Geometric inequalities from phase space translationsResearch Paper
Motivation
We establish a quantum version of the classical isoperimetric inequality relating the Fisher information and the entropy power of a quantum state. The key tool is a Fisher information inequality for a state which results from a certain convolution operation: the latter maps a classical probability distribution on phase space and a quantum state to a quantum state. We show that this inequality also gives rise to several related inequalities whose counterparts are well-known in the classical setting: in particular, it implies an entropy power inequality for the mentioned convolution operation as well as the isoperimetric inequality, and establishes concavity of the entropy power along trajectories of the quantum heat diffusion semigroup. As an application, we derive a Log-Sobolev inequality for the quantum Ornstein-Uhlenbeck semigroup, and argue that it implies fast convergence towards the fixed point for a large class of initial states.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of Geometric inequalities from phase space translations (arXiv:1606.08603v2). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
10 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Lemma 1: convolution data processing (Lemma 1, (30), PDF p. 11). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
14 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
Theorem 1, (35)–(36): quantum Stam inequality; abstract seed: Canonical extended displacement family with output finite second derivatives established from local input C2 (hard)
Theorem 5: energy-constrained attenuator optimum: Extended right entropy derivative convention on the full finite-mean state/law domain, and energy-constrained attainment with that convention (source-ambiguity)
Theorem 6: constrained quantum/classical correspondence: Extended right entropy derivative convention on the full finite-mean state/law domain, and energy-constrained attainment with that convention (source-ambiguity)
Theorem 8: geometric pure-death optimum: Extended right entropy derivative convention on the full finite-mean state/law domain, and energy-constrained attainment with that convention (source-ambiguity)
Lemma 8, (62): relative entropy production identity: Source-pinned general-state entropy/Fisher analytic domain; well-defined rate/energy identities without infinity cancellations (source-ambiguity)
Example 1: large-entropy OU convergence: Exact threshold together with a source-pinned domain for entropy/relative-entropy rates (source-ambiguity)
Example 2: low-energy OU convergence: Exact threshold together with a source-pinned domain for entropy/relative-entropy rates (source-ambiguity)
Lemma 10, (72): classical OU entropy derivative: Initial-density domain justifying entropy differentiation, integrability and vanishing boundary terms for the classical OU process (source-ambiguity)
The Unique Pure Gaussian State Determined by the Partial Saturation of the Uncertainty Relations of a Mixed Gaussian StateResearch Paper
Motivation
Let {\rho} the density matrix of a mixed Gaussian state. Assuming that one of the Robertson--Schr"odinger uncertainty inequalities is saturated by {\rho}, e.g. ({\Delta}^{{\rho}}X_1)^2({\Delta}^{{\rho}}P_1)^2={\Delta}^{{\rho}}(X_1,P_1)^2+(1/4)\hbar^2, we show that there exists a unique pure Gaussian state whose Wigner distribution is dominated by that of {\rho} and having the same variances and covariance {\Delta}^{{\rho}}X_1,{\Delta}^{{\rho}}P_1, and {\Delta}^{{\rho}}(X_1,P_1) as {\rho}. This property can be viewed as an analytic version of Gromov's non-squeezing theorem in the linear case, which implies that the intersection of a symplectic ball by a single plane of conjugate coordinates determines the radius of this ball.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of The Unique Pure Gaussian State Determined by the Partial Saturation of the Uncertainty Relations of a Mixed Gaussian State (arXiv:1205.5222v1). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
1 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Saturation of one Robertson–Schrödinger inequality gives minimal symplectic capacity (Section 4, First step (continued on p.8), PDF p. 7). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
3 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
Theorem 1 (both clauses): A corrected uniqueness and domination statement for normalized Gaussian physical states (source-ambiguity)
Section 4, Second step: A valid uniqueness criterion for a quantum blob contained in a minimal-capacity ellipsoid (source-ambiguity)
Proposition 2: A valid replacement for the claimed fixed conjugate-coordinate plane section-area identity (source-ambiguity)
Selected references
The Unique Pure Gaussian State Determined by the Partial Saturation of the Uncertainty Relations of a Mixed Gaussian State, arXiv:1205.5222v1, https://arxiv.org/abs/1205.5222v1
R'enyi divergences as weighted non-commutative vector valued Lₚ-spacesResearch Paper
Motivation
We show that Araki and Masuda's weighted non-commutative vector valued Lp-spaces [Araki & Masuda, Publ. Res. Inst. Math. Sci., 18:339 (1982)] correspond to an algebraic generalization of the sandwiched R'enyi divergences with parameter α=2p. Using complex interpolation theory, we prove various fundamental properties of these divergences in the setup of von Neumann algebras, including a data-processing inequality and monotonicity in α. We thereby also give new proofs for the corresponding finite-dimensional properties. We discuss the limiting cases α→{21,1,∞} leading to minus the logarithm of Uhlmann's fidelity, Umegaki's relative entropy, and the max-relative entropy, respectively. As a contribution that might be of independent interest, we derive a Riesz-Thorin theorem for Araki-Masuda Lp-spaces and an Araki-Lieb-Thirring inequality for states on von Neumann algebras.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of R'enyi divergences as weighted non-commutative vector valued Lₚ-spaces (arXiv:1608.05317v2). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
1 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Finite-dimensional identification of Araki–Masuda and sandwiched Rényi divergences (§4.1 Eq.(39); Definition 2 and Eq.(10), p.5; Definition 7, p.8, PDF p. 9). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
18 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
Lemma 1: interpolation for products of spatial derivatives: Supported spatial derivative and its domain-sensitive complex powers in arbitrary normal representations (hard)
Proposition 4: norm interpolation: General Araki–Masuda norms at reciprocal exponents, including infinity (hard)
Corollary 5: convexity of log of the p-th power: Extended logarithm of the p-th power of the general Araki–Masuda norm (hard)
Theorem 6: Riesz–Thorin for Araki–Masuda spaces: Extended induced operator norm between general Araki–Masuda spaces (hard)
Lemma 8, monotonicity clause: General Araki–Masuda divergence with an infinity-order endpoint (hard)
Lemma 8, full-range continuity clause: A valid finite-domain boundary hypothesis for the printed continuity assertion (source-ambiguity)
Lemma 9: fidelity and max-relative entropy endpoints: General AM divergence, squared intertwiner fidelity, and domination infimum (hard)
Proposition 11: three Petz-divergence properties: Petz spectral moments, Umegaki entropy, and endpoint extensions on arbitrary W*-algebras (hard)
Theorem 12, Eq.(57): algebraic ALT divergence comparison: Distinct general AM and Petz divergences in the common order domain (hard)
Theorem 12, Eq.(58): vector ALT assertion as printed: Support and representative restrictions missing from Eq.(58) (source-ambiguity)
Theorem 13: Umegaki entropy as the alpha=1 limit: General AM divergence and extended spectral Umegaki entropy (hard)
Theorem 14, Eq.(72): data processing: Normal unital completely positive observable maps and general AM divergences (hard)
Theorem 14, Eq.(73): Stinespring vector inequalities: A consistent p=2 definition or a corrected reversed endpoint in Eq.(73) (source-ambiguity)
§5 Eq.(81): tensor-product additivity: Spatial von Neumann tensor powers and product normal states with AM divergences (hard)
§5 Eq.(84): lower bound on the strong converse exponent: General tensor-product testing exponent with extended limsup/liminf and AM variational bound (hard)
Lemma 16: general interpolation for unbounded positive operators: Supported unbounded positive self-adjoint operators with genuine complex-power domains (hard)
Lemma 20: Jensen for unbounded operators: Domain-sensitive closed quadratic-form compression, including potentially nondense form domains, and fractional powers (hard)
Contingency tables and the generalized Littlewood-Richardson coefficientsResearch Paper
Motivation
The Littlewood-Richardson coefficients cμνλ give the multiplicity of an irreducible polynomial GLn-representation Fnλ in the tensor product of polynomial representations Fnμ⊗Fnν. In this paper, we generalize these coefficients to an r-fold tensor product of rational representations, and give a new method for computing them using an analogue of statistical contingency tables. We demonstrate special cases in which our method reduces to counting statistical contingency tables with prescribed margins. Finally, we extend our result from the general linear group to both the orthogonal and symplectic groups.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of Contingency tables and the generalized Littlewood-Richardson coefficients (arXiv:2012.06928v1). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
12 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Stable rational GL multiplicities as weighted hollow LR tables (Theorem 3, PDF p. 7). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
This article provides an elementary introduction to Gaussian channels and their capacities. We review results on the classical, quantum, and entanglement assisted capacities and discuss related entropic quantities as well as additivity issues. Some of the known results are extended. In particular, it is shown that the quantum conditional entropy is maximized by Gaussian states and that some implications for additivity problems can be extended to the Gaussian setting.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of Gaussian quantum channels (arXiv:quant-ph/0505151v1). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
4 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Gaussian states maximize quantum conditional entropy at fixed moments (§3.3, Eq. (23): Gaussian conditional-entropy extremality (abstract seed), PDF p. 8). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
4 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
Section 3.3, Eqs. (24)--(25): Operational distillable entanglement on arbitrary finite-mode bipartite trace-class states, with genuine LOCC protocols on tensor powers and asymptotic EPR yield in nats. (hard)
Section 5.4, Eqs. (54)--(55); independent capacity definition on p.15: A Gaussian-displacement ensemble interface in the accepted full trace-class model: centered Gaussian trace-class realization for every physical covariance, finite-dimensional Gaussian probability laws including singular laws, measurable displaced-state preparation in trace norm, its trace-norm barycenter, and the independently optimized Gaussian Holevo objective with exact average-state constraints. (hard)
Section 5.4, Eq. (58) implies (I)--(IV); proof continues p.17: A Gaussian-displacement ensemble interface in the accepted full trace-class model: centered Gaussian trace-class realization for every physical covariance, finite-dimensional Gaussian probability laws including singular laws, measurable displaced-state preparation in trace norm, its trace-norm barycenter, and the independently optimized Gaussian Holevo objective with exact average-state constraints. Also needed: compatible tensor-product channels and marginal constraint sets for the capacity-additivity clause. (hard)
Section 5.4, final consequence after Eq. (61): An unrestricted infinite-dimensional entanglement-of-formation functional and its global tensor-additivity property, with the ensemble convention and finite-marginal-entropy domain needed by the background implications. (hard)
Gaussian transformations and distillation of entangled Gaussian statesResearch Paper
Motivation
We prove that it is impossible to distill more entanglement from a single copy of a two-mode bipartite entangled Gaussian state via LOCC Gaussian operations. More generally, we show that any hypothetical distillation protocol for Gaussian states involving only Gaussian operations would be a deterministic protocol. Finally, we argue that the protocol considered by Eisert et al. [quant-ph/0204052] is the optimum Gaussian distillation protocol for two copies of entangled Gaussian states.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of Gaussian transformations and distillation of entangled Gaussian states (arXiv:quant-ph/0204069v2). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
3 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Finite Gaussian contraction and normalized covariance update (Eqs.(1),(3)–(7), PDF p. 2). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
7 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
Single-copy nondistillation paragraph: Full Gaussian LOCC instruments and deterministic-LOCC entanglement monotonicity on actual conditional states (hard)
Eq.(8), Bell measurement and Fig.1: Trace-preserving Bell quadrature spectral instrument and outcome-dependent local displacement feedback (hard)
Fixed-input deterministic realization, continued pp.2–3: Universal fixed-input deterministic Gaussian LOCC replacement including ideal homodyne operations (hard)
Finite-squeezing sentence continued on p.3: Topology and domain of the claimed approximation to an infinitely squeezed resource/transformation (source-ambiguity)
Eqs.(9),(10): Actual Gaussian separability-to-product-resource decomposition and normalized possibly degenerate posterior displacement law (hard)
Pure-resource optimum paragraph: Operational pure-resource protocol family including ideal resources and deterministic displacement-mixture degradation (hard)
Fig.2 and optimum protocol paragraph: Full operational Fig.2 family and entanglement-dominating reduction from arbitrary Gaussian LOCC protocols (hard)
On approximation of quantum channelsResearch Paper
Motivation
We develop an approximation approach to infinite dimensional quantum channels based on detailed investigation of the continuity properties of entropic characteristics of quantum channels and operations (trace-nonincreasing completely positive maps) as functions of a pair ``channel, input state''. The obtained results are then applied to the following problems: continuity of the χ-capacity as function of a channel; strong additivity of the χ-capacity for infinite dimensional channels; the analytical expression for the convex closure of the output entropy of arbitrary quantum channel.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of On approximation of quantum channels (arXiv:0711.2245v1). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
8 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Strong topology of quantum operations is metrizable (§3, unnumbered: metrizability of the operation topology, PDF p. 6). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
36 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
§2, Proposition 1: entropy functionals of measures: Bochner barycenter and spectral entropy/relative entropy functionals for arbitrary Borel state measures (hard)
§2, Corollary 1: continuity on entropy-continuous barycenters: Finite-valued entropy continuity on barycenter images and the three measure functionals (hard)
§2, Proposition 2(A–C): convex closures and attainment: Genuine real locally convex trace-class domain, two spectral entropies, closed convex envelopes and pure measure attainment (hard)
§2, equation (7): finite versus general-measure χ optimization: Finite-ensemble and general-measure Holevo optimization on fixed Bochner barycenter fibers (hard)
§2, equation (8): finite-output-entropy χ identity: Unnormalized spectral S and both convex envelopes in the finite-output-entropy Holevo identity (hard)
§3, Remark 1: compact-uniform versus strong topology: Genuine bounded complex-linear trace-class maps with their Banach operator norm and compact-uniform topology (hard)
§3, Proposition 3: generalized Choi–Jamiolkowski isomorphism: Source-ambiguity / missing hypothesis: full rank of TrH |Ω⟩⟨Ω| does not imply full rank of TrK |Ω⟩⟨Ω|. With H=C², K=C, Ω=e0⊗1, identity and dephasing channels on C² have identical Y images. The proof assumes a complete Schmidt basis of H. Faithful input marginal or restriction to its support is required. (source-ambiguity)
§3, proof of Proposition 3: faithful canonical purification: Canonical faithful purification and typed tensor amplification Choi homeomorphisms (hard)
§3, unnumbered: channels with two fixed marginals: Canonical Choi map in input-reference/output order for channels with two fixed marginals (hard)
§3, Corollary 2(1–2): compactness criterion as printed: Printed (1) is false without strong closedness of F0. On C² with σ=I/2, the unitary conjugations diag(1,e^{it}) for 0<t<1 have singleton evaluation image {σ}, yet the channel set is nonclosed and noncompact. The proof establishes relative compactness, not compactness of every subset. (source-ambiguity)
§3, Example 1: negative compactness observations: Unpinned hypotheses: finite-dimensional operation fibers are uniformly compact, and for faithful σ and A=0 the positive-map fiber is just the zero map, compact in both topologies. The source’s universal-sounding negative claims require an existential example or restrictions it does not specify. (source-ambiguity)
§4, Proposition 4: joint lower semicontinuity: Joint extended Holevo function and closed convex output-entropy envelope (hard)
§4, Lemma 1: joint lower semicontinuity for measures: Joint extended H-integral on operations times weak Borel probability measures (hard)
§4, Corollary 3: convexity/concavity in the operation: Extended convexity and concavity in operations of chi and closed convex output entropy (hard)
§4, unnumbered: entropy minimum at an extreme channel: Closed convex output entropy, convex operation sets and their actual extreme points (hard)
§4, unnumbered: minimal-noise channel with fixed input/output: CCoOE and canonical inverse-Choi extreme coupling minimizers (hard)
§4, Proposition 5: entropy-controlled convergence of characteristics: Joint spectral H convergence and three extended characteristic limits (hard)
§4, application after Proposition 5: energy-constrained joint continuity: Finite real-valued spectral entropy and characteristic functions on the energy-bounded product (hard)
§4, Proposition 6(A–B): approximation without finite output entropy: Both extended entropy envelopes and chi under compression or domination approximation (hard)
§4, Lemma 2: order bound for finite-ensemble Holevo quantities: Subnormalized infinite-dimensional relative entropy and its finite-ensemble order comparison (hard)
§4, Remark 3: continuous bounded approximation of χ and CCoOE: Spectral chi and CCoOE plus increasing bounded continuous concave/convex function approximations (hard)
§5.1, unnumbered equation (18): lower semicontinuity of constrained χ-capacity: Constrained single-use chi-capacity on arbitrary state subsets (hard)
§5.1, equations (19) and postprocessing example: Extended constrained capacity and typed postprocessing composition (hard)
§5.1, Proposition 7: capacity continuity on compact constraints: Spectral H continuous convergence on compact input constraints and chi-capacity (hard)
§5.1, Corollary 4: energy-constrained capacity continuity: Finite real constrained capacity and output partition-function condition (hard)
§5.1, Proposition 8: stability of output optimal average: Uniquely specified output optimal average as a capacity-approaching-ensemble limit (hard)
§5.2, Proposition 9: strong χ-capacity additivity for complementary-EB channels: Actual Stinespring complementary channels, tensor products and extended chi-capacity (hard)
§5.2, Example 3: the externally defined Φap channel: The named channel Φap is specified only by a reference to the example in [18] (quant-ph/0608090); the allowed local paper does not define its action, input/output spaces or full a,p domain. The claimed operational classical capacity also needs the external constrained coding model. Proposition 9 itself is retained without this unresolved example. (source-ambiguity)
§5.3, unnumbered: atomic roof equality iff lower semicontinuity: Separate countable-pure and general-measure entropy roofs on trace-norm states (hard)
§5.3, Proposition 10: increasing continuous bounded convex approximation of CCoOE: Ordered output eigenvalues with zero padding, unnormalized truncated spectral entropy and countable pure roofs (hard)
