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Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Smoothed Analysis of Algorithms: Why the Simplex Algorithm Usually Takes Polynomial Time 2: The Two-Phase Shadow-Vertex Simplex Method Has Polynomial Smoothed ComplexityResearch Paper

Motivation

The simplex method solves linear programs by moving between vertices of a feasible polyhedron. Its worst-case number of moves can grow exponentially, yet it often performs well on ordinary inputs. Worst-case examples alone therefore give an incomplete account of the method’s behavior. Spielman and Teng introduced smoothed analysis to measure expected performance after small random perturbations of an arbitrary input. Their result for a two-phase shadow-vertex simplex method gives a polynomial bound in the input dimensions and inverse perturbation scale. The pinned preprint is the source for every theorem number and constant in this mission.

The paper separates a geometric result about the expected size of a polytope’s shadow (Theorem 4.0.1) from the algorithmic result here (Theorem 5.0.1). That separation matters: a plane chosen before perturbation and a plane chosen by a running algorithm have different distributions. This mission addresses the latter. It complements the standard-form simplex theorems already formalized in the Introduction to Linear Optimization series and the worst-case Klee–Minty result in the Smale’s Ninth Problem mission; those results concern different algorithms or input models and are context rather than imported statements.

Setting

A linear program is specified by vectors a1,…,an∈Rda_1,\ldots,a_n\in\mathbb R^da1​,…,an​∈Rd, right-hand sides y1,…,yn∈Ry_1,\ldots,y_n\in\mathbb Ry1​,…,yn​∈R, and an objective vector z∈Rdz\in\mathbb R^dz∈Rd:

max⁡x⟨z,x⟩subject to⟨ai,x⟩≤yi(1≤i≤n).\max_x\langle z,x\rangle\quad\text{subject to}\quad \langle a_i,x\rangle\le y_i\qquad(1\le i\le n).xmax​⟨z,x⟩subject to⟨ai​,x⟩≤yi​(1≤i≤n).

The paper’s two-phase shadow-vertex method first draws a collection I\mathcal II of ddd-element subsets of [n][n][n] and chooses one whose constraint matrix AIA_IAI​ has the largest smallest singular value. It sets a power-of-two scale MMM from the input norm and a power-of-two scale κ\kappaκ from that singular value. These determine positive relaxed right-hand sides yi′y'_iyi′​: MMM for i∈Ii\in Ii∈I and dM2/(4κ)\sqrt d M^2/(4\kappa)d​M2/(4κ) otherwise. A coefficient vector α\alphaα is chosen uniformly from A1/d2={α:∑i∈Iαi=1, αi≥1/d2}A_{1/d^2}=\{\alpha:\sum_{i\in I}\alpha_i=1,\ \alpha_i\ge1/d^2\}A1/d2​={α:∑i∈I​αi​=1, αi​≥1/d2}. The first phase solves the relaxed program LP′ from the objective AIαA_I\alphaAI​α.

The second phase uses a lifted program LP⁺ in Rd+1\mathbb R^{d+1}Rd+1. For each original constraint it forms ai+=((yi′−yi)/2,ai)a_i^+=((y'_i-y_i)/2,a_i)ai+​=((yi′​−yi​)/2,ai​) and yi+=(yi′+yi)/2y_i^+=(y'_i+y_i)/2yi+​=(yi′​+yi​)/2, together with two artificial constraints at first coordinates 111 and −1-1−1. LP⁺ connects LP′ to the original program and makes infeasibility detectable. Its shadow is taken in the plane of (0,z)(0,z)(0,z) and z+=(1,0,…,0)z^+=(1,0,\ldots,0)z+=(1,0,…,0).

For positive right-hand sides, an optimal polar simplex is a ddd-subset of constraints whose scaled vectors ai/yia_i/y_iai​/yi​ form a facet of ConvHull⁡(0,a1/y1,…,an/yn)\operatorname{ConvHull}(0,a_1/y_1,\ldots,a_n/y_n)ConvHull(0,a1​/y1​,…,an​/yn​) and whose unscaled cone contains an objective qqq. The shadow for objectives t,zt,zt,z is the union of these simplices over all qqq in Span⁡(t,z)\operatorname{Span}(t,z)Span(t,z). Its size bounds the number of polar pivots. In Section 5 the paper writes Sz′S'_zSz′​ for the first-phase shadow size and Sz+S_z^+Sz+​ for the second-phase shadow size without the two artificial pivots.

The input is perturbed by independent Gaussians: each coordinate of aia_iai​ and each yiy_iyi​ has its prescribed center and common standard deviation σR\sigma RσR, where R=max⁡i∥(yˉi,aˉi)∥2R=\max_i\|(\bar y_i,\bar a_i)\|_2R=maxi​∥(yˉ​i​,aˉi​)∥2​. The algorithm has separate random choices of I\mathcal II and α\alphaα.

Formalization targets

The immediate targets bound the two phases: Lemma 5.2.1 gives an explicit expectation bound for Sz′S'_zSz′​ and Lemma 5.3.1 gives one for Sz+S_z^+Sz+​. Lemma 5.1.1 and its corollaries control the chance that the chosen basis has a very small singular value. Corollary 4.3.3 extends the geometric shadow bound to positive, unequal right-hand sides and general Gaussian covariance. These are the mission’s milestone targets.

The goal is the shape of Theorem 5.0.1. With C(A,y,z)=EI,α(Sz′+Sz++2)C(A,y,z)=\mathbb E_{\mathcal I,\alpha}(S'_z+S_z^++2)C(A,y,z)=EI,α​(Sz′​+Sz+​+2), there are a single polynomial P\mathcal PP and a positive constant σ0\sigma_0σ0​ such that, for all n>d≥3n>d\ge3n>d≥3 and all centers and objectives,

EA,yC(A,y,z)≤min⁡{P(d,n,1min⁡(σ,σ0)),(nd)+(nd+1)+2}.\mathbb E_{A,y}C(A,y,z)\le \min\left\{\mathcal P\left(d,n,\frac1{\min(\sigma,\sigma_0)}\right), \binom nd+\binom n{d+1}+2\right\}.EA,y​C(A,y,z)≤min{P(d,n,min(σ,σ0​)1​),(dn​)+(d+1n​)+2}.

The polynomial is uniform over the dimensions and inputs; its coefficients are not prescribed. The bound on CCC implies the corresponding result for the actual pivot count through the paper’s step-to-shadow comparison. The goal is stated with a positive center scale RRR, the case in which the paper’s Gaussian rescaling applies.

Significance

The theorem places the number of pivots of a complete simplex method under one explicit perturbation model, including the work needed to find a starting feasible basis and handle an arbitrary right-hand side. The trivial binomial bound is retained because it controls rare events in the proof and is part of the stated result. The polynomial bound says that even when the unperturbed LP is adversarial, Gaussian noise of a controlled scale makes the expected shadow-size cost polynomial.

The paper proves the mathematical result. This mission asks for machine-checked proofs of its statement and the listed milestones; the draft Lean declarations are targets with sorry, not completed proofs. The reusable formal infrastructure is the finite polar simplex and shadow construction, product Gaussian input law, smallest-singular-value events for sampled minors, and the uniform truncated-simplex coefficient law. The two shadow-size lemmas also require explicit handling of measurable finite-valued counts and their expectations.

Difficulty

The basic shadow estimate fixes its projection plane before perturbing the constraints. In LP′, the initial objective AIαA_I\alphaAI​α uses a basis selected after the perturbation, so the relevant plane depends on the random LP. The fixed-plane theorem cannot be substituted directly. For LP⁺, the normalized lifted vectors ai+/yi+a_i^+/y_i^+ai+​/yi+​ are nonlinear functions of Gaussian data; they are generally not Gaussian vectors. Thus the same shadow estimate does not apply directly to their law either. A further issue is that a poor sampled basis can make y′y'y′ very large. These are distinct obstacles, reflected in the milestone groups from Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3.

Formalization scope

Vectors are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d), constraints are Fin n → EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d), and index families are finite sets of Fin n. The paper’s [n][n][n] starts at one; Fin n starts at zero. The Gaussian constructor receives variance σ2\sigma^2σ2, not standard deviation σ\sigmaσ. The 3ndln⁡n3nd\ln n3ndlnn draws are rounded upward and are independent uniform draws with replacement. Equal singular values are resolved by the first sampled set. The uniform law on AδA_\deltaAδ​ is represented by normalized independent exponential weights followed by the affine shift that imposes αi≥δ\alpha_i\ge\deltaαi​≥δ.

The Lean definition of CCC is exactly the Section 5 shadow-size upper bound E(Sz′+Sz++2)\mathbb E(S'_z+S_z^++2)E(Sz′​+Sz+​+2), computed from the sampled LP data. It is not an arbitrary cost variable. The actual algorithmic step bound needs the paper’s polar algorithm and Lemma 3.3.5. The goal explicitly asks for inner and outer integrability so Lean’s default value for a nonintegrable Bochner integral cannot make the result vacuous. The source’s all-zero center scale is excluded because it gives zero perturbation and defeats the rescaling used in Theorem 5.0.1.

For LP⁺ the vectors live in Rd+1\mathbb R^{d+1}Rd+1, so the two LP⁺ milestone bounds use D(n,d+1,⋅)\mathcal D(n,d+1,\cdot)D(n,d+1,⋅). The preprint prints ddd in those calls even though the preceding extension theorem would be applied in dimension d+1d+1d+1. Lemma 5.2.1 is written as an inequality: its printed equality is stronger than the bound established on page 71. These corrections are visible in the theorem titles and notes. Contributions that prove the exact statements, establish the measurability and Gaussian law facts, or formalize the step-to-shadow comparison are welcome.

Selected references

  • Daniel A. Spielman and Shang-Hua Teng, Smoothed Analysis of Algorithms: Why the Simplex Algorithm Usually Takes Polynomial Time, arXiv:cs/0111050v7, 2003, preprint. The PDF used here is the 96-page version with printed and PDF page numbers aligned.
22 thms2 active usersReviewed
Calculus of VariationsControl TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Variational Principle III: Every Terminal-Cost Control Problem Has ε-Optimal Measurable Controls Satisfying the Pontryagin Maximum Principle up to εResearch Paper

Motivation

The Pontryagin maximum principle is the basic first-order necessary condition of optimal control: along an optimal control, the control value at almost every time extremizes a Hamiltonian built from the dynamics and an adjoint vector. The classical statement presupposes that an optimal control exists. For many problems none does: the set of trajectories is not closed, or the cost does not attain its infimum, and the classical principle then says nothing.

Ekeland's 1974 paper On the Variational Principle (DOI 10.1016/0022-247X(74)90025-0) proves a general result about lower semicontinuous functions on complete metric spaces (its Theorem 1.1, now called Ekeland's variational principle) and closes with an application to control theory in §7 (pp. 348–351): for every terminal-cost problem satisfying mild regularity and growth conditions, there are ε-optimal controls that satisfy the maximum principle up to ε, whether or not an optimal control exists. The argument equips the measurable controls with the metric "measure of the set where two controls differ", which has since become a standard device in nonsmooth and approximate optimal control. For the classical theory, Ekeland refers to the treatise of Pallu de la Barrière (Optimal Control Theory, Saunders, 1967).

Setting

Fix n≥0n \ge 0n≥0, a horizon T>0T > 0T>0, an initial state x0∈Rnx_0 \in \mathbb R^nx0​∈Rn, and a nonempty compact metrizable space KKK of control values, with its Borel σ-algebra. A control is a measurable map u:[0,T]→Ku : [0, T] \to Ku:[0,T]→K. The dynamics are a map f:Rn×K×[0,T]→Rnf : \mathbb R^n \times K \times [0, T] \to \mathbb R^nf:Rn×K×[0,T]→Rn, and the state obeys

dxdt(t)=f(x(t),u(t),t)  a.e.,x(0)=x0.(7.1)\frac{dx}{dt}(t) = f(x(t), u(t), t) \ \text{ a.e.}, \qquad x(0) = x_0. \qquad (7.1)dtdx​(t)=f(x(t),u(t),t)  a.e.,x(0)=x0​.(7.1)

A trajectory of uuu (Lean: IsTrajectory f x₀ T u x) is a function xxx continuous on [0,T][0, T][0,T] with x(t)=x0+∫0tf(x(s),u(s),s) dsx(t) = x_0 + \int_0^t f(x(s), u(s), s)\,dsx(t)=x0​+∫0t​f(x(s),u(s),s)ds for all t∈[0,T]t \in [0, T]t∈[0,T]. The standing hypotheses are:

  • (a) fff and its state Jacobian fx′=(∂f/∂x1,…,∂f/∂xn)f_x' = (\partial f/\partial x_1, \dots, \partial f/\partial x_n)fx′​=(∂f/∂x1​,…,∂f/∂xn​) (Lean: fx) are continuous on Rn×K×[0,T]\mathbb R^n \times K \times [0, T]Rn×K×[0,T];
  • (b) ⟨x,f(x,u,t)⟩≤c (1+∥x∥2)\langle x, f(x, u, t)\rangle \le c\,(1 + \|x\|^2)⟨x,f(x,u,t)⟩≤c(1+∥x∥2) for some constant ccc.

The terminal cost is given by a C1C^1C1 function g:Rn→Rg : \mathbb R^n \to \mathbb Rg:Rn→R, and the problem is to minimize g(x(T))g(x(T))g(x(T)) over all controls. The adjoint vector ppp along a pair (u,x)(u, x)(u,x) (Lean: IsAdjoint fx g T u x p) solves the linear equation

dpdt(t)=−tfx′(x(t),u(t),t) p(t),p(T)=g′(x(T)),\frac{dp}{dt}(t) = -{}^t f_x'(x(t), u(t), t)\, p(t), \qquad p(T) = g'(x(T)),dtdp​(t)=−tfx′​(x(t),u(t),t)p(t),p(T)=g′(x(T)),

where tA{}^t AtA is the transpose. The control distance (Lean: ctrlDist T u₁ u₂) is

δ(u1,u2)=meas⁡{t∈[0,T]∣u1(t)≠u2(t)},\delta(u_1, u_2) = \operatorname{meas}\{t \in [0, T] \mid u_1(t) \neq u_2(t)\},δ(u1​,u2​)=meas{t∈[0,T]∣u1​(t)=u2​(t)},

and the needle variation vτv_\tauvτ​ of a control uεu_\varepsilonuε​ at t0t_0t0​ with value u0∈Ku_0 \in Ku0​∈K (Lean: needle T uε u₀ t₀ τ) equals u0u_0u0​ on [0,T]∩ ]t0−τ,t0[[0, T] \cap\, ]t_0 - \tau, t_0[[0,T]∩]t0​−τ,t0​[ and uεu_\varepsilonuε​ elsewhere.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7.1

For every ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0 there is a control uεu_\varepsilonuε​ with trajectory xεx_\varepsilonxε​ and adjoint vector pεp_\varepsilonpε​ such that

g(xε(T))≤inf⁡ug(x(T))+ε,⟨f(xε(t),uε(t),t),pε(t)⟩≤min⁡w∈K⟨f(xε(t),w,t),pε(t)⟩+ε  a.e. on [0,T].g(x_\varepsilon(T)) \le \inf_u g(x(T)) + \varepsilon, \qquad \langle f(x_\varepsilon(t), u_\varepsilon(t), t), p_\varepsilon(t)\rangle \le \min_{w \in K} \langle f(x_\varepsilon(t), w, t), p_\varepsilon(t)\rangle + \varepsilon \ \text{ a.e. on } [0, T].g(xε​(T))≤uinf​g(x(T))+ε,⟨f(xε​(t),uε​(t),t),pε​(t)⟩≤w∈Kmin​⟨f(xε​(t),w,t),pε​(t)⟩+ε  a.e. on [0,T].

Milestones

  1. (7.2), a priori bound: every trajectory satisfies ∥x(t)∥2≤(∥x0∥2+2cT)e2cT\|x(t)\|^2 \le (\|x_0\|^2 + 2cT)e^{2cT}∥x(t)∥2≤(∥x0​∥2+2cT)e2cT.
  2. Well-posedness (p. 348): every control has exactly one trajectory on [0,T][0, T][0,T].
  3. Lemma 7.2: (U,δ)(\mathcal U, \delta)(U,δ) is a complete metric space (on almost-everywhere classes).
  4. Lemma 7.3: u↦g(x(T))u \mapsto g(x(T))u↦g(x(T)) is continuous on (U,δ)(\mathcal U, \delta)(U,δ).
  5. (7.15)–(7.16): a control uεu_\varepsilonuε​ with F(uε)≤inf⁡F+ε2F(u_\varepsilon) \le \inf F + \varepsilon^2F(uε​)≤infF+ε2 and F(u)≥F(uε)−ε δ(u,uε)F(u) \ge F(u_\varepsilon) - \varepsilon\,\delta(u, u_\varepsilon)F(u)≥F(uε​)−εδ(u,uε​) for all uuu, where F(u)=g(x(T))F(u) = g(x(T))F(u)=g(x(T)).
  6. Lemma 7.4: the right derivative of τ↦g(xτ(T))\tau \mapsto g(x_\tau(T))τ↦g(xτ​(T)) at τ=0\tau = 0τ=0, for the needle variations vτv_\tauvτ​, equals ⟨f(xε(t0),u0,t0)−f(xε(t0),uε(t0),t0),pε(t0)⟩\langle f(x_\varepsilon(t_0), u_0, t_0) - f(x_\varepsilon(t_0), u_\varepsilon(t_0), t_0), p_\varepsilon(t_0)\rangle⟨f(xε​(t0​),u0​,t0​)−f(xε​(t0​),uε​(t0​),t0​),pε​(t0​)⟩.

Significance

The result. Theorem 7.1 decouples the maximum principle from existence of optimal controls. Any minimizing sequence can be replaced by one consisting of controls that satisfy the necessary condition up to a vanishing error, so approximate extremals are available for numerical schemes and for limiting arguments (relaxation, convergence of extremals) in problems without compactness or convexity of the velocity sets. The same scheme, a complete metric on controls plus Ekeland's principle plus needle variations, underlies later proofs of the maximum principle with state constraints and in nonsmooth settings.

Formalizing it. The theorem has a published proof, which the paper sketches in four pages and partly defers to classical results (local existence for measurable controls, differentiability of trajectories with respect to needle variations). Neither Mathlib nor the platform contains this theorem or a maximum principle for measurable controls with time-dependent dynamics; the nearest platform items assume an exact optimum, a running cost and globally Lipschitz autonomous dynamics. A formalization requires a Carathéodory theory of ODEs in Lean, the complete metric space of controls, and a rigorous version of the classical first-variation computation. Each of these is useful well beyond this paper.

Difficulty

The obvious argument fails at its first step: a minimizing sequence of controls has no convergent subsequence in any useful sense, because measurable controls with values in KKK are not compact in the metric δ\deltaδ and their weak limits are relaxed controls, which are not controls. Ekeland's principle avoids compactness, but it needs a complete metric space on which the cost is lower semicontinuous. Completeness of (U,δ)(\mathcal U, \delta)(U,δ) (Lemma 7.2) and continuity of the cost (Lemma 7.3) both require care. Continuity must hold for trajectories driven by merely measurable controls, which converge only in measure. The needle derivative (Lemma 7.4) holds only at times where the trajectory satisfies the state equation in the classical sense, which is almost every time but not every time.

Formalization scope

  • Controls are functions ℝ → K with Measurable u; only values on [0,T][0, T][0,T] matter. Trajectories and adjoint vectors are functions ℝ → EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n), continuous on [0,T][0, T][0,T] and solving the integral form of their equation. The paper uses the same form in (7.13). A definition that asks for a derivative at every time would be unsatisfiable for discontinuous controls and would make the goal vacuous; the integral form avoids this.
  • Hypothesis (a) is stated as joint continuity of f and fx on univ ×ˢ univ ×ˢ Icc 0 T together with HasFDerivAt (fun y => f y u t) (fx x u t) x. Hypothesis (b) is ∃ c, … with the order of arguments f(x,u,t)f(x, u, t)f(x,u,t); the page prints f(t,x,u)f(t, x, u)f(t,x,u) in (b), a slip.
  • The transpose tfx′{}^t f_x'tfx′​ is ContinuousLinearMap.adjoint, and g′(x)g'(x)g′(x) is gradient g x.
  • Infima over controls are never taken as real ⨅; (7.4) and (7.15) are stated as "for every control uuu with trajectory xxx".
  • (7.5) is printed with "× ε\times\,\varepsilon×ε". The proof's last line (7.21) gives "+ ε+\,\varepsilon+ε", which is what is stated. The minimum over the compact KKK is replaced by the equivalent "for every w∈Kw \in Kw∈K", with one null set for all www.
  • Added hypothesis: [Nonempty K] in the goal and milestone 5. With KKK empty no control exists and the existential statements would be false.
  • Lemma 7.2 is stated as the triangle inequality, "δ=0\delta = 0δ=0 iff almost-everywhere equality on [0,T][0, T][0,T]", and sequential completeness for measurable controls. Lemma 7.3 is sequential continuity. Lemma 7.4 is a one-sided derivative within [0,t0][0, t_0][0,t0​] at 000, stated for an arbitrary measurable uεu_\varepsilonuε​.
  • Theorem 1.1 (Ekeland's principle) is a separate mission of this series and still a draft, so milestone 5 states the instance used here directly.
  • Out of scope: the uniform bound (7.3) and the remark after Theorem 7.1 that one may take ε=0\varepsilon = 0ε=0 in (7.5) when (7.4) holds with ε=0\varepsilon = 0ε=0.

Welcome contributions include Carathéodory existence and uniqueness for ODEs with measurable time dependence, Gronwall-type estimates for absolutely continuous functions, the complete metric space of measurable maps under the disagreement measure, and differentiability of flows with respect to initial data.

Selected references

  • I. Ekeland, On the Variational Principle, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 47 (1974), 324–353. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-247X(74)90025-0
  • I. Ekeland, Nonconvex minimization problems, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. (N.S.) 1 (1979), 443–474. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0273-0979-1979-14595-6
  • R. Pallu de la Barrière, Optimal Control Theory, Saunders, Philadelphia, 1967.
  • L. S. Pontryagin, V. G. Boltyanskii, R. V. Gamkrelidze, E. F. Mishchenko, The Mathematical Theory of Optimal Processes, Interscience, New York, 1962.
11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Discrete GeometryLinear OptimizationOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Sensitivity Theorems in Integer Linear Programming: Every Integral m×n Matrix Has Chvátal Rank at Most 2^(n³+1)·n^(5n)·Δ(A)^(n+1)Research Paper

Motivation

An integer linear program max⁡{wx:Ax≤b, x integral}\max\{wx : Ax \le b,\ x \text{ integral}\}max{wx:Ax≤b, x integral} is usually attacked through its linear programming relaxation max⁡{wx:Ax≤b}\max\{wx : Ax \le b\}max{wx:Ax≤b}, which drops the integrality constraint. Two questions follow at once. How far can an optimal solution of the relaxation be from an optimal integer solution? And how many rounds of rounding-based cutting planes are needed before the relaxation describes the integer points exactly? Branch-and-bound, cutting-plane methods and the parametric analysis of integer programs all depend on the answers.

W. Cook, A.M.H. Gerards, A. Schrijver and É. Tardos, Sensitivity theorems in integer linear programming (Math. Programming 34 (1986) 251–264), answer both in terms of the number of variables nnn and the largest subdeterminant Δ(A)\Delta(A)Δ(A) of the constraint matrix, independently of the right-hand side.

Timeline.

  • 1958–1963: Gomory introduces integer rounding cuts. In 1973 Chvátal (Discrete Math. 4) shows that finitely many rounds reach the integer hull of a bounded polyhedron.
  • 1977–1979: Blair and Jeroslow prove that for a fixed matrix AAA the distance between LP and IP optima, and the gap between their values, are bounded by constants depending on AAA.
  • 1980: Schrijver (Ann. Discrete Math. 9) proves that the Chvátal closure of a rational polyhedron is a polyhedron, and that every rational polyhedron, bounded or not, reaches its integer hull after finitely many rounds.
  • 1986: Cook, Gerards, Schrijver and Tardos prove the explicit bounds of this mission, nΔ(A)n\Delta(A)nΔ(A) for proximity, and show that every integral matrix has finite Chvátal rank.
  • Later work, for example Eisenbrand and Weismantel (2018), replaces the ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​ proximity bound by ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ bounds for programs in standard form.

Setting

All matrices, vectors and polyhedra are rational. Let AAA be an integral m×nm\times nm×n matrix. A square submatrix of order kkk, where 1≤k≤min⁡(m,n)1\le k\le\min(m,n)1≤k≤min(m,n), keeps kkk rows and kkk columns of AAA. The quantity Δ(A)\Delta(A)Δ(A) is the largest ∣det⁡B∣|\det B|∣detB∣ over all such submatrices BBB. So Δ(0)=0\Delta(0)=0Δ(0)=0, and Δ(A)≥1\Delta(A)\ge 1Δ(A)≥1 whenever A≠0A\ne 0A=0. Norms are ∥x∥∞=max⁡i∣xi∣\|x\|_\infty=\max_i|x_i|∥x∥∞​=maxi​∣xi​∣ and ∥x∥1=∑i∣xi∣\|x\|_1=\sum_i|x_i|∥x∥1​=∑i​∣xi​∣.

For b∈Qmb\in\mathbb{Q}^mb∈Qm write P={x∈Qn:Ax≤b}P=\{x\in\mathbb{Q}^n : Ax\le b\}P={x∈Qn:Ax≤b}. An optimal solution of max⁡{wx:Ax≤b}\max\{wx : Ax\le b\}max{wx:Ax≤b} is a point of PPP maximizing wxwxwx. For max⁡{wx:Ax≤b, x integral}\max\{wx : Ax\le b,\ x\text{ integral}\}max{wx:Ax≤b, x integral} it is an integral point of PPP maximizing wxwxwx among the integral points of PPP. A rational polyhedron is a set {x:Dx≤d}\{x : Dx\le d\}{x:Dx≤d} with DDD, ddd rational. The integer hull PIP_IPI​ is the convex hull of the integral points of PPP.

If ay≤βay\le\betaay≤β for all y∈Py\in Py∈P, with aaa integral and β\betaβ rational, then every integral point of PPP satisfies the Chvátal cut ax≤⌊β⌋ax\le\lfloor\beta\rfloorax≤⌊β⌋. The Chvátal closure P′P'P′ is the set of points satisfying all Chvátal cuts. Set P(0)=PP^{(0)}=PP(0)=P and P(i)=(P(i−1))′P^{(i)}=(P^{(i-1)})'P(i)=(P(i−1))′. Then PI⊆P(i)P_I\subseteq P^{(i)}PI​⊆P(i) for all iii. The Chvátal rank of PPP is the least ttt with P(t)=PIP^{(t)}=P_IP(t)=PI​. The Chvátal rank of the matrix AAA is the supremum of the Chvátal ranks of {x:Ax≤b}\{x : Ax\le b\}{x:Ax≤b} over all integral vectors bbb.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 10 (p. 260)

sup⁡b∈Zm rank⁡{x:Ax≤b} ≤ 2n3+1 n5n Δ(A)n+1.\sup_{b\in\mathbb{Z}^m}\ \operatorname{rank}\{x : Ax\le b\}\ \le\ 2^{n^3+1}\,n^{5n}\,\Delta(A)^{n+1}.b∈Zmsup​ rank{x:Ax≤b} ≤ 2n3+1n5nΔ(A)n+1.

In particular, every integral matrix has finite Chvátal rank, and the bound does not depend on mmm or on bbb.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Theorem 1 (p. 252). Suppose Ax≤bAx\le bAx≤b has an integral solution and the LP maximum exists. Then every LP optimum has an IP optimum within ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​-distance nΔ(A)n\Delta(A)nΔ(A), and every IP optimum has an LP optimum within the same distance.
  2. Corollary 2 (p. 253). Under the same hypotheses, max⁡{wx:Ax≤b}−max⁡{wx:Ax≤b, x integral}≤nΔ(A)∥w∥1\max\{wx: Ax\le b\}-\max\{wx : Ax\le b,\ x\text{ integral}\}\le n\Delta(A)\|w\|_1max{wx:Ax≤b}−max{wx:Ax≤b, x integral}≤nΔ(A)∥w∥1​.
  3. Theorem 5 (p. 255). Changing bbb to b′b'b′ moves LP optima by at most nΔ(A)∥b−b′∥∞n\Delta(A)\|b-b'\|_\inftynΔ(A)∥b−b′∥∞​ and IP optima by at most nΔ(A)(∥b−b′∥∞+2)n\Delta(A)(\|b-b'\|_\infty+2)nΔ(A)(∥b−b′∥∞​+2). This result is off the goal's path.
  4. Theorem 6 (p. 256). A non-optimal integral solution can be improved by an integral solution within ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​-distance nΔ(A)n\Delta(A)nΔ(A).
  5. Theorem 7 (p. 257). A single integral matrix MMM, with entries at most n2nΔ(A)nn^{2n}\Delta(A)^nn2nΔ(A)n in absolute value, gives {x:Ax≤b}I={x:Mx≤db}\{x: Ax\le b\}_I=\{x : Mx\le d_b\}{x:Ax≤b}I​={x:Mx≤db​} for every bbb for which Ax≤bAx\le bAx≤b has an integral solution.
  6. Theorem 8, printed "Theorem 9" (p. 259). If a rational polyhedron P⊆QnP\subseteq\mathbb{Q}^nP⊆Qn has no integral point, then P(n2n2n3)=∅P^{(n^{2n}2^{n^3})}=\emptysetP(n2n2n3)=∅.
  7. Corollary 9 (p. 260). Let q=max⁡{wx:x∈PI}q=\max\{wx : x\in P_I\}q=max{wx:x∈PI​} with www integral. Then P(r)⊆{x:wx≤q}P^{(r)}\subseteq\{x : wx\le q\}P(r)⊆{x:wx≤q} for r=(n2n2n3+1)(⌊max⁡{wx:x∈P}⌋−q)+1r=(n^{2n}2^{n^3}+1)(\lfloor\max\{wx : x\in P\}\rfloor-q)+1r=(n2n2n3+1)(⌊max{wx:x∈P}⌋−q)+1.

Significance

The result. Theorem 10 shows that the number of Gomory–Chvátal rounding rounds needed for {x:Ax≤b}\{x : Ax\le b\}{x:Ax≤b} is controlled by AAA alone. It is the first general finite bound on the Chvátal rank of a matrix. Earlier, the matrices of Chvátal rank 0 had been characterized by Hoffman and Kruskal: they are the matrices whose transpose is unimodular. Some classes of rank 1 had also been characterized (Edmonds–Johnson, Gerards–Schrijver). The proximity results of §2 are used on their own. They bound the work needed to solve an integer program from an LP optimum, and they show that the optimal value of an integer program changes at most affinely with bbb. They are also the standard starting point for the later proximity literature.

Formalizing it. All results are proved in the paper. As far as is known, none of them has a machine-checked proof: the Prove2Me corpus holds no Chvátal rank bound, and its existing proximity theorems concern a different bound, the ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ bound with Δ\DeltaΔ the largest entry. This mission asks for Lean proofs of the paper's statements with the constants exactly as printed. It also builds a reusable layer over Q\mathbb{Q}Q: polyhedra, LP and IP optimality, integer hulls, the Chvátal closure and the Chvátal rank.

Difficulty

The proximity theorems need a conic decomposition xˉ−zˉ=∑λigi\bar x-\bar z=\sum\lambda_i g^ixˉ−zˉ=∑λi​gi into integral generators with entries bounded by Δ(A)\Delta(A)Δ(A). That requires Cramer's rule bounds on cone generators and Carathéodory's theorem, and neither is in Mathlib in this form for rational polyhedral cones.

Theorem 7 needs finite generation of integral cones with explicit coefficient bounds, together with LP duality.

The Chvátal-rank part is harder. The obvious induction on the value of a valid inequality fails, because the value gap ⌊max⁡Pwx⌋−q\lfloor\max_P wx\rfloor-q⌊maxP​wx⌋−q is not bounded independently of bbb until Theorem 7 and Corollary 2 bound it by n2n+2Δ(A)n+1n^{2n+2}\Delta(A)^{n+1}n2n+2Δ(A)n+1. Theorem 8 itself rests on a flatness theorem for lattice-free polyhedra (Lenstra; Grötschel–Lovász–Schrijver), which the paper cites without proof. It also needs Schrijver's lemma that P(k)∩F⊆F(k)P^{(k)}\cap F\subseteq F^{(k)}P(k)∩F⊆F(k) for faces FFF, and invariance under unimodular affine maps. None of these is in Mathlib.

Formalization scope

  • Rationality. Everything is over Q\mathbb{Q}Q, following the paper's standing assumption on p. 252. Points are Fin n → ℚ, AAA is Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℤ cast to Q\mathbb{Q}Q, and a polyhedron is a finite system of rational inequalities.
  • Δ(A)\Delta(A)Δ(A). Only nonempty submatrices count, so Δ(0)=0\Delta(0)=0Δ(0)=0.
  • Optimality. "The maximum exists" means an optimal solution exists. Existence claims that the paper proves are part of the conclusions: the IP optimum in Theorem 1 and Corollary 2, and max⁡{wx:x∈P}\max\{wx : x\in P\}max{wx:x∈P} in Corollary 9.
  • Chvátal closure. It is defined for every subset of Qn\mathbb{Q}^nQn, using all integral aaa and rational β\betaβ. The rank is valued in N∪{∞}\mathbb{N}\cup\{\infty\}N∪{∞}, with ∞\infty∞ if no iterate equals PIP_IPI​. A version with junk value 000 would make the goal trivial and is not used. The matrix rank is a supremum over integral bbb, as printed.
  • Added hypotheses. Theorems 1 and 6 carry the hypothesis A≠0A\ne0A=0. For A=0A=0A=0 the bound nΔ(A)=0n\Delta(A)=0nΔ(A)=0 makes both statements false, and the proof on p. 257 assumes A≠0A\ne0A=0 as well. In Corollary 9 the value qqq is taken to be an integer. This loses nothing, because a maximum of an integral www over PIP_IPI​ is attained at an integral point.
  • Constants. All constants are exactly as printed, written in N\mathbb{N}N with 00=10^0=100=1.

A complete development needs the following:

  • cone generation with Cramer bounds and Carathéodory's theorem;
  • LP duality and Farkas' lemma over Q\mathbb{Q}Q;
  • the polyhedrality of P′P'P′ for rational polyhedra (Schrijver 1980);
  • Schrijver's face lemma and unimodular invariance;
  • a flatness theorem.

The LP, cone and Chvátal-closure layers are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, and so is groundwork such as polyhedrality of the Chvátal closure or the flatness theorem, submitted as separate theorems.

Selected references

  • W. Cook, A.M.H. Gerards, A. Schrijver, É. Tardos, Sensitivity theorems in integer linear programming, Mathematical Programming 34 (1986) 251–264. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01582230
  • V. Chvátal, Edmonds polytopes and a hierarchy of combinatorial problems, Discrete Mathematics 4 (1973) 305–337. https://doi.org/10.1016/0012-365X(73)90167-2
  • A. Schrijver, On cutting planes, Annals of Discrete Mathematics 9 (1980) 291–296. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-5060(08)70085-2
  • W. Cook, C.R. Coullard, Gy. Turán, On the complexity of cutting-plane proofs, Discrete Applied Mathematics 18 (1987) 25–38. https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-218X(87)90039-4
  • F. Eisenbrand, R. Weismantel, Proximity results and faster algorithms for integer programming using the Steinitz lemma, ACM Transactions on Algorithms 16 (2020), Art. 5. https://doi.org/10.1145/3340322
11 thms2 active usersReviewed
AnalysisOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Łojasiewicz Inequality for Nonsmooth Subanalytic Functions with Applications to Subgradient Dynamical Systems I: The Łojasiewicz Inequality at Critical Points of Continuous Subanalytic FunctionsResearch Paper

Motivation

For a real-analytic function f:U→Rf : U \to \mathbb{R}f:U→R on an open set U⊆RnU \subseteq \mathbb{R}^nU⊆Rn and a critical point aaa (so ∇f(a)=0\nabla f(a) = 0∇f(a)=0), the Łojasiewicz gradient inequality says that there is an exponent θ∈[0,1)\theta \in [0,1)θ∈[0,1) such that ∣f−f(a)∣θ/∥∇f∥|f - f(a)|^{\theta} / \|\nabla f\|∣f−f(a)∣θ/∥∇f∥ stays bounded near aaa. It is the standard tool for proving that bounded gradient trajectories x˙=−∇f(x)\dot x = -\nabla f(x)x˙=−∇f(x) have finite length and converge to a single critical point, and, in its descendants (the Kurdyka–Łojasiewicz property), for proving convergence of the whole iterate sequence of nonconvex descent methods: proximal gradient, alternating minimization, PALM, ADMM. Those algorithmic results all assume a nonsmooth version of the inequality, for functions that may take the value +∞+\infty+∞ and are not differentiable.

Bolte, Daniilidis and Lewis (SIAM J. Optim. 17 (2007)) supplied that nonsmooth version. This mission formalizes their first main result, Theorem 3.1: the inequality at critical points of subanalytic functions that are continuous on a closed domain.

Timeline.

  • 1963: Łojasiewicz proves the inequality for real-analytic functions (Une propriété topologique des sous-ensembles analytiques réels), and in 1984 derives convergence of bounded analytic gradient trajectories.
  • 1998: Kurdyka (Ann. Inst. Fourier 48) extends it to C1C^1C1 functions definable in an o-minimal structure, with a desingularizing function in place of the power.
  • 2006: Bolte, Daniilidis and Lewis prove a nonsmooth Sard theorem (J. Math. Anal. Appl. 321): a subanalytic function continuous on its closed domain is constant on each connected component of its critical set.
  • 2007: The present paper proves the nonsmooth inequality for continuous subanalytic functions (Theorem 3.1) and for lower semicontinuous convex ones (Theorem 3.3).
  • 2007: Bolte, Daniilidis, Lewis and Shiota (SIAM J. Optim. 18) extend it to lower semicontinuous functions definable in o-minimal structures (the KL property).

Setting

Write Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn with its Euclidean norm. A function f:Rn→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R} \cup \{+\infty\}f:Rn→R∪{+∞} has domain dom⁡f={x:f(x)<+∞}\operatorname{dom} f = \{x : f(x) < +\infty\}domf={x:f(x)<+∞}.

Subanalytic sets (Definition 2.1). A set A⊆RnA \subseteq \mathbb{R}^nA⊆Rn is semianalytic if every point of Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn has a neighbourhood VVV on which A∩V=⋃i=1p⋂j=1q{x∈V:fij(x)=0, gij(x)>0}A \cap V = \bigcup_{i=1}^{p}\bigcap_{j=1}^{q}\{x \in V : f_{ij}(x) = 0,\ g_{ij}(x) > 0\}A∩V=⋃i=1p​⋂j=1q​{x∈V:fij​(x)=0, gij​(x)>0} with fij,gijf_{ij}, g_{ij}fij​,gij​ real-analytic on VVV. It is subanalytic if every point of Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn has a neighbourhood VVV such that A∩VA \cap VA∩V is the projection onto Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn of a bounded semianalytic subset of Rn×Rm\mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R}^mRn×Rm, m≥1m \ge 1m≥1. A function fff is subanalytic if its graph {(x,λ)∈Rn×R:f(x)=λ}\{(x,\lambda) \in \mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R} : f(x) = \lambda\}{(x,λ)∈Rn×R:f(x)=λ} is subanalytic. Semialgebraic functions, and functions locally built from analytic ones by finitely many algebraic operations, max/min and compositions, are subanalytic.

Subdifferentials (Definition 2.10). The Fréchet subdifferential ∂^f(x)\hat\partial f(x)∂^f(x) is the set of x∗x^*x∗ with lim inf⁡y→x, y≠xf(y)−f(x)−⟨x∗,y−x⟩∥y−x∥≥0\liminf_{y \to x,\, y \ne x} \frac{f(y) - f(x) - \langle x^*, y - x\rangle}{\|y - x\|} \ge 0liminfy→x,y=x​∥y−x∥f(y)−f(x)−⟨x∗,y−x⟩​≥0 (empty off dom⁡f\operatorname{dom} fdomf). The limiting subdifferential ∂f(x)\partial f(x)∂f(x) is the set of limits of xk∗∈∂^f(xk)x^*_k \in \hat\partial f(x_k)xk∗​∈∂^f(xk​) along xk→xx_k \to xxk​→x with f(xk)→f(x)f(x_k) \to f(x)f(xk​)→f(x).

Slope and critical points. The nonsmooth slope is mf(x)=inf⁡{∥x∗∥:x∗∈∂f(x)}m_f(x) = \inf\{\|x^*\| : x^* \in \partial f(x)\}mf​(x)=inf{∥x∗∥:x∗∈∂f(x)}, equal to +∞+\infty+∞ when ∂f(x)=∅\partial f(x) = \emptyset∂f(x)=∅ (equation (4)). The critical set is crit⁡f={x:0∈∂f(x)}\operatorname{crit} f = \{x : 0 \in \partial f(x)\}critf={x:0∈∂f(x)} (Definition 2.11).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1

Let fff be subanalytic with closed domain and f∣dom⁡ff|_{\operatorname{dom} f}f∣domf​ continuous, and let a∈crit⁡fa \in \operatorname{crit} fa∈critf. Then there is θ∈[0,1)\theta \in [0,1)θ∈[0,1) such that

∣f−f(a)∣θmf  is bounded around a,\frac{|f - f(a)|^{\theta}}{m_f} \ \text{ is bounded around } a,mf​∣f−f(a)∣θ​  is bounded around a,

with the conventions 00=10^0 = 100=1 and ∞/∞=0/0=0\infty/\infty = 0/0 = 0∞/∞=0/0=0. In division-free form: there are CCC and a neighbourhood UUU of aaa with ∣f(x)−f(a)∣θ≤C∥x∗∥|f(x) - f(a)|^{\theta} \le C\|x^*\|∣f(x)−f(a)∣θ≤C∥x∗∥ for all x∈Ux \in Ux∈U and x∗∈∂f(x)x^* \in \partial f(x)x∗∈∂f(x). The exponent is existential; the goal fixes no value of θ\thetaθ or CCC.

