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Campaigns (experimental)

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Campaigns group missions around a shared mathematical goal. Each one tracks a quantity, such as an upper or lower bound. Have a good candidate in mind? Ping us on Slack, Zulip, or WeChat.

Block Sensitivity vs. Sensitivity

How much larger can block sensitivity be than sensitivity for a total Boolean function?

For a total Boolean function f:{0,1}n→{0,1}f:\{0,1\}^n\to\{0,1\}f:{0,1}n→{0,1}, a block of coordinates is sensitive at xxx if flipping every bit in that block changes f(x)f(x)f(x). Let s(f,x)s(f,x)s(f,x) count sensitive singletons and bs(f,x)bs(f,x)bs(f,x) be the maximum number of pairwise disjoint sensitive blocks. Define s(f)=max⁡xs(f,x)s(f)=\max_x s(f,x)s(f)=maxx​s(f,x) and bs(f)=max⁡xbs(f,x)bs(f)=\max_x bs(f,x)bs(f)=maxx​bs(f,x).

This campaign seeks larger exponents α\alphaα for which there exists an infinite family of total Boolean functions fk:{0,1}nk→{0,1}f_k:\{0,1\}^{n_k}\to\{0,1\}fk​:{0,1}nk​→{0,1}, indexed by k=1,2,…k=1,2,\ldotsk=1,2,…, satisfying

s(fk)→∞,bs(fk)≥s(fk)α−o(1)as k→∞.s(f_k)\to\infty,\qquad bs(f_k)\ge s(f_k)^{\alpha-o(1)}\quad\text{as }k\to\infty.s(fk​)→∞,bs(fk​)≥s(fk​)α−o(1)as k→∞.

Here o(1)o(1)o(1) denotes a quantity tending to zero as k→∞k\to\inftyk→∞. Higher is better. The classical exponent is 222, and Huang's bound gives a ceiling of 444.

OpenAI's construction achieves an exponent strictly greater than 222.

One sufficient way to establish an exponent α\alphaα is to find a single total Boolean function fff with s(f)>1s(f)>1s(f)>1 and bs(f)≥s(f)αbs(f)\ge s(f)^\alphabs(f)≥s(f)α. Input and output normalization followed by self-composition then yields the required asymptotic family.

≥ 2.13981Formalized record→≥ 2.15Open frontier
11 provers on it22 of 23 missions formalized

Integer Multiplication Below n log n

Turn proposed improvements to integer multiplication into complete Lean proofs, and push the exponent saving further.

Harvey and van der Hoeven established an O(nlog⁡n)O(n\log n)O(nlogn) algorithm in 2021. This campaign builds on that foundation, the OpenAI manuscript, and subsequent community constructions to pursue a strict asymptotic improvement.

For two nnn-bit integers, the target is

T(n)=O ⁣(n L(n)1−κ),L(n)=max⁡(⌈log⁡2n⌉,1).T(n)=O\!\left(n\,L(n)^{1-\kappa}\right),\qquad L(n)=\max(\lceil\log_2 n\rceil,1).T(n)=O(nL(n)1−κ),L(n)=max(⌈log2​n⌉,1).

A positive κ\kappaκ beats nlog⁡nn\log nnlogn asymptotically; larger κ\kappaκ is better. Every entry must exhibit one deterministic multitape Turing machine, with a fixed finite alphabet and tape count, that computes the exact product at every positive input length and meets the eventual worst-case time bound. The tracked number measures an asymptotic exponent saving.

≥ 3.6 × 10−5Formalized record→≥ 5.1 × 10−5Open frontier
8 provers on it4 of 7 missions formalized

3SUM Exponent

Classical algorithms solve 3SUM in O(n2)O(n^2)O(n2) time. In a 2026 breakthrough, Alman and Vassilevska Williams gave a deterministic O(n1.9992)O(n^{1.9992})O(n1.9992) algorithm, refuting the integer 3SUM hypothesis. How low can the exponent go?

Building on existing Lean formalizations, this campaign tracks upper bounds for 3SUM on polynomially bounded integers, using a word RAM with O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn)-bit words, and pursues smaller exponents.

≤ 1.960614Formalized record→≤ 1.9202796Open frontier
4 provers on it7 of 8 missions formalized

All-Pairs Shortest Paths (APSP) Exponent

Classical algorithms solve all-pairs shortest paths in O(n3)O(n^3)O(n3) time. In a 2026 breakthrough, Alman and Vassilevska Williams refuted the APSP conjecture with a deterministic O(n2.99942)O(n^{2.99942})O(n2.99942) algorithm. How low can the exponent go?

Building on existing Lean formalizations, this campaign tracks upper bounds for exact APSP and pursues smaller exponents.

≤ 2.995561Formalized record
3 provers on it5 of 5 missions formalized

The irrationality measure of π

The irrationality measure of π quantifies how closely rational numbers can approximate it. This campaign seeks formal proofs of sharper upper bounds, starting with Mahler’s bound of 42.

≤ 2Formalized record
19 provers on it9 of 9 missions formalized

Sharp diagonal Hlawka constant

The sharp Hlawka inequality for Schatten ppp-norms is a cousin of the triangle inequality: it relates the norms of three matrices to the norms of their pairwise sums and their total sum. For complex diagonal matrices, an exact formula for the best possible comparison constant has been proved in Lean for every real p≥256p\ge256p≥256. We conjecture that the same formula holds for all p≥2p\ge2p≥2.

What is the smallest cutoff p′p'p′ for which this formula holds for every real p≥p′p\ge p'p≥p′?

References:

  • Wolfram MathWorld, Hlawka's Inequality.
  • Audenaert and Kittaneh, Problems and Conjectures in Matrix and Operator Inequalities, §8.2 (2017).
  • Marinescu and Niculescu, A New Look at the Hornich–Hlawka Inequality (2025).
  • Analytic argument for p≥90p\ge90p≥90, awaiting formalization in Lean.
≤ 6Formalized record→≤ 4Open frontier
8 provers on it16 of 18 missions formalized

Odd numbers as sums of primes

Is every odd number a sum of kkk primes? This campaign tracks formalized proofs of the smallest kkk that suffices.

Schnirelmann (1930) showed some finite kkk works. Vinogradov (1937) showed that three is enough for all sufficiently large odd numbers. Tao (2012) proved k=5k = 5k=5 unconditionally. Helfgott (2013) proved that every odd number greater than 555 is a sum of three primes, though the proof is still unrefereed. Ideally, we can formalize this statement here. Note that three is optimal: 272727 is neither prime nor 222 + prime.

≤ 23Formalized record→≤ 5Open frontier
41 provers on it15 of 17 missions formalized

Matrix multiplication exponent

Schoolbook matrix multiplication takes n3n^3n3 operations. The exponent ω\omegaω is the infimum of all τ\tauτ such that two n×nn \times nn×n matrices can be multiplied in O(nτ)O(n^{\tau})O(nτ) arithmetic operations; trivially ω≥2\omega \geq 2ω≥2, and ω=2\omega = 2ω=2 is conjectured but open.

Strassen gave the first nontrivial bound, ω<2.81\omega < 2.81ω<2.81, in 1969, and introduced the laser method in 1986 to reach ω<2.48\omega < 2.48ω<2.48. Coppersmith and Winograd's 1990 bound of 2.3762.3762.376 stood for two decades. Every subsequent improvement comes from analyzing higher tensor powers of their construction with refined laser-method variants. That line reached ω<2.371339\omega < 2.371339ω<2.371339 in 2025, and the current record is ω<2.371177\omega < 2.371177ω<2.371177, from August 2026. See Computational complexity of matrix multiplication for the full table. Can we formalize these results and even improve on them?

≤ 2.25Formalized record
16 provers on it9 of 9 missions formalized

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Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

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Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Technical Note–A Simple Heuristic Policy for Stochastic Distribution Inventory Systems with Fixed Shipment Costs: An Upper Bound on the Long-Run Average Cost of Modified Echelon (r,Q) PoliciesResearch Paper

Motivation

A one-warehouse, multi-retailer (OWMR) distribution system is the basic model of a supply chain in which a central warehouse buys from an outside supplier and ships to several retail locations. When every shipment carries a fixed cost and a positive lead time, the optimal policy of the stochastic system is unknown, and the classical approach is to search over a structured class of policies and bound its cost. Exact evaluation of even a simple policy is hard, because the warehouse can run out of stock and then the retailers' replenishments interact.

Zhu, Chen, Hu and Yang (SSRN 2921743; Operations Research, 2021, doi:10.1287/opre.2021.2101) study modified echelon (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q) policies for continuous-review OWMR systems with Poisson demand. Their central tool is an explicit upper bound on the long-run average cost of any such policy, written as the retailers' single-stage (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q) costs, a warehouse term that depends on the retailer policies, and a fixed-cost allowance. Their heuristic policy, its worst-case performance guarantee and its asymptotic optimality (Theorems 2–4 of the paper) are all built on this bound. The single-stage cost functions follow Zheng (1992) and the echelon cost accounting follows Chen and Zheng (1994).

Setting

There are N≥1N\ge1N≥1 retailers, indexed i=1,…,Ni=1,\dots,Ni=1,…,N, and one warehouse, indexed 000. Retailer iii faces Poisson demand of rate λi>0\lambda_i>0λi​>0, independent across retailers, so the warehouse sees Poisson demand of rate λ0=∑iλi\lambda_0=\sum_i\lambda_iλ0​=∑i​λi​. Installation iii has a constant lead time Li>0L_i>0Li​>0, a fixed cost Ki>0K_i>0Ki​>0 per shipment, and an echelon holding cost rate hi>0h_i>0hi​>0; unmet retailer demand is backlogged at rate pi>0p_i>0pi​>0. Write Kˉ=max⁡iKi\bar K=\max_iK_iKˉ=maxi​Ki​.

A modified echelon (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q) policy has reorder levels rir_iri​ and order quantities Qi>0Q_i>0Qi​>0 for every installation. When the echelon inventory position IPiIP_iIPi​ of installation iii is at or below rir_iri​ and the upstream installation has stock on hand, a shipment raises IPiIP_iIPi​ as close as possible to ri+Qir_i+Q_iri​+Qi​.

With Di∼Poisson(λiLi)D_i\sim\mathrm{Poisson}(\lambda_iL_i)Di​∼Poisson(λi​Li​) the lead-time demand of retailer iii, the single-stage holding-and-backlog rate and the single-stage (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q) cost are

Gi(y)=E[hi(y−Di)++(h0+pi)(y−Di)−],Ci(ri,Qi)=λiKi+∫riri+QiGi(y) dyQi.G_i(y)=\mathbb E\big[h_i(y-D_i)^++(h_0+p_i)(y-D_i)^-\big],\qquad C_i(r_i,Q_i)=\frac{\lambda_iK_i+\int_{r_i}^{r_i+Q_i}G_i(y)\,dy}{Q_i}.Gi​(y)=E[hi​(y−Di​)++(h0​+pi​)(y−Di​)−],Ci​(ri​,Qi​)=Qi​λi​Ki​+∫ri​ri​+Qi​​Gi​(y)dy​.

With Gi(wi)=sup⁡ri<z≤ri+QiGi(z)G_i(w_i)=\sup_{r_i<z\le r_i+Q_i}G_i(z)Gi​(wi​)=supri​<z≤ri​+Qi​​Gi​(z), Mj=max⁡{Gj(wj),Cj(rj,Qj)}M_j=\max\{G_j(w_j),C_j(r_j,Q_j)\}Mj​=max{Gj​(wj​),Cj​(rj​,Qj​)} and Si=∑j≠i(rj+Qj)S_i=\sum_{j\ne i}(r_j+Q_j)Si​=∑j=i​(rj​+Qj​), the envelope of Lemma 3 at warehouse echelon level xxx is

Γˉi(x)=∑j≠iMj+{Mix−Si>ri,max⁡{Gi(x−Si),Mi}otherwise,Γˉ(x)=max⁡iΓˉi(x).\bar\Gamma_i(x)=\sum_{j\ne i}M_j+\begin{cases}M_i & x-S_i>r_i,\\ \max\{G_i(x-S_i),M_i\} & \text{otherwise},\end{cases}\qquad \bar\Gamma(x)=\max_i\bar\Gamma_i(x).Γˉi​(x)=j=i∑​Mj​+{Mi​max{Gi​(x−Si​),Mi​}​x−Si​>ri​,otherwise,​Γˉ(x)=imax​Γˉi​(x).