§5.3, Corollary 5: uniform convergence on entropy-continuous compact sets: Spectral truncated pure roofs and real uniform convergence on entropy-continuous compact sets (hard)
§5.3, unnumbered Gaussian energy application: Unpinned source interface: the Gaussian-channel and energy convention are delegated to [8]; this paper supplies no number of modes, canonical Hamiltonian, or parameter/access specification for that application. Corollary 5 and the explicit partition-function energy results remain state targets. (source-ambiguity)
§5.3, unnumbered EoF limit representation: Actual partial-trace entropy channel, general-measure EoF and truncated atomic pure roofs (hard)
§5.3, unnumbered EoF class-membership conclusion: The function class hat P is not defined in the supplied paper; [17] is referenced for its definition. A precise class-membership proposition cannot be invented merely from the letter P. The actual displayed EoF approximation theorem is separately retained. (source-ambiguity)
§5.3, unnumbered uniform EoF approximation under energy bound: Missing energy assumptions: no composite Hamiltonian or spectral/partition-function hypothesis is specified for this sentence. Bounded mean energy alone need not give compactness or entropy continuity. Supplying an arbitrary Hamiltonian would make the claim false; the precise sufficient conditions are preserved in Corollary 5. (source-ambiguity)
§6, unnumbered Corollary: two-marginal compactness as printed: Printed necessity is false: on l²(N), A={|n⟩⟨n|:n∈N} is noncompact and B={0} is compact. Every joint positive operator has equal traces of its two marginals, so A⊗B is empty and compact. Nonempty counterexamples also arise from unused trace sectors. Continuous partial traces only prove compactness of their actual images, not arbitrary supersets A,B. (source-ambiguity)
Optimal quantum learning of a unitary transformationResearch Paper
Motivation
We address the problem of learning an unknown unitary transformation from a finite number of examples. The problem consists in finding the learning machine that optimally emulates the examples, thus reproducing the unknown unitary maximum fidelity. Learning a unitary is equivalent to storing it in the state of a quantum memory (the memory of the learning machine), and subsequently retrieving it. We prove that, whenever the unknown unitary is drawn from a group, the optimal strategy consists in a parallel call of the available uses followed by a "measure-and-rotate" retrieving. Differing from the case of quantum cloning, where the incoherent "measure-and-prepare" strategies are typically suboptimal, in the case of learning the "measure-and-rotate" strategy is optimal even when the learning machine is asked to reproduce a single copy of the unknown unitary. We finally address the problem of the optimal inversion of an unknown unitary evolution, showing also in this case the optimality of the "measure-and-rotate" strategies and applying our result to the optimal approximate realignment of reference frames for quantum communication.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of Optimal quantum learning of a unitary transformation (arXiv:0903.0543v2). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
2 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Covariance without loss for a delayed learning comb (§III A, Eq.(9): covariance without loss for a learning comb, PDF p. 3). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
11 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
Abstract and §III A: optimal N-to-1 unitary learning: Canonical memory, its normalized covariant POVM and the actual integral measure-and-rotate retrieval channel. Shared prerequisite: A finite, continuous, unitary, based irreducible decomposition of the actual example tensor representation, with positive multiplicities, pairwise inequivalent irreps, an exhaustive unitary intertwiner, and the induced canonical-memory embedding. (hard)
Lemma 2 (Optimal states for storage): Canonical irrep memory and an isometric embedding into H_o tensor H_i tied to the actual U^N decomposition. Shared prerequisite: A finite, continuous, unitary, based irreducible decomposition of the actual example tensor representation, with positive multiplicities, pairwise inequivalent irreps, an exhaustive unitary intertwiner, and the induced canonical-memory embedding. (hard)
§III A, Eq.(14): covariance without loss for retrieval: Two independent group actions on the actual reduced irrep memory. Shared prerequisite: A finite, continuous, unitary, based irreducible decomposition of the actual example tensor representation, with positive multiplicities, pairwise inequivalent irreps, an exhaustive unitary intertwiner, and the induced canonical-memory embedding. (hard)
§III A, Eqs.(19)-(25): sharp fixed-storage retrieval bound: Common-irrep coupling maps for U tensor conjugate(U_j), actual m_K^(j), occurrence sets P_KL, and transported retrieval blocks. Shared prerequisite: A finite, continuous, unitary, based irreducible decomposition of the actual example tensor representation, with positive multiplicities, pairwise inequivalent irreps, an exhaustive unitary intertwiner, and the induced canonical-memory embedding. (hard)
Theorem 1 (Optimal retrieving strategy): Actual eta_h memory coordinates and their integrated retrieval Choi matrix. Shared prerequisite: A finite, continuous, unitary, based irreducible decomposition of the actual example tensor representation, with positive multiplicities, pairwise inequivalent irreps, an exhaustive unitary intertwiner, and the induced canonical-memory embedding. (hard)
§III B.1: multiple outputs with optimal single-copy fidelities: Canonical measure-and-rotate optimum plus local input insertion and output marginal maps for arbitrary joint Sigma. Shared prerequisite: A finite, continuous, unitary, based irreducible decomposition of the actual example tensor representation, with positive multiplicities, pairwise inequivalent irreps, an exhaustive unitary intertwiner, and the induced canonical-memory embedding. (hard)
§III B.2: optimal N-to-M learning for global fidelity: Canonical storage and an integral conditional tensor-target retrieval with M-dependent optimized weights. Shared prerequisite: A finite, continuous, unitary, based irreducible decomposition of the actual example tensor representation, with positive multiplicities, pairwise inequivalent irreps, an exhaustive unitary intertwiner, and the induced canonical-memory embedding. (hard)
Remark: generalization to nonidentical group representations: Heterogeneous example/target tensor representations with actual based decomposition and common coupling data. Shared prerequisite: A finite, continuous, unitary, based irreducible decomposition of the actual example tensor representation, with positive multiplicities, pairwise inequivalent irreps, an exhaustive unitary intertwiner, and the induced canonical-memory embedding. (hard)
§IV: optimal inversion learning: Canonical integral estimator/conditional inverse channel and the normalized inverse global objective. Shared prerequisite: A finite, continuous, unitary, based irreducible decomposition of the actual example tensor representation, with positive multiplicities, pairwise inequivalent irreps, an exhaustive unitary intertwiner, and the induced canonical-memory embedding. (hard)
§IV: optimal approximate reference-frame realignment: Canonical token orbit and decoder on the Haar-correlated token/message state. Shared prerequisite: A finite, continuous, unitary, based irreducible decomposition of the actual example tensor representation, with positive multiplicities, pairwise inequivalent irreps, an exhaustive unitary intertwiner, and the induced canonical-memory embedding. (hard)
§IV: fidelity-optimal versus maximum-likelihood token states: Actual SU(2) and U(1) tensor-power irrep families and their optimized-token versus likelihood-token fidelity sequences. Shared prerequisite: A finite, continuous, unitary, based irreducible decomposition of the actual example tensor representation, with positive multiplicities, pairwise inequivalent irreps, an exhaustive unitary intertwiner, and the induced canonical-memory embedding. (hard)
On the entanglement-assisted classical capacity of infinite-dimensional quantum channelsResearch Paper
Motivation
The coding theorem for the entanglement-assisted communication via infinite-dimensional quantum channel with linear constraint is extended to a natural degree of generality. Relations between the entanglement-assisted classical capacity and the χ-capacity of constrained channels are obtained and conditions for their coincidence are given. Sufficient conditions for continuity of the entanglement-assisted classical capacity as a function of a channel are obtained. Some applications of the obtained results to analysis of Gaussian channels are considered. A general (continuous) version of the fundamental relation between the coherent information and the measure of privacy of classical information transmission by infinite-dimensional quantum channel is proved.
This mission is the statement-level formalization of On the entanglement-assisted classical capacity of infinite-dimensional quantum channels (arXiv:1210.6926v2). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.
What is formalized
21 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Theorem 1, (14): general constrained entanglement-assisted coding theorem (Theorem 1, (14): general constrained entanglement-assisted coding theorem, PDF p. 6). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.
The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.
Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.
Deferred results
6 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:
Proposition 2 [7]: existence of a generalized optimal ensemble (cited): Nonempty feasible set and finite-valued entropy continuity (source-ambiguity)
Corollary 1, both sufficient alternatives: Meaning of nontrivial subchannel and non-pure optimal support in alternative 2 (source-ambiguity)
Unnumbered Gaussian strictness application, both alternatives: Energy above the pure ground-state boundary in the full-row-rank alternative (source-ambiguity)
Section 5 Gaussian continuity application: Many-mode regular irreducible Weyl system, canonical unbounded quadratures, oscillator closed form, and actual Gaussian channel action compatible with the trace-class channel (hard)
Appendix Proposition 5(1): Gaussian c-q characterization: Many-mode Gaussian dual action on bounded Weyl observables, full normal dual, and general commuting-range c-q predicate (hard)
Appendix Proposition 5(2): full-rank Gaussian subchannel claim: Many-mode Gaussian interface and subspace restriction compatible with the full-rank Weyl action (hard)
Selected references
On the entanglement-assisted classical capacity of infinite-dimensional quantum channels, arXiv:1210.6926v2, https://arxiv.org/abs/1210.6926v2
The Informational Role of Buyback Contracts: The Most Efficient Separating Equilibrium Exists, and the Less Risky Manufacturer Signals by Lowering Both Wholesale and Returns PricesResearch Paper
Why returns risk matters
A buyback contract lets a retailer return unsold goods to a manufacturer at an agreed returns price. The promise changes the retailer's willingness to order before demand is known. If the manufacturer may fail to honor it, the retailer must also judge how credible the promise is. Wang, Gurnani, and Subramanian study what the contract's wholesale and returns prices reveal about that credibility in a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer (Wang et al., 2020, §3–4). Their returns-risk result gives a precise case in which a more reliable manufacturer signals through lower prices. The direction is economically consequential because lower orders and less leftover stock accompany the signal.
This mission follows the authors' revised SSRN version, whose main-body page numbers and Electronic Companion result numbers fix the statements below. The result is a known theorem in that paper; the open work here is its Lean formalization.
Model and notation
The manufacturer offers a pair (w,r): a nonnegative wholesale pricew per unit ordered and a nonnegative returns pricer per unit the manufacturer accepts back. Her marginal production cost is zero. The retailer orders stock s≥0 before observing demand. After demand's baseline is realized, he sets a retail price pi∈[0,αi/β]. Demand is αi−βpi, where the baseline is high, αh, with probability λ, or low, αl<αh, with probability λc=1−λ. Write Δα=αh−αl and α=λαh+λcαl.
The manufacturer's type is the probability θ that she honors the returns promise. The less risky type has probability θˉ and the riskier type has probability θ<θˉ. The retailer does not know the type when he sees the contract, so his perceived probability is θ^(w,r). Demand potential λ is common knowledge in this mission. With x+=max(x,0), the retailer's order formula from Lemma 1, at perceived demand probability λ^, is
The retailer's price-stage and ordering objectives are defined separately, so Lemma 1 connects this formula to actual optimization rather than merely repeating a definition (SSRN version, pp. 9–11 and EC p. 1).
With the type known, Lemma 2 gives the symmetric-information benchmark:
The two types earn the same π∘. Their actual returns prices differ because the expected payment depends on θr.
Formalization targets
The main target is Proposition 1. A separating equilibrium has the riskier type offer (w∘,r∘(θ)) and the less risky type offer a solution (wˉ⋆,rˉ⋆) of problem (4). The retailer believes θˉ at the latter contract and θ at every other contract. Problem (4) maximizes Π(wˉ,rˉ∣θˉ,θˉ) over wˉ≥θˉrˉ≥0, subject to the riskier type's non-mimicry constraint and the less risky type's participation constraint. A solution must actually attain that maximum; existence is part of the goal. The target comparison is
wˉ⋆<w∘,rˉ⋆<r∘(θˉ)<r∘(θ),sˉ⋆<s∘,qˉ⋆<q∘,
and no stock remains after high demand. The Lean goal also verifies both types' no-deviation clauses under the stated beliefs (SSRN version, p. 13, Proposition 1; EC p. 15).
The milestone list follows the paper's retailer-response and benchmark lemmas, then the Appendix B bounds on the transformed optimizer and the less risky type's off-path deviations. The transformed coordinates are w~=wˉ−w∘ and u~=wˉ−θˉrˉ−λΔα/(2β). They encode the constraints and quadratic objective in (B.4)–(B.7), rather than defining the original profit by that quadratic outside its valid region.
What the result gives
Under the authors' model, signaling greater reliability reduces both contract prices and the retailer's volume of trade. The comparison distinguishes the effects of information about returns risk from the symmetric-information benchmark. The paper also studies signals about demand potential and joint private information, but those are distinct results (Wang et al., 2020, §§5–6).
A complete Lean development would make the demand-stage optimization, two-type incentive constraints, existence of a maximizer, and the directional inequalities independently checkable and reusable in related contract models. The present mission states those targets; it does not claim they already have machine-checked proofs. The authors prove them in the cited paper. The objective here is to formalize that known argument or another proof of the same statements.
Where the proof is difficult
The less risky type chooses two continuous prices under a non-mimicry constraint that is nonlinear and changes form when the retailer stops carrying safety stock. A direct appeal to an unconstrained quadratic optimum misses the boundary and can violate the riskier type's incentive constraint. Existence also requires an attained maximum of problem (4), rather than a supremum or an assumed optimizer. The Appendix B characterization shows that the optimal transformed coordinates satisfy specific equations and strict inequalities; the no-deviation check then ranges over off-path contracts, not only local perturbations (SSRN version, EC pp. 4–15).
Formalization scope
Lean uses real parameters for the two demand baselines, β, λ, θˉ, and θ, and pairs of reals for contracts. The standing assumptions include 0<αl<αh, β>0, 0<λ<1, and 0<θ<θˉ≤1. The strict lower bounds on αl and θ are disclosed additions: the printed model allows zero, but its returns-price benchmark divides by θ and Proposition 1's strict lower-price claim fails at αl=0.
The admissible action set for a type θ is w≥θr≥0, as in the paper's optimization problems; a deviation is checked when w−θ^(w,r)r≥0, following the retailer-response convention on p. 10. Beliefs range over [θ,θˉ] and are pessimistic away from the less risky type's equilibrium contract. This is the paper's operational most-efficient profile from problem (4). Maximality over all possible separating equilibria and refinement by the intuitive criterion are outside this target.
For the retailer-price value, Lean takes a real supremum over the compact nonempty interval [0,αi/β]; the objective is continuous there under the standing assumptions. Lemma 1 makes its printed order formula an optimizer only when that formula is nonnegative, correcting the negative-order edge case; it states the unsold stock as the realized leftover at every optimal retail price, and claims the low-demand amount only under the price cap βθ^r≤αl of Lemma A.1, without which the printed amount can exceed the stock. Manufacturer profit remains the paper's equation (2); defining it as the Appendix B quadratic would make the target easier by changing the model. The first-stage solution predicate quantifies over every feasible contract and carries no desired sign condition. Reusable contributions include the price-stage analysis, the symmetric-information benchmark, and optimization facts for the transformed feasible set.
Selected references
S. Wang, H. Gurnani, and U. Subramanian, The Informational Role of Buyback Contracts, Management Science, 2020. DOI; authors' revised SSRN version, abstract 3166462. The formal statements use the latter version's pp. 7–13 and Electronic Companion pp. 1–15.
Technological Determinants of Financial Constraints: Peak Cumulative Likelihood Ratio Ranks Agency Rents at Low Disutility of Effort; the Left-Tail Entrepreneur Has the Lower Rent at High DisutilityResearch Paper
Motivation
Financial constraints, the gap between what a firm could produce and what it can raise from outside investors, are a central object of corporate finance. In moral-hazard models of financing, an entrepreneur must be paid an agency rent to exert unobservable effort, and the investor can only be repaid out of what is left; the agency rent therefore fixes the entrepreneur's pledgeable income and the degree to which the entrepreneur is financially constrained (Tirole, The Theory of Corporate Finance, 2006).
J. Starmans, Technological Determinants of Financial Constraints (manuscript, February 4, 2022; published in Management Science, 2022, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4421), asks how an entrepreneur's production technology, meaning which part of the cash-flow distribution the entrepreneur's effort improves, determines the agency rent, and hence which entrepreneur an investor with limited capital prefers to finance. The answer links technology, the form of the optimal security (debt, equity or a combination), and financial constraints in one model. The mission formalizes the paper's general comparison of entrepreneurs (its Proposition 6) together with the closed-form solution of the contracting problem on which it rests.
Setting
There are states Ω={0,…,n} with n>1, and a project pays the cash flow xi in state i, where 0=x0<x1<⋯<xn. If the entrepreneur shirks, the state is drawn from a baseline distributionq with qi>0 for every state. An entrepreneur's typep is the distribution of the state under effort. Write Ew[f]=∑iwifi.
The likelihood ratio of a type is φi(p)=(pi−qi)/qi. The type set P consists of the distributions p such that (Assumption 1) every type creates the same expected value of effortπ>0, Ep[x]−Eq[x]=π; (Assumption 2) p first-order stochastically dominates q, with at least one strict tail inequality; and (Assumption 3) φ(p) is single-peaked in the state. The cumulative likelihood ratio is
and ιˉ(p) denotes the highest state with pi>qi: the upper end of the region the entrepreneur improves.
A contracts=(si)i∈Ω pays the entrepreneur si in state i. Given the entrepreneur's disutility of effortc, an optimal contract solves problem (1): maximize the investor's expected payoff Ep[x−s] subject to the incentive constraint Ep[s]−c≥Eq[s], the participation constraint Ep[s]−c≥0, limited liability si≥0, and monotonicity of both payoffs, si≥si−1 and xi−si≥xi−1−si−1. The agency rent of an optimal contract is Eq[s]. The tranchessˉik=1{i≥k}(xk−xk−1), k=1,…,n, partition the cash flow.