Milestones

  1. Remark 2.12, for fff continuous on a closed domain: the graph of ∂f\partial f∂f is closed; crit⁡f\operatorname{crit} fcritf is closed; mfm_fmf​ is lower semicontinuous; crit⁡f=mf−1(0)\operatorname{crit} f = m_f^{-1}(0)critf=mf−1​(0).
  2. Proposition 2.13(ii), its clause on the critical set: if fff is subanalytic and relatively bounded on its domain, then crit⁡f\operatorname{crit} fcritf is subanalytic.
  3. Equation (6), recalled from the nonsmooth Sard theorem: fff is constant on the connected component of crit⁡f\operatorname{crit} fcritf containing aaa.
  4. The curve selection lemma, recalled from Bierstone–Milman: a boundary point of a subanalytic set is the origin of an analytic arc entering the set.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3.1 is the nonsmooth Łojasiewicz inequality at critical points. With the subgradient in place of the gradient, it yields finite length of bounded trajectories of subgradient systems x˙∈−∂f(x)\dot x \in -\partial f(x)x˙∈−∂f(x) (Section 4 of the paper) and is the template for the Kurdyka–Łojasiewicz property that underlies convergence proofs for proximal and splitting methods on nonconvex, nonsmooth problems (e.g. Attouch–Bolte–Redont–Soubeyran 2010, Bolte–Sabach–Teboulle 2014). Those papers assume the KL property and cite this line of results to know it holds for semialgebraic and subanalytic objectives.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved; this mission produces a machine-checked proof. To our knowledge no proof assistant has a formal definition of subanalytic sets or of the nonsmooth Łojasiewicz inequality. The definitions layer (semianalytic and subanalytic sets, the slope, the inequality) is reusable by any later formalization of KL-based convergence analyses, and the milestones on Remark 2.12 are general facts about limiting subdifferentials that apply well beyond subanalytic geometry.

Difficulty

The obvious argument restricts fff and mfm_fmf​ to an analytic curve and compares their Puiseux expansions. That step needs three pieces of subanalytic geometry that no library has: curve selection, the structure of one-variable subanalytic functions (monotonicity and Puiseux expansions), and the fact that the sets built in the proof (sets of points with a subgradient satisfying an inequality, level-wise infima of mfm_fmf​) are again subanalytic, which in the paper goes through global subanalyticity and the projection theorem. The second obstacle is that fff is not smooth: the classical proof differentiates fff along a curve, while here only Fréchet subgradients are available, and the chain rule along an analytic curve holds only almost everywhere. The constancy of fff on critical components, equation (6), is itself a nonsmooth Sard-type theorem whose published proof uses stratification. A solver who replaces subanalytic by semialgebraic, or assumes fff real-valued and C1C^1C1, proves a different and much weaker statement.

Formalization scope

  • Space and values. The space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n). The function is f : E → EReal with f x ≠ ⊥ for every x. The domain is {x | f x ≠ ⊤}; it is assumed closed, and f is assumed ContinuousOn it.
  • Subdifferentials. ∂^f\hat\partial f∂^f and ∂f\partial f∂f are the published platform definitions NonconvexSplitting.Shared.IsRegularSubgrad and LimitingSubdiff, which match Definition 2.10 for functions never equal to −∞-\infty−∞.
  • Subanalyticity. It is defined on any finite-dimensional real normed space, so that the same definition covers Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn, Rn×R\mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R}Rn×R and Rn×Rm\mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R}^mRn×Rm. Analyticity is AnalyticOnNhd ℝ. The boundedness of the semianalytic set in Definition 2.1(ii) is part of the definition: without it every projection of a semianalytic set would count.
  • Slope. The slope is valued in [0,+∞][0,+\infty][0,+∞], with +∞+\infty+∞ on points without subgradients.
  • The inequality. It is the predicate LojIneqAt f a θ: one constant CCC and one neighbourhood of aaa, quantified over all limiting subgradients. Under 00=10^0 = 100=1 the value θ=0\theta = 0θ=0 never works at a critical point, as under the paper's conventions.
  • Not assumed. The goal does not assume lower semicontinuity, real values, global subanalyticity, compactness of the critical set, or f(a)=0f(a) = 0f(a)=0. These are reductions inside the paper's proof. Any formalization that adds them, fixes θ\thetaθ, or replaces the class of fff by semialgebraic or C1C^1C1 functions trivializes the target.
  • Infrastructure. A complete proof needs: curve selection; the monotonicity lemma and Puiseux expansions for one-variable globally subanalytic functions; the projection theorem or an equivalent definability argument; the nonsmooth Sard theorem (6); and a chain rule for Fréchet subgradients along analytic curves. Each of these is welcome as a separate contribution, and the subanalytic-geometry results are reusable well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • J. Bolte, A. Daniilidis, A. Lewis, The Łojasiewicz inequality for nonsmooth subanalytic functions with applications to subgradient dynamical systems, SIAM J. Optim. 17 (2007) 1205–1223. https://doi.org/10.1137/050644641
  • J. Bolte, A. Daniilidis, A. Lewis, A Sard theorem for non-differentiable functions, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 321 (2006) 729–740.
  • E. Bierstone, P. Milman, Semianalytic and subanalytic sets, Publ. Math. IHÉS 67 (1988) 5–42. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02699126
  • K. Kurdyka, On gradients of functions definable in o-minimal structures, Ann. Inst. Fourier 48 (1998) 769–783. https://doi.org/10.5802/aif.1638
  • J. Bolte, A. Daniilidis, A. Lewis, M. Shiota, Clarke subgradients of stratifiable functions, SIAM J. Optim. 18 (2007) 556–572. https://doi.org/10.1137/060670080
  • S. Łojasiewicz, Une propriété topologique des sous-ensembles analytiques réels, in Les Équations aux Dérivées Partielles, CNRS, Paris, 1963, 87–89.
  • R. T. Rockafellar, R. J.-B. Wets, Variational Analysis, Grundlehren 317, Springer, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02431-3
12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

The Sample Complexity of Pattern Classification with Neural Networks: The Size of the Weights is More Important than the Size of the Network I: Fat-Shattering Margin Bound with d = fat_H(γ/16)Research Paper

Motivation

Classical generalization bounds for classifiers, built on the VC dimension, grow with the number of adjustable parameters. For neural networks this is at odds with practice: networks with many more weights than training examples often generalize well. Bartlett's 1998 paper (IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 44(2), 525–536) explains part of this by measuring a real-valued classifier's confidence. If a hypothesis classifies most training examples correctly with a margin γ\gammaγ, its misclassification probability is controlled by a scale-sensitive dimension of the class at scale proportional to γ\gammaγ, not by its VC dimension. Later in the paper this yields bounds for networks with small weights that do not depend on the number of weights.

This mission formalizes the first of the paper's two main technical results, the margin bound of Theorem 2 (p. 527), together with the steps of its proof on pp. 527–528.

The fat-shattering dimension was introduced by Kearns and Schapire (JCSS 1994). Alon, Ben-David, Cesa-Bianchi and Haussler (J. ACM 1997) proved the scale-sensitive Sauer-type covering bound used here (Theorem 5 of the paper). Shawe-Taylor, Bartlett, Williamson and Anthony (IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 1998) proved the zero-training-error version (Theorem 1 of the paper). Theorem 2 extends it to hypotheses that make margin errors on the training data.

Setting

Let XXX be a set and PPP a probability distribution on X×{−1,1}X\times\{-1,1\}X×{−1,1}. The threshold function is sgn⁡(α)=−1\operatorname{sgn}(\alpha)=-1sgn(α)=−1 for α<0\alpha<0α<0 and sgn⁡(α)=1\operatorname{sgn}(\alpha)=1sgn(α)=1 for α≥0\alpha\ge0α≥0. For a real-valued hypothesis hhh on XXX, the misclassification probability is er⁡P(h)=P{sgn⁡(h(x))≠y}\operatorname{er}_P(h)=P\{\operatorname{sgn}(h(x))\ne y\}erP​(h)=P{sgn(h(x))=y}. For a sample z=((x1,y1),…,(xm,ym))z=((x_1,y_1),\dots,(x_m,y_m))z=((x1​,y1​),…,(xm​,ym​)) drawn independently from PPP and γ>0\gamma>0γ>0, the margin error estimate is

er⁡^zγ(h)=1m ∣{i:yih(xi)<γ}∣.\widehat{\operatorname{er}}{}^{\gamma}_z(h)=\tfrac1m\,|\{i : y_ih(x_i)<\gamma\}|.erzγ​(h)=m1​∣{i:yi​h(xi​)<γ}∣.

Let HHH be a class of real functions on XXX. Points x1,…,xmx_1,\dots,x_mx1​,…,xm​ are γ\gammaγ-shattered by HHH if some r∈Rmr\in\mathbb R^mr∈Rm has the following property: for every sign vector b∈{−1,1}mb\in\{-1,1\}^mb∈{−1,1}m, some h∈Hh\in Hh∈H satisfies (h(xi)−ri)bi≥γ(h(x_i)-r_i)b_i\ge\gamma(h(xi​)−ri​)bi​≥γ for all iii. The fat-shattering dimension fat⁡H(γ)\operatorname{fat}_H(\gamma)fatH​(γ) is the largest such mmm, possibly ∞\infty∞.

The proof uses the following objects:

  • the squashing function πγ(α)=max⁡(−γ,min⁡(γ,α))\pi_\gamma(\alpha)=\max(-\gamma,\min(\gamma,\alpha))πγ​(α)=max(−γ,min(γ,α)) and the class πγ(H)={πγ∘h:h∈H}\pi_\gamma(H)=\{\pi_\gamma\circ h:h\in H\}πγ​(H)={πγ​∘h:h∈H};
  • the sample ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​ pseudometric dℓ∞(x)(f,g)=max⁡i∣f(xi)−g(xi)∣d_{\ell_\infty(x)}(f,g)=\max_i|f(x_i)-g(x_i)|dℓ∞​(x)​(f,g)=maxi​∣f(xi​)−g(xi​)∣;
  • the covering number N∞(F,ϵ,m)\mathcal N_\infty(F,\epsilon,m)N∞​(F,ϵ,m), the largest over x∈Xmx\in X^mx∈Xm of the size of the smallest ϵ\epsilonϵ-cover (Definition 3), and the corresponding packing number M∞(F,α,m)\mathcal M_\infty(F,\alpha,m)M∞​(F,α,m);
  • the quantization Qα(x)=⌈(x−α/2)/α⌉αQ_\alpha(x)=\lceil (x-\alpha/2)/\alpha\rceil\alphaQα​(x)=⌈(x−α/2)/α⌉α.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2

Assume 0<δ<1/20<\delta<1/20<δ<1/2, 0<γ<10<\gamma<10<γ<1, m≥1m\ge1m≥1, and d=fat⁡H(γ/16)d=\operatorname{fat}_H(\gamma/16)d=fatH​(γ/16) finite with d≤34md\le 34md≤34m. With probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ over zzz, every h∈Hh\in Hh∈H satisfies

er⁡P(h)<er⁡^zγ(h)+2m(dln⁡34emdlog⁡2(578m)+ln⁡4δ).\operatorname{er}_P(h)<\widehat{\operatorname{er}}{}^{\gamma}_z(h)+\sqrt{\frac2m\Bigl(d\ln\frac{34em}{d}\log_2(578m)+\ln\frac4\delta\Bigr)} .erP​(h)<erzγ​(h)+m2​(dlnd34em​log2​(578m)+lnδ4​)​.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. Lemma 4. er⁡P(h)<er⁡^zγ(h)+(2/m)ln⁡(2N∞(πγ(H),γ/2,2m)/δ)\operatorname{er}_P(h)<\widehat{\operatorname{er}}{}^{\gamma}_z(h)+\sqrt{(2/m)\ln(2\mathcal N_\infty(\pi_\gamma(H),\gamma/2,2m)/\delta)}erP​(h)<erzγ​(h)+(2/m)ln(2N∞​(πγ​(H),γ/2,2m)/δ)​ uniformly over HHH, with probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ.
  2. Theorem 5 (Alon et al.). If F:{1,…,n}→{1,…,b}F:\{1,\dots,n\}\to\{1,\dots,b\}F:{1,…,n}→{1,…,b} and fat⁡F(1)≤d\operatorname{fat}_F(1)\le dfatF​(1)≤d, then log⁡2N∞(F,2,n)<1+log⁡2(nb2)log⁡2∑i≤d(ni)bi\log_2\mathcal N_\infty(F,2,n)<1+\log_2(nb^2)\log_2\sum_{i\le d}\binom ni b^ilog2​N∞​(F,2,n)<1+log2​(nb2)log2​∑i≤d​(in​)bi, provided nnn is large enough.
  3. Writing F=Qγ/8(πγ(H))F=Q_{\gamma/8}(\pi_\gamma(H))F=Qγ/8​(πγ​(H)): fat⁡F(γ/8)≤fat⁡πγ(H)(γ/16)\operatorname{fat}_F(\gamma/8)\le\operatorname{fat}_{\pi_\gamma(H)}(\gamma/16)fatF​(γ/8)≤fatπγ​(H)​(γ/16).
  4. M∞(πγ(H),γ/2,2m)≤M∞(F,γ/2,2m)\mathcal M_\infty(\pi_\gamma(H),\gamma/2,2m)\le\mathcal M_\infty(F,\gamma/2,2m)M∞​(πγ​(H),γ/2,2m)≤M∞​(F,γ/2,2m).
  5. N∞(πγ(H),γ/2,2m)≤N∞(F,γ/4,2m)\mathcal N_\infty(\pi_\gamma(H),\gamma/2,2m)\le\mathcal N_\infty(F,\gamma/4,2m)N∞​(πγ​(H),γ/2,2m)≤N∞​(F,γ/4,2m).
  6. log⁡2N∞(πγ(H),γ/2,2m)<1+dlog⁡2(34em/d)log⁡2(578m)\log_2\mathcal N_\infty(\pi_\gamma(H),\gamma/2,2m)<1+d\log_2(34em/d)\log_2(578m)log2​N∞​(πγ​(H),γ/2,2m)<1+dlog2​(34em/d)log2​(578m) when 1≤d≤2m1\le d\le 2m1≤d≤2m and m≥dlog⁡2(34em/d)+1m\ge d\log_2(34em/d)+1m≥dlog2​(34em/d)+1.
  7. fat⁡πγ(H)(γ/16)≤fat⁡H(γ/16)\operatorname{fat}_{\pi_\gamma(H)}(\gamma/16)\le\operatorname{fat}_H(\gamma/16)fatπγ​(H)​(γ/16)≤fatH​(γ/16).

A further item, Proposition 8 (p. 529), is the probabilistic device the paper uses to make such bounds uniform over γ\gammaγ.

Significance

Theorem 2 is the bound behind the paper's main message. Corollary 9 makes it uniform over γ\gammaγ, and Theorem 28 combines it with fat-shattering estimates for networks with bounded weights. Together they show that a network classifying the training data with a large margin generalizes at a rate governed by the size of its weights, not by its number of weights. The same template, a margin error plus a capacity term at scale γ\gammaγ, underlies later margin analyses of support vector machines and boosting.

All results in this mission are proved in the literature; none is open. None is machine-checked on this platform: the platform has Rademacher-complexity margin bounds, but no statement about fat-shattering dimension or ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​ sample covering numbers of real-valued classes. A complete formalization would provide a reusable library of these objects, with their basic inequalities between squashing, quantization, packing and covering. It would also give a checked version of the explicit constants 34em/d34em/d34em/d and 578m578m578m, which differ from those in later textbook treatments.

Difficulty

The bound is uniform over a possibly uncountable class HHH, so a union bound over hypotheses does not apply. The obvious replacement is a union bound over a cover of HHH. Two steps make it hard:

  • Lemma 4. It needs a ghost-sample symmetrization and a random-swap argument, carried out with an ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​ cover of the squashed class on the double sample, so the cover depends on the data.
  • Theorem 5. Bounding that covering number by the fat-shattering dimension is a combinatorial counting argument about strongly shattered pairs. It is the scale-sensitive analogue of the Sauer–Shelah lemma, and here the bookkeeping of constants is exact.

The quantization steps look routine but carry the factor-of-two losses that produce the constants γ/16\gamma/16γ/16, 171717 and 578578578.

Formalization scope

The model is in the namespace BartlettNN.Margin.

  • Labels and samples. Labels are Bool, read as ±1\pm1±1 through pm (true is +1+1+1). sgn⁡(0)=1\operatorname{sgn}(0)=1sgn(0)=1. Samples are functions Fin m → X × Bool, indexed from 000, with law Measure.pi (fun _ => P). The margin estimate uses the strict inequality yih(xi)<γy_ih(x_i)<\gammayi​h(xi​)<γ, and shattering uses ≥γ\ge\gamma≥γ.
  • Fat-shattering dimension. fat⁡\operatorname{fat}fat is valued in ℕ∞. A ℕ-valued supremum would be 000 on an unbounded set, so the goal assumes fat H (γ/16) = d with d : ℕ.
  • Covering and packing numbers. Covers are finite and external (centres are arbitrary functions), the cover inequality is strict, and covering numbers are ⊤ when no finite cover exists. N∞\mathcal N_\inftyN∞​ and M∞\mathcal M_\inftyM∞​ are suprema over all samples, with repetitions allowed. "α\alphaα-separated", which the paper leaves undefined, is read as distance ≥α\ge\alpha≥α.
  • Logarithms. ln⁡\lnln is Real.log, log⁡2\log_2log2​ is Real.logb 2, and eee is Real.exp 1.
  • High probability. "With probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ, every hhh" bounds the measure of the event that some h∈Hh\in Hh∈H violates the inequality. It is not a per-hypothesis statement.

Measurability. The paper states "we ignore issues of measurability, and assume that all sets considered are measurable" (p. 526). This is made explicit, not removed, through three hypotheses:

  • every h∈Hh\in Hh∈H is measurable;
  • the bad events {z:∃h∈H, er⁡P(h)≥er⁡^zγ(h)+ϵ}\{z:\exists h\in H,\ \operatorname{er}_P(h)\ge\widehat{\operatorname{er}}{}^{\gamma}_z(h)+\epsilon\}{z:∃h∈H, erP​(h)≥erzγ​(h)+ϵ} are measurable;
  • the double-sample events of display (1) are measurable.

Replacing these by countability of HHH would weaken the theorem.

Corrections of the printed text.

  • Theorem 2. The goal adds d≤34md\le 34md≤34m. Beyond 34m34m34m the term dln⁡(34em/d)d\ln(34em/d)dln(34em/d) decreases, vanishes at d=34emd=34emd=34em and then turns negative, and the printed statement fails for rich classes. Within this range nothing is lost: the proof covers d≤2md\le2md≤2m, and for 2m<d≤34m2m<d\le34m2m<d≤34m the bound exceeds 111.
  • Milestone 6. It carries the hypothesis d≤2md\le 2md≤2m, the range of the binomial estimate behind 34em/d34em/d34em/d.
  • Milestone 3. Its printed justification ∣Qγ/8(a)−Qγ/8(b)∣<∣a−b∣+γ/16|Q_{\gamma/8}(a)-Q_{\gamma/8}(b)|<|a-b|+\gamma/16∣Qγ/8​(a)−Qγ/8​(b)∣<∣a−b∣+γ/16 is false; the correct term is γ/8\gamma/8γ/8. The milestone's conclusion is true as printed, and only the conclusion is formalized.

Trivializing formalizations, ruled out. The following would each make the statements empty or different, and none is used:

  • a ℕ-valued fat dimension or covering number;
  • Real.sign in place of sgn⁡\operatorname{sgn}sgn;
  • a per-hypothesis probability bound;
  • an unrestricted ddd, which makes ⋅\sqrt{\cdot}⋅​ of a negative number equal to 000;
  • a covering number that is 000 on classes without finite covers.

Infrastructure that a complete development needs, and contributions that are welcome:

  • product measures and Hoeffding's inequality, which Mathlib has;
  • a symmetrization (ghost-sample) lemma for margin events;
  • the combinatorics of Theorem 5;
  • the elementary inequalities between packing and covering numbers.

The covering/packing and fat-shattering lemmas apply beyond this mission. Proofs of individual milestones, or of Theorem 5 in the generality of Alon et al., are useful contributions in their own right.

Selected references

  • P. L. Bartlett, The Sample Complexity of Pattern Classification with Neural Networks: The Size of the Weights is More Important than the Size of the Network, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 44(2), 525–536, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1109/18.661502
  • N. Alon, S. Ben-David, N. Cesa-Bianchi, D. Haussler, Scale-sensitive dimensions, uniform convergence, and learnability, J. ACM 44(4), 615–631, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1145/263867.263927
  • J. Shawe-Taylor, P. L. Bartlett, R. C. Williamson, M. Anthony, Structural risk minimization over data-dependent hierarchies, IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 44(5), 1926–1940, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1109/18.705570
  • M. J. Kearns, R. E. Schapire, Efficient distribution-free learning of probabilistic concepts, J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 48(3), 464–497, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0000(05)80062-5
  • V. N. Vapnik, A. Ya. Chervonenkis, On the uniform convergence of relative frequencies of events to their probabilities, Theory Probab. Appl. 16(2), 264–280, 1971. https://doi.org/10.1137/1116025
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Control TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Electricity Demand Response Contracting with Responsiveness Incentives 2: The Producer's First-Best Value in Closed FormResearch Paper

Motivation

Electricity demand response asks consumers to lower their consumption during price events, when generation is expensive or scarce. Field trials such as the Low Carbon London experiment showed that consumers do react to price signals, but that the reaction is erratic: the average consumption falls while its variability stays high, and a producer that has to follow the load curve in real time pays for that variability. Aïd, Possamaï and Touzi (arXiv:1810.09063; Math. Oper. Res. 2022, doi:10.1287/moor.2021.1201) model this as a continuous-time principal–agent problem in which the consumer (the agent) controls both the level and the volatility of consumption, and the producer (the principal) designs a payment that rewards both.

The paper compares two benchmarks. In the second best, the producer observes only the consumption path and the consumer responds optimally to the contract; this is the subject of the companion mission of this series. In the first best, the producer dictates both the contract and the consumer's effort, subject only to the consumer's participation. The first best is the reference point against which the cost of moral hazard, the information rent, is measured. This mission formalizes the first-best value in closed form, Proposition 3.1 (i) of the paper.

The methodology follows the continuous-time principal–agent literature: Holmström and Milgrom (1987) for exponential utilities and linear contracts, Sannikov (2008) for the dynamic-programming view of the agent's continuation value, and Cvitanić, Possamaï and Touzi (2018) for contracts indexed on both the output and its quadratic variation.

Setting

Fix integers N,d≥0N,d\ge0N,d≥0 (usages for the mean effort and for the volatility effort), cost parameters μ∈(0,∞)N\mu\in(0,\infty)^Nμ∈(0,∞)N, λ∈(0,∞)d\lambda\in(0,\infty)^dλ∈(0,∞)d, nominal volatilities σ∈(0,∞)d\sigma\in(0,\infty)^dσ∈(0,∞)d, effort bounds Amax⁡>0A_{\max}>0Amax​>0 and 0<ε≤10<\varepsilon\le10<ε≤1, risk aversions r,p>0r,p>0r,p>0, a marginal volatility cost h>0h>0h>0, slopes κ,θ∈R\kappa,\theta\in\mathbb Rκ,θ∈R, a horizon T>0T>0T>0, an initial consumption X0∈RX_0\in\mathbb RX0​∈R and a reservation utility R0<0R_0<0R0​<0.

The consumer chooses a mean effort α\alphaα with values in A=∏i[0,μiAmax⁡]A=\prod_i[0,\mu_iA_{\max}]A=∏i​[0,μi​Amax​] and a responsiveness effort β\betaβ with values in B=[ε,1]dB=[\varepsilon,1]^dB=[ε,1]d, at cost

c(α,β)=c1(α)+12c2(β),c1(a)=12∑iai2μi,c2(b)=∑jσj2λj(bj−1−1).c(\alpha,\beta)=c_1(\alpha)+\tfrac12c_2(\beta),\qquad c_1(a)=\tfrac12\sum_i\frac{a_i^2}{\mu_i},\qquad c_2(b)=\sum_j\frac{\sigma_j^2}{\lambda_j}\big(b_j^{-1}-1\big).c(α,β)=c1​(α)+21​c2​(β),c1​(a)=21​i∑​μi​ai2​​,c2​(b)=j∑​λj​σj2​​(bj−1​−1).

The consumption XXX follows Xt=X0−∫0tαs⋅1 ds+∫0tσ(βs)⋅dWsX_t=X_0-\int_0^t\alpha_s\cdot\mathbf 1\,ds+\int_0^t\sigma(\beta_s)\cdot dW_sXt​=X0​−∫0t​αs​⋅1ds+∫0t​σ(βs​)⋅dWs​ with σ(b)=(σ1b1,…,σdbd)\sigma(b)=(\sigma_1\sqrt{b_1},\dots,\sigma_d\sqrt{b_d})σ(b)=(σ1​b1​​,…,σd​bd​​), in the weak sense: XXX is the canonical process on C([0,T],R)C([0,T],\mathbb R)C([0,T],R), and an admissible pair (ν,P)(\nu,\mathbb P)(ν,P) is a progressively measurable control ν=(α,β)\nu=(\alpha,\beta)ν=(α,β) with a probability measure under which XXX starts at X0X_0X0​ and solves the associated martingale problem.

The consumer values consumption by f(x)=κxf(x)=\kappa xf(x)=κx and the producer bears the generation cost g(x)=θxg(x)=\theta xg(x)=θx; write δ=κ−θ\delta=\kappa-\thetaδ=κ−θ. For a payment ξ\xiξ made at time TTT, the consumer's and the producer's criteria are

JA=EP[−e−r(ξ+∫0T(κXs−c(νs))ds)],JP=EP[−e−p(−ξ−∫0TθXsds−h2⟨X⟩T)].J_A=\mathbb E^{\mathbb P}\Big[-e^{-r\left(\xi+\int_0^T(\kappa X_s-c(\nu_s))ds\right)}\Big],\qquad J_P=\mathbb E^{\mathbb P}\Big[-e^{-p\left(-\xi-\int_0^T\theta X_sds-\frac h2\langle X\rangle_T\right)}\Big].JA​=EP[−e−r(ξ+∫0T​(κXs​−c(νs​))ds)],JP​=EP[−e−p(−ξ−∫0T​θXs​ds−2h​⟨X⟩T​)].

A contract is an FT\mathcal F_TFT​-measurable ξ\xiξ with uniform exponential moments (2.5). The first-best value is

VFB=sup⁡{JP(ξ,ν,P): ξ a contract, (ν,P) admissible, JA(ξ,ν,P)≥R0}.V^{FB}=\sup\big\{J_P(\xi,\nu,\mathbb P):\ \xi\text{ a contract},\ (\nu,\mathbb P)\text{ admissible},\ J_A(\xi,\nu,\mathbb P)\ge R_0\big\}.VFB=sup{JP​(ξ,ν,P): ξ a contract, (ν,P) admissible, JA​(ξ,ν,P)≥R0​}.

The consumer's Hamiltonians are Hm(z)=−inf⁡a∈A{a⋅1 z+c1(a)}H_m(z)=-\inf_{a\in A}\{a\cdot\mathbf 1\,z+c_1(a)\}Hm​(z)=−infa∈A​{a⋅1z+c1​(a)} and Hv(γ)=−12inf⁡b∈B{c2(b)−γ∣σ(b)∣2}H_v(\gamma)=-\frac12\inf_{b\in B}\{c_2(b)-\gamma|\sigma(b)|^2\}Hv​(γ)=−21​infb∈B​{c2​(b)−γ∣σ(b)∣2}. Finally ρ=rpr+p\rho=\frac{rp}{r+p}ρ=r+prp​, L0=−1rlog⁡(−R0)L_0=-\frac1r\log(-R_0)L0​=−r1​log(−R0​), U(x)=−e−pxU(x)=-e^{-px}U(x)=−e−px, μˉ=∑iμi\bar\mu=\sum_i\mu_iμˉ​=∑i​μi​ and x−=max⁡(0,−x)x^-=\max(0,-x)x−=max(0,−x).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3.1 (i)

Assume δ−T≤Amax⁡\delta^-T\le A_{\max}δ−T≤Amax​. Then

VFB=U(vˉ(0,X0)−L0),vˉ(0,X0)=δTX0+∫0T(12μˉ(δ−)2(T−t)2+Hv(−h−ρδ2(T−t)2))dt.V^{FB}=U\big(\bar v(0,X_0)-L_0\big),\quad \bar v(0,X_0)=\delta TX_0+\int_0^T\Big(\tfrac12\bar\mu(\delta^-)^2(T-t)^2+H_v\big(-h-\rho\delta^2(T-t)^2\big)\Big)dt.VFB=U(vˉ(0,X0​)−L0​),vˉ(0,X0​)=δTX0​+∫0T​(21​μˉ​(δ−)2(T−t)2+Hv​(−h−ρδ2(T−t)2))dt.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 2.1. The best responses a^(z)\hat a(z)a^(z), b^(γ)\hat b(\gamma)b^(γ) attain the infima defining HmH_mHm​, HvH_vHv​, and these Hamiltonians have explicit closed forms.
  2. (A.5). The auxiliary value Vˉ=sup⁡(ν,P)EP[−e−ρ(∫0T(δXt−c(νt))dt−h2⟨X⟩T)]\bar V=\sup_{(\nu,\mathbb P)}\mathbb E^{\mathbb P}\big[-e^{-\rho(\int_0^T(\delta X_t-c(\nu_t))dt-\frac h2\langle X\rangle_T)}\big]Vˉ=sup(ν,P)​EP[−e−ρ(∫0T​(δXt​−c(νt​))dt−2h​⟨X⟩T​)] is finite and negative, and VFB=R0(Vˉ/R0)1+p/rV^{FB}=R_0(\bar V/R_0)^{1+p/r}VFB=R0​(Vˉ/R0​)1+p/r.
  3. Proposition A.3 (i), with the explicit solution of p. 28.
Vˉ=−e−ρ(δTX0+∫0Tmˉ(t)dt),mˉ(t)=Hm(δ(T−t))+Hv(−h−ρδ2(T−t)2).\bar V=-e^{-\rho\left(\delta TX_0+\int_0^T\bar m(t)dt\right)},\qquad \bar m(t)=H_m(\delta(T-t))+H_v\big(-h-\rho\delta^2(T-t)^2\big).Vˉ=−e−ρ(δTX0​+∫0T​mˉ(t)dt),mˉ(t)=Hm​(δ(T−t))+Hv​(−h−ρδ2(T−t)2).

Significance

The closed form shows how the first-best value depends on each parameter: on the energy value discrepancy δ\deltaδ through the mean-effort term, on the volatility cost hhh and the effective risk aversion ρ\rhoρ through the volatility Hamiltonian, and on the reservation utility only through the shift by L0L_0L0​. It is one half of the paper's information rent (Proposition 3.4), the gap between the first- and second-best values, and it is the benchmark against which the calibrated contracts of the paper's Section 4 are judged.

The result is proved in the paper, partly by appeal to standard stochastic control arguments. To our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. A formal proof requires a verification theorem for an exponential-utility control problem in the weak formulation, and a risk-sharing argument with a pathwise quadratic-variation term in the contract; both are reusable beyond this paper.

Difficulty

The deterministic parts, Proposition 2.1 and the algebra that turns (A.5) and the value of Vˉ\bar VVˉ into the goal, are calculus. The difficulty lies in the two stochastic steps. In (A.5), the producer's optimal payment for a given effort depends on ⟨X⟩T\langle X\rangle_T⟨X⟩T​; it must be realised as a measurable function of the path that is a contract in the sense of (2.5), uniformly over all admissible laws, and the participation constraint must be shown to bind. In Proposition A.3 (i), the upper bound on Vˉ\bar VVˉ must hold for every progressively measurable, path-dependent control, not only for Markov feedback controls; the paper invokes "standard stochastic control theory", which has to be made precise for controls of the volatility under a martingale-problem formulation, where no Brownian motion is given in advance.

Formalization scope

The canonical space is C([0,T],R)C([0,T],\mathbb R)C([0,T],R) with the coordinate σ-algebra and the canonical filtration; processes are indexed by [0,T][0,T][0,T]. Admissible pairs are given by a martingale problem: X0=X0X_0=X_0X0​=X0​ almost surely, and both Xt−X0+∫0tαs⋅1 dsX_t-X_0+\int_0^t\alpha_s\cdot\mathbf 1\,dsXt​−X0​+∫0t​αs​⋅1ds and its square minus ∫0t∣σ(βs)∣2ds\int_0^t|\sigma(\beta_s)|^2ds∫0t​∣σ(βs​)∣2ds are martingales. In the criteria, ⟨X⟩T\langle X\rangle_T⟨X⟩T​ is replaced by its almost-sure value ∫0T∣σ(βs)∣2ds\int_0^T|\sigma(\beta_s)|^2ds∫0T​∣σ(βs​)∣2ds; a contract remains any FT\mathcal F_TFT​-measurable function of the path. Expectations of utilities are negated lower Lebesgue integrals of exponentials in [−∞,0][-\infty,0][−∞,0], and every value is an extended-real supremum with sup⁡∅=−∞\sup\emptyset=-\inftysup∅=−∞. BBB is read as [ε,1]d[\varepsilon,1]^d[ε,1]d, with indices in Fin N and Fin d.

The Hamiltonians are defined by their infima, never by their closed forms, so that Proposition 2.1 is not true by definition, and the first-best value is a supremum over the model's own objects, not a variable pinned by hypotheses. Three hypotheses are added to the page: ε≤1\varepsilon\le1ε≤1 (so B≠∅B\ne\emptysetB=∅), R0<0R_0<0R0​<0 (so L0L_0L0​ is defined), and, for the goal only, δ−T≤Amax⁡\delta^-T\le A_{\max}δ−T≤Amax​, without which the printed 12μˉ(δ−)2(T−t)2\frac12\bar\mu(\delta^-)^2(T-t)^221​μˉ​(δ−)2(T−t)2 exceeds Hm(δ(T−t))H_m(\delta(T-t))Hm​(δ(T−t)) and contradicts the paper's own proof. Misprints corrected and disclosed in the items: the closed form of HmH_mHm​ in Proposition 2.1 is false for z−>Amax⁡z^->A_{\max}z−>Amax​ and is replaced by μˉ(mz−−m2/2)\bar\mu(m z^--m^2/2)μˉ​(mz−−m2/2) with m=z−∧Amax⁡m=z^-\wedge A_{\max}m=z−∧Amax​; the index range of b^\hat bb^ is j=1,…,dj=1,\dots,dj=1,…,d; on p. 28, ∫0tmˉ\int_0^t\bar m∫0t​mˉ is ∫tTmˉ\int_t^T\bar m∫tT​mˉ and "(A.11)" is (A.6).

The parts (ii)–(iii) of Proposition 3.1, the optimal efforts and the optimal contract, are not stated. Contributions welcome: a verification theorem for controlled martingale problems with bounded coefficients, exponential moment bounds uniform over admissible laws, and a pathwise quadratic variation on the canonical space.

Selected references

  • R. Aïd, D. Possamaï, N. Touzi, Optimal electricity demand response contracting with responsiveness incentives, arXiv:1810.09063v3, 2019; Math. Oper. Res. 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.09063
  • J. Cvitanić, D. Possamaï, N. Touzi, Dynamic programming approach to principal–agent problems, Finance Stoch. 22, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1510.07111
  • B. Holmström, P. Milgrom, Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives, Econometrica 55, 1987. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913238
  • Y. Sannikov, A continuous-time version of the principal–agent problem, Rev. Econ. Stud. 75, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00463.x
  • I. Karatzas, S. Shreve, Brownian Motion and Stochastic Calculus, Springer, 1991, §5.4 (martingale problems and weak solutions). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-0949-2
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Mathematical PhysicsOptimizationPartial Differential Equations+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimization of Mean-field Spin Glasses I: Every Minimizer of the Extended Parisi Functional Has Full SupportResearch Paper

Motivation

The Ising mixed ppp-spin model assigns to each configuration σ∈{−1,+1}N\sigma \in \{-1,+1\}^Nσ∈{−1,+1}N the energy of a random polynomial whose covariance is E{HN(σ)HN(σ′)}=Nξ(⟨σ,σ′⟩/N)\mathbb E\{H_N(\sigma)H_N(\sigma')\} = N\xi(\langle\sigma,\sigma'\rangle/N)E{HN​(σ)HN​(σ′)}=Nξ(⟨σ,σ′⟩/N). Its ground-state energy max⁡σHN(σ)/N\max_\sigma H_N(\sigma)/Nmaxσ​HN​(σ)/N converges to the value of a variational problem, the zero-temperature Parisi formula (Auffinger–Chen 2017), in which a functional P\mathsf PP is minimized over non-decreasing order parameters γ\gammaγ. El Alaoui, Montanari and Sellke (arXiv:2001.00904v1) ask how close a polynomial-time algorithm can get to this maximum. Their answer is an extended variational principle: the best value reachable by incremental approximate message passing is inf⁡γ∈LP(γ)\inf_{\gamma\in\mathscr L}\mathsf P(\gamma)infγ∈L​P(γ), where the space L\mathscr LL drops the monotonicity constraint.

The algorithm that reaches this value is built from a minimizer γ∗\gamma_*γ∗​ of P\mathsf PP over L\mathscr LL, and it runs along the set of times where γ∗\gamma_*γ∗​ is positive. Theorem 5 of the paper (p. 30) shows that this set is dense: a minimizer has full support. This mission formalizes that theorem and the first- and second-order optimality conditions it rests on (Section 6.1, pp. 22–31).

Timeline. Parisi proposed the variational formula in 1979. Talagrand (2006) and Panchenko (2013) proved it at positive temperature. Auffinger and Chen (2017) established the zero-temperature version with Φ(1,x)=∣x∣\Phi(1,x)=|x|Φ(1,x)=∣x∣ and proved that a minimizer over the monotone space exists. Jagannath and Tobasco (2016) developed the PDE and SDE tools for the Parisi functional that Section 6.1 of the present paper adapts to non-monotone order parameters. Montanari (2019) gave the first message passing algorithm for the Sherrington–Kirkpatrick case; the present paper (2020) extended it to general mixtures and introduced L\mathscr LL.

Setting

A mixture is ξ(t)=∑k≥2ck2tk\xi(t) = \sum_{k\ge2} c_k^2 t^kξ(t)=∑k≥2​ck2​tk with ξ(1+ε)<∞\xi(1+\varepsilon) < \inftyξ(1+ε)<∞ for some ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0; its derivatives ξ′\xi'ξ′, ξ′′\xi''ξ′′ are the termwise differentiated power series, non-negative and non-decreasing on [0,1][0,1][0,1].

An order parameter is a function γ:[0,1)→R≥0\gamma : [0,1) \to \mathbb R_{\ge0}γ:[0,1)→R≥0​. The extended space is

L={γ:[0,1)→R≥0:∥ξ′′γ∥TV[0,t]<∞ ∀t∈[0,1), ∫01ξ′′(t)γ(t) dt<∞},\mathscr L = \Bigl\{\gamma : [0,1)\to\mathbb R_{\ge0} : \|\xi''\gamma\|_{\mathrm{TV}[0,t]}<\infty\ \forall t\in[0,1),\ \int_0^1\xi''(t)\gamma(t)\,dt<\infty\Bigr\},L={γ:[0,1)→R≥0​:∥ξ′′γ∥TV[0,t]​<∞ ∀t∈[0,1), ∫01​ξ′′(t)γ(t)dt<∞},

with the weighted distance ∥γ1−γ2∥1,ξ′′=∫01ξ′′(t)∣γ1(t)−γ2(t)∣ dt\|\gamma_1-\gamma_2\|_{1,\xi''} = \int_0^1\xi''(t)|\gamma_1(t)-\gamma_2(t)|\,dt∥γ1​−γ2​∥1,ξ′′​=∫01​ξ′′(t)∣γ1​(t)−γ2​(t)∣dt. The non-negative step functions SF+\mathsf{SF}_+SF+​ are the finite sums ∑iaiI[ti−1,ti)\sum_i a_i\mathbb I_{[t_{i-1},t_i)}∑i​ai​I[ti−1​,ti​)​ with 0=t0<⋯<tm=10=t_0<\dots<t_m=10=t0​<⋯<tm​=1 and ai≥0a_i\ge0ai​≥0.

