an asset's expected return to the risks it shares with the market. A familiar covariance term measures exposure to the market return, while a coskewness term measures exposure to the square of that return. Shi, Cui and Zhou ask how these two coefficients change when investors weight probabilities as well as valuing outcomes. Their 2020 working paper derives a market pricing kernel and a three-moment capital asset pricing relation from a representative investor's rank-dependent utility. The paper subsequently studies the signs of the coefficients and tests the resulting relationships with financial data; this mission concerns its theoretical pricing result, Theorem 2.
Setting
At date 0, investors choose positions in finitely many assets. At date 1, asset i pays a random total returnRi per unit invested. One asset is risk-free, so its total return is the constant 1+rf. A pricing kernelm~ is a strictly positive random variable that prices every total return by E[m~Ri]=1. The market return is R~M=∑ixiMRi, where the market-capitalization weights sum to one. A return rate subtracts the invested unit: r~i=Ri−1 and r~M=R~M−1. These are the conventions of §§2–3 of the source.
The representative investor has rank-dependent utility. For a nonnegative payoff X with cumulative distribution function FX, an outcome-utility function u, and a probability-weighting function w, its value is the distributional integral
U(X)=∫Ru(x)w′(1−FX(x))dFX(x).
The model assumes an atomless probability space; u is strictly increasing and strictly concave on positive wealth, continuously differentiable there, and satisfies the Inada and asymptotic-elasticity conditions of Assumption 1; w is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable on [0,1], with w(0)=0 and w(1)=1. Problem (P′) asks for the largest U(X) among measurable nonnegative payoffs with E[m~X]=1. Equilibrium means that R~M attains this value. The working paper states these assumptions and this optimization problem on pp. 8–9 and identifies equilibrium with the optimal market return in Appendix A, p. 33 (source).
Write FM for the CDF of R~M and set K=E[w′(1−FM(R~M))u′(R~M)]. The paper defines the pricing function
m(x)=(1+rf)Kw′(1−FM(x))u′(x),x>0.
The probability weight depends on the market distribution, while marginal utility depends on the realized total return. Their joint variation determines the pricing coefficients in Theorem 2 (source, pp. 10–11).
Formalization targets
Equilibrium kernel
For an equilibrium whose market return has a continuous CDF, the goal begins with the almost-sure identity
m~=m(R~M).
Appendix A states an intermediate first-order form with a positive multiplier λ∗, then equation (12) determines λ∗=(1+rf)K from the risk-free asset. Both are milestones (source, pp. 33–34).
Three-moment pricing relation
When FM has a continuously differentiable density f, Theorem 2 gives a beta premiumA and a coskewness premiumB by the closed forms in its equations (6)–(7), with A=−(1+rf)m′(1) and B=−(1+rf)m′′(1). It states
The formal target makes the last term exact. Define ρ(x)=m(1+x)−m(1)−m′(1)x−21m′′(1)x2, with ρ(x)=o(x2) as x→0. The pricing identity then has remainder −(1+rf)Cov(ρ(r~M),r~i). The source's quadratic expansion (13), its premium identities (6)–(7), and its covariance pricing identity are the remaining milestones (source, pp. 11 and 34–35).
Significance
The kernel identity connects the market's state prices to both marginal utility and probability weighting. The three-moment relation then specifies how an asset's covariance and coskewness with the market enter its expected return. Without the kernel identity the coefficients would be free parameters; without the density and derivatives their explicit forms would be unavailable. The paper uses these coefficients to analyze beta and coskewness pricing under particular weighting functions and later compares the relationships with data (source, §§3–5).
The paper result is published in Operations Research; this mission follows the held SSRN version of June 2, 2020, whose theorem numbering and pages are pinned below. The Lean theorem statements in this proposal compile as open targets; they do not yet have machine-checked proofs. A completed development would add a reusable RDU model, a pricing-kernel characterization under equilibrium, and a precise covariance relation with a controlled remainder. The later parameter-specific propositions and empirical sections are outside this mission.
Difficulty
The central difficulty is the first part of the theorem. The optimality condition concerns an objective that depends on the entire payoff distribution through FX, so ordinary pointwise differentiation of u(X) does not identify the kernel. The paper obtains this step from an earlier result of Xia and Zhou, then uses the risk-free asset to fix the multiplier (source, Appendix A). The second part needs third derivatives of u and w although Assumption 1 only says they are continuously differentiable. It also uses a random-variable little-o without specifying how that term enters an expected return. These are mathematical conditions the formal statement must make explicit.
Formalization scope
Lean represents the probability space by a probability measure and atomless by the event-splitting property: every positive-measure event has a measurable subset of strictly intermediate measure. Assets are indexed by Fin n; the risk-free asset is specified by its constant total return, and R~M is computed from the weights and asset returns. The RDU objective is the paper's integral against the payoff law, including the CDF factor, and equilibrium is optimality for problem (P′). It is not defined through the desired kernel equation.
The Bochner RDU integral is required to be integrable for the market payoff and for compared competitors. Those competitors also have continuous CDFs and positive payoffs almost surely, so endpoint values of the two-sided derivatives and the utility at zero do not affect the comparison. This is a disclosed strengthening of the conclusion's scope: the equilibrium requirement compares fewer payoffs than the paper writes. The CAPM clause assumes local C3 regularity of u at 1 and w at 1−FM(1), 0<FM(1)<1, a nonnegative C1 density represented as the law of R~M, and finite second and fourth moments needed for genuine covariances. Its premiums are the closed forms of (6)–(7), and its remainder is computed from m, once for every asset. The kernel identity is a conclusion; an assumed kernel or an independently chosen remainder would erase the target.
The development uses Mathlib's CDF, pushforward and density measures, Bochner integrals, covariance, MemLp, derivatives, and little-o. The event-splitting predicate, priced-market interface, RDU functional, feasibility and equilibrium notions, closed-form premiums, and Taylor remainder are local definitions. Contributions to the first-order characterization, the derivative identities, the precise expansion, and the covariance step all advance the goal.
Selected references
Yun Shi, Xiangyu Cui and Xun Yu Zhou, Beta and coskewness pricing: perspective from probability weighting, SSRN 3579960, version of June 2, 2020; published in Operations Research 71(2), 2023. Working paper; journal DOI.
Stochastic Liquidity as a Proxy for Nonlinear Price Impact: Stable Convergence of the Nonlinear Propagator Model to a Linear Impact Model with Stochastic LiquidityResearch Paper
Motivation
A trade moves the price at which subsequent trades are executed. Price impact models describe this shift as a function of the signed order flow and are the basic input of optimal execution and statistical-arbitrage problems. Empirically, the immediate impact of a trade is a concave function of its size, close to a square root for large orders (Bouchaud et al. 2009; Bucci et al. 2019), while most tractable models for optimal trading assume linear impact, as in the model of Obizhaeva and Wang (2013). Muhle-Karbe, Wang and Webster (SSRN 4286108; Operations Research, 2022) connect the two: when trades are small, frequent and diffusive, a nonlinear propagator model with concave impact converges to a linear impact model whose illiquidity parameter is stochastic and moves with the volatility of order flow. This mission formalizes that scaling limit, Theorem 3.3 of the paper, together with the steps of its proof in Appendix A.1.
Setting
Fix a horizon T>0 and a filtered probability space (Ω,F,(Ft),P) carrying two independent (Ft)-Brownian motions W and W⊥. The signed order flow is an Itô process with stochastic volatility,
dFt=μtdt+vtdWt,dvt=atdt+ηtdWt+btdWt⊥,
where μ,a,η,b are locally bounded càdlàg processes, vt>0, and E[∫0TFt2dt]<∞.
Divide [0,T] into N steps of width ΔtN=T/N, with grid points tnN=nΔtN and increments ΔFnN=FtnN−Ftn−1N. An impact functiong:R→R is odd, continuously differentiable and concave on [0,∞). The nonlinear propagator model (Definition 2.1) with the diffusive scaling (3.1) is the recursion
I0N=0,ΔInN=−βIn−1NΔtN+ΔtNg(ΔtN1ΔFnN),
for a decay rate β>0: each trade shifts the price by a concave function of its size, and the shift decays exponentially.