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 6
Let p′,p′′∈P with ιˉ(p′)=1<ιˉ(p′′). For every c∈(0,π] both have optimal contracts, and, writing sc′,sc′′ for any optimal contracts at c:
The threshold cˉ is existential; no constant is fixed.
Milestones
In attack order: the sign facts p0<q0, pn≥qn (Lemma A.1); the sign pattern of φ(p) (Lemma 2) and of Φ(p) (Lemma 3); the greedy optimal contract ∑j<msˉσ(j)+λσ(m)sˉσ(m) with thresholds 0=cˉ0<cˉ1≤⋯≤cˉn=π (Proposition 1); the closed-form agency rent, continuous, increasing, piecewise linear and convex in c (Proposition 2); the bounds s≤min{x,xιˉ(p)} and Eq[s]≤Eq[min{x,xιˉ(p)}] with equality iff c=π (Corollaries 2 and 3); and the two facts of the proof of Proposition 6 (p. 47): the agency rent is c/Φ∗(p) on [0,π] when ιˉ(p)=1, and on an initial interval for every p.
Significance
Proposition 6 says that the peak cumulative likelihood ratio, the informativeness of the most informative tranche, decides which entrepreneur is cheaper to incentivize when effort is cheap, while at high disutility of effort the entrepreneur who improves only the left tail of the distribution (whose optimal contract is equity-like) is cheaper. Its instance with the optimal equity-financed and the optimal debt-financed entrepreneurs is the paper's Proposition 5, which underlies its predictions about which firms are more financially constrained. The milestones give a complete closed-form solution of a linear contracting problem with limited liability and two-sided monotonicity under a single-peaked likelihood ratio, a setting that generalizes the monotone likelihood ratio property.
The results are proved in the paper (Appendix A). As far as a search of the Prove2Me catalog shows, none of them, and no model of security design with tranches, has a machine-checked proof. The mission produces formal proofs of the paper's results; the agency-rent formula of Proposition 2 is a reusable description of a fractional knapsack's value function.
Difficulty
The comparison is not a pointwise statement about two formulas: the agency rent is the value of an optimization problem over all contracts, and only the solution of that problem (Proposition 1) turns it into a piecewise-linear function. The step that does not follow from slopes alone is the comparison at c=π: it needs the identification of the optimal contract at c=π with min{x,xιˉ(p)} (Corollaries 2 and 3), which rests on the sign structure of Lemmas 2 and 3 and therefore on Assumptions 2 and 3 together. The monotonicity constraint on the investor's payoff, xi−si≥xi−1−si−1, is what caps each tranche at weight one; without it (the paper's Appendix C) the agency rent is c/Φ∗(p) for every c and the crossing in case (i) disappears.
Formalization scope
States are Fin (n + 1); types, contracts and cash flows are vectors Fin (n + 1) → ℝ, and all expectations are finite sums. The standing assumptions n>1, 0=x0<⋯<xn, qi>0, ∑iqi=1, π>0 are bundled in Economy.Standing; P is InP, which keeps Assumption 2's strict clause as written. Tranches and positions of the ordering σ are indexed by Fin n, standing for the paper's indices 1,…,n shifted by one. Φ∗ is the maximum over all of Ω, including j=0. ιˉ(p) is defined as the highest state with pi>qi; Lemma 2 shows it is the paper's ιˉ(p). The agency rent function is the infimum of Eq[s] over optimal contracts, and Proposition 2 states that every optimal contract attains it on [0,π].
Conventions disclosed in the statements: "an optimal contract from Proposition 1" in Corollaries 2–3 and in the goal is read as every optimal contract of problem (1) (all optimal contracts share one agency rent, footnote 7, p. 11); existence of optimal contracts is stated explicitly wherever a statement quantifies over them; the investor's capital I and the condition Eq[x]+π−c≥I≥Eq[x] (p. 8) are omitted because problem (1) drops the investor's participation constraint. Each statement carries its own range of c as on its page.
The agency rent is defined through problem (1) over all feasible contracts, never by the formula of Proposition 2 or the construction of Proposition 1; a formalization that defined it by the formula, or that dropped the monotonicity constraint (1f), would make the goal arithmetic or false, and is ruled out.
A complete development needs only finite sums and elementary real analysis (one-sided slopes, convexity on an interval); Mathlib suffices. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, a general lemma on fractional knapsack problems (reusable beyond this mission), and the paper's remaining results (Propositions 3–5 and 7).
Selected references
J. Starmans, Technological Determinants of Financial Constraints, manuscript, February 4, 2022; Management Science, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4421
J. Tirole, The Theory of Corporate Finance, Princeton University Press, 2006.
R. D. Innes, Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices, Journal of Economic Theory 52(1), 1990, 45–67. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90066-S
J. Poblete and D. Spulber, The form of incentive contracts: agency with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and limited liability, RAND Journal of Economics 43(2), 2012, 215–234. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00164.x
A Polynomial-Time Approximation Scheme for Sequential Batch Testing of Series Systems: The Dynamic Program over Great-Looking States Finds a Testing Scheme Within Factor 1 + O(ε) of OptimalResearch Paper
Motivation
A series system works only if every one of its components works. Deciding whether it works by inspecting components one at a time, in the order that minimizes the expected inspection cost, is the classic sequential testing problem for series systems (Mitten 1960; Butterworth 1972; Simon & Kadane 1975). It is solved by sorting the components by the ratio ci/(1−pi). In medical diagnosis, quality control and software testing, tests are often run in batches: a laboratory charges a fixed shipping-and-handling fee per batch on top of the per-test fees. Daldal, Gamzu, Segev & Ünlüyurt (Naval Research Logistics, 2016) introduced this sequential batch testing problem and gave a (6.829+ϵ)-approximation. Segev and Shaposhnik (SSRN 3277805, 2018; Operations Research) settled its approximability up to 1+ϵ with a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS).
Timeline:
1960–1975: the single-test problem is solved by a ratio rule (Mitten; Butterworth; Simon–Kadane).
2016: batch testing with a set-up cost; a 6.829+ϵ approximation (Daldal et al.).
2018: a quasi-PTAS and then a PTAS (Segev & Shaposhnik), the results of this mission.
Setting
Let X1,…,Xn be independent Bernoulli variables with Pr[Xi=1]=pi. Testing Xi costs ci>0, and each batch also costs a set-up costβ≥0. A testing scheme is an ordered partition S=(S1,…,ST) of [n]. Batch St is inspected only if every earlier batch found no zero, which happens with probability φ(S,t)=∏τ<t∏i∈Sτpi. The expected cost is
E(S)=t=1∑Tφ(S,t)(β+i∈St∑ci),
and the problem is to minimize E(S) over all testing schemes.
The algorithm first scales the costs by cmin=minici and rounds each ci/cmin up to a power (1+ϵ)r. The variables then fall into cost classesC0,…,CR of equal rounded cost. A state is a vector N=(N0,…,NR) in F=∏r{0,…,∣Cr∣}: it records that the Nr lowest-probability variables of each class Cr have been tested. P0(N) is the product of their pi. An action Δ⪈0 costs C(Δ)=β+∑rΔr(1+ϵ)r, in normalized units. For a set of states G, a G-path runs 0→⋯→N(all)=(∣C0∣,…,∣CR∣) through G with strictly increasing states, and costs ∑tP0(N(t−1))C(N(t)−N(t−1)). OPTG is the least such cost.
Let ψ(N) be the largest class with Nr≥1, and let κ=⌈log1+ϵ(n/ϵ)⌉. A state is nice-looking if every class r≤ψ(N)−κ is exhausted. It is great-looking if, in addition, on each of the κ middle classes ψ(N)−κ<r≤ψ(N) it holds
Nr=min{⌊μr⋅κϵ2⋅P2[(1+ϵ)ρ]/(1+ϵ)r⌋,∣Cr∣}
for some integer 0≤ρ≤R+⌈log1+ϵn⌉ and non-negative integers μr with ∑rμr≤3κ/ϵ2. Here P2[x] rounds x down to a power of 2. Fnice and Fgreat denote these sets.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 6), in algorithm-output form
For 0<ϵ≤1: the dynamic program over Fgreat has an optimal path. The testing scheme Sπ of any optimal path π satisfies, with the original costs,
E(Sπ)≤(1+ϵ)K(ϵ)E(S) for every testing scheme S,K(ϵ)=(1+3ϵ)(1+ϵ)2+2ϵ(1+ϵ)4,
and ∣Fgreat∣≤(n+1)(R+⌈log1+ϵn⌉+1)(κ⌊3κ/ϵ2⌋+κ).
Milestones, in proof order
Rounding: Ec(S)≤Ec^(S)≤(1+ϵ)Ec(S) (§2.1, p. 8).
Greedy-within-class: every scheme is matched by an F-path (pp. 8–10). Path cost equals the expected cost of the path's scheme (eqs. (1), (3)).
Lemmas 1–2 and Theorem 2: OPTFnice≤(1+ϵ)OPTF (pp. 12–14).
Lemmas 3–4, on the bucketing by powers of 1+ϵ in probability (p. 18).
Lemma 5 and Properties A–C, on the great-looking construction (pp. 19–24).
Theorem 3: OPTF≤OPTFgreat≤K(ϵ)OPTF (p. 17).
The explicit count of ∣Fgreat∣ (pp. 16–17).
Significance
The PTAS shows that batch testing of series systems can be approximated to within any factor 1+ϵ in polynomial time for fixed ϵ, improving the earlier constant factor 6.829+ϵ. Its ingredients are general tools of approximate dynamic programming: a structural ordering that turns schemes into count vectors, a collapse of the state space by exhausting cheap classes, and a rounding of the middle classes onto a coarse power-of-two grid. Local charging arguments control the error of the last two. These tools apply beyond this problem.
The result is proved on paper; nothing in it has a machine-checked proof that we know of. A formalization produces a checked chain from the testing model to the approximation guarantee, including the delicate parts: the rounding interplay in Lemma 5, the double-sum exchange in the proof of Theorem 3, and the case analysis of inequalities (8)–(12). It also makes explicit what the paper leaves as 1+O(ϵ) and O(n). The resulting library of testing schemes, count-vector dynamic programs and restricted state spaces can be reused for other sequential testing models.
Difficulty
Restricting the dynamic program to a small set of states can only make it worse. The work is showing it is not much worse, and the obvious charging fails. Exhausting all cheap classes at once (Theorem 2) costs only a factor 1+ϵ, but it leaves nO(κ) states, which is quasi-polynomial. Rounding the middle classes onto a grid shrinks the state space to polynomial size, but a per-step rounding error is not small compared with that step's own cost. It must be charged to the cost of all earlier steps. That charge is affordable only because the bucketing makes the probabilities of successive steps decrease geometrically (Lemma 4). The grid must also be nested from step to step so that rounding never forces a count to decrease (Lemma 5, which relies on the power-of-two operator P2). Any single per-step argument loses a factor that does not tend to 1.
Formalization scope
All objects are defined from scratch in one file in BatchTesting.PTAS. The model and its conventions:
Instance. An instance is (p,c,β) on Fin n, with standing assumptions n≥1, pi∈[0,1], ci>0 and β≥0. Of these, ci>0 is the paper's own (p. 8); the other three are added. Every statement also assumes 0<ϵ≤1; ϵ≤1 is used in the proofs of Property A and inequality (12).
Normalization. The normalization minici=1 is carried out by the definitions, never assumed. The goal compares expected costs of the original instance.
Testing schemes and paths. Testing schemes are lists of Finsets, and may contain empty batches. Paths are lists of states with strictly increasing steps. Every DP statement is in path form ("for every path there is a path with cost at most …"), not as an infimum over paths.
Classes. Class arithmetic (ψ, κ, the middle range) is in Z, and ψ(0)=−∞ is encoded as −1. Ties within a class are broken by index.
Constructions. The constructions of §3.4, §4.3 and §4.5 are definitions, so Lemmas 1–5 and Properties A–C are about the page's objects. Steps with P0=0 form one extra last bucket. The §4.5 action is integer-valued, so Lemma 5 has content.
The paper's "1+O(ϵ)" is the explicit K(ϵ) of its own chain on pp. 19–20. Its "within factor 1+ϵ" is the factor (1+ϵ)K(ϵ), which reaches 1+ϵ′ after rescaling ϵ. The running time is not formalized: the inputs are real numbers and the exponent is O(1/ϵ3). The explicit bound on ∣Fgreat∣ stands in for it.
The statement "some testing scheme is within 1+ϵ of optimal" is trivially true, because an optimal scheme exists. The goal therefore concerns the scheme read off an optimal path over Fgreat, and it carries the state count.
A complete development needs finite products over nested Finsets, an exchange argument for the greedy order, and list manipulations of paths (removing zero actions, subsequences). The counting milestone needs a stars-and-bars bound. The testing-scheme and path layer can be reused for other sequential testing problems. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative arguments with better constants, are welcome.
R. Daldal, I. Gamzu, D. Segev, T. Ünlüyurt, Approximation algorithms for sequential batch-testing of series systems, Naval Research Logistics 63(4):275–286, 2016.
L. Mitten, An analytic solution to the least cost testing sequence problem, Journal of Industrial Engineering 11(1):17, 1960.
R. Butterworth, Some reliability fault-testing models, Operations Research 20(2):335–343, 1972.
H. A. Simon, J. B. Kadane, Optimal problem-solving search: All-or-none solutions, Artificial Intelligence 6(3):235–247, 1975.
Intertemporal Product Management with Strategic Consumers: The Value of Defective Product Returns: Profit Equals the Commitment Profit Above a Defect-Rate Threshold and Can Rise with the Defect RateResearch Paper
Motivation
Consumer electronics firms receive a steady stream of defective product returns (DPRs): units that fail shortly after purchase and are exchanged for a new unit. Many of these returns are repaired and resold as refurbished products at a discount. Refurbishing is usually studied as a cost-recovery or environmental question. Singh, Ramachandran and Subramanian ask a different question: how do defective returns interact with the firm's pricing over time when consumers are strategic, that is, when they anticipate future prices and may wait?
The relevant background is the time-inconsistency problem of a durable-goods monopolist. Coase (1972) argued that a monopolist selling a durable good over time competes with its own future sales; Bulow (1982, 1986) made this precise in a two-period model and showed that a firm that cannot commit to its second-period price earns strictly less than one that can. The paper embeds defective returns in Bulow's two-period model. Returns from the first period become the supply of a cheaper refurbished product in the second, which competes with the firm's own new product in that period. The paper finds that a higher defect rate can then raise the firm's profit.
Setting
A monopolist sells over two periods to a continuum of consumers of total mass one. A consumer's quality valuationθ is uniformly distributed on [0,1]; each consumer buys at most one unit.
The new product has perceived quality vn and marginal cost cn. The refurbished product has quality vr, with 0<vr<vn, and refurbishing cost cr, with 0≤cr<cn.
The defect rateα>0 is the expected number of replacement units per unit sold, so selling q new units costs (1+α)cnq. A refurbished unit has defect rate krα with 0≤kr<1 and costs (1+krα)cr per unit sold. Each return costs the consumer a hassle h≥0.
Firm and consumers discount the second period by ρ∈(0,1).
for buying new in period 1, new in period 2, refurbished in period 2, or nothing. Write μn=vn−(1+α)cn−hα and μr=vr−(1+krα)cr−hkrα.
Without commitment. The firm sets p1; consumers buy in period 1 if U1θ≥max{U2θ,Urθ,0} at the second-period prices they anticipate. After observing first-period sales q1, the firm chooses (p2,pr) to maximize second-period profit subject to the returns constraint (1+krα)qr≤αq1, since refurbished units come only from first-period returns. In a subgame-perfect outcome the anticipated prices are the optimal ones. Π∗(α) is the firm's optimal discounted two-period profit.
With commitment. The firm announces (p1,p2,pr) at the start; each consumer picks the best of the four options, and the firm maximizes subject to the same returns constraint. ΠC(α) is the optimal profit.
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 3
For every parameter vector satisfying the standing assumptions:
(i)ΠC is strictly decreasing on {α>0:ΠC(α)>0};(ii)Π∗(α)≤ΠC(α)(α>0);(ii)(a)Π∗(α)=ΠC(α)for α≥αc=cn+hvn−cn.
At the parameters of the paper's Figure 3 (cn=0.7, cr=0.1, vn=1, ρ=0.9, kr=0.25, h=0.05):
(ii)(b)∃v^r<1∀vr∈(v^r,1):α↦Π∗(α)is neither nondecreasing nor nonincreasing on (0,∞).
Milestones
In attack order:
Proposition 1, the second-period product strategy (None, New Only, Refurbished Only, Product Line) with explicit thresholds αˉ, q1, qˉ1.
Lemma 2, which excludes two candidate equilibrium strategies.
Proposition 7, the commitment benchmark: no new units in period 2, and refurbishing none, some or all returns according to αˉ and an explicit vˉr.
The three general parts (i), (ii), (ii)(a) of Proposition 3.
Significance
The result. Under commitment, defects only add friction: replacement production, refurbishing cost and hassle all lower profit, so ΠC falls with α. Without commitment, the firm's temptation to sell new units again in period 2 is what lowers its profit, as in Bulow's model. Refurbished returns compete with that second-period new product, and above αc the firm stops offering it. The defect rate then acts as a commitment device, and on part of the parameter space profit increases with α. Without the commitment benchmark, this effect could not be separated from the direct cost of defects.