For a terminal condition f0f_0f0​ (convex, continuous, even, non-negative, differentiable off 000 with 0≤f0′≤10\le f_0'\le10≤f0′​≤1 on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞)) and γ∈SF+\gamma\in\mathsf{SF}_+γ∈SF+​, the Parisi PDE

∂tΦ+12ξ′′(t)(∂x2Φ+γ(t)(∂xΦ)2)=0,Φ(1,x)=f0(x),\partial_t\Phi + \tfrac12\xi''(t)\bigl(\partial_x^2\Phi + \gamma(t)(\partial_x\Phi)^2\bigr) = 0,\qquad \Phi(1,x) = f_0(x),∂t​Φ+21​ξ′′(t)(∂x2​Φ+γ(t)(∂x​Φ)2)=0,Φ(1,x)=f0​(x),

has the explicit Cole–Hopf solution Φγ\Phi^\gammaΦγ: on [ti−1,ti)[t_{i-1},t_i)[ti−1​,ti​), Φ(t,x)=γi−1log⁡Eexp⁡{γiΦ(ti,x+ξ′(ti)−ξ′(t) G)}\Phi(t,x) = \gamma_i^{-1}\log\mathbb E\exp\{\gamma_i\Phi(t_i, x+\sqrt{\xi'(t_i)-\xi'(t)}\,G)\}Φ(t,x)=γi−1​logEexp{γi​Φ(ti​,x+ξ′(ti​)−ξ′(t)​G)} with G∼N(0,1)G\sim\mathsf N(0,1)G∼N(0,1). For γ∈L\gamma\in\mathscr Lγ∈L, Φγ\Phi^\gammaΦγ is the limit of Φγn\Phi^{\gamma_n}Φγn​ along step functions γn→γ\gamma_n\to\gammaγn​→γ in the weighted distance. The Parisi functional is

P(γ)=Φγ(0,0)−12∫01t ξ′′(t)γ(t) dt.\mathsf P(\gamma) = \Phi^\gamma(0,0) - \frac12\int_0^1 t\,\xi''(t)\gamma(t)\,dt .P(γ)=Φγ(0,0)−21​∫01​tξ′′(t)γ(t)dt.

Given a Brownian motion BBB, the process XXX solves dXt=ξ′′(t)γ(t) ∂xΦγ(t,Xt) dt+ξ′′(t) dBtdX_t = \xi''(t)\gamma(t)\,\partial_x\Phi^\gamma(t,X_t)\,dt + \sqrt{\xi''(t)}\,dB_tdXt​=ξ′′(t)γ(t)∂x​Φγ(t,Xt​)dt+ξ′′(t)​dBt​, X0=0X_0 = 0X0​=0. The support of γ\gammaγ is S(γ)={t∈[0,1):γ(t)>0}S(\gamma) = \{t\in[0,1):\gamma(t)>0\}S(γ)={t∈[0,1):γ(t)>0}, and S‾(γ)\overline S(\gamma)S(γ) is its closure in [0,1)[0,1)[0,1).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5

With f0(x)=∣x∣f_0(x) = |x|f0​(x)=∣x∣, if γ∗∈L\gamma_*\in\mathscr Lγ∗​∈L satisfies P(γ∗)=inf⁡γ∈LP(γ)\mathsf P(\gamma_*) = \inf_{\gamma\in\mathscr L}\mathsf P(\gamma)P(γ∗​)=infγ∈L​P(γ), then

S‾(γ∗)=[0,1).\overline S(\gamma_*) = [0,1).S(γ∗​)=[0,1).

Milestones

The path to the goal, in attack order:

  • Proposition 6.1(b),(c): on step functions, ∂xΦ\partial_x\Phi∂x​Φ is non-decreasing with ∣∂xΦ∣≤1|\partial_x\Phi|\le1∣∂x​Φ∣≤1, and ∥Φγ1−Φγ2∥∞≤∥ξ′′(γ1−γ2)∥1\|\Phi^{\gamma_1}-\Phi^{\gamma_2}\|_\infty\le\|\xi''(\gamma_1-\gamma_2)\|_1∥Φγ1​−Φγ2​∥∞​≤∥ξ′′(γ1​−γ2​)∥1​.
  • Lemma 6.2: these properties pass to γ∈L\gamma\in\mathscr Lγ∈L.
  • Lemma 6.5: the SDE has a unique strong solution on [0,1][0,1][0,1].
  • Corollary 6.6: E{∂xΦ(t2,Xt2)2}−E{∂xΦ(t1,Xt1)2}=∫t1t2ξ′′(s) E{(∂x2Φ(s,Xs))2} ds\mathbb E\{\partial_x\Phi(t_2,X_{t_2})^2\}-\mathbb E\{\partial_x\Phi(t_1,X_{t_1})^2\}=\int_{t_1}^{t_2}\xi''(s)\,\mathbb E\{(\partial_x^2\Phi(s,X_s))^2\}\,dsE{∂x​Φ(t2​,Xt2​​)2}−E{∂x​Φ(t1​,Xt1​​)2}=∫t1​t2​​ξ′′(s)E{(∂x2​Φ(s,Xs​))2}ds.
  • Lemma 6.7: the map t↦E{∂x2Φ(t,Xt)2}t\mapsto\mathbb E\{\partial_x^2\Phi(t,X_t)^2\}t↦E{∂x2​Φ(t,Xt​)2} is continuous on [0,1)[0,1)[0,1).
  • Proposition 6.8: the first variation ddsP(γ+sδ)∣s=0+=12∫01ξ′′δ (E{∂xΦ(t,Xt)2}−t) dt\frac{d}{ds}\mathsf P(\gamma+s\delta)|_{s=0+}=\frac12\int_0^1\xi''\delta\,(\mathbb E\{\partial_x\Phi(t,X_t)^2\}-t)\,dtdsd​P(γ+sδ)∣s=0+​=21​∫01​ξ′′δ(E{∂x​Φ(t,Xt​)2}−t)dt.
  • Lemma 6.9: S(γ)S(\gamma)S(γ) is a countable disjoint union of intervals.
  • Corollary 6.10: E{∂xΦγ∗(t,Xt)2}=t\mathbb E\{\partial_x\Phi^{\gamma_*}(t,X_t)^2\}=tE{∂x​Φγ∗​(t,Xt​)2}=t on S‾(γ∗)\overline S(\gamma_*)S(γ∗​) and ≥t\ge t≥t off it.
  • Corollary 6.11: ξ′′(t) E{∂x2Φγ∗(t,Xt)2}=1\xi''(t)\,\mathbb E\{\partial_x^2\Phi^{\gamma_*}(t,X_t)^2\}=1ξ′′(t)E{∂x2​Φγ∗​(t,Xt​)2}=1 on S‾(γ∗)\overline S(\gamma_*)S(γ∗​).
  • Lemma 6.12: the law of XtX_tXt​ has a density, bounded below on compact sets, once γ\gammaγ vanishes.

Significance

The result. Full support identifies the extended variational principle as one whose minimizers are "nowhere flat". The algorithm of Theorem 3 in the paper follows γ∗\gamma_*γ∗​ through incremental steps whose size is set by γ∗\gamma_*γ∗​, and it needs no special treatment of gaps where γ∗=0\gamma_* = 0γ∗​=0. The stationarity conditions (Corollaries 6.10–6.11) also characterize minimizers over L\mathscr LL the way the Auffinger–Chen conditions characterize minimizers over the monotone space. They are the starting point for comparing inf⁡LP\inf_{\mathscr L}\mathsf PinfL​P with the Parisi value.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; nothing here is open mathematics. The paper's proofs rely on cited PDE regularity (Jagannath–Tobasco 2016) and on standard SDE theory, often in one line. The mission produces a machine-checked chain from the explicit Cole–Hopf formula to the support theorem. Along the way it builds the Parisi PDE solution on a non-monotone class, a first-variation formula, and stationarity conditions, none of which have a formal counterpart. No formal statement of the Parisi functional or the Parisi PDE exists on Prove2Me (index search, 2026-10-03).

Difficulty

Two steps resist a direct argument. The first is the first variation (Proposition 6.8): differentiating Φγ(0,0)\Phi^\gamma(0,0)Φγ(0,0) in γ\gammaγ requires comparing the SDE for γ\gammaγ with the SDE for the perturbed parameter and controlling their difference uniformly, which needs bounds on ∂x2Φ\partial_x^2\Phi∂x2​Φ that degenerate as t→1t\to1t→1. The second is the exclusion of gaps: on an interval where γ∗=0\gamma_*=0γ∗​=0 the PDE is a time-changed heat equation, and the contradiction comes from a strict inequality, which requires the law of XtX_tXt​ to charge every interval (Lemma 6.12). The obvious idea of perturbing γ∗\gamma_*γ∗​ upward on a gap only yields the inequality (6.14), which is consistent with a gap; the second-order identity at the gap's endpoints is what closes the argument.

Formalization scope

Conventions committed to in Lean:

  • The mixture is a coefficient sequence ccc with c0=c1=0c_0=c_1=0c0​=c1​=0; ξ,ξ′,ξ′′\xi,\xi',\xi''ξ,ξ′,ξ′′ are explicit series.
  • Order parameters are functions R→R\mathbb R\to\mathbb RR→R read only on [0,1)[0,1)[0,1). Membership in L\mathscr LL uses eVariationOn for the total variation and IntegrableOn for the integral; the latter includes the a.e.-measurability that the paper takes for granted.
  • Φγ\Phi^\gammaΦγ for step functions is the Cole–Hopf recursion (7.3). For a piece with γi=0\gamma_i = 0γi​=0 the formula's limit, the heat semigroup, is used instead of a division by zero. E\mathbb EE over GGG is integration against gaussianReal 0 1. For γ∈L\gamma\in\mathscr Lγ∈L, Φγ\Phi^\gammaΦγ is a limit along the filter of step functions converging in the weighted L1L^1L1 distance; it is never "some solution of the PDE".
  • ∂xΦ\partial_x\Phi∂x​Φ and ∂x2Φ\partial_x^2\Phi∂x2​Φ are iterated derivs in xxx. Lemma 6.2's weak-derivative claim is stated as "convex and 1-Lipschitz", its equivalent.
  • The SDE uses the published strong-solution concept EthierKurtz.SolvesBrownianSDE in dimension one, with coefficients extended by zero after time 111. The driver is assumed to be a standard Brownian motion (IsBrownianReal). Statements about XXX hold for every strong solution, which by Lemma 6.5 is unique.
  • Section 6.1's results are stated for every admissible f0f_0f0​; P\mathsf PP is parametrized by f0f_0f0​, and Theorem 5 fixes f0=∣⋅∣f_0=|\cdot|f0​=∣⋅∣.
  • Minimality is "P(γ∗)≤P(γ)\mathsf P(\gamma_*)\le\mathsf P(\gamma)P(γ∗​)≤P(γ) for all γ∈L\gamma\in\mathscr Lγ∈L", never a real infimum. S‾(γ)\overline S(\gamma)S(γ) is closure (S γ) ∩ Ico 0 1. Right-continuity of γ∗\gamma_*γ∗​, the paper's convention from p. 28, is a hypothesis.
  • Disclosed hypothesis ξ≢0\xi\not\equiv0ξ≡0 (some ck≠0c_k\neq0ck​=0) on Theorem 5, Corollaries 6.10–6.11 and Lemma 6.12. For ξ≡0\xi\equiv0ξ≡0 every γ\gammaγ minimizes P\mathsf PP and X≡0X\equiv0X≡0, so γ∗≡0\gamma_*\equiv0γ∗​≡0 has empty support and each of those statements fails. When c2=0c_2=0c2​=0 no minimizer exists (Corollary 6.11 at t=0t=0t=0), and Theorem 5 is vacuous, as in the paper.
  • Lemma 6.12's density bound is stated without choosing density versions: ε Leb(A)≤P(Xt∈A)\varepsilon\,\mathrm{Leb}(A)\le\mathbb P(X_t\in A)εLeb(A)≤P(Xt​∈A) for measurable A⊆[−M,M]A\subseteq[-M,M]A⊆[−M,M].

A trivializing formalization is excluded: Φγ\Phi^\gammaΦγ and XXX are the paper's objects, built from the data, so the goal cannot be met by choosing a convenient solution, and minimality over L\mathscr LL cannot be satisfied by a junk infimum.

Not formalized: the weak formulation (6.4) of Lemma 6.2, printed with a wrong boundary term; the stochastic-integral identity (6.7) of Lemma 6.5; the regularity Lemmas 6.3–6.4; Proposition 6.1(a). The paper's algorithmic Theorems 2–4 are out of scope, because they concern algorithms in an informal model of computation and an AMP state-evolution theory that is not part of this mission.

Useful infrastructure beyond this mission: the Cole–Hopf solution and its Lipschitz dependence on γ\gammaγ, the Parisi functional on L\mathscr LL, and the SDE (6.3). Contributions that formalize Itô's formula for these processes or the regularity of Φγ\Phi^\gammaΦγ are welcome as supporting lemmas.

Selected references

  • A. El Alaoui, A. Montanari, M. Sellke, Optimization of Mean-field Spin Glasses, arXiv:2001.00904v1, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.00904
  • A. Auffinger, W.-K. Chen, Parisi formula for the ground state energy in the mixed p-spin model, Annals of Probability, 2017. https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.05335
  • A. Jagannath, I. Tobasco, A dynamic programming approach to the Parisi functional, Proceedings of the AMS, 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1502.04398
  • A. Montanari, Optimization of the Sherrington–Kirkpatrick Hamiltonian, FOCS 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.10897
  • M. Talagrand, The Parisi formula, Annals of Mathematics 163(1), 2006. https://doi.org/10.4007/annals.2006.163.221
  • D. Panchenko, The Parisi ultrametricity conjecture, Annals of Mathematics 177(1), 2013. https://doi.org/10.4007/annals.2013.177.1.8
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Optimal Electricity Demand Response Contracting with Responsiveness Incentives 1: The Producer's Second-Best Value in Closed FormResearch Paper

Motivation

Demand response asks electricity consumers to lower or smooth their consumption when generation is expensive, in exchange for payments. Field trials such as Low Carbon London showed two effects of such incentives: consumers reduce their average consumption, and the variability of their response depends on how much effort they put into it. A producer who cannot observe the consumer's individual usages, only the aggregate consumption path, faces a moral hazard problem: the payment can depend only on what is observed.

Aïd, Possamaï and Touzi (arXiv:1810.09063v3, 2019; Math. Oper. Res. 2022) cast this as a continuous-time principal–agent problem in which the consumer controls both the drift and the volatility of his consumption, and the producer pays for reductions in both. The volatility channel is what makes the problem new: the classical Holmström–Milgrom model (Econometrica 1987) controls only the drift. The paper uses the general reduction of Cvitanić, Possamaï and Touzi (Finance Stoch. 2018) to optimal contracts with volatility control, and obtains the producer's value in closed form up to a scalar minimisation. This mission formalizes that closed form.

Setting

Fix integers N,d≥0N,d\ge0N,d≥0, cost parameters μ∈(0,∞)N\mu\in(0,\infty)^Nμ∈(0,∞)N and λ∈(0,∞)d\lambda\in(0,\infty)^dλ∈(0,∞)d, nominal volatilities σ∈(0,∞)d\sigma\in(0,\infty)^dσ∈(0,∞)d, effort bounds Amax⁡>0A_{\max}>0Amax​>0 and ε∈(0,1]\varepsilon\in(0,1]ε∈(0,1], risk aversions r,p>0r,p>0r,p>0, a marginal cost of volatility h>0h>0h>0, marginal energy value κ\kappaκ and cost θ\thetaθ with δ:=κ−θ\delta:=\kappa-\thetaδ:=κ−θ, a horizon T>0T>0T>0, an initial consumption X0X_0X0​ and a reservation utility R0<0R_0<0R0​<0. Write μˉ:=∑iμi\bar\mu:=\sum_i\mu_iμˉ​:=∑i​μi​ and x−:=max⁡(0,−x)x^-:=\max(0,-x)x−:=max(0,−x).

Consumption. XXX is the canonical process on Ω=C([0,T],R)\Omega=C([0,T],\mathbb R)Ω=C([0,T],R) with its natural filtration F\mathbb FF. A control ν=(α,β)\nu=(\alpha,\beta)ν=(α,β) is progressively measurable, with αt∈A:=∏i[0,μiAmax⁡]\alpha_t\in A:=\prod_i[0,\mu_iA_{\max}]αt​∈A:=∏i​[0,μi​Amax​] (effort to reduce consumption) and βt∈B:=[ε,1]d\beta_t\in B:=[\varepsilon,1]^dβt​∈B:=[ε,1]d (effort to reduce volatility). Under ν\nuν the consumption follows, in the weak sense,

Xt=X0−∫0tαs⋅1 ds+∫0tσ(βs)⋅dWs,∣σ(b)∣2=∑jσj2bj.X_t=X_0-\int_0^t\alpha_s\cdot\mathbf 1\,ds+\int_0^t\sigma(\beta_s)\cdot dW_s,\qquad |\sigma(b)|^2=\sum_j\sigma_j^2b_j .Xt​=X0​−∫0t​αs​⋅1ds+∫0t​σ(βs​)⋅dWs​,∣σ(b)∣2=j∑​σj2​bj​.

Effort costs c(ν)=c1(α)+12c2(β)c(\nu)=c_1(\alpha)+\frac12c_2(\beta)c(ν)=c1​(α)+21​c2​(β) per unit time, with c1(a)=12∑iai2/μic_1(a)=\frac12\sum_ia_i^2/\mu_ic1​(a)=21​∑i​ai2​/μi​ and c2(b)=∑jσj2λj(bj−1−1)c_2(b)=\sum_j\frac{\sigma_j^2}{\lambda_j}(b_j^{-1}-1)c2​(b)=∑j​λj​σj2​​(bj−1​−1).

Criteria. For a payment ξ\xiξ at time TTT, the consumer's criterion is JA=E[−e−r(ξ+∫0T(κXs−c(νs))ds)]J_A=\mathbb E[-e^{-r(\xi+\int_0^T(\kappa X_s-c(\nu_s))ds)}]JA​=E[−e−r(ξ+∫0T​(κXs​−c(νs​))ds)] and the producer's is JP=E[U(−ξ−∫0TθXsds−h2⟨X⟩T)]J_P=\mathbb E[U(-\xi-\int_0^T\theta X_sds-\frac h2\langle X\rangle_T)]JP​=E[U(−ξ−∫0T​θXs​ds−2h​⟨X⟩T​)] with U(x)=−e−pxU(x)=-e^{-px}U(x)=−e−px. Contracts C\mathcal CC are the FT\mathcal F_TFT​-measurable ξ\xiξ with exponential moments of order m>1m>1m>1 uniformly over the consumer's responses (2.5). The consumer's value is VA(ξ)=sup⁡JAV_A(\xi)=\sup J_AVA​(ξ)=supJA​, and P⋆(ξ)\mathcal P^\star(\xi)P⋆(ξ) is the set of his optimal responses.

Second best. The producer offers ξ\xiξ, the consumer responds optimally, ties are broken in the producer's favour, and participation requires VA(ξ)≥R0V_A(\xi)\ge R_0VA​(ξ)≥R0​:

VSB:=sup⁡ξ∈C, VA(ξ)≥R0 sup⁡P⋆(ξ)JP(ξ,⋅),sup⁡∅=−∞.V^{SB}:=\sup_{\xi\in\mathcal C,\ V_A(\xi)\ge R_0}\ \sup_{\mathcal P^\star(\xi)}J_P(\xi,\cdot),\qquad\sup\emptyset=-\infty .VSB:=ξ∈C, VA​(ξ)≥R0​sup​ P⋆(ξ)sup​JP​(ξ,⋅),sup∅=−∞.

Hamiltonians. Hm(z)=−inf⁡a∈A{a⋅1 z+c1(a)}H_m(z)=-\inf_{a\in A}\{a\cdot\mathbf 1\,z+c_1(a)\}Hm​(z)=−infa∈A​{a⋅1z+c1​(a)} and Hv(γ)=−12inf⁡b∈B{c2(b)−γ∣σ(b)∣2}H_v(\gamma)=-\frac12\inf_{b\in B}\{c_2(b)-\gamma|\sigma(b)|^2\}Hv​(γ)=−21​infb∈B​{c2​(b)−γ∣σ(b)∣2}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3.2 (i)

Assume δ−T≤Amax⁡\delta^-T\le A_{\max}δ−T≤Amax​. With qt(z)=h+rz2+p(z−δ(T−t))2q_t(z)=h+rz^2+p(z-\delta(T-t))^2qt​(z)=h+rz2+p(z−δ(T−t))2, L0=−1rlog⁡(−R0)L_0=-\frac1r\log(-R_0)L0​=−r1​log(−R0​),

mSB(t)=12μˉδ2(T−t)2−12inf⁡z∈R{μˉ(z−+δ(T−t))2−2Hv(−qt(z))},m_{SB}(t)=\frac12\bar\mu\delta^2(T-t)^2-\frac12\inf_{z\in\mathbb R}\Big\{\bar\mu\big(z^-+\delta(T-t)\big)^2-2H_v\big(-q_t(z)\big)\Big\},mSB​(t)=21​μˉ​δ2(T−t)2−21​z∈Rinf​{μˉ​(z−+δ(T−t))2−2Hv​(−qt​(z))}, VSB=U(v(0,X0)−L0),v(0,X0)=δTX0+∫0TmSB(s) ds.V^{SB}=U\big(v(0,X_0)-L_0\big),\qquad v(0,X_0)=\delta TX_0+\int_0^Tm_{SB}(s)\,ds .VSB=U(v(0,X0​)−L0​),v(0,X0​)=δTX0​+∫0T​mSB​(s)ds.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 2.1. The consumer's best responses a^i(z)=μi(z−∧Amax⁡)\hat a_i(z)=\mu_i(z^-\wedge A_{\max})a^i​(z)=μi​(z−∧Amax​) and b^j(γ)=(1∧(λjγ−)−1/2)∨ε\hat b_j(\gamma)=(1\wedge(\lambda_j\gamma^-)^{-1/2})\vee\varepsilonb^j​(γ)=(1∧(λj​γ−)−1/2)∨ε attain the infima defining HmH_mHm​ and HvH_vHv​, and
Hm(z)=μˉ(mz−−m22), m=z−∧Amax⁡;Hv(γ)=−12(c^2(γ)−γ∣σ^(γ)∣2).H_m(z)=\bar\mu\big(m z^--\tfrac{m^2}2\big),\ m=z^-\wedge A_{\max};\qquad H_v(\gamma)=-\tfrac12\big(\hat c_2(\gamma)-\gamma|\hat\sigma(\gamma)|^2\big).Hm​(z)=μˉ​(mz−−2m2​), m=z−∧Amax​;Hv​(γ)=−21​(c^2​(γ)−γ∣σ^(γ)∣2).
  1. Lemma A.1. With f0(q,γ)=q∣σ^(γ)∣2+c^2(γ)f_0(q,\gamma)=q|\hat\sigma(\gamma)|^2+\hat c_2(\gamma)f0​(q,γ)=q∣σ^(γ)∣2+c^2​(γ), F0(q):=inf⁡γ≤0f0(q,γ)=f0(q,−q)=−2Hv(−q)F_0(q):=\inf_{\gamma\le0}f_0(q,\gamma)=f_0(q,-q)=-2H_v(-q)F0​(q):=infγ≤0​f0​(q,γ)=f0​(q,−q)=−2Hv​(−q), and F0F_0F0​ is non-decreasing.
  2. Proposition A.4 (ii). A minimiser of z↦F0(h−k+rz2+p(z−y)2)+μˉ(z−+y)2z\mapsto F_0(h-k+rz^2+p(z-y)^2)+\bar\mu(z^-+y)^2z↦F0​(h−k+rz2+p(z−y)2)+μˉ​(z−+y)2 is pr+py\frac p{r+p}yr+pp​y when y≥0y\ge0y≥0, and lies in [y,pr+py][y,\frac p{r+p}y][y,r+pp​y] when y≤0y\le0y≤0.

A companion statement, Corollary 3.1 (i), gives the explicit off-peak payment rates zSB(t)=pr+pδ(T−t)z_{SB}(t)=\frac p{r+p}\delta(T-t)zSB​(t)=r+pp​δ(T−t) and γSB(t)=−h−rpr+pδ2(T−t)2\gamma_{SB}(t)=-h-\frac{rp}{r+p}\delta^2(T-t)^2γSB​(t)=−h−r+prp​δ2(T−t)2 when δ≥0\delta\ge0δ≥0.

Significance

The closed form reduces an infinite-dimensional contracting problem, a supremum over all path-dependent payments and all consumer responses, to a deterministic one-dimensional minimisation at each time. It is the basis of the paper's comparisons: with the first-best value it measures the cost of moral hazard, and its minimiser gives the price of energy and of responsiveness that the optimal contract charges, which the paper calibrates on Low Carbon London data.

The result is proved on paper. No part of it is machine-checked. A complete formalization would give a checked instance of a continuous-time principal–agent theorem with volatility control. It would also fix, in exact terms, the conventions the paper leaves implicit (weak solutions, the effort cap), and the printed misprints that this mission corrects.

Difficulty

The deterministic milestones are calculus on boxes. The goal is not. The upper bound VSB≤U(v(0,X0)−L0)V^{SB}\le U(v(0,X_0)-L_0)VSB≤U(v(0,X0​)−L0​) must hold for every FT\mathcal F_TFT​-measurable contract, not only for contracts of a convenient form. The step that fails in a direct attempt is the representation of an arbitrary contract: one needs that every ξ∈C\xi\in\mathcal Cξ∈C inducing an optimal response can be written as YTy0,Z,ΓY_T^{y_0,Z,\Gamma}YTy0​,Z,Γ​, an integral against dXdXdX and d⟨X⟩d\langle X\rangled⟨X⟩ driven by the consumer's continuation certainty equivalent. This is the main theorem of Cvitanić–Possamaï–Touzi (2018) and rests on second-order backward SDEs; it has no counterpart in Mathlib. Restricting the supremum to linear or representable contracts at the outset would assume exactly that theorem. The lower bound needs, for the candidate contract, existence of the consumer's optimal response as a weak solution and a verification argument for the producer's HJB equation.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace DemandResponse.SecondBest, and all hypotheses are fields of a structure Params. Conventions:

  • Weak formulation. An admissible pair (ν,P)(\nu,\mathbb P)(ν,P) is a control and a probability measure on C([0,T],R)C([0,T],\mathbb R)C([0,T],R) with X0=X0X_0=X_0X0​=X0​ a.s., under which Xt−X0+∫0tαs⋅1 dsX_t-X_0+\int_0^t\alpha_s\cdot\mathbf 1\,dsXt​−X0​+∫0t​αs​⋅1ds and its square minus ∫0t∣σ(βs)∣2ds\int_0^t|\sigma(\beta_s)|^2ds∫0t​∣σ(βs​)∣2ds are F\mathbb FF-martingales. This is the martingale problem equivalent to weak solutions of (2.1); the paper deliberately leaves weak solutions informal (footnote 2). The pair, not the law alone, is the admissible object, because the cost depends on ν\nuν.
  • Quadratic variation. ⟨X⟩T\langle X\rangle_T⟨X⟩T​ in JPJ_PJP​ is its almost-sure value ∫0T∣σ(βs)∣2ds\int_0^T|\sigma(\beta_s)|^2ds∫0T​∣σ(βs​)∣2ds.
  • Values. Expected utilities are negated lower Lebesgue integrals, in [−∞,0][-\infty,0][−∞,0]; all suprema are in the extended reals, so the empty supremum is −∞-\infty−∞, as on p. 9.
  • Hamiltonians are defined by their infima, not by the closed forms of Proposition 2.1.
  • Indices are Fin N, Fin d; N=0N=0N=0, d=0d=0d=0 are allowed. b^j(γ)=1\hat b_j(\gamma)=1b^j​(γ)=1 when λjγ−≤1\lambda_j\gamma^-\le1λj​γ−≤1 (the paper's 0−1/2=+∞0^{-1/2}=+\infty0−1/2=+∞).
  • Added hypotheses. ε≤1\varepsilon\le1ε≤1 (B≠∅B\neq\emptysetB=∅), R0<0R_0<0R0​<0 (log⁡(−R0)\log(-R_0)log(−R0​) defined), and for the goal δ−T≤Amax⁡\delta^-T\le A_{\max}δ−T≤Amax​. The paper's closed form is computed with the effort cap removed ("ηA→0\eta_A\to0ηA​→0 as A↗∞A\nearrow\inftyA↗∞", p. 30), and with the capped effort of the model it is correct exactly under this hypothesis.
  • Corrected misprints. −2Hm(−q(z))-2H_m(-q(z))−2Hm​(−q(z)) in mSBm_{SB}mSB​ is read as −2Hv(−q(z))-2H_v(-q(z))−2Hv​(−q(z)); with HmH_mHm​ the infimum is −∞-\infty−∞. The printed Hm(z)=12μˉ(z−∧Amax⁡)2H_m(z)=\frac12\bar\mu(z^-\wedge A_{\max})^2Hm​(z)=21​μˉ​(z−∧Amax​)2 is false for z−>Amax⁡z^->A_{\max}z−>Amax​ and is corrected. "j=1,…,Nj=1,\dots,Nj=1,…,N" for b^\hat bb^ means j=1,…,dj=1,\dots,dj=1,…,d. In Proposition A.4 (ii) the open interval becomes closed, and "for large AAA" is read as ηA≡0\eta_A\equiv0ηA​≡0.

The goal is an equality of extended reals between VSBV^{SB}VSB, defined from the model, and an explicit real number. A formalization that defines VSBV^{SB}VSB over a restricted class of contracts, or with a real-valued supremum that returns 000 on unbounded sets, would trivialize or change it and is not the goal.

Needed infrastructure: continuous-time martingales on the canonical path space (Mathlib has Martingale and progressive measurability), existence of weak solutions with bounded coefficients, a representation theorem for contracts (Cvitanić–Possamaï–Touzi), and a verification theorem for the producer's HJB equation. The weak-formulation layer and the contract representation are reusable for any continuous-time principal–agent model with drift and volatility control. Contributions of any of these pieces, and proofs of the deterministic milestones, are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. Aïd, D. Possamaï, N. Touzi, Optimal Electricity Demand Response Contracting with Responsiveness Incentives, arXiv:1810.09063v3, 2019; Mathematics of Operations Research 47 (2022). https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.09063v3
  • J. Cvitanić, D. Possamaï, N. Touzi, Dynamic programming approach to principal–agent problems, Finance and Stochastics 22 (2018) 1–37. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00780-017-0344-4
  • B. Holmström, P. Milgrom, Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives, Econometrica 55 (1987) 303–328. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913238
  • Y. Sannikov, A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem, Review of Economic Studies 75 (2008) 957–984. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00486.x
  • I. Karatzas, S. Shreve, Brownian Motion and Stochastic Calculus, 2nd ed., Springer 1991, §5.4 (martingale problem and weak solutions). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-0949-2
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Machine LearningQuantum InformationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Shadow Tomography of Quantum States 1: Polylogarithmically Many Copies Suffice to Estimate Every Acceptance Probability to Within εResearch Paper

Motivation

Learning an unknown quantum state is expensive. Full quantum state tomography of a DDD-dimensional mixed state ρ\rhoρ to accuracy ε\varepsilonε in trace distance needs on the order of D2/ε2D^2/\varepsilon^2D2/ε2 copies of ρ\rhoρ (O'Donnell–Wright 2016; Haah et al. 2017), and this is optimal. For a system of nnn qubits, D=2nD = 2^nD=2n, so full tomography is out of reach beyond a few dozen qubits.

Often one does not need the whole density matrix, only the behaviour of ρ\rhoρ on a fixed list of tests: acceptance probabilities of verification circuits, expectation values of observables, or the answers a piece of quantum advice gives to a set of questions. Aaronson (arXiv:1711.01053, STOC 2018) named this task shadow tomography and asked whether the number of copies can be polylogarithmic in both the dimension and the number of tests. Measuring each test on separate copies costs O~(M/ε2)\tilde O(M/\varepsilon^2)O~(M/ε2) copies, which is linear in MMM.

Timeline.

  • 2016: the question was posed at a mini-course without a name (Aaronson, The Complexity of Quantum States and Transformations, §8.3.1).
  • 2016: Harrow, Lin and Montanaro gave a correct "quantum OR" test, repairing an earlier flawed claim (arXiv:1607.03236, Corollary 11).
  • 2017–2018: Aaronson proved the first polylogarithmic bound, the theorem of this mission.
  • Later work improved the exponents, notably Bădescu–O'Donnell 2021, and introduced the related "classical shadows" of Huang–Kueng–Preskill 2020.

Setting

A mixed state of dimension DDD is a D×DD\times DD×D Hermitian positive semidefinite matrix ρ\rhoρ with Tr ρ=1\mathrm{Tr}\,\rho = 1Trρ=1. A two-outcome measurement is a D×DD\times DD×D Hermitian matrix EEE with all eigenvalues in [0,1][0,1][0,1]. Equivalently, 0⪯E⪯10 \preceq E \preceq \mathbb 10⪯E⪯1. It accepts ρ\rhoρ with probability Tr(Eρ)\mathrm{Tr}(E\rho)Tr(Eρ).

The state ρ⊗k\rho^{\otimes k}ρ⊗k consists of kkk independent copies of ρ\rhoρ. A measurement of ρ⊗k\rho^{\otimes k}ρ⊗k with classical output is a POVM: a finite family of positive semidefinite matrices PωP_\omegaPω​ on the kkk-register space with ∑ωPω=1\sum_\omega P_\omega = \mathbb 1∑ω​Pω​=1. Outcome ω\omegaω occurs with probability Tr(Pωρ⊗k)\mathrm{Tr}(P_\omega\rho^{\otimes k})Tr(Pω​ρ⊗k). An adaptive procedure that measures the copies one after another is described by one such POVM.

Problem 1 (shadow tomography). Given an unknown ρ\rhoρ and known two-outcome measurements E1,…,EME_1,\dots,E_ME1​,…,EM​, output numbers b1,…,bM∈[0,1]b_1,\dots,b_M\in[0,1]b1​,…,bM​∈[0,1] with ∣bi−Tr(Eiρ)∣≤ε|b_i-\mathrm{Tr}(E_i\rho)|\le\varepsilon∣bi​−Tr(Ei​ρ)∣≤ε for all iii, with success probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ. The output must come from a measurement of ρ⊗k\rho^{\otimes k}ρ⊗k, with k=k(D,M,ε,δ)k=k(D,M,\varepsilon,\delta)k=k(D,M,ε,δ) as small as possible. The measurement may depend on the EiE_iEi​, but not on ρ\rhoρ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2, in the explicit form proved in §5

There is a universal constant CCC such that, for M≥2M\ge2M≥2 and 0<ε,δ≤1/20<\varepsilon,\delta\le 1/20<ε,δ≤1/2, Problem 1 is solvable with

k≤C log⁡Dε(log⁡log⁡D+log⁡1εε2)2log⁡4M(log⁡log⁡M+log⁡log⁡D+log⁡1ε+log⁡1δ)=O~(log⁡1/δε5log⁡4Mlog⁡D)k \le C\,\frac{\log D}{\varepsilon}\Big(\frac{\log\log D+\log\frac1\varepsilon}{\varepsilon^{2}}\Big)^{2}\log^4 M\Big(\log\log M+\log\log D+\log\frac1\varepsilon+\log\frac1\delta\Big) = \tilde O\Big(\frac{\log 1/\delta}{\varepsilon^5}\log^4 M\log D\Big)k≤CεlogD​(ε2loglogD+logε1​​)2log4M(loglogM+loglogD+logε1​+logδ1​)=O~(ε5log1/δ​log4MlogD)

copies. This is the last display of the proof (p. 19). The goal fixes no constant, so any improvement of CCC remains consistent with it.

Milestones

  • Theorem 13 (Harrow–Lin–Montanaro). A one-copy test that accepts with probability at least (1−ϵ)2/7(1-\epsilon)^2/7(1−ϵ)2/7 if some Tr(Eiρ)≥1−ϵ\mathrm{Tr}(E_i\rho)\ge1-\epsilonTr(Ei​ρ)≥1−ϵ, and at most 4ΔM4\Delta M4ΔM if ∑iTr(Eiρ)≤ΔM\sum_i\mathrm{Tr}(E_i\rho)\le\Delta M∑i​Tr(Ei​ρ)≤ΔM.
  • Lemma 14 (Quantum OR Bound). Deciding whether max⁡iTr(Eiρ)≥c\max_i\mathrm{Tr}(E_i\rho)\ge cmaxi​Tr(Ei​ρ)≥c or ≤c−ε\le c-\varepsilon≤c−ε with O(log⁡(1/δ)log⁡M/ε2)O(\log(1/\delta)\log M/\varepsilon^2)O(log(1/δ)logM/ε2) copies, independent of DDD.
  • Lemma 15 (Gentle Search). Finding jjj with Tr(Ejρ)≥c−ε\mathrm{Tr}(E_j\rho)\ge c-\varepsilonTr(Ej​ρ)≥c−ε with O(log⁡4Mε2(log⁡log⁡M+log⁡1δ))O(\frac{\log^4M}{\varepsilon^2}(\log\log M+\log\frac1\delta))O(ε2log4M​(loglogM+logδ1​)) copies.
  • Amplification claims (p. 16). The threshold tests Ei,t,±∗E^*_{i,t,\pm}Ei,t,±∗​ on ρ⊗q\rho^{\otimes q}ρ⊗q accept with probability at least 5/65/65/6 when the hypothesis is off by ε\varepsilonε, and at most 1/31/31/3 when it is within ε/2\varepsilon/2ε/2.
  • Markov claim (p. 17). The postselection test FtF_tFt​ on an arbitrary, possibly entangled, qqq-register state accepts with probability at most aq(a+ε/4)q\frac{a q}{(a+\varepsilon/4)q}(a+ε/4)qaq​.
  • Lemma 12 (Quantum Union Bound, probability part). Measurements each accepting with probability at least 1−ε1-\varepsilon1−ε all accept in succession with probability at least 1−2Mε1-2M\sqrt\varepsilon1−2Mε​.
  • Chernoff claim (p. 18). 1−Tr(Ftρ⊗q)≤ε4/log⁡2D1-\mathrm{Tr}(F_t\rho^{\otimes q})\le\varepsilon^4/\log^2D1−Tr(Ft​ρ⊗q)≤ε4/log2D.
  • Proposition 20. Promise-gap thresholds for all iii at once can be decided with O(log⁡(M/δ)/ε2)O(\log(M/\delta)/\varepsilon^2)O(log(M/δ)/ε2) copies.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 shows that a state of exponential dimension can be learned "for all practical purposes" on exponentially many tests from polynomially many copies. Applications in the paper include a bound on quantum advice and one-way communication, and implications for quantum money and copy-protection. It also shows that the information needed to predict many measurement outcomes is far smaller than the description of ρ\rhoρ.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper, and later work improves its exponents. As far as is known it has not been machine-checked. A complete development formalizes the gentle-measurement toolkit (Lemma 12, Lemma 14, Lemma 15), the amplification of two-outcome measurements on tensor powers, and the postselection argument. These are standard tools of quantum learning theory and quantum complexity with no formal counterpart yet. Lemma 14 and Lemma 15 are reusable beyond this mission.

Difficulty

The naive approach measures the EiE_iEi​ directly on shared copies. A measurement that is likely to reject disturbs the state, so later measurements see a damaged state, and separate copies per measurement cost MMM copies.

The proof needs three ingredients:

  • a gentle search that finds a measurement on which the current hypothesis is wrong while damaging the copies only slightly;
  • a potential argument showing that postselection cannot happen too often;
  • a uniform control of the damage.

The potential argument has to hold for the state after postselection, which is correlated or entangled across registers. Independence-based concentration fails there, which is why the Markov claim, not a Chernoff bound, governs that step. Theorem 13 itself rests on a delicate ancilla-based procedure of Harrow, Lin and Montanaro, and the mission cites it as a milestone without its proof.

Formalization scope

  • Representation.
    • Operators are complex matrices over a finite index type, and states use the published WildeQIT.IsDensityOperator (positive semidefinite, trace one).
    • A two-outcome measurement is IsEffect E: both EEE and 1−E\mathbb 1-E1−E are positive semidefinite.
    • ρ⊗k\rho^{\otimes k}ρ⊗k is a matrix indexed by kkk-tuples Fin k → n.
    • A measurement with output is a POVM structure with a finite outcome type. Probabilities are real parts of traces.
  • Quantifier order of the goal. ∃C\exists C∃C, then for all D,M,ε,δD,M,\varepsilon,\deltaD,M,ε,δ there is kkk; then for all EiE_iEi​ there are a POVM and outputs bbb; then for all ρ\rhoρ. Choosing the measurement after ρ\rhoρ would make the goal trivial (output the true values with k=0k=0k=0), and this order rules that out.
  • Disclosed hypotheses.
    • Theorem 2 assumes M≥2M\ge2M≥2, ε≤1/2\varepsilon\le1/2ε≤1/2 and δ≤1/2\delta\le1/2δ≤1/2. These keep the logarithmic factors positive; at M=1M=1M=1 the bound would force k=0k=0k=0.
    • Lemma 14 assumes M≥2M\ge2M≥2, and Lemmas 14 and 15 bound δ\deltaδ.
    • Theorem 13 assumes ϵ≤1/2\epsilon\le1/2ϵ≤1/2, as in Harrow–Lin–Montanaro's Corollary 11.
    • The Chernoff claim assumes D≥2D\ge2D≥2.
  • Conventions.
    • All logarithms are natural, including inside log⁡log⁡\log\logloglog.
    • Amplified tests use real thresholds.
    • "Applied in succession" in Lemma 12 uses Lüders instruments (E\sqrt{E}E​ Kraus operators), in the order E1,E2,…E_1,E_2,\dotsE1​,E2​,….
    • The hypothesis ρt\rho_tρt​ enters the amplification claims only as the number a=Tr(Eρt)a=\mathrm{Tr}(E\rho_t)a=Tr(Eρt​).
  • Printed steps not drafted.
    • The printed ε−4\varepsilon^{-4}ε−4 form of Theorem 2 relies on an external online-learning algorithm that is only sketched.
    • The halting rule of §5 is unspecified, because Lemma 15 always returns an index.
    • The asymptotic claims pt≥0.9/Dqp_t\ge0.9/D^qpt​≥0.9/Dq for t=o(log⁡2D/ε4)t=o(\log^2D/\varepsilon^4)t=o(log2D/ε4) and t=O(qlog⁡D/ε)t=O(q\log D/\varepsilon)t=O(qlogD/ε) use a circular o(⋅)o(\cdot)o(⋅).
    • The trace-distance part of Lemma 12 has an unquantified O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅).
    • Lemma 12's printed bound 1−2Mε1-2M\sqrt\varepsilon1−2Mε​ is weaker than its use on p. 18. It is stated as printed. The proof of the goal must retune constants or use Wilde's stronger 1−2Mε1-2\sqrt{M\varepsilon}1−2Mε​-type bound.
  • Contributions welcome. Proofs of any milestone; a formal Hoeffding bound for binomial counts of product effects; the gentle measurement lemma for Lüders instruments; Naimark dilation for effects.