The limit involves Gaussian averages of g. With ϕv the density of the centred normal law with standard deviation v,
A limit of this kind lives on an extension of the probability space, a larger filtered space (Ω′,(Gt),P′) with a projection π:Ω′→Ω preserving the law; it is very good if every (Ft)-martingale remains a (Gt)-martingale. Stable convergence in law of processes XN on Ω to X on such an extension means E[Yf(XN)]→E′[(Y∘π)f(X)] for every bounded measurable Y on Ω and every bounded path functional f that is Lipschitz for the uniform distance on [0,T].
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 3.3 (p. 7)
As N→∞, the step paths t↦I⌈t/ΔtN⌉N converge stably in law to a solution of the linear impact model
dIt=−βItdt+λtdFt+ηtχtdt+θtdWt′,I0=0,
where W′ is a Brownian motion on a very good extension with
Theorem A.3 (p. 25): for an Itô process dXt=btdt+σtdWt with Itô volatility (Assumption A.1) and F(t,x) odd, C1 in x, of linear growth and Hölder in time (Assumption A.2),
stably in law, with Z standard normal and [W,W′]t=∫0tE~[ZF(s,σsZ)]/E~[F2(s,σsZ)]ds.
3. Rescaled convergence (p. 28): ΔtN∑m=1neβtmNg(ΔFmN/ΔtN)→eβtIt stably in law.
Significance
The theorem shows that the nonlinearity of microstructure impact does not disappear in the continuous-time limit; it is absorbed into a stochastic illiquidity λt that is an explicit Gaussian average of g′ at the current order-flow volatility, plus an additional noise term θtdWt′ and a drift correction ηtχt. Section 4 of the paper uses the limit to solve optimal trading problems explicitly for nonparametric signals and to derive conditions that rule out price manipulation, and Section 5 fits the resulting model to public trading data. Without the limit theorem, those linear-model results would have no stated connection to the concave impact observed in the data.
The paper proves Theorem 3.3 by reduction to a functional central limit theorem of Jacod and Protter (2012, Theorem 10.3.2(a)), outlined in Appendix A.1 rather than written out. To our knowledge none of these results has a machine-checked proof. The mission produces a precise statement of the scaling limit, including the mode of convergence and the space on which the limit lives, and a formal statement of the stable functional CLT (Theorem A.3), which is a standard tool in high-frequency statistics and reusable well beyond this paper.
Difficulty
The impact process is not a functional of increments of a fixed process: IN solves a difference equation whose coefficients depend on the grid, so a central limit theorem for sums ∑F(ΔXnN) does not apply to it directly. Even for such sums the stable CLT is needed in full: the rescaled increments ΔFnN/ΔtN are of order one, so g cannot be linearized pointwise, and the limit carries both a Gaussian average of g′ and an independent noise term. The CLT itself is the hard part. Its limit lives on an extension of the original space, the drift term arises from the correlation between the volatility increments and the increments of X, and stability (joint convergence with every bounded F-measurable variable) is what allows the limit to be combined with the stochastic factor e−βt and with λtdFt. A naive Taylor expansion of g around zero gives the wrong limit for every nonlinear g.
Formalization scope
Time is R≥0 and statements read [0,T]. Brownian motions are IsBrownianReal with continuous paths for every ω, adapted, with increments independent of the past; Itô integrals use the published relation EthierKurtz_HasBrownianItoIntegral with continuous versions, and quadratic covariation the published EthierKurtz_HasCrossVariation. Itô coefficients are progressively measurable with locally integrable drift paths. ϕv is Mathlib's gaussianPDFReal 0 (v^2), whose parameter is the variance. Stable convergence is encoded with bounded measurable Y times bounded functionals Lipschitz for the [0,∞]-valued uniform distance on [0,T]; since the limits have continuous paths this matches Skorohod-topology stable convergence, and no Skorohod space is built. The goal is existential in the extension, in W′ and in the solution I; a universal reading would be false.
Added and disclosed conventions: the growth bound ∣g(x)∣+∣g′(x)∣≤C(1+∣x∣) (Assumption A.2(c), p. 25, required by the paper's proof); I0N=0 and I0=0; ⌈t/ΔtN⌉ capped at N for the paper's ⌈Nt⌉; βΔtN=1 for the negative powers on p. 27. The printed formulas for θt and d[W,W′]t are kept.
The statements cannot be satisfied trivially: I is a solution of the integral equation (3.2), not a definition as the limit of IN; the coefficients are the Gaussian integrals themselves; and the test class of stable convergence contains non-constant functionals, so convergence of the zero process to a non-zero limit fails (checked in a sorry-free sanity file).
A complete development needs a stable functional CLT for triangular arrays, Gaussian integration by parts, existence of very good extensions carrying independent Brownian motions, and pathwise stochastic calculus for Itô processes with stochastic volatility. The extension and stable-convergence definitions and Theorem A.3 are reusable for realized-variance and high-frequency estimators. Contributions on any milestone, and on the general infrastructure, are welcome.
Selected references
J. Muhle-Karbe, Z. Wang, K. Webster, Stochastic liquidity as a proxy for nonlinear price impact, Operations Research, 2022; cited from SSRN 4286108, version of November 2, 2023. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4286108 (DOI 10.1287/opre.2022.0627)
J.-P. Bouchaud, J. D. Farmer, F. Lillo, How markets slowly digest changes in supply and demand, Handbook of Financial Markets, 2009. https://arxiv.org/abs/0809.0822
F. Bucci, M. Benzaquen, F. Lillo, J.-P. Bouchaud, Crossover from linear to square-root market impact, Physical Review Letters 122(10):108302, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.122.108302
Sufficient Optimality Conditions in Bilevel Programming: A Second-Order Sufficient Condition via the Value Function Reformulation and Second-Order Directional DerivativesResearch Paper
Why bilevel optimality needs a second-order condition
In a bilevel program, the decision maker chooses an upper-level variable while a second decision must solve a lower-level optimization problem. This structure occurs when a leader anticipates the response of a follower, or when an outer design problem contains an optimization problem as a constraint. A feasible upper-level decision can therefore change the lower-level solution set as its parameters move. Ordinary smooth constrained optimization tests do not directly describe that dependence. Mehlitz and Zemkoho study sufficient optimality conditions for this setting; their Theorem 5.3 gives a second-order condition ensuring a strict local minimum with quantitative growth. Mehlitz and Zemkoho, 2019
The bilevel model and the value function
Write x∈Rn for the upper-level decision and y∈Rm for the lower-level decision. The upper-level objective is F(x,y), with componentwise constraints Gi(x,y)≤0. At each fixed x, the lower-level feasible set is K(x)={y:gj(x,y)≤0 for every j}, and its solution set is S(x)=argminy∈K(x)f(x,y). The bilevel feasible set is M={(x,y):Gi(x,y)≤0 for all i,y∈S(x)}. The program minimizes F over M. All components of F,f,G,g are twice continuously differentiable, as assumed on page 2 of the source. Mehlitz and Zemkoho, pp. 1–2
The lower-level value function is φ(x)=infy∈K(x)f(x,y). It may be nonsmooth even though the data are smooth. The condition y∈S(x) can be expressed using g(x,y)≤0 and f(x,y)≤φ(x), giving the value-function reformulation. For the main theorem, φ is locally Lipschitz near the reference point and has a second-order directional derivativeφ′′(xˉ;d,w). This derivative measures the second-order change along the curved path xˉ+td+21t2w, after subtracting the first-order directional term. Mehlitz and Zemkoho, pp. 5, 8–9
At a feasible point (xˉ,yˉ), the paper defines a linearization coneLMφ by the active G and g inequalities and the linearized value-function inequality. Its critical coneCMφ adds the directions in which the first-order change of F is nonpositive. The Abadie constraint qualification, abbreviated ACQ, equates the tangent cone of {(x,y):g(x,y)≤0} with its linearization cone at (xˉ,yˉ). It is imposed on this lower-level constraint set in the joint (x,y) space. Mehlitz and Zemkoho, pp. 18–19
Formalization targets
Second-order growth for the bilevel program
The goal is Theorem 5.3. At a feasible (xˉ,yˉ), assume ACQ for the lower-level constraint set, local Lipschitz continuity and second-order directional differentiability of φ, and second-order epi-regularity of −φ. The first-order test requires ∇F(xˉ,yˉ)⊤d≥0 on LMφ. For each nonzero d∈CMφ, the minimax program (5.5), formed from the second-order expansions of F, active Gi, f−φ, and active gj, must have positive optimal value. The conclusion is
and (xˉ,yˉ) is a strict local minimizer of the bilevel program. The milestones capture the paper's supporting results: the C2 derivative formula, rules for a finite maximum, the Hadamard derivative and tangent-cone necessary condition, Remark 5.1 under ACQ, and Proposition 2.10 on second-order growth. Mehlitz and Zemkoho, Theorem 5.3, pp. 19–20
What the result provides
The theorem turns tests on first- and second-order directional behavior into a guarantee about actual feasible bilevel decisions near the reference point. The growth estimate is stronger than strict local minimality: it quantifies how the upper-level objective rises with displacement along the feasible set. It applies when the lower-level value function is nonsmooth, provided its directional derivatives and epi-regularity are available. The paper gives special cases in which these hypotheses can be checked more concretely. Mehlitz and Zemkoho, §5, pp. 18–28
The result is proved in the source paper. The open work here is a machine-checked development of its variational definitions, finite-maximum rules, and sufficient-condition argument. The mission includes open Lean statements, not completed proofs. The reusable part is the generic theory of directional derivatives, epi-regularity, and growth on finite-dimensional normed spaces; the bilevel model and cones specialize it to this paper.