With D0∼Poisson(λ0L0)D_0\sim\mathrm{Poisson}(\lambda_0L_0)D0​∼Poisson(λ0​L0​), set G^=Γˉ−∑iCi\hat G=\bar\Gamma-\sum_iC_iG^=Γˉ−∑i​Ci​, Λ0(y)=E[h0(y−D0)+G^(y−D0)]\Lambda_0(y)=\mathbb E[h_0(y-D_0)+\hat G(y-D_0)]Λ0​(y)=E[h0​(y−D0​)+G^(y−D0​)] and

C^0(r0,Q0)=1Q0[λ0K0+∫r0r0+Q0Λ0(y) dy].\hat C_0(r_0,Q_0)=\frac1{Q_0}\Big[\lambda_0K_0+\int_{r_0}^{r_0+Q_0}\Lambda_0(y)\,dy\Big].C^0​(r0​,Q0​)=Q0​1​[λ0​K0​+∫r0​r0​+Q0​​Λ0​(y)dy].

The long-run average system cost is (1) of the paper,

C(r,Q)=1Q0[λ0K0+∫r0r0+Q0E[h0(y−D0)+Ω(y)] dy],C(r,Q)=\frac1{Q_0}\Big[\lambda_0K_0+\int_{r_0}^{r_0+Q_0}\mathbb E\big[h_0(y-D_0)+\Omega(y)\big]\,dy\Big],C(r,Q)=Q0​1​[λ0​K0​+∫r0​r0​+Q0​​E[h0​(y−D0​)+Ω(y)]dy],

where Ω(y)\Omega(y)Ω(y) is the expected cost rate of all retailers when the warehouse inventory position is yyy.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 13)

C(r,Q)≤CU(r,Q)≡∑i=1NCi(ri,Qi)+C^0(r0,Q0)+λ0KˉQ0.C(r,Q)\le C^U(r,Q)\equiv\sum_{i=1}^NC_i(r_i,Q_i)+\hat C_0(r_0,Q_0)+\frac{\lambda_0\bar K}{Q_0}.C(r,Q)≤CU(r,Q)≡i=1∑N​Ci​(ri​,Qi​)+C^0​(r0​,Q0​)+Q0​λ0​Kˉ​.

It is stated for every policy, with no assumption on the parameters beyond Qi,Q0>0Q_i,Q_0>0Qi​,Q0​>0.

Milestones

  1. App. A (3): the per-retailer bound: the charge of retailer iii is at most the own-retailer term of Γˉi(x)\bar\Gamma_i(x)Γˉi​(x).
  2. Lemma 3: the total retailer charge at a feasible state is at most Γˉ(x)\bar\Gamma(x)Γˉ(x).
  3. App. A (8): Γ^(x)≤Γˉ(x)=G^(x)+∑iCi\hat\Gamma(x)\le\bar\Gamma(x)=\hat G(x)+\sum_iC_iΓ^(x)≤Γˉ(x)=G^(x)+∑i​Ci​.
  4. App. A (9): Γ0(y)≤Λ0(y)+∑iCi\Gamma_0(y)\le\Lambda_0(y)+\sum_iC_iΓ0​(y)≤Λ0​(y)+∑i​Ci​.
  5. App. A (10): 1Q0[λ0K0+∫r0r0+Q0Γ0]≤C^0(r0,Q0)+∑iCi\frac1{Q_0}[\lambda_0K_0+\int_{r_0}^{r_0+Q_0}\Gamma_0]\le\hat C_0(r_0,Q_0)+\sum_iC_iQ0​1​[λ0​K0​+∫r0​r0​+Q0​​Γ0​]≤C^0​(r0​,Q0​)+∑i​Ci​.

Significance

The bound replaces the cost of an (N+1)(N+1)(N+1)-installation stochastic system, which has no closed form, by computable retailer costs and a warehouse term. This is what makes the paper's heuristic policy computable and what its performance guarantees compare against: each retailer uses its single-stage optimal (ri∗,Qi∗)(r_i^*,Q_i^*)(ri∗​,Qi∗​), and the warehouse minimizes the remaining term. Bounds of this decomposition type are a standard device in multi-echelon inventory theory, and Lemma 3's envelope, which charges each retailer at the lowest inventory position the others can leave it, is the step specific to the distribution setting.

The result is proved in the paper's online appendix. It has not been formalized. A formal development adds to the platform a single-stage (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q) cost with Poisson lead-time demand, the echelon envelope of Lemma 3 for general NNN, and an explicit OWMR cost decomposition, all of which are reusable by later work on distribution systems, including the paper's own performance bounds.

Difficulty

The core is Lemma 3 for general NNN. Bounding each retailer separately by its worst case max⁡{Gi(wi),Ci}\max\{G_i(w_i),C_i\}max{Gi​(wi​),Ci​} fails, because a retailer below its reorder level can have a much larger cost rate Gi(IPi)G_i(IP_i)Gi​(IPi​); the bound must use that the inventory positions are coupled through the warehouse echelon level. The printed proof is an induction on NNN whose step needs convexity of a sum in which one term is only bounded by a convex function, so the order of bounding and convexity arguments matters. Convexity and continuity of GiG_iGi​ (a Poisson mixture of piecewise-linear functions) must be established, and every expectation against the Poisson law needs an integrability argument, since the integrands grow linearly.

Formalization scope

All declarations live in the namespace DistribRQ.UpperBound. Retailers are indexed by Fin N with [NeZero N]; the warehouse data L0,K0,h0,r0,Q0L_0,K_0,h_0,r_0,Q_0L0​,K0​,h0​,r0​,Q0​ are separate. The primitives are bundled in Primitives N (all rates and costs positive) and the policy in Policy N (real ri,r0r_i,r_0ri​,r0​; Qi,Q0>0Q_i,Q_0>0Qi​,Q0​>0), following the paper's continuous approximation (p. 7). Poisson expectations are Bochner integrals over N\mathbb NN against poissonMeasure, evaluated at real arguments y−ny-ny−n. Gi(wi)G_i(w_i)Gi​(wi​) is the supremum of GiG_iGi​ over (ri,ri+Qi](r_i,r_i+Q_i](ri​,ri​+Qi​], since the paper's arg⁡max⁡\arg\maxargmax need not be attained on a half-open interval.

The sample-path model (cycles, shipment intervals, the paper's Lemmas 1–2) has no substrate, so the system is encoded as the paper's proof uses it:

  • C(r,Q)C(r,Q)C(r,Q) is (1), with Ω\OmegaΩ any interval-integrable function satisfying the bound of p. 12, Ω(y)≤λ0Kˉ/Q0+E[Γ^(y−D0)]\Omega(y)\le\lambda_0\bar K/Q_0+\mathbb E[\hat\Gamma(y-D_0)]Ω(y)≤λ0​Kˉ/Q0​+E[Γ^(y−D0​)]; this bound is where Lemmas 1–2 enter and is a hypothesis.
  • Γ^(x)=∫∑ici(zi) κ(x)(dz)\hat\Gamma(x)=\int\sum_ic_i(z_i)\,\kappa(x)(dz)Γ^(x)=∫∑i​ci​(zi​)κ(x)(dz) for any Markov kernel κ\kappaκ concentrated on the feasible states of p. A1 (zj≤rj+Qjz_j\le r_j+Q_jzj​≤rj​+Qj​; ∑jzj≤x\sum_jz_j\le x∑j​zj​≤x; and ∑jzj<x\sum_jz_j<x∑j​zj​<x forces zi>riz_i>r_izi​>ri​ for all iii), and any measurable, nonnegative admissible charges (ci(z)≤max⁡{Gi(z),Ci}c_i(z)\le\max\{G_i(z),C_i\}ci​(z)≤max{Gi​(z),Ci​} for z>riz>r_iz>ri​, ci(z)≤Gi(z)c_i(z)\le G_i(z)ci​(z)≤Gi​(z) for z≤riz\le r_iz≤ri​).
  • The theorem holds for every such κ\kappaκ, ccc and Ω\OmegaΩ, so the real system is an instance.

Γ^\hat\GammaΓ^ is never a free function bounded by Γˉ\bar\GammaΓˉ, the feasible set keeps the clause for positive warehouse stock, and GiG_iGi​, CiC_iCi​, Λ0\Lambda_0Λ0​ are computed from the Poisson law rather than taken as parameters; formalizations that relax any of these, or that rely on a junk value of sSup, an integral or a division, trivialize the statement and are not accepted.

Contributions welcome: convexity and continuity of GiG_iGi​, Poisson integrability lemmas, Lemma 3 for general NNN, and the averaging steps of App. A (8)–(10).

Selected references

  • H. Zhu, Y. (F.) Chen, M. Hu, Y. Yang, Technical Note—A Simple Heuristic Policy for Stochastic Distribution Inventory Systems with Fixed Shipment Costs, Operations Research, 2021. SSRN copy of 2020-09-08: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2921743; doi:10.1287/opre.2021.2101.
  • Y.-S. Zheng, On properties of stochastic inventory systems, Management Science 38(1), 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.38.1.87
  • F. Chen, Y.-S. Zheng, Lower bounds for multi-echelon stochastic inventory systems, Management Science 40(11), 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.11.1426
7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Sequential Multi-class Diagnosis: Under Exponential Tilting, Every Reachable Posterior Belief Is a Closed-Form Function of an r-Dimensional Diagnostic Statistic, r = rank(B)Research Paper

Motivation

In sequential multi-class diagnosis, a decision maker observes a system repeatedly, then chooses when to stop and which hidden class to report. Each new observation can improve the diagnosis, but waiting has a cost. A direct dynamic program uses the vector of posterior class probabilities as its state. With N+1N+1N+1 possible classes, that state lies in an NNN-dimensional probability simplex. Wang's model asks when the observed sequence can instead be summarized by fewer coordinates, so that the same posterior can be recovered without retaining a full belief vector as an independent state Wang, §2–§3.

The paper considers class distributions related by exponential tilting. This relationship appears in common one-dimensional distribution families, including the normal, binomial, Poisson, and gamma examples collected in its Table 1 Wang, p. 8. The result targeted here is the belief reconstruction identity of Theorem 1. Later parts of the paper use the reduced statistic in optimality equations and study stopping regions; those results are outside this mission Wang, pp. 12–18.

Setting

The hidden class is j∈{0,…,N}j\in\{0,\ldots,N\}j∈{0,…,N}. Before observing data, the decision maker has a prior belief θ=(θ0,…,θN)\theta=(\theta_0,\ldots,\theta_N)θ=(θ0​,…,θN​): every component is nonnegative and their sum is one. Conditional on class jjj, observations y1,…,yty_1,\ldots,y_ty1​,…,yt​ are independent and have the same density fjf_jfj​ on the observation space Y\mathcal YY. Class 000 supplies a baseline density f0f_0f0​. The one-step Bayesian operator B\mathcal BB multiplies each current class weight by that class's likelihood at the new observation and divides by the sum of all weighted likelihoods. Starting at Π0=θ\Pi_0=\thetaΠ0​=θ, the belief Πt\Pi_tΠt​ is obtained by applying B\mathcal BB once for each observation in arrival order Wang, pp. 6–7.

In the exponential tilting model, a transformed observation h(y)∈Rph(y)\in\mathbb R^ph(y)∈Rp and a parameter βj∈Rp\beta_j\in\mathbb R^pβj​∈Rp describe each nonbaseline density:

fj(y)=f0(y)exp⁡{βj0+βjTh(y)},βj0=−log⁡∫Yexp⁡{βjTh(y)}f0(y) dy.f_j(y)=f_0(y)\exp\{\beta_{j0}+\beta_j^{\mathsf T}h(y)\},\qquad \beta_{j0}=-\log\int_{\mathcal Y}\exp\{\beta_j^{\mathsf T}h(y)\}f_0(y)\,dy.fj​(y)=f0​(y)exp{βj0​+βjT​h(y)},βj0​=−log∫Y​exp{βjT​h(y)}f0​(y)dy.

Here j=1,…,Nj=1,\ldots,Nj=1,…,N. Place the βjT\beta_j^{\mathsf T}βjT​ in the rows of the diagnostic parameter matrix B\mathbb BB. Its rank decomposition is B=RP\mathbb B=\mathbb R\mathbb PB=RP, where R\mathbb RR has NNN rows and rrr linearly independent columns, while P\mathbb PP has rrr linearly independent rows and ppp columns. Thus r=rank⁡(B)r=\operatorname{rank}(\mathbb B)r=rank(B). The paper calls R\mathbb RR the reconstruction matrix and P\mathbb PP the projection matrix Wang, Definition 1, p. 8.