Selected references

  • S. Aaronson, Shadow Tomography of Quantum States, STOC 2018; arXiv:1711.01053v2, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.01053
  • A. W. Harrow, C. Y.-Y. Lin, A. Montanaro, Sequential measurements, disturbance and property testing, SODA 2017. https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.03236
  • M. M. Wilde, Sequential decoding of a general classical-quantum channel, Proc. R. Soc. A, 2013. https://arxiv.org/abs/1303.0808
  • R. O'Donnell, J. Wright, Efficient quantum tomography, STOC 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.01907
  • J. Haah, A. W. Harrow, Z. Ji, X. Wu, N. Yu, Sample-optimal tomography of quantum states, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, 2017. https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.01797
  • C. Bădescu, R. O'Donnell, Improved quantum data analysis, STOC 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.10908
  • H.-Y. Huang, R. Kueng, J. Preskill, Predicting many properties of a quantum system from very few measurements, Nature Physics, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.08953
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Bandit AlgorithmsOperations ResearchStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies IV: Sufficient Conditions for Logarithmic Regret with a Known Incumbent PriceResearch Paper

Motivation

A seller who does not know how demand responds to price must learn the demand curve from its own sales while also earning revenue. This is the learn-and-earn problem of dynamic pricing. Every price it charges both earns and informs, and a policy that only earns can stop learning. Keskin and Zeevi (Operations Research 62(5), 2014) study the problem for a linear demand model with unknown parameters. They show that the certainty-equivalent ("greedy") policy can fail, and they give simple conditions on a policy's price path under which its regret is of optimal order.

This mission covers the paper's incumbent price problem (§3.4). Here the seller has charged one price p^\hat pp^​ for a long time and knows its expected demand D^\hat DD^. Only the slope of the demand curve is unknown, and p^\hat pp^​ is the single price that reveals nothing about it. A greedy seller whose estimates drift toward p^\hat pp^​ stops learning ("incomplete learning"), and its regret can grow linearly. Earlier single-parameter models (Broder and Rusmevichientong 2012) assumed that the intercept is known, which makes the uninformative price 000, a price no seller would choose. The incumbent price model makes the trade-off real. The paper proves a log⁡T\log TlogT lower bound on regret for this model (its Theorem 3), and its Theorem 4 gives sufficient conditions for matching that bound. Theorem 4 is the goal of this mission.

Setting

Prices lie in [l,u][l,u][l,u] with 0≤l<u0 \le l < u0≤l<u. The incumbent price is p^∈[l,u]\hat p \in [l,u]p^​∈[l,u]. The seller decides the price deviation xt=pt−p^x_t = p_t - \hat pxt​=pt​−p^​ in each period t=1,2,…t = 1, 2, \dotst=1,2,… and observes demand

Dt=D^+βxt+εt.D_t = \hat D + \beta x_t + \varepsilon_t .Dt​=D^+βxt​+εt​.

The unknown slope β\betaβ lies in a known interval B=[bmin⁡,bmax⁡]\mathfrak B = [b_{\min}, b_{\max}]B=[bmin​,bmax​] with bmin⁡<bmax⁡<0b_{\min} < b_{\max} < 0bmin​<bmax​<0. The shocks εt\varepsilon_tεt​ are i.i.d., with mean 000 and variance σ2>0\sigma^2 > 0σ2>0, and they are light-tailed: E[ezεt]<∞\mathbb E[e^{z\varepsilon_t}] < \inftyE[ezεt​]<∞ for ∣z∣≤z0|z| \le z_0∣z∣≤z0​, for some z0>0z_0 > 0z0​>0. They need not be Gaussian. The expected revenue at deviation xxx is rβ(x)=(p^+x)(D^+βx)r_\beta(x) = (\hat p + x)(\hat D + \beta x)rβ​(x)=(p^​+x)(D^+βx). It is maximized at

ψ(β)=−p^2−D^2β,\psi(\beta) = -\frac{\hat p}{2} - \frac{\hat D}{2\beta},ψ(β)=−2p^​​−2βD^​,

and p^+ψ(β)\hat p + \psi(\beta)p^​+ψ(β) is assumed to lie in the open interval (l,u)(l,u)(l,u) for every β∈B\beta \in \mathfrak Bβ∈B.

A pricing policy π\piπ chooses each price in [l,u][l,u][l,u] as a measurable function of past demands and prices only. Its regret over TTT periods is

Δβπ(T)=T rβ(ψ(β))−Eβπ∑t=1Trβ(xt).\Delta^\pi_\beta(T) = T\, r_\beta(\psi(\beta)) - \mathbb E^\pi_\beta \sum_{t=1}^T r_\beta(x_t).Δβπ​(T)=Trβ​(ψ(β))−Eβπ​t=1∑T​rβ​(xt​).

From the data the seller forms the information metric J^t=∑s=1txs2\hat J_t = \sum_{s=1}^t x_s^2J^t​=∑s=1t​xs2​, the least squares estimate β^t=∑s=1t(Ds−D^)xs/J^t\hat\beta_t = \sum_{s=1}^t (D_s - \hat D)x_s / \hat J_tβ^​t​=∑s=1t​(Ds​−D^)xs​/J^t​ and the truncated estimate bt=bmin⁡∨(β^t∧bmax⁡)b_t = b_{\min} \vee (\hat\beta_t \wedge b_{\max})bt​=bmin​∨(β^​t​∧bmax​). The greedy deviation at the end of period ttt is ψ(bt)\psi(b_t)ψ(bt​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (p. 1150)

Let β∈B\beta \in \mathfrak Bβ∈B with ψ(β)≠0\psi(\beta) \ne 0ψ(β)=0. There is κ0′>0\kappa_0' > 0κ0′​>0 such that for all κ0≥κ0′\kappa_0 \ge \kappa_0'κ0​≥κ0′​, κ1>0\kappa_1 > 0κ1​>0 and t0≥1t_0 \ge 1t0​≥1 there is a finite C>0C > 0C>0 with the following property. If a policy satisfies, almost surely for all t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​,

(i) J^t≥κ0log⁡t,(ii) ∑s=1t(ψ(bs)−xs+1)2≤κ1log⁡t,\text{(i)}\ \hat J_t \ge \kappa_0 \log t, \qquad \text{(ii)}\ \sum_{s=1}^t (\psi(b_s) - x_{s+1})^2 \le \kappa_1 \log t,(i) J^t​≥κ0​logt,(ii) s=1∑t​(ψ(bs​)−xs+1​)2≤κ1​logt,

then Δβπ(T)≤Clog⁡T\Delta^\pi_\beta(T) \le C \log TΔβπ​(T)≤ClogT for all T≥3T \ge 3T≥3.

Milestones

  1. (27), p. 1150: β^t−β=Mt/J^t\hat\beta_t - \beta = M_t / \hat J_tβ^​t​−β=Mt​/J^t​ with Mt=∑s=1tεsxsM_t = \sum_{s=1}^t \varepsilon_s x_sMt​=∑s=1t​εs​xs​, whenever J^t≠0\hat J_t \ne 0J^t​=0.
  2. Lemma 5, p. 1150: there is ρ>0\rho > 0ρ>0 with Pβπ{∣β^t−β∣>δ,J^t≥m}≤2exp⁡(−ρ(δ∧δ2)m)\mathbb P^\pi_\beta\{|\hat\beta_t - \beta| > \delta, \hat J_t \ge m\} \le 2\exp(-\rho(\delta\wedge\delta^2)m)Pβπ​{∣β^​t​−β∣>δ,J^t​≥m}≤2exp(−ρ(δ∧δ2)m) for every policy, every β∈B\beta \in \mathfrak Bβ∈B, all δ,m>0\delta, m > 0δ,m>0 and t≥2t \ge 2t≥2.
  3. (A14), p. 1159: E(ψ(β)−xt+1)2≤2E(ψ(β)−ψ(bt))2+2E(ψ(bt)−xt+1)2\mathbb E(\psi(\beta) - x_{t+1})^2 \le 2\mathbb E(\psi(\beta) - \psi(b_t))^2 + 2\mathbb E(\psi(b_t) - x_{t+1})^2E(ψ(β)−xt+1​)2≤2E(ψ(β)−ψ(bt​))2+2E(ψ(bt​)−xt+1​)2.
  4. Linear growth of J^t\hat J_tJ^t​ on AtA_tAt​, p. 1159. Here At=⋂s=⌊(t−1)/2⌋t−1{(ψ(β)−ψ(bs))2≤ψ(β)2/12}A_t = \bigcap_{s=\lfloor (t-1)/2\rfloor}^{t-1}\{(\psi(\beta)-\psi(b_s))^2 \le \psi(\beta)^2/12\}At​=⋂s=⌊(t−1)/2⌋t−1​{(ψ(β)−ψ(bs​))2≤ψ(β)2/12} is the event (A15). The claim: J^t≥(ψ(β)2/8−κ1log⁡(t−1)/(t−1))(t−1)\hat J_t \ge (\psi(\beta)^2/8 - \kappa_1\log(t-1)/(t-1))(t-1)J^t​≥(ψ(β)2/8−κ1​log(t−1)/(t−1))(t−1) on AtA_tAt​, given (ii) at time t−1t-1t−1.
  5. (A19), p. 1160: E(ψ(β)−ψ(bt))2≤K1t−1+K2 P(Atc)\mathbb E(\psi(\beta) - \psi(b_t))^2 \le K_1 t^{-1} + K_2\,\mathbb P(A_t^c)E(ψ(β)−ψ(bt​))2≤K1​t−1+K2​P(Atc​) for all t≥Nt \ge Nt≥N. The constants are K1=512K0σ2(u−l)2ψ(β)−4K_1 = 512K_0\sigma^2(u-l)^2\psi(\beta)^{-4}K1​=512K0​σ2(u−l)2ψ(β)−4, K2=4(u−l)2K_2 = 4(u-l)^2K2​=4(u−l)2 and K0=D^2/(4bmax⁡4)K_0 = \hat D^2/(4b_{\max}^4)K0​=D^2/(4bmax4​).

The goal fixes no constants beyond the order log⁡T\log TlogT. The milestones keep the paper's explicit constants where the paper gives them.

Significance

Theorem 4 turns asymptotic optimality into two checkable properties of a price path: enough information (i) and closeness to the greedy price (ii). Any policy meeting them has regret of order log⁡T\log TlogT. Together with the paper's matching lower bound, this pins down the optimal regret of the incumbent price problem. The same conditions certify whole families of simple policies. One example is the "constrained iterated least squares" rule of p. 1150, which perturbs the greedy price by ±κt−1/2\pm\kappa t^{-1/2}±κt−1/2 when it comes too close to p^\hat pp^​. Heavy exploration schemes are not needed. The contrast with the paper's two-parameter Theorem 2, where the corresponding rate is Tlog⁡T\sqrt T \log TT​logT, shows that the known incumbent point is what makes linear information growth free.

The result is proved in the paper. As far as a search of the platform shows, none of it is machine-checked: the platform has no dynamic pricing regret results and no least squares tail bound of this self-normalized, adaptively designed form. A formal proof would give a checked instance of a pattern that recurs throughout learning-and-earning analyses: an exponential tail bound for a self-normalized martingale with an adaptively chosen design, combined with a pathwise information-growth argument.

Difficulty

The deviations xsx_sxs​ are chosen adaptively from past data, so Mt=∑εsxsM_t = \sum \varepsilon_s x_sMt​=∑εs​xs​ is a martingale with a random, data-dependent quadratic variation σ2J^t\sigma^2\hat J_tσ2J^t​. Classical fixed-design least squares bounds do not apply, and a bound that holds on the event {J^t≥m}\{\hat J_t \ge m\}{J^t​≥m} uniformly over all policies is needed (Lemma 5). The regret bound then needs a bootstrap. The information grows linearly only if the recent greedy prices are near optimal (the event AtA_tAt​). Near-optimal greedy prices are likely only if enough information has already been collected. Closing this loop requires the tail bounds of Lemma 5 to be summable in ttt, and this is where the threshold on κ0\kappa_0κ0​ enters. A naive argument that bounds the estimation error by σ2/J^t\sigma^2/\hat J_tσ2/J^t​ using only condition (i) gives ∑t1/log⁡t\sum_t 1/\log t∑t​1/logt, which is far from logarithmic regret.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace KeskinZeevi.IncumbentSufficient. Model bundles l,u,p^,D^,bmin⁡,bmax⁡l, u, \hat p, \hat D, b_{\min}, b_{\max}l,u,p^​,D^,bmin​,bmax​ with the standing assumptions, and ψ\psiψ is the closed form above. LightTailedNoise P ε σ states the shock assumptions on a probability space. A Policy is a sequence of measurable history-to-price maps into [l,u][l,u][l,u]. The price, deviation and demand processes are defined by recursion from the noise, which realizes the paper's law of the sales process on the noise space. Periods are 1-based. Regret is for a fixed true slope β\betaβ, not the worst case over B\mathfrak BB. Expectations are Bochner integrals of bounded measurable functions, and probabilities are measures of sets.

The goal is a corrected form of the printed Theorem 4. The page says "there exist finite positive constants κ0,κ1\kappa_0, \kappa_1κ0​,κ1​, and CCC such that if π\piπ … satisfies (i)–(ii) almost surely for all ttt". Read literally, that statement is satisfied vacuously by choosing κ0\kappa_0κ0​ so large that no policy meets (i) (at t=2t = 2t=2, J^2≤2(u−l)2\hat J_2 \le 2(u-l)^2J^2​≤2(u−l)2). The Lean statement instead quantifies universally over every κ0\kappa_0κ0​ above a threshold, every κ1>0\kappa_1 > 0κ1​>0 and every start time t0t_0t0​, which is what the proof establishes, and it implies the printed statement. The sum in (ii) starts at s=1s = 1s=1 rather than s=0s = 0s=0, because b0b_0b0​ is defined only for the greedy policy. This only weakens the hypothesis. When J^t=0\hat J_t = 0J^t​=0, β^t\hat\beta_tβ^​t​ uses Lean's a/0=0a/0 = 0a/0=0, a case the hypotheses exclude for t≥max⁡(t0,2)t \ge \max(t_0, 2)t≥max(t0​,2). (27) is stated under J^t≠0\hat J_t \ne 0J^t​=0. The linear-growth milestone is pathwise and is stated for t≥3t \ge 3t≥3. (A19) has its threshold NNN existential and uniform over policies.

A complete development needs a conditional exponential-moment (supermartingale) argument for MtM_tMt​ under adaptive design, a mean value bound for ψ\psiψ on B\mathfrak BB, and elementary summation of s−3s^{-3}s−3 and log⁡\loglog terms. The self-normalized tail bound (Lemma 5) and the regret identity Δβπ(T)=−β∑tE(xt−ψ(β))2\Delta^\pi_\beta(T) = -\beta\sum_t \mathbb E(x_t - \psi(\beta))^2Δβπ​(T)=−β∑t​E(xt​−ψ(β))2 are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome, as are sharper constants.

Selected references

  • N. B. Keskin and A. Zeevi, Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies, Operations Research 62(5):1142–1167, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1294
  • J. Broder and P. Rusmevichientong, Dynamic Pricing under a General Parametric Choice Model, Operations Research 60(4):965–980, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1120.1057
  • T. L. Lai and H. Robbins, Iterated Least Squares in Multiperiod Control, Advances in Applied Mathematics 3(1):50–73, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1016/0196-8858(82)90005-5
  • A. Goldenshluger and A. Zeevi, Woodroofe's One-Armed Bandit Problem Revisited, Annals of Applied Probability 19(4):1603–1633, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1214/08-AAP589
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Analysis of Bid-Price Controls for Network Revenue Management II: Bid-Price Controls Are Not Optimal in GeneralResearch Paper

Motivation

Airlines, hotels and other capacity-constrained sellers decide, request by request, whether to sell a unit of a perishable resource now or hold it for a more valuable request later. In an airline network an itinerary uses seats on several flight legs at once, so the decision couples the legs. Bid-price controls are a widely used practical answer: each leg carries a threshold price, the bid price, and a request is accepted if and only if its fare covers the sum of the bid prices of the seats it uses. They are simple to store, to explain and to compute from linear programming duals (Simpson 1989 and Williamson 1992, as cited by Talluri and van Ryzin 1998, p. 1581).

Talluri and van Ryzin, An Analysis of Bid-Price Controls for Network Revenue Management, Management Science 44(11), 1998, asked whether this simplicity costs revenue. Their Proposition 1 shows that the optimal policy of the underlying dynamic program already compares each fare with an opportunity cost, which suggests that bid prices might be exactly optimal. Their §3.1 shows they are not: a two-leg, two-period instance in which the best bid-price control earns 10% less than the optimal policy. The same paper then proves (Theorem 1, a separate mission) that fixed bid prices are asymptotically optimal in large networks; the counterexample shows that this asymptotic statement cannot be sharpened to exact optimality.

Setting

A network has mmm legs and nnn itineraries; aij∈Na_{ij} \in \mathbb{N}aij​∈N seats of leg iii are used by itinerary jjj, A=[aij]A = [a_{ij}]A=[aij​], and AjA^jAj is the jjj-th column. The state is the vector y∈Nmy \in \mathbb{N}^my∈Nm of remaining capacities; selling itinerary jjj moves it to y−Ajy - A^jy−Aj. Time is counted backwards: period ttt has ttt periods to go.

In each period one request vector Rt∈RnR_t \in \mathbb{R}^nRt​∈Rn arrives: Rtj>0R_t^j > 0Rtj​>0 is a request for itinerary jjj with revenue RtjR_t^jRtj​, and Rt=0R_t = 0Rt​=0 means no request. Requests lie in S={αe:e∈En, α≥0}\mathcal{S} = \{\alpha e : e \in E_n,\ \alpha \ge 0\}S={αe:e∈En​, α≥0}, where En={e0=0,e1,…,en}E_n = \{e_0 = 0, e_1, \dots, e_n\}En​={e0​=0,e1​,…,en​}: at most one component is positive. The requests of different periods are independent, with laws FtF_tFt​ concentrated on S\mathcal{S}S and with finite first moments.

A control chooses in each period a decision ut(y,r)∈U(y)={e∈En:Ae≤y}u_t(y, r) \in \mathcal{U}(y) = \{e \in E_n : Ae \le y\}ut​(y,r)∈U(y)={e∈En​:Ae≤y} (reject, or sell one itinerary that fits), measurably in the request rrr. Its expected revenue is

V0u(y)=0,Vtu(y)=E[Rt ut(y,Rt)+Vt−1u(y−A ut(y,Rt))].V^u_0(y) = 0, \qquad V^u_t(y) = \mathbb{E}\big[R_t\,u_t(y, R_t) + V^u_{t-1}(y - A\,u_t(y, R_t))\big].V0u​(y)=0,Vtu​(y)=E[Rt​ut​(y,Rt​)+Vt−1u​(y−Aut​(y,Rt​))].

The optimal expected revenue Jt(y)J_t(y)Jt​(y) solves the Bellman equations

J0(y)=0,Jt(y)=E[max⁡e∈U(y)(Rte+Jt−1(y−Ae))].J_0(y) = 0, \qquad J_t(y) = \mathbb{E}\Big[\max_{e \in \mathcal{U}(y)} \big(R_t e + J_{t-1}(y - Ae)\big)\Big].J0​(y)=0,Jt​(y)=E[e∈U(y)max​(Rt​e+Jt−1​(y−Ae))].

A bid-price control (Definition 1) is given by real-valued bid prices μti(y)\mu_t^i(y)μti​(y) for every leg, period and capacity, and accepts an arriving request for itinerary jjj if and only if Aj≤yA^j \le yAj≤y and

rj≥∑i∈Aj∑h=0aij−1μti(y−hei).r^j \ge \sum_{i \in A^j} \sum_{h=0}^{a_{ij}-1} \mu_t^i(y - h e_i).rj≥i∈Aj∑​h=0∑aij​−1​μti​(y−hei​).

The instance of §3.1 has two legs with one seat each, the through itinerary (1,1)(1,1)(1,1) and the local itineraries (1,0)(1,0)(1,0), (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), and two periods. In period 2 a $500 through request arrives with probability 0.4 and a $250 request for each local itinerary with probability 0.3; in period 1 a $500 through request arrives with probability 0.8, and nothing with probability 0.2.

Formalization targets

Goal: the §3.1 counterexample

In the §3.1 instance, from capacity (1,1)(1,1)(1,1) with two periods to go,

max⁡u admissibleV2u(1,1)=440,max⁡μV2uμ(1,1)=400,\max_{u \text{ admissible}} V^u_2(1,1) = 440, \qquad \max_{\mu} V^{u^\mu}_2(1,1) = 400,u admissiblemax​V2u​(1,1)=440,μmax​V2uμ​(1,1)=400,

where uμu^\muuμ is the bid-price control with bid prices μ\muμ; both maxima are attained. The goal fixes the paper's instance and its numbers exactly.

Milestones

  1. Equation (5): for k≥1k \ge 1k≥1, Jk(x)=Jk−1(x)+∑j:Aj≤xE(Rkj+Jk−1(x−Aj)−Jk−1(x))+J_k(x) = J_{k-1}(x) + \sum_{j : A^j \le x} \mathbb{E}\big(R_k^j + J_{k-1}(x - A^j) - J_{k-1}(x)\big)^+Jk​(x)=Jk−1​(x)+∑j:Aj≤x​E(Rkj​+Jk−1​(x−Aj)−Jk−1​(x))+.
  2. Proposition 1: with finite first moments, Jk(x)J_k(x)Jk​(x) is finite, the threshold control u∗u^*u∗ that accepts jjj iff rj≥Jk−1(x)−Jk−1(x−Aj)r^j \ge J_{k-1}(x) - J_{k-1}(x - A^j)rj≥Jk−1​(x)−Jk−1​(x−Aj) and Aj≤xA^j \le xAj≤x attains JkJ_kJk​, and no admissible control does better.
  3. Values of the instance: J1(1,1)=400J_1(1,1) = 400J1​(1,1)=400, J1=0J_1 = 0J1​=0 at the other capacities, J2(1,1)=440J_2(1,1) = 440J2​(1,1)=440.
  4. No bid prices reproduce the optimal period-2 decisions: for every μ\muμ there is a period-2 request of positive probability at which the bid-price decision differs from that of every optimal control.

Significance

The result shows that the class of bid-price controls, the standard control class of network revenue management practice, does not contain an optimal policy in general, even though the optimal policy of Proposition 1 has a threshold form. The loss in the example is 10% of expected revenue, and it arises because the opportunity cost of a two-leg itinerary is not the sum of the opportunity costs of its legs. This is the negative half of the paper's analysis; the positive half is the asymptotic optimality of fixed bid prices (Theorem 1).

On the formal side, the mission builds a reusable finite-horizon model of network capacity control: request laws on S\mathcal{S}S, admissible Markov controls, their expected revenue, the Bellman value, and a proof that the Bellman value is the optimum over admissible controls (Proposition 1). The paper's argument for the counterexample is a few lines of inspection; formalizing it requires the upper bound over all admissible controls and the lower bound over all bid prices, including negative, time- and state-dependent ones. A search of the Prove2Me corpus (2026-09-25) found no network capacity-control model: the existing revenue-management items treat a single resource with discrete fare classes, and the existing finite-horizon dynamic-programming items assume a finite disturbance space, which excludes the request laws used here. As far as known, none of this has a machine-checked proof.

Difficulty

The upper bound V2u(1,1)≤440V^u_2(1,1) \le 440V2u​(1,1)≤440 ranges over every measurable admissible control, not over a finite menu; it needs Proposition 1, i.e. the verification theorem for a finite-horizon dynamic program with continuous state of the request and integrability under only finite first moments. The bid-price bound ranges over arbitrary real-valued bid-price functions of the period and the capacity, so the argument must show that every realizable pattern of period-2 decisions earns at most 400, not only that one pattern is unrealizable. Equation (5) is an identity between Bochner integrals under only finite first moments, so every integrand involved must be shown integrable rather than assumed so.

Formalization scope

Legs are Fin m, itineraries Fin n, A : Fin m → Fin n → ℕ, capacities Fin m → ℕ, requests Fin n → ℝ, laws F : ℕ → Measure (Fin n → ℝ) indexed by time-to-go; expectations are Bochner integrals. A decision is Option (Fin n) (none is reject). Controls are Markov and may depend on the whole request vector; admissibility requires decisions in U(y)\mathcal{U}(y)U(y) and measurability in the request. The request laws are probability measures concentrated on S\mathcal{S}S with integrable coordinates; the continuity of fare distributions assumed in §1 of the paper is not assumed, because Proposition 1 does not need it and the §3.1 instance has deterministic fares, which the paper itself notes (p. 1581). The paper's remark that a continuous perturbation gives the same counterexample is not formalized. Read literally, (1) and (4) set uj=1u^j = 1uj=1 for every itinerary whose zero fare meets its threshold, which is not a unit vector; both are formalized as accepting only the arriving request (rj>0r^j > 0rj>0), at most one per period on S\mathcal{S}S. In (1), "x−hx - hx−h" is read as y−heiy - h e_iy−hei​, hhh fewer seats on leg iii. "Jk(x)J_k(x)Jk​(x) is finite" is stated as integrability of the Bellman integrands. Probabilities are exact rationals and fares exact reals. The goal cannot be discharged by restricting the bid prices (constant or nonnegative ones only) or the competing controls (a finite list): the Lean statement quantifies over all real-valued bid-price functions and all admissible controls, and it asserts attainment of both maxima, not only the strict inequality 400<440400 < 440400<440.

Reusable parts: the model definitions (bid-price controls, admissible controls, the Bellman value) and Proposition 1 as a verification theorem for finite-horizon capacity control. Contributions are welcome on any milestone; Proposition 1 and equation (5) are general and independent of the instance.

Selected references

  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, An Analysis of Bid-Price Controls for Network Revenue Management, Management Science 44(11), 1577–1593, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.44.11.1577
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control, Athena Scientific, 1995 (the Bellman equation (2) cites p. 18). http://www.athenasc.com/dpbook.html
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Analysis of Bid-Price Controls for Network Revenue Management I: The Fixed-Bid-Price Heuristic Is Asymptotically OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

Airlines, hotels and rental-car firms sell a fixed, perishable capacity to customers who arrive over time and pay different prices. In an airline network, one ticket for an origin–destination itinerary consumes seats on several flight legs at once, so accepting a cheap connecting passenger today can displace a more valuable request tomorrow on any of those legs. The exact optimal accept/reject rule is a dynamic program whose state is the whole vector of remaining leg capacities, which is intractable at airline scale.

Bid-price control is the standard practical answer. Each leg iii carries a price μi\mu^iμi, and a request for itinerary jjj is accepted only if its revenue exceeds the sum of the bid prices of the seats it uses. Talluri and van Ryzin (Management Science 44(11), 1998) gave the first rigorous analysis of this scheme. They showed that bid prices are not optimal in general, the subject of a separate mission in this series. They also showed that one fixed vector of bid prices, obtained from a convex upper-bound problem, is asymptotically optimal when capacity and demand are scaled up together. This mission targets that positive result, Theorem 1 of the paper. It is one of the results most often cited to justify the use of bid prices and of deterministic or fluid upper bounds in revenue management; see Talluri and van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management (Springer, 2004), Ch. 3.

Setting

A network has mmm legs and nnn itineraries. Itinerary jjj uses aij∈Na_{ij} \in \mathbb{N}aij​∈N seats of leg iii; A=[aij]A = [a_{ij}]A=[aij​] and AjA^jAj is its jjj-th column. The state is the vector y∈Nmy \in \mathbb{N}^my∈Nm of remaining capacities, and time is counted backwards: period ttt has ttt periods to go, and the horizon is kkk.

In each period one request vector Rt=(Rt1,…,Rtn)R_t = (R_t^1, \dots, R_t^n)Rt​=(Rt1​,…,Rtn​) arrives. It lies in S={αe:e∈{0,e1,…,en}, α≥0}\mathcal{S} = \{\alpha e : e \in \{0, e_1, \dots, e_n\},\ \alpha \ge 0\}S={αe:e∈{0,e1​,…,en​}, α≥0}: at most one component is positive, Rtj>0R_t^j > 0Rtj​>0 is a request for itinerary jjj with revenue RtjR_t^jRtj​, and Rt=0R_t = 0Rt​=0 means no request. The RtR_tRt​ are independent with laws FtF_tFt​ concentrated on S\mathcal{S}S. Each marginal P(Rtj≤r)P(R_t^j \le r)P(Rtj​≤r) is continuous on (0,+∞)(0, +\infty)(0,+∞), and each RtjR_t^jRtj​ has a finite mean. These are the paper's standing assumptions. For the asymptotic result the revenues are also bounded: Rtj≤CR_t^j \le CRtj​≤C almost surely.

The optimal expected revenue Jt(y)J_t(y)Jt​(y) solves the Bellman equations

J0(y)=0,Jt(y)=E[max⁡(Jt−1(y), max⁡j: Aj≤y(Rtj+Jt−1(y−Aj)))].J_0(y) = 0, \qquad J_t(y) = \mathbb{E}\Big[\max\Big(J_{t-1}(y),\ \max_{j:\,A^j \le y}\big(R_t^j + J_{t-1}(y - A^j)\big)\Big)\Big].J0​(y)=0,Jt​(y)=E[max(Jt−1​(y), j:Aj≤ymax​(Rtj​+Jt−1​(y−Aj)))].

For bid prices μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0 write μAj=∑iμiaij\mu A^j = \sum_i \mu^i a_{ij}μAj=∑i​μiaij​ and define the relaxed value

Jˉk(x,μ)=∑t=1k∑j=1nE (Rtj−μAj)++μx.\bar J_k(x, \mu) = \sum_{t=1}^k \sum_{j=1}^n \mathbb{E}\,(R_t^j - \mu A^j)^+ + \mu x .Jˉk​(x,μ)=t=1∑k​j=1∑n​E(Rtj​−μAj)++μx.

The convex program vk(x)=min⁡μ≥0Jˉk(x,μ)v_k(x) = \min_{\mu \ge 0} \bar J_k(x, \mu)vk​(x)=minμ≥0​Jˉk​(x,μ) has an optimal solution μ∗\mu^*μ∗.

The fixed-bid-price heuristic uses μ∗\mu^*μ∗ throughout the horizon. It accepts a request for itinerary jjj with revenue rrr if and only if the remaining capacity suffices (Aj≤yA^j \le yAj≤y) and r>μ∗Ajr > \mu^* A^jr>μ∗Aj. The θ\thetaθ-scaled problem, for an integer θ≥1\theta \ge 1θ≥1, has capacity θx\theta xθx, horizon θk\theta kθk and request laws Rt(θ)∼F⌈t/θ⌉R_t(\theta) \sim F_{\lceil t/\theta \rceil}Rt​(θ)∼F⌈t/θ⌉​. Each original period is thus split into θ\thetaθ independent copies. Write Jθk(θx)J_{\theta k}(\theta x)Jθk​(θx) for its optimal expected revenue and JθkH(θx)J^H_{\theta k}(\theta x)JθkH​(θx) for the expected revenue of the heuristic with the bid prices μ∗\mu^*μ∗ of the original problem.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

There is a constant KKK, depending on the instance (A,F,C,k,x,μ∗)(A, F, C, k, x, \mu^*)(A,F,C,k,x,μ∗) but not on θ\thetaθ, such that for every integer θ≥1\theta \ge 1θ≥1

JθkH(θx) ≥ (1−Kθ) Jθk(θx).J^H_{\theta k}(\theta x) \ \ge\ \Big(1 - \frac{K}{\sqrt{\theta}}\Big)\, J_{\theta k}(\theta x).JθkH​(θx) ≥ (1−θ​K​)Jθk​(θx).

This is the paper's JθkH(θx)/Jθk(θx)≥1−O(θ−1/2)J^H_{\theta k}(\theta x) / J_{\theta k}(\theta x) \ge 1 - O(\theta^{-1/2})JθkH​(θx)/Jθk​(θx)≥1−O(θ−1/2), multiplied out.

Milestones

In the order the paper's argument uses them:

  1. Gallego's bound E(Z−z)+≤(σ2+(z−m)2−(z−m))/2\mathbb{E}(Z - z)^+ \le \big(\sqrt{\sigma^2 + (z - m)^2} - (z - m)\big)/2E(Z−z)+≤(σ2+(z−m)2​−(z−m))/2 for a random variable with mean mmm and variance σ2\sigma^2σ2.
  2. The scaling identity: the relaxed value of the θ\thetaθ-scaled problem is θJˉk(x,μ)\theta \bar J_k(x, \mu)θJˉk​(x,μ), so μ∗\mu^*μ∗ is optimal for every θ\thetaθ.
  3. Lemma 1: Jk(x)≤Jˉk(x,μ)J_k(x) \le \bar J_k(x, \mu)Jk​(x)≤Jˉk​(x,μ) for every μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0.
  4. The Kuhn–Tucker conditions (10): for every leg iii, ∑t,jP(Rtj>μ∗Aj) aij≤xi\sum_{t,j} P(R_t^j > \mu^* A^j)\,a_{ij} \le x^i∑t,j​P(Rtj​>μ∗Aj)aij​≤xi, with equality where μ∗i>0\mu^{*i} > 0μ∗i>0.
  5. Eq. (13): Jθk(θx)≤θvk(x)J_{\theta k}(\theta x) \le \theta v_k(x)Jθk​(θx)≤θvk​(x).
  6. The coupling bound (14): JθkH(θx)J^H_{\theta k}(\theta x)JθkH​(θx) is at least the revenue of an uncapacitated system accepting every request above its bid price, minus CCC times the expected seat overflow ∑iE(Ni−θxi)+\sum_i \mathbb{E}(N^i - \theta x^i)^+∑i​E(Ni−θxi)+.
  7. ENi=θ∑t,jEYijt\mathbb{E}N^i = \theta \sum_{t,j} \mathbb{E}Y_{ijt}ENi=θ∑t,j​EYijt​ and Var⁡(Ni)≤θ∑t,jVar⁡(Yijt)\operatorname{Var}(N^i) \le \theta \sum_{t,j} \operatorname{Var}(Y_{ijt})Var(Ni)≤θ∑t,j​Var(Yijt​), where Yijt=1{Rtj>μ∗Aj} aijY_{ijt} = \mathbf{1}\{R_t^j > \mu^* A^j\}\,a_{ij}Yijt​=1{Rtj​>μ∗Aj}aij​.
  8. Eq. (15): E(Ni−θxi)+≤Var⁡(Ni)/2\mathbb{E}(N^i - \theta x^i)^+ \le \sqrt{\operatorname{Var}(N^i)}/2E(Ni−θxi)+≤Var(Ni)​/2.
  9. Eq. (16): ∑t≤θk∑jP(Rtj(θ)>μ∗Aj) μ∗Aj=θμ∗x\sum_{t \le \theta k}\sum_j P(R_t^j(\theta) > \mu^* A^j)\,\mu^* A^j = \theta \mu^* x∑t≤θk​∑j​P(Rtj​(θ)>μ∗Aj)μ∗Aj=θμ∗x.
  10. The explicit bound
JθkH(θx)≥θvk(x)−C2θ∑i=1m∑t=1k∑j=1nVar⁡(Yijt).J^H_{\theta k}(\theta x) \ge \theta v_k(x) - \frac{C}{2}\sqrt{\theta}\sum_{i=1}^m \sqrt{\sum_{t=1}^k\sum_{j=1}^n \operatorname{Var}(Y_{ijt})}.JθkH​(θx)≥θvk​(x)−2C​θ​i=1∑m​t=1∑k​j=1∑n​Var(Yijt​)​.

The goal leaves KKK unspecified. The explicit bound (milestone 10), together with (13), identifies one admissible value when vk(x)>0v_k(x) > 0vk​(x)>0.

Significance

Theorem 1 says that the whole value of dynamic, state-dependent control over a static price-per-leg rule vanishes relative to revenue as the system grows: the loss is O(θ)O(\sqrt{\theta})O(θ​) against revenues of order θ\thetaθ. It justifies computing bid prices once from a convex (or, in later work, linear) upper-bound problem instead of solving the network dynamic program. The same fluid-scaling argument underlies a large later literature on asymptotically optimal policies in network revenue management and online resource allocation. That literature includes re-solving heuristics and the choice-based deterministic linear program (Liu and van Ryzin, M&SOM 2008).

The result has a complete published proof. What this mission adds is a machine-checked version. It includes the network Bellman recursion, the relaxation bound, a coupling argument between a capacitated and an uncapacitated system on the product space of request paths, and a second-moment overflow estimate. Two statements on the printed page are wrong as written and appear here in corrected form (see Formalization scope). A formal proof settles that the theorem survives both corrections. No machine-checked proof of this theorem, or of the fluid upper bound for network revenue management, is known.

Difficulty

The optimal value JJJ is defined by a recursion over the full capacity vector and has no closed form; the only access to it is an upper bound. The heuristic's revenue JHJ^HJH depends on the random time at which each leg runs out, which couples all legs and all periods, so it cannot be computed period by period either. The obvious approach, comparing both values period by period through their recursions, fails for exactly this reason: neither side decomposes over time. The two sides must instead be connected through a third object, the relaxed value Jˉ\bar JJˉ, which is explicit but relies on the requests' distributional structure (at most one request per period, and continuous marginals, which make the optimality conditions of the convex program hold). The step from an upper bound on JJJ to a lower bound on JHJ^HJH has to hold path by path, including for group requests that take several seats of one leg. On the probabilistic side, the seat counts of one period are indicators of mutually exclusive events, so their variances do not simply add.

Formalization scope

Legs are Fin m, itineraries Fin n, the seat matrix is A : Fin m → Fin n → ℕ and capacities are Fin m → ℕ. A request law is a Measure (Fin n → ℝ), and IsRequestLaw bundles the standing assumptions:

  • it is a probability measure;
  • it is concentrated on S\mathcal{S}S;
  • no marginal has an atom at a positive value, which is continuity of the marginal distribution functions on (0,+∞)(0, +\infty)(0,+∞);
  • each coordinate is integrable.

The bound Rtj≤CR_t^j \le CRtj​≤C a.s. is a separate hypothesis wherever the paper uses it. Laws are indexed by time-to-go. JJJ is defined by the Bellman recursion, with the maximum over the finite control set taken for each realized request; capacity subtraction in ℕ occurs only when Aj≤yA^j \le yAj≤y. Jˉ\bar JJˉ is the closed form (8), which the paper derives from the relaxed control problem (7). An optimal μ∗\mu^*μ∗ is a hypothesis (μ∗≥0\mu^* \ge 0μ∗≥0 and Jˉk(x,μ∗)≤Jˉk(x,μ)\bar J_k(x, \mu^*) \le \bar J_k(x, \mu)Jˉk​(x,μ∗)≤Jˉk​(x,μ) for all μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0), not an sInf. The scaled laws use ⌈t/θ⌉=(t+θ−1)/θ\lceil t/\theta \rceil = (t + \theta - 1)/\theta⌈t/θ⌉=(t+θ−1)/θ in ℕ. JHJ^HJH is the integral of the heuristic's pathwise revenue, with strict threshold and capacity check, against Measure.pi over the θk\theta kθk periods, and NiN^iNi is a random variable on the same space. Var⁡(Yijt)\operatorname{Var}(Y_{ijt})Var(Yijt​) is the closed form aij2 p(1−p)a_{ij}^2\,p(1-p)aij2​p(1−p).

Corrections to the printed page:

  • (10) is printed with −λ-\lambda−λ; the stated conditions use the sign that the paper's own reading of (10) requires (expected demand at most capacity).
  • The page's Var⁡(Ni)=θ∑Var⁡(Yijt)\operatorname{Var}(N^i) = \theta\sum\operatorname{Var}(Y_{ijt})Var(Ni)=θ∑Var(Yijt​) holds only as ≤\le≤, which is all the proof needs.
  • NiN^iNi is the uncapacitated system's seat count, as the displayed formula says, not the heuristic's sales, as the sentence says.

The coupling bound and the mean/variance statement are stated at an optimal μ∗\mu^*μ∗ of (9), as on the page. The ratio of Theorem 1 is multiplied out because Jθk(θx)J_{\theta k}(\theta x)Jθk​(θx) may be 000, and KKK is quantified before θ\thetaθ. A formalization that replaced JJJ by an easier quantity, or JHJ^HJH by the uncapacitated system's revenue, would make the goal trivial or different; the definitions here are the Bellman optimum and the capacity-respecting heuristic.