Where the formal proof is difficult
Smooth Taylor expansion alone does not handle φ: an infimum over a parameter-dependent feasible set can be nonsmooth. First-order stationarity on the paper's linearization cone also gives no quadratic increase in directions where the first-order change vanishes. The second-order test must retain the active indices of each constraint and the dependence of φ′′ on both the first- and second-order directions. ACQ matters because the tangent-cone necessary condition for f−φ does not automatically apply to every linearized lower-level direction; Example 5.2 of the paper demonstrates the failure without a constraint qualification. Mehlitz and Zemkoho, pp. 19–20
Formalization scope
Lean uses EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) and EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin m), with zero-based Fin indices and uncurried maps on their product. Fréchet derivatives express the paper's gradient and Hessian terms. Generic preliminary results are stated on finite-dimensional real normed spaces, a generalization of the Euclidean statements. The tangent cone uses positive sequences converging to zero. Directional derivatives are named finite limits; epi-regularity uses the eventual inequality for every admissible curved path and every positive error coefficient. The value function takes values in EReal, so an empty feasible set and an unbounded-below lower-level problem are represented by +∞ and −∞. A real representative agrees with it on a neighbourhood of xˉ, where the local Lipschitz and derivative hypotheses apply. This agreement rules out an unrelated or default-valued value function.
The theorem's growth estimate uses the sum of squared Euclidean norms printed in (5.6), not the product space's sup norm. The positive value of (5.5) is expressed by a uniform positive lower bound over every w on its maximum of constraint expressions. The generic maximum rules use a nonempty finite index type. The preliminary formulation of Proposition 2.10 includes local Lipschitz continuity, used in this mission's application and disclosed as an added hypothesis relative to its printed statement. Real-valued functions and finite second-order limits are also explicit scope conventions.
Selected references
Patrick Mehlitz and Alain B. Zemkoho, Sufficient Optimality Conditions in Bilevel Programming, arXiv:1911.01647v1, 2019; published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2021. Preprint.
Extension of Additive Valuations to General Valuations on the Existence of EFX: A Complete EFX Allocation Exists When Every Agent Has One of Two General ValuationsResearch Paper
Motivation
Dividing indivisible goods fairly among agents with different preferences is a central problem of fair division, with uses ranging from inheritance and divorce settlements to course allocation and fair-division services such as Spliddit (Goldman–Procaccia 2014). Envy-freeness cannot always be achieved with indivisible goods (one good, two agents), so relaxations are studied. Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX), introduced by Caragiannis et al. (2019), is widely regarded as the strongest relaxation of this kind whose existence is still unsettled: whether every instance admits a complete EFX allocation is open in general, even for additive valuations.
Timeline.
Plaut and Roughgarden (2020): complete EFX allocations exist when all agents share one identical general valuation, and for two agents with general valuations.
Mahara (2021/2024): existence when every agent has one of two general valuations, the result of this mission.
Setting
There are n≥1 agents 0,…,n−1 and a set M of m indivisible items. Each agent i has a valuationvi assigning a real number to every bundle S⊆M. It is normalized, vi(∅)=0, and monotone, S⊆T⇒vi(S)≤vi(T). Nothing else is assumed (general valuations: no additivity, submodularity or cancelability). Write S<iT for vi(S)<vi(T).
An allocationX=(X0,…,Xn−1) is a family of pairwise disjoint bundles. It is complete if every item is allocated, and partial otherwise. Agent ienviesj if Xi<iXj. Agent iEFX enviesj if Xi<iXj∖{h} for some h∈Xj. The allocation is EFX if no agent EFX envies another, i.e.
vi(Xj∖{g})≤vi(Xi)for all agents i,j and all g∈Xj.
The two-valuation setting: there are set functions va,vb such that every vi equals one of them. Na and Nb denote the agents with valuation va and vb.
The proof works with a vocabulary that the definition file formalizes. The terms are non-degeneracy (distinct bundles have distinct values), minimum preferred sets and κX(i,S), most envious agents, g-champions, the champion graphMX and its Pareto improvable (PI) cycles, semi-EFX allocations, and the partition leximin potentialψ(X). The potential lists va(Xa) over a∈Na in increasing order, followed by vb(Xb) over b∈Nb in increasing order. Y≻p.lexminX means that ψ(Y) is lexicographically larger than ψ(X).
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 3)
∀n≥1,∀v normalized, monotone with vi∈{va,vb}:∃X complete allocation that is EFX.
Milestones, in the order the proof uses them
Lemma 18 (p. 25): for ε>0 small, vi′(S)=vi(S)+ε∑gj∈S2j preserves strict preferences, is non-degenerate, and every EFX allocation for v′ is EFX for v.
Lemma 5 (p. 8): a g-champion of j that does not envy j, with neither agent a self g-champion, g-decomposes j.
Lemma 8 (p. 9, Berger et al.): a PI cycle in MX yields a Pareto-dominating allocation that preserves the absence of EFX envy.
Lemma 15 (p. 12): a semi-EFX allocation can be turned into an EFX allocation without changing the bundles of Na or of the vb-poorest agent b0.
Theorem 14 (p. 12): for every partial EFX allocation X there is an EFX allocation Y with Y≻p.lexminX.
Termination (p. 12): Theorem 14 implies the existence of a complete EFX allocation.
Milestones 2–6 are stated for non-degenerate instances, as in the paper. The goal is not.
Significance
The result. Theorem 1 is the most general multi-agent EFX existence theorem in which the number of agents is unbounded and the valuations carry no structure beyond monotonicity. It contains the identical-valuation theorem of Plaut and Roughgarden and the two-additive-valuation theorem as special cases. The potential ψ is the paper's tool for making progress when no Pareto-dominating EFX allocation exists. Pareto domination is the progress measure used for additive and cancelable valuations, and it fails for general ones.
Formalization. The theorem is proved on paper and, to our knowledge, has no machine-checked proof. The remaining work is to formalize the known proof: the perturbation reduction, the champion-graph machinery (minimum preferred sets, most envious agents, PI cycles), the semi-EFX repair, and the case analysis of Theorem 14. The champion-graph layer is shared with the proofs of EFX with charity and of EFX for four agents.
Difficulty
The obvious argument is Pareto improvement: from a partial EFX allocation, hand out an unallocated item and keep everyone at least as well off. For general valuations no Pareto-dominating EFX allocation need exist. The progress step must therefore sometimes make an agent strictly worse off, and that agent may then come to EFX envy others. Theorem 14 allows an agent of Nb to lose value while improving the va-block of ψ. The paper repairs the resulting EFX envy, which is confined to Nb (semi-EFX), by trimming bundles. Keeping track of which agents may envy which bundles through several reallocations is the central difficulty. The champion-graph statements are also delicate: minimum preferred sets are not unique, and the cardinality parameter κX takes the value +∞.