Formalization targets

Theorem 1: posterior reconstruction

For t≥1t\ge1t≥1, define the diagnostic statistic xt=P(∑m=1th(ym))/t∈Rrx_t=\mathbb P\big(\sum_{m=1}^t h(y_m)\big)/t\in\mathbb R^rxt​=P(∑m=1t​h(ym​))/t∈Rr. For classes j=1,…,Nj=1,\ldots,Nj=1,…,N, the target identity is

Πt(y1,…,yt,θ)j=Tjt(xt,θ)=θjexp⁡{t(βj0+ejRxt)}θ0+∑i=1Nθiexp⁡{t(βi0+eiRxt)}.\Pi_t(y_1,\ldots,y_t,\theta)_j =\mathcal T_j^t(x_t,\theta) =\frac{\theta_j\exp\{t(\beta_{j0}+e_j\mathbb R x_t)\}} {\theta_0+\sum_{i=1}^{N}\theta_i\exp\{t(\beta_{i0}+e_i\mathbb R x_t)\}}.Πt​(y1​,…,yt​,θ)j​=Tjt​(xt​,θ)=θ0​+∑i=1N​θi​exp{t(βi0​+ei​Rxt​)}θj​exp{t(βj0​+ej​Rxt​)}​.

The baseline coordinate is T0t=1−∑j=1NTjt\mathcal T_0^t=1-\sum_{j=1}^{N}\mathcal T_j^tT0t​=1−∑j=1N​Tjt​. The normalizer appearing in Tt\mathcal T^tTt is evaluated from the row eiRPe_i\mathbb R\mathbb Pei​RP, as in equation (3), and the theorem identifies it with the model normalizer through B=RP\mathbb B=\mathbb R\mathbb PB=RP. The target also identifies the set of posteriors reachable after exactly ttt observations with Tt(Ωt,θ)\mathcal T^t(\Omega_t,\theta)Tt(Ωt​,θ), where Ωt\Omega_tΩt​ is the set of attainable diagnostic statistics. These statements give a precise reading of the paper's claim that reachable beliefs admit an rrr-coordinate representation Wang, Theorem 1, p. 9; Definition 2, p. 10.

The goal additionally states that the map x↦Tt(x,θ)x\mapsto\mathcal T^t(x,\theta)x↦Tt(x,θ) is injective on Rr\mathbb R^rRr when every prior component is positive. This is an explicit, qualified reading of the paper's phrase that the dimensionality is equal to rrr. For discrete observations, the reachable set Ωt\Omega_tΩt​ can be finite, so the phrase cannot always mean its geometric dimension is literally rrr. The five milestones follow the source's Bayes operator and the displayed identities in its proof of Theorem 1 Wang, p. ec1.

Significance

The formula determines every posterior component from rrr real coordinates, the prior, and the observation count. When rrr is smaller than NNN, this supplies the representation used by the paper to reformulate a diagnosis problem in a smaller state space. The paper's examples show cases with one or two diagnostic coordinates; Proposition 1 then rewrites its optimality equations using those coordinates Wang, pp. 9–12. This mission formalizes the reconstruction claim itself, including the exact reachable-set statement, while leaving the decision costs and Bellman equations for later work.

A completed development would provide reusable definitions for a finite-class Bayes update and its sequential iterate, an exponential-tilting model over densities, and a rank-factorized reconstruction map. The result is proved in the cited paper. The Lean declarations in this proposal compile as statements, but their sorry bodies are open proof obligations; this mission seeks machine-checked proofs of them.

Difficulty

The main verification burden is connecting several expressions for the same posterior without quietly replacing one definition by another. A sequential posterior is an iterated one-step update; the paper's closed form is a normalized product of likelihoods; and equation (3) is an exponential expression in a projected sum of transformed observations. Each form has its own denominator, so the positivity conditions that make division meaningful must be stated. The rank claim also requires full-rank assumptions on both factors of B\mathbb BB. For a prior with zero mass on a class, the posterior formula remains meaningful, but the injectivity assertion needs a separate full-support condition.

Formalization scope

Lean represents classes by Fin (N + 1), with class zero as the baseline. Row i : Fin N of the diagnostic matrix is class i.succ. Observations form a List in arrival order; ttt is its length, and the posterior is the list fold of B\mathcal BB. The observation space is a measurable type with a reference measure μ\muμ, covering continuous and discrete densities with one notation. This generalizes the paper's Y⊆R\mathcal Y\subseteq\mathbb RY⊆R; no order or arithmetic operation on observations is used by Theorem 1. Integrals are real-valued, and N=0N=0N=0 and p=0p=0p=0 are permitted. The reconstruction identity is stated for t≥1t\ge1t≥1, matching the paper and avoiding the division by zero in xtx_txt​.

The standing assumptions say that every fjf_jfj​ is measurable, f0f_0f0​ is positive at every admitted observation, its integral is one, and each tilted baseline density is integrable. These make the normalizers and the Bayesian denominators meaningful. Positivity, normalization, and integrability are explicit refinements of the paper's use of densities and normalizing constants. The prior lies in the standard simplex; θ0\theta_0θ0​ need not be positive for reconstruction. The additional full-support condition appears only in the injectivity clause. The paper's conditional independence assumption is represented by multiplying class likelihoods along the list.

The generic Bayesian update and its reachable set are separate from the paper-specific model. In particular, the posterior is an actual fold of the one-step update, and the class densities are given data constrained by exponential tilting. Defining the posterior directly as equation (3), or defining the densities to make the tilting identity true by construction, would erase the result being formalized. A complete proof needs finite-sum identities, exponential and logarithm facts, integrability facts, matrix rank and row identities, and the algebra of probability normalization. The generic Bayes definitions and list-level likelihood identity are reusable beyond this paper; contributions that establish those interfaces or close any source-derived milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Wang, Optimal Sequential Multi-class Diagnosis, Operations Research 70(5), 2022; arXiv:1506.08915v4. The mission cites the v4 preprint's pages and indices.
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Fluid Limits for Multiclass Many-Server Queues with General Reneging Distributions and Head-of-the-Line Scheduling: Fluid-Scaled States Are Tight and Their Limit Points Are Fluid Model SolutionsResearch Paper

Motivation

Call centers, hospital wards and other service systems with many agents serve several customer classes, and customers who wait too long hang up or leave. The standard model is the multiclass many-server queue with reneging: NNN identical servers, JJJ classes, class-dependent service-time and patience-time distributions, and a control policy that decides when an idle server takes a customer and from which class. Exact analysis is out of reach once service and patience times are not exponential, so performance is studied through fluid limits: the limit of the system scaled by 1/N1/N1/N as N→∞N\to\inftyN→∞.

A. L. Puha and A. R. Ward (MOR 2022, doi:10.1287/moor.2021.1166) prove such a limit theorem for general service and patience distributions, batch arrivals and an arbitrary admissible head-of-the-line policy, including policies that idle or randomize. Earlier results covered one class without reneging (Kaspi and Ramanan, Ann. Appl. Probab. 2011), one class with reneging and unit arrivals (Kang and Ramanan, Ann. Appl. Probab. 2010), and static priority policies (Atar, Kaspi and Shimkin, Math. Oper. Res. 2014).

Setting

Fix J≥1J\ge1J≥1 classes. Class jjj has a service-time distribution GjsG^s_jGjs​ on R+\mathbb R_+R+​ with density gjsg^s_jgjs​, and a patience-time distribution GjrG^r_jGjr​ on [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] with density gjrg^r_jgjr​ on R+\mathbb R_+R+​, so a customer may never abandon. For a distribution GGG with density ggg, H=sup⁡{x:G(x)<1}H=\sup\{x:G(x)<1\}H=sup{x:G(x)<1} is the right edge of its support and h=g/(1−G)h=g/(1-G)h=g/(1−G) on [0,H)[0,H)[0,H) is its hazard function.

In the NNN-th queue, class-jjj customers arrive by a counting process EjNE^N_jEjN​ that may jump by more than one. The state is (αN,XN,νN,ηN)(\alpha^N,X^N,\nu^N,\eta^N)(αN,XN,νN,ηN): XjNX^N_jXjN​ counts class-jjj customers in system; νjN\nu^N_jνjN​ is the age-in-service measure, a unit atom at the service age of each class-jjj customer in service; and ηjN\eta^N_jηjN​ is the potential-queue measure, a unit atom at the time in system of each class-jjj customer whose patience has not run out. The control enters only through the entry-into-service times. A head-of-the-line (HL) policy serves each class in order of arrival. It is admissible when the entry-into-service process KNK^NKN is adapted to the filtration generated by the state history and the policy's own independent uniform random variables.

The fluid model works on the state space X=R+J×∏jM[0,Hjs)×∏jM[0,Hjr)\mathbb X=\mathbb R^J_+\times\prod_j\mathbf M[0,H^s_j)\times\prod_j\mathbf M[0,H^r_j)X=R+J​×∏j​M[0,Hjs​)×∏j​M[0,Hjr​) of finite measures with the weak topology. Given an arrival function EEE (nondecreasing, rcll, E(0)=0E(0)=0E(0)=0), a path (X,ν,η)(X,\nu,\eta)(X,ν,η) defines the auxiliary functions Bj=⟨1,νj⟩B_j=\langle1,\nu_j\rangleBj​=⟨1,νj​⟩, Qj=Xj−BjQ_j=X_j-B_jQj​=Xj​−Bj​, Dj(t)=∫0t⟨hjs,νj(u)⟩duD_j(t)=\int_0^t\langle h^s_j,\nu_j(u)\rangle duDj​(t)=∫0t​⟨hjs​,νj​(u)⟩du, Kj=Bj+Dj−Bj(0)K_j=B_j+D_j-B_j(0)Kj​=Bj​+Dj​−Bj​(0), I=1−∑jBjI=1-\sum_jB_jI=1−∑j​Bj​, and the reneging function

Rj(t)=∫0t∫0Qj(u)hjr((Fj,u)−1(y)) dy du,Fj,u(x)=⟨1[0,x],ηj(u)⟩.R_j(t)=\int_0^t\int_0^{Q_j(u)}h^r_j\big((F_{j,u})^{-1}(y)\big)\,dy\,du,\qquad F_{j,u}(x)=\langle1_{[0,x]},\eta_j(u)\rangle .Rj​(t)=∫0t​∫0Qj​(u)​hjr​((Fj,u​)−1(y))dydu,Fj,u​(x)=⟨1[0,x]​,ηj​(u)⟩.

A fluid model solution for EEE satisfies the constraints (35)–(37), the monotonicity of KKK, the balance law Xj=Xj(0)+Ej−Rj−DjX_j=X_j(0)+E_j-R_j-D_jXj​=Xj​(0)+Ej​−Rj​−Dj​, and the transport equations (46)–(47) for νj\nu_jνj​ and ηj\eta_jηj​ driven by dKjdK_jdKj​ and dEjdE_jdEj​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 17)

Under Assumptions 4 and 5, for every sequence of admissible HL policies:

{(XˉN,νˉN,ηˉN)}N is tight in D(X),\{(\bar X^N,\bar\nu^N,\bar\eta^N)\}_{N}\ \text{is tight in }\mathbf D(\mathbb X),{(XˉN,νˉN,ηˉ​N)}N​ is tight in D(X),

and every distributional limit point (X,ν,η)(X,\nu,\eta)(X,ν,η) is, almost surely, a continuous fluid model solution for EEE started from (X0,ν0,η0)(X^0,\nu^0,\eta^0)(X0,ν0,η0), with continuous auxiliary functions and each ηj(t)\eta_j(t)ηj​(t) charging no points. Assumptions 1–3 ask that the scaled arrivals and initial states converge. Assumption 4 asks that the hazards be bounded or lower semicontinuous near the right edges Hjs,HjrH^s_j,H^r_jHjs​,Hjr​. Assumption 5 adds continuity of EEE, an atomless η0\eta^0η0, and control of KˉN\bar K^NKˉN by C-tightness or by inequality (55).