A complete development needs Bochner integrals against product measures, independence of coordinates under Measure.pi, variance of sums, one-sided derivatives of z↦E(Z−z)+z \mapsto \mathbb{E}(Z - z)^+z↦E(Z−z)+, and first-order optimality for a convex function on the nonnegative orthant. The Bellman-recursion and coupling infrastructure is reusable for other network revenue management results. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, An Analysis of Bid-Price Controls for Network Revenue Management, Management Science 44(11), 1577–1593, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.44.11.1577
  • G. Gallego, A minmax distribution free procedure for the (Q, R) inventory model, Operations Research Letters 11(1), 55–60, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6377(92)90063-C
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Springer, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
  • Q. Liu, G. van Ryzin, On the Choice-Based Linear Programming Model for Network Revenue Management, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(2), 288–310, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1070.0171
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Optimal Dynamic Assortment Planning with Demand Learning: The Separation-Based Policy Has Regret at Most κ₁⌈N/C⌉ log T + K̄₁Research Paper

Motivation

A retailer who can display only a limited number of products must decide which assortment to show each arriving customer, without knowing how attractive each product is. Offering a product reveals how often it is bought, but offering a poor product costs revenue. This exploration–exploitation trade-off arises in fast fashion, where the selling season is short, and in online display advertising, where the "shelf" is a page of slots. It is the assortment analogue of the multi-armed bandit problem, with one difference: an arm is a set of products, and the feedback from one set says something about every other set containing the same products.

Sauré and Zeevi, Optimal Dynamic Assortment Planning with Demand Learning (Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2013), give a lower bound for the regret of every consistent policy that is of order log⁡T\log TlogT in the number TTT of customers (their Theorem 1). They then show that simple policies attain this rate. This mission formalizes the first of those policies, the separation-based policy, and its regret bound (Theorem 2). Its proof is the only upper-bound proof printed in full in the article.

Setting

There are NNN products i∈N={1,…,N}i\in\mathcal N=\{1,\dots,N\}i∈N={1,…,N}, a display capacity 1≤C≤N1\le C\le N1≤C≤N and margins wi>0w_i>0wi​>0. Customer ttt assigns product iii the utility Uit=μi+ζitU_i^t=\mu_i+\zeta_i^tUit​=μi​+ζit​ and the no-purchase alternative 000 the utility U0t=ζ0tU_0^t=\zeta_0^tU0t​=ζ0t​ (mean utility μ0=0\mu_0=0μ0​=0). The shocks are i.i.d. with distribution FFF, which has an everywhere-positive density fff. Offered an assortment SSS, the customer buys the product of highest utility if that utility beats the no-purchase alternative, so product i∈Si\in Si∈S is bought with probability

pi(S,μ)=∫−∞∞∏j∈S∪{0}∖{i}F(x−μj) dF(x−μi).p_i(S,\mu)=\int_{-\infty}^{\infty}\prod_{j\in S\cup\{0\}\setminus\{i\}}F(x-\mu_j)\,dF(x-\mu_i).pi​(S,μ)=∫−∞∞​j∈S∪{0}∖{i}∏​F(x−μj​)dF(x−μi​).

The single-sale profit is r(S,μ)=∑i∈Swipi(S,μ)r(S,\mu)=\sum_{i\in S}w_ip_i(S,\mu)r(S,μ)=∑i∈S​wi​pi​(S,μ), the feasible assortments are S={S⊆N:∣S∣≤C}\mathcal S=\{S\subseteq\mathcal N:|S|\le C\}S={S⊆N:∣S∣≤C}, and S∗(μ)∈arg⁡max⁡S∈Sr(S,μ)S^*(\mu)\in\arg\max_{S\in\mathcal S}r(S,\mu)S∗(μ)∈argmaxS∈S​r(S,μ) is the optimal assortment, assumed unique at the true μ\muμ.

The retailer knows FFF but not μ\muμ. A policy chooses the assortment StS_tSt​ offered to customer ttt as a function of the purchases of customers 1,…,t−11,\dots,t-11,…,t−1. Its expected revenue over TTT customers is Jπ(T,μ)=Eπ∑t=1T∑iwiZitJ^\pi(T,\mu)=\mathbb E_\pi\sum_{t=1}^T\sum_iw_iZ_i^tJπ(T,μ)=Eπ​∑t=1T​∑i​wi​Zit​, where Zit=1Z_i^t=1Zit​=1 if customer ttt buys iii. Its regret is

Rπ(T,μ)=T−Jπ(T,μ)r(S∗(μ),μ),\mathcal R^\pi(T,\mu)=T-\frac{J^\pi(T,\mu)}{r(S^*(\mu),\mu)},Rπ(T,μ)=T−r(S∗(μ),μ)Jπ(T,μ)​,

the revenue lost against offering S∗(μ)S^*(\mu)S∗(μ) to everyone, in units of one optimal sale.

Assumption 1 (identifiability) says that purchase probabilities determine mean utilities. For a vector ρ\rhoρ of purchase probabilities with ∑iρi<1\sum_i\rho_i<1∑i​ρi​<1 there is a unique η(ρ)\eta(\rho)η(ρ) with pi(N,η(ρ))=ρip_i(\mathcal N,\eta(\rho))=\rho_ipi​(N,η(ρ))=ρi​. The map η\etaη is locally Lipschitz, and the choice probabilities are Lipschitz. The logit model (standard Gumbel FFF) satisfies it.

The separation-based policy π1=π(κ1,T,w)\pi_1=\pi(\kappa_1,T,w)π1​=π(κ1​,T,w) (Algorithm 1) partitions the products into ⌈N/C⌉\lceil N/C\rceil⌈N/C⌉ test assortments Aj={(j−1)C+1,…,min⁡{jC,N}}A_j=\{(j-1)C+1,\dots,\min\{jC,N\}\}Aj​={(j−1)C+1,…,min{jC,N}}.

  1. Exploration. Each test assortment is offered, in turn, to ⌈κ1log⁡T⌉\lceil\kappa_1\log T\rceil⌈κ1​logT⌉ customers.
  2. Exploitation. Every remaining customer ttt is offered S∗(μ^t)S^*(\hat\mu_t)S∗(μ^​t​). Here μ^t,i=η(p^t(Aj))i\hat\mu_{t,i}=\eta(\hat p_t(A_j))_iμ^​t,i​=η(p^​t​(Aj​))i​ for the test assortment Aj∋iA_j\ni iAj​∋i, and
p^i,t(Aj)=∑u=1t−1Ziu1{Su=Aj}∑u=1t−11{Su=Aj}(4)\hat p_{i,t}(A_j)=\frac{\sum_{u=1}^{t-1}Z_i^u\mathbf 1\{S_u=A_j\}}{\sum_{u=1}^{t-1}\mathbf 1\{S_u=A_j\}}\qquad(4)p^​i,t​(Aj​)=∑u=1t−1​1{Su​=Aj​}∑u=1t−1​Ziu​1{Su​=Aj​}​(4)

is the empirical purchase frequency of iii among the customers offered AjA_jAj​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2

For every instance satisfying the standing assumptions and Assumption 1, there are finite constants Kˉ1\bar K_1Kˉ1​ and κˉ1\bar\kappa_1κˉ1​, depending on the instance but not on TTT or κ1\kappa_1κ1​, such that

Rπ1(T,μ)≤κ1⌈N/C⌉log⁡T+Kˉ1for all T, whenever κ1>κˉ1.\mathcal R^{\pi_1}(T,\mu)\le\kappa_1\lceil N/C\rceil\log T+\bar K_1\qquad\text{for all }T,\text{ whenever }\kappa_1>\bar\kappa_1.Rπ1​(T,μ)≤κ1​⌈N/C⌉logT+Kˉ1​for all T, whenever κ1​>κˉ1​.

The leading term is explicit; the constants are existential, as in the paper.

Milestones

In the order in which the proof of Theorem 2 (Appendix A) uses them:

  1. Lemma 1. On a test assortment, the empirical purchase frequencies concentrate exponentially: the deviation event has probability ≤2e−c(ϵ)n\le 2e^{-c(\epsilon)n}≤2e−c(ϵ)n once the assortment has been offered nnn times, with c(ϵ)c(\epsilon)c(ϵ) independent of TTT.
  2. Display (9). ∥μ−μ^t∥Aj≤κ(ϵ)∥p−p^t∥Aj\|\mu-\hat\mu_t\|_{A_j}\le\kappa(\epsilon)\|p-\hat p_t\|_{A_j}∥μ−μ^​t​∥Aj​​≤κ(ϵ)∥p−p^​t​∥Aj​​ whenever the right-hand norm is small.
  3. Display (10). P{∥μ−μ^t∥Aj>ϵ, Tj(t)≥n}≤2∣Aj∣e−cn\mathbb P\{\|\mu-\hat\mu_t\|_{A_j}>\epsilon,\ T^j(t)\ge n\}\le2|A_j|e^{-cn}P{∥μ−μ^​t​∥Aj​​>ϵ, Tj(t)≥n}≤2∣Aj​∣e−cn.
  4. Display (11). ∣r(S,μ)−r(S,μ^t)∣≤∥w∥∞KC∥μ−μ^t∥S|r(S,\mu)-r(S,\hat\mu_t)|\le\|w\|_\infty KC\|\mu-\hat\mu_t\|_S∣r(S,μ)−r(S,μ^​t​)∣≤∥w∥∞​KC∥μ−μ^​t​∥S​.
  5. Display (12). Estimates within (2∥w∥∞KC)−1δ(μ)r(S∗(μ),μ)(2\|w\|_\infty KC)^{-1}\delta(\mu)r(S^*(\mu),\mu)(2∥w∥∞​KC)−1δ(μ)r(S∗(μ),μ) of μ\muμ on S∗(μ)∪S∗(μ^t)S^*(\mu)\cup S^*(\hat\mu_t)S∗(μ)∪S∗(μ^​t​) recover the optimal assortment.
  6. Step 3. In the exploitation phase, P{St≠S∗(μ)}≤∑Aj2∣Aj∣T−κ1c\mathbb P\{S_t\ne S^*(\mu)\}\le\sum_{A_j}2|A_j|T^{-\kappa_1c}P{St​=S∗(μ)}≤∑Aj​​2∣Aj​∣T−κ1​c.
  7. Final display. Rπ(T,μ)≤∑t=1TP{St≠S∗(μ)}\mathcal R^\pi(T,\mu)\le\sum_{t=1}^T\mathbb P\{S_t\ne S^*(\mu)\}Rπ(T,μ)≤∑t=1T​P{St​=S∗(μ)}.

Significance

Theorem 2 shows that, under identifiability, the regret of the dynamic assortment problem grows logarithmically in the horizon, matching the order in TTT of the lower bound. It also shows that separating exploration from exploitation is enough to reach that order, provided the exploration length is tuned by a large enough κ1\kappa_1κ1​. The refined policies of the paper (Theorems 3 and 4) sharpen the constant in front of log⁡T\log TlogT and are proved in the online companion. The argument of Theorem 2 is their template: concentration of frequencies, stability of η\etaη, stability of the argmax, and a sum over customers.

The theorem is proved in the article. It has not, to our knowledge, been machine-checked. A formal development would contain a finite model of a sequential choice process, a Hoeffding-type bound along policy-dependent sampling times, and a perturbation theory for random-utility choice models, and each of these is reusable for other assortment and revenue-management results.

Difficulty

The concentration step does not follow from an off-the-shelf bound for i.i.d. samples. The times at which a test assortment is offered are chosen by the policy, and the number of offers Tj(t)T^j(t)Tj(t) is random. The estimate μ^t\hat\mu_tμ^​t​ is a nonlinear function, η\etaη, of the frequencies, and η\etaη is only locally Lipschitz, so the frequency error must first be driven into the neighbourhood where the Lipschitz bound applies. The exploitation-phase assortment S∗(μ^t)S^*(\hat\mu_t)S∗(μ^​t​) may itself coincide with a test assortment and feed further data into (4). Finally, every constant (ccc, κ\kappaκ, ξ\xiξ) must be shown independent of TTT and κ1\kappa_1κ1​; without that uniformity the bound T1−κ1cT^{1-\kappa_1c}T1−κ1​c is not summable into a constant.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Products are Fin N (0-based), with 1≤C≤N1\le C\le N1≤C≤N and wi>0w_i>0wi​>0. The noise is a density f that is integrable, positive everywhere and of integral one, and F(x)=∫−∞xfF(x)=\int_{-\infty}^xfF(x)=∫−∞x​f. The choice probabilities are the paper's integral, with μ0=0\mu_0=0μ0​=0 built in.
  • History law. The purchase history of TTT customers lives in the finite type Fin T → Option (Fin N). Its law under a policy is the product of the per-customer choice probabilities given the offered assortments. Every probability and expectation is a finite sum.
  • Policies. A policy maps each customer and the earlier purchases to an assortment. Algorithm 1 is defined for each κ1\kappa_1κ1​ and TTT, and the regret at horizon TTT is that of the policy built for TTT. Exploration offers the test assortments in consecutive blocks. μ^t\hat\mu_tμ^​t​ is recomputed for every exploitation customer from all earlier offers.
  • Optimal assortments. S∗S^*S∗ is any selection of maximizers at every vector, and the goal holds for every such selection. Uniqueness is assumed at the true μ\muμ only.
  • Hypotheses added or restated. Several are standing assumptions of §3–4 that Theorem 2's sentence does not repeat: wi>0w_i>0wi​>0, C≤NC\le NC≤N, μ0=0\mu_0=0μ0​=0, uniqueness of the optimum, and the positive density. 1≤C1\le C1≤C is implicit on the page. Assumption 1 is restated per test assortment: an inverse ηAj\eta_{A_j}ηAj​​ on {ρ:ρi>0 (i∈Aj), ∑Ajρi<1}\{\rho:\rho_i>0\ (i\in A_j),\ \sum_{A_j}\rho_i<1\}{ρ:ρi​>0 (i∈Aj​), ∑Aj​​ρi​<1} replaces the page's convention ηi=−∞\eta_i=-\inftyηi​=−∞ for products outside AjA_jAj​. Lipschitz continuity is required of every p(S,⋅)p(S,\cdot)p(S,⋅), S∈SS\in\mathcal SS∈S, as the proof uses it, not only of p(N,⋅)p(\mathcal N,\cdot)p(N,⋅). The minimum relative optimality gap δ(μ)\delta(\mu)δ(μ) is defined locally, since its definition is in the online companion.
  • Corrections of the page. ∥ν∥A\|\nu\|_A∥ν∥A​ carries absolute values. Display (9) is claimed only for small ϵ\epsilonϵ. Line (b) of (10) is read with the sum over earlier customers. Step 3 is stated for the exploitation phase. The final display's step ∣A∣⌈κ1log⁡T⌉≤∣A∣κ1log⁡T|\mathcal A|\lceil\kappa_1\log T\rceil\le|\mathcal A|\kappa_1\log T∣A∣⌈κ1​logT⌉≤∣A∣κ1​logT loses the rounding, so Kˉ1=2N\bar K_1=2NKˉ1​=2N should read 2N+⌈N/C⌉2N+\lceil N/C\rceil2N+⌈N/C⌉. Theorem 2 asserts only that some finite Kˉ1\bar K_1Kˉ1​ exists, so the goal is unaffected.
  • Ruled out. The estimator is the paper's, η\etaη applied to the frequencies (4), not an oracle or a free parameter with a concentration hypothesis. The constants Kˉ1,κˉ1\bar K_1,\bar\kappa_1Kˉ1​,κˉ1​ and those of Lemma 1, (10) and Step 3 are quantified before κ1\kappa_1κ1​ and TTT. Letting them depend on TTT would make the goal trivial, since R≤T\mathcal R\le TR≤T always.
  • Needed infrastructure. Marginalization and conditioning for finite product laws, Hoeffding's inequality along stopping times (optional skipping), and Lipschitz estimates for integrals depending on parameters. Contributions of these as general lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Sauré, A. Zeevi, Optimal Dynamic Assortment Planning with Demand Learning, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 15(3):387–404, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2013.0429
  • P. Rusmevichientong, Z.-J. M. Shen, D. B. Shmoys, Dynamic Assortment Optimization with a Multinomial Logit Choice Model and Capacity Constraint, Operations Research 58(6):1666–1680, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1100.0866
  • T. L. Lai, H. Robbins, Asymptotically Efficient Adaptive Allocation Rules, Advances in Applied Mathematics 6(1):4–22, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1016/0196-8858(85)90002-8
  • C. F. Daganzo, Multinomial Probit: The Theory and Its Application to Demand Forecasting, Academic Press, 1979.
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing Strategies with Reference Effects II: A Myopic Firm Underprices and Its Prices Converge MonotonicallyResearch Paper

Motivation

Consumers judge a price against a reference price, an internal expectation formed from the prices they have seen before. A price below the reference feels like a gain and raises demand, a price above it feels like a loss and lowers demand. Because today's price moves tomorrow's reference price, a firm facing such consumers solves a dynamic problem even when nothing else changes over time. The marketing and revenue management literature has studied this problem since the late 1980s, mostly for linear demand (Kopalle, Rao and Assunção 1996; Fibich, Gavious and Lowengart 2003).

Popescu and Wu (2007) analyse the problem for a general reference-dependent demand model, using structural assumptions (monotonicity, concavity, supermodularity) instead of a parametric form. Their Proposition 1 answers a practical question: what does a firm lose, and how does its behaviour differ, if it ignores the effect of current prices on future expectations? The answer is that such a myopic firm systematically charges too little, and its prices drift monotonically to a single level.

Setting

Prices lie in P=[0,pˉ]P = [0, \bar p]P=[0,pˉ​] with pˉ>0\bar p > 0pˉ​>0. The data are a base demand d(p)d(p)d(p), the demand when the price equals the reference price, and a reference effect R(x,r)R(x, r)R(x,r), the change in demand caused by a perceived gain x=r−px = r - px=r−p at reference price rrr. Demand is

D(p,r)=d(p)+R(r−p,r),D(p, r) = d(p) + R(r - p, r),D(p,r)=d(p)+R(r−p,r),

so R(0,r)=0R(0, r) = 0R(0,r)=0. Short-term profit is Π(p,r)=p D(p,r)\Pi(p, r) = p\,D(p, r)Π(p,r)=pD(p,r) (unit cost zero), base profit is π(p)=p d(p)\pi(p) = p\,d(p)π(p)=pd(p), reference profit is ΠR(p,r)=p R(r−p,r)\Pi^R(p, r) = p\,R(r - p, r)ΠR(p,r)=pR(r−p,r), and λ(r)=Rx(0,r)\lambda(r) = R_x(0, r)λ(r)=Rx​(0,r) is the slope of the reference effect at zero gain.

Reference prices follow exponential smoothing, memory equation (1): with memory α∈[0,1)\alpha \in [0, 1)α∈[0,1) and prices ptp_tpt​,

rt+1=α rt+(1−α) pt.r_{t+1} = \alpha\, r_t + (1 - \alpha)\, p_t .rt+1​=αrt​+(1−α)pt​.

The strategic firm maximises discounted profit with discount factor β∈(0,1)\beta \in (0, 1)β∈(0,1). Its value function is

V(r0)=sup⁡(pt)⊂P∑t≥0βt Π(pt,rt),V(r_0) = \sup_{(p_t) \subset P} \sum_{t \ge 0} \beta^t\, \Pi(p_t, r_t),V(r0​)=(pt​)⊂Psup​t≥0∑​βtΠ(pt​,rt​),

its Bellman objective is W(p,r)=Π(p,r)+βV(αr+(1−α)p)W(p, r) = \Pi(p, r) + \beta V(\alpha r + (1-\alpha) p)W(p,r)=Π(p,r)+βV(αr+(1−α)p), and its optimal price p∗(r)p^*(r)p∗(r) is the largest maximizer of W(⋅,r)W(\cdot, r)W(⋅,r) over PPP. The myopic price p~(r)\tilde p(r)p~​(r) is the largest maximizer of Π(⋅,r)\Pi(\cdot, r)Π(⋅,r) over PPP. From a common initial reference price r0r_0r0​, the strategic firm follows rt+1∗=αrt∗+(1−α)p∗(rt∗)r^*_{t+1} = \alpha r^*_t + (1-\alpha) p^*(r^*_t)rt+1∗​=αrt∗​+(1−α)p∗(rt∗​) and charges pt∗=p∗(rt∗)p^*_t = p^*(r^*_t)pt∗​=p∗(rt∗​); the myopic firm follows rt+1M=αrtM+(1−α)p~(rtM)r^M_{t+1} = \alpha r^M_t + (1-\alpha)\tilde p(r^M_t)rt+1M​=αrtM​+(1−α)p~​(rtM​) and charges ptM=p~(rtM)p^M_t = \tilde p(r^M_t)ptM​=p~​(rtM​).

The standing hypotheses are the paper's Assumption 1 (on P×PP \times PP×P, demand is nonnegative, bounded and continuous, decreasing in ppp and increasing in rrr, and RRR is increasing in the gain), Assumption 2 (RRR is twice differentiable), and Assumption 3 (π\piπ is nonmonotonic and concave on PPP; π′(r)−rλ(r)\pi'(r) - r\lambda(r)π′(r)−rλ(r) is strictly decreasing; ΠR\Pi^RΠR is concave in ppp and supermodular in (p,r)(p, r)(p,r)).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1 (Myopic vs. Strategic Firm)

Under the hypotheses above:

∀r∈P: p~(r)≤p∗(r),∀r0∈P, ∀t: ptM≤pt∗,\forall r \in P:\ \tilde p(r) \le p^*(r), \qquad \forall r_0 \in P,\ \forall t:\ p^M_t \le p^*_t,∀r∈P: p~​(r)≤p∗(r),∀r0​∈P, ∀t: ptM​≤pt∗​, ∃ pM∗∈P  ∀r0∈P: (ptM)t is monotone and lim⁡t→∞ptM=pM∗.\exists\, p^{M*} \in P\ \ \forall r_0 \in P:\ (p^M_t)_t \text{ is monotone and } \lim_{t\to\infty} p^M_t = p^{M*}.∃pM∗∈P  ∀r0​∈P: (ptM​)t​ is monotone and t→∞lim​ptM​=pM∗.

The limit pM∗p^{M*}pM∗ is one price, the same for every initial reference price.

Milestones

  1. Remark 2. VVV is increasing on PPP (Assumption 1 only).
  2. Lemma 1. p~\tilde pp~​ is increasing on PPP.
  3. Pointwise underpricing (§A.1): p~(r)≤p∗(r)\tilde p(r) \le p^*(r)p~​(r)≤p∗(r) for every r∈Pr \in Pr∈P.
  4. Underpricing along paths (§A.1): rtM≤rt∗r^M_t \le r^*_trtM​≤rt∗​ and ptM≤pt∗p^M_t \le p^*_tptM​≤pt∗​ for all ttt.
  5. Monotone myopic paths (§A.1): if p~(r0)≥r0\tilde p(r_0) \ge r_0p~​(r0​)≥r0​ the path ptMp^M_tptM​ is increasing, and if p~(r0)≤r0\tilde p(r_0) \le r_0p~​(r0​)≤r0​ it is decreasing.
  6. Unique myopic steady state (§A.1): at most one p∈Pp \in Pp∈P satisfies p~(p)=p\tilde p(p) = pp~​(p)=p.

Significance

Proposition 1 shows that the error a myopic firm makes has a definite sign: it underprices at every state and at every date along its own trajectory, not only on average. The monotone convergence clause means the myopic firm's long-run behaviour is a single price independent of initial expectations, which the paper later uses to bound the strategic firm's steady-state price from below (Theorem 1, pM∗≤p∗∗p^{M*} \le p^{**}pM∗≤p∗∗). The result holds for general reference-dependent demand, which is what distinguishes it from the linear models that preceded it.

A formal development gives machine-checked versions of standard tools that recur throughout dynamic pricing and inventory theory: existence and monotonicity of the largest maximizer under supermodularity (Topkis' theorem on an interval), monotonicity of an infinite-horizon value function defined as a supremum over sequences, and monotone convergence of one-dimensional policy iterations. The result is proved in the paper; none of it has been formalized.

Difficulty

The value function is defined as a supremum over infinite price sequences, not as a given solution of a Bellman equation, so its monotonicity and the existence of a maximizer of W(⋅,r)W(\cdot, r)W(⋅,r) (which needs continuity of VVV) have to be established from the sequence problem. The comparison p~≤p∗\tilde p \le p^*p~​≤p∗ depends on the largest-maximizer convention: for arbitrary selections from the two argmax sets the inequality is false, because the sets can overlap without their chosen elements being ordered. The two firms move along different reference-price paths, so the path comparison is not a pointwise statement about one state. Uniqueness of the limit has to cover fixed points of p~\tilde pp~​ at the endpoints of PPP, where the first-order condition is only an inequality, and the limit of a myopic path is a priori only a maximizer of Π(⋅,pM∗)\Pi(\cdot, p^{M*})Π(⋅,pM∗), not necessarily the largest one.

Formalization scope

The data are functions d:R→Rd : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}d:R→R and R:R→R→RR : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}R:R→R→R; demand is defined from them, and R(0,r)=0R(0, r) = 0R(0,r)=0 is a hypothesis. The price set is Set.Icc 0 pbar. VVV is a real ⨆ over sequences N→[0,pˉ]\mathbb{N} \to [0, \bar p]N→[0,pˉ​] of a tsum; under the hypotheses the family is bounded and every series summable, so the default values of ⨆ and ∑' on unbounded or non-summable input are not reached. Both p∗p^*p∗ and p~\tilde pp~​ are defined as sSup of their sets of maximizers over PPP, which is the paper's largest-maximizer convention. That these sets are nonempty is a proof obligation, not a hypothesis. The myopic firm is defined directly from Π\PiΠ, not as problem (2) with β=0\beta = 0β=0.

"Increasing" and "decreasing" are non-strict. "Nonmonotonic" means neither monotone nor antitone on PPP. "Twice differentiable" means RRR and its Fréchet derivative are differentiable on R2\mathbb{R}^2R2. Supermodularity of ΠR\Pi^RΠR is the increasing-differences inequality on P×PP \times PP×P. One hypothesis is added to the paper's: ddd is differentiable, because Assumption 3(b) refers to π′\pi'π′ and Lean's deriv returns 000 where a function is not differentiable. Assumptions 2 and 3 hold throughout §§4.1–4.3, so they are hypotheses of every §4 item. They are not hypotheses of Remark 2, which is in §3.

A formalization in which VVV is an arbitrary increasing function, or p∗p^*p∗ an arbitrary maximizer satisfying p∗≥p~p^* \ge \tilde pp∗≥p~​ by hypothesis, would make the goal trivial. The definitions here rule it out, because VVV, p∗p^*p∗, p~\tilde pp~​ and both paths are all computed from (d,R,α,β,pˉ)(d, R, \alpha, \beta, \bar p)(d,R,α,β,pˉ​). The convergence clause quantifies the limit before the initial state, so a statement in which each path merely converges would not satisfy it. The hypotheses are jointly satisfiable: pˉ=3/4\bar p = 3/4pˉ​=3/4, d(p)=1−pd(p) = 1 - pd(p)=1−p, R(x,r)=x/4R(x, r) = x/4R(x,r)=x/4 satisfies all of them.

A complete development needs Topkis-type monotone comparative statics on intervals, continuity and monotonicity of the value function of a bounded discounted problem, and elementary facts on monotone bounded sequences. The first two are reusable across dynamic pricing, inventory and queueing-control missions, and contributions of them as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. Popescu and Y. Wu, Dynamic Pricing Strategies with Reference Effects, Operations Research 55(3):413–429, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0393
  • D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
  • N. L. Stokey, R. E. Lucas and E. C. Prescott, Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics, Harvard University Press, 1989. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvjnrt76
  • P. K. Kopalle, A. G. Rao and J. L. Assunção, Asymmetric Reference Price Effects and Dynamic Pricing Policies, Marketing Science 15(1):60–85, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.15.1.60
  • G. Fibich, A. Gavious and O. Lowengart, Explicit Solutions of Optimization Models and Differential Games with Nonsmooth (Asymmetric) Reference-Price Effects, Operations Research 51(5):721–734, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.51.5.721.16758
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Choice-Based Linear Programming Model for Network Revenue Management III: Under MNL, Offering the Top-Ranked Products Solves the Offer-Set ProblemResearch Paper

Motivation

Airlines, hotels and rail operators sell many products (itinerary–fare combinations) that share scarce capacity. When customers choose among whatever is on offer, the seller's lever is the offer set: the subset of products made available at each moment. Choice-based network revenue management, as set up by Liu and van Ryzin (2008), optimizes over offer sets through the choice-based deterministic linear program (CDLP), whose columns are indexed by all 2n2^n2n subsets of the nnn products. Solving it by column generation requires, at every iteration, a subproblem that picks the best offer set against the current dual prices; the paper's decomposition heuristic needs subproblems of the same form.

For a general choice model this subproblem is a hard combinatorial optimization. Under the multinomial logit (MNL) model with disjoint customer segments it separates by segment, and each segment's problem is solved by ranking the products. This observation is the reason the CDLP is computationally practical under MNL, and it is the content of Proposition 6 of the paper. The same structural fact, that under MNL the optimal assortment is revenue-ordered, was shown by Gallego, Iyengar, Phillips and Dubey (2004) and is related to the single-leg analysis of Talluri and van Ryzin (2004). It underlies a large later literature on assortment optimization.

Setting

Fix one customer segment. Its consideration set is a finite set ι\iotaι of products, of size sss. Each product j∈ιj \in \iotaj∈ι has an MNL preference weight vj>0v_j > 0vj​>0, and not buying has a no-purchase weight v0≥0v_0 \ge 0v0​≥0. When the set S⊆ιS \subseteq \iotaS⊆ι is offered, a customer of the segment buys j∈Sj \in Sj∈S with probability

Pj(S)=vj∑i∈Svi+v0.P_j(S) = \frac{v_j}{\sum_{i \in S} v_i + v_0}.Pj​(S)=∑i∈S​vi​+v0​vj​​.

Each product also carries a real score wjw_jwj​; in the paper's application wj=rj−π⊤Ajw_j = r_j - \pi^\top A_jwj​=rj​−π⊤Aj​ is the product's revenue minus the dual prices of the legs it uses, so wjw_jwj​ may be negative. The expected score per customer when SSS is offered is

f(S)=∑j∈Swjvj∑j∈Svj+v0,f(S) = \frac{\sum_{j \in S} w_j v_j}{\sum_{j \in S} v_j + v_0},f(S)=∑j∈S​vj​+v0​∑j∈S​wj​vj​​,

and the offer-set problem (the paper's (14)) is max⁡S⊆ιf(S)\max_{S \subseteq \iota} f(S)maxS⊆ι​f(S). The paper writes offer sets as binary vectors y∈{0,1}sy \in \{0,1\}^sy∈{0,1}s with yj=1y_j = 1yj​=1 iff jjj is offered; the formalization uses subsets.

The paper's proof passes through the relaxation (17): with zj=vjyjz_j = v_j y_jzj​=vj​yj​ allowed to range over the whole interval [0,vj][0, v_j][0,vj​], maximize

h(z)=∑jwjzj∑jzj+v0h(z) = \frac{\sum_j w_j z_j}{\sum_j z_j + v_0}h(z)=∑j​zj​+v0​∑j​wj​zj​​

over the box D=[0,v1]×⋯×[0,vs]\mathcal{D} = [0, v_1] \times \cdots \times [0, v_s]D=[0,v1​]×⋯×[0,vs​]. When v0=0v_0 = 0v0​=0 the paper sets h(0):=0h(0) := 0h(0):=0 (and likewise f(∅)=0f(\emptyset) = 0f(∅)=0).

In Lean, mnlObjective v w v₀ S is f(S)f(S)f(S) and relaxedObjective w v₀ z is h(z)h(z)h(z); the box is Set.Icc 0 v in the componentwise order.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 6, the top-ranked products are an optimal offer set

Assume vj>0v_j > 0vj​>0 for all jjj, v0≥0v_0 \ge 0v0​≥0, and that some score is nonnegative. Then there is a product k∈ιk \in \iotak∈ι such that

f(S)  ≤  f({j∈ι:wj≥wk})for every S⊆ι.f(S) \;\le\; f\bigl(\{ j \in \iota : w_j \ge w_k \}\bigr) \qquad \text{for every } S \subseteq \iota.f(S)≤f({j∈ι:wj​≥wk​})for every S⊆ι.

Here wkw_kwk​ is the paper's w[k∗]w_{[k^*]}w[k∗]​, the k∗k^*k∗-th largest score; the threshold set contains every product tied with it.

Milestones (all from the Appendix, proof of Proposition 6, p. 309)

  1. Claim (17). The relaxation has the same optimal value: max⁡z∈Dh(z)=max⁡S⊆ιf(S)\max_{z \in \mathcal{D}} h(z) = \max_{S \subseteq \iota} f(S)maxz∈D​h(z)=maxS⊆ι​f(S), both maxima attained.
  2. Quasiconvexity. hhh is quasiconvex on D\mathcal{D}D, including the case v0=0v_0 = 0v0​=0 with h(0):=0h(0) := 0h(0):=0.
  3. Nested relaxed optimum. If w1≥⋯≥wsw_1 \ge \cdots \ge w_sw1​≥⋯≥ws​ and some wi≥0w_i \ge 0wi​≥0, there is 1≤i∗≤s1 \le i^* \le s1≤i∗≤s such that z∗=(v1,…,vi∗,0,…,0)z^* = (v_1, \dots, v_{i^*}, 0, \dots, 0)z∗=(v1​,…,vi∗​,0,…,0) is an optimal solution of the relaxation.

Significance

The result. Proposition 6 reduces a search over 2s2^s2s offer sets to a search over at most sss nested sets, one per possible threshold. Under MNL with disjoint segments, it lets the CDLP column-generation subproblem, and the inner offer-set problems of the leg-level dynamic programs in the decomposition heuristic, be solved by checking at most sss candidate sets per segment, sss being the size of the segment's consideration set. Revenue-ordered assortments are the reference point against which later models (nested logit, mixtures of logits, constrained assortments) are measured.

Formalizing it. The proposition is proved on paper, twice (Gallego et al. 2004; Liu and van Ryzin 2008, Appendix), and no machine-checked version is known to the platform. The mission produces a checked statement of the ranking property with its hypotheses made exact, including the case the printed statement gets wrong (see below), and the supporting facts about the linear-fractional relaxation: that the box relaxation loses nothing, and that its objective is quasiconvex. These facts about ratios of affine functions over boxes are reusable beyond revenue management, for instance in fractional combinatorial optimization.

Difficulty

The objective is a ratio, so neither the numerator nor the denominator can be optimized alone, and adding a product with a positive score can lower fff by diluting the probability mass of better products. The optimal threshold is not a fixed number such as 000: it depends on the optimal value itself. A proof must therefore relate every one of the 2s2^s2s offer sets to a threshold set without enumerating them. Ties among scores, ties between a score and the optimal value, and the degenerate case v0=0v_0 = 0v0​=0 (where the denominator vanishes at the empty offer set) all have to be handled; in the relaxation, ties make interior points optimal, so an argument that every optimum is a vertex of the box is false.

Formalization scope

  • Offer sets are subsets S : Finset ι of a finite type ι (the consideration set); the binary vectors of the paper correspond one-to-one. The milestone on sorted scores uses Fin s with Antitone w, so indices are 0-based and i∗i^*i∗ is an element of Fin s.
  • Ranking. The goal does not formalize a sorting permutation: "wj≥w[k∗]w_j \ge w_{[k^*]}wj​≥w[k∗]​ for some 1≤k∗≤s1 \le k^* \le s1≤k∗≤s" is stated as "wj≥wkw_j \ge w_kwj​≥wk​ for some product kkk". With ties this is exactly the printed rule; it is not "the first k∗k^*k∗ products of a chosen sort order", which differs under ties.
  • Optimality means "is an optimal solution": the chosen set (or point) is compared with every S⊆ιS \subseteq \iotaS⊆ι (every z∈Dz \in \mathcal{D}z∈D). Uniqueness is not claimed, since ties produce several optima.
  • Division by zero. v0=0v_0 = 0v0​=0 is allowed, as in the paper's numerical study; the only zero denominator is at S=∅S = \emptysetS=∅ (or z=0z = 0z=0), where Lean's 0/0=00/0 = 00/0=0 implements the paper's convention h(0):=0h(0) := 0h(0):=0.
  • Repair. As printed, Proposition 6 (and the nested optimum in its proof) requires 1≤k∗1 \le k^*1≤k∗, i.e. a nonempty offer set, and is false when every score is negative: for s=1s = 1s=1, w1=−1w_1 = -1w1​=−1, v1=v0=1v_1 = v_0 = 1v1​=v0​=1, the empty set has value 000 and the only admissible set has value −1/2-1/2−1/2. Such scores occur in the paper's own application. The goal and milestone 3 therefore add the hypothesis that some score is nonnegative. The hypothesis is not strengthened to "all scores nonnegative", which would exclude the cases the column-generation subproblem actually meets.
  • Ruling out trivializations. The objective is the full MNL ratio with v0v_0v0​ in the denominator, the comparison ranges over every subset (not only threshold sets), and the consideration set is arbitrary, so the goal cannot be discharged by checking nested sets against each other or by a special case.
  • Infrastructure. Mathlib's QuasiconvexOn (and QuasilinearOn) and Finset sums suffice; there is no Mathlib lemma on quasiconvexity of linear-fractional functions, which milestone 2 would supply. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative routes to the goal that bypass the relaxation, are welcome.

Selected references

  • Q. Liu, G. van Ryzin. On the choice-based linear programming model for network revenue management. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(2):288–310, 2008. doi:10.1287/msom.1070.0169
  • G. Gallego, G. Iyengar, R. Phillips, A. Dubey. Managing flexible products on a network. CORC Technical Report TR-2004-01, Columbia University, 2004. CORC technical reports
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin. Revenue management under a general discrete choice model of consumer behavior. Management Science 50(1):15–33, 2004. doi:10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • M. Avriel. Nonlinear Programming: Analysis and Methods. Prentice Hall, 1976.
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Convex OptimizationLinear OptimizationOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Choice-Based Linear Programming Model for Network Revenue Management II: Only Efficient Offer Sets Carry Time in an Optimal CDLP SolutionResearch Paper

Motivation

Airlines, hotels and rail operators sell many products (an itinerary combined with a fare class) that share a network of finite resources (flight legs, room-nights). When customers choose among whatever products are on offer, the firm's control is no longer "accept or reject a request for product jjj" but which set of products to offer at each moment. The exact dynamic program for this problem is intractable for realistic networks, so practice and theory rely on a deterministic approximation, the choice-based deterministic linear program (CDLP) of Gallego, Iyengar, Phillips and Dubey (2004), which decides for how long each offer set should be offered.

The CDLP has one variable per offer set, so 2n2^n2n variables for nnn products, and it is solved by column generation. Knowing in advance which offer sets can never receive positive time in an optimal solution cuts this search space. Liu and van Ryzin (MSOM 2008) extended the single-leg notion of an efficient offer set from Talluri and van Ryzin (Management Science 2004) to networks and showed that only efficient sets are used by an optimal CDLP solution. This mission formalizes that section of their paper (§5).

Setting

A network has mmm legs and nnn products N={1,…,n}N = \{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n}. Product jjj earns revenue rjr_jrj​, and the 0–1 incidence matrix A=[aij]A = [a_{ij}]A=[aij​] records which legs product jjj uses. An offer set is a subset S⊆NS \subseteq NS⊆N. When SSS is offered, an arriving customer buys product jjj with probability Pj(S)≥0P_j(S) \ge 0Pj​(S)≥0, where Pj(S)=0P_j(S) = 0Pj​(S)=0 for j∉Sj \notin Sj∈/S, and buys nothing with probability P0(S)≥0P_0(S) \ge 0P0​(S)≥0, with ∑j∈SPj(S)+P0(S)=1\sum_{j\in S} P_j(S) + P_0(S) = 1∑j∈S​Pj​(S)+P0​(S)=1. The expected revenue per arriving customer and the vector of expected capacity consumption are

R(S)=∑j∈SrjPj(S),Q(S)=A P(S)∈Rm.R(S) = \sum_{j\in S} r_j P_j(S), \qquad Q(S) = A\,P(S) \in \mathbb{R}^m .R(S)=j∈S∑​rj​Pj​(S),Q(S)=AP(S)∈Rm.

An offer set TTT is inefficient if some convex weights α(S)≥0\alpha(S) \ge 0α(S)≥0, ∑Sα(S)=1\sum_S \alpha(S) = 1∑S​α(S)=1, over all offer sets satisfy

R(T)<∑Sα(S)R(S),Q(T)≥∑Sα(S)Q(S) (componentwise);R(T) < \sum_S \alpha(S) R(S), \qquad Q(T) \ge \sum_S \alpha(S) Q(S) \ \text{(componentwise)};R(T)<S∑​α(S)R(S),Q(T)≥S∑​α(S)Q(S) (componentwise);

otherwise TTT is efficient.

With arrival probability λ∈(0,1]\lambda \in (0,1]λ∈(0,1] per period, capacities c∈R≥0mc \in \mathbb{R}^m_{\ge 0}c∈R≥0m​ and a horizon of length τ≥0\tau \ge 0τ≥0, the CDLP is

max⁡∑S⊆NλR(S) t(S)s.t.∑SλQ(S) t(S)≤c,∑St(S)≤τ,t(S)≥0,\max \sum_{S\subseteq N} \lambda R(S)\,t(S) \quad\text{s.t.}\quad \sum_{S} \lambda Q(S)\,t(S) \le c,\quad \sum_S t(S) \le \tau,\quad t(S) \ge 0,maxS⊆N∑​λR(S)t(S)s.t.S∑​λQ(S)t(S)≤c,S∑​t(S)≤τ,t(S)≥0,

where t(S)t(S)t(S) is the total time during which SSS is offered. Its dual has prices π∈R≥0m\pi \in \mathbb{R}^m_{\ge 0}π∈R≥0m​ on the legs and σ≥0\sigma \ge 0σ≥0 on time. Finally, the frontier function is

Rˉ(q)=max⁡α{∑Sα(S)R(S):∑Sα(S)Q(S)≤q, ∑Sα(S)=1, α≥0},q∈[0,1]m.\bar R(q) = \max_\alpha\Big\{\sum_S \alpha(S)R(S) : \sum_S \alpha(S)Q(S) \le q,\ \sum_S\alpha(S) = 1,\ \alpha \ge 0\Big\}, \qquad q \in [0,1]^m .Rˉ(q)=αmax​{S∑​α(S)R(S):S∑​α(S)Q(S)≤q, S∑​α(S)=1, α≥0},q∈[0,1]m.