Formalizing it. Proposition 3 is proved on paper through closed forms for each candidate strategy (Tables 2, 4 and 8 of the paper) and signs of derivatives. No part of it has a machine-checked proof. The mission adds a two-period durable-goods monopoly with strategic consumers to the platform, with both its subgame-perfect and its commitment profit defined from the consumers' purchase rules. Part (ii)(b) appears here in a corrected form: as printed it is vacuous (see Formalization scope), and the mission states a non-vacuous version at the paper's own numerical parameters.
Difficulty
Π∗ is defined through an equilibrium, not a formula. Evaluating it requires three steps:
the second-period optimum for every q1, which is a strictly concave quadratic program over a polygon whose active constraints change with q1 and α (Proposition 1);
consumers' rational anticipation of those prices in the first period;
a one-dimensional maximization over q1 of a piecewise-quadratic profit.
The obvious route to part (ii)(b) is to differentiate a closed form in α. It fails at the step that matters: the increase happens at the boundary between strategies NNRA and N∅RA, where the equilibrium strategy switches. There the profit is not given by a single formula, and the sign must be controlled uniformly in vr near vn. Part (i) needs the commitment optimum, its regime boundaries (αˉ, vˉr), and a strictly negative derivative inside each regime, glued across regime changes.
Formalization scope
The Lean development lives in the namespace RefurbCommit.DefectProfit. All quantities are real.
Demands are Lebesgue measures of buyer sets defined by the purchase rules, not the closed forms (4.2), (4.4), (B.19). The closed forms omit the clipping of θ to [0,1]. A consumer indifferent between two options counts in both buyer sets; the overlaps have measure zero.
Second period. The remaining types are [0,1−q1]. Prices are optimal if they satisfy the returns constraint and maximize Π2 among all prices that satisfy it.
Π∗ is the supremum of (4.5) over subgame-perfect outcomes (p1,q1,p2,pr). In such an outcome, q1 is the first-period demand at p1 under the anticipation (p2,pr), and (p2,pr) is optimal given q1. ΠC is the supremum of (B.20) over feasible committed prices. Both suprema are taken in R; the commitment set always contains 0.
Added hypotheses, each disclosed in the item concerned:
vr>0;
vr(cn+h)−vn(cr+h)kr>0 wherever αˉ is used;
in Proposition 1, μr>0 for the ordering q1<qˉ1, and q1>0 in the two cases that sell refurbished units;
Π∗>0 or ΠC>0 where the paper's positive-profit restriction is used.
The paper's bound h<hˉ (p. 8) is not imposed.
Part (ii)(b) is pinned to the Figure 3 parameters, and v^r<vn is required. As printed, "there exists v^r such that Π∗ is non-monotonic when v^r<vr<vn" holds vacuously with v^r=vn. A formalization that lets v^r=vn, lets v^r depend on vr, reads "non-monotonic" as "not nonincreasing" only, or defines Π∗ or ΠC by the paper's closed-form tables is trivial and does not capture the result.
A complete development needs the following:
the second-period quadratic program;
a measure-theoretic computation of interval buyer sets;
the rational-expectations reduction of the first period to a choice of q1;
continuity of the equilibrium profit in α.
The buyer-set and second-period lemmas apply to other two-period vertical-differentiation models. Contributions of any of these lemmas, of exact profit formulas proved from the definitions, and of the closed-form strategy tables as theorems are welcome.
Selected references
N. Singh, K. Ramachandran, R. Subramanian, Intertemporal product management with strategic consumers: the value of defective product returns, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2021. Accepted manuscript (Dec. 2020): https://ssrn.com/abstract=2511424; journal version https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0972
Online Capacity Scaling Augmented With Unreliable Machine Learning Predictions: Adaptive Balanced Capacity Scaling Is min((1+(√(2ωβ)+θ)η)·OCR, PCR)-Competitive with η-Accurate PredictionsResearch Paper
Why capacity scaling with predictions matters
A data center can save energy by running fewer servers when demand is low, but restarting servers costs energy and queued work delays users. A controller must choose capacity while demand arrives, with limited knowledge of future traffic. Forecasts can help, yet an inaccurate forecast can make a controller perform worse than one that ignores it. Rutten and Mukherjee study this tension in a continuous-time fluid model and give a controller whose cost improves with prediction quality while retaining a bound for arbitrary predictions (arXiv:2101.12160v2, §§2–4).
The paper’s Adaptive Balanced Capacity Scaling controller, or ABCS, joins an online controller to Adapt to the Prediction, or AP. AP starts with an offline capacity plan for predicted arrivals and reacts to arrivals missed by the forecast. ABCS uses AP as advice while changing its own response rates according to the current queue and capacity. Theorem 4.11 gives an explicit bound for both accurate and inaccurate forecasts (Rutten–Mukherjee, p. 16).
The fluid model
Time ranges over a known finite interval [0,T], with T>0. An arrival rateλ(t)≥0 brings divisible work into a queue. A server schedulem(t)≥0 supplies processing capacity, with m(0)=0. The workloadq(t) is the work waiting at time t. It increases when arrivals exceed service and decreases under spare service only while work is waiting. The defining equation is
q(t)=∫0t(λ(s)−m(s))1{q(s)>0 or λ(s)≥m(s)}ds.
The objective combines three costs. With waiting weight ω>0, activation price β>0, and operating rate θ≥0, the costCostλ(m,t) is ω∫0tq, plus β times the limiting sum of positive capacity increases, plus θ∫0tm. The offline optimumOpt is the infimum of total cost over feasible schedules for the actual arrivals. The infimum is attained according to Proposition 2.2 (pp. 7–8, equations (2.1)–(2.3)).
A prediction λ~ covers the same horizon. Its mean absolute error is ∥λ~−λ∥MAE=T−1∫0T∣λ~−λ∣. It is η-accurate when η>0 and ∫0T∣λ~−λ∣≤ηOpt. An algorithm has competitive ratio at most C if its cost is at most COpt for every instance and applicable prediction. These are Definitions 3.1–3.3 (pp. 10–11).
AP adds to an offline optimum for λ~ an online response to positive underprediction Δλ=(λ−λ~)+. ABCS receives AP’s server schedule m~ and the workload q~ that schedule would produce under actual arrivals. It chooses its own schedule m by an integrated form of the differential rule m′=(r^1ωq−r^2θm)/β. The coefficients switch between r1,R1 and r2,R2 by comparing (m,q) with (m~,q~), as specified in Algorithm 3 (pp. 13–15).
Formalization targets
Theorem 4.11: an adaptive competitive bound
For every η-accurate prediction, the goal is
Costλ(m,T)≤min{[1+(2ωβ+θ)η]OCR,PCR}Opt.
The constants OCR and PCR are exactly the rate-dependent formulas in equation (4.14), with c1 through c6 defined there. The first term approaches OCR as prediction error shrinks; the second is a uniform bound over predictions. The goal quantifies over every admissible instance, forecast, AP advice, and ABCS trajectory. It is the pointwise cost form of the paper’s competitive-ratio statement, Definition 3.3 (p. 16, Theorem 4.11).
Results leading to the goal
The milestone list includes the offline minimizer, the pessimistic bound Cost(ABCS)≤PCROpt, the advice comparison Cost(ABCS)≤OCRCost(AP), and AP’s additive prediction-error bound. It also records equations (A.32), (A.34), and (A.30), which express the cost decomposition and online-correction estimate used for AP (pp. 8, 14, 22–23, 35).
What the result gives
The theorem puts the quality of a forecast into the same cost units as waiting, server activation, and operation. A good forecast yields the OCR term; a poor one cannot push the bound above PCR. The constants expose how the four ABCS response rates trade closeness to advice against protection from bad advice. In the zero-confidence setting R1=r1, R2=r2 the paper reports both ratios equal to five; for instance R1=r1=2, R2=r2=1 gives OCR=PCR=5 from (4.14) (p. 16, Remark 4.14).
The paper proves the mathematical result. The present formalization supplies precise Lean statements for the model, controller rules, intermediate claims, and final bound; their proofs remain to be machine checked. A complete proof would also make the reflection workload, limiting switching cost, and potential-function inequalities reusable in continuous-time online optimization.
Where the proof is difficult
The comparison bounds require potential functions whose derivatives balance queueing cost, capacity increases, and power cost across several switching cases. The case analysis in Appendices A.9–A.10 depends on regularity of the trajectories and of the advice. Simply integrating a differential inequality is insufficient until absolute continuity and the behavior at switching times are established. The existence of an ABCS trajectory for general arrival processes is not proved in the paper, so it is a separate analytical issue (pp. 37–45).
The offline existence result has a different obstacle: the capacity activation term is a limsup of positive mesh increments and does not vary continuously with the schedule in an elementary function norm. The paper uses a selection argument. The AP estimate also needs the one-sided queue reflection to behave appropriately when predicted arrivals and underprediction are separated (pp. 29–30, 34–36).
Formalization scope
Lean represents time and rates by real numbers and costs and the offline infimum by extended nonnegative reals R≥0∪{∞}. The workload is an implicit integral-equation predicate. Offline optimization ranges over feasible schedule–workload pairs. AP and ABCS are trajectory predicates, with the latter expressing the integrated differential equation; the statements concern every trajectory satisfying it. They do not assert general existence. The zero-arrival instance has explicit AP and ABCS trajectories in a separate sanity check.
The source assumes nonnegative arrivals and predictions, T>0, ω,β>0, θ≥0, and Ri≥ri≥0. Lean additionally requires integrability of arrival rates and relevant integrands. It uses r1,r2>0 because real division by zero would turn the paper’s infinite constants into finite Lean values. The AP correction starts at zero, as required by the server schedule’s initial value. The mesh activation sum clips its last interval at t so that cost through t depends only on m through t. These choices are recorded with the item statements.
The cost keeps q explicit because ABCS reads queue values. The accuracy condition uses extended nonnegative arithmetic and expresses ∥λ~−λ∥MAE≤ηOpt/T without dividing by a possibly infinite optimum. The formalization rules out zero-denominator constants, default values from nonintegrable Bochner integrals, dependence on schedules after the horizon, and a vacuous zero-instance controller. Contributions on workload reflection, switching-cost limits, offline attainment, controller existence, and the stated milestones are welcome.
Selected references
Debankur Mukherjee and Daniel Rutten, Online Capacity Scaling Augmented With Unreliable Machine Learning Predictions, arXiv:2101.12160v2, 2022; published as A New Approach to Capacity Scaling Augmented with Unreliable Machine Learning Predictions, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024. arXiv
Optimal Auction Duration: A Price Formation Viewpoint: Semi-Explicit Formula for the Expected Squared Clearing-Price Error E(h) as a Function of the Auction DurationResearch Paper
Motivation
Most equity markets trade through a continuous limit order book (CLOB): any market order is matched immediately against the resting limit orders. Budish, Cramton and Shim (QJE 2015) argued that continuous matching creates mechanical arbitrage and a race in speed between high-frequency market makers, and proposed frequent batch auctions instead, with a lower bound of about 100 milliseconds on the auction period. Earlier work, notably Madhavan (J. Finance 1992), compared auctions and continuous markets through the quality of price formation. What neither line of work gives is a quantitative answer to the question an exchange designing a periodic auction has to settle: how long should an auction last? A longer auction gathers more liquidity before the price is fixed, but the information on which that liquidity was posted grows stale.
Jusselin, Mastrolia and Rosenbaum (arXiv:1906.01713, published in Operations Research, 2021, doi:10.1287/opre.2021.2113) model a market organized in sequential call auctions triggered by market orders, measure the quality of price formation by the mean squared distance between the clearing price and the efficient price, and give this error in semi-explicit form as a function of the auction duration h (their Theorem 2.1). Minimizing the formula on Euronext data gives optimal durations of a few minutes. This mission formalizes that formula and the lemmas of its proof.
Setting
Fix constants ν>0, μ>0, σf>0, σ≥0, K>0, P0∈R and an auction duration h≥0. On a probability space (Ω,F,P):
the efficient price is Pt=P0+σfWt, with W a standard Brownian motion;
market makers arrive at the epochs τ1mm<τ2mm<⋯ of a Poisson process Nmm of intensity μ;
the auction opens at the first market order, at a time τ1op∼Exp(ν), and clears at τ1cl=τ1op+h;
the k-th market maker posts the linear supply Sk(p)=K(p−P~k) around its viewP~k=Pτkmm+gk, where the estimation noisesgk are i.i.d., centred, with variance σ2;
the market takers' imbalance at the clearing is a square-integrable random variable Iτ1cl;
W, Nmm, τ1op, (gk) and Iτ1cl are mutually independent.
With N=Nτ1clmm market makers present, the clearing price solves ∑k=1NSk(p)=Iτ1cl, and the mid-price ignores the market orders:
together with the integrability of both squared errors.
Milestones (Appendix A, pp. 20–22)
(9): P(Nτ1clmm>0)=1−e−μhν/(ν+μ).
Lemma A.2 (11): for Nt∼Poisson(mt), E[1Nt>0/Nt]=e−mt∫0mtses−1ds and the analogous double integral for E[1Nt>0/Nt2].
Lemma A.2 (12): closed forms of E[(1+Nt)−2] and E[(2+Nt)−2], for mt>0.
Lemma A.1 (10): g(t)=σf22t2μE[(Ntmm+1)−2]+σf23t3μ2E[(Ntmm+2)−2], where g(t) is the expected squared average price move between the market makers' arrivals and a deterministic time t.
(8): E(h)=P(Ω~)−1eνh∫h+∞νe−νt(g(t)+σ2f(t)+ℓ(t)/K2)dt, with f(t)=E[1Ntmm>0/Ntmm] and ℓ(t)=E[Iτ1cl2]E[1Ntmm>0/(Ntmm)2].
Significance
The result. Theorem 2.1 turns the design question into a one-dimensional minimization: every quantity in the formula is a model parameter that can be estimated from order-book data (ν, μ, σf, σ, K, E[I2]). It shows that E(h)>Emid(h) for h>0, quantifies the cost of market orders through E[I2]/K2, and contains the continuous order book as the case h=0, so that the auction and the CLOB can be compared in one metric. The paper's Lemma 2.1 identifies E(h) with the almost-sure long-run average squared error over the sequence of auctions, and Section 3 feeds the formula with the imbalance produced by strategic market takers.
Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper; no part of it is machine-checked. The mission produces a formal model of a call auction with Poisson liquidity and a Brownian efficient price, a checked derivation of the error formula, and, as separable by-products, closed forms for inverse moments of a Poisson variable (Lemma A.2) and a Palm-type computation for Brownian increments sampled at Poisson points (Lemma A.1). The proof in Appendix A is a short sketch: the passage from the random clearing time to deterministic times in (8), the vanishing of cross terms, and the Palm formula step of Lemma A.1 are asserted rather than carried out.
Difficulty
The obvious argument conditions on everything and expands the square. The random clearing time is the obstacle: the number of market makers, their arrival epochs and the Brownian value at the clearing all depend on τ1op, and the conditioning on Ω~ couples the Poisson process with the opening time, so neither can be treated as having its unconditional law. Turning (8) into a rigorous statement needs a disintegration over τ1op and measurability of Brownian motion evaluated at random times. Lemma A.1 needs the conditional uniformity of Poisson arrival epochs given their number (or the Mecke–Palm formula) combined with independence from W; neither is available off the shelf. The Lemma A.2 identities are series manipulations, but they require exchanging sums and integrals of (es−1)/s near s=0.
Formalization scope
AuctionDuration.ClearingError.Model defines Params (with Standing: ν,μ,σf,K>0, σ≥0), the random objects Auction (W, interarrival times A, opening time T, noises g, imbalance J), the hypothesis bundle IsModel, and Nmm, tauCl, Peff, view, Pmid, Pcl, OmegaT, E, Emid, gFun, fFun, ellFun. Market-maker arrivals use the published definition QueueingFundamentals.Foundations.ArrivalProcess (IsExpInterarrivals, arrivalTime, countingProcess); the Brownian motion is Mathlib's IsBrownianReal.
Conventions the formalization commits to:
One auction, the first one; the regenerative multi-auction structure is not modelled.
Appendix A's reading of Assumption 2: the Poisson process and the Exp(ν) opening time are independent and are conditioned jointly on Ω~. Assumption 2 read literally (opening time unconditioned) gives a different value, under which Theorem 2.1 does not hold.
Added hypotheses, disclosed in every item: E[gk]=0; independence of Iτ1cl from the other families; every Brownian path continuous (a version choice); mt>0 in (12).
Lean's g k and arrivalTime A (k+1) are the paper's gk+1 and τk+1mm. W is indexed by R≥0 and evaluated at t.toNNReal.
1/0=0 in Lean; E, Emid are integrals under P[|OmegaT X h], and f, ℓ, g carry the indicator 1Nt>0 as on the page. Inner integrands (es−1)/s are 0 at s=0, a null set.
Lemma A.2 is stated for a Poisson random variable, the time-t marginal of the paper's inhomogeneous process; only that law enters.
E, Emid, g, f and ℓ are expectations over the model, not their closed forms: defining any of them by the formulas of Theorem 2.1 or Lemmas A.1–A.2 would make the goal or a milestone true by definition, and is ruled out. Integrability conjuncts in the goal, (8) and Lemma A.1 prevent a junk Bochner value from satisfying an identity.
Useful published facts: QueueingFundamentals.Foundations.poisson_count_cdf (Proved) gives the Poisson law of countingProcess for exponential interarrival times, which reduces Lemmas A.1–A.2 at fixed t to Poisson-distribution computations. Contributions of general value are welcome: conditional uniformity of Poisson epochs, a Mecke formula for the published arrival process, measurability of Brownian motion at random times, and inverse-moment identities for the Poisson law.