Formalization scope
Agents are Fin n and items Fin m, both 0-indexed. Valuations are maps Fin n → Finset (Fin m) → ℝ, assumed normalized and monotone (IsNormalized, IsMonotoneVal). Allocations are maps Fin n → Finset (Fin m) with pairwise disjoint values (IsPartialAllocation). Completeness is pool X = ∅. EFX is IsEFX, from the published definition file LittleCharity.EFX.Setting. The two valuation classes are a finset A of agents with v i = va on A and v i = vb off A; in the goal they are ∀ i, v i = va ∨ v i = vb. κ takes values in ℕ∞. PI cycles are indexed by Fin k: distinct vertices, edge labels Option (Fin m), unallocated champion labels, labels pairwise disjoint. ψ is a pair of sorted lists, and ≻p.lexmin is the strict List.Lex (· < ·).
Disclosed readings:
Decomposition quantifies over every minimum preferred set.
The PI-cycle label condition is read for distinct edges.
Lemma 15 keeps only the part of the chain Xb0<b⋯ that names b0.
Theorem 14 assumes both classes nonempty, as its proof does.
Lemma 8's printed clause "for any i,j, if i does not EFX envy j in X, then neither in Y" is false for non-EFX X. It is formalized along the cycle: the bundle of at in Y is judged against at+1's bundle in X. This is the form the proof of Theorem 14 uses.
The goal assumes neither additivity nor non-degeneracy. Its only added hypothesis is 0<n, which is necessary. Every item must be allocated: the empty allocation is always EFX, so a goal without completeness would be trivial. Contributions are welcome at every level: proofs of the milestones, the champion-graph library, and the termination argument for strict lexicographic orders on finite sets.
Selected references
R. Mahara, Extension of Additive Valuations to General Valuations on the Existence of EFX, arXiv:2107.09901v2, 2021; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.09901
B. Berger, A. Cohen, M. Feldman, A. Fiat, (Almost Full) EFX Exists for Four Agents (and Beyond), AAAI 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.10654
B. Plaut, T. Roughgarden, Almost Envy-Freeness with General Valuations, SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics 34(2), 2020. https://doi.org/10.1137/19M124397X
I. Caragiannis, D. Kurokawa, H. Moulin, A. D. Procaccia, N. Shah, J. Wang, The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare, ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 7(3), 2019. https://doi.org/10.1145/3355902
The Square Root Agreement Rule for Incentivizing Truthful Feedback on Online Platforms: Strict Truthful Equilibrium Approximately Payoff-Dominating All Symmetric Equilibria for Many TasksResearch Paper
Motivation
Online platforms (labor marketplaces, review sites, crowdsourcing services) rely on feedback from their users: did the plumber arrive on time, is this image labelled correctly. The answers cannot be checked against ground truth, so a platform that rewards feedback must reward it by comparing it with other users' answers. This is the problem of peer prediction, or information elicitation without verification. The classical mechanisms of Miller, Resnick and Zeckhauser (2005) and Prelec (2004) make truthful reporting an equilibrium, but they either need the designer to know the joint distribution of the users' observations or ask users for extra reports (predictions of others' answers). Both requirements are unrealistic on a large platform.
Kamble, Shah, Marn, Parekh and Ramchandran propose the square root agreement rule (SRA). It uses only the users' answers, needs no knowledge of the distribution, and works when users perform many statistically similar tasks. A second difficulty of peer prediction is that uninformative coordinated behavior (everyone answers "yes") is often also an equilibrium, sometimes a better-paying one. The paper's main result says that, with many tasks, SRA makes truthful reporting a strict equilibrium whose payoff is within any prescribed ω of the best symmetric equilibrium.
Timeline. Output agreement and the peer-prediction method (Miller, Resnick, Zeckhauser 2005) require a known prior. The Bayesian truth serum (Prelec 2004) and its robust variants ask for prediction reports. Multi-task mechanisms (Dasgupta and Ghosh 2013; Shnayder, Agarwal, Frongillo and Parkes 2016) estimate the statistics from other tasks and obtain informed truthfulness under correlation assumptions. SRA (arXiv 2015, Management Science 2023) obtains strict truthfulness for every separated model and approximate payoff dominance over symmetric equilibria.
Setting
There are N evaluation tasks and M agents. Agent j performs the tasks Nj; task i is performed by the agents Mi, with ∣Mi∣≥2. Each task concerns an entity whose typeXi lies in a finite set X; types are i.i.d. with law PX. An agent j∈Mi observes an answer Yji in a finite set Y, drawn independently from p(Xi)=(py(Xi);y∈Y). The pair (PX,p) is the generating model.
A reporting strategyq gives, for each observation y, a distribution (qy′(y);y′∈Y) over reported answers. The truthful strategy reports what it observes; a fully informative strategy reports σ(y) for a fixed permutation σ of Y. A profile is symmetric if all agents use the same strategy.
SRA (Mechanism 1). For every task i∈/Nj pick two distinct agents j1(i),j2(i)∈Mi, and let
with K>0. On each of her tasks i∈Nj, agent j is paid ej(y) if she and her peer j′∈Mi∖{j} both report y, and 0 otherwise. Rare agreements pay more.
A profile is a Bayes–Nash equilibrium if no agent can raise her expected payment by changing her own strategies, and a strict one if every change on her tasks lowers it. With g(y)=∑xPX(x)py(x)2, the Cauchy–Schwarz gap is
and the model is α-separated if δ(PX,p)≥α. The square root agreement measure is Γ(Y1,Y2)=∑yg(y), and the uninformativeness of q is Ω(q)=∣Y∣(∣Y∣−1)1∑y∑y′=y′′qy(y′)qy(y′′).
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 2
For every α,K,ω>0, n and ∣Y∣ there is N0 such that for every α-separated model, every N>N0 and every allocation with ∣Nj∣≤n:
every symmetric fully informative profile is a strict BNE, andEq[τj]≤Eσ[τj]+ω
for every symmetric BNE q, every permutation σ and every agent j. No constant is hard-coded: N0 is only asserted to exist, uniformly over all models with the same α.
Milestones
g(y)≥α2 in an α-separated model (proof of Theorem 1, p. 48).
The payoff decomposition (31) when everyone else is truthful (p. 49).
Uniform concentration ∣E(ej(y))−K/g(y)∣→0 under truthful reporting, uniformly given α,n,K (p. 49).
Theorem 1 (pp. 24–25): for ω∈(0,αK(∣Y∣−1)) and N large, truthful reporting is a strict BNE and beats every observation-independent strategy by ω.
Fully informative symmetric profiles inherit (strict) equilibrium from truthful behavior and are payoff-equivalent to it (§5, p. 25).
Proposition 5.1 (p. 27):
Γ(Z1,Z2)≤Γ(Y1,Y2)−2∣Y∣δ(PX,p)Ω(q)2(∣Y∣−1).
Significance
Theorem 1 gives a detail-free mechanism: the designer needs neither PX nor p, and the agents need only know that the model is α-separated. The guaranteed gap over observation-independent reporting lets a platform pay for effort by scaling K. Theorem 2 addresses equilibrium multiplicity, the main criticism of agreement-based mechanisms: no symmetric equilibrium can pay noticeably more than truthful reporting. Proposition 5.1 is a quantitative data-processing inequality for the square root agreement measure, of independent interest.
All statements are proved in the paper (arXiv:1507.07045v5, Appendix A). None has a machine-checked proof. The mission asks for formal proofs of the stated results with N0 uniform in the model; explicit bounds on N0 and alternative arguments for the second claim of Theorem 2 are welcome.
Difficulty
The payments ej(y) are inverse square roots of empirical frequencies, so their expectations do not follow from the law of large numbers alone: a bound uniform over all α-separated models is required, and it must be uniform in the answer y. For a general symmetric profile q the agreement probability of some answer can be arbitrarily close to 0, so no uniform concentration bound for E(ej(y)) holds across all symmetric profiles; the obvious argument "compare the limit payoffs KΓ(Z1,Z2)≤KΓ(Y1,Y2)" therefore does not transfer to finite N directly. Finally, the expectations are over a product space of types, observations and reports of all agents on all tasks, and the independence structure (payments of j never read her own reports) has to be made explicit.