In the Lean development these objects are ChoiceNetwork m n (with revenue and consumption), IsEfficient, IsCDLPFeasible / cdlpObjective / IsCDLPOptimal, and frontier, all in the namespace ChoiceCDLP.Efficient.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4

If t∗t^*t∗ is an optimal solution of the CDLP and TTT is an offer set with t∗(T)>0t^*(T) > 0t∗(T)>0, then TTT is efficient:

t∗ optimal for the CDLP,  t∗(T)>0 ⟹ T efficient.t^* \text{ optimal for the CDLP},\ \ t^*(T) > 0 \ \Longrightarrow\ T \text{ efficient}.t∗ optimal for the CDLP,  t∗(T)>0 ⟹ T efficient.

The statement covers every optimal solution, not only basic ones.

Milestones

  1. Frontier function (Appendix, p. 307): Rˉ\bar RRˉ is increasing and concave on [0,1]m[0,1]^m[0,1]m.
  2. Proposition 3 (p. 296): TTT is efficient if and only if, for some π≥0\pi \ge 0π≥0, TTT maximizes R(S)−π⊤Q(S)R(S) - \pi^\top Q(S)R(S)−π⊤Q(S) over all offer sets SSS.
  3. Reduced cost at the optimal dual (proof of Proposition 4, p. 296): if t∗t^*t∗ is optimal and t∗(T)>0t^*(T) > 0t∗(T)>0, some optimal dual solution (π∗,σ∗)(\pi^*,\sigma^*)(π∗,σ∗) satisfies λR(S)−λπ∗⊤Q(S)−σ∗≤0\lambda R(S) - \lambda \pi^{*\top}Q(S) - \sigma^* \le 0λR(S)−λπ∗⊤Q(S)−σ∗≤0 for every SSS, with equality at S=TS = TS=T.
  4. Proposition 5 (p. 297): for efficient S1,S2S_1, S_2S1​,S2​, Q(S2)≥Q(S1)Q(S_2) \ge Q(S_1)Q(S2​)≥Q(S1​) implies R(S2)≥R(S1)R(S_2) \ge R(S_1)R(S2​)≥R(S1​).

Significance

Proposition 4 says that efficiency is a property of every offer set an optimal CDLP solution actually uses. Inefficient sets can therefore be removed from the column space of the CDLP, and Proposition 3 describes the remaining sets as the maximizers of revenue net of leg prices, which is the pricing subproblem of column generation. The paper also uses Proposition 4 to argue that its asymptotically optimal policy (Proposition 2 of the same paper) uses only efficient sets. Proposition 5 gives the partial order of efficient sets in the network, the analogue of the total order that drives nested policies in the single-leg model.

The results are proved in the paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof. A formalization provides a checked statement of the network notion of efficiency and its price characterization, which the single-leg results already on the platform do not cover (there Q(S)Q(S)Q(S) is a scalar), and a checked link between LP duality for the CDLP and the structure of its optimal solutions.

Difficulty

The paper's proof of Proposition 4 appeals to "the optimal basis" of the CDLP, while the statement is about every optimal solution, including non-basic ones, so the simplex-tableau argument as written does not cover the statement; the existence of optimal dual prices with the required reduced-cost properties has to be established for an arbitrary optimal solution. The "only if" half of Proposition 3 is argued in the paper by a supporting hyperplane to the concave function Rˉ\bar RRˉ at Q(T)Q(T)Q(T), followed by an informal argument that the hyperplane's slope is nonnegative; Q(T)Q(T)Q(T) may lie on the boundary of [0,1]m[0,1]^m[0,1]m, where a supporting hyperplane of a concave function need not exist in the naive sense, and the sign argument is stated in one line. Concavity of Rˉ\bar RRˉ is the concavity of an LP's optimal value in its right-hand side, which the paper cites from Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis without proof and which Mathlib does not provide.

Formalization scope

  • Products and legs are Fin n and Fin m; offer sets are Finset (Fin n), so sums over "all S⊆NS \subseteq NS⊆N" are sums over Finset.univ. All quantities are real. Vector inequalities (Q(T)≥∑Sα(S)Q(S)Q(T) \ge \sum_S\alpha(S)Q(S)Q(T)≥∑S​α(S)Q(S), c≥0c \ge 0c≥0, π≥0\pi \ge 0π≥0, Q(S2)≥Q(S1)Q(S_2) \ge Q(S_1)Q(S2​)≥Q(S1​)) are componentwise, and π⊤Q(S)\pi^\top Q(S)π⊤Q(S) is dotProduct.
  • The choice probabilities are generic, as in the paper: nonnegative, zero outside the offer set, and summing with P0(S)P_0(S)P0​(S) to one. Revenues are arbitrary reals.
  • The CDLP horizon is written τ\tauτ (the paper's TTT) to keep TTT for an offer set. "An optimal solution" is a feasible ttt whose objective is at least that of every feasible vector.
  • Repairs of the printed statements. (i) In Propositions 3 and 4, "TTT is the optimal solution" is read as "TTT is an optimal solution": with a unique-maximizer reading, Proposition 3's "only if" direction is false whenever two offer sets have the same RRR and QQQ (for instance, T′T'T′ is TTT plus a product that is never bought from T′T'T′); both are then efficient, and neither is a unique maximizer. (ii) Proposition 4 assumes λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0, the paper's standing assumption that λ\lambdaλ is an arrival probability; at λ=0\lambda = 0λ=0 every feasible ttt is optimal and inefficient sets can receive positive time. The milestone texts remain verbatim.
  • Rˉ\bar RRˉ is a real supremum (sSup) over attainable mixed revenues; on [0,1]m[0,1]^m[0,1]m the set is nonempty (the weight concentrated on the empty offer set is feasible because Q(∅)=0Q(\emptyset) = 0Q(∅)=0) and bounded above by max⁡SR(S)\max_S R(S)maxS​R(S), so it is the paper's maximum.
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out: efficiency quantifies over all convex weights on offer sets (not only single dominating sets), the price vector in Proposition 3 is required to be nonnegative, and the optimum in Proposition 4 is over the full feasible set of the CDLP.
  • A complete development needs finite-dimensional LP duality with complementary slackness (or Farkas' lemma) and concavity of the optimal value of a parametric LP. Both are reusable well beyond this mission; contributions of either as standalone results are welcome.

Selected references

  • Q. Liu, G. van Ryzin, On the Choice-Based Linear Programming Model for Network Revenue Management, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(2):288–310, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1070.0169
  • G. Gallego, G. Iyengar, R. Phillips, A. Dubey, Managing Flexible Products on a Network, CORC Technical Report TR-2004-01, Columbia University, 2004 (no DOI; cited as Gallego et al. 2004 in the paper).
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1):15–33, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • D. Bertsimas, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Introduction to Linear Optimization, Athena Scientific, 1997 (Theorem 5.1, p. 213).
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research+2·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design XI: Optimal Sequential Screening by Option ContractsTextbook

Motivation

Many sales are contracted before the buyer knows what the good is worth to her. An airline sells a ticket months before the trip, a hotel sells a refundable or non-refundable room before the traveller's plans are settled, and a supplier signs a capacity contract before demand is realised. At the time of contracting the buyer holds some private information about her future valuation (how likely she is to travel), and after contracting she learns more (whether she actually travels). Sequential screening is the mechanism design problem of a seller facing such a buyer.

The chapter formalized here, Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz's Dynamic Mechanism Design (Chapter 11 of Börgers' textbook), develops the problem along two lines. The first is dynamic private information: one sale, two rounds of private information. The second is dynamic allocations: repeated sales, one fixed valuation.

Timeline:

  • Baron and Besanko (1984) show that dynamic allocations with static information produce no real dynamics in the optimal mechanism.
  • Courty and Li (2000, Review of Economic Studies) solve the sequential screening problem and show that the optimal mechanism is a menu of option contracts.
  • Esö and Szentes (2007) decompose the buyer's information into initial and additional information, show that the seller can extract the additional information at no cost, and derive the optimal multi-buyer mechanism, the handicap auction.
  • Krähmer and Strausz (2011, 2014), cited in the chapter's problems (notes 2–3, p.237), show that the conclusions depend on the model's assumptions; with discrete ex ante types the privacy of the additional information can cost the seller (Problem 11.5(c), p.233).

Setting

A seller sells one indivisible good. Before contracting, the buyer privately observes her ex ante type τ∈[τ‾,τˉ]\tau\in[\underline\tau,\bar\tau]τ∈[τ​,τˉ], with distribution function GGG and density g>0g>0g>0. After accepting the mechanism she privately observes her ex post type θ∈[θ‾,θˉ]\theta\in[\underline\theta,\bar\theta]θ∈[θ​,θˉ], 0≤θ‾<θˉ0\le\underline\theta<\bar\theta0≤θ​<θˉ, which is her valuation. Conditionally on τ\tauτ it has distribution function F(θ∣τ)F(\theta\mid\tau)F(θ∣τ) and density f(θ∣τ)>0f(\theta\mid\tau)>0f(θ∣τ)>0. Both FFF and fff are continuously differentiable in τ\tauτ, ∣∂F/∂τ∣<K|\partial F/\partial\tau|<K∣∂F/∂τ∣<K, and higher τ\tauτ is good news in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance: ∂F(θ∣τ)/∂τ<0\partial F(\theta\mid\tau)/\partial\tau<0∂F(θ∣τ)/∂τ<0 for θ∈(θ‾,θˉ)\theta\in(\underline\theta,\bar\theta)θ∈(θ​,θˉ).

A direct mechanism is a pair q(τ,θ)∈[0,1]q(\tau,\theta)\in[0,1]q(τ,θ)∈[0,1], t(τ,θ)∈Rt(\tau,\theta)\in\mathbb Rt(τ,θ)∈R. The buyer first reports τ\tauτ, then θ\thetaθ. Write u(τ,θ)=θq(τ,θ)−t(τ,θ)u(\tau,\theta)=\theta q(\tau,\theta)-t(\tau,\theta)u(τ,θ)=θq(τ,θ)−t(τ,θ), U^(τ′∣τ)=∫u(τ′,θ^)f(θ^∣τ) dθ^\hat U(\tau'\mid\tau)=\int u(\tau',\hat\theta)f(\hat\theta\mid\tau)\,d\hat\thetaU^(τ′∣τ)=∫u(τ′,θ^)f(θ^∣τ)dθ^ and U(τ)=U^(τ∣τ)U(\tau)=\hat U(\tau\mid\tau)U(τ)=U^(τ∣τ). The mechanism is incentive-compatible if truth about θ\thetaθ is optimal after every report of τ\tauτ, and truth about τ\tauτ is optimal against every subsequent reporting function θr\theta_rθr​. It is individually rational if U(τ)≥0U(\tau)\ge0U(τ)≥0 for all τ\tauτ. The seller maximizes expected revenue ∫ ⁣ ⁣∫t f g\int\!\!\int t\,f\,g∫∫tfg. The virtual valuation is

ψ(τ,θ)=θ+1−G(τ)g(τ) ∂F(θ∣τ)/∂τf(θ∣τ),\psi(\tau,\theta)=\theta+\frac{1-G(\tau)}{g(\tau)}\,\frac{\partial F(\theta\mid\tau)/\partial\tau}{f(\theta\mid\tau)} ,ψ(τ,θ)=θ+g(τ)1−G(τ)​f(θ∣τ)∂F(θ∣τ)/∂τ​,

and Assumption 11.1 requires ψ\psiψ to be increasing in τ\tauτ and θ\thetaθ. The exercise price is p(τ)=min⁡{θ^∣ψ(τ,θ^)≥0}p(\tau)=\min\{\hat\theta\mid\psi(\tau,\hat\theta)\ge0\}p(τ)=min{θ^∣ψ(τ,θ^)≥0}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 11.8 (optimal sequential screening)

Under Assumption 11.1 the optimal mechanism is

q∗(τ,θ)=1[θ≥p(τ)],t∗(τ,θ)=t0(τ)+p(τ) 1[θ≥p(τ)],q^*(\tau,\theta)=\mathbf 1[\theta\ge p(\tau)],\qquad t^*(\tau,\theta)=t_0(\tau)+p(\tau)\,\mathbf 1[\theta\ge p(\tau)],q∗(τ,θ)=1[θ≥p(τ)],t∗(τ,θ)=t0​(τ)+p(τ)1[θ≥p(τ)],

where t0t_0t0​ is the expression of Proposition 11.5 for q∗q^*q∗, and the lowest type pays

t(τ‾,θ‾)=∫p(τ‾)θˉθ^f(θ^∣τ‾) dθ^−p(τ‾)[1−F(p(τ‾)∣τ‾)]+θ‾q∗(τ‾,θ‾).t(\underline\tau,\underline\theta)=\int_{p(\underline\tau)}^{\bar\theta}\hat\theta f(\hat\theta\mid\underline\tau)\,d\hat\theta-p(\underline\tau)\bigl[1-F(p(\underline\tau)\mid\underline\tau)\bigr]+\underline\theta q^*(\underline\tau,\underline\theta).t(τ​,θ​)=∫p(τ​)θˉ​θ^f(θ^∣τ​)dθ^−p(τ​)[1−F(p(τ​)∣τ​)]+θ​q∗(τ​,θ​).

The goal asserts that this mechanism is incentive-compatible, individually rational and optimal. It also characterizes all optimal mechanisms: an incentive-compatible, individually rational mechanism is optimal if and only if q=q∗q=q^*q=q∗ almost everywhere off {ψ=0}\{\psi=0\}{ψ=0} and U(τ‾)=0U(\underline\tau)=0U(τ​)=0. When {ψ=0}\{\psi=0\}{ψ=0} is null, this becomes q=q∗q=q^*q=q∗ and t=t∗t=t^*t=t∗ almost everywhere.

Milestones

The path to the goal, in the book's order:

  • the dynamic revelation principle (Proposition 11.1);
  • the reduction of incentive compatibility to two families of inequalities (Proposition 11.2);
  • the ex post characterization (Proposition 11.3);
  • monotonicity and absolute continuity of UUU (Lemma 11.1);
  • the envelope formula U′(τ)=−∫q(τ,θ^) ∂F(θ^∣τ)/∂τ dθ^U'(\tau)=-\int q(\tau,\hat\theta)\,\partial F(\hat\theta\mid\tau)/\partial\tau\,d\hat\thetaU′(τ)=−∫q(τ,θ^)∂F(θ^∣τ)/∂τdθ^ (Proposition 11.4);
  • the transfer formula (Proposition 11.5);
  • sufficiency of monotone allocation rules (Proposition 11.6);
  • individual rationality at τ‾\underline\tauτ​ (Proposition 11.7).

Three extensions follow. Propositions 11.9 and 11.10 show that the privacy of the additional information γ=F(θ∣τ)\gamma=F(\theta\mid\tau)γ=F(θ∣τ) costs the seller nothing. Proposition 11.11 gives the optimal mechanism with several buyers. Proposition 11.12 shows that with dynamic allocations and a fixed valuation, repeating the static posted price is optimal.

Significance

The result gives a practical rule: sell an option. Ex ante type τ\tauτ pays a fee t0(τ)t_0(\tau)t0​(τ) for the right to buy later at the exercise price p(τ)p(\tau)p(τ), and ppp decreases in τ\tauτ. This explains refund and cancellation menus in advance-purchase markets. Proposition 11.10 adds that information the buyer receives after contracting generates no rents under Assumption 11.1. A seller therefore gains from contracting early and from disclosing information after contracting. Proposition 11.12 shows that, under full commitment, a monopolist gains nothing from responding to past purchases.

On the formal side, the results are proved in the literature and in the book, but none of them is machine-checked. The mission produces a verified envelope theorem in a two-dimensional type space where incentive compatibility does not imply monotonicity. It also produces a verified revenue-equivalence formula for sequential mechanisms, and the first verified optimal-mechanism results with dynamic information.

Difficulty

The static argument of Chapter 2 does not carry over directly. Incentive compatibility with respect to τ\tauτ does not make qqq increasing in τ\tauτ. The buyer's first-period utility is an expectation over a whole schedule q(τ′,⋅)q(\tau',\cdot)q(τ′,⋅), so single crossing has no bite. The characterization therefore splits into necessary conditions (the envelope formula in τ\tauτ, which needs Lipschitz continuity of UUU from the bound KKK) and a sufficient condition (monotonicity in both arguments, via first-order stochastic dominance), and the two meet only under Assumption 11.1.

Definition 11.2(ii) quantifies over all off-path reporting functions. The revelation principle does not remove them, so Proposition 11.2 is needed before any envelope argument applies.

Pointwise maximization of the virtual surplus pins down qqq only where ψ≠0\psi\ne0ψ=0 and only almost everywhere. The optimal mechanism is therefore not unique in the pointwise sense the page states.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. F(θ∣τ)F(\theta\mid\tau)F(θ∣τ) is F θ τ and q(τ,θ)q(\tau,\theta)q(τ,θ) is q τ θ. Functions are total on R\mathbb RR or R2\mathbb R^2R2, and conditions quantify over the type intervals only. ∂F/∂τ\partial F/\partial\tau∂F/∂τ and ∂f/∂τ\partial f/\partial\tau∂f/∂τ are fields pinned by HasDerivWithinAt on [τ‾,τˉ][\underline\tau,\bar\tau][τ​,τˉ].
  • Measurability. The book omits all measurability. Here the densities are jointly measurable, mechanisms are admissible (measurable on the type rectangle, q∈[0,1]q\in[0,1]q∈[0,1]), and reporting functions are measurable. In the observable-γ\gammaγ model each t~(τ,⋅)\tilde t(\tau,\cdot)t~(τ,⋅) is integrable on [0,1][0,1][0,1], and in the several-buyer model each payment tit_iti​ is integrable against the distribution of the type profile, so that expected utilities and expected revenue are genuine integrals.
  • Revenue and a.e. Revenue is the integral of ttt against the joint law with density g(τ)f(θ∣τ)g(\tau)f(\theta\mid\tau)g(τ)f(θ∣τ), and "almost everywhere" refers to that law.
  • Corrected necessity. The page's pointwise "if and only if" in Propositions 11.8 and 11.11 is corrected. The explicit optimal mechanism is kept, with the formulas (11.10), (11.11), (11.12) and t0t_0t0​ of Proposition 11.5. Necessity is stated almost everywhere and off {ψ=0}\{\psi=0\}{ψ=0}, and, for several buyers, off ties between virtual valuations.
  • Regularity. Propositions 11.9 and 11.10 assume fff and ∂F/∂τ\partial F/\partial\tau∂F/∂τ continuous in (τ,θ)(\tau,\theta)(τ,θ), the regularity the book invokes on p.217 to differentiate F−1(γ∣τ)F^{-1}(\gamma\mid\tau)F−1(γ∣τ).
  • Exercise price. p(τ)p(\tau)p(τ) is the infimum of {θ^∣ψ(τ,θ^)≥0}\{\hat\theta\mid\psi(\tau,\hat\theta)\ge0\}{θ^∣ψ(τ,θ^)≥0}.

Ruled out. Stating only that the cutoff mechanism is incentive-compatible and individually rational, or only that it beats posted prices, would trivialize the goal. The goal asserts optimality among all admissible incentive-compatible, individually rational sequential mechanisms with randomized allocations, together with the explicit fee t0t_0t0​ and (11.12).

Infrastructure. A complete development needs envelope theorems for suprema of equi-differentiable families, integration by parts with absolutely continuous functions, differentiation under the integral sign, and change of variables γ=F(θ∣τ)\gamma=F(\theta\mid\tau)γ=F(θ∣τ). The single-buyer lemmas (Propositions 11.2–11.7) are reusable for the multi-buyer case through the interim mechanism (Qi,Ti)(Q_i,T_i)(Qi​,Ti​). Proofs of any milestone, and sorry-free lemmas on the definitions, are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Krähmer and R. Strausz, Dynamic Mechanism Design, Chapter 11 in T. Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001
  • P. Courty and H. Li, Sequential Screening, Review of Economic Studies 67 (2000) 697–717. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00150
  • P. Eső and B. Szentes, Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction, Review of Economic Studies 74 (2007) 705–731. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00438.x
  • D. P. Baron and D. Besanko, Regulation and Information in a Continuing Relationship, Information Economics and Policy 1 (1984) 267–302.
18 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The d-Level Nested Logit Model: Assortment and Price Optimization Problems I: The Optimal Assortment Offers Each Product Whose Revenue Meets Its Parent's ThresholdResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer or an airline chooses which products to offer, and customers choose among what is offered. The assortment problem asks for the offer set that maximizes expected revenue when customer choice follows a given probabilistic model. Under the multinomial logit model the answer has a simple shape: an optimal assortment is revenue ordered, i.e. it consists of all products whose revenue exceeds some threshold (Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004). The multinomial logit model treats all products as equally substitutable, and nested logit models relax this by grouping products into nests whose utilities are correlated.

The ddd-level nested logit model organizes the products as the leaves of a tree with ddd levels, each level refining the grouping of the previous one (for instance category, brand, size). Li, Rusmevichientong and Topaloglu (Oper. Res. 63(2), 2015) characterized an optimal assortment under this model for every ddd. Timeline: the one-level case (multinomial logit) is due to Talluri and van Ryzin (2004); the two-level case with an arbitrary number of nests is due to Davis, Gallego and Topaloglu (2014); Li, Rusmevichientong and Topaloglu (2015) treat arbitrary depth ddd. This mission formalizes the 2015 characterization and the three statements of §4 of that paper that lead to it.

Setting

There are nnn products 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n and a no-purchase option 000. A product tree TTT is a finite rooted tree with ddd levels whose leaves are exactly the n+1n+1n+1 products: the leaves 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n lie at depth ddd, and leaf 000 is a child of the root. Each node jjj other than the root has a parent Parent(j)\mathrm{Parent}(j)Parent(j); Children(j)\mathrm{Children}(j)Children(j) is the set of its children, and Nj⊆{0,…,n}N_j\subseteq\{0,\dots,n\}Nj​⊆{0,…,n} is the set of leaves below jjj. Each nonleaf node carries a nest parameter ηj∈(0,1]\eta_j\in(0,1]ηj​∈(0,1], with ηroot=0\eta_{\mathrm{root}}=0ηroot​=0. Each product carries an attractiveness vl>0v_l>0vl​>0, and each product l≥1l\ge1l≥1 a revenue rl∈Rr_l\in\mathbb Rrl​∈R.

An assortment is a set S⊆{1,…,n}S\subseteq\{1,\dots,n\}S⊆{1,…,n}; the no-purchase option is always available. The preference weight of a node is defined bottom-up: Vl=vlV_l=v_lVl​=vl​ at an offered product leaf, Vl=0V_l=0Vl​=0 at a product leaf that is not offered, V0=v0V_0=v_0V0​=v0​, and at a nonleaf node

Vj(Sj)=(∑k∈Children(j)Vk(Sk))ηj,V_j(S_j)=\Big(\sum_{k\in\mathrm{Children}(j)}V_k(S_k)\Big)^{\eta_j},Vj​(Sj​)=(k∈Children(j)∑​Vk​(Sk​))ηj​,

so Vroot=1V_{\mathrm{root}}=1Vroot​=1. A customer at a nonleaf node jjj moves to child kkk with probability Vk/∑lVlV_k/\sum_{l}V_lVk​/∑l​Vl​. The expected revenue from a customer at node jjj is Rl=rlR_l=r_lRl​=rl​ at an offered product leaf, 000 at an unoffered leaf and at leaf 000, and

Rj(Sj)=∑k∈Children(j)Vk(Sk)Rk(Sk)∑k∈Children(j)Vk(Sk)R_j(S_j)=\frac{\sum_{k\in\mathrm{Children}(j)}V_k(S_k)R_k(S_k)}{\sum_{k\in\mathrm{Children}(j)}V_k(S_k)}Rj​(Sj​)=∑k∈Children(j)​Vk​(Sk​)∑k∈Children(j)​Vk​(Sk​)Rk​(Sk​)​

at a nonleaf node. The assortment problem is

Z∗=max⁡S⊆{1,…,n}Rroot(Sroot).(3)Z^*=\max_{S\subseteq\{1,\dots,n\}}R_{\mathrm{root}}(S_{\mathrm{root}}).\tag{3}Z∗=S⊆{1,…,n}max​Rroot​(Sroot​).(3)

Given an optimal assortment S∗S^*S∗, the thresholds tj∗t^*_jtj∗​ are computed top-down by

tj∗=max⁡{tParent(j)∗, ηjtParent(j)∗+(1−ηj)Rj(Sj∗)},tParent(root)∗=0,t^*_j=\max\{t^*_{\mathrm{Parent}(j)},\ \eta_jt^*_{\mathrm{Parent}(j)}+(1-\eta_j)R_j(S^*_j)\},\qquad t^*_{\mathrm{Parent}(\mathrm{root})}=0,tj∗​=max{tParent(j)∗​, ηj​tParent(j)∗​+(1−ηj​)Rj​(Sj∗​)},tParent(root)∗​=0,

and the local problem at node jjj is

max⁡Sj⊆Nj Vj(Sj)(Rj(Sj)−tParent(j)∗).(4)\max_{S_j\subseteq N_j}\ V_j(S_j)\big(R_j(S_j)-t^*_{\mathrm{Parent}(j)}\big).\tag{4}Sj​⊆Nj​max​ Vj​(Sj​)(Rj​(Sj​)−tParent(j)∗​).(4)

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 4.3 (revenue comparison)

For every product tree and parameters in the ranges above, and for every optimal assortment S∗S^*S∗ with its thresholds t∗t^*t∗,

S^={ l∈{1,…,n}: rl≥tParent(l)∗ }satisfiesRroot(Sroot)≤Rroot(S^root)  for all S⊆{1,…,n}.\hat S=\{\,l\in\{1,\dots,n\}:\ r_l\ge t^*_{\mathrm{Parent}(l)}\,\}\quad\text{satisfies}\quad R_{\mathrm{root}}(S_{\mathrm{root}})\le R_{\mathrm{root}}(\hat S_{\mathrm{root}})\ \text{ for all } S\subseteq\{1,\dots,n\}.S^={l∈{1,…,n}: rl​≥tParent(l)∗​}satisfiesRroot​(Sroot​)≤Rroot​(S^root​)  for all S⊆{1,…,n}.

Milestones

  • Proposition 4.1. For an optimal S∗S^*S∗ and every node jjj, Sj∗=S∗∩NjS^*_j=S^*\cap N_jSj∗​=S∗∩Nj​ is an optimal solution of the local problem (4) at jjj.
  • The root observation (§4, p. 329). The objective of the local problem at the root equals RrootR_{\mathrm{root}}Rroot​, and a set solves the local problem at the root exactly when it solves (3).
  • Theorem 4.2. At a nonleaf node jjj, if S^k⊆Nk\hat S_k\subseteq N_kS^k​⊆Nk​ solves the local problem at each child kkk, then ⋃k∈Children(j)S^k\bigcup_{k\in\mathrm{Children}(j)}\hat S_k⋃k∈Children(j)​S^k​ solves the local problem at jjj.

Significance

The corollary says that an optimal assortment is determined by one comparison per product: a product is offered exactly when its revenue reaches a threshold attached to its parent node. Within each group of sibling products the optimal assortment is therefore revenue ordered, which reduces the search from 2n2^n2n subsets to a structured family, and it is the basis of the paper's polynomial-time algorithm (§5). For one level it recovers the revenue-ordered result for multinomial logit, and for two levels the characterization of Davis, Gallego and Topaloglu (2014). Theorem 4.2, the synthesis of local solutions, is the property that makes a bottom-up dynamic program over the tree correct.

The result is proved in the paper; the proofs of Proposition 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 are in its online appendix. No machine-checked version of any nested logit assortment result is known to exist. A formalization would give a verified statement of the model itself (recursive preference weights with real exponents, conditional revenues, top-down thresholds), which is reusable for the paper's pricing results and for other tree-structured choice models.

Difficulty

The objective RrootR_{\mathrm{root}}Rroot​ is a nested ratio of sums raised to fractional powers, neither concave nor monotone in the offer set, so the usual exchange argument for revenue-ordered sets does not apply directly: adding a product to a nest changes that nest's weight, and through the exponents ηj\eta_jηj​ the weight of every ancestor. The thresholds tj∗t^*_jtj∗​ are defined from an optimal assortment that is not known in advance, so every statement is a property of an unknown optimum rather than a computation. The local problems couple across levels only through these thresholds, and relating the optimum of the problem at a node to the optima at its children is the step that requires work. A proof that tries to compare S^\hat SS^ with S∗S^*S∗ product by product meets the fact that S^\hat SS^ and S∗S^*S∗ may differ at ties.

Formalization scope

The tree is a structure ProductTree n with a finite node type, a root, a parent map, a depth function (root at depth 000, children one level deeper, all depths at most ddd, product leaves at depth exactly ddd, leaf 000 a child of the root) and an injective leaf map Fin (n + 1) → Node. Assortments are finsets of Fin (n + 1) not containing 000; the no-purchase leaf always contributes v0v_0v0​. Preference weights use Real.rpow, so x0=1x^0=1x0=1 gives Vroot=1V_{\mathrm{root}}=1Vroot​=1. Conventions fixed in Lean and silent on the page:

  • ηroot=0\eta_{\mathrm{root}}=0ηroot​=0 and ηj∈(0,1]\eta_j\in(0,1]ηj​∈(0,1] at the other nonleaf nodes (StandingEta);
  • v0,…,vn>0v_0,\dots,v_n>0v0​,…,vn​>0 is a hypothesis of every theorem: the page never states a sign, but the model presupposes it, and it makes every denominator in (2) positive; revenues carry no sign condition;
  • Rj(∅)=0R_j(\emptyset)=0Rj​(∅)=0 at a nonleaf node whose subtree offers nothing (Lean's x / 0 = 0 on the page's 0/00/00/0); in t∗t^*t∗ this value yields tj∗=tParent(j)∗t^*_j=t^*_{\mathrm{Parent}(j)}tj∗​=tParent(j)∗​;
  • the thresholds are a function of the given optimal S∗S^*S∗, and the goal holds for every optimal S∗S^*S∗;
  • optimality means "no assortment has larger objective", with a finite quantifier, never a supremum.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the thresholds are not free parameters or computed from S^\hat SS^, and the conclusion is optimality of S^\hat SS^ against every assortment, not an existence statement.

A complete development needs facts about the recursive definitions (unfolding at leaves and nonleaf nodes, Nroot={0,…,n}N_{\mathrm{root}}=\{0,\dots,n\}Nroot​={0,…,n}, disjointness of the NkN_kNk​ of siblings), monotonicity and concavity properties of x↦xηx\mapsto x^{\eta}x↦xη on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) from Mathlib, and induction over the tree by depth. Tree-induction lemmas and the model layer are reusable by the companion pricing mission. Contributions of a proof of any milestone, of alternative proofs of Theorem 4.2, and of the special cases d=1d=1d=1 and d=2d=2d=2 are welcome.

Selected references

  • H. Li, P. Rusmevichientong, H. Topaloglu, The d-Level Nested Logit Model: Assortment and Price Optimization Problems, Operations Research 63(2):325–341, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2015.1355
  • J. M. Davis, G. Gallego, H. Topaloglu, Assortment Optimization Under Variants of the Nested Logit Model, Operations Research 62(2):250–273, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1256
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, Revenue Management Under a General Discrete Choice Model of Consumer Behavior, Management Science 50(1):15–33, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
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Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies II: Sufficient Conditions for Square-Root-Times-Log Regret of Least Squares PricingResearch Paper

Motivation

A seller who does not know its demand curve has to learn it from the sales it makes. Each price it charges earns revenue now and also produces information for later. This learning-and-earning problem is basic to revenue management and online retail. The most common heuristic is certainty-equivalence pricing: fit the demand model by least squares, then charge the price that would be optimal if the fit were exact. The heuristic can fail. Its prices may settle at a wrong value, so that estimation stops improving, a phenomenon called incomplete learning (Lai and Robbins 1982; den Boer and Zwart 2013). The regret then grows linearly in the horizon.

Keskin and Zeevi (2014) first show that no policy can have regret below order T\sqrt TT​ (the subject of the first mission in this series). They then give two simple, checkable conditions on a policy's price path that guarantee regret of order Tlog⁡T\sqrt T \log TT​logT. The conditions cover a whole family of modified least squares policies, including the "MLE-cycle" policy of Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012) and the "controlled variance" policy of den Boer and Zwart. This mission formalizes those sufficient conditions (Theorem 2 of the paper).

Setting

A seller charges prices pt∈[l,u]p_t \in [l,u]pt​∈[l,u], 0≤l<u0 \le l < u0≤l<u, in periods t=1,2,…t = 1, 2, \dotst=1,2,… and observes the demand

Dt=α+βpt+εt.D_t = \alpha + \beta p_t + \varepsilon_t .Dt​=α+βpt​+εt​.

The unknown parameter θ=(α,β)\theta = (\alpha,\beta)θ=(α,β) lies in a rectangle Θ=[amin⁡,amax⁡]×[bmin⁡,bmax⁡]\Theta = [a_{\min},a_{\max}]\times[b_{\min},b_{\max}]Θ=[amin​,amax​]×[bmin​,bmax​] with bmax⁡<0b_{\max} < 0bmax​<0. The demand shocks εt\varepsilon_tεt​ are i.i.d. with mean 000 and variance σ2>0\sigma^2 > 0σ2>0, and they are light-tailed: E[ezεt]<∞\mathbb{E}[e^{z\varepsilon_t}] < \inftyE[ezεt​]<∞ for ∣z∣≤z0|z| \le z_0∣z∣≤z0​, for some z0>0z_0 > 0z0​>0. The expected revenue is rθ(p)=p(α+βp)r_\theta(p) = p(\alpha+\beta p)rθ​(p)=p(α+βp), maximized at the myopic price φ(θ)=−α/(2β)\varphi(\theta) = -\alpha/(2\beta)φ(θ)=−α/(2β). The model assumes φ(θ)∈(l,u)\varphi(\theta) \in (l,u)φ(θ)∈(l,u) for all θ∈Θ\theta \in \Thetaθ∈Θ.

A pricing policy π\piπ charges a constant p1p_1p1​ and then pt+1=πt+1(Ht)p_{t+1} = \pi_{t+1}(H_t)pt+1​=πt+1​(Ht​), where πt+1\pi_{t+1}πt+1​ is a measurable function of the history Ht=(D1,p1,…,Dt,pt)H_t = (D_1,p_1,\dots,D_t,p_t)Ht​=(D1​,p1​,…,Dt​,pt​) with values in [l,u][l,u][l,u]. The regret of π\piπ under θ\thetaθ is

Δθπ(T)=T rθ(φ(θ))−Eθπ[∑t=1Trθ(pt)].\Delta^\pi_\theta(T) = T\,r_\theta(\varphi(\theta)) - \mathbb{E}^\pi_\theta\Big[\sum_{t=1}^T r_\theta(p_t)\Big].Δθπ​(T)=Trθ​(φ(θ))−Eθπ​[t=1∑T​rθ​(pt​)].

After ttt periods the empirical Fisher information is Jt=∑s=1t[1pspsps2]\mathcal{J}_t = \sum_{s=1}^t \begin{bmatrix}1 & p_s\\ p_s & p_s^2\end{bmatrix}Jt​=∑s=1t​[1ps​​ps​ps2​​]. The least squares estimate is θ^t=Jt−1(∑sDs,∑sDsps)T\hat\theta_t = \mathcal{J}_t^{-1}(\sum_s D_s, \sum_s D_s p_s)^{\mathsf T}θ^t​=Jt−1​(∑s​Ds​,∑s​Ds​ps​)T, and the truncated estimate ϑt\vartheta_tϑt​ is the Euclidean projection of θ^t\hat\theta_tθ^t​ onto Θ\ThetaΘ. The information metric is Jt=∑s=1t(ps−pˉt)2J_t = \sum_{s=1}^t (p_s - \bar p_t)^2Jt​=∑s=1t​(ps​−pˉ​t​)2 with pˉt=t−1∑s=1tps\bar p_t = t^{-1}\sum_{s=1}^t p_spˉ​t​=t−1∑s=1t​ps​. The greedy least squares price in period s+1s+1s+1 is φ(ϑs)\varphi(\vartheta_s)φ(ϑs​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (sufficient conditions for asymptotic optimality)

Let θ∈Θ\theta \in \Thetaθ∈Θ, let κ0,κ1>0\kappa_0,\kappa_1 > 0κ0​,κ1​>0, and let π\piπ satisfy, almost surely for all t≥2t \ge 2t≥2,

(i)  Jt≥κ0t,(ii)  ∑s=2t(φ(ϑs)−ps+1)2≤κ1t.\text{(i)}\ \ J_t \ge \kappa_0\sqrt t, \qquad \text{(ii)}\ \ \sum_{s=2}^t \big(\varphi(\vartheta_s) - p_{s+1}\big)^2 \le \kappa_1 \sqrt t .(i)  Jt​≥κ0​t​,(ii)  s=2∑t​(φ(ϑs​)−ps+1​)2≤κ1​t​.

Then there is a finite C>0C > 0C>0 with

Δθπ(T)≤CTlog⁡Tfor all T≥3.\Delta^\pi_\theta(T) \le C\sqrt T \log T \quad\text{for all } T \ge 3 .Δθπ​(T)≤CT​logTfor all T≥3.

The goal fixes no constant. It asserts only the rate Tlog⁡T\sqrt T\log TT​logT.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2 (corrected constant). For any prices in [l,u][l,u][l,u], μmin⁡(Jt)≥Jt/(1+u2+(u−l)2)\mu_{\min}(\mathcal{J}_t) \ge J_t/(1+u^2+(u-l)^2)μmin​(Jt​)≥Jt​/(1+u2+(u−l)2).
  2. Lemma 3. There are ρ,k>0\rho, k > 0ρ,k>0 such that for every policy, every θ∈Θ\theta\in\Thetaθ∈Θ, all δ,m>0\delta,m>0δ,m>0 and t≥2t\ge 2t≥2,
Pθπ{∥θ^t−θ∥>δ, Jt≥m}≤k t e−ρ(δ∧δ2)m.\mathbb{P}^\pi_\theta\{\lVert\hat\theta_t-\theta\rVert>\delta,\ J_t\ge m\} \le k\,t\,e^{-\rho(\delta\wedge\delta^2)m}.Pθπ​{∥θ^t​−θ∥>δ, Jt​≥m}≤kte−ρ(δ∧δ2)m.
  1. (A10). E(φ(θ)−pt+1)2≤2E(φ(θ)−φ(ϑt))2+2E(φ(ϑt)−pt+1)2\mathbb{E}(\varphi(\theta)-p_{t+1})^2 \le 2\mathbb{E}(\varphi(\theta)-\varphi(\vartheta_t))^2 + 2\mathbb{E}(\varphi(\vartheta_t)-p_{t+1})^2E(φ(θ)−pt+1​)2≤2E(φ(θ)−φ(ϑt​))2+2E(φ(ϑt​)−pt+1​)2.
  2. (A11). Under (i), there are K>0K>0K>0 and NNN with E(φ(θ)−pt+1)2≤Klog⁡t/t+2E(φ(ϑt)−pt+1)2\mathbb{E}(\varphi(\theta)-p_{t+1})^2 \le K\log t/\sqrt t + 2\mathbb{E}(\varphi(\vartheta_t)-p_{t+1})^2E(φ(θ)−pt+1​)2≤Klogt/t​+2E(φ(ϑt​)−pt+1​)2 for t≥max⁡{N,2}t \ge \max\{N,2\}t≥max{N,2}.
  3. Regret identity. Δθπ(T)=−β∑t=1TE(pt−φ(θ))2\Delta^\pi_\theta(T) = -\beta\sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{E}(p_t-\varphi(\theta))^2Δθπ​(T)=−β∑t=1T​E(pt​−φ(θ))2.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 turns the design of a near-optimal learning policy into two pathwise constraints on the price sequence. Condition (i) requires enough price dispersion to keep learning. Condition (ii) requires the policy to stay close to the greedy price so that it keeps earning. Any least squares variant that satisfies both constraints is optimal up to a logarithmic factor, and together with the T\sqrt TT​ lower bound this fixes the minimax rate of the problem. The constrained-ILS and decaying-perturbation policies of §3.3 are certified this way, and the same template reappears in the paper's incumbent-price and multiproduct results.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper. It has no machine-checked proof, and the platform has no dynamic-pricing results so far. A formalization would contribute a reusable model of adaptively chosen designs with a least squares estimator, an exponential concentration bound for least squares under adaptive prices (Lemma 3), and the regret decomposition. The formalization also checks the paper's constants: one of them, in Lemma 2, is misprinted (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The prices are chosen by the policy from past noise, so the regression design is random and adapted. The classical fixed-design analysis of least squares does not apply, and neither does a union bound over a fixed set of designs. Lemma 3 needs a tail bound for θ^t−θ\hat\theta_t - \thetaθ^t​−θ that is uniform over all directions in the plane and holds only on the event where JtJ_tJt​ is large, with noise that is only light-tailed rather than Gaussian or bounded. Converting the eigenvalue of Jt\mathcal{J}_tJt​ into the scalar JtJ_tJt​ (Lemma 2) is elementary but easy to get wrong, as the misprinted constant shows. Summing the per-period bounds into the Tlog⁡T\sqrt T\log TT​logT rate is where conditions (i) and (ii) interact.