E. Budish, P. Cramton, J. Shim, The high-frequency trading arms race: frequent batch auctions as a market design response, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 130(4), 1547–1621, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv027
J.-F. Coeurjolly, J. Møller, R. Waagepetersen, A tutorial on Palm distributions for spatial point processes, International Statistical Review 85(3), 404–420, 2017 (the Palm formula used for Lemma A.1). https://doi.org/10.1111/insr.12205
A Sparse Version of Reznick’s Positivstellensatz: Under the Running Intersection Property, a Sparse Positive Definite Form Is a Sum of Sparse SOS Fractions with Uniform DenominatorsResearch Paper
Motivation
A polynomial that is positive away from the origin can be certified by writing it as a sum of squares after multiplication by a suitable power of the squared Euclidean norm. This is the uniform denominator theorem of Reznick (1995). In polynomial optimization, the size of a sum of squares certificate is governed by the number of variables in each square. A dense certificate can therefore lose the computational advantage of a polynomial whose terms involve only small groups of variables. Mai, Magron and Lasserre establish a version of Reznick’s result in which every numerator retains its own variable block. The question addressed here is the exact algebraic statement of that certificate, including its denominators and degree bounds.
Setting
A form of degree 2d is a homogeneous polynomial f in real variables x1,…,xn; it is positive definite when f(x)>0 for every x=0. The variables are covered by nonempty blocks I1,…,Ip, with p≥2. Write x(Il) for the coordinates in block Il and ∥x(T)∥22=∑i∈Txi2 for any coordinate set T. A sparse form has a decomposition f=∑lfl, where each fl is a degree-2d form in x(Il). Individual fl need not be positive.
The running intersection property assigns every block l>1 an earlier parent sl<l. Its overlap with preceding blocks, Il=Il∩⋃j<lIj, must be contained in Isl. This condition lets the certificate keep each numerator in one block. The paper defines a polynomial Φl by multiplying squared norms of Il (except at the first block) and of later overlaps whose parent is l. It then sets Hl=∥x(Il)∥22Φl. The set Σ[x(Il)]t consists of finite sums of squares of polynomials in the variables x(Il) with total degree at most 2t.
A second class of objects appears in the supporting results. A continuous rational form is a continuous, homogeneous function represented by a quotient of polynomials wherever the denominator is nonzero. It is positive definite on a block when it is positive wherever the coordinates of that block are not all zero. This block condition is weaker than positivity at every nonzero point of the full ambient space, since the form ignores coordinates outside its block.
Formalization targets
Sparse positive definite forms
The goal is Corollary 2.1 of the pinned preprint. For a positive definite form f=∑l=1pfl of degree 2d, with d>0 and each fl supported on Il, it asserts the existence of a single k∈N and blockwise sums of squares σl such that
f=l=1∑pHlkσl,σl∈Σ[x(Il)]d+k(1+deg(Φl)/2).
This is an identity of rational functions, evaluated where its denominators are nonzero. The degree index is part of the target: leaving it free would discard the quantitative certificate. In the formal statement, every overlap Il with l>1 is assumed nonempty so that the printed Hl is a nonzero polynomial.
Rational-form generalization
Theorem 2.1 is the last milestone. It begins with a positive definite rational form f=∑lpl/∥x(Il)∥22kl, in which pl is homogeneous of degree 2(d+kl), and yields the same blockwise degree bound with a common exponent k. The polynomial goal follows by taking every kl=0. Earlier milestones state the paper’s continuity, approximation, block-splitting, and uniform denominator results.
Significance
The result supplies a certificate whose numerator for block Il uses only variables in that block. That is the structural property needed when a polynomial optimization problem is represented by smaller semidefinite constraints instead of one dense constraint. The running intersection hypothesis is explicit, so the theorem also records when that sparsity claim applies. The common exponent and exact bound on each numerator make the certificate suitable for a hierarchy indexed by degree, as described in the source paper.
The 2020 preprint proves these mathematical results; this mission asks for machine-checked proofs of the statements in Lean. The definitions of sparse sums of squares, rational forms on blocks, and running intersection data are reusable in other polynomial optimization formalizations. No proof of the target is claimed by the draft statements themselves.
Difficulty
A dense Reznick certificate does not identify numerators in individual blocks. Even if the sum f is positive definite, a summand fl can be negative, so a separate application of a positivity theorem to each fl cannot establish the target. The supporting statements must express how positivity is recovered on each block while preserving both the rational representation and variable support. The denominator factors also overlap: their degree contribution depends on the parent map sl, so the final bound must track each factor rather than only a global degree.
Formalization scope
Lean uses MvPolynomial (Fin n) ℝ, with blocks as finite sets of coordinate indices and a zero-based Fin p block index. The paper’s first block is index zero in Lean. The standing condition n>0 from page 3 is explicit in supporting lemmas that do not assume the running intersection property; that property already implies it for the other results. Its squared Euclidean norm is the polynomial ∑i∈TXi2; the function norm on Fin n → ℝ is not used for this purpose. A sparse sum of squares is represented explicitly as a finite sum of squares whose bases lie in Mathlib’s supported subalgebra. The paper’s deg(Φl) is encoded by its combinatorial formula, which is even under the nonempty-overlap assumption. Lemma 3.3 requires the approximating polynomials to have exact total degree 2k, as printed.
The printed formulas divide by Φl, although the stated running intersection property allows an empty overlap and then makes that polynomial zero. The goal and Theorem 2.1 add nonempty overlaps for later blocks; Lemma 3.6 similarly requires every denominator block to be nonempty. Lemma 3.5 adds d>0, used by its cited continuity result. These are disclosed restrictions to the printed statements, rather than conclusions hidden in definitions. Rational identities are pointwise on the set where every displayed denominator is nonzero; at a zero denominator, Lean’s total division returns zero. The quotient q/∥x(T)∥22k in the continuity lemma takes that zero value at the origin.
The supporting statements retain the restriction that every σl is a sum of squares in x(Il), the fixed degree bound, and positivity on each block’s own nonzero inputs. The nonempty-overlap conditions ensure the rational identity has points where all denominators are nonzero. Work on the algebraic preordering and real spectrum, homogeneous polynomial approximation, continuous rational forms, and degree control is within scope. The paper’s other main result, its sparse Putinar–Vasilescu certificate, is a separate target and is not stated here.
Selected references
N. H. A. Mai, V. Magron and J.-B. Lasserre, A Sparse Version of Reznick’s Positivstellensatz, arXiv:2002.05101v2, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.05101
B. Reznick, Uniform denominators in Hilbert’s seventeenth problem, Mathematische Zeitschrift 220, 1995, 75–97. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02572604
M. Schweighofer, Iterated rings of bounded elements and generalizations of Schmüdgen’s Positivstellensatz, Journal für die reine und angewandte Mathematik 554, 2003, 19–45. https://doi.org/10.1515/crll.2003.004
Geometrical Bounds for Variance and Recentered Moments: Among Measures with Support Diameter at Most d, Equal Mass on the Vertices of a Regular n-Simplex Maximizes Every Recentered MomentResearch Paper
Why support geometry matters
A probability distribution can spread its mass while remaining inside a set of limited diameter. A bound on the diameter alone does not specify its center, shape, or number of support points. Lim and McCann ask how large a recentered moment can become under this sparse geometric information. Their answer identifies a regular simplex as the extremal configuration: in dimension two it is an equilateral triangle, and in dimension three a regular tetrahedron. This gives an exact higher-dimensional analogue of the familiar one-dimensional observation that a distribution on an interval maximizes variance by placing equal mass at the endpoints. The paper frames the question in connection with systems of particles or organisms that prefer separation from one another, where a diameter constraint limits how far their spatial distribution can spread (Lim and McCann, 2020, pp. 5–7).
The mission follows the first arXiv version of the paper. The theorem is already proved in the source. The formalization task is to express its sharp bound and its equality case precisely in Lean, together with the geometric statements that distinguish the simplex from other diameter-constrained supports.
The objects being compared
Work in Euclidean space En=Rn with its ordinary distance. For a Borel probability measure μ, its supportsptμ is the smallest closed set carrying all its mass. The diameter of the support is the supremum of the distances between its points. A bounded diameter places no restriction on where the support sits in space: translating the distribution leaves the diameter unchanged.
For a nonnegative convex function V:En→[0,∞), the generalized variance allows the center to move:
VarV(μ)=z∈Eninf∫EnV(x−z)dμ(x).
The center minimizing this integral can depend on V and need not be the ordinary barycenter. For V(x)=∥x∥2 it is the barycenter and the expression is classical variance. This mission focuses on radial functions V(x)=v(∥x∥), where v is convex and increasing on nonnegative radii. The paper's definition and the relation to classical variance appear in equation (1.8) and Remark 1.6 (pp. 4–5).
A regular n-simplex in En has n+1 vertices, and every pair of distinct vertices has the same positive distance d. Its uniform vertex measure assigns mass 1/(n+1) to each vertex. Write
rn=2n+2n.
This is the distance from the centroid to each vertex when the simplex has side length one. The paper defines regular and unit simplices in Definition 1.8 and identifies this radius in Proposition 3.1 (pp. 6, 13).
Formalization targets
Sharp diameter bound
For a Borel probability measure μ with diam(sptμ)≤d, the target is
Varv∘∥⋅∥(μ)≤v(rnd).
Here d≥0, so the argument rnd belongs to the domain on which v is specified. The bound fixes the optimal constant in every dimension and for each eligible radial cost (Theorem 1.10, pp. 6–7).
Equality and its geometric milestones
When d>0 and v is differentiable at rnd, equality is characterized by a regular n-simplex with side length d:
The source's proof uses a maximization principle for generalized variance (Theorem 1.7), a constraint placing a minimizing center inside the support's closed convex hull, the two parts of Proposition 3.1 on spherical sets, and the uniqueness of barycentric weights in Remark 3.2. Those statements are the five milestones. Their order follows the progression from the measure problem to the limiting geometry and finally to equal mass (pp. 5, 13, 15).
What the result gives
The bound controls every convex radial recentered moment allowed by the hypotheses using only the diameter and dimension. Its equality clause identifies the entire extremal distribution, rather than merely the value of the maximum. For squared distance, this recovers a sharp variance statement; for powers of the distance, it supplies corresponding recentered moment bounds (Example 1.11, p. 7). The geometric threshold rn also links the paper's result to Jung's enclosing-ball theorem, which the authors discuss separately (Theorem 1.12 and §3.1, pp. 7, 15–16).
A complete Lean proof would connect measure-theoretic optimization to finite-dimensional convex geometry. It would provide reusable formal statements for generalized variance, support-constrained probability measures, simplex geometry, and the equality mechanism. The source paper proves these results mathematically. In this mission, the Lean statements are drafted and compile with proof placeholders; they do not yet have machine-checked proofs.
Where the difficulty lies
The diameter restriction is imposed on the support, which need not be convex. Replacing it by a restriction on a convex set loses the particular geometry that makes the simplex extremal. The minimizing center is also part of the optimization: evaluating the integral at the barycenter would change the object for a general radial cost. In the equality case, knowing only that the support lies on a sphere is insufficient. The radius must reach exactly rn, the spherical support must be precisely the n+1 simplex vertices, and the mass at those vertices must be equal. Proposition 3.1 and Remark 3.2 isolate these separate assertions (pp. 13–15).
Formalization scope
Lean represents En as EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n), with the Euclidean norm and Borel measurable space. The support diameter in the goal is the extended metric diameter, which correctly excludes unbounded supports from a finite bound. The paper's conv(K) is its smallest closed convex hull, so the statements use closedConvexHull. Probability measures supported on K carry the condition μ(Kc)=0. The generalized variance is the infimum over all centers z∈En; restricting centers to the support hull or replacing the infimum by the integral at the mean would give a different and potentially easier claim.
The function v is modeled on all real numbers because Lean functions are total, but every value used by the mathematical statements is at a nonnegative radius. The hypotheses require nonnegativity, convexity, and strict increase on [0,∞); the latter makes the paper's equality conclusion meaningful. The equality clause additionally assumes differentiability at rnd. Without it, a kinked strictly increasing convex v, with a change of slope at that radius, can have unequal masses attaining the same optimum. The manuscript states the clause without this condition. Theorem 1.7 explicitly assumes K nonempty, and the goal explicitly records d≥0 and d>0 where they are needed. Theorem 1.7's support level set follows the sign proved on p. 12, V(x−z∗)=λ; the printed translated set has the opposite sign.
The definitions and theorem files contain no custom probability or simplex infrastructure beyond these source objects. Contributions proving the optimization principle, the center-in-hull claim, either part of the spherical geometry proposition, or the barycentric uniqueness statement are within scope. Theorem 1.1, the paper's separate convex-envelope result, and the deduction of Jung's theorem are outside this mission.
Selected references
Tongseok Lim and Robert J. McCann, Geometrical bounds for the variance and recentered moments, arXiv:2001.11851v1, 2020; published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022. arXiv version.
Disclosing Delivery Performance Information When Consumers Are Sensitive to Promised Delivery Time, Delivery Reliability, and Price: Full or No Information-Quality Effort Is OptimalResearch Paper
Motivation
Online retailers and service providers quote a promised delivery time and are judged on how often they meet it. Platforms increasingly publish delivery-performance information, such as on-time ratings or conformance scores, so that consumers can weigh a quoted time against the firm's record. Producing accurate information is costly: the firm must track deliveries, audit ratings and present them clearly. Whether a firm should pay for precise information, or let consumers infer its reliability from noisy signals, is a question for operations management (capacity, lead-time quotation) and for marketing (pricing, information disclosure) at once.
Leng, Becerril-Arreola, Parlar and Ferguson (MSOM 2024; the mission follows the authors' preprint of April 2nd, 2023) model a firm that jointly sets a price, a promised delivery time and an effort toward the quality of its conformance information, facing consumers who care about all three. Their central analytical result, Theorem 1, says the firm should never invest partially: the optimal effort is either none or full.
The model joins two lines of work. The first is joint price and delivery-time decisions with congestion, as in So (2000), Liu, Parlar and Zhu (2007) and Boyaci and Ray (2006), where delivery reliability enters demand. The second is logit demand from discrete-choice theory (Anderson, de Palma and Thisse 1992), where the scale parameter measures how dispersed consumers' valuations are.
Setting
A firm serves consumers at service rateμ. It sets a pricep, a promised delivery timet, and an information-quality effortϕ∈[0,1]. The market has size Λ. Each consumer compares the firm with an outside option of deterministic utility Ve.
If consumers arrive at rate l, the firm operates as an M/M/1 queue, and an order is delivered within the promised time with probability
q=1−e−(μ−l)t(eq. (1)).
The deterministic utility of buying is
V=α−p+βrρq−βtt(eq. (4)),
where α is the base value, βr and βt are the sensitivities to the conformance score and to the promised time, and ρ scales the score. Effort narrows the dispersion of consumers' inferences: the utility shock has scale
ωθ(ϕ)=βr2(1−ϕ2)+ωY2(eq. (6)),
decreasing from βr2+ωY2 at ϕ=0 to ωY at ϕ=1.
The demand rateλ(p,t,ϕ) is the logit share times the market size (eqs. (8)–(9)):
λ=1+exp[−(V−Ve)/ωθ]Λ.
Since V depends on λ through q, this is a fixed-point equation in λ. The firm earns
Π(p,t,ϕ)=λ(p,t,ϕ)(p−bϕ−c)(eq. (11)),
with unit cost c and unit effort cost b. A plan (p,t) is feasible when p≥c, t≥0 and (μ−λ)t≥1. The optimal profitΠ∗(ϕ) is the supremum of Π over feasible plans, λ∗(ϕ) and V∗(ϕ) are the demand and utility at the optimal plan, and the gap
h(ϕ)=βr2ϕbωθ−ωθV∗(ϕ)−Ve
measures by how much Lemma 2's condition (19) holds. With Sˉ(ϕ) the largest attainable market share (eq. (10)), the capacity condition (16) is μ≥SˉΛ+(βt/(βrρ))e.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 15)
Let V1=V∗(1). If
βr2bωY2≥V1−Ve(23),
then Π∗ is strictly decreasing on [0,1] and ϕ∗=0 is the unique optimum. Otherwise Π∗ strictly decreases and then strictly increases, with the turn at some ϕ0∈(0,1). In both cases
Π∗(ϕ)<max{Π∗(0),Π∗(1)}for all ϕ∈(0,1).
Milestones
Eq. (10): λ(p,t,ϕ)≤Sˉ(ϕ)Λ.
Lemma 1, item 2: the optimal plan exists, is unique, and solves the first-order equations (13)–(14).
Lemma 2, item 1 (profit part): if (19) holds at ϕ, then Π∗ has non-positive derivative there.
Lemma 2, item 2 (demand and profit parts): if (19) fails at ϕ, then λ∗ and Π∗ have positive derivatives there.
h(ϕ)→+∞ as ϕ→0+ (p. OA-7).
Eq. (35): h′(ϕ0)<0 wherever h(ϕ0)<0 (p. OA-8).
Single crossing: h(ϕ0)<0 implies h<0 on [ϕ0,1) (pp. OA-8 – OA-9).
h(1−)=bωY/βr2−(V1−Ve)/ωY, so (23) holds exactly when h(1−)≥0 (p. OA-9).
Three supporting items have no counterpart in the paper. They state that the demand fixed point is well posed, that Π∗ is continuous on [0,1], and the envelope identity dΠ∗/dϕ=−(λ∗βr2ϕ/ωθ)h(ϕ).
Significance
Theorem 1 is a bang-bang result. A firm choosing how much to spend on delivery-performance information should consider only two options, no effort and full effort, and condition (23) gives a closed-form test for when no effort is optimal. The paper's sensitivity results (Corollaries 1–4) and its numerical study are all built on this reduction, since they compare the two endpoint regimes using the closed forms in Table 1.