Formalization scope
Types, answers, tasks and agents are Fin m, Fin k, Fin N, Fin M; all quantities are real. A strategy is q : Fin k → Fin k → ℝ with q obs ans the probability of reporting ans after observing obs; models and strategies are required to be stochastic. A Setting holds the allocation i↦Mi together with the mechanism's choices (peers and the pairs j1(i)=j2(i)), and every theorem quantifies over all legal choices after N0. Every (task, agent) pair carries an observation and a report; entries of agents not assigned to a task are never read by a payment and marginalize out. The expected payment is the explicit finite sum, over all types, observations and reports, of the product probability times the payment; deviations change only the deviating agent's strategies on her own tasks, and strictness is over deviations that change some strategy on her tasks. "Commonly known" has no formal content beyond computing expectations under the true model. The printed "Nj≤n" is read as ∣Nj∣≤n; Theorem 1's second claim assumes Nj=∅. δ is 0 when ∣Y∣<2, so the separated theorems are vacuous there, as the page's δ is undefined.
Expected payments are not defined by (31) or by the limit formulas KΓ, and N0 never depends on the model, the population or the mechanism's choices: either shortcut would make the targets trivial or strictly weaker.
A complete development needs binomial tail bounds (Hoeffding), moment bounds for inverse square roots of binomials, Cauchy–Schwarz on finite sums and the marginalization of product measures over finite types; the last two are reusable for other multi-task peer-prediction mechanisms. Proofs of any milestone are welcome.
Selected references
V. Kamble, N. Shah, D. Marn, A. Parekh, K. Ramchandran, The Square Root Agreement Rule for Incentivizing Truthful Feedback on Online Platforms, Management Science, 2023; arXiv:1507.07045v5. https://arxiv.org/abs/1507.07045
N. Miller, P. Resnick, R. Zeckhauser, Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method, Management Science 51(9), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1050.0379
Supply Chains and Antitrust Governance: Under the Illinois Brick Ruling, Only the Wholesale-Price-Plus-Fixed-Fee Contract Lets Competing Manufacturers ColludeResearch Paper
Motivation: who may sue a cartel
In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois (431 U.S. 720, 1977) the U.S. Supreme Court held that only direct purchasers may recover antitrust damages; an indirect purchaser, who bought the overpriced goods through an intermediary, may not sue on the ground that the overcharge was passed on to it. In a three-tier supply chain of manufacturers, retailers and consumers, this IB ruling leaves the consumers without standing against colluding manufacturers. Only the retailers can sue, and a retailer sues only if collusion has cost it profit.
Jain, Hasija and Netessine (Management Science, 2021) ask which supply-chain contracts let competing manufacturers collude under this rule. They compare five common contract structures: wholesale price, revenue sharing, quantity discount, wholesale price plus fixed fee, and minimum order quantity. Their answer is that under the IB ruling only the contract with a fixed fee supports a cartel, and that the fee then takes the form of a slotting fee paid by the manufacturers to the retailers. Under competition all five contracts give the same outcome. The result tells public enforcers where to look: supply chains that use slotting fees.
Setting
Two manufacturers M1,M2 make a homogeneous product at common marginal cost c. Two retailers R1,R2 buy quantities q1,q2 and sell them in a market with deterministic inverse demand
p=a−b(q1+q2),0<b,c<a.
Retailer Ri buys from manufacturer Mi. A manufacturer's payment termsv fix the payment T(v,q,r) a retailer makes for quantity q when its sales revenue is r (Table 1 of the paper):
Contract
Terms
T(v,q,r)
Wholesale price (WP)
w
wq
Revenue sharing (RS)
w, 0≤α≤1
wq+αr
Quantity discount (QD)
w≥c, ξ≥0
wq−ξq2/2 if ξq≤w−c; (w−c)2/(2ξ)+cq otherwise
WP plus fixed fee (WPFF)
w, f
wq+fI(q>0)
Minimum order quantity (MOQ)
w, qmin≥0
wq, purchases restricted to q≥qmin
With revenue ri=(a−b(q1+q2))qi, retailer i earns πi=ri−T(vi,qi,ri) and manufacturer j earns Πj=T(vj,qj,rj)−cqj. A retailer equilibrium under v=[v1,v2] is a pair of feasible quantities in which each qi maximizes πi given the rival's quantity.
The competitive termsvC of Proposition 1 set w=c and all other terms to 0, except that under MOQ the minimum is qmin=(a−c)/(4b). Terms v with retailer equilibrium q meet the cartel conditions against a retailer equilibrium qC under [vC,vC] when
(C1) each manufacturer earns strictly more: Πj(v,q)>Πj(vC,qC) for j=1,2;
(C2) each retailer earns at least as much: πi(v,q)≥πi(vC,qC) for i=1,2.
Condition (C1) is the manufacturers' motive to collude. Condition (C2) is what keeps the retailers, the only parties with standing, from suing.
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 2
For every contract a competitive retailer equilibrium exists, and
(a)k∈{WP,RS,QD,MOQ},v admissible,q,qC retailer equilibria⟹¬(C1∧C2);(b)∃v admissible WPFF terms with a retailer equilibrium, and C1∧C2 at every retailer equilibrium under v.
The goal fixes no collusive terms; it asserts only which contracts admit a cartel.
Milestones
Proposition 1 (outcome part): under [vC,vC] every retailer equilibrium has qi=(a−c)/(3b), Πj=0 and πi=(a−c)2/(9b).
Problem (1), closed form: with a common wholesale price w<a and fees fi≤0, the unique retailer equilibrium is qi=(a−w)/(3b) with πi=(a−w)2/(9b)−fi.
Retailers' loss (§4.2): under WP, RS, QD and MOQ, every retailer equilibrium has πi≤bqi2.
Supply-chain profit (§4.2): π1+π2+Π1+Π2=(a−bQ−c)Q, and this is at most 2(a−c)2/(9b) once Q≥2(a−c)/(3b).
Proposition 2 part a.
Proposition 2 part b.
Significance
The result. Proposition 2 separates contracts that are equivalent under competition. Under the IB ruling the manufacturers prefer the fixed-fee contract because it is the one under which they can collude without being sued. Slotting fees are usually explained by demand signalling, risk sharing or retailer power; the paper adds a further explanation, as a way of paying off the only plaintiffs who could sue. For antitrust practice it identifies supply chains with heavy slotting fees as the place to look for cartels. The other four contracts need no such scrutiny under this ruling.
Formalizing it. The paper's proofs are in an online appendix and are not reproduced in the article. The mission produces a machine-checked version of the deterministic-demand model and of its two central propositions, stated over arbitrary admissible terms (including unequal terms for the two manufacturers) and over every retailer equilibrium rather than a selected one. No part of this model or result has a machine-checked proof yet.
Difficulty
Part (b) is an existence claim with a two-sided requirement: the witnessing terms must admit a retailer equilibrium, and every retailer equilibrium they admit must satisfy (C1) and (C2). A fixed fee makes a retailer's profit discontinuous at q=0, so the best responses and the uniqueness of the equilibrium need care.
Part (a) is a negative statement over all admissible terms of four different contracts. Solving each contract's retailer game in closed form and then comparing the profits does not work: the quantity-discount schedule is piecewise, its profit need not be concave when ξ is large, the minimum order quantity can bind at a corner, and the two manufacturers may offer different terms.
Formalization scope
All objects are in the namespace IllinoisBrick.Cartel; equilibrium is the published generic pure Nash relation CarbonDoubleCount.Planner.IsPureNash. The conventions are:
Deterministic demand throughout (§4 opening), so the expectations of (1)–(6) disappear and the quantity sold equals the quantity bought (no disposal at stage 3).
Standing assumptions0<b and c<a, which the paper does not state; with a≤c there is no trade and part (b) is false.