Formalization scope

Periods are indexed from 111. The noise is a family ε : ℕ → Ω → ℝ on a probability space, with ε t used in period ttt. The price process of a policy is built by recursion from the noise, which realises the paper's law on demand sequences. A policy is a family of measurable maps from histories Fin t → ℝ × ℝ of (demand, price) pairs into [l,u][l,u][l,u], and it sees neither θ\thetaθ nor the noise. Expectations are Bochner integrals of bounded measurable functions. Probabilities are ENNReal values. Real.log is the natural logarithm. The least squares estimate uses Mathlib's matrix inverse, which is 000 on singular matrices. Every statement uses θ^t\hat\theta_tθ^t​ only where Jt>0J_t > 0Jt​>0, which is equivalent to det⁡Jt=tJt>0\det\mathcal{J}_t = tJ_t > 0detJt​=tJt​>0. The truncation onto Θ\ThetaΘ is coordinatewise clamping, the Euclidean projection onto a rectangle. The smallest eigenvalue is the infimum of the Rayleigh quotient over unit vectors. Constants sit in the paper's quantifier positions: CCC after θ\thetaθ and π\piπ in the goal; ρ,k\rho, kρ,k before the policy in Lemma 3.

Corrections of the printed statements.

  • Theorem 2, condition (i). The page requires (i) "almost surely for all ttt". At t=1t=1t=1, J1=0<κ0J_1 = 0 < \kappa_0J1​=0<κ0​, so read literally no policy satisfies the hypotheses and the theorem is vacuous. Conditions (i) and (ii) are required for t≥2t \ge 2t≥2, as the proof uses them.
  • Theorem 2, condition (ii). The page's sum starts at s=0s=0s=0, but ϑ0\vartheta_0ϑ0​ and ϑ1\vartheta_1ϑ1​ are undefined for a general policy because J0\mathcal{J}_0J0​ and J1\mathcal{J}_1J1​ are singular. The sum starts at s=2s = 2s=2. This only weakens the hypothesis.
  • Lemma 2. The printed constant γ=2/(1+2u−l)2\gamma = 2/(1+2u-l)^2γ=2/(1+2u−l)2 is false. For l=9.9l = 9.9l=9.9, u=10u=10u=10, p=(9.9,10)p = (9.9, 10)p=(9.9,10) one gets μmin⁡≈5.0⋅10−5<γJ2≈8.1⋅10−5\mu_{\min} \approx 5.0\cdot10^{-5} < \gamma J_2 \approx 8.1\cdot10^{-5}μmin​≈5.0⋅10−5<γJ2​≈8.1⋅10−5. The statement uses γ′=1/(1+u2+(u−l)2)\gamma' = 1/(1+u^2+(u-l)^2)γ′=1/(1+u2+(u−l)2), and downstream results use only γ′>0\gamma' > 0γ′>0.
  • (A11). The paper's explicit constants 4K~0/(ρκ0)4\tilde K_0/(\rho\kappa_0)4K~0​/(ρκ0​) and NNN depend on the existential constants of Lemma 3. They are therefore stated as existential KKK and NNN, uniform in θ\thetaθ and π\piπ.

Trivializing formalizations ruled out. Hypotheses that no policy can satisfy (conditions required at t=1t=1t=1) are excluded by the t≥2t \ge 2t≥2 form. A policy type that could read θ\thetaθ or the noise is excluded by construction. Junk values of the matrix inverse and of pˉ0\bar p_0pˉ​0​ never enter a hypothesis or conclusion.

A complete development needs the price-process recursion and its measurability, exponential supermartingales for adaptively weighted sums of light-tailed noise, a covering argument on the unit circle, and the layer-cake formula for E∥θ^t−θ∥2\mathbb{E}\lVert\hat\theta_t-\theta\rVert^2E∥θ^t​−θ∥2. The model, the least squares estimator and Lemmas 2–3 can be reused for the incumbent-price variant (mission IV of this series) and for other least-squares-based pricing and bandit policies. Contributions of any milestone are welcome, and Lemma 3 on its own is a useful statement.

Selected references

  • N. B. Keskin and A. Zeevi, Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies, Operations Research 62(5):1142–1167, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1294
  • J. Broder and P. Rusmevichientong, Dynamic Pricing under a General Parametric Choice Model, Operations Research 60(4):965–980, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1120.1057
  • A. V. den Boer and B. Zwart, Simultaneously Learning and Optimizing Using Controlled Variance Pricing, Management Science 60(3):770–783, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1788
  • T. L. Lai and H. Robbins, Iterated Least Squares in Multiperiod Control, Advances in Applied Mathematics 3(1):50–73, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1016/0196-8858(82)90003-1
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Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies I: A Square-Root Lower Bound on Regret for Linear DemandResearch Paper

Motivation

A firm that sells a product repeatedly and does not know how demand responds to price must learn the demand curve and profit from it at the same time. This is the learn-and-earn or dynamic pricing with demand learning problem. It is a standard model in revenue management, and it is one of the simplest settings where exploration and exploitation have to be traded off in a continuous action space.

The paper behind this mission is N. Bora Keskin and Assaf Zeevi, Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies, Operations Research 62(5):1142–1167, 2014 (doi:10.1287/opre.2014.1294). For a linear demand model with two unknown parameters, it proves a lower bound on the regret of every pricing policy. It then gives simple conditions under which least-squares-based policies attain that bound up to a logarithmic factor. This mission is the first of a series on the paper, and its target is the lower bound (Theorem 1).

Timeline. Earlier work had already obtained T\sqrt{T}T​-type lower bounds for dynamic pricing under demand uncertainty:

  • Besbes and Zeevi (2009, doi:10.1287/opre.1080.0640) studied non-parametric pricing.
  • Besbes and Zeevi (2011) and Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012, doi:10.1287/opre.1120.1057) proved T\sqrt{T}T​ lower bounds with arguments based on the Kullback–Leibler divergence, for uncertainty in a single model parameter.

Keskin and Zeevi (2014) prove the T\sqrt{T}T​ bound when both the intercept and the slope of the demand curve are unknown. Their argument uses the Van Trees inequality instead (p. 1146).

Setting

Prices lie in an interval [l,u][l,u][l,u] with 0≤l<u0 \le l < u0≤l<u. In period t=1,2,…t = 1, 2, \dotst=1,2,… the seller charges pt∈[l,u]p_t \in [l,u]pt​∈[l,u] and observes the demand

Dt=α+βpt+εt.D_t = \alpha + \beta p_t + \varepsilon_t .Dt​=α+βpt​+εt​.

The demand shocks ε1,ε2,…\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2, \dotsε1​,ε2​,… are i.i.d. N(0,σ2)\mathcal{N}(0,\sigma^2)N(0,σ2) with σ>0\sigma > 0σ>0.

The parameter θ=(α,β)\theta = (\alpha,\beta)θ=(α,β) is unknown to the seller. It lies in a rectangle

Θ=[amin⁡,amax⁡]×[bmin⁡,bmax⁡],amin⁡<amax⁡,bmin⁡<bmax⁡<0.\Theta = [a_{\min},a_{\max}] \times [b_{\min},b_{\max}], \qquad a_{\min} < a_{\max},\quad b_{\min} < b_{\max} < 0 .Θ=[amin​,amax​]×[bmin​,bmax​],amin​<amax​,bmin​<bmax​<0.

The expected single-period revenue is rθ(p)=p(α+βp)r_\theta(p) = p(\alpha + \beta p)rθ​(p)=p(α+βp), and it is maximized at φ(θ)=−α/(2β)\varphi(\theta) = -\alpha/(2\beta)φ(θ)=−α/(2β). The model assumes that this optimal price lies in the open interval (l,u)(l,u)(l,u) for every θ∈Θ\theta \in \Thetaθ∈Θ.

A pricing policy π\piπ is a constant first price π1∈[l,u]\pi_1 \in [l,u]π1​∈[l,u] together with measurable maps πt+1\pi_{t+1}πt+1​. Each πt+1\pi_{t+1}πt+1​ sends the observed history Ht=(D1,p1,…,Dt,pt)H_t = (D_1,p_1,\dots,D_t,p_t)Ht​=(D1​,p1​,…,Dt​,pt​) to [l,u][l,u][l,u], and the seller charges pt+1=πt+1(Ht)p_{t+1} = \pi_{t+1}(H_t)pt+1​=πt+1​(Ht​). The policy sees neither θ\thetaθ nor the shocks.

The regret of π\piπ over TTT periods under θ\thetaθ is

Δθπ(T)=T rθ(φ(θ))−Eθπ[∑t=1Trθ(pt)].\Delta^\pi_\theta(T) = T\,r_\theta(\varphi(\theta)) - \mathbb{E}^\pi_\theta\Big[\sum_{t=1}^T r_\theta(p_t)\Big].Δθπ​(T)=Trθ​(φ(θ))−Eθπ​[t=1∑T​rθ​(pt​)].

The worst-case regret is Δπ(T)=sup⁡θ∈ΘΔθπ(T)\Delta^\pi(T) = \sup_{\theta\in\Theta}\Delta^\pi_\theta(T)Δπ(T)=supθ∈Θ​Δθπ​(T).

The proof also uses the empirical Fisher information Jt=∑s=1t[1pspsps2]\mathcal{J}_t = \sum_{s=1}^t \begin{bmatrix}1 & p_s\\ p_s & p_s^2\end{bmatrix}Jt​=∑s=1t​[1ps​​ps​ps2​​] and the row vector C(θ)=[−φ(θ)  1]C(\theta) = [-\varphi(\theta)\ \ 1]C(θ)=[−φ(θ)  1].

In Lean, the model is the structure KeskinZeevi.LowerBound.Model. The noise hypothesis is the shared definition RobustBooking.Shared.GaussianNoise (measurable, mutually independent shocks, each with law N(0,σ2)\mathcal{N}(0,\sigma^2)N(0,σ2)). The other objects are Policy, pricePath, regret, worstRegret, sqErr (the expected squared pricing error Eθπ(pt−φ(θ))2\mathbb{E}^\pi_\theta(p_t-\varphi(\theta))^2Eθπ​(pt​−φ(θ))2) and infoQuad (the scalar C(θ)Eθπ[Jt]C(θ)TC(\theta)\mathbb{E}^\pi_\theta[\mathcal{J}_t]C(\theta)^{\mathsf T}C(θ)Eθπ​[Jt​]C(θ)T).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 1146)

There is a finite constant c>0c > 0c>0, depending only on the model, such that

Δπ(T)  ≥  cTfor every pricing policy π and every horizon T≥3.\Delta^\pi(T) \;\ge\; c\sqrt{T}\qquad\text{for every pricing policy } \pi \text{ and every horizon } T \ge 3 .Δπ(T)≥cT​for every pricing policy π and every horizon T≥3.

Milestones (Appendix A.1, pp. 1146 and 1156)

  • Lemma 1, inequality (14). For positive constants c0,c1c_0, c_1c0​,c1​,
sup⁡θ∈Θ∑t=2TEθπ(pt−φ(θ))2  ≥  ∑t=2Tc0c1+sup⁡θ∈ΘC(θ) Eθπ[Jt−1] C(θ)T.\sup_{\theta\in\Theta}\sum_{t=2}^T\mathbb{E}^\pi_\theta(p_t-\varphi(\theta))^2 \;\ge\; \sum_{t=2}^T \frac{c_0}{c_1 + \sup_{\theta\in\Theta} C(\theta)\,\mathbb{E}^\pi_\theta[\mathcal{J}_{t-1}]\,C(\theta)^{\mathsf T}}.θ∈Θsup​t=2∑T​Eθπ​(pt​−φ(θ))2≥t=2∑T​c1​+supθ∈Θ​C(θ)Eθπ​[Jt−1​]C(θ)Tc0​​.
  • The quadratic-form identity. C(θ)Eθπ[Jt−1]C(θ)T=∑s=1t−1Eθπ(ps−φ(θ))2C(\theta)\mathbb{E}^\pi_\theta[\mathcal{J}_{t-1}]C(\theta)^{\mathsf T} = \sum_{s=1}^{t-1}\mathbb{E}^\pi_\theta(p_s-\varphi(\theta))^2C(θ)Eθπ​[Jt−1​]C(θ)T=∑s=1t−1​Eθπ​(ps​−φ(θ))2.
  • Inequality (A2). Lemma 1 with that identity substituted.
  • The regret identity. Δθπ(T)=−β∑t=1TEθπ(pt−φ(θ))2\Delta^\pi_\theta(T) = -\beta\sum_{t=1}^T\mathbb{E}^\pi_\theta(p_t-\varphi(\theta))^2Δθπ​(T)=−β∑t=1T​Eθπ​(pt​−φ(θ))2 for θ∈Θ\theta \in \Thetaθ∈Θ, and consequently Δπ(T)≥∣bmax⁡∣sup⁡θ∑t=2TEθπ(pt−φ(θ))2\Delta^\pi(T) \ge |b_{\max}|\sup_\theta \sum_{t=2}^T \mathbb{E}^\pi_\theta(p_t-\varphi(\theta))^2Δπ(T)≥∣bmax​∣supθ​∑t=2T​Eθπ​(pt​−φ(θ))2.
  • Inequality (A3). Δπ(T)≥bmax⁡2∑t=2Tc0/(∣bmax⁡∣c1+Δπ(t−1))\Delta^\pi(T) \ge b_{\max}^2\sum_{t=2}^T c_0/(|b_{\max}|c_1 + \Delta^\pi(t-1))Δπ(T)≥bmax2​∑t=2T​c0​/(∣bmax​∣c1​+Δπ(t−1)).

The goal states only the order T\sqrt{T}T​ with an unspecified constant. The paper's explicit constant is not part of the target.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 sets the benchmark for the whole paper. A policy is called asymptotically optimal when its regret grows no faster than T\sqrt{T}T​, up to logarithmic factors. Theorem 2 of the paper then gives sufficient conditions under which least-squares pricing policies meet this benchmark. Without Theorem 1, those upper bounds would have nothing to be optimal against.

The lower bound also explains a well-known failure. Greedy (myopic) least-squares pricing can stop learning and suffer linear regret, and this happens precisely when the information on the right side of (14) stops growing.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper but has not been formalized; no dynamic pricing or learn-and-earn regret result is on the platform yet. A formal proof needs a Van Trees (Bayesian Cramér–Rao) inequality for an adaptively generated sample, which Mathlib does not have, and a machine-checked version of the elementary recursion that turns (A3) into T\sqrt{T}T​. The model layer (policies driven by noise, regret, worst-case regret) is shared with the three later missions of the series.

Difficulty

The bound must hold for every measurable, history-dependent policy. So it is a statement about a sequential experiment whose design adapts to the data, not about one fixed estimator.

The usual two-point argument (Le Cam or Kullback–Leibler) perturbs one parameter at a time. It yields T\sqrt{T}T​ only when a single parameter is uncertain, and here both α\alphaα and β\betaβ are unknown. The information a policy gathers about the optimal price is itself tied to how far its prices stray from that price. That self-reference is what inequalities (A2) and (A3) express, and it has to be handled uniformly in π\piπ and in the horizon.

Formalization scope

  • Periods. Lean periods are indexed from 000, so Lean period ttt is the paper's period t+1t+1t+1. Sums ∑t=1T\sum_{t=1}^T∑t=1T​ are Finset.range T, and sums ∑t=2T\sum_{t=2}^T∑t=2T​ are Finset.Ico 1 T.
  • Histories. A history is a function Fin t → ℝ × ℝ of (demand, price) pairs. A policy is a structure with measurable rules valued in [l,u][l,u][l,u].
  • Law of the process. The price process is defined by feeding the noise εt(ω)\varepsilon_t(\omega)εt​(ω) into the policy recursion. This realizes the paper's measure Pθπ\mathbb{P}^\pi_\thetaPθπ​ of Eq. (5) on the noise space.
  • Noise. The theorems quantify over every probability space and every i.i.d. N(0,σ2)\mathcal{N}(0,\sigma^2)N(0,σ2) sequence on it.
  • Constants. Every existential constant is placed before the probability space, the noise, the policy and the horizon, so it depends only on the model.
  • Worst-case regret. It is a real supremum over the subtype Θ\ThetaΘ, which is nonempty. The family is bounded above by ∣bmin⁡∣(u−l)2T|b_{\min}|(u-l)^2T∣bmin​∣(u−l)2T, so the supremum is genuine.
  • Optimal price. φ\varphiφ is defined by its closed form −α/(2β)-\alpha/(2\beta)−α/(2β), and interiority of the optimal price is a field of the model.
  • Correction of the printed statement. Nonempty interior of Θ\ThetaΘ (amin⁡<amax⁡a_{\min}<a_{\max}amin​<amax​, bmin⁡<bmax⁡b_{\min}<b_{\max}bmin​<bmax​) is made explicit. The printed statement leaves it implicit, while the proof uses a prior density positive on the interior of Θ\ThetaΘ (p. 1155). With α\alphaα or β\betaβ known, the statement is false.
  • Trivializing formalizations. The following are ruled out: a degenerate or empty Θ\ThetaΘ, a constant ccc that may depend on π\piπ or TTT, a policy type that can read θ\thetaθ or the noise, and replacing the supremum over Θ\ThetaΘ by an existential over Θ\ThetaΘ.

The Van Trees step (A1) of the proof of Lemma 1 is not a milestone. It needs Fisher information and a prior density on Θ\ThetaΘ, and neither is in Mathlib. Contributions of a Van Trees inequality for this Gaussian model are welcome, as is a formal proof that (A3) implies the T\sqrt{T}T​ bound. The first is reusable for other lower-bound missions of the series, and the second is elementary but careful real analysis. The multiproduct generalization (Theorem 5, §4) is outside this mission.

Selected references

  • N. B. Keskin and A. Zeevi, Dynamic Pricing with an Unknown Demand Model: Asymptotically Optimal Semi-Myopic Policies, Operations Research 62(5):1142–1167, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2014.1294
  • R. D. Gill and B. Y. Levit, Applications of the van Trees inequality: a Bayesian Cramér–Rao bound, Bernoulli 1(1–2):59–79, 1995. https://doi.org/10.2307/3318681
  • O. Besbes and A. Zeevi, Dynamic Pricing Without Knowing the Demand Function: Risk Bounds and Near-Optimal Algorithms, Operations Research 57(6):1407–1420, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1080.0640
  • J. Broder and P. Rusmevichientong, Dynamic Pricing Under a General Parametric Choice Model, Operations Research 60(4):965–980, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1120.1057
  • A. Goldenshluger and A. Zeevi, Woodroofe's One-Armed Bandit Problem Revisited, Annals of Applied Probability 19(4):1603–1633, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1214/08-AAP589
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Operations ResearchOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Toward Robust Revenue Management: Competitive Analysis of Online Booking III: Bid-Price Controls Are Optimally 1/(1 − ln r)-CompetitiveResearch Paper

Motivation

Revenue management decides how much of a fixed, perishable capacity (airline seats, hotel rooms) to sell, and at what price. Classical single-leg models assume a known demand distribution for each fare class and maximise expected revenue. Many carriers instead use bid-price controls: a request is accepted when its fare is at least a threshold ("bid price") that rises as capacity is sold. Fares then need not fall into a few predefined classes; a fare may be any number in an interval.

Ball and Queyranne (Oper. Res. 57(4), 2009) study booking with competitive analysis from the theory of online algorithms. A policy is judged by the worst case, over all request sequences, of the ratio between its revenue and the revenue of a seller who knows the whole sequence in advance; no distribution is assumed. For two fare classes the best ratio is 1/(2−r)1/(2 - r)1/(2−r); for mmm classes it is 1/Δ1/\Delta1/Δ. For fares ranging over a whole interval [fmin⁡,fmax⁡][f_{\min}, f_{\max}][fmin​,fmax​] with r=fmin⁡/fmax⁡r = f_{\min}/f_{\max}r=fmin​/fmax​, the paper shows that the best ratio is 1/(1−ln⁡r)1/(1 - \ln r)1/(1−lnr) and that an explicit bid-price policy attains it. This mission formalizes that result (§2.2 of the paper). The constant 1/(1−ln⁡r)1/(1 - \ln r)1/(1−lnr) is the same as in the threat-based one-way trading algorithm of El-Yaniv, Fiat, Karp and Turpin (2001), which works in a different model.

Setting

A seller holds capacity n>0n > 0n>0, a real number. In the continuous problem demands and accepted quantities are nonnegative reals and orders may be partially accepted. Fix fares 0<fmin⁡<fmax⁡0 < f_{\min} < f_{\max}0<fmin​<fmax​ and the maximum discount ratio r=fmin⁡/fmax⁡∈(0,1)r = f_{\min}/f_{\max} \in (0,1)r=fmin​/fmax​∈(0,1). A request has a fare O∈[fmin⁡,fmax⁡]O \in [f_{\min}, f_{\max}]O∈[fmin​,fmax​] and a quantity d>0d > 0d>0. An instance III is a finite sequence of requests, revealed one at a time. On each arrival the seller irrevocably accepts some a∈[0,min⁡(d,remaining capacity)]a \in [0, \min(d, \text{remaining capacity})]a∈[0,min(d,remaining capacity)], and its revenue v′(I)v'(I)v′(I) is ∑O a\sum O\,a∑Oa. The optimal offline revenue v∗(I)v^*(I)v∗(I) is the maximum of ∑iOixi\sum_i O_i x_i∑i​Oi​xi​ over 0≤xi≤di0 \le x_i \le d_i0≤xi​≤di​, ∑ixi≤n\sum_i x_i \le n∑i​xi​≤n.

A deterministic online policy chooses each accepted quantity from the earlier requests and the current one only. Its competitive ratio is

CR(A)=inf⁡I : v∗(I)>0vA′(I)v∗(I).\mathrm{CR}(A) = \inf_{I \,:\, v^*(I) > 0} \frac{v'_A(I)}{v^*(I)}.CR(A)=I:v∗(I)>0inf​v∗(I)vA′​(I)​.

A randomized policy is a random choice A(ω)A(\omega)A(ω) of a deterministic policy, and its ratio uses the expected revenue E[vA(ω)′(I)]\mathbb{E}[v'_{A(\omega)}(I)]E[vA(ω)′​(I)].

Bid-price policies are built from protection levels θ(f)\theta(f)θ(f), nonincreasing in fff. The paper's choice is Eq. (15):

θ(f)=ln⁡fmax⁡−ln⁡fln⁡fmax⁡−ln⁡fmin⁡(1−11−ln⁡r)n,fmin⁡≤f≤fmax⁡.\theta(f) = \frac{\ln f_{\max} - \ln f}{\ln f_{\max} - \ln f_{\min}}\Big(1 - \frac{1}{1 - \ln r}\Big)n, \qquad f_{\min} \le f \le f_{\max}.θ(f)=lnfmax​−lnfmin​lnfmax​−lnf​(1−1−lnr1​)n,fmin​≤f≤fmax​.

The protection-level control function is Q(f)=n−θ(f)Q(f) = n - \theta(f)Q(f)=n−θ(f), and the order quantity control function is P(q)=min⁡{f∈[fmin⁡,fmax⁡]:Q(f)≥q}P(q) = \min\{f \in [f_{\min}, f_{\max}] : Q(f) \ge q\}P(q)=min{f∈[fmin​,fmax​]:Q(f)≥q} for 0≤q≤n0 \le q \le n0≤q≤n. Let q^\hat qq^​ be the quantity accepted so far and q^(f)\hat q(f)q^​(f) the part of it accepted at fares ≤f\le f≤f. The protection-level control policy AθA_\thetaAθ​ accepts from a request with fare OOO the largest α≤d\alpha \le dα≤d with α+q^(f)≤Q(f)\alpha + \hat q(f) \le Q(f)α+q^​(f)≤Q(f) for every f∈[O,fmax⁡]f \in [O, f_{\max}]f∈[O,fmax​]. The order quantity control policy Aθ′A'_\thetaAθ′​ rejects the request if O<P(q^)O < P(\hat q)O<P(q^​), and otherwise accepts the largest α≤d\alpha \le dα≤d with P(α+q^)≤OP(\alpha + \hat q) \le OP(α+q^​)≤O. Finally ρ=1/(1−ln⁡r)\rho = 1/(1 - \ln r)ρ=1/(1−lnr) and V(q)=∫0qP(s) dsV(q) = \int_0^q P(s)\,dsV(q)=∫0q​P(s)ds.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7 (p. 959)

vAθ′(I) ≥ 11−ln⁡r v∗(I)andvAθ′′(I) ≥ 11−ln⁡r v∗(I)v'_{A_\theta}(I) \ \ge\ \frac{1}{1 - \ln r}\, v^*(I) \quad\text{and}\quad v'_{A'_\theta}(I) \ \ge\ \frac{1}{1 - \ln r}\, v^*(I)vAθ​′​(I) ≥ 1−lnr1​v∗(I)andvAθ′​′​(I) ≥ 1−lnr1​v∗(I)

for every instance III with all fares in [fmin⁡,fmax⁡][f_{\min}, f_{\max}][fmin​,fmax​], with θ\thetaθ given by Eq. (15). Both bid-price policies achieve competitive ratio at least 1/(1−ln⁡r)1/(1 - \ln r)1/(1−lnr). The paper claims "at least", and so does the goal.

Milestones

  • Eq. (5) (p. 956): P(Q(f))≤fP(Q(f)) \le fP(Q(f))≤f for fmin⁡≤f≤fmax⁡f_{\min} \le f \le f_{\max}fmin​≤f≤fmax​.
  • Lemma 2 (p. 959): closed forms (16) and (17). P(q)=fmin⁡P(q) = f_{\min}P(q)=fmin​ and V(q)=qfmin⁡V(q) = q f_{\min}V(q)=qfmin​ for q<nρq < n\rhoq<nρ; P(q)=fmax⁡r(n−q)/(n(1−ρ))P(q) = f_{\max} r^{(n-q)/(n(1-\rho))}P(q)=fmax​r(n−q)/(n(1−ρ)) and V(q)=nP(q)/(1−ln⁡r)V(q) = nP(q)/(1 - \ln r)V(q)=nP(q)/(1−lnr) for nρ≤q≤nn\rho \le q \le nnρ≤q≤n.
  • Proof of Theorem 6, first display (p. 959): on the geometric fares fi(m)=fmax⁡r(i−1)/(m−1)f_i^{(m)} = f_{\max} r^{(i-1)/(m-1)}fi(m)​=fmax​r(i−1)/(m−1) of Eq. (13), m≥2m \ge 2m≥2, no policy has competitive ratio above c(m)=1/(m−(m−1)r1/(m−1))c^{(m)} = 1/(m - (m-1) r^{1/(m-1)})c(m)=1/(m−(m−1)r1/(m−1)).
  • Theorem 6 (p. 959): no policy, deterministic or randomized, has competitive ratio larger than 1/(1−ln⁡r)1/(1 - \ln r)1/(1−lnr).

Significance

The result. Theorems 6 and 7 together give the exact optimal competitive ratio of online booking when fares range over an interval: 1/(1−ln⁡r)1/(1 - \ln r)1/(1−lnr), attained by bid-price policies whose protection levels are linear in ln⁡f\ln flnf. The guarantee holds for every demand sequence with no forecast. It decreases slowly as the fare spread grows: it is about 0.590.590.59 at r=1/2r = 1/2r=1/2 and about 0.420.420.42 at r=1/4r = 1/4r=1/4. It is the limit of the mmm-fare ratios 1/Δ1/\Delta1/Δ as the fare grid becomes dense. The paper derives its discrete bid-price policy (§2.3) from this continuous one.

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper; none is known to be machine-checked. The proof of Theorem 7 for the protection-level policy is only sketched in the paper, as an interval-rearrangement argument around Figure 7, and Lemma 2 is proved only in the online companion. A formal proof closes both gaps. The mission also produces a reusable model of online booking with real-valued fares, sized requests, an offline optimum, deterministic and randomized nonanticipative policies, and competitive ratios restricted to a fare set.

Difficulty

The lower bound must hold for every admissible instance, including sequences where fares go up and down and the offline optimum is not a closed form. Both policies are defined by suprema over constraints: for Aθ′A'_\thetaAθ′​ through the minimum defining PPP, and for AθA_\thetaAθ​ through protection constraints on nested cumulative sums over a continuum of fares. The accepted orders of AθA_\thetaAθ​ need not form consecutive blocks of capacity, so the analysis of one policy does not transfer to the other. The paper sketches the protection-level case only informally, around a figure. Theorem 6 is a bound against randomized policies, which may hedge between accepting and rejecting cheap requests. No single hard instance defeats them, and the bound must connect the finite-grid bounds c(m)c^{(m)}c(m), which involve real powers r1/(m−1)r^{1/(m-1)}r1/(m−1), to the constant 1/(1−ln⁡r)1/(1-\ln r)1/(1−lnr). Lemma 2 needs the minimum defining PPP to be computed exactly and then integrated.

Formalization scope

  • Capacity nnn is real with n>0n > 0n>0; fares are reals with 0<fmin⁡<fmax⁡0 < f_{\min} < f_{\max}0<fmin​<fmax​, and rrr is f_min / f_max; ln⁡\lnln is Real.log and real powers are Real.rpow.
  • Requests are sized (a real fare and a quantity qty > 0); the paper's unit orders with fractional acceptance are qty = 1. Instances are lists, and the admissibility hypothesis that every fare lies in [fmin⁡,fmax⁡][f_{\min}, f_{\max}][fmin​,fmax​] is explicit. Theorems 6 and 7 are false without it.
  • A deterministic policy is any function from the history (earlier requests with their accepted quantities) and the current request to a proposed quantity; the run clips proposals to [0,min⁡(d,n−q^)][0, \min(d, n - \hat q)][0,min(d,n−q^​)]. A randomized policy is an arbitrary probability space with a measurable revenue for each admissible instance. The revenue is bounded by nfmax⁡n f_{\max}nfmax​, so the Bochner integral is a genuine expectation.
  • v∗v^*v∗ is the sSup of offline revenues (nonempty, bounded, attained). Competitive ratios are sInfs over admissible instances with positive optimum (nonempty, bounded below by 000). "At least ccc" in Theorem 7 is stated per instance as c v∗≤v′c\,v^* \le v'cv∗≤v′.
  • PPP is defined from QQQ by an sInf over {f∈[fmin⁡,fmax⁡]:Q(f)≥q}\{f \in [f_{\min}, f_{\max}] : Q(f) \ge q\}{f∈[fmin​,fmax​]:Q(f)≥q}, not by the closed form (16). VVV is an interval integral. AθA_\thetaAθ​ checks its constraint over the whole continuum [O,fmax⁡][O, f_{\max}][O,fmax​], and Aθ′A'_\thetaAθ′​ also requires α+q^≤n\alpha + \hat q \le nα+q^​≤n so that PPP is evaluated on its domain.
  • A trivializing formalization — defining PPP or VVV by the closed forms of Lemma 2, replacing the policies' sup rules or the protection levels (15), checking protection constraints on a finite grid of fares, dropping the fare interval, or letting the offline optimum be a formula — is ruled out by the definitions above.
  • Useful infrastructure: monotonicity of QQQ and PPP, invariants of the policies' runs (the protection constraints hold after every step), a description of the offline optimum as a greedy fill by fare, and averaging over a distribution of instances. General lemmas about online policies and offline optima are reusable in the two-fare and multifare missions.

Selected references

  • M. O. Ball, M. Queyranne, Toward Robust Revenue Management: Competitive Analysis of Online Booking, Operations Research 57(4):950–963, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1080.0654
  • R. El-Yaniv, A. Fiat, R. M. Karp, G. Turpin, Optimal Search and One-Way Trading Online Algorithms, Algorithmica 30(1):101–139, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-001-0003-0
  • A. Borodin, R. El-Yaniv, Online Computation and Competitive Analysis, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
  • K. T. Talluri, G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Springer, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
8 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Toward Robust Revenue Management: Competitive Analysis of Online Booking II: Nested Protection Levels Are Optimally 1/Δ-Competitive for m FaresResearch Paper

Motivation

Airlines, hotels and rental firms sell a fixed stock of capacity to customers who arrive over time and pay different prices for the same unit. Classical revenue management, from Littlewood's two-fare rule (1972) to the dynamic programs of Brumelle and McGill (1993), decides how much capacity to hold back for high-fare customers from a demand forecast. When demand is new, volatile or unknown, no reliable forecast is available.

Ball and Queyranne (Oper. Res. 57(4), 2009) study the problem as an online algorithm instead, with no distributional assumption at all. A policy is judged by its competitive ratio: the worst case, over every demand sequence, of the revenue it earns divided by the revenue of a clairvoyant seller who knew the whole sequence in advance. For mmm fare classes they compute the best achievable ratio exactly and show that it is attained by the nested protection-level policies that practitioners already use. This mission formalizes that mmm-fare result.

Setting

A seller holds n>0n > 0n>0 units of capacity. There are m≥2m \ge 2m≥2 fare classes with fares f1>f2>⋯>fm>0f_1 > f_2 > \dots > f_m > 0f1​>f2​>⋯>fm​>0. A request names a class and a quantity d>0d > 0d>0; an instance III is a finite sequence of requests, of any classes in any order. Quantities are real numbers and requests may be partly accepted (the continuous problem).

A deterministic online policy decides how much of each request to accept when it arrives. It knows the earlier requests and what it accepted from them, but not what comes later. Its decision is clipped to the request's size and the remaining capacity. Its revenue R(A,I)R(A, I)R(A,I) is the sum of fare times accepted quantity. The offline optimum v∗(I)v^*(I)v∗(I) is the largest revenue of any feasible acceptance vector 0≤xk≤dk0 \le x_k \le d_k0≤xk​≤dk​, ∑kxk≤n\sum_k x_k \le n∑k​xk​≤n. The competitive ratio of AAA is

c(A)=inf⁡I: v∗(I)>0R(A,I)v∗(I).c(A) = \inf_{I:\ v^*(I) > 0} \frac{R(A, I)}{v^*(I)}.c(A)=I: v∗(I)>0inf​v∗(I)R(A,I)​.

A randomized policy draws a deterministic policy A(ω)A(\omega)A(ω) at random, ω∼μ\omega \sim \muω∼μ for a probability measure μ\muμ. Its ratio c(μ,A)c(\mu, A)c(μ,A) uses the expected revenue Eμ[R(A(ω),I)]\mathbb{E}_\mu[R(A(\omega), I)]Eμ​[R(A(ω),I)] in place of R(A,I)R(A, I)R(A,I).

The paper's constants are

Δ=m−∑i=2mfifi−1,θi=nΔ(i−∑j=1ifj+1fj) (1≤i≤m−1),θm=n,\Delta = m - \sum_{i=2}^{m} \frac{f_i}{f_{i-1}}, \qquad \theta_i = \frac{n}{\Delta}\Bigl(i - \sum_{j=1}^{i} \frac{f_{j+1}}{f_j}\Bigr)\ (1 \le i \le m-1), \quad \theta_m = n,Δ=m−i=2∑m​fi−1​fi​​,θi​=Δn​(i−j=1∑i​fj​fj+1​​) (1≤i≤m−1),θm​=n,

and the protection-level controls Qi=n−θi−1Q_i = n - \theta_{i-1}Qi​=n−θi−1​ for 1≤i≤m+11 \le i \le m+11≤i≤m+1, with Q1=nQ_1 = nQ1​=n and Qm+1=0Q_{m+1} = 0Qm+1​=0. The control QiQ_iQi​ caps the total quantity sold to classes i,…,mi, \dots, mi,…,m. The order quantity control function is P(q)=fiP(q) = f_iP(q)=fi​ for Qi+1<q≤QiQ_{i+1} < q \le Q_iQi+1​<q≤Qi​, with P(0)=0P(0) = 0P(0)=0; it gives the lowest fare still accepted once qqq units are sold.

Two policies use these controls. Write q^\hat qq^​ for the quantity sold so far and q^(fj)\hat q(f_j)q^​(fj​) for the quantity sold so far at fares ≤fj\le f_j≤fj​.

  • The protection-level policy AθA_\thetaAθ​ gives a class-ccc request of size ddd the amount sup⁡{α∈[0,d]:α+q^(fj)≤Qj for all j≤c}\sup\{\alpha \in [0, d] : \alpha + \hat q(f_j) \le Q_j \text{ for all } j \le c\}sup{α∈[0,d]:α+q^​(fj​)≤Qj​ for all j≤c}.
  • The order quantity policy Aθ′A'_\thetaAθ′​ gives it 000 if fc<P(q^)f_c < P(\hat q)fc​<P(q^​), and otherwise sup⁡{α∈[0,d]:α+q^≤n, P(α+q^)≤fc}\sup\{\alpha \in [0, d] : \alpha + \hat q \le n,\ P(\alpha + \hat q) \le f_c\}sup{α∈[0,d]:α+q^​≤n, P(α+q^​)≤fc​}.

Formalization targets

Goal — Theorem 5 (p. 958)

For every m≥2m \ge 2m≥2, all fares f1>⋯>fm>0f_1 > \dots > f_m > 0f1​>⋯>fm​>0 and every n>0n > 0n>0,

c(Aθ)=c(Aθ′)=1Δ.c(A_\theta) = c(A'_\theta) = \frac{1}{\Delta}.c(Aθ​)=c(Aθ′​)=Δ1​.

Both directions are part of the claim: each policy guarantees a 1/Δ1/\Delta1/Δ fraction of the offline optimum on every instance, and some instances bring it down to exactly that fraction.

Milestone — Lemma 1 (p. 957)

The controls satisfy

fi(Qi−Qi+1)=nΔ(fi−fi+1) (1≤i≤m−1),fm(Qm−Qm+1)=fmnΔ,f_i(Q_i - Q_{i+1}) = \tfrac{n}{\Delta}(f_i - f_{i+1})\ (1 \le i \le m-1), \qquad f_m(Q_m - Q_{m+1}) = \tfrac{f_m n}{\Delta},fi​(Qi​−Qi+1​)=Δn​(fi​−fi+1​) (1≤i≤m−1),fm​(Qm​−Qm+1​)=Δfm​n​, ∑i=i′mfi(Qi−Qi+1)=fi′nΔ(1≤i′≤m).\sum_{i=i'}^{m} f_i(Q_i - Q_{i+1}) = f_{i'} \tfrac{n}{\Delta} \quad (1 \le i' \le m).i=i′∑m​fi​(Qi​−Qi+1​)=fi′​Δn​(1≤i′≤m).

Milestone — Theorem 4 (p. 957)

No policy does better. For every deterministic policy BBB, and every randomized policy (μ,A)(\mu, A)(μ,A) whose revenue on each instance is measurable in ω\omegaω,

c(B)≤1Δ,c(μ,A)≤1Δ.c(B) \le \frac{1}{\Delta}, \qquad c(\mu, A) \le \frac{1}{\Delta}.c(B)≤Δ1​,c(μ,A)≤Δ1​.

Significance

Theorems 4 and 5 together settle the robust mmm-fare problem in the continuous setting. The best worst-case guarantee, over all deterministic and randomized online policies, is 1/Δ1/\Delta1/Δ. The protection levels of Eq. (7) achieve it, with either implementation, protection-level control or order-quantity control. Nested booking therefore needs no forecast to be optimal in this sense, and 1/Δ1/\Delta1/Δ is an explicit guarantee a practitioner can compute from the fares alone. For m=2m = 2m=2 and f2/f1=rf_2/f_1 = rf2​/f1​=r it is the two-fare ratio 1/(2−r)1/(2 - r)1/(2−r). As the fares get denser, the paper's §2.2 obtains the bid-price bound 1/(1−ln⁡r)1/(1 - \ln r)1/(1−lnr) as a limit, reusing Theorem 4.

The paper proves Theorem 4 and Theorem 5 in the text; Lemma 1's proof is in the online companion. None of these results has a machine-checked proof. A formal development pins down what the paper leaves informal (partial orders at the thresholds, the sup⁡\supsup in the policy definitions) and yields a reusable library of online booking policies, offline optima and competitive ratios.

Difficulty

The upper bound (Theorem 4) needs a lower bound on every policy, randomized ones included. Exhibiting one hard instance for each deterministic policy does not bound a randomized policy, whose expected revenue averages over its choices, and the bound must hold uniformly over an arbitrary probability space of such choices.

The lower bound in Theorem 5 needs a guarantee on every instance: arbitrary interleavings of classes, arbitrary sizes, and partial acceptances at the control thresholds. It is not enough to check the extreme instances that fix the protection levels. The order-quantity policy is harder than the protection-level policy, because it cuts off lower fares based on the total sold rather than per class, so the revenue collected before and after the critical threshold must be accounted for separately. The offline optimum is a supremum over a linear program and has to be bounded from above on arbitrary instances.