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1, (24) and (26): the prelimit dynamic equations for ⟨f,νjN⟩\langle f,\nu^N_j\rangle⟨f,νjN​⟩ and ⟨ς,ηjN⟩\langle\varsigma,\eta^N_j\rangle⟨ς,ηjN​⟩.
  2. Lemma 6, (61): ⟨1[0,x]hjr,ηjN(t)⟩=∫0Fj,tN(x)hjr((Fj,tN)−1(y)) dy\langle1_{[0,x]}h^r_j,\eta^N_j(t)\rangle=\int_0^{F^N_{j,t}(x)}h^r_j((F^N_{j,t})^{-1}(y))\,dy⟨1[0,x]​hjr​,ηjN​(t)⟩=∫0Fj,tN​(x)​hjr​((Fj,tN​)−1(y))dy.
  3. Lemma 7: the compensator bounds ∣As,jN(φ,t)∣≤∥φ∥∞(XjN(0)+EjN(t))∫0mhjs|\mathcal A^N_{s,j}(\varphi,t)|\le\|\varphi\|_\infty(X^N_j(0)+E^N_j(t))\int_0^mh^s_j∣As,jN​(φ,t)∣≤∥φ∥∞​(XjN​(0)+EjN​(t))∫0m​hjs​ and the reneging analogue.
  4. Lemma 8: relative compactness in D(R+)\mathbf D(\mathbb R_+)D(R+​) of the fluid-scaled real processes, and their C-tightness under Assumption 5.
  5. Lemma 2 (i) and (iii): continuity and the absence of atoms propagate along fluid model solutions.

Significance

Theorem 1 characterizes fluid limits for every admissible HL policy at once. To get the fluid limit of a specific policy, one adds the equations that policy imposes and proves uniqueness for the resulting system; the paper does this for weighted random buffer selection (its Theorems 3–5). The reneging equation (40) is the main new feature: abandonment depends on the whole distribution of waiting times in queue, not only on the queue length. Allowing batch arrivals means the reneging count can only be sandwiched between two compensators, which is why Lemma 6 is needed.

The results are proved in the paper, with parts of the tightness argument delegated to Kang–Ramanan and Kaspi–Ramanan. None of them is formalized. The mission defines from scratch a measure-valued queue with abandonment, the Skorokhod space D(X)\mathbf D(\mathbb X)D(X) with J1J_1J1​ convergence, and the fluid model of §3. These definitions are reusable for the single-class models of Kaspi–Ramanan and Kang–Ramanan, for the WRBS and static-priority policies, and for other measure-valued fluid limits.

Difficulty

Each milestone is a known argument, but the obvious route to the goal breaks at the reneging term. A naive limit passage in the prelimit reneging count RjNR^N_jRjN​ fails: with batch arrivals, RjNR^N_jRjN​ is not a functional of ηjN\eta^N_jηjN​ and QjNQ^N_jQjN​ alone, because customers with equal waiting times may be split between queue and service. Identifying the limit as the nonlinear function (40) requires bounds from above and below by marked point processes. It also requires showing that the compensators of these processes converge to a common limit, which uses that η\etaη charges no points along the limit. The tightness part needs Kurtz–Jakubowski criteria for measure-valued processes on spaces [0,H)[0,H)[0,H) whose right end may carry escaping mass. Lemma 6 is a pathwise identity for finite counting measures, and Lemma 7 is a pathwise bound.

Formalization scope

Classes are Fin J with J≥1J\ge1J≥1. Time is ℝ≥0. Customers are indexed by integers as in the paper. Event times are extended reals: a patience of ∞\infty∞ keeps a customer in the potential queue forever, and an entry time of ∞\infty∞ means the customer is never served. M[0,H)\mathbf M[0,H)M[0,H) is FiniteMeasure on the subtype [0,H)[0,H)[0,H) of ℝ≥0. J1J_1J1​ convergence uses one time change for all coordinates, with the maximum of the sup-norm and Lévy–Prokhorov distances on X\mathbb XX. Convergence in distribution, distributional limit points, relative compactness and C-tightness are stated in coupling form; on the Polish space D(X)\mathbf D(\mathbb X)D(X) these are equivalent to the usual notions. Hazards take values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] and are 000 off [0,H)[0,H)[0,H). The integrals in (37), (40), (41), Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 are integrals of nonnegative functions. The derivative indicators that define the departure, reneging and marked processes are written as explicit counts.

Four readings are disclosed in the items. The goal's initial condition is stated through a coupling carrying (E,X0,ν0,η0)(E,X^0,\nu^0,\eta^0)(E,X0,ν0,η0) jointly, because the limit point lives on its own probability space. Gs,GrG^s,G^rGs,Gr in (46)–(47) are read as Gjs,GjrG^s_j,G^r_jGjs​,Gjr​. In Lemma 8, the (K.2) branch of Assumption 2 is read as relative compactness of KˉjN\bar K^N_jKˉjN​, because the printed (K.2) does not imply it. The goal encodes Assumption 2 as printed. The head-of-the-line order is the HL condition stated in words on pp. 8–9 rather than inequality (10) alone, which would let a policy skip a waiting customer for good and serve younger ones.

The statement admits trivializing formalizations, and they are excluded here. The HL predicate contains only the defining constraints of Definitions 1–3: entry no earlier than arrival and before abandonment (9), the head-of-the-line order (the HL condition of pp. 8–9, which contains (10): a customer can enter service only after every earlier customer of its class has entered or abandoned), the state constraints (S.1), (S.2), (15) and (16), and rcll paths. The identities (18)–(26) are not in it. All standing independence and distributional hypotheses and the adaptedness of KNK^NKN are explicit. The auxiliary functions R,D,B,Q,K,IR,D,B,Q,K,IR,D,B,Q,K,I are computed from the path, never chosen. The policy is not specialized: idling and randomization are allowed.

Not posed: Lemmas 3–5, 9 and 10, Theorem 2, and Lemma 2 (ii) and (iv). Lemma 4 needs a server-assignment filtration, Lemma 5 needs predictable quadratic variations, and Theorem 2, Lemma 9 and Lemma 10 need measure-valued marked point processes on [0,H)×R+[0,H)\times\mathbb R_+[0,H)×R+​. Formalizing these, or a sorry-free construction of an admissible system satisfying Assumptions 1–5, is welcome.

Selected references

  • A. L. Puha, A. R. Ward, Fluid limits for multiclass many-server queues with general reneging distributions and head-of-the-line scheduling, Mathematics of Operations Research, Articles in Advance, 2021 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2021.1166
  • H. Kaspi, K. Ramanan, Law of large numbers limits for many-server queues, Annals of Applied Probability 21 (2011) 33–114. https://doi.org/10.1214/10-AAP681
  • W. Kang, K. Ramanan, Fluid limits of many-server queues with reneging, Annals of Applied Probability 20 (2010) 2204–2260. https://doi.org/10.1214/10-AAP683
  • R. Atar, H. Kaspi, N. Shimkin, Fluid limits for many-server systems with reneging under a priority policy, Mathematics of Operations Research 39 (2014) 672–696. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2013.0632
  • S. N. Ethier, T. G. Kurtz, Markov Processes: Characterization and Convergence, Wiley, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316658
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Exploiting Random Lead Times for Significant Inventory Cost Savings: With Exponential Lead Times, the Generalized Base-Stock Policy's Scaled Stationary Inventory Level Converges to N(0, 1/(βγ))Research Paper

Motivation

In continuous-review inventory systems with backlogging, the classical constant base-stock (CBS) policy orders one unit whenever one unit of demand arrives, so that the inventory position (net inventory plus in-transit inventory) stays constant. Under CBS with Poisson demand of rate rrr and i.i.d. lead times with mean 1/β1/\beta1/β, the in-transit inventory has a Poisson law with mean r/βr/\betar/β, and the steady-state net inventory level Yr(∞)Y^r(\infty)Yr(∞) fluctuates on the scale r\sqrt rr​: E∣Yr(∞)∣/r→2(2πβ)−1/2\mathbb E|Y^r(\infty)|/\sqrt r \to 2(2\pi\beta)^{-1/2}E∣Yr(∞)∣/r​→2(2πβ)−1/2. Average holding and backlog costs therefore grow like r\sqrt rr​.

Stolyar and Wang (arXiv:1801.02646, Operations Research 2022) observe that when lead times are random and orders may cross, an inventory manager can exploit the randomness: by ordering more aggressively when the inventory level is low and less when it is high, the variance of the inventory level can be reduced. Their generalized base-stock (GBS) policy implements this with a single gain parameter γ\gammaγ. The main theoretical result, Theorem 1, identifies the diffusion-scale steady-state law of the inventory level under GBS when lead times are exponential: it is normal with variance 1/(βγ)1/(\beta\gamma)1/(βγ), a factor γ\gammaγ below the CBS variance. With γ=γ(r)→∞\gamma = \gamma(r) \to \inftyγ=γ(r)→∞ (Corollary 2), the scaled average cost E∣Yr(∞)∣/r\mathbb E|Y^r(\infty)|/\sqrt rE∣Yr(∞)∣/r​ tends to 000, so GBS becomes infinitely better than CBS in the limit.

Setting

Demand units (customers) arrive as a Poisson process of rate rrr. Supply units (items) are ordered by the policy and each arrives after an independent exponential lead time with mean 1/β1/\beta1/β. Let YYY be the net inventory level (positive or negative, backlog allowed) and Z≥0Z \ge 0Z≥0 the number of items in transit. Write a∨b=max⁡(a,b)a\vee b=\max(a,b)a∨b=max(a,b), a∧b=min⁡(a,b)a\wedge b=\min(a,b)a∧b=min(a,b), a+=a∨0a^+=a\vee 0a+=a∨0, a−=(−a)+a^-=(-a)^+a−=(−a)+.

The GBS policy has an integer gain γ≥1\gamma\ge 1γ≥1, a truncation level f>0f>0f>0 and a centering x∗x_*x∗​. With X∗=r/βX_* = r/\betaX∗​=r/β it uses the target and the truncated target

X=X∗−γ(Y−x∗),T=[X∧(X∗+f)]∨0.X = X_* - \gamma(Y - x_*), \qquad T = [X\wedge(X_*+f)]\vee 0 .X=X∗​−γ(Y−x∗​),T=[X∧(X∗​+f)]∨0.

At every arrival: a customer sets Y:=Y−1Y := Y-1Y:=Y−1; an item sets Y:=Y+1Y := Y+1Y:=Y+1, Z:=Z−1Z := Z-1Z:=Z−1. Then TTT is recomputed and A=⌈T−Z⌉∨0A = \lceil T - Z\rceil\vee 0A=⌈T−Z⌉∨0 items are ordered, Z:=Z+AZ := Z + AZ:=Z+A. Under exponential lead times (Y,Z)(Y,Z)(Y,Z) is a continuous-time Markov chain on Z×Z+\mathbb Z\times\mathbb Z_+Z×Z+​ with customer rate rrr and item rate βZ\beta ZβZ.

The systems are indexed by r→∞r\to\inftyr→∞, with f=f(r)f = f(r)f=f(r) satisfying

f(r)/r→0,f(r)/r→∞,f(r)/r\to 0, \qquad f(r)/\sqrt r\to\infty,f(r)/r→0,f(r)/r​→∞,

and x∗=x∗(r)x_* = x_*(r)x∗​=x∗​(r) arbitrary. A stationary distribution ppp of a countable chain with rates q(s,s′)q(s,s')q(s,s′) and exit rates q(s)q(s)q(s) is a probability mass function with finite mean exit rate satisfying global balance ∑sp(s)q(s,s′)=p(s′)q(s′)\sum_s p(s)q(s,s') = p(s')q(s')∑s​p(s)q(s,s′)=p(s′)q(s′).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

For every r>0r>0r>0 some state is reachable from every state, for all large rrr the chain has a unique stationary distribution, and for every choice of stationary distributions

Yr(∞)−x∗r⇒N(0,(βγ)−1),E[Yr(∞)−x∗r]±→(2πβγ)−1/2.\frac{Y^r(\infty)-x_*}{\sqrt r}\Rightarrow\mathcal N\big(0,(\beta\gamma)^{-1}\big),\qquad \mathbb E\Big[\frac{Y^r(\infty)-x_*}{\sqrt r}\Big]^{\pm}\to(2\pi\beta\gamma)^{-1/2}.r​Yr(∞)−x∗​​⇒N(0,(βγ)−1),E[r​Yr(∞)−x∗​​]±→(2πβγ)−1/2.

Milestones

In proof order: the stability part of Theorem 1; the conservation law βEZr(∞)=r\beta\mathbb E Z^r(\infty)=rβEZr(∞)=r (14); the mean bound for the reflected random walk QnQ_nQn​ that dominates the order gap (p. 16, EC.3); Lemma 4, EDr(∞)≤ED~r(∞)≤C\mathbb E D^r(\infty)\le\mathbb E\tilde D^r(\infty)\le CEDr(∞)≤ED~r(∞)≤C; the conservation law (19) and Lemma 5 for the artificial process, a birth–death chain Y^r\hat Y^rY^r that keeps Z^=⌈T^⌉\hat Z = \lceil\hat T\rceilZ^=⌈T^⌉ exactly; Corollary 6; the stochastic comparison Lemma 8, Y^r(∞)≤stYr(∞)\hat Y^r(\infty)\le_{st}Y^r(\infty)Y^r(∞)≤st​Yr(∞) and T^r(∞)≥stTr(∞)\hat T^r(\infty)\ge_{st}T^r(\infty)T^r(∞)≥st​Tr(∞); the target-gap bound (31); the transfer Lemma 9; and the reduction (36), EYr(∞)/r−EY^r(∞)/r→0\mathbb E Y^r(\infty)/\sqrt r - \mathbb E\hat Y^r(\infty)/\sqrt r\to 0EYr(∞)/r​−EY^r(∞)/r​→0. For §4 milestones the centering is x∗≡0x_*\equiv 0x∗​≡0, as in the paper (p. 12).