Paired sourcing: retailer i buys from manufacturer i. The paper fixes this for identical terms (p. 9); the mission keeps it for unequal terms.
Admissible ranges: 0≤α≤1 (RS), c≤w and 0≤ξ (QD), 0≤qmin (MOQ); WP and WPFF terms are arbitrary reals. Unused fields of the terms are 0.
MOQ benchmark correction: Proposition 1(e) prints qmin=q∗, the centralized total quantity (a−c)/(2b). Applied as a minimum for each retailer, this makes Proposition 2(a) false: at a=5,b=1,c=1, the literal benchmark gives each retailer profit 7/9 with stage-3 disposal, while admissible MOQ terms w=2,qmin=0 give each retailer profit 1 and each manufacturer profit 1. The formal statement corrects the minimum to each retailer's half, qmin=(a−c)/(4b), which does not bind. This correction changes the printed formula and is explicit in the model definition.
RS revenue is the retailer's sales revenue (a−bQ)q.
The QD threshold q≤(w−c)/ξ is written ξq≤w−c, so that ξ=0 (the competitive terms) gives T=wq rather than a division by zero.
Quantities and prices are real numbers; prices may be negative.
Several readings would trivialize the goal, and the statement rules each of them out. The competitive profits are computed in the model at vC, not hard-coded. Part (a) covers all four contracts and unequal terms. Part (b) requires the cartel conditions at every retailer equilibrium of the witnessing terms, together with existence of one. Retailer equilibrium is a best-response predicate, never a closed-form formula.
Not formalized: the manufacturers' equilibrium part of Proposition 1 (that vC solves problem (3), which needs a sourcing rule for unequal offers the paper does not give), Propositions 3–11, consumer surplus and condition (C3), and stochastic demand. Proofs of any milestone are welcome. The equilibrium lemmas for linear Cournot games with transfer payments (milestones 2 and 3) are reusable for other supply-chain contract models.
Selected references
N. Jain, S. Hasija, S. Netessine, Supply chains and antitrust governance, Management Science 67(11), 6822–6838, 2021. Cited from the accepted manuscript, LBS Research Online eprint 1493. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3833
“Zero Cost” Majority Attacks on Permissionless Blockchains: Under Congestion, a Miner With Less Than Half the Hash Power Gains From a Majority Attack Even With Nothing to Double-SpendResearch Paper
Why transaction fees matter for chain security
A majority attack lets a miner create blocks on a private branch of a permissionless blockchain and later publish that branch as the accepted transaction history. The familiar motive is a private benefit from changing the record, such as a double-spend. Gans and Halaburda show that this motive need not be present: when transactions compete for limited block space, a slower private branch can collect more fees per block. The extra mining revenue can outweigh the attacker's cost even when the private benefit is zero. Their analysis therefore makes the fee market part of the security calculation, alongside the hash power needed to overtake the public branch. This mission formalizes the Proof of Work result in Proposition 1 of the pinned preprint, pp. 13–14.
The result matters for miners deciding whether to continue honestly on the incumbent chain and for designers assessing what a given distribution of mining power actually guarantees. An active miner need not already control half of the incumbent hash power to face a profitable attack opportunity. That is the specific vulnerability established here; the model does not claim that every miner attacks or that every attack succeeds under every network rule.
Mining and attack model
Let hi∗≥0 be miner i's hash power before an attack and H=∑ihi∗>0 the incumbent total. If the intended time between blocks is τ>0, the puzzle difficulty is D=τH. A miner deploying hash power h earns an expected h/D blocks per unit of clock time. With per-block rewardρ and mining cost ci(h) per unit time, its flow profit is
PD(h,ρ,ci)=Dhρ−ci(h).
For an honest block, ρ=R+Φ: R is the value of newly issued tokens and Φ the expected transaction fees. A miner is active when its incumbent flow profit is nonnegative, the participation condition (1) on p. 5. The attacking branch pays ρ=R+Φ per block. The token reward is the same on both branches, as §4.3 states; their expected fees can differ.
If a miner held h∗ before attacking, the paper's minimum attack-power bound is hA=max{H/2,H−h∗} (p. 6). Let hA be an attained maximizer of attack-chain flow profit over nonnegative hash powers. Equation (3), p. 8, evaluates the attack at max{hA,hA} and defines its net cost over expected duration L>0:
Cnet=(PD(h∗,R+Φ,c)−PD(max{hA,hA},R+Φ,c))L.
A miner with private attack benefit Vattack prefers not to attack only if Vattack≤Cnet. A no-attack equilibrium, for this mission, means that every active miner satisfies this incentive condition. These definitions follow the paper's benchmark, attack description and incentive condition in §§2–4, pp. 4–8.
Formalization targets
In the fee model, every available transaction has unit size and a nonnegative fee. A block takes the b highest fees among its available transactions. Write Φb(n) for the expected block fee when n independent fees have a common law μ. For congested honest blocks and a slower attack branch, the first central target is Lemma 2, pp. 12–13:
0<b<n<n′⟹Φb(n′)>Φb(n).
The paper expresses congestion as τσ>b, with σ the mean transaction arrival rate, and obtains more arrivals between attack-chain blocks when attack hash power is below H. The natural counts n<n′ state that comparison directly. The same law μ on both branches represents users leaving their fee submissions unchanged.
The economic target is Lemma 1, p. 11. When the attack-chain reward per block is greater, there is a threshold strictly below half of H above which the net attack cost is negative:
ρ>ρ⟹∃h∈(0,H/2)∀h∗≥h,Cnet(h∗)<0.
The goal, Proposition 1, pp. 13–14, combines these claims. For the finite miner population, there is h∈(0,H/2) such that any active miner with hi∗>h violates the no-attack incentive condition even at Vattack=0. The threshold is chosen before the incumbent allocation varies. Thus it applies to genuinely sub-majority values of hi∗, including an interval below H/2.
What the result establishes
Strictly higher fees on the private branch make its reward per block greater even though the issued-token reward remains R. Lemma 1 then identifies incumbent miners whose forgone honest profit is less than their expected attack profit. Proposition 1 states the resulting failure of the no-attack equilibrium condition. This gives a precise economic implication of congestion in the model: hash-power shares alone do not determine whether an active miner has an incentive to preserve the public chain.
The paper proves these claims informally, while the proposed Lean theorems remain open proof targets. The development contributes reusable objects beyond the final proposition: a top-b sum for finite fee samples, its expectation under a product probability law, and a separate mining-profit and attack-cost model. Formal proofs would make the assumptions behind strict fee improvement and a sub-majority threshold explicit. They would also resolve the paper's informal assertions about the attack cost curve without changing its stated target.
Mathematical difficulty
Adding candidate transactions can never reduce the top-b fee sum, but that only gives a non-strict comparison. Strictness requires a positive probability that a new transaction displaces one selected by the honest block. The common fee law must therefore have more than one possible value, the block capacity must be positive, and the expectation must be finite. These conditions are easy to overlook when replacing the paper's order-statistics prose with a real-valued integral.
The threshold statement has a different difficulty. The paper describes a break-even hash-power level and treats its behavior as evident, but the needed existence and ordering are not established in the text. A faithful formal statement must retain the existential threshold below H/2 for an entire range of incumbent powers. It cannot choose a threshold after seeing one fixed allocation, since that would lose the proposition's sub-majority content.
Formalization scope
Hash powers, rewards, costs, time and net cost are real numbers; hash powers used by miners are nonnegative. The miner population is finite, and the goal requires H=∑ihi∗. The puzzle difficulty is always D=τH with τ,H>0, so no division by zero is used. Attack duration L is positive. The attack fee Φ and honest fee Φ come from the same fee law with natural arrival counts n′>n>b>0; the goal does not assume their ordering.
The paper says mining cost is nondecreasing and weakly quasi-convex on nonnegative power. Here cost is additionally convex there, which supports the single-peaked attack-profit model used in equation (3) and Figure 1. The attack-chain maximizer is required to be attained; some otherwise admissible costs yield no finite maximizer. The fee law is a nonnegative probability distribution with a finite first moment and is not a point mass. These additions are disclosed in the theorem descriptions and are needed for the paper's strict claims. Independent fees are represented by a product measure, and block fees by a maximum over sets of at most b indices; with nonnegative fees and b<n, this is the sum of the b highest fees. This representation is continuous and integrable under the stated law, so the real integral does not receive Lean's default value for a non-integrable integrand.