The result has an analytical proof in the paper's online appendix, but no machine-checked proof. The formalization adds a precise statement of the model's well-posedness: the demand is a fixed point, and the optimal plan exists and is unique. It also makes the comparative statics explicit. Parts of Lemma 2 as printed are false, namely the directions of t∗ and λ∗ in item 1 and of p∗ and V in item 2, and the mission states only the parts that hold. A complete development would certify which of the paper's conclusions survive and by which argument.
Difficulty
The optimal profit Π∗(ϕ) is the value of a two-dimensional optimization whose objective is defined through an implicit equation, since demand appears on both sides of the logit formula. Differentiating Π∗ in ϕ requires an envelope argument over a constrained problem. That in turn requires knowing that the optimum is interior, unique and a smooth function of ϕ, and that the queue constraint (μ−λ)t≥1 does not bind.
The single-crossing step is the delicate one. The paper reaches it through a derivative of λ∗ with respect to ωθ (eqs. (30)–(34)) whose sign claims are partly wrong. The tempting shortcut, to read the sign of Π∗′ off the sign of λ∗′, is unsound: when (19) holds, λ∗ can rise while Π∗ falls.
Formalization scope
Everything is real-valued and lives in the namespace DeliveryDisclosure.InfoEffort. A structure Params holds Λ,α,βr,βt,ρ,Ve,ωY,μ,c,b, and the predicate Standing bundles the standing assumptions. The paper writes βr,βt≥0 but divides by them, so Standing requires Λ,βr,βt,ρ,ωY,b>0, together with c≥0 and condition (16) for every ϕ∈[0,1].
The logit demand (8)–(9) with scale (6) is the primitive. The paper derives it from a Gumbel-plus-C(ϕ) decomposition of the utility shock that holds only when ωY=ϕβr. Every result from (8) on uses only the logit formula, so neither Claim 1 nor the C(ϕ) distribution is formalized.
Demand is the supremum of the l∈[0,Λ] below the logit right-hand side, which is the unique fixed point for t≥0. The function Real.sigmoid gives the logit share.
The shortest delivery time is t=0, so Vˉ=α−c+βrρ.
Effort ranges over the closed interval [0,1]. The paper's 0+ and 1− are its endpoints, and V1 is V at the ϕ=1 optimum.
Π∗ is the supremum over all feasible plans, not a closed form or a solution of (13)–(14).
h divides by ϕ, so it is used only on (0,1].
Π∗ is defined as a supremum over all feasible plans and h uses V at the optimum, which rules out a trivializing formalization: Π∗ cannot be replaced by Table 1's closed forms, by profit at a fixed plan, or by a demand with the conformance frozen. Lemma 1's corner case (item 1), Claim 1, Remarks 1–5, Table 1 and Corollaries 1–4 are not formalized.
A complete development needs implicit differentiation of a fixed point, an envelope theorem for a two-variable constrained maximization, and existence of maximizers on a non-compact feasible set. These ingredients apply to other congestion-pricing and logit-demand models. Contributions toward any milestone are welcome, as are proofs of the supporting items.
Selected references
M. Leng, R. Becerril-Arreola, M. Parlar, M. Ferguson, Disclosing Delivery Performance Information When Consumers Are Sensitive to Promised Delivery Time, Delivery Reliability, and Price, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2024 (authors' preprint, April 2nd, 2023). https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0223
K. C. So, Price and time competition for service delivery, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 2(4):392–409, 2000.
L. Liu, M. Parlar, S. X. Zhu, Pricing and lead time decisions in decentralized supply chains, Management Science 53(5):713–725, 2007.
T. Boyaci, S. Ray, The impact of capacity costs on product differentiation in delivery time, delivery reliability, and price, Production and Operations Management 15(2):179–197, 2006.
S. P. Anderson, A. de Palma, J.-F. Thisse, Discrete Choice Theory of Product Differentiation, MIT Press, 1992.
N. S. Cardell, Variance components structures for the extreme-value and logistic distributions with application to models of heterogeneity, Econometric Theory 13(2):185–213, 1997.
Subsampling to Enhance Efficiency in Input Uncertainty Quantification: The Proportionate Subsampled Variance Bootstrap Is Relatively ConsistentResearch Paper
Why input uncertainty matters
A simulation may give precise answers under specified input distributions while the distributions themselves are estimated from limited data. In a queueing model, for example, arrival and service times are fitted from observations before the queue is simulated. Repeating the simulation more often reduces simulation noise, but it does not remove uncertainty in those fitted inputs. Lam and Qian study the variance attributable to that data uncertainty and an estimator that can remain relatively accurate with a simulation budget that grows much more slowly than the data size Lam and Qian, pp. 6–7, 13–17.
The paper uses a nonparametric model: an input distribution is estimated by the empirical distribution of its observations. This matters when a finite-dimensional parameterization is unavailable or would conceal sensitivity to parts of the distribution. The variance is small, of order 1/n, so an estimator with small absolute error can still have poor relative error. The mission targets relative consistency, which asks that the ratio of estimated to true input variance approach one.
Input data and the subsampling procedure
There are m≥1 independent input processes. Process i has a true probability law Fi on a measurable space Ξi and ni independent observations Xi,1,…,Xi,ni. Its empirical law is Fi=ni−1∑jδXi,j. A real performance functionalψ(P1,…,Pm) gives the expected simulation response under a vector of input laws. The input variance is the variance over the observed data,
σI2=Var[ψ(F1,…,Fm)].
To estimate it, Algorithm 2 chooses a common subsample ratio0<θ≤1 and takes si=⌊θni⌋ observations with replacement from each empirical input law. It draws B≥2 independent vectors of subsamples and produces R≥2 independent simulation responses for each vector. Each response has conditional mean ψ at its resampled input laws. Let ψˉb be the mean of the R responses in group b, ψˉˉ the mean of the B group means, and V the pooled within-group sample variance. The reported proportionate subsampled variance bootstrap estimate is
The comparison quantity without simulation error is σSVB2=θVar∗[ψ(Fs1,1∗,…,Fsm,m∗)], where the star means variance over subsampling conditional on the original data. Both quantities are defined in the paper pp. 15, 17, equations (4) and (8).
Formalization targets
Write n=m−1∑ini for the average input data size. The goal is Theorem 2p. 15: under Assumptions 1–7, as every ni→∞, if
B=ω(1),BR2=ω((θn)2),θ=ω(n−1),
then
σI2σSVB2p1.
The milestone list follows the paper's supporting results. Proposition 1 identifies the first-order scale σI2=∑iσi2/ni+o(n−1), with σi2 the variance of the ith influence function. Theorem 7 gives σSVB2/σI2→1 in probability without Monte Carlo error. The first sentence of Lemma 1 states exact conditional unbiasedness of σSVB2 for σSVB2. Its conditional mean squared error formula is also posed as a milestone in a labelled corrected form; the printed formula (18) omits a term when R remains bounded pp. 22, 25; proof p. ec14.
What the result supplies
The theorem makes a precise distinction between a small subsample and an inaccurate variance estimate. The subsample can be much smaller than the original data set, yet the estimate retains the correct first-order input-uncertainty scale if the stated parameter rates and regularity conditions hold. This supports the paper's later simulation-budget statements, including the possibility of a budget whose growth rate is independent of the original data size pp. 16–17.
The mathematical results are proved in the cited paper; the goal here is a machine-checked formalization of their statements and eventually their proofs. The reusable output includes empirical and resampled measure constructions, an explicit conditional simulation law, and formulations of convergence for estimators that depend on both observed data and resampling. The corrected mean squared error target records a limitation of the printed asymptotic constant rather than treating that display as a verified fact.
Where the argument is delicate
The input variance shrinks like 1/n, so absolute consistency alone cannot establish the ratio limit. The resampling approximation and the Monte Carlo output have different sources of error, and each must be small relative to this shrinking target. The performance functional need not be linear in its input laws: the influence-function expansion has remainders under both the original empirical laws and every mixture of empirical and resampled laws. The simulation response also has input-dependent variance and a fourth moment. Treating it as fixed-variance noise would change the conditions being formalized. The paper's first-order assumptions and its conditional moment assumptions must therefore be represented on the same asymptotic regime.
Formalization scope
The Lean model uses one infinite independent array of observations, with a finite prefix for each data size. A theorem quantifies over arbitrary sequences of data-size vectors and algorithm parameters; every input sample size diverges, and Assumption 1 bounds ratios of sizes eventually. The paper's support is represented by a measurable full-measure set Si of allowed point masses. Assumption 2 quantifies over the finite convex mixtures of Fi and Dirac laws at points of Si, rather than over all probability measures. Its signed-measure integral is written as a difference of ordinary integrals. Conditional bootstrap expectation is an exact finite average over with-replacement index maps. Independent simulation responses are represented by product measures of an unbiased one-replication law.
The target uses the conditional probability of a relative-error event, viewed as a random quantity over the original data. Convergence of that bounded conditional probability to zero in probability is equivalent to the paper's unconditional convergence in probability. This representation avoids a zero measure produced by a nonmeasurable total-law construction. Integrability and moment guards prevent non-integrable expectations and variances from taking Lean's default zero value. The fourth simulation moment is extended nonnegative, so an infinite value stays visible. Algorithm 2 uses B,R≥2 and 0<θ≤1; positive sample and subsample sizes hold eventually. The unqualified s in Assumption 4 is read as θn. For the corrected equation (18) milestone only, the true simulation variance is assumed positive. Contributions to the influence-function assumptions, bootstrap remainder estimates, and finite-product moment identities are all within scope.
Selected references
H. Lam and H. Qian, Subsampling to Enhance Efficiency in Input Uncertainty Quantification, accepted in Operations Research, arXiv:1811.04500v2, 2021 preprint. Version used for theorem numbers and pages.
Impact of Information Asymmetry and Limited Production Capacity on Business Interruption Insurance: The Low-Demand Firm's Optimal Contract Has Weakly Higher Coverage and PremiumResearch Paper
Motivation
Business-interruption (BI) insurance reimburses a firm for the revenue it loses while a disruption (a flood, a fire, a supplier failure) keeps its capacity down. The 2011 Thailand floods and the Tōhoku earthquake made such losses large and visible for manufacturers, and BI cover is now a standard part of commercial property insurance. Two information problems make it hard to price. The insurer does not know how strong the firm's demand will be, and so how much revenue is really at stake (adverse selection); and once a disruption happens, the insurer does not observe how hard the firm works to restore capacity (moral hazard).
Kao, Keskin and Shang (SSRN 3184530, version of May 13, 2020; published in Management Science, 2021, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2020.3776) model both problems at once for a firm with limited production capacity. Their headline is an ordering of the optimal contracts that runs against standard screening theory: the firm with the lower demand forecast is sold the contract with more coverage and a higher premium.
Setting
A firm has capacity K>0 and sells over periods 1,…,T at unit price p. Its early demand forecastμ∈{μH,μL}, with μH>μL>0, is its private type, high with probability α. A forecast updateδ∈{δH,δL}, with δH>0>δL, probability β of δH and mean zero, arrives before selling starts. Demand in period t is Dt=μ+δ+ϵt with i.i.d. logistic shocks ϵt of mean 0 and scale γ>0. Expected sales from a capacity x are E[min(D,x)].
In period τ a disruption occurs with probability ρ and wipes out capacity. The firm then chooses a recovery efforte∈[0,1] at cost ceK and sells from capacity eK for the remaining T−τ periods. It also pays a penalty λ>0 per unit of the net disruption loss.
An insurance contract (y,s) has premium y and coverage percentages∈[0,sˉ]. From period τ+w on, the insurer reimburses the fraction s of the expected revenue loss pE[min(D,K)−min(D,eK)]. Given the contract, the firm chooses the effort e∗(s) that maximizes its profit under disruption, and Eδ,Z[πiI(K,y,s)] denotes its expected profit with insurance when μ=μi. Without insurance the effort is e^ and the expected profit is Eδ,Z[πiN(K)].
The insurer offers a menu(yH,sH), (yL,sL). It maximizes expected premiums minus expected claims, α{yH−claimsH(sH)}+(1−α){yL−claimsL(sL)}, subject to four constraints:
incentive compatibility, (IC-HL) and (IC-LH): each type prefers its own contract;
individual rationality, (IR-H) and (IR-L): each type prefers its contract to no insurance.
This is program (5.1).
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 4
Under the paper's standing conditions,
K>μH+δH+γlnc(T−τ)p−cand (5.5),
program (5.1) has an optimal menu, and every optimal menu satisfies
sL∗≥sH∗andyL∗≥yH∗.
The goal asserts only the order of the two contracts, not their values: the optimal coverages have no closed form.
Milestones
Eq. (4.1): the closed form E[min(D,x)]=x+m−γln[ex/γ+em/γ] for logistic demand with location m.
Eq. (4.13)–(4.14):e∗(s) is the unique optimal effort, and it is positive.
Proposition 1(i):e∗(s) is non-increasing and concave in s, and e∗(s)≤e^.
Proposition 1(ii):Eδ,Z[πiI(K,y,s)] is non-decreasing and convex in s.
The marginal profit formula from the proof of Proposition 1(ii).
Proposition 2: the marginal profit in s is non-increasing in μ (the reverse single-crossing property).
Eq. (5.2)–(5.4): (IC-HL) and (IR-L) are redundant, and (IC-LH) and (IR-H) bind at the optimum.
Lemma 1(i): the reduced objective R(sH,sL) is quasi-concave in sL.
Lemma 1(ii): under (5.5), R(sH,sL) is quasi-concave in sH.
Proposition 3: the optimal coverages are selected by the first-order conditions (5.6)–(5.7), with the cap and a zero-root boundary case handled explicitly.
The FOC comparison from the proof of Proposition 4.
Significance
In the classical screening model (Mussa–Rosen, Maskin–Riley), the type with the higher valuation receives the higher quality, and the lower type's participation constraint binds. Here the order is reversed. The high-demand firm restores more capacity on its own and is more often capacity-bound, so a unit of coverage is worth less to it than to the low-demand firm. Proposition 4 turns this into an operational recommendation: offer the low-demand firm the richer and dearer policy. The reduction of (5.1) to two binding constraints, and the resulting first-order conditions, support the paper's comparative statics (Table 1) and its capacity-investment results (Propositions 5–6).
The results are proved in the paper by calculus on explicit closed forms. None of them has been machine-checked, and the platform has no model of BI insurance, no logistic demand law and no two-type insurance-screening program. A complete development checks every step of a chain that mixes an expectation, an envelope argument, a reverse single crossing and a constrained optimization. It also produces reusable pieces: logistic expected sales, and a template for two-type screening problems in which the binding constraints are derived rather than assumed.
Difficulty
Each analytic step is elementary on its own; the difficulty is the length of the chain and the places where the obvious argument does not apply.
The expected-sales formula. It is an improper integral against the logistic density, and the rest of the development rests on it.
Differentiability at the effort cap. The optimal effort switches between an interior formula and the cap e=1 and is not differentiable in s at the switch, while Propositions 1(ii) and 2 are statements about the derivative of the firm's profit there.
Existence of an optimal menu. The paper presupposes it. The premiums range over all of R, so (5.1) as posed is not an optimization over a compact set.
The order of the premiums. It does not follow from the order of the coverages alone: it also needs the monotonicity of the firm's profit in coverage.
Formalization scope
All objects live in the namespace BIInsurance.Screening:
Logistic: the logistic density and expected sales as a Lebesgue integral;
Model: the parameters, the standing assumptions, the firm's profits, the efforts e^ and e∗, program (5.1), gH, gL, R, condition (5.5) and the left sides of (5.6)–(5.7).
The formalization commits to these conventions:
Periods.T,τ,w are natural numbers cast to reals. The disruption period satisfies τ≥1, as it belongs to the selling season. One waiting period w=wH=wL is used.
Expectations. Expectations over δ and over the disruption indicator are finite weighted sums. Only the demand shock is integrated.
Coverage set. It is [0,sˉ], i.e. s=0, as in all results of the paper.
Added hypotheses.ρ>0 and w<T−τ are added to the page's assumptions. Without them insurance pays nothing and the goal is false.
Standing conditions. The K-condition and (5.5) are explicit hypotheses wherever the paper assumes them "throughout the sequel" (p. 19).
Effort.e∗ is defined by its formula (4.13), and its optimality is a milestone.
General forecasts. Firm-level milestones are stated for every early forecast μ≥μL, as the proofs show.
Printed slip. Lemma 1(ii)'s "positive slope" is stated under strict (5.5), because a non-strict (5.5) gives only a non-negative slope.
Boundary root. When (5.5) holds with equality, zero solves (5.6); Proposition 3 distinguishes when zero is optimal from when a positive root or the cap is optimal.
A trivializing encoding is ruled out. The optimal contract is a maximizer of (5.1) with all four constraints, never the closed form min{s′,sˉ} of Proposition 3, and never a maximizer of the reduced objective R. Expected sales are an integral, not their closed form.
The development needs:
improper integrals of logistic densities;
one-variable derivatives of compositions with ln and exp;
quasi-concavity on intervals;
an existence argument for the insurer's optimum.
The logistic expected-sales lemma and the redundancy argument for two-type screening are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone are welcome.
Selected references
Y.-M. Kao, N. B. Keskin, K. Shang, Impact of Information Asymmetry and Limited Production Capacity on Business Interruption Insurance, SSRN working paper 3184530, version of May 13, 2020. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3184530
Y.-M. Kao, N. B. Keskin, K. Shang, Impact of Information Asymmetry and Limited Production Capacity on Business Interruption Insurance, Management Science, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3776
How Should We Score Athletes and Candidates: Geometric Scoring Rules: A Scoring Rule Is Independent of Unanimous Winners and of Unanimous Losers if and only if It Is a Geometric Scoring RuleResearch Paper
Motivation
Season-long sports competitions (the biathlon World Cup, Formula One, the motorcycle Grand Prix, golf's FedEx Cup) rank athletes by adding up points awarded for the positions they take in individual races. The same mechanism, under the name positional scoring rule, is one of the oldest objects of social choice theory: Borda's rule, plurality and antiplurality are all scoring rules, and Young (1975) characterised the class axiomatically.