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 quantifies the value of random lead times: the GBS policy divides the asymptotic variance of the steady-state inventory level by γ\gammaγ, and the half-normal limits of E[⋅]±\mathbb E[\cdot]^\pmE[⋅]± give the asymptotic holding and backlog costs, which is what makes the cost comparison with CBS (bounds (12)–(13) and Corollary 2) possible. The artificial-process comparison and Lemma 9 form a reusable template for transferring a diffusion limit from a tractable one-dimensional chain to a higher-dimensional controlled chain.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version exists. The mission formalizes the GBS chain itself as explicit transition rates, so the theorem cannot be discharged by a model that only resembles the policy. The stability part is only sketched in the paper ("We omit further details of the stability proof", p. 13), so a complete formal proof also fills that gap. Lemma 5 is a stationary Halfin–Whitt-type limit for a birth–death chain with state-dependent up-rates, including uniform integrability of the scaled tails.

Difficulty

The two-dimensional chain has no product form, and its in-transit inventory does not track the target: after an item arrival YYY rises by one while the target XXX falls by γ\gammaγ, but only one item leaves transit, so ZZZ overshoots its target and the gap D=Z−⌈T⌉D = Z - \lceil T\rceilD=Z−⌈T⌉ is random. The natural argument, "the chain behaves like the birth–death chain with Z=⌈T⌉Z = \lceil T\rceilZ=⌈T⌉", fails on two counts: the steady-state gap must be bounded uniformly in rrr (Lemma 4), although the rates of the chain grow with rrr and ZZZ is unbounded on the state space, and the truncations of TTT at 000 and at X∗+fX_*+fX∗​+f produce error terms that must vanish after 1/r1/\sqrt r1/r​ scaling (Corollary 6). Stochastic order alone gives only an inequality between the two laws; closing it needs the mean identity (36), which rests on the exact conservation laws (14) and (19).

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace RandomLeadGBS.Diffusion. The state is (Y,Z)∈Z×N(Y,Z)\in\mathbb Z\times\mathbb N(Y,Z)∈Z×N; the demand rate rrr is real and r→∞r\to\inftyr→∞ along atTop. The parameters are β>0\beta>0β>0, γ∈N\gamma\in\mathbb Nγ∈N with γ≥1\gamma\ge 1γ≥1, f:R→Rf:\mathbb R\to\mathbb Rf:R→R with f>0f>0f>0 and (10), and arbitrary x∗:R→Rx_*:\mathbb R\to\mathbb Rx∗​:R→R. The policy is encoded literally: target (4), truncated target (5), order step Z+toNat⌈T−Z⌉Z + \mathrm{toNat}\lceil T - Z\rceilZ+toNat⌈T−Z⌉ applied after every arrival; the item rate is βZ\beta ZβZ and the cap is X∗+fX_*+fX∗​+f (not X∗+γx∗+fX_*+\gamma x_*+fX∗​+γx∗​+f).

Conventions committed to:

  • a stationary distribution is a probability solution of global balance with finite mean exit rate (the state space is unbounded in ZZZ);
  • expectations and probabilities are series over states, and every expectation bound also asserts the summability it needs;
  • weak convergence ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ is stated by its definition, through every bounded continuous test function, against Mathlib's gaussianReal 0 (1/(βγ));
  • the paper's "irreducible" is replaced by "some state is reachable from every state", because states with Z<⌈T(Y)⌉Z<\lceil T(Y)\rceilZ<⌈T(Y)⌉ are never entered;
  • "uniformly in rrr" and "sup⁡r\sup_rsupr​" (Lemma 4, Corollary 6, (31)) are stated for all r≥r0r\ge r_0r≥r0​.

The goal concerns the two-dimensional GBS chain; stating it for the artificial chain, or only for an empty family of stationary laws, would trivialize it. The uniqueness clause and the existence clause of Lemma 5 rule out the vacuous reading.

A complete development needs a theory of stationary laws of countable continuous-time chains (existence via drift/Foster criteria, embedded-chain time change), birth–death stationary laws and their local normal asymptotics, and stochastic comparison of chains by coupling. The countable-chain stationarity layer and Lemma 9 are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative routes to the goal, are welcome. Propositions 3 and 7 (generic comparison results used for Lemma 4 and Lemma 8) are not posed as milestones.

Selected references

  • A. L. Stolyar and Q. Wang, Exploiting random lead times for significant inventory cost savings, Operations Research, 2022; preprint arXiv:1801.02646v6, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.02646
  • S. M. Disney, A. Maltz, X. Wang and R. D. H. Warburton, Inventory management for stochastic lead times with order crossovers, European Journal of Operational Research 248(2), 473–486, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.07.047
  • S. Halfin and W. Whitt, Heavy-traffic limits for queues with many exponential servers, Operations Research 29(3), 567–588, 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.29.3.567
  • T. Lindvall, Lectures on the Coupling Method, Dover, 1992.
  • S. P. Meyn and R. L. Tweedie, Markov Chains and Stochastic Stability, Springer, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-3267-7
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Implications of Price Matching in Supply Chain Negotiation: Under Symmetric Bargaining Power the Seller Prefers Price Matching to Simultaneous Negotiation and Both Buyers Prefer the ReverseResearch Paper

Motivation

A seller that supplies several competing buyers may negotiate a wholesale price with each of them independently and simultaneously (simultaneous negotiation, SN), or may commit to charge all of them the same price (price-matching negotiation, PM). PM is the bargaining counterpart of the most-favoured-customer clause, a contractual guarantee that a customer receives the best price the vendor gives anyone. Retailers such as Walmart and Costco demand such clauses from common suppliers, and buyers command them expecting to obtain the same price as their rivals (Shang and Cai, §1). Shang and Cai (MSOM, 2021; SSRN 3021563) ask who benefits from PM relative to SN when wholesale prices are the outcome of Nash bargaining between the seller and each buyer, and show that with symmetric buyers PM benefits the seller and hurts both buyers.

The model builds on the bilateral-bargaining framework of Horn and Wolinsky (1988), in which a common supplier negotiates simultaneously with competing downstream firms, and on the analysis of negotiated wholesale contracts by O'Brien and Shaffer (2005, RAND Journal of Economics 36, 573–595) and Dukes, Gal-Or and Srinivasan (2006).

Setting

A seller supplies an intermediate good to Buyer 1 and Buyer 2, who each turn one unit of it into one unit of a substitutable end product. With demand base a>0a > 0a>0 and substitutability γ∈[0,1)\gamma \in [0,1)γ∈[0,1), retail prices and quantities satisfy the reverse demand system pi=a−xi−γxjp_i = a - x_i - \gamma x_jpi​=a−xi​−γxj​, j=3−ij = 3 - ij=3−i.

The game has two stages.

  1. Retail stage. Given wholesale prices (wi,wj)(w_i, w_j)(wi​,wj​), the buyers set retail prices in a differentiated Bertrand game. Buyer iii earns πi=(pi−wi)xi\pi_i = (p_i - w_i)x_iπi​=(pi​−wi​)xi​ and the seller earns πs=wixi+wjxj\pi_s = w_i x_i + w_j x_jπs​=wi​xi​+wj​xj​. Writing p^i(wi,wj)\hat p_i(w_i,w_j)p^​i​(wi​,wj​) and x^i(wi,wj)\hat x_i(w_i,w_j)x^i​(wi​,wj​) for the equilibrium prices and quantities, the second-stage profits are πi(wi,wj)\pi_i(w_i,w_j)πi​(wi​,wj​) and πs(wi,wj)\pi_s(w_i,w_j)πs​(wi​,wj​).
  2. Negotiation stage. Wholesale prices are set by generalized Nash bargaining: Buyer iii has bargaining power θi∈(0,1)\theta_i \in (0,1)θi​∈(0,1) against the seller, who has 1−θi1-\theta_i1−θi​. A bargain over a price w≥0w \ge 0w≥0 with buyer payoff U(w)U(w)U(w), seller payoff V(w)V(w)V(w) and disagreement point (0,d)(0, d)(0,d) selects the individually rational www maximizing U(w)θi(V(w)−d)1−θiU(w)^{\theta_i}(V(w) - d)^{1-\theta_i}U(w)θi​(V(w)−d)1−θi​.

If a negotiation fails, the seller can sell to the other buyer alone. Then Buyer jjj faces demand a−pja - p_ja−pj​, and the seller earns the monopoly profit πsM(wj)\pi^M_s(w_j)πsM​(wj​).

The two mechanisms are:

  • Simultaneous negotiation (SN). The seller bargains with both buyers at once. A pair (w1SN,w2SN)(w^{SN}_1, w^{SN}_2)(w1SN​,w2SN​) is an equilibrium if each wiSNw^{SN}_iwiSN​ solves dyad iii's bargain with payoffs πi(⋅,wjSN)\pi_i(\cdot, w^{SN}_j)πi​(⋅,wjSN​), πs(⋅,wjSN)\pi_s(\cdot, w^{SN}_j)πs​(⋅,wjSN​) and disagreement point (0,πsM(wjSN))(0, \pi^M_s(w^{SN}_j))(0,πsM​(wjSN​)).
  • Price matching (PM). The seller bargains with one buyer first; the other buyer accepts the same price. If the first bargain fails, the seller bargains with the other buyer alone, reaching w^j\hat w_jw^j​. The PM price wPMw^{PM}wPM solves the bargain with payoffs πi(w,w)\pi_i(w,w)πi​(w,w), πs(w,w)\pi_s(w,w)πs​(w,w) and disagreement point (0,πsM(w^j))(0, \pi^M_s(\hat w_j))(0,πsM​(w^j​)).

The Lean development uses this notation: pHat, xHat, piB (πi\pi_iπi​), piS (πs\pi_sπs​), piMb, piMs, IsNashBargain, IsSNEq, IsPMPrice.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 10)

With symmetric power θ1=θ2=θ∈(0,1)\theta_1 = \theta_2 = \theta \in (0,1)θ1​=θ2​=θ∈(0,1), an SN equilibrium and a PM equilibrium price exist, and for every SN equilibrium (w1,w2)(w_1, w_2)(w1​,w2​) and every PM price www

πs(w1,w2)<πs(w,w),π1(w,w)<π1(w1,w2),π2(w,w)<π2(w2,w1).\pi_s(w_1,w_2) < \pi_s(w,w), \qquad \pi_1(w,w) < \pi_1(w_1,w_2), \qquad \pi_2(w,w) < \pi_2(w_2,w_1).πs​(w1​,w2​)<πs​(w,w),π1​(w,w)<π1​(w1​,w2​),π2​(w,w)<π2​(w2​,w1​).

The goal is stated about the equilibrium predicates, not about the closed-form prices, so that it asserts the comparison of the two mechanisms as the paper defines them.

Milestones

  1. The retail equilibrium p^i\hat p_ip^​i​, x^i\hat x_ix^i​ and the profit formulas (1)–(2), §3.1.1.
  2. The single-channel monopoly price and profits, §3.1.2.
  3. The single-channel bargain w^j=(1−θj)a/2\hat w_j = (1-\theta_j)a/2w^j​=(1−θj​)a/2, with πsM(w^j)=(1−θj2)a2/8\pi^M_s(\hat w_j) = (1-\theta_j^2)a^2/8πsM​(w^j​)=(1−θj2​)a2/8, §3.2.2.
  4. The SN equilibrium is unique and equals wSN=(1−θ)(1−γ)(2+γ)a2(1−γ)(2+γ)+γ2(1+γ)(2−γ)θw^{SN} = \dfrac{(1-\theta)(1-\gamma)(2+\gamma)a}{2(1-\gamma)(2+\gamma) + \gamma^2(1+\gamma)(2-\gamma)\theta}wSN=2(1−γ)(2+γ)+γ2(1+γ)(2−γ)θ(1−θ)(1−γ)(2+γ)a​, §3.2.1.
  5. The PM equilibrium price is unique and equals wiPM=a4(3−θi−1−γθi+γ2θi+θi2+(1+γ)(2−γ)θiθj2)w^{PM}_i = \tfrac a4\bigl(3 - \theta_i - \sqrt{1 - \gamma\theta_i + \gamma^2\theta_i + \theta_i^2 + (1+\gamma)(2-\gamma)\theta_i\theta_j^2}\bigr)wiPM​=4a​(3−θi​−1−γθi​+γ2θi​+θi2​+(1+γ)(2−γ)θi​θj2​​), §3.2.2, for general θi,θj\theta_i, \theta_jθi​,θj​.
  6. 0<wSN<wPM≤a/20 < w^{SN} < w^{PM} \le a/20<wSN<wPM≤a/2 under symmetric power, §3.2.2.
  7. At a common price, πs(w,w)\pi_s(w,w)πs​(w,w) increases on [0,a/2][0, a/2][0,a/2] and πi(w,w)\pi_i(w,w)πi​(w,w) decreases on [0,a][0,a][0,a] (proof of Theorem 1, Online Supplement p. 1).