The paper uses hA as a lower bound even though it says a successful attack must exceed it. The net-cost definition follows equation (3) literally at the maximum of that bound and the unconstrained optimizer. The target concerns the paper's incentive inequality in this stated model. Contributions to the fee-order-statistic infrastructure, continuity and integrability, attack-cost comparisons, and the two numbered lemmas are all useful to this mission.
Selected references
J. S. Gans and H. Halaburda, “Zero Cost” Majority Attacks on Permissionless Blockchains, arXiv:2308.06568v1, 2023, §§2–4 and Proposition 1. Pinned preprint. Published under a revised title in Management Science, 2024; this mission cites the pinned preprint's pages and numbering.
Infinite Horizon Stochastic Impulse Control with Delay and Random Coefficients: The Strategy Built from Iterated Snell Envelopes Is Optimal over All Admissible Delayed Impulse StrategiesResearch Paper
Motivation
Impulse control models a decision maker who acts on a system by discrete interventions rather than continuously: a central bank adjusting a rate, a firm switching production capacity, a portfolio manager rebalancing with fixed transaction costs. Each intervention has a fixed cost, so the controller chooses both when to act and how much. In many applications an order is not executed the moment it is given: there is an execution delay between the decision and its effect, during which the controller cannot revise it.
Djehiche, Hamadène, Hdhiri and Zaatra (arXiv:1904.11924v2, published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022) study the infinite-horizon version of this problem with random coefficients: the state process and the reward are only assumed progressively measurable with respect to a Brownian filtration, not Markovian. Without a Markov structure the usual route through quasi-variational inequalities is unavailable, and the authors work instead with optimal stopping and (reflected) backward stochastic differential equations.
Execution delay in impulse control goes back to Robin (1976) for diffusions. It was treated for inventory problems with delivery lags by Bar-Ilan and Sulem (1995), for delayed reaction by Øksendal and Sulem (2008), and on a finite horizon by Bruder and Pham (2009), all in Markovian settings. Non-Markovian impulse control without delay was studied by Djehiche, Hamadène and Hdhiri (2010), and with execution delay by Hdhiri and Karouf (2018). The paper under formalization treats delay, random coefficients and an infinite horizon together; its stated main issue is the continuity of the value process.
Setting
Let (Ω,F,P) carry a standard d-dimensional Brownian motion B, and let (Ft)t≥0 be its natural filtration augmented by the P-null sets. The data are:
a finite nonempty set U={β1,…,βp}⊂Rl of admissible impulses;
an execution delay Δ>0 and a discount rate r>0;
an intervention cost ψ(β)=k+φ(β) with k>0 and φ≥0;
a progressively measurable process L in Rl (the uncontrolled system);
a running reward h(t,ω,x), progressively measurable in (t,ω) and Borel in x, with 0≤h≤γ (Assumption 3.1).
A strategy is a sequence δ=(τn,ξn)n≥0 of stopping times and Fτn-measurable U-valued impulses. It is admissible, δ∈A, if τn+1−τn≥Δ almost surely. The impulse decided at τn takes effect at τn+Δ:
The value is built by an iterated optimal stopping scheme. For an index(ν,ξ), a stopping time ν and a finitely-valued Fν-measurable ξ, set Yt0(ν,ξ)=E[∫t∞e−rsh(s,Ls+ξ)1[s≥ν]ds∣Ft], and for n≥1 define the obstacle
The sequence increases to a limit Y(ν,ξ), with obstacle O(ν,ξ) given by the same formula with Y in place of Yn−1.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 6.1
Define τ0∗=inf{s≥0:Os(0,0)≥Ys(0,0)}, τn∗=inf{s≥τn−1∗+Δ:Os(τn−1∗,β0∗+⋯+βn−1∗)≥Ys(⋅)}, and let βn∗ be an Fτn∗-measurable U-valued maximiser in the obstacle. Then δ∗=(τn∗,βn∗) is optimal:
Y0(0,0)=δ∈AsupJ(δ)=J(δ∗).
The formal goal asserts that the scheme and its obstacle exist, that a strategy δ∗ satisfying the recursion exists, and that every such δ∗ is admissible, attains Y0(0,0), and dominates every admissible strategy.
Milestones
In the order the proof uses them: Proposition 4.1 (the scheme is well-posed, 0≤Ytn≤rγe−rt, Yn≤Yn+1); Remark 4.2 (gluing over the values of ξ); Proposition 4.2 i) (monotone convergence, càdlàg limit, the Snell identity for Y) and ii) (independence of the starting time after ν′); the measurable maximiser of the proof of Proposition 5.3; the bound (6.27) on ∣Ot∣; Proposition 6.4 (continuity of Y); the full optimal-stopping identity at the first hitting time, Appendix (8.54), including the essential supremum after a random starting time; and the two halves of the proof of Theorem 6.1, Y0(0,0)=J(δ∗) and Y0(0,0)≥J(δ′) for every δ′∈A.
Significance
Theorem 6.1 reduces a control problem over sequences of stopping times and impulses, with delayed effect, to a countable family of single optimal stopping problems, and identifies an optimal strategy explicitly from the value process. It gives existence of an optimal strategy in a non-Markovian infinite-horizon setting where no verification theorem for a quasi-variational inequality is available.
The result is proved on paper. As far as is known it has no machine-checked proof. Formalizing it would add a continuous-time optimal stopping layer (Snell envelopes with values at +∞, first hitting times after random times) that the current libraries lack, and a precise record of the conventions the paper leaves implicit: values at t=+∞, versions of optional projections, and the index shift between Sections 3 and 6.
Difficulty
The obvious argument is a dynamic programming verification: show the value satisfies a fixed-point equation, then check the candidate strategy attains it. Here the candidate strategy stops at the first time Y meets its obstacle O, and that time is optimal only if the Snell envelope is continuous. The limit of increasing continuous supermartingales is only càdlàg, and the obstacle O involves Y at the shifted time t+Δ, so a jump of Y propagates to a jump of O and back. Ruling out these jumps (Proposition 6.4) is the main technical step of the paper; it uses that the Brownian filtration is quasi-left continuous, and fails for general filtrations. The remainder needs a continuous-time Snell envelope theory over stopping times that may be infinite, which Mathlib does not provide.
Formalization scope
Lean representation.Rl is Fin l → ℝ; U is a nonempty Finset. Time is ℝ≥0; stopping times take values in WithTop ℝ≥0. The filtration is the published ReflectedBSDE.Existence.augmentedFiltration of a standard Brownian motion (Peng1990.SMP.IsStdBrownian). It is never an arbitrary filtration. The essential supremum is the published ReflectedBSDE.Existence.IsEssSupOver.
Standing hypotheses (§3, Assumption 3.1): U nonempty, Δ>0, r>0, k>0, φ≥0 on U, L progressively measurable, h measurable for the progressive σ-algebra times B(Rl), and 0≤h≤γ almost surely.
Model objects.B and its augmented filtration, L, h, U, Δ, ψ, the admissible strategies, Lδ, J, the scheme Yn, On, its limit Y, the obstacle O, and the strategy δ∗.
Conventions. Strategies are indexed from 0. A process evaluated at time +∞ is 0, and e−r⋅∞=0. The scheme is defined by its Snell-envelope characterisation (4.4)/(4.6); On and O are adapted versions with continuous, resp. right-continuous, paths that equal the displayed conditional expectations almost surely at each t. Y=limnYn is the pointwise supremum. Indices have finitely-valued ξ. β0∗ is U-valued. The hitting times τn∗ are stopping times almost surely equal to the displayed infima. Y0(0,0)=J(δ∗) is read almost surely. "supδ∈AJ(δ)=J(δ∗)" is stated as domination plus attainment, with no real supremum over strategies.
Ruling out trivializations. The goal carries existence clauses for the scheme, its obstacle and δ∗, so its universally quantified parts cannot hold vacuously, and it keeps the identity with Y0(0,0) and the explicit δ∗ rather than the bare existence of an optimal strategy.