Kondratev, Ianovski and Nesterov start from a concrete anomaly. In the 2013/14 IBU Biathlon World Cup (Women's Individual), Soukalová won both races; under the official points table, disqualifying her would have changed the order of the athletes behind her, with Hildebrand overtaking Skardino for third. An athlete who finished first everywhere, or last everywhere, carries no information about how the others compare, so a ranking method that reorders the others when such an athlete is dropped is open to manipulation and to disputes after disqualifications. The paper asks which scoring rules are immune to this, and its answer is a one-parameter family that contains Borda's rule and has the convex point tables used in practice as other members.
The two axioms belong to a long line of independence conditions in social choice (independence of clones, of Pareto-dominated alternatives, of irrelevant alternatives). Fishburn (1981) showed that two non-equivalent score vectors always rank some profile differently, which is the classical fact behind the paper's Proposition 4.
Setting
Let M be the number of potential athletes, finite or M=∞. A scoring rules assigns to every number of athletes m≤M a vector of m real scores s1m,…,smm, where sjm is awarded for position j. A race on a finite set A of m athletes is a strict ranking of A; a profile is a sequence of n races. The total score of athlete a is the sum, over all races, of sjm for the position j that a takes in that race, and the overall ranking is the weak order by total score: higher totals rank higher, equal totals rank equally.
An athlete is a unanimous loser if it is last in every race, and a unanimous winner if it is first in every race. A scoring rule satisfies independence of unanimous losers if, in every profile, a unanimous loser is ranked last overall and removing it from every race (the others keep their positions, and the rule now uses the score vector for m−1 athletes) leaves the overall ranking of the remaining athletes unchanged. Independence of unanimous winners is the mirror image: a unanimous winner is ranked first overall, and removing it (every other athlete moves up one place) leaves the ranking of the others unchanged.
Two vectors s1,…,sk and t1,…,tk are affinely equivalent if sj=αtj+β for all j, for some α>0 and some β; affinely equivalent vectors produce the same overall ranking on every profile. For a parameter p>0 the geometric scores are
gjm(p)=⎩⎨⎧pm−jm−j1−pm−j1<p,p=1,0<p<1,
and a geometric scoring rule with parameter p is one whose score vector for every m is affinely equivalent to gm(p). The case p=1 is Borda's rule; p>1 gives convex point tables that reward winning, 0<p<1 concave ones that punish finishing last.
The parameter p is one number for the whole rule, not one per m. Nothing about the values of the scores beyond their affine class is fixed.
Milestones
Proposition 4, first part.IULM(s) holds if and only if s1m>⋯>smm for every m≤M and, for all k<m≤M, sk is affinely equivalent to the first k scores s1m,…,skm.
Proposition 4, second part.IUWM(s) holds if and only if the scores are strictly decreasing and sk is affinely equivalent to the last k scores sm−k+1m,…,smm.
First and last scores (§3, p. 6). Under both axioms, the first k and the last k scores for m athletes are affinely equivalent; in particular s1m,…,sm−1m is affinely equivalent to s2m,…,smm.
The geometric recurrence (§3, pp. 6–7). A strictly decreasing vector whose first m−1 and last m−1 entries are affinely equivalent is affinely equivalent to gm(p) for some p>0.
Significance
Theorem 6 says that two weak, individually almost costless requirements together cut the infinite-dimensional space of scoring rules down to a single parameter. Each axiom alone is satisfied by any strictly decreasing score table extended by truncation at one end; jointly they force self-similarity of the table. The rest of the paper builds on this family: Theorem 9 characterises Borda's rule within it, Theorem 10 characterises 0<p≤1, and §5 compares geometric rules with the scores that are optimal for an organiser who wants to identify the strongest athlete. For practice, the result tells a league that wants its standings to survive disqualifications of dominant or hopeless athletes exactly which point tables it may use.
The result is proved in the paper, partly through Fishburn's (1981) theorem and partly through a constructive argument in Appendix A. No machine-checked version of Theorem 6 or Proposition 4 is known; neither Mathlib nor the platform has positional scoring rules, profiles of races or the weak ranking they induce. A formal proof would add a reusable model of positional voting, a formal version of the fact that non-equivalent score vectors are separated by some profile, and a checked proof of the characterisation for every M, including M=∞.
Difficulty
The "if" direction is a computation: geometric vectors have geometric prefixes and suffixes with the same p, and positive affine maps preserve every comparison of total scores. The difficulty is in the "only if" direction of Proposition 4. Strict monotonicity follows from single-race profiles, but affine equivalence of the vector for k athletes with a prefix (or suffix) of the vector for m athletes does not: the axioms only speak about rankings, so every failure of affine equivalence must be witnessed by an explicit profile of strict rankings, for arbitrary real scores, in which removing the unanimous losers (or winners) reverses a comparison. Producing such witnesses uniformly is the substantive step, and it is where the published argument leans on an external theorem (Fishburn 1981) or on a dedicated construction.
A second obstacle is uniformity of the parameter when M=∞: each sm with m≥3 determines its own p, and these must agree across all m; for m≤2 the parameter is not determined at all.
Formalization scope
Athletes form an arbitrary finite type α with Fintype.card α ≤ M, where M : ℕ∞ (⊤ encodes M=∞). A race is a bijection α ≃ Fin (Fintype.card α), a profile is Fin n → Race α, and a scoring rule is (m : ℕ) → Fin m → ℝ. Positions are 0-based: Lean's position j is the paper's position j+1, so the paper's exponent m−j is m - 1 - j. The overall ranking is compared as a weak order: "unchanged" means Sa≤Sb⟺Sa′≤Sb′ for all remaining athletes a,b. The removed profile is not constructed: the axioms quantify over every profile on {a // a ≠ x} satisfying the removal relation, and such a profile exists and is unique.
Two readings are fixed and disclosed. "Ranked last/first in the overall ranking" is strict (the unanimous loser has a strictly smaller total than every other athlete), as the paper's proof uses it; under a weak reading constant scores would satisfy both axioms and Proposition 4's strict inequalities would fail. Consequently the axioms range over profiles with at least one race: with no races all totals vanish and no athlete is strictly last. The parameter of a geometric scoring rule is 0<p<∞: the limits p→∞ and p→0 are multi-round generalised rules (Definition 2), not scoring rules.
The axioms are stated about profiles and the removal of athletes, never about score vectors. A formalization in which independence of unanimous losers is defined as the right-hand side of Proposition 4 would make Proposition 4 true by definition and reduce Theorem 6 to algebra on sequences; that is ruled out.
A complete development needs: sums of scores over races, the existence of removal profiles, explicit strict rankings on Fin m and profiles assembled from them, and the algebra of affine equivalence and geometric sequences. The model is reusable for the paper's later characterisations (Theorems 9–11) and for scoring-rule results in voting theory. Contributions of the "if" directions, of the recurrence, and of the separating-profile lemma as standalone results are welcome.
Selected references
A. Y. Kondratev, E. Ianovski, A. S. Nesterov, How should we score athletes and candidates: geometric scoring rules, Operations Research, 2024; preprint arXiv:1907.05082v5, 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.05082v5
Tail Risk and Robust Portfolio Decisions: Under Jump Ambiguity the Robust Optimal Portfolio Splits into a Closed-Form Diffusion Exposure and a Jump Exposure Solving a Reduced ProblemResearch Paper
Motivation
Investors who hold risky assets face losses from occasional jumps in prices. Such jumps are infrequent, so their frequency and size distribution can be harder to estimate than ordinary price fluctuations. Jin, Luo, and Zeng study how a portfolio changes when an investor treats both the arrival rate and the size distribution of jumps as uncertain. Their 2017 working paper combines a jump-diffusion market with an entropy penalty for departures from a reference model. Its main portfolio result separates the exposure to jump risk from a component that depends only on diffusion risk and expected returns.
The practical question is precise: when several stocks share a smaller number of jump types, which combinations of stock holdings carry jump exposure, and how should the investor allocate the remaining risk? A direct optimization in all stock weights obscures this distinction. The paper's Proposition 2 describes optimal holdings through a reduced jump-dependent problem and an explicit formula for the orthogonal component. This mission asks for a machine-checked statement and proof of that result for the pointwise robust objective used in the paper's Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman calculation.
Setting
There are m risky assets and n≤m jump types. A portfolio π∈Rm records the fraction of wealth invested in each risky asset; the remaining fraction is invested in a bond with rate r. The risky assets have expected returns μ∈Rm, a nonsingular diffusion matrixΣ∈Rm×m, and a full-column-rank jump matrixJ∈[0,1]m×n. Its column Jk scales the effect of jump type k on the stock prices. The reference arrival intensity is λk>0, and Φk is a probability law for its jump size Yk∈(−1,∞). The paper requires the jump exposureπ′Jk to lie in [0,1] for each k; these constraints define an admissible portfolio in the pointwise problem. The market assumptions come from §2 of the working paper, pp. 7–8.
An alternative jump model multiplies λk by ϑk>0 and replaces Φk by φkΦk, where φk is positive and integrates to one. Its departure from the reference model is penalized by the generalized relative-entropy integrand ϑkφklog(ϑkφk)+1−ϑkφk. The investor has constant relative risk aversion γ>0, with γ=1, and ambiguity aversion ϕ>0. The authors derive a pointwise robust generatorG(π) from their value-function ansatz. It includes the diffusion quadratic, excess expected return, the bond rate, and a genuine infimum over alternative jump models. For jump exposure a, the type-k inner objective is
This is equation (A.1) of the paper, p. 33, with its term depending only on time removed. The infimum is taken for each jump type over normalized positive density and positive intensity pairs.
Formalization targets
Worst-case jump model
Proposition 1 identifies the minimizing alternative model. For a∈[0,1], write ψk∗(a,y)=exp{ϕ((1+ay)1−γ−1)/(γ−1)}. Its intensity and density factors are
The target says this pair is admissible and attains the inner minimum. The other milestones cover the orthogonal decomposition, the jump-exposure identity, separation of G, and the explicit optimum of the diffusion component. These are the claims used for the portfolio result in Proposition 2 and Appendix A of the paper, pp. 12–15 and 33–34.
Portfolio decomposition
Define J=Σ−1J and μ=Σ−1(μ−r1). Let K be the column space of J and decompose μ=μˉ+μ⊥ into its parts in K and its orthogonal complement. The goal characterizes every maximizer of the robust generator over admissible portfolios by
Here R is the reduced objective in equation (A.10), including the entropy penalty of the worst-case model. The target is an equivalence between maximizers of the original and reduced problems; it leaves existence of a maximizer as a separate question. The formula for the orthogonal component is fixed, while the jump component is determined by the reduced optimization.
Significance
The result identifies which part of the asset allocation depends on jump ambiguity. In the transformed coordinates, the component orthogonal to the jump columns responds to expected excess returns and diffusion risk through μ⊥/γ. All dependence on the jump-size laws, arrival intensities, and ambiguity aversion is confined to the column-space component. Since K has dimension n, the jump-dependent problem is effectively smaller when n<m. These conclusions are the content of Proposition 2, rather than a claim that every stochastic portfolio policy has been verified as optimal.
The paper supplies an analytic argument, but the stated formulas are not yet a machine-checked development in this mission. A formal proof would also give reusable statements about an unnormalized entropy-penalized jump measure, the integrability required for its exponential tilt, and the matrix projection used in the decomposition. Those pieces can support later treatments of the paper's comparative statics or related robust-control models. The goal itself is a known result from the working paper, not an open research conjecture.
Difficulty
The inner problem optimizes an intensity and a normalized density together. Their product is an unnormalized positive tilt, so a finite-simplex relative-entropy theorem does not directly express this problem. The displayed exponential tilt may fail to have a finite real integral for a law with sufficiently much mass near jump size −1, particularly when γ>1 and the exposure reaches 1. A formal proof has to keep the real-valued expectations meaningful and show that the proposed model lies in the admissible class.
For the outer problem, the stock weights appear in both the diffusion quadratic and every jump exposure. The useful orthogonal decomposition is in the transformed coordinate π=Σ′π, while admissibility is originally written as π′Jk∈[0,1]. Identifying the same feasible exposures after that change of coordinates is necessary for the two optimization problems to have the same maximizers. One cannot infer the portfolio statement merely by maximizing the diffusion quadratic in isolation.
Formalization scope
Lean represents vectors as Fin m → ℝ, jump-size laws as probability measures on R, and the column space as the span of the columns of J. Orthogonality uses the standard real dot product. The model allows n=0 and m=n; neither the standing assumptions nor the target inserts a positive-jump-count or strict-dimension-gap condition. The laws give zero mass outside (−1,∞), so real powers on that complement do not affect the objectives.
The mission starts from the pointwise generator in (A.1), after the authors' ansatz V(W,t)=U(W)h(t). It does not formalize the price SDE, filtration, stochastic integral, or a verification theorem for the full dynamic control problem. The term involving dh/dt is omitted because it is independent of the choices in this generator problem. The generator keeps the genuine inner infimum; replacing it with Proposition 1's closed form would remove the inner optimization that the mission is meant to formalize.
The source presupposes finiteness of the expectation defining ϑk∗. The development states only the needed integrability of ψk∗ and of its product with the CRRA jump increment for every a∈[0,1]. It also requires the combined inner-objective integrand to be integrable for an admissible alternative pair. Excluded nonintegrable pairs have extended value +∞ under the integrable lower bound and cannot improve the infimum. Positivity of γ, ϕ, and λk, together with γ=1, makes the paper's divisions and preference parameters explicit. Definitions of the admissible pair, inner objective, projection, and reduced objective are intended for reuse; contributions toward the five source milestones and the goal are welcome.
The printed objective (17) omits the entropy term retained by the proof's (A.10). Since the worst-case model varies with πˉ, the two objectives can have different maximizers. The formal target uses (A.10), which matches the robust generator. The goal's Formalization Note records this discrepancy and the added integrability hypothesis.
Selected references
X. Jin, D. Luo, and X. Zeng, Tail Risk and Robust Portfolio Decisions, SSRN working paper 2865064, version of April 18, 2017, §§2–3 and Appendix A. SSRN record. Published in Management Science, DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2020.3615; the mission's statement and page numbers follow the 2017 working paper.
Sunk Cost Bias and Time Inconsistency: A Strategic Analysis of Pricing Decisions: A Small Sunk Cost Bias Weakly Raises Monopoly Profit, Consumer Welfare and Social WelfareResearch Paper
Motivation
Many products deliver their value only after the buyer exerts effort: a gym membership has to be used, furniture assembled, software learned, a ticket redeemed by attending. Consumers with present bias discount future benefits relative to present costs and so often fail to exert that effort, even when it would pay off in the long run (DellaVigna and Malmendier 2004; Laibson 1997). A second, well-documented behavioural regularity pushes the other way: people who have paid for a product feel a sunk-cost pull to use it, and use it more the more they paid (Arkes and Blumer 1985; Gourville and Soman 1998).
Jain and Chen (Management Science, 2022) put both biases into one monopoly pricing model. Because the sunk-cost effect is proportional to the price paid, the price itself becomes a lever on consumption: a higher price makes buyers more likely to follow through. The paper asks how a profit-maximizing firm uses this lever, and whether sunk-cost bias, usually treated as a mistake that hurts consumers, can instead benefit everyone. This mission formalizes its answer for a small bias: firm profit, consumer welfare and social welfare all weakly increase with the strength of the bias.
Setting
A monopolist sells a durable product at a price p≥0; the firm's marginal cost is c≥0. A consumer's valuation v is drawn from a distribution function F with support (0,1). After buying, the consumer learns the effort cost of using the product: with probability α∈(0,1] it is low, κ∈(0,1), and with probability 1−α it is 1. The effort is paid before the benefit v arrives, and the consumer discounts quasi-hyperbolically: future payoffs are weighted by β∈(κ,1] (the exponential discount factor is 1). A consumer who paid p and leaves the product unused experiences a sunk-cost discomfort−λp, where λ≥0 measures the sunk-cost bias.
At the time of use, a consumer with valuation v therefore uses the product under the low cost iff βv−κ+λp≥0, i.e. v≥v1, and under the high cost iff βv−1+λp>0, i.e. v>v2, with
v1=βκ−λp,v2=β1−λp.
Consumers foresee their own behaviour. A consumer who will use the product only under the low cost buys iff Ul=α(v−κ)−p>0; one who will always use it buys iff Uh=v−ακ−(1−α)−p>0. The demandD(p) is the F-probability of the set of buyers, and profit is (p−c)D(p). With v3=p/α+κ and v4=p+ακ+(1−α), the paper derives (eq. (4))
Two prices organize the analysis. The usage-constrained pricep^a=κ(1−β)α/(λα+β) is where v1=v3. The unconstrained pricepr maximizes (p−c)(1−F(v3)) (eq. (7)), the profit the firm would face if every buyer used the product whenever the cost is low. Welfare is measured with long-run preferences (β=1): consumer welfare is the F-integral of Ul or Uh over the buyers, at their actual usage, and social welfare adds the firm's profit. The small-bias regime is λ<λ1=(1−β)/(α(1−κ)), in which no consumer overconsumes.
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 3(c)
Assume pr<κα(1−β)/β, that the objective of (7) is strictly concave, and that c<p^a. Then for 0≤λ≤λ′<λ1, with p∗(λ) any optimal price,
Proposition 1, monotonicity: demand increases in p below p^a and decreases above it; it weakly increases in λ and in β.