Significance

Theorem 1 separates the effect of the negotiation mechanism from any asymmetry between buyers: under symmetric power the buyers are interchangeable, SN gives them the same price, and still the mechanism alone moves surplus from the buyers to the seller. The paper's explanation is that price matching lowers a buyer's incentive to negotiate the price down, so the matched wholesale price is higher (p. 10). The paper builds its asymmetric-power, side-payment and spot-market results (§§4–6) on this comparison.

The result is proved in the paper; nothing here is open. Neither the result nor its ingredients have been formalized. The mission produces a machine-checked account of a two-stage bargaining-over-competition model: the Bertrand stage, the Nash-bargaining stage with endogenous disagreement points, and the closed-form equilibria. Two steps the paper only asserts become formal obligations: uniqueness of the SN equilibrium, and the claim that the closed-form PM price is the global maximizer of the Nash product.

Difficulty

The comparison step is short once the closed forms are known: by milestones 6 and 7 the PM price is higher, the seller's diagonal profit increases, and the buyers' decreases. The work is in the equilibrium characterizations.

  • In SN each dyad's disagreement payoff πsM(wj)\pi^M_s(w_j)πsM​(wj​) depends on the other dyad's outcome, so an equilibrium is a fixed point of two coupled Nash-product maximizations. The paper asserts uniqueness. The best-response map is not a contraction for γ\gammaγ near 111, so a contraction argument does not give uniqueness directly.
  • The Nash products involve real powers with exponents θ\thetaθ and 1−θ1-\theta1−θ. Showing that the first-order condition picks out the global maximizer over the individually rational set requires a concavity or single-peakedness argument, not just a derivative computation.
  • The PM closed form contains a square root. Comparing it with the rational function wSNw^{SN}wSN is an inequality in three parameters (γ,θ,a)(\gamma, \theta, a)(γ,θ,a).

Formalization scope

All quantities are real numbers. The standing assumptions are a>0a > 0a>0, γ∈[0,1)\gamma \in [0,1)γ∈[0,1) and every bargaining power in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1). The sign a>0a > 0a>0 is added; the paper never states it.

  • Bargaining. A Nash bargaining solution maximizes Uθ(V−d)1−θU^{\theta}(V-d)^{1-\theta}Uθ(V−d)1−θ over the individually rational prices {w≥0:U(w)≥0, V(w)≥d}\{w \ge 0 : U(w) \ge 0,\ V(w) \ge d\}{w≥0:U(w)≥0, V(w)≥d}. Lean's Real.rpow is the real power only on non-negative bases, and the individually rational set guarantees non-negative bases.
  • Feasible domain. Equilibrium wholesale prices are required to lie in [0,a][0,a][0,a], the paper's "entire feasible domain" (p. 9; Online Supplement p. 1); bargaining deviations range over all individually rational w≥0w \ge 0w≥0.
  • Second-stage profits. πi\pi_iπi​ and πs\pi_sπs​ are defined from the demand system at (p^i,p^j)(\hat p_i,\hat p_j)(p^​i​,p^​j​), not by the closed forms (1)–(2), so milestone 1 is a genuine identity.
  • PM outcome. In PM the matched price applies to both buyers, and the seller negotiates first with Buyer 1. With symmetric power the choice of first buyer is immaterial.
  • Preference. "Prefers" is strict; θ∈(0,1)\theta \in (0,1)θ∈(0,1) excludes the paper's equality cases.

Substituting the closed-form prices wSNw^{SN}wSN, wPMw^{PM}wPM into the profit comparison would turn Theorem 1 into the algebra of milestones 6–7. The goal is therefore stated for every equilibrium of each mechanism, together with existence of both equilibria, so neither the closed forms nor a vacuous equilibrium set can discharge it.

A complete development needs:

  • concavity of the Nash product along the individually rational interval (reusable for other one-dimensional Nash-bargaining models);
  • the Bertrand equilibrium of a linear differentiated duopoly;
  • real-analysis inequalities involving square roots.

Contributions to any milestone, or to reusable lemmas on maximizing uθv1−θu^{\theta} v^{1-\theta}uθv1−θ over an interval, are welcome.

Selected references

  • W. Shang and G. Cai, Implications of Price Matching in Supply Chain Negotiation, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2021 (accepted manuscript, SSRN 3021563). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3021563 — DOI https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0992
  • H. Horn and A. Wolinsky, Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger, RAND Journal of Economics 19(3), 408–419, 1988. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555721
  • D. P. O'Brien and G. Shaffer, Bargaining, Bundling, and Clout: The Portfolio Effects of Horizontal Mergers, RAND Journal of Economics 36, 573–595, 2005.
  • A. Dukes, E. Gal-Or and K. Srinivasan, Channel Bargaining with Retailer Asymmetry, Journal of Marketing Research 43, 84–97, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.43.1.84
  • E. Kalai, Nonsymmetric Nash Solutions and Replications of 2-Person Bargaining, International Journal of Game Theory 6(3), 129–133, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01770215
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Dynamic Fair Resource Division: The Optimal Fairness Ratio of d-Uniform Control Vectors Is 1/((d+1)·ln((d+1)/d)), Attained by the Frugally Fair AlgorithmResearch Paper

Motivation

Shared computing infrastructure — a data-centre cluster, a cloud platform's memory — is divided among users who arrive over time. Two requirements pull against each other. Proportional fairness asks that, when ttt users are present, each holds at least a 1/t1/t1/t fraction of the resource. Limited disruption asks that the system not take resource away from running jobs at every arrival, because preemption and reallocation are costly; production cluster managers such as Google's Borg impose an explicit cap on the number of task disruptions an update may cause (Verma et al., 2015, as quoted in Vardi–Psomas–Friedman 2022, pp. 945–946). If reallocation were free, the resource could be re-split evenly at every arrival; if fairness did not matter, the first user could keep everything. The question is how much fairness survives a hard cap on disruptions.

Earlier work on dynamic fair division (Walsh 2011, online cake cutting; Kash, Procaccia and Shah 2014) did not allow reallocation at all. Friedman, Psomas and Vardi (EC 2017) introduced control vectors and gave non-optimal algorithms. Vardi, Psomas and Friedman (Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022) give an optimal algorithm for every control vector once the target ratio is known, and compute the optimal ratio exactly for uniform disruption budgets. This mission formalizes that exact computation.

Setting

One unit of a homogeneous, divisible resource is shared. Users arrive one at a time and never leave (the paper treats arrivals and departures separately; §§3–5, which this mission covers, are arrivals only). Users are labelled by arrival order, and XktX^t_kXkt​ is the share of the (k+1)(k+1)(k+1)-th user when ttt users are present.

A control vector ψ\psiψ of length n∈{1,2,… }∪{∞}n \in \{1,2,\dots\}\cup\{\infty\}n∈{1,2,…}∪{∞} fixes, for each arrival 1≤t≤n1 \le t \le n1≤t≤n, a budget ψ[t]\psi[t]ψ[t]: when the ttt-th user arrives, at most ψ[t]\psi[t]ψ[t] of the t−1t-1t−1 users already present may have their share strictly reduced (disrupted). Increasing a share is free. The ddd-uniform control vector has ψ[t]=d\psi[t] = dψ[t]=d for every ttt, of any length, finite or infinite.

An allocation sequence X=(X1,X2,… )X = (X^1, X^2, \dots)X=(X1,X2,…) for ψ\psiψ is feasible if at every time 1≤t≤n1 \le t \le n1≤t≤n the shares are nonnegative, sum to at most 111, and respect the disruption budget. Its fairness ratio is

inf⁡1≤t≤n  t⋅min⁡k<tXkt,\inf_{1 \le t \le n}\; t \cdot \min_{k<t} X^t_k ,1≤t≤ninf​t⋅k<tmin​Xkt​,

the smallest share relative to the proportional share 1/t1/t1/t, in the worst time step. The fairness ratio of the control vector, FAIRNESS(ψ)\mathrm{FAIRNESS}(\psi)FAIRNESS(ψ), is the supremum of this quantity over all feasible allocation sequences, and

FAIRNESS(d-uniform)=inf⁡ψ d-uniformFAIRNESS(ψ).\mathrm{FAIRNESS}(d\text{-uniform}) = \inf_{\psi\ d\text{-uniform}} \mathrm{FAIRNESS}(\psi).FAIRNESS(d-uniform)=ψ d-uniforminf​FAIRNESS(ψ).

The frugally fair algorithm FFA(ψ,σ)\mathrm{FFA}(\psi,\sigma)FFA(ψ,σ) takes a target ratio σ\sigmaσ: when user ttt arrives, it gives the newcomer σ/t\sigma/tσ/t and cuts the ψ[t]\psi[t]ψ[t] largest existing shares to σ/t\sigma/tσ/t. It may allocate more than one unit; StS^tSt denotes its total allocation at time ttt.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4

For every integer d≥1d \ge 1d≥1,

FAIRNESS(d-uniform)  =  σd∗  :=  1(d+1)ln⁡ ⁣(d+1d).\mathrm{FAIRNESS}(d\text{-uniform}) \;=\; \sigma^*_d \;:=\; \frac{1}{(d+1)\ln\!\big(\frac{d+1}{d}\big)} .FAIRNESS(d-uniform)=σd∗​:=(d+1)ln(dd+1​)1​.

The goal states this in three parts: the infinite ddd-uniform vector admits one feasible allocation sequence with ratio at least σd∗\sigma^*_dσd∗​; for every σ>σd∗\sigma > \sigma^*_dσ>σd∗​ some finite ddd-uniform vector admits no feasible allocation sequence with ratio σ\sigmaσ; and the infimum over all lengths of FAIRNESS\mathrm{FAIRNESS}FAIRNESS equals σd∗\sigma^*_dσd∗​. For d=1d = 1d=1, σ1∗=1/(2ln⁡2)≈0.721\sigma^*_1 = 1/(2\ln 2) \approx 0.721σ1∗​=1/(2ln2)≈0.721.

Milestones

  1. Feasible runs of FFA yield feasible allocation sequences with the same shares and ratio σ\sigmaσ (§3, p. 949).
  2. Theorem 1 (p. 950): if any algorithm achieves a nonnegative ratio σ\sigmaσ on ψ\psiψ, then FFA(ψ,σ)\mathrm{FFA}(\psi,\sigma)FFA(ψ,σ) is feasible at every time.
  3. Lemma 1 (p. 951): FFA(ψ,σ)\mathrm{FFA}(\psi,\sigma)FFA(ψ,σ) is FFA(ψ,σ′)\mathrm{FFA}(\psi,\sigma')FFA(ψ,σ′) scaled by σ/σ′\sigma/\sigma'σ/σ′.
  4. Proposition 2 (p. 952): FAIRNESS(ψ)≤FAIRNESS(ψ′)\mathrm{FAIRNESS}(\psi) \le \mathrm{FAIRNESS}(\psi')FAIRNESS(ψ)≤FAIRNESS(ψ′) when ψ′\psi'ψ′ is a prefix of ψ\psiψ.
  5. Lemma E.1 (p. 959): the explicit allocation of FFA on the infinite ddd-uniform vector at time t=ℓ(d+1)+it = \ell(d+1)+it=ℓ(d+1)+i.
  6. StS^tSt is nondecreasing in ttt on the ddd-uniform vector (p. 959).
  7. Display (E.1) (p. 959): lim⁡ℓ→∞Sℓ(d+1)=σ(d+1)ln⁡d+1d\lim_{\ell\to\infty} S^{\ell(d+1)} = \sigma(d+1)\ln\frac{d+1}{d}limℓ→∞​Sℓ(d+1)=σ(d+1)lndd+1​.