Formalization scope

  • Fares are a function f : ℕ → ℝ read 1-based. The hypotheses are StrictAntiOn f (Set.Icc 1 m) and 0 < f m, with 2 ≤ m. The paper's §2.1 says m≥3m \ge 3m≥3; every statement here is claimed for m≥2m \ge 2m≥2, a strengthening, and m=2m = 2m=2 is the paper's two-fare case.
  • Capacity is a real n with 0 < n. A request is a class cls : ℕ with a real qty. An instance is a List of requests with 1≤1 \le1≤ cls ≤m\le m≤m and qty >0> 0>0. The paper's unit orders with fractional acceptance are the case qty = 1.
  • A deterministic policy is any function from the booking record so far (requests and accepted quantities) and the current request to a proposed quantity; the run clips it to [0,min⁡(d,n−sold)][0, \min(d, n - \text{sold})][0,min(d,n−sold)]. Seeing its own past acceptances gives a policy no information beyond the past requests, since those acceptances are determined by them.
  • Randomized policies live on an arbitrary probability space; expected revenue is a Bochner integral, and the revenue on each instance is required to be measurable in ω\omegaω. It is bounded, so it is then integrable.
  • v∗v^*v∗ is a real sSup of a nonempty set that is bounded above. Competitive ratios are real sInfs over instances with v∗(I)>0v^*(I) > 0v∗(I)>0, a nonempty set bounded below by 000.
  • QQQ is defined from Eqs. (8)–(9), Qi=n−θi−1Q_i = n - \theta_{i-1}Qi​=n−θi−1​. The paper's text also writes Q(f)=n−θ(f)Q(f) = n - \theta(f)Q(f)=n−θ(f) with θi=θ(fi)\theta_i = \theta(f_i)θi​=θ(fi​), which is off by one index. PPP picks the largest index i≤mi \le mi≤m with q≤Qiq \le Q_iq≤Qi​. The policies use it only on [0,n][0, n][0,n], and Aθ′A'_\thetaAθ′​ carries the constraint α+q^≤n\alpha + \hat q \le nα+q^​≤n explicitly.
  • The sup in AθA_\thetaAθ​ ranges over the fares fj≥fcf_j \ge f_cfj​≥fc​, i.e. the classes j≤cj \le cj≤c.

Theorem 5 is an equality. A statement of only c≥1/Δc \ge 1/\Deltac≥1/Δ, or one restricted to the extreme instances I1,…,ImI_1, \dots, I_mI1​,…,Im​ or to low-before-high arrival orders, would be a different and weaker theorem. So would treating v∗(Ii)=finv^*(I_i) = f_i nv∗(Ii​)=fi​n as a definition instead of a consequence of the offline optimum.

A complete development needs finite sums over Lists and Fin, sSup/sInf on ℝ, the Bochner integral, and facts about the offline optimum of a single-resource allocation. The booking model and offline-optimum lemmas are reusable for the two-fare and bid-price results of the same paper; general lemmas about the offline optimum are welcome contributions.

Selected references

  • M. O. Ball, M. Queyranne, Toward Robust Revenue Management: Competitive Analysis of Online Booking, Operations Research 57(4):950–963, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1080.0654
  • K. Littlewood, Forecasting and control of passenger bookings, AGIFORS Symposium Proceedings 12, 1972; reprinted in Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management 4(2):111–123, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.rpm.5170134
  • S. L. Brumelle, J. I. McGill, Airline seat allocation with multiple nested fare classes, Operations Research 41(1):127–137, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.41.1.127
  • A. Borodin, R. El-Yaniv, Online Computation and Competitive Analysis, Cambridge University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511546563
  • K. T. Talluri, G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Springer, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
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Operations ResearchOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Toward Robust Revenue Management: Competitive Analysis of Online Booking I: The Nested Two-Fare Protection Level Is Optimally b(r)-CompetitiveResearch Paper

Motivation

Revenue management decides how much of a fixed, perishable capacity (airline seats, hotel rooms) to sell at each price. The classical single-leg models, starting with Littlewood's two-fare rule (1972) and continued by Belobaba, Brumelle–McGill and Lee–Hersh, assume that demand for each fare class follows a known probability distribution and maximise expected revenue. Both assumptions (forecastable demand, risk neutrality) are questionable in new or volatile markets.

Ball and Queyranne (Oper. Res. 57(4), 2009) replace them with competitive analysis from the theory of online algorithms: a booking policy is judged by the worst case, over all request sequences, of the ratio between the revenue it earns and the revenue a clairvoyant seller could have earned. No distribution is assumed. For two fare classes they determine the best achievable ratio exactly and show that it is attained by the same kind of policy used in practice, a nested protection level. This mission formalizes that result and its companion propositions from §1 of the paper.

Setting

A seller holds capacity n>0n > 0n>0, a real number: in the continuous problem of the paper, demands and accepted quantities may be any nonnegative reals and orders may be partially accepted. There are two fare classes, high with fare f1f_1f1​ and low with fare f2f_2f2​, where f1>f2>0f_1 > f_2 > 0f1​>f2​>0. The discount ratio is r=f2/f1∈(0,1)r = f_2/f_1 \in (0,1)r=f2​/f1​∈(0,1).

A request is a fare class together with a quantity q>0q > 0q>0. An instance III is a finite sequence of requests, revealed one at a time. On each arrival the seller irrevocably accepts some quantity a∈[0,min⁡(q,remaining capacity)]a \in [0, \min(q, \text{remaining capacity})]a∈[0,min(q,remaining capacity)]; revenue is ∑fc a\sum f_{c}\,a∑fc​a over the requests. The optimal offline revenue v∗(I)v^*(I)v∗(I) (written R∗(I)R^*(I)R∗(I) in the paper) is the maximum of ∑ifcixi\sum_i f_{c_i} x_i∑i​fci​​xi​ over 0≤xi≤qi0 \le x_i \le q_i0≤xi​≤qi​, ∑ixi≤n\sum_i x_i \le n∑i​xi​≤n: what a seller knowing III in advance would earn.

A deterministic online policy AAA chooses the accepted quantity from the earlier requests and the current one only. Its revenue on III is vA′(I)=R(A,I)v'_A(I) = R(A,I)vA′​(I)=R(A,I), and its competitive ratio is

CR(A)=inf⁡I : v∗(I)>0vA′(I)v∗(I).\mathrm{CR}(A) = \inf_{I \,:\, v^*(I) > 0} \frac{v'_A(I)}{v^*(I)}.CR(A)=I:v∗(I)>0inf​v∗(I)vA′​(I)​.

A randomized policy is a random choice A(ω)A(\omega)A(ω) of a deterministic policy, ω\omegaω drawn from a probability measure μ\muμ; its competitive ratio replaces vA′(I)v'_A(I)vA′​(I) by the expectation Eμ[R(A(ω),I)]\mathbb{E}_\mu[R(A(\omega), I)]Eμ​[R(A(ω),I)].

The nested protection-level policy with protection level θ1\theta_1θ1​ reserves θ1\theta_1θ1​ units for the high fare: high-fare requests are accepted while any capacity remains, low-fare quantity only while the total low-fare quantity sold stays at most the booking limit n−θ1n - \theta_1n−θ1​. First-come, first-served (FCFS) accepts everything while capacity remains. A partitioned protection-level (PPL) policy splits capacity into exclusive buckets, θ1\theta_1θ1​ for high fare and θ2=n−θ1\theta_2 = n - \theta_1θ2​=n−θ1​ for low fare.

Two instances play a special role: I1I_1I1​, a low-fare request for nnn followed by a high-fare request for nnn, and I2I_2I2​, a low-fare request for nnn alone. Finally let

b(r)=12−r(Eq. (1) of the paper).b(r) = \frac{1}{2 - r} \qquad \text{(Eq. (1) of the paper).}b(r)=2−r1​(Eq. (1) of the paper).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 954)

CR(nestedθ1=(1−b(r))n)=b(r),CR(A)≤b(r)  for every online policy A,\mathrm{CR}\big(\text{nested}_{\theta_1 = (1-b(r))n}\big) = b(r), \qquad \mathrm{CR}(A) \le b(r) \ \text{ for every online policy } A,CR(nestedθ1​=(1−b(r))n​)=b(r),CR(A)≤b(r)  for every online policy A,

the second for deterministic policies and for randomized policies alike. The optimal competitive ratio of the continuous two-fare problem is therefore exactly 1/(2−r)1/(2-r)1/(2−r), and the nested policy with low-fare booking limit b(r) nb(r)\,nb(r)n attains it.

Milestones

  • Proposition 1 (p. 953): the nested policy with θ1=(1−b(r))n\theta_1 = (1 - b(r))nθ1​=(1−b(r))n has competitive ratio exactly b(r)b(r)b(r).
  • Proposition 2 (p. 953): every deterministic online policy has CR(A)≤b(r)\mathrm{CR}(A) \le b(r)CR(A)≤b(r).
  • Proposition 3 (pp. 953–954): every randomized policy has competitive ratio at most b(r)b(r)b(r); even
min⁡{E[R(A,I1)]R∗(I1),E[R(A,I2)]R∗(I2)}≤b(r).\min\left\{\frac{\mathbb{E}[R(A,I_1)]}{R^*(I_1)}, \frac{\mathbb{E}[R(A,I_2)]}{R^*(I_2)}\right\} \le b(r).min{R∗(I1​)E[R(A,I1​)]​,R∗(I2​)E[R(A,I2​)]​}≤b(r).
  • Proposition 5 (p. 955): CR(FCFS)=r\mathrm{CR}(\mathrm{FCFS}) = rCR(FCFS)=r.
  • Proposition 6 (p. 955): CR(PPLn/2)=12\mathrm{CR}(\mathrm{PPL}_{n/2}) = \tfrac12CR(PPLn/2​)=21​, and CR(PPLθ1)≤12\mathrm{CR}(\mathrm{PPL}_{\theta_1}) \le \tfrac12CR(PPLθ1​​)≤21​ for every θ1∈[0,n]\theta_1 \in [0, n]θ1​∈[0,n].

Propositions 1–3 are the two halves of Theorem 1; Propositions 5 and 6 compare the nested policy with the two natural alternatives, both strictly worse for 0<r<10 < r < 10<r<1, since r<1/(2−r)r < 1/(2-r)r<1/(2−r) and 12<1/(2−r)\tfrac12 < 1/(2-r)21​<1/(2−r) there.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 gives a distribution-free guarantee: a seller who protects (1−b(r))n(1 - b(r))n(1−b(r))n units for the full fare earns at least a fraction 1/(2−r)1/(2-r)1/(2−r) of the clairvoyant revenue on every demand sequence, and no policy, even a randomized one, can promise more. The guarantee lies between 12\tfrac1221​ (as r→0r \to 0r→0) and 111 (as r→1r \to 1r→1). It also shows that nesting is optimal under this criterion, while FCFS guarantees only rrr and the best partitioned policy only 12\tfrac1221​. The paper extends the same analysis to mmm fare classes (ratio 1/Δ1/\Delta1/Δ) and to bid-price controls (ratio 1/(1−ln⁡r)1/(1 - \ln r)1/(1−lnr)); the two-fare case is the base on which both rest.

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper; none is known to be machine-checked. The mission produces a reusable formal model of online booking with partial acceptance, an offline optimum, deterministic and randomized nonanticipative policies and their competitive ratios, together with exact statements of the five results above. The same model underlies the multifare and bid-price missions of this series.

Difficulty

The achievability half requires a bound v′(I)≥b(r) v∗(I)v'(I) \ge b(r)\, v^*(I)v′(I)≥b(r)v∗(I) for every instance, including interleaved sequences where low- and high-fare requests alternate and the offline optimum is not a closed form; the online revenue must be compared with an optimum defined as a supremum over a polytope. The randomized lower bound cannot argue with a single hard instance: a randomized policy may hedge between accepting and rejecting low fares, so one must control the expected revenue on a distribution over instances without assuming any minimax equality between policies and instance distributions. Throughout, "competitive ratio b(r)b(r)b(r)" is an equality, so both an everywhere lower bound and a witness attaining it are needed.

Formalization scope

  • Capacity nnn is a real number with n>0n > 0n>0; fares are reals with 0<f2<f10 < f_2 < f_10<f2​<f1​ and rrr is written f₂ / f₁.
  • Requests are sized: a fare class and a quantity qty > 0. The unit requests of the paper are qty = 1; the paper's "nnn low-fare requests followed by nnn high-fare requests" is rendered as one request of quantity nnn per class.
  • A deterministic policy is any function List (Request × ℝ) → Request → ℝ from the history (earlier requests with the quantities accepted from them) and the current request to a proposed quantity; the run clips the proposal to [0,min⁡(q,n−sold)][0, \min(q, n - \text{sold})][0,min(q,n−sold)]. Every such function is a feasible nonanticipative policy and every such policy is some function. Policies never see future requests or the length of the sequence.
  • A randomized policy is an arbitrary probability space (Ω,μ)(\Omega, \mu)(Ω,μ) with A : Ω → DetPolicy and ω↦R(A(ω),I)\omega \mapsto R(A(\omega), I)ω↦R(A(ω),I) measurable for each III; no finiteness of the support is assumed. Revenue is bounded by f1nf_1 nf1​n, so the Bochner integral is a genuine expectation.
  • The offline optimum is sSup of the offline revenues over the feasible set (nonempty and bounded); the competitive ratio is sInf over instances with positive optimum (nonempty and bounded below by 000). The values R∗(I1)=f1nR^*(I_1) = f_1 nR∗(I1​)=f1​n and R∗(I2)=f2nR^*(I_2) = f_2 nR∗(I2​)=f2​n are not built in and are part of the work.
  • The statements are equalities where the paper says "has competitive ratio". A trivializing formalization — for instance restricting to threshold policies, fixing the offline optimum by a formula, or stating only "at least b(r)b(r)b(r)" — is ruled out: the policy class is all nonanticipative functions, and the optimum is the true supremum.
  • Useful infrastructure: lemmas about the run of a policy (monotonicity of capacity sold, prefix behaviour), an explicit description of the offline optimum of a two-class instance, and averaging of ratios over a two-point distribution of instances. Contributions of general lemmas about online policies and offline optima are welcome and reusable in the multifare and bid-price missions.

Selected references

  • M. O. Ball, M. Queyranne, Toward Robust Revenue Management: Competitive Analysis of Online Booking, Operations Research 57(4):950–963, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1080.0654
  • K. Littlewood, Forecasting and control of passenger bookings, AGIFORS Symposium Proc. 12, 1972; reprinted in J. Revenue Pricing Management 4(2):111–123, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.rpm.5170134
  • A. Borodin, R. El-Yaniv, Online Computation and Competitive Analysis, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
  • K. T. Talluri, G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Springer, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On linear optimization over Wasserstein balls: Existence of Discrete Optimal Solutions on at Most N+1 AtomsResearch Paper

Motivation

Wasserstein distributionally robust optimization replaces an unknown data-generating distribution by the set of all distributions within a prescribed optimal-transport distance of a reference distribution, typically the empirical distribution of NNN training samples. The inner problem of every such model is a linear optimization over this set: maximize the expectation of a loss function over all probability measures in a Wasserstein ball. The same problem appears when classification, clustering or generative models are regularized against overfitting to the training samples (Kuhn et al. 2019, Blanchet & Murthy 2019, Gao & Kleywegt 2016).

Whether this problem has a finite value, whether that value is attained, and whether it is attained by a measure with few atoms determine whether it can be solved by finite-dimensional optimization. Earlier answers appeared under differing hypotheses. Wozabal (2012) used the Richter–Rogosinski theorem to obtain solutions on at most N+3N+3N+3 atoms, Owhadi & Scovel (2017) improved this to N+2N+2N+2, and Gao & Kleywegt (2016) obtained the sharp bound N+1N+1N+1 through first-order optimality conditions of the dual problem. Yue, Kuhn & Wiesemann (2022) give short, self-contained proofs of weak compactness, finiteness, attainment and (N+1)(N+1)(N+1)-sparsity under conditions that are easy to check. This mission formalizes that paper.

Setting

Let (X,d)(X,d)(X,d) be a proper metric space: every closed ball BR(x0)={x∈X:d(x,x0)≤R}B_R(x_0)=\{x\in X:d(x,x_0)\le R\}BR​(x0​)={x∈X:d(x,x0​)≤R} is compact. Such a space is complete and separable. P(X)\mathcal P(X)P(X) is the set of Borel probability measures on XXX, with the weak topology of convergence against bounded continuous functions.

For p≥1p\ge1p≥1 and μ1,μ2∈P(X)\mu_1,\mu_2\in\mathcal P(X)μ1​,μ2​∈P(X), a coupling is a measure γ\gammaγ on X×XX\times XX×X with marginals μ1\mu_1μ1​ and μ2\mu_2μ2​. The set of couplings is Π(μ1,μ2)\Pi(\mu_1,\mu_2)Π(μ1​,μ2​). The Wasserstein distance is

Wp(μ1,μ2)=(inf⁡γ∈Π(μ1,μ2)∫X×Xdp(x1,x2) dγ(x1,x2))1/p∈[0,+∞].W_p(\mu_1,\mu_2)=\Big(\inf_{\gamma\in\Pi(\mu_1,\mu_2)}\int_{X\times X}d^p(x_1,x_2)\,d\gamma(x_1,x_2)\Big)^{1/p}\in[0,+\infty].Wp​(μ1​,μ2​)=(γ∈Π(μ1​,μ2​)inf​∫X×X​dp(x1​,x2​)dγ(x1​,x2​))1/p∈[0,+∞].

It is defined for every pair of probability measures, and it is +∞+\infty+∞ for some pairs. The Wasserstein ball of radius r>0r>0r>0 around ν∈P(X)\nu\in\mathcal P(X)ν∈P(X) is Br(ν)={μ∈P(X):Wp(μ,ν)≤r}\mathcal B_r(\nu)=\{\mu\in\mathcal P(X):W_p(\mu,\nu)\le r\}Br​(ν)={μ∈P(X):Wp​(μ,ν)≤r}. A measure has a finite ppp-th moment if ∫Xdp(x,x0) dμ(x)<∞\int_X d^p(x,x_0)\,d\mu(x)<\infty∫X​dp(x,x0​)dμ(x)<∞ for some x0x_0x0​.

Given an upper semicontinuous f:X→Rf:X\to\mathbb Rf:X→R, the paper studies

(3)sup⁡{∫Xf dμ: μ∈Br(ν)},\text{(3)}\qquad \sup\Big\{\int_X f\,d\mu:\ \mu\in\mathcal B_r(\nu)\Big\},(3)sup{∫X​fdμ: μ∈Br​(ν)},

under the standing assumption that for every μ\muμ in the ball at least one of ∫[f]+ dμ\int[f]_+\,d\mu∫[f]+​dμ and ∫[−f]+ dμ\int[-f]_+\,d\mu∫[−f]+​dμ is finite. The integral is ∫[f]+dμ−∫[−f]+dμ∈[−∞,+∞]\int[f]_+d\mu-\int[-f]_+d\mu\in[-\infty,+\infty]∫[f]+​dμ−∫[−f]+​dμ∈[−∞,+∞]. The optimal value is finite if it is neither +∞+\infty+∞ nor −∞-\infty−∞, and attained if some μ⋆∈Br(ν)\mu^\star\in\mathcal B_r(\nu)μ⋆∈Br​(ν) achieves it.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (existence of discrete optimal solutions)

Let ν=∑i=1Nαiδyi\nu=\sum_{i=1}^N\alpha_i\delta_{y_i}ν=∑i=1N​αi​δyi​​ with distinct yiy_iyi​, αi≥0\alpha_i\ge0αi​≥0 and ∑iαi=1\sum_i\alpha_i=1∑i​αi​=1. Suppose there are x0∈Xx_0\in Xx0​∈X, c>0c>0c>0 and p′∈(0,p)p'\in(0,p)p′∈(0,p) with f(x)≤c[1+dp′(x,x0)]f(x)\le c[1+d^{p'}(x,x_0)]f(x)≤c[1+dp′(x,x0​)] for all xxx. Then there exist x1,…,xN+1∈Xx_1,\dots,x_{N+1}\in Xx1​,…,xN+1​∈X and β∈R+N+1\beta\in\mathbb R^{N+1}_+β∈R+N+1​ with ∑jβj=1\sum_j\beta_j=1∑j​βj​=1 such that

μ⋆=∑j=1N+1βjδxj∈Br(ν),∫Xf dμ⋆=sup⁡{∫Xf dμ:μ∈Br(ν)}.\mu^\star=\sum_{j=1}^{N+1}\beta_j\delta_{x_j}\in\mathcal B_r(\nu),\qquad \int_X f\,d\mu^\star=\sup\Big\{\int_X f\,d\mu:\mu\in\mathcal B_r(\nu)\Big\}.μ⋆=j=1∑N+1​βj​δxj​​∈Br​(ν),∫X​fdμ⋆=sup{∫X​fdμ:μ∈Br​(ν)}.

The bound N+1N+1N+1 cannot be improved in general (Kuhn et al. 2019, Example 5).

Milestones, in the order the argument uses them

  • Lemma 1. If ν\nuν has a finite ppp-th moment, then for every x0x_0x0​ there is C>0C>0C>0 with ∫dp(x,x0) dμ≤C\int d^p(x,x_0)\,d\mu\le C∫dp(x,x0​)dμ≤C for all μ∈Br(ν)\mu\in\mathcal B_r(\nu)μ∈Br​(ν).
  • Theorem 1. Under the same assumption, Br(ν)\mathcal B_r(\nu)Br​(ν) is weakly compact.
  • Theorem 2. The optimal value of (3) is finite if and only if f(x)≤c[1+dp(x,x0)]f(x)\le c[1+d^p(x,x_0)]f(x)≤c[1+dp(x,x0​)] for some x0x_0x0​ and c>0c>0c>0.
  • Lemma 3 (Portmanteau). μk→μ∞\mu^k\to\mu^\inftyμk→μ∞ weakly if and only if lim sup⁡k∫g dμk≤∫g dμ∞\limsup_k\int g\,d\mu^k\le\int g\,d\mu^\inftylimsupk​∫gdμk≤∫gdμ∞ for every upper-bounded upper semicontinuous ggg.
  • Theorem 3. Under growth of order p′<pp'<pp′<p, the optimal value of (3) is attained.
  • Proposition 1 (two items; Pinelis 2016). For the moment problem sup⁡{∫ψ dγ:γ≥0 finite, ∫φi dγ=vi, i≤m}\sup\{\int\psi\,d\gamma:\gamma\ge0 \text{ finite},\ \int\varphi_i\,d\gamma=v_i,\ i\le m\}sup{∫ψdγ:γ≥0 finite, ∫φi​dγ=vi​, i≤m}, the supremum over its feasible region F\mathcal FF equals the supremum over F∩Dm(Z)\mathcal F\cap\mathcal D_m(Z)F∩Dm​(Z), measures on at most mmm points, provided the supremum is already achieved over extreme points (condition (12)). Condition (12) holds when ZZZ is Hausdorff and F\mathcal FF consists of probability measures.
  • Lemma 2. Under the hypotheses of Theorem 4, the discrete relaxation (10), a transport problem over measures on N+1N+1N+1 points of X×{y1,…,yN}X\times\{y_1,\dots,y_N\}X×{y1​,…,yN​}, attains its value whenever that value is finite.

A further item, Observation 1, shows that properness is necessary: if every Wasserstein ball over a Polish space is weakly compact, the space is proper.

Significance

Theorem 4 turns problem (3) with an empirical reference measure into a finite-dimensional problem over N+1N+1N+1 support points and weights. Many reformulations and algorithms for Wasserstein DRO rest on this sparsity. Theorems 2 and 3 give checkable growth conditions for finiteness and attainment, and their hypotheses differ only in whether the growth exponent is ppp or strictly smaller. The paper cites Kuhn et al. 2019, Example 4 for an instance with a finite but unattained value. Theorem 1 is a compactness statement for Wasserstein balls over a non-compact space, of use well beyond optimization.

All results are proved in the paper. None is known to be formalized. Mathlib has Prokhorov's theorem, tightness and the weak topology on probability measures, but no Wasserstein distance on a general metric space, no couplings, and no theory of extreme points of moment sets. Formalizing this paper builds those foundations.

Difficulty

The ball is not weakly closed in an obvious way: WpW_pWp​ is only lower semicontinuous for weak convergence. Tightness has to come from a moment bound (Lemma 1), which needs the triangle inequality for WpW_pWp​ on measures without finite moments. The integral μ↦∫f dμ\mu\mapsto\int f\,d\muμ↦∫fdμ is not weakly upper semicontinuous for unbounded fff, so compactness alone does not give attainment. That failure is exactly what the example with growth of order ppp shows. For sparsity, the natural idea is Carathéodory or Richter–Rogosinski: NNN marginal constraints, one cost constraint and one optimality condition give N+2N+2N+2 moment conditions, one atom too many. Reaching N+1N+1N+1 needs an extreme-point argument for an infinite-dimensional linear program, a separate case for an inactive cost constraint, and attainment for a relaxation whose feasible set is not obviously compact.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in the namespace WassersteinLinOpt.Ball. XXX carries [MetricSpace X] [ProperSpace X] [MeasurableSpace X] [BorelSpace X], and P(X)\mathcal P(X)P(X) is ProbabilityMeasure X with its standard topology. Weak compactness is IsCompact, which agrees with the paper's sequential notion because P(X)\mathcal P(X)P(X) is metrizable. wassersteinDist is valued in ℝ≥0∞, with couplings given by Measure.map Prod.fst/Prod.snd, and the ball is wassersteinDist p μ ν ≤ ENNReal.ofReal r with 0 < r. The objective quasiIntegral is ∫[f]+−∫[−f]+\int[f]_+-\int[-f]_+∫[f]+​−∫[−f]+​ computed in EReal from two lower Lebesgue integrals, and the optimal value is an EReal supremum. Every theorem about (3), (10) or (11) carries the paper's quasi-integrability hypothesis, because EReal evaluates ⊤−⊤\top-\top⊤−⊤ to ⊥\bot⊥. "Finite" means ≠ ⊤ ∧ ≠ ⊥. "Attained" means a member of the feasible set whose value equals the supremum. The feasible set of (11) requires Integrable (φ i) γ, so the Bochner integral's value 000 on non-integrable functions cannot create feasible points. Extreme points of a set of measures are defined directly, because measures form a cone and not a real vector space. N+1N+1N+1 atoms means Fin (N+1)-indexed points and non-negative weights.

A formalization that replaces the extended-real objective by a Bochner integral, drops the quasi-integrability or 0<r0<r0<r hypotheses, weakens "attained" to "the supremum is finite", or replaces "N+1N+1N+1 atoms" by "finitely supported" states a different theorem. None of these is acceptable. Solvers must not add hypotheses such as the triangle inequality for WpW_pWp​ or existence of optimal couplings; these are facts to prove.

A complete development needs the triangle inequality and lower semicontinuity of WpW_pWp​, existence of optimal couplings, density of finitely supported measures in WpW_pWp​, continuity of marginal maps, and the extreme-point theory of moment sets. All of these are reusable beyond this mission, and contributions of any of them are welcome.

Selected references

  • M.-C. Yue, D. Kuhn, W. Wiesemann, On linear optimization over Wasserstein balls, Mathematical Programming 195 (2022) 1107–1122. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-021-01673-8
  • I. Pinelis, On the extreme points of moments sets, Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 83 (2016) 325–349. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-015-0530-0
  • D. Wozabal, A framework for optimization under ambiguity, Annals of Operations Research 193 (2012) 21–47. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-010-0812-0
  • H. Owhadi, C. Scovel, Extreme points of a ball about a measure with finite support, Communications in Mathematical Sciences 15 (2017) 77–96. https://doi.org/10.4310/cms.2017.v15.n1.a4
  • R. Gao, A. J. Kleywegt, Distributionally robust stochastic optimization with Wasserstein distance, 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.02199
  • D. Kuhn, P. Mohajerin Esfahani, V. A. Nguyen, S. Shafieezadeh-Abadeh, Wasserstein distributionally robust optimization: theory and applications in machine learning, INFORMS TutORials (2019) 130–166. https://doi.org/10.1287/educ.2019.0198
  • J. Blanchet, K. Murthy, Quantifying distributional model risk via optimal transport, Mathematics of Operations Research 44 (2019) 565–600. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2018.0936
  • P. Clément, W. Desch, Wasserstein metric and subordination, Studia Mathematica 189 (2008) 35–52. https://doi.org/10.4064/sm189-1-4
  • C. Villani, Optimal Transport: Old and New, Springer, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71050-9
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Calculus of VariationsControl TheoryDynamic Programming+3·Captain: mikedeng1

Bellman's Dynamic Programming VII: Convergence of Discrete Approximations in the Calculus of VariationsTextbook

Motivation

Chapter IX of Richard Bellman's Dynamic Programming (Princeton University Press, 1957; Princeton Landmarks edition 2010, DOI 10.2307/j.ctv1nxcw0f) recasts problems of the calculus of variations with constraints as dynamic programming processes. A variational problem with an inequality constraint on the control, such as 0≤y≤x0 \le y \le x0≤y≤x, is awkward for the classical Euler–Lagrange theory: the optimal control switches between the constraint boundary and the interior, and the number and location of the switches are unknown in advance. Bellman's proposal is to replace the continuous problem by a discrete-time one and to solve that by the recurrence relations of dynamic programming, a procedure he describes as the more reliable computational one "in cases treated to date" (§ 11, p. 260).

That proposal is sound only if the discrete values converge to the continuous value as the time step goes to zero. Chapter IX states one such convergence result, Theorem 2 of § 12, and proves it through an Euler-scheme error estimate. The same chapter works through an example (§§ 10–11) whose discrete version is described by Theorem 1. Both are the subject of this mission. The convergence of time-discretized dynamic programming to the continuous value function has since become a standard topic of numerical optimal control (for example the semi-Lagrangian schemes analysed by Capuzzo-Dolcetta and Falcone), and Bellman's § 12 is an early rigorous instance of it.

Setting

A state x(t)≥0x(t) \ge 0x(t)≥0 evolves on a horizon [0,T][0, T][0,T] under a control y(t)y(t)y(t) with 0≤y≤x0 \le y \le x0≤y≤x, a running reward F(x,y)F(x, y)F(x,y) and dynamics

dxdt=G(x,y),x(0)=c.\frac{dx}{dt} = G(x, y), \qquad x(0) = c .dtdx​=G(x,y),x(0)=c.

Writing y=φxy = \varphi xy=φx with a fractional control 0≤φ≤10 \le \varphi \le 10≤φ≤1 turns FFF and GGG into F~(x,φ)=F(x,φx)\tilde F(x, \varphi) = F(x, \varphi x)F~(x,φ)=F(x,φx) and G~(x,φ)=G(x,φx)\tilde G(x, \varphi) = G(x, \varphi x)G~(x,φ)=G(x,φx) (phiForm). The continuous value is

f(c,T)=sup⁡φ∫0TF~(x(t),φ(t)) dt,f(c, T) = \sup_{\varphi} \int_0^T \tilde F(x(t), \varphi(t))\, dt,f(c,T)=φsup​∫0T​F~(x(t),φ(t))dt,

over measurable φ\varphiφ with values in [0,1][0, 1][0,1], where xxx solves x(t)=c+∫0tG~(x(s),φ(s)) dsx(t) = c + \int_0^t \tilde G(x(s), \varphi(s))\,dsx(t)=c+∫0t​G~(x(s),φ(s))ds on [0,T][0, T][0,T] (IsTrajectory, contValue).

For n=1,2,…n = 1, 2, \dotsn=1,2,… the discrete problem uses step 1/n1/n1/n and N=⌊Tn⌋N = \lfloor Tn \rfloorN=⌊Tn⌋ steps (horizonSteps): for φ0,…,φN∈[0,1]\varphi_0, \dots, \varphi_N \in [0, 1]φ0​,…,φN​∈[0,1],

x0=c,xk+1=xk+G~(xk,φk)n,JN({φk},n)=∑k=0NF~(xk,φk)n,x_0 = c, \quad x_{k+1} = x_k + \frac{\tilde G(x_k, \varphi_k)}{n}, \qquad J_N(\{\varphi_k\}, n) = \sum_{k=0}^{N} \frac{\tilde F(x_k, \varphi_k)}{n},x0​=c,xk+1​=xk​+nG~(xk​,φk​)​,JN​({φk​},n)=k=0∑N​nF~(xk​,φk​)​,

and f(c,T,n)=max⁡JNf(c, T, n) = \max J_Nf(c,T,n)=maxJN​ (eulerTraj, discretePayoff, discreteValue). A discrete control defines the step control φ(t)=φk\varphi(t) = \varphi_kφ(t)=φk​ on k/n≤t<(k+1)/nk/n \le t < (k+1)/nk/n≤t<(k+1)/n (stepControl).

The example of §§ 10–11 has a gain function bbb with b(0)=0b(0) = 0b(0)=0, b′(0)=∞b'(0) = \inftyb′(0)=∞, b′>0b' > 0b′>0, b′(y)→0b'(y) \to 0b′(y)→0 as y→∞y \to \inftyy→∞, b′′<0b'' < 0b′′<0 (IsGainFunction; b(y)=y1/2b(y) = y^{1/2}b(y)=y1/2 is one), and value functions (uSeq)

u0(c)=c,uN+1(c)=max⁡0≤v≤c [c−v+uN(c+b(v))].u_0(c) = c, \qquad u_{N+1}(c) = \max_{0 \le v \le c}\,\bigl[c - v + u_N(c + b(v))\bigr].u0​(c)=c,uN+1​(c)=0≤v≤cmax​[c−v+uN​(c+b(v))].

Formalization targets

Goal: Chapter IX, Theorem 2 (corrected)

Assume (11): (a) FFF and GGG have continuous second partial derivatives; (b) px≤G(x,y)≤qx+rpx \le G(x, y) \le qx + rpx≤G(x,y)≤qx+r for x>0x > 0x>0, 0≤y≤x0 \le y \le x0≤y≤x; (c) Gy>0G_y > 0Gy​>0 throughout that region, or Gy<0G_y < 0Gy​<0 throughout. Then for all c≥0c \ge 0c≥0, T>0T > 0T>0, the set of continuous payoffs is nonempty and bounded above, and

lim⁡n→∞f(c,T,n)=f(c,T).\lim_{n \to \infty} f(c, T, n) = f(c, T).n→∞lim​f(c,T,n)=f(c,T).

Milestones

  1. Chapter IX, Theorem 1: the structure of uNu_NuN​. There are vN(c)v_N(c)vN​(c) and thresholds cNc_NcN​ with vNv_NvN​ decreasing in ccc, vN+1>vNv_{N+1} > v_NvN+1​>vN​, cNc_NcN​ the unique fixed point of vNv_NvN​ with cN+1>cNc_{N+1} > c_NcN+1​>cN​, uN(c)=uN−1(c+b(c))u_N(c) = u_{N-1}(c + b(c))uN​(c)=uN−1​(c+b(c)) for c≤cNc \le c_Nc≤cN​, uN(c)=c−vN(c)+uN−1(c+b(vN(c)))u_N(c) = c - v_N(c) + u_{N-1}(c + b(v_N(c)))uN​(c)=c−vN​(c)+uN−1​(c+b(vN​(c))) for c≥cNc \ge c_Nc≥cN​, and uN′≥uN−1′u_N' \ge u_{N-1}'uN′​≥uN−1′​.
  2. § 12, Lemma (corrected): for GGG Lipschitz on [m,M]×[0,1][m, M] \times [0, 1][m,M]×[0,1], the Euler states with a step control are within κ/n\kappa / nκ/n of the exact solution on [0,T][0, T][0,T].
  3. Eq. (12.13): ∣J(φ)−JN({φk},n)∣≤B′/n|J(\varphi) - J_N(\{\varphi_k\}, n)| \le B'/n∣J(φ)−JN​({φk​},n)∣≤B′/n for step controls.
  4. Eq. (12.14): f(c,T,n)≤f(c,T)+B′/nf(c, T, n) \le f(c, T) + B'/nf(c,T,n)≤f(c,T)+B′/n for all n≥1n \ge 1n≥1.
  5. Eq. (12.17): f(c,T)≤lim inf⁡n→∞f(c,T,n)f(c, T) \le \liminf_{n \to \infty} f(c, T, n)f(c,T)≤liminfn→∞​f(c,T,n).

Milestones 3–5 are stated for c>0c > 0c>0, as in the book's proof ("Given c>0c > 0c>0 and T>0T > 0T>0"); the goal is stated for c≥0c \ge 0c≥0, as in the theorem.

Significance

Theorem 2 says that the value of a constrained continuous-time control problem can be computed, to any accuracy, by the finite recurrence of dynamic programming on a time grid. Its upper half (12.14) gives a rate: the discrete value never exceeds the continuous one by more than B′/nB'/nB′/n. The lower half (12.17) needs no rate and holds because measurable controls are approximated by step controls. Theorem 1 is a discrete counterpart of the transition curve computed in § 10: below the threshold cNc_NcN​ the whole state is invested, above it an interior amount, and the thresholds increase with the number of remaining stages.

As far as the mission's author could establish, none of these results has a machine-checked proof. The Euler error estimate is classical and has a Gronwall-type proof; Mathlib contains Gronwall's inequality (Analysis/ODE/Gronwall) and Picard–Lindelöf for continuous right-hand sides, but no convergence theory for the value of discretized control problems. The book leaves the proof of Theorem 1 to the reader.

Difficulty

The upper bound (12.14) follows from the Lemma once the continuous and the discrete trajectories are known to stay in a common bounded strip m≤x≤Mm \le x \le Mm≤x≤M; that uniform bound is what assumption (11b) provides and must be established first. The lower bound is where the obvious argument fails: an arbitrary measurable control is not a step control on the grid k/nk/nk/n, and passing to a step control changes the trajectory, so the payoff must be shown continuous under almost-everywhere convergence of controls. This uses the trajectory's dependence on the control in L1L^1L1, not only on the initial value. Solutions exist in the Carathéodory sense only, so the integral form of the equation is required. For Theorem 1 the induction must carry concavity of uNu_NuN​ and a strict comparison of marginal values across NNN, and uNu_NuN​ is not differentiable at c=0c = 0c=0, where b′(0)=∞b'(0) = \inftyb′(0)=∞.

Formalization scope

States, controls and rewards are real; F,G,b:R→RF, G, b : \mathbb R \to \mathbb RF,G,b:R→R (or R→R→R\mathbb R \to \mathbb R \to \mathbb RR→R→R), with the hypotheses imposed where the book imposes them. The conventions:

  • Misprint in (12.5). The print sets N=[T/n]N = [T/n]N=[T/n] while using the step 1/n1/n1/n in (12.6) and the intervals k/n≤t<(k+1)/nk/n \le t < (k+1)/nk/n≤t<(k+1)/n in the Lemma. Under the literal reading the discrete horizon N/nN/nN/n tends to 000 and Theorem 2 is false: for F≡1F \equiv 1F≡1, G(x,y)=yG(x, y) = yG(x,y)=y (which satisfies (11) with p=0p = 0p=0, q=1q = 1q=1, r=0r = 0r=0, Gy=1G_y = 1Gy​=1) and T=1T = 1T=1, f(c,1)=1f(c, 1) = 1f(c,1)=1 but f(c,1,n)=1/nf(c, 1, n) = 1/nf(c,1,n)=1/n for n≥2n \ge 2n≥2. The mission uses N=⌊Tn⌋N = \lfloor Tn \rfloorN=⌊Tn⌋ and keeps the book's sum ∑k=0N\sum_{k=0}^{N}∑k=0N​; the range "k=0,…,n−1k = 0, \dots, n - 1k=0,…,n−1" in (12.6) is read as k=0,…,N−1k = 0, \dots, N - 1k=0,…,N−1.
  • Lemma. Its range "0≤t≤N0 \le t \le N0≤t≤N" is read as 0≤t≤T0 \le t \le T0≤t≤T. The bounds m≤x≤Mm \le x \le Mm≤x≤M are required of the solution x(t)x(t)x(t) as well as of the sequence xkx_kxk​, since a Lipschitz condition on the strip says nothing about GGG outside it; the proof of Theorem 2 supplies both bounds. The constant may depend on mmm, MMM and the Lipschitz constant.
  • Assumptions (11) are on the original F(x,y)F(x, y)F(x,y), G(x,y)G(x, y)G(x,y), with (11a) read as C2C^2C2 on R2\mathbb R^2R2; the problem is posed through y=φxy = \varphi xy=φx.
  • "Max" over measurable controls is a supremum (the proof picks ε\varepsilonε-optimal controls). The goal asserts that the set of payoffs is nonempty and bounded above, so the Lean supremum cannot take its default value 000. Trajectories satisfy the integral equation with integrable right-hand side, and the reward is required integrable, so the Bochner integral's default 000 cannot enter either.
  • Theorem 1. (5a) is read as non-strict monotonicity: for N=1N = 1N=1 the interior optimum solves b′(v)=1b'(v) = 1b′(v)=1 and is constant in ccc. vN(c)≥0v_N(c) \ge 0vN​(c)≥0 is required for c≥cNc \ge c_Nc≥cN​, so that vN(c)v_N(c)vN​(c) is a feasible choice. (5f) presupposes differentiability and is stated where both derivatives exist.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the discrete and continuous values are defined from FFF and GGG by the book's recursions and integrals, not assumed as hypotheses, and the corrected step count is not a free parameter.

Needed infrastructure: Carathéodory existence and uniqueness for Lipschitz right-hand sides with measurable controls, Gronwall estimates for the Euler scheme, and approximation of measurable controls by step functions. All three are reusable beyond this mission, and contributions of any of them are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. Bellman, Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press, 1957; Princeton Landmarks in Mathematics edition, 2010. Chapter IX, §§ 10–12, pp. 256–263. DOI 10.2307/j.ctv1nxcw0f
  • I. Capuzzo-Dolcetta, On a discrete approximation of the Hamilton–Jacobi equation of dynamic programming, Applied Mathematics and Optimization 10 (1983) 367–377. DOI 10.1007/BF01448394
  • M. Bardi and I. Capuzzo-Dolcetta, Optimal Control and Viscosity Solutions of Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman Equations, Birkhäuser, 1997. DOI 10.1007/978-0-8176-4755-1
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