Not formalized. The risk-sensitive problem of §7 (Theorem 7.2), Proposition 5.3, and the BSDE form of the scheme (Theorem 2.1, (4.3), (4.5) i) and iii), Remark 6.3).
Welcome contributions. A Snell envelope theory in continuous time with values at +∞, début and hitting-time results for right-continuous processes, and conditional expectation at stopping times are reusable well beyond this mission.
Selected references
The bibliographic data are those of the paper's reference list (arXiv:1904.11924v2, pp. 28–29).
B. Djehiche, S. Hamadène, I. Hdhiri, H. Zaatra, Infinite Horizon Stochastic Impulse Control with Delay and Random Coefficients, arXiv:1904.11924v2, 2019; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.11924
M. Robin, Contrôle impulsionnel avec retard pour les processus de diffusion, C. R. Acad. Sci. Paris 282, 463–466, 1976.
A. Bar-Ilan, A. Sulem, Explicit solution of inventory problems with delivery lags, Mathematics of Operations Research 20, 709–720, 1995.
B. Øksendal, A. Sulem, Optimal stochastic impulse control with delayed reaction, Applied Mathematics and Optimization 58(2), 243–255, 2008.
B. Bruder, H. Pham, Impulse control problem on finite horizon with execution delay, Stochastic Processes and their Applications 119(5), 1436–1469, 2009.
B. Djehiche, S. Hamadène, I. Hdhiri, Stochastic impulse control of non-Markovian processes, Applied Mathematics and Optimization 61(1), 1–26, 2010.
I. Hdhiri, M. Karouf, Optimal stochastic impulse control with random coefficients and execution delay, Stochastics 90(2), 151–164, 2018.
S. Hamadène, J.-P. Lepeltier, Z. Wu, Infinite horizon reflected backward stochastic differential equations and applications in mixed control and game problems, Probability and Mathematical Statistics 19, 211–234, 1999.
Probability Distributions on Partially Ordered Sets and Network Interdiction Games: Under the Conservation Law, Element Marginals and Maximal-Chain Hitting Bounds Are Jointly AchievableResearch Paper
Motivation
Network interdiction asks how an inspector should randomize over sets of links when a router can choose a path through a network. Link inspection probabilities and path interception probabilities describe different features of the same random choice. Specifying both sets of numbers separately does not guarantee that one distribution over inspection sets realizes them. The poset model of Dahan, Amin and Jaillet isolates this compatibility question: links become elements of a partially ordered set, and relevant paths become maximal chains. Their feasibility theorem supplies the distributions required in the equilibrium analysis of their interdiction game. This mission formalizes that theorem and its stated structural results, from the pinned preprint arXiv:1811.08516v3.
The question also stands on its own as a finite probability problem. A vector of element marginals fixes the chance of selecting each element, while a lower bound for every maximal chain fixes the chance of selecting at least one element from that chain. The two requirements interact because chains can overlap and share several splice points. Conditions that look sufficient one chain at a time can fail to support a single distribution across all chains. The paper's Example 2 on p. 9 demonstrates infeasibility when its conservation condition is absent. Dahan, Amin and Jaillet prove that the two stated conditions together are sufficient for every finite nonempty poset.
Setting
A finite posetP=(X,⪯) is a finite set with a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive order. A chain is a subset whose points are pairwise comparable; a chain is maximal when it cannot be enlarged while remaining a chain. Write C for the family of maximal chains. For each x∈X, prescribe an element marginalρx∈[0,1]. For each C∈C, prescribe a chain hitting targetπC≤1. A distribution σ gives a nonnegative weight σS to every subset S⊆X, including the empty set, with total weight one. Its marginal at x is the total weight of subsets containing x; its hitting probability for C is the total weight of subsets meeting C.
Two parameter conditions are central. Condition (2) says πC≤∑x∈Cρx for every maximal chain. To state condition (3), take maximal chains C1,C2 and a common point x∗. Splice them at x∗: C12 follows C1 through x∗ and then C2 above it; C21 takes the opposite halves. The conservation law is πC1+πC2=πC12+πC21 for every such pair and every common point. The paper's §2.2 specifies these conditions and the distribution problem (D) on pp. 7–8.
The auxiliary program (Q) keeps the element marginal equalities but omits total weight one. It minimizes total assigned weight while limiting how much weight may be assigned to subsets that meet a maximal chain more than once. Its slack is δC=∑x∈Cρx−πC, and its optimum is zQ∗. The factor in its chain constraint is the real number ∣S∩C∣−1 when ∣S∩C∣≥2.
Formalization targets
Joint feasibility
The goal is the paper's Theorem 1, p. 8: under conditions (2) and (3), some distribution σ satisfies all marginals and chain hitting bounds simultaneously:
Theorem 2, p. 11, is the strongest quantitative milestone. With the same standing setting, it identifies the least feasible total weight in (Q):
zQ∗=max{x∈Xmaxρx,C∈CmaxπC}.
The intervening milestones are the paper's Lemmas 1–3 and Propositions 1–4. Lemma 2 establishes the poset generated by a splice-closed family of chains. Proposition 1 relates (D) to the bound zQ∗≤1. Propositions 2–4 state the properties, termination, feasibility and total weight of the paper's Algorithm 1.
Significance
Theorem 1 is an existence guarantee for a joint distribution, not merely separate bounds that can be met one chain at a time. It lets a model specify desired inspection marginals and path interception lower bounds while retaining a genuine probability distribution over inspection sets. In the paper, this supplies the interdiction strategies used in the network game's equilibrium characterization in §5. Theorem 2 gives the exact amount of unnormalized weight needed to meet the same constraints, which also identifies when normalization to a probability distribution is possible.
The results are already proved in the cited paper. The work here is to state their hypotheses, objects, algorithm and conclusions in Lean and then construct machine-checked proofs. The reusable output is a finite-poset interface for maximal-chain splicing, chain-generated subposets, distributions on subsets, and the auxiliary optimization problem. The game equilibrium theorem of §5 is outside this mission; a formal development of it could import the distribution theorem after it is proved.
Difficulty
Matching each element marginal separately does not control the probability of hitting every chain at once. If a selected subset meets a chain at two or more elements, the sum of its element marginals counts that subset more than once, while the chain hitting event counts it once. Hence condition (2), although necessary, does not alone capture all compatibility constraints. The conservation law couples overlapping maximal chains at every common splice point, and the auxiliary program records the excess count ∣S∩C∣−1. In Algorithm 1, a chain can be removed from the active family while its constraint must remain satisfied; the paper's Lemma 3 addresses precisely that issue. Sections 2–3 of the preprint give the detailed statements.
Formalization scope
The ground set X is a nonempty finite Lean type with a partial order. Subsets and maximal chains are Finsets, and a distribution is a real-valued function on all finite subsets. The values of π are stored as a function on finite subsets for convenient splicing, but all bounds and conservation equations use only maximal chains. The splice uses the first chain at and below the common point and the second at and above it. The conservation equation quantifies over every common point. This rules out a vacuous or weaker encoding that checks only one splice, drops the empty subset, or replaces probability normalization by an inequality.
The optimal value zQ∗ is the real infimum of feasible (Q) objective values. Under the standing assumptions it is a proper finite optimum; the statements using it retain those assumptions. The maximum in Theorem 2 ranges over all elements and maximal chains of the nonempty poset. Cardinalities in (Q) are converted to reals before subtracting one. The algorithm's Lean state zero is paper iteration one, and its output accumulates weights assigned to a subset if that subset appears in more than one iteration. This additive interpretation of step A7 is disclosed because the printed assignment does not say what happens on repetition.
The development needs Mathlib's finite posets, chains, finite sets and real-number sums, together with the paper-specific chain relation and algorithm state. Contributions proving the numbered milestones, establishing the algorithm's invariants, or providing reusable facts about chain splicing and finite distributions all advance the goal. The affine special case of §4 and the game theory of §5 are separate work.
Selected references
M. Dahan, S. Amin and P. Jaillet, Probability Distributions on Partially Ordered Sets and Network Interdiction Games, arXiv:1811.08516v3, 2020; published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022. Preprint.