Significance

The theorem gives a closed-form price of limited disruption: with ddd reallocations per arrival, a system can guarantee every user σd∗/t\sigma^*_d/tσd∗​/t of the resource forever, and no algorithm can guarantee more uniformly over all horizons. Since σd∗=1−12d+O(d−2)\sigma^*_d = 1 - \frac{1}{2d} + O(d^{-2})σd∗​=1−2d1​+O(d−2), a modest budget already recovers most of proportional fairness, which is the quantitative content a system designer needs to choose ddd. Combined with Theorem 1, the value also turns FFA into a concrete optimal algorithm for the infinite ddd-uniform vector, running online with no knowledge of the horizon.

The result is proved in the paper; to the best of a search of the Prove2Me catalogue, nothing about control vectors, disruption-limited fair division or this constant is formalized there. The mission produces a machine-checked model of disruption-limited dynamic allocation, a formal optimality proof for a greedy online algorithm (Theorem 1) that is reusable for other control vectors (the paper's finite-vector algorithm and ccc-gap bounds rest on the same theorem), and an explicit harmonic-sum asymptotic.

Difficulty

The impossibility half must rule out every algorithm, including ones that over-allocate early, raise shares opportunistically and choose whom to disrupt adaptively. The first idea, comparing total allocations time by time, fails: an arbitrary algorithm's allocation is not entrywise comparable with any fixed reference allocation, and a single well-chosen disruption can change which users are largest. The attainment half needs one allocation sequence for an unbounded horizon, so it cannot be obtained from finitely many feasibility checks; and the value σd∗\sigma^*_dσd∗​ is not the outcome of any finite computation but a limit of harmonic-number differences. The paper's own computation of the one-step change in total allocation contains a slip (a missing factor ℓ\ellℓ; the sign is unaffected), so that step cannot be transcribed as printed.

Formalization scope

Everything is real-valued and lives in DynFairDiv.Uniform. A control vector is ψ : ℕ → ℕ (index t≥1t \ge 1t≥1) with a horizon n : ℕ∞, where ⊤ is the infinite vector; uniformCV d is the constant vector. Allocation sequences are X : ℕ → ℕ → ℝ with users labelled by arrival order, which is equivalent to the paper's sorted vectors because feasibility uses only sums, fairness only minima, and a disruption is a strict decrease of a given user's share; the newcomer is never counted as disrupted. Fairness at least σ\sigmaσ is σ / t ≤ X t k for all 1≤t≤n1 \le t \le n1≤t≤n and k<tk < tk<t. FAIRNESS(ψ)\mathrm{FAIRNESS}(\psi)FAIRNESS(ψ) is a real sSup, genuine for n≥1n \ge 1n≥1. FFA's state is a list of shares kept in nonincreasing order, so "the ψ[t]\psi[t]ψ[t] largest shares" is the front of the list. Departures (the paper's §6) are not modelled.

Added hypotheses, each disclosed in its item: d≥1d \ge 1d≥1 throughout §5.1 (the paper's own assumption); σ≥0\sigma \ge 0σ≥0 for milestones 1, 2 and 6 (the paper's fairness ratios lie in [0,1][0,1][0,1]); σ′≠0\sigma' \ne 0σ′=0 in Lemma 1; a prefix of length at least 111 in Proposition 2. Milestone 1 identifies the resulting sequence's shares with FFA's shares at each time.

A trivializing reading is ruled out: the impossibility half quantifies over every feasible allocation sequence, not only FFA-like or sorted ones, and the attainment half asks for a single sequence on the infinite horizon rather than one per finite length.

A complete development needs basic facts about FFA's list (length, order, scaling) and the harmonic asymptotics already in Mathlib (Real.tendsto_harmonic_sub_log). The FFA model and Theorem 1 apply to arbitrary control vectors and are reusable for the paper's finite-vector and ccc-gap results; contributions of auxiliary lemmas about FFA (length, sortedness, scaling) are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Vardi, A. Psomas, E. Friedman, Dynamic Fair Resource Division, Mathematics of Operations Research 47(2):945–968, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2021.1155
  • E. Friedman, C.-A. Psomas, S. Vardi, Controlled Dynamic Fair Division, Proc. 18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 461–478, 2017.
  • I. A. Kash, A. D. Procaccia, N. Shah, No Agent Left Behind: Dynamic Fair Division of Multiple Resources, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 51:579–603, 2014.
  • T. Walsh, Online Cake Cutting, Algorithmic Decision Theory (ADT), Springer, 292–305, 2011.
  • A. Verma, L. Pedrosa, M. Korupolu, D. Oppenheimer, E. Tune, J. Wilkes, Large-Scale Cluster Management at Google with Borg, Proc. 10th European Conference on Computer Systems (EuroSys), 2015.
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Smart Policies for Multisource Inventory Systems and General Tandem Queues with Order Tracking and Expediting: State Space and Product-Form Stationary Distribution under Policy-MResearch Paper

Why state-dependent sourcing matters

An inventory system can replenish demand from several stages of a supply process. When an order is placed, the manager chooses where it enters; when work finishes at one stage, the manager may send it past intermediate stages to speed delivery. These choices change the future congestion of every stage. A stationary occupancy distribution is needed to calculate how often stock is available, how often demand waits, and how often expediting is used. Song, Xiao, Zhang, and Zipkin study such policies through a tandem network whose arrival and routing decisions depend on the current occupancies. They identify Policy-M as one family with a product-form stationary distribution, despite this state dependence (Song et al., SSRN 3702068, §§3–4).

The paper's Theorem 1 is the target here. Its formula permits the system's long-run inventory cost to be evaluated by summing over states with known product weights. The same paper develops a distinct Policy-E family, but its theorem has a different routing rule and is outside this mission (Song et al., Theorems 1–2).

The tandem supply system

There are K≥1K\ge1K≥1 service nodes in series, numbered 1,…,K1,\ldots,K1,…,K. A state n=(n1,…,nK)∈NKn=(n_1,\ldots,n_K)\in\mathbb N^Kn=(n1​,…,nK​)∈NK records the number of units at each node. The segment occupancy n[a,b]=∑l=abnln[a,b]=\sum_{l=a}^{b}n_ln[a,b]=∑l=ab​nl​ counts units between nodes aaa and bbb, inclusive. Demand arrives at positive rate λ\lambdaλ. Node kkk completes service at positive rate μk\mu_kμk​ whenever nk>0n_k>0nk​>0. A completion at node KKK leaves the supply system.

Policy parameters are thresholds uiju_{ij}uij​ for 0≤i<j≤K0\le i<j\le K0≤i<j≤K, with values in N∪{∞}\mathbb N\cup\{\infty\}N∪{∞}. For fixed origin iii, thresholds are nondecreasing as jjj grows; for fixed destination jjj, they are nonincreasing as iii grows. Every terminal threshold uiKu_{iK}uiK​ equals ∞\infty∞. An arriving demand places a new unit at node 111 when no prefix n[1,k]n[1,k]n[1,k] reaches u0ku_{0k}u0k​; otherwise it places the unit at one node beyond the largest such kkk. A service completion at node m<Km<Km<K follows the analogous Policy-M rule using downstream segments n[m+1,k]n[m+1,k]n[m+1,k] and thresholds umku_{mk}umk​. An empty set of reached thresholds sends the unit to m+1m+1m+1 (Song et al., (5), (7), §4).

Assumption A imposes two inequalities on these thresholds: a triangle inequality ukj≤uki+uiju_{kj}\le u_{ki}+u_{ij}ukj​≤uki​+uij​ for k<i<jk<i<jk<i<j, and supermodularity uij+ukl≤ukj+uilu_{ij}+u_{kl}\le u_{kj}+u_{il}uij​+ukl​≤ukj​+uil​ for k<i<j<lk<i<j<lk<i<j<l. The indices may include the demand source 000. The admissible state set SM(u)S_M(u)SM​(u) consists of all occupancies whose segments obey n[k+1,l]≤ukln[k+1,l]\le u_{kl}n[k+1,l]≤ukl​ for every 0≤k<l≤K0\le k<l\le K0≤k<l≤K (Song et al., Assumption A and (11)).

Formalization targets

The first part of Theorem 1 identifies the states reachable from the empty system through positive-rate Policy-M transitions:

Reach⁡M(0)=SM(u)={n∈NK:n[k+1,l]≤ukl for 0≤k<l≤K}.\operatorname{Reach}_{M}(0)=S_M(u) =\{n\in\mathbb N^K:n[k+1,l]\le u_{kl}\text{ for }0\le k<l\le K\}.ReachM​(0)=SM​(u)={n∈NK:n[k+1,l]≤ukl​ for 0≤k<l≤K}.

For λ<μK\lambda<\mu_Kλ<μK​ and finite u0iu_{0i}u0i​ whenever 1≤i<K1\le i<K1≤i<K, define w(n)=∏k=1K(λ/μk)nkw(n)=\prod_{k=1}^{K}(\lambda/\mu_k)^{n_k}w(n)=∏k=1K​(λ/μk​)nk​ and G(u)=∑n∈SM(u)w(n)G(u)=\sum_{n\in S_M(u)}w(n)G(u)=∑n∈SM​(u)​w(n). The second part gives a normalized product law:

0<G(u)<∞,πM(n)=1SM(u)(n)G(u)∏k=1K(λμk)nk.0<G(u)<\infty,\qquad \pi_M(n)=\frac{\mathbf1_{S_M(u)}(n)}{G(u)} \prod_{k=1}^{K}\left(\frac{\lambda}{\mu_k}\right)^{n_k}.0<G(u)<∞,πM​(n)=G(u)1SM​(u)​(n)​k=1∏K​(μk​λ​)nk​.

The mission also requires πM\pi_MπM​ to have total mass one and to satisfy global balance for the rates generated by the stated routing rules. Its milestones are the closure claims (A-2) and (A-5), equality of the Appendix proof sets in (A-30), the indicator identity (A-25), and the local balance equations (A-12)–(A-15) (Song et al., Theorem 1 and Appendix A).

What the result gives

The formula describes the joint occupancy of all service nodes from KKK rates and the policy thresholds. Once its normalizer is known, probabilities of stock levels and congestion events can be summed over SM(u)S_M(u)SM​(u), supplying the inputs to the paper's long-run cost calculation (9). The state-space result determines which occupancies contribute to those sums (Song et al., (9), Theorem 1).

Theorem 1 is proved in the paper. This mission asks for machine-checked proofs of its formal statements, not a new queueing result. A complete development would provide reusable finite-segment reasoning, routing-set identities, and countable-state balance calculations. The declarations staged here are open Lean statements, so they do not yet constitute machine-checked proofs.

The obstacle in the balance equations

With fixed routing, a proposed product weight can be compared across neighboring states using only the node rates. Here the route of a newly arriving or completed unit changes with several segment occupancies. An incoming transition to a state may have skipped nodes, and the condition that selected its destination must hold in the predecessor state. Checking only the product ratio therefore leaves out the routing indicators. The source's local equations (A-12)–(A-15) and its proof-set identity (A-25) make those indicators explicit. The paper also gives an example showing that state-dependent routing does not yield product form for every policy (Song et al., Example 1 and Appendix A).

Formalization scope

Lean represents nnn as a function from Fin K to natural numbers, while the functions occ and seg retain the paper's one-based node numbers. The threshold array takes values in extended natural numbers so uiK=∞u_{iK}=\inftyuiK​=∞ is representable; a strict comparison with a threshold expresses the paper's “at most u−1u-1u−1” condition. Both routing rules specify the destination when no threshold is reached. A service transition is enabled only when its origin node is occupied. The theorem states K≥1K\ge1K≥1, which is implicit in the paper's numbered-node model, along with positive arrival and service rates.

The source defines π\piπ as the limiting law of a continuous-time Markov chain and invokes known ergodicity. This Lean development encodes its stationary claim by a summable, normalized product weight and the global balance equations for explicit Policy-M rates. It does not formalize the CTMC limit or uniqueness of that limit. The normalizer is a countable sum; the goal asserts summability and G(u)>0G(u)>0G(u)>0, so a default value for a divergent sum or division by zero cannot certify the claim. The state space is constructed from uuu and proved reachable rather than supplied as a hypothesis. Empty-node departures are guarded to avoid natural-number subtraction at zero. The special K=1K=1K=1 case remains in the goal; the milestone combining four separate local equations assumes K≥2K\ge2K≥2 because its node-1 and node-KKK formulas must refer to distinct nodes.