The optimal price (§4.2 and the discussion of Proposition 5): for λ<λ1 the optimal price is exactly max(p^a,pr).
Proposition 3(a): there is a λ∗>0 with optimal price p^a for λ<λ∗ and pr for λ>λ∗.
Significance
The goal is the paper's "win–win" result. Most of the behavioural literature treats sunk-cost bias as harmful to the consumer; here, for a small bias, it offsets the self-control problem, raises consumption, and makes the firm, the consumers and society better off together. Milestones 1–3 establish the paper's upward-sloping demand, which is what lets a firm raise both price and sales; milestones 4–5 give the price rigidity the paper highlights: for small λ the optimal price p^a does not depend on the marginal cost.
The proofs are in an online appendix that is not part of the published article, and none of these results has a machine-checked proof. A formal development fixes the exact hypotheses under which the comparative statics hold: the paper's tie-breaking conventions, the domain of the concavity assumption, and how the cost condition c<p^a varies with λ are all made explicit.
Difficulty
The demand is not given in closed form: it is the F-measure of a set of valuations defined by two usage rules and a purchase rule, and identifying it with (4) and (5) requires tracking which of the four thresholds binds in each price region. The optimal-price characterization cannot use concavity of profit directly, because profit is not concave across p^a: below the kink demand rises with price and the objective is (p−c)(1−F(v1)), above it the objective is (7). The welfare comparison in the goal is not a corollary of the profit comparison: as λ grows the optimal price moves along p^a and then switches to pr, and consumer welfare must be compared across that switch as an integral over a moving buyer set.
Formalization scope
All quantities are real numbers. The parameters (α,κ,β,c) form a record with the standing assumptions 0<α≤1, 0<κ<1, κ<β≤1, c≥0; the bias λ is a separate argument whose range each theorem states. The exponential discount factor is fixed at 1.
Valuation distribution.F is a Mathlib StieltjesFunction that is continuous, equals 0 on (−∞,0] and 1 on [1,∞), and is strictly increasing on [0,1]; this is the reading of "support (0,1)". Demand is the measure, under F.measure, of the set of v∈[0,1] with positive anticipated utility.
Tie-breaks are those printed on p. 8: low-cost usage at ≥, high-cost usage and purchase at >.
Welfare omits the discomfort −λp, as (2) and (3) do. Social welfare is consumer welfare plus profit, which the paper does not display.
Optimal price is a p≥0 maximizing profit over all p′≥0. The price pr is a variable pinned by the hypothesis that it maximizes (7), and strict concavity of (7) is assumed on [0,(1−κ)α], where 1−F(v3)>0. The cost condition c<p^a(λ) is assumed for every λ in the range.
Demand is never defined by formula (4) or (5), and the goal never evaluates welfare at the explicit price max(p^a,pr); either would reduce the mission to algebra on explicit expressions. The goal quantifies over optimal prices of the primitive demand, and milestone 4 supplies their existence.
The development needs set-integral and Stieltjes-measure computations for intervals of a continuous distribution function, together with one-variable concavity arguments. Contributions to these interval lemmas, and to proofs of any milestone, are welcome. Proposition 3(b), the large-bias regime (Propositions 2 and 5) and the extensions of §5 are outside this mission.
Selected references
S. Jain and H. (A.) Chen, Sunk cost bias and time inconsistency: a strategic analysis of pricing decisions, Management Science, Articles in Advance, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4479
S. DellaVigna and U. Malmendier, Contract design and self-control: theory and evidence, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(2), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1162/0033553041382111
J. T. Gourville and D. Soman, Payment depreciation: the behavioral effects of temporally separating payments from consumption, Journal of Consumer Research 25(2), 1998. https://doi.org/10.1086/209534
Smooth Contextual Bandits: Bridging the Parametric and Non-differentiable Regret Regimes: The SmoothBandit Algorithm Has Regret Õ(T^((β+d−αβ)/(2β+d)) + 1) on Every Hölder-Smooth InstanceResearch Paper
Motivation
In a contextual bandit a decision maker repeatedly observes a context Xt, chooses one of two actions, and sees the reward of that action only. Personalised medicine, dynamic pricing and online advertising have this structure: the reward of the action not taken is never observed, so learning and earning must be balanced. Performance is measured by the regret, the expected reward lost against the oracle that knows which action is better at every context.
Two regimes were well understood before this paper. When the mean rewards are linear (parametric) in the context, the regret is of order logT (up to dimension factors) under a sharp margin condition (Bastani and Bayati 2020, doi:10.1287/opre.2019.1902). When they are only Lipschitz or Hölder with exponent at most one (non-differentiable), the optimal regret is T1−(1+α)β/(2β+d) (Rigollet and Zeevi 2010, arXiv:1003.1630; Perchet and Rigollet 2013, arXiv:1110.6084). Hu, Kallus and Mao (arXiv:1909.02553, Operations Research 2022) treat mean rewards with β≥1 derivatives' worth of smoothness and obtain a rate that moves continuously from the non-differentiable rate at β=1 to the parametric rate as β→∞.
Setting
The context X takes values in a compact set X⊆[0,1]d and has a Lebesgue density between μmin>0 and μmax on X. At each round t=1,…,T, nature draws (Xt,Yt(1),Yt(−1)) i.i.d., with rewards Yt(±1)∈[0,1]; the decision maker sees Xt, pulls an arm At∈{−1,1} using the history, and receives Yt(At). Write η±1(x)=E[Y(±1)∣X=x], the conditional average treatment effectτ=η1−η−1, the oracle policy π∗(x)=+1 if τ(x)≥0 and −1 otherwise, and the regret
RT(π)=E[t=1∑T(Yt(π∗(Xt))−Yt(At))].
For β>0 let b(β) be the largest integer strictly below β. A function is (β,L,X)-Hölder if it is b(β)-times continuously differentiable and its Taylor polynomial of order b(β) at x approximates it at x′ within L∥x′−x∥β. A Lebesgue-measurable set S is weakly (c,r)-regular at x∈S if Leb[S∩B(x,r)]≥cLeb[B(x,r)] for the closed ball B(x,r), and a (c0,r0)-regular set if this holds at each of its points for all 0≤r≤r0. The class P consists of the instances with:
η±1 both (β,L,X)-Hölder and L1-Lipschitz, with β≥1;
the optimal regions Qa={x∈X:aτ(x)≥0} non-empty and (c0,r0)-regular;
the density condition above;
the margin conditionP(0<∣τ(X)∣≤t)≤γtα for all t>0.
The algorithm, SmoothBandit (Algorithm 1), partitions [0,1]d into cubes of side δ=T−β/(2β+d)(logT)−1 and runs in epochs of geometrically growing length nk, with error tolerance ϵk=2−k. Each cube is assigned to an exploitation region E±1 (always pull that arm) or to the randomisation region Rk (toss a fair coin). After each epoch it estimates η±1 at the cube centres by local polynomial regression of degree b(β) with bandwidth Ha,k=Na,k−1/(2β+d), using data from inside and outside each cube. It moves a cube to Ea when the estimated effect exceeds ϵk in favour of arm a, and hands to the other arm the cubes where the data of arm a are too sparse to estimate (the inestimable regions Da,k).
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 25)
With e=(β+d−αβ)/(2β+d), uniformly over the class P (constants depending only on the parameters):
RT(π^)≤C(Telog1+2βdT+log2T)(αβ<β+d,orαβ>β+d and d≤2β),RT(π^)≤C(Te+1)logmT(all α≥0),
for all T≥T0, where π^ is Algorithm 1 run with horizon T.
Milestones
In the order the proof uses them:
Lemma 1: each arm is optimal with probability at least p=μminc0r0dvd.
Lemma 2: the number of epochs is at most ⌈βlogT/((2β+d)log2)⌉.
Lemma 3: the bandwidths are at least dδ.
Lemma 14: inestimable cubes are cubes where the data support is not regular.
Lemma 5: on the good events the regions behave as intended.
Lemma 16: uniform concentration of the local polynomial estimates.
Theorem 1: P(GˉkC∪MˉkC)≤(10+4Mβ2)k/T.
Significance
Together with the paper's lower bound (Theorem 3, not part of this mission), Theorem 2 identifies the minimax regret of smooth contextual bandits as T(β+d−αβ)/(2β+d) up to logarithmic factors when αβ≤d. The two known regimes are endpoints of this rate: β=1 recovers the non-differentiable rate T1−(1+α)/(2+d), and as β→∞ the exponent tends to the parametric value (1−α)/2, which is T without a margin condition (α=0) and polylogarithmic under a sharp margin (α=1). The result says how much the smoothness of the reward functions is worth in a sequential decision problem, and its algorithm shows that local polynomial estimators, which use data outside each cube, are needed to get there.
The theorem is proved in the paper; no machine-checked proof of it, or of any smooth (β>1) nonparametric bandit bound, is known. A formal proof would also check the paper's analysis, which has gaps recorded in this mission: Theorem 2's O-form fails for αβ>β+d when d>2β and its explicit constant needs αβ<β+d, Lemma 5's fourth statement needs the sample-size event of the current epoch, and a display of Lemma 3 is misprinted. The definitions layer (the Hölder class with derivatives, regular sets, the local polynomial estimator, an epoch-based algorithm on a probability space with coins) is reusable for other nonparametric bandit and estimation results.
Difficulty
The goal's own proof is short once its ingredients are available: the decomposition (13), Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, then a geometric sum. The weight is in Theorem 1 and Lemma 16. The samples of each epoch are collected adaptively: which contexts are sampled for arm a depends on regions computed from earlier data, so the samples are i.i.d. only conditionally on the past, with a conditional density that vanishes on the other arm's exploitation region. The classical analysis of local polynomial regression assumes a design density bounded below on a neighbourhood of every point and so does not apply. The paper restores a usable condition through the regularity of the regions Qa (Assumption 2) and the screening rule (6); making this rigorous requires conditioning on events of the past epochs, a lower bound on the smallest eigenvalue of the local Gram matrices uniformly over the grid, and a union bound over δ−d cubes. Bounding the estimation error at one point is not enough: the accuracy event Gk is a supremum over a region that is itself random.
Formalization scope
Contexts live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) with d≥1; arms are Bool (true is +1); Lean rounds start at 0. An instance is a structure on a probability space Ω that carries the contexts, the potential rewards of both arms, i.i.d. fair coins independent of the data, the support X and the mean rewards η±1. Its laws are stated through iIndepFun, identical distributions and the integral form of E[Y(a)∣X]=ηa(X). The Hölder condition uses Cb(β) on an open neighbourhood of X and iteratedFDeriv. The density condition is stated on measurable subsets of X. All standing parameter conditions are explicit (β≥1, L,L1>0, 0<c0≤1, r0>0, 0<μmin≤μmax, γ>0, α≥0).
Algorithm 1 is a concrete, total function of the contexts, the coins and the rewards of the pulled arms, with the paper's constants p, λ0, C0, the epoch lengths (10) and every tie-break as printed. Its conventions:
regions are finite sets of grid cells;
the bandwidth uses max(N,1);
G uses Lebesgue volume (equivalent under Assumption 3);
the local polynomial estimate is 0 exactly when the least-squares minimiser is not unique.
The goal must be proved for this algorithm. A statement for an abstract policy assumed to satisfy Lemma 5, or with regions or good events taken as hypotheses, would reduce Theorem 2 to the decomposition (13) and is not the theorem. The constants C, T0 and m are chosen before the instance. The O-form clause excludes only the parameters where it fails as printed (αβ>β+d with d>2β) and the boundary αβ=β+d.
Welcome contributions: proofs of the milestones; the conditional i.i.d. structure (Lemma 6) and the Gram-matrix bound (Lemma 7), which are used inside Lemma 16 but not stated here; and general lemmas on local polynomial regression and on regular sets.
Selected references
Y. Hu, N. Kallus, X. Mao, Smooth Contextual Bandits: Bridging the Parametric and Non-differentiable Regret Regimes, Operations Research 70(6), 2022; arXiv:1909.02553v4 (2020). https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.02553
The Mnemonomics of Contractual Screening: The Optimal Menu Under Limited Memory, and When Forgetting Lowers the Low Type's Marginal Price Below Its Perfect-Memory LevelResearch Paper
Motivation
Contract terms can affect what a buyer remembers when a later purchase decision arrives. In Guo's model, a buyer learns her expected value before signing a contract but loses direct access to that information before deciding whether to trade. She can infer her earlier value from the contract she chose. A seller therefore designs prices and upfront fees for two buyer types while accounting for the buyer's later belief. Guo's 2022 preprint asks how this loss of memory changes the screening menu relative to a buyer who remembers her type. The result matters for two-part tariffs: a high upfront fee and a low per-unit price can have a different incentive effect when choosing that tariff also changes the buyer's future belief.
Setting
There is one seller with marginal delivery costc≥0 and one buyer whose true expected value is either αH or αL, with αH>αL. The high value occurs with probability θ∈(0,1). The buyer knows her value when selecting a tariff, whereas the seller knows only the prior. The seller offers a menu of two-part tariffs, (TH,pH) and (TL,pL), each comprising an upfront payment and a marginal price. The outside option yields zero to both parties.
After selecting a tariff, the buyer observes a transaction cost b. Its continuous density is f and its cumulative distribution is F(x)=∫−∞xf(b)db. The buyer trades when b≤α−p, where α is the value she believes she has at that time. Under limited memory, she cannot recall her true type directly. In a separating outcome she infers αH from the high-type tariff and αL from the low-type tariff. A buyer who deviates to the other tariff also inherits that tariff's stage-two belief. The true value still determines the payoff from trade. Thus the buyer's expected payoff from (T,p) is
EU(T,p;α,α)=∫−∞α−p(α−b−p)f(b)db−T.
The seller's separating program (6) maximizes expected upfront receipts and trade margins over both tariffs. Feasibility imposes individual rationality for each type and both incentive constraints, with the deviating type evaluated at the belief associated with the tariff selected. A menu is optimal when it is feasible and no other feasible menu yields more seller profit. The comparison benchmark is the perfect-memory objective (4), in which the buyer remembers her true type after signing. Its low-type maximizing marginal price is denoted pLB.
The statement asserts that a feasible profit-maximizing menu with these prices exists. With positive density across the relevant transaction thresholds, every optimal menu has these marginal prices. The upfront fees are determined by the binding low-type participation and high-type incentive constraints, rather than fixed in the goal's displayed formula.
Comparison with perfect memory
Let pLB maximize the perfect-memory objective, with a locally rising and then falling objective around the two prices being compared. The same proposition gives the exact condition
The milestone list follows the paper's displayed steps: the payoff's integration-by-parts identity, the limited-memory information rent, binding constraints, the remaining incentive constraint, the reduced objective's derivatives and maximum, and the perfect-memory derivative comparison. Each milestone cites its location in the preprint.
Significance
Under limited memory, the low-type marginal price is higher than marginal cost by θ(αH−αL)/(1−θ). The comparison condition shows that this distortion can nevertheless be smaller than in the perfect-memory benchmark. It contrasts the density at the low type's transaction threshold with the average increase of the distribution function over an interval of length αH−αL. The choice of tariff changes the buyer's later belief, so a high type deviating to the low tariff has information rent (αH−αL)F(αL−pL) rather than the perfect-memory rent expressed by an integral of F. These are the paper's precise claims, including the possibility that forgetting changes the distortion in either direction. Guo, §§3.1–3.2.1 develops the two regimes.
The paper proves Proposition 1 on paper. This mission makes the program, its belief-dependent incentive constraints, the perfect-memory benchmark, and the exact comparison separately checkable in Lean. The density and CDF layer can be reused in other continuous-cost screening models. The theorem items are open proof obligations at the proposal stage; compilation of their statements does not constitute a machine-checked proof of Proposition 1.
Difficulty
The delicate point is that the incentive constraints compare payoffs under different stage-two beliefs. Replacing the deviating buyer's belief with her true type changes the screening problem and its information rent. Another obstacle is that the reduced objective has to establish global optimality for every continuous admissible density, including densities with zero regions; a first-order condition alone does not give that conclusion. Price uniqueness needs the paper's sufficiently wide support to be made precise. On the perfect-memory side, the price comparison depends on the derivative of an integral objective and on where its maximizing peak lies. These facts cannot be substituted by an assumed closed-form derivative without losing the content of the claim.
Formalization scope
The Lean model uses real-valued prices, fees, types, and transaction costs. It represents f as a continuous nonnegative probability density, derives F from f, and requires a finite first moment so all payoff integrals over a possibly unbounded support are finite. Integrals starting at the paper's lower support endpoint use (−∞,x] in Lean; the density vanishes below the support. One transaction period implements the paper's normalization n=1. The seller's feasibility predicate uses the weak IR and IC inequalities printed in program (6); the footnote's small fee cuts for tie-breaking are outside this predicate. The paper assumes differentiability of f, which is omitted because the statements here use only continuity. The separate uniqueness clause requires f>0 on an interval extending below αL−pL∗ and above αH−c.
The paper's standing phrase “single peaked” is represented by a global maximizer pLB and strict derivative signs on a local interval containing pL∗ and pLB. This local condition is explicit because a density with bounded support makes the objective flat outside the active trade region. Optimality in the goal is optimality among all feasible menus of program (6). It is never defined as maximization of the already reduced two-price objective. The broader claim that no pooling contract can improve the seller's equilibrium payoff, and the paper's two-step revelation refinement, are outside this mission. Useful contributions include the measure-integral identities, the original-program reduction, global price optimality, and the perfect-memory comparison.
Selected references
L. Guo, The Mnemonomics of Contractual Screening, SSRN preprint 3930657, 2022, pp. 6–12 and 28–30. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3930657