The staged definition supplies segments, thresholds, routing, transition rates, product weights, and the source's Appendix sets. Contributions may prove the listed milestones, build general lemmas about segment sums and reachability, or establish summability and the passage from local to global balance. These supporting tools can be reused for other countable-state queueing models.

Selected references

  • J.-S. Song, L. Xiao, H. Zhang, and P. Zipkin, Smart Policies for Multisource Inventory Systems and General Tandem Queues with Order Tracking and Expediting, SSRN 3702068, version of September 28, 2020; subsequently published in Operations Research, DOI 10.1287/opre.2021.2124. Source preprint.
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Operations ResearchOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Resource Allocation in the Cloud with Near-Optimal Efficiency: The Multiplicative Weight Algorithm Nearly Matches the Offline Dynamic Optimum's Work While Approximately Satisfying Every SLAResearch Paper

Motivation

Cloud platforms divide a shared physical resource, such as a pool of processors, among many users at once. Each user is promised a service level agreement (SLA): a fraction β(i)\beta(i)β(i) of the resource that it should effectively receive whenever it has work to do. The operator wants two things that pull against each other: to keep the resource busy (total work done should be large) and to honour every SLA. The difficulty is informational. The operator does not see future demand, and in the setting of Perez-Salazar, Menache, Singh and Toriello (arXiv:1809.02688) it does not even see current demand: at each step it only learns which users have a non-empty queue.

The paper answers with a multiplicative weight rule. Multiplicative weight methods go back to online learning (Freund and Schapire, 1997; survey: Arora, Hazan and Kale, 2012) and can be read as entropic mirror descent (Beck and Teboulle, 2003). Their classical guarantees compare an online learner with the best fixed decision in hindsight. This paper compares the algorithm with the best time-varying offline allocation instead, and proves the comparison directly, without the standard regret analysis.

Setting

There are N≥2N \ge 2N≥2 users and discrete time steps t=1,2,…t = 1, 2, \dotst=1,2,…. Each user iii has an SLA β(i)≥0\beta(i) \ge 0β(i)≥0, with ∑iβ(i)≤1\sum_i \beta(i) \le 1∑i​β(i)≤1. Loads Lt(i)≥0L_t(i) \ge 0Lt​(i)≥0 arrive online. User iii keeps a queue Qt(i)Q_t(i)Qt​(i) of unfinished work. At each step:

  1. the decision maker observes the active users At={i:Qt(i)>0}A_t = \{i : Q_t(i) > 0\}At​={i:Qt​(i)>0};
  2. it chooses an allocation hth_tht​ with ht(i)≥0h_t(i) \ge 0ht​(i)≥0 and ∑iht(i)≤1\sum_i h_t(i) \le 1∑i​ht​(i)≤1;
  3. the load LtL_tLt​ arrives, user iii completes wt(i)=min⁡{ht(i), Lt(i)+Qt(i)}w_t(i) = \min\{h_t(i),\, L_t(i) + Q_t(i)\}wt​(i)=min{ht​(i),Lt​(i)+Qt​(i)}, and Qt+1(i)=max⁡{0, Lt(i)+Qt(i)−ht(i)}Q_{t+1}(i) = \max\{0,\, L_t(i) + Q_t(i) - h_t(i)\}Qt+1​(i)=max{0,Lt​(i)+Qt​(i)−ht​(i)}.

The total work of an allocation sequence hhh up to time ttt is workh(t)=∑i∑τ≤twτ(i)\mathrm{work}_h(t) = \sum_i \sum_{\tau \le t} w_\tau(i)workh​(t)=∑i​∑τ≤t​wτ​(i).

Algorithm 1 has parameters 0<ε≤1/100 < \varepsilon \le 1/100<ε≤1/10 and 0<η<1/30 < \eta < 1/30<η<1/3, and sets λ=ε2/(8N)\lambda = \varepsilon^2/(8N)λ=ε2/(8N). It keeps hth_tht​ in the truncated simplex Δε={x:∑ix(i)=1, x(i)≥ε/N}\Delta_\varepsilon = \{x : \sum_i x(i) = 1,\ x(i) \ge \varepsilon/N\}Δε​={x:∑i​x(i)=1, x(i)≥ε/N}, starting anywhere in Δε\Delta_\varepsilonΔε​. At step ttt it assigns the gain gt(i)=1+λg_t(i) = 1 + \lambdagt​(i)=1+λ to active users below their SLA (At1A^1_tAt1​: ht(i)<β(i)h_t(i) < \beta(i)ht​(i)<β(i)), gt(i)=1g_t(i) = 1gt​(i)=1 to the other active users (At2A^2_tAt2​) and gt(i)=0g_t(i) = 0gt​(i)=0 to inactive users. It then sets h^t+1(i)=ht(i)eηgt(i)\widehat h_{t+1}(i) = h_t(i)e^{\eta g_t(i)}ht+1​(i)=ht​(i)eηgt​(i) and takes ht+1=πΔε(h^t+1)h_{t+1} = \pi_{\Delta_\varepsilon}(\widehat h_{t+1})ht+1​=πΔε​​(ht+1​), the KL projection: the minimizer over Δε\Delta_\varepsilonΔε​ of ∑ix(i)ln⁡(x(i)/h^t+1(i))\sum_i x(i)\ln(x(i)/\widehat h_{t+1}(i))∑i​x(i)ln(x(i)/ht+1​(i)).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 with the explicit constants of p. 10

Let β(i)≥2ε/N\beta(i) \ge 2\varepsilon/Nβ(i)≥2ε/N for all iii and let hhh be any run of Algorithm 1. For every offline allocation sequence h∗h^*h∗ and every time ttt,

workalg(t)≥(1−4ε) workh∗(t)−2000 Nε2ηln⁡Nε,\mathrm{work}_{\mathrm{alg}}(t) \ge (1 - 4\varepsilon)\,\mathrm{work}_{h^*}(t) - 2000\,\frac{N}{\varepsilon^2\eta}\ln\frac{N}{\varepsilon},workalg​(t)≥(1−4ε)workh∗​(t)−2000ε2ηN​lnεN​,

and for every user iii, every comparator h′h'h′ with 0≤ht′(i)≤β(i)0 \le h'_t(i) \le \beta(i)0≤ht′​(i)≤β(i) and every ttt,

∑τ≤twτ(i)≥(1−2ε)∑τ≤twτ′(i)−β(i) p~,p~=32N2ε3ηln⁡Nε.\sum_{\tau \le t} w_\tau(i) \ge (1 - 2\varepsilon)\sum_{\tau \le t} w'_\tau(i) - \beta(i)\,\tilde p, \qquad \tilde p = \frac{32N^2}{\varepsilon^3\eta}\ln\frac{N}{\varepsilon}.τ≤t∑​wτ​(i)≥(1−2ε)τ≤t∑​wτ′​(i)−β(i)p~​,p~​=ε3η32N2​lnεN​.

Intermediate targets (milestones)

  • Theorem 3: against every sequence of (1−4ε)(1-4\varepsilon)(1−4ε)-allocations, workh∗(t)−workalg(t)≤8Nε2ηln⁡Nε+2\mathrm{work}_{h^*}(t) - \mathrm{work}_{\mathrm{alg}}(t) \le \frac{8N}{\varepsilon^2\eta}\ln\frac{N}{\varepsilon} + 2workh∗​(t)−workalg​(t)≤ε2η8N​lnεN​+2 at every ttt.
  • Theorem 4: if β(j)>eη(1+λ)ε/N\beta(j) > e^{\eta(1+\lambda)}\varepsilon/Nβ(j)>eη(1+λ)ε/N for all jjj, each user's work by time t+⌈p~⌉t + \lceil\tilde p\rceilt+⌈p~​⌉ is at least what the constant share (1−2ε)β(i)(1-2\varepsilon)\beta(i)(1−2ε)β(i) completes by time ttt.
  • Lemma 1 and Lemma 2: per-step growth factors 1+c1 + c1+c, 1−εc1 - \varepsilon c1−εc and 1+c′1 + c'1+c′ of a busy user's allocation, with c=εη/(4N)c = \varepsilon\eta/(4N)c=εη/(4N) and c′=εηλ/(2N)c' = \varepsilon\eta\lambda/(2N)c′=εηλ/(2N).
  • Proposition 1(b): the closed form of the KL projection onto Δε\Delta_\varepsilonΔε​.
  • Proposition 2 (weak-duality half), Claims 3.1 and 3.2 (first conclusion): the amortization behind Theorem 3.
  • The scaling step of p. 10: scaling an allocation by κ≤1\kappa \le 1κ≤1 keeps at least a κ\kappaκ fraction of its work, and work is monotone in the allocation.
  • Existence and uniqueness of the KL projection, hence of the run from each start.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 is a bicriteria guarantee against a dynamic benchmark. The work benchmark may change its allocation arbitrarily over time with full knowledge of all loads, and the algorithm, which sees only which queues are non-empty, loses only an additive amount that does not grow with time, at the price of a 4ε4\varepsilon4ε fraction of capacity. At the same time every user receives, up to a fixed delay, at least the work of a dedicated (1−2ε)(1-2\varepsilon)(1−2ε) fraction of its SLA. The paper also shows (arXiv:1809.02688, Theorem 2) that against the unscaled offline optimum every deterministic online algorithm loses Ω(T)\Omega(\sqrt T)Ω(T​) work on some load sequence, so some form of slack is unavoidable.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper; no machine-checked proof exists. A formalization would check the constant bookkeeping, where the printed text has slips (an ε\varepsilonε versus ε/4\varepsilon/4ε/4 in Theorem 1, a real block length s~\tilde ss~ used as an integer, an off-by-one in Claim 3.1). It would also produce a reusable deterministic queueing model and a verified closed form of the KL projection onto a truncated simplex.

Difficulty

The obvious first idea, the regret analysis of mirror descent, does not apply. Regret bounds compare with a fixed decision, but here the benchmark changes over time. The algorithm's gains also depend on its own past decisions through the queues, so they are not an exogenous sequence of losses. The paper notes (p. 10) that its guarantees do not follow from the standard analysis of mirror descent. A second obstacle is the feedback: a busy user is not the same as a user that uses its whole allocation. A user whose queue empties during a step completes less than its allocation, so utilization and work done can differ. Finally, the constants matter, because the goal states them explicitly. The printed derivation mixes ε\varepsilonε and ε/4\varepsilon/4ε/4, uses the real number s~\tilde ss~ as a block length, and is off by one step when it identifies the work done with the arrived load.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Everything is real-valued. Time is 0-based: Lean's step ttt is the paper's step t+1t + 1t+1, the queue at Lean time ttt is the paper's Qt+1Q_{t+1}Qt+1​, and ∑τ=1t\sum_{\tau=1}^{t}∑τ=1t​ is a sum over the first ttt steps. Queues start empty, a convention the paper uses but does not state. Loads form an infinite sequence; the horizon TTT is not a parameter and every bound holds at every ttt.
  • Runs. The KL projection is a predicate for positive inputs, the domain where the logarithm is defined; Algorithm 1 always projects a positive vector. A run is any sequence satisfying the recursion. The gains are computed from the queues the run itself produces before step ttt, so ht+1h_{t+1}ht+1​ never uses the load of step ttt or later. A milestone proves that each start in Δε\Delta_\varepsilonΔε​ has exactly one run, and a sorry-free sanity check exhibits one. Statements about runs are therefore not vacuous.
  • Benchmarks. "The optimal offline sequence" is replaced by every allocation sequence with ∑iht∗(i)≤1\sum_i h^*_t(i) \le 1∑i​ht∗​(i)≤1 (or ≤1−4ε\le 1 - 4\varepsilon≤1−4ε), which is equivalent and avoids a supremum. The SLA comparator ranges over every sequence with ht′(i)≤β(i)h'_t(i) \le \beta(i)ht′​(i)≤β(i), not only the constant one.
  • Disclosed readings and corrections. Part 1 of the goal uses the (1−4ε)(1 - 4\varepsilon)(1−4ε) form of p. 10 for the same ε\varepsilonε, not the headline's (1−ε)(1-\varepsilon)(1−ε). Theorem 3 carries a +2+2+2 for integer blocks. Claim 3.1 is stated in its corrected 0-based form. Theorem 4 assumes the SLA bound strictly. 0<η<1/30 < \eta < 1/30<η<1/3 (Algorithm 1's input) is assumed throughout. ∑iβ(i)≤1\sum_i \beta(i) \le 1∑i​β(i)≤1 replaces the =1= 1=1 used in the proof of Lemma 2.
  • Ruled out. The goal is stated for every run of the algorithm, with the active sets read from the run's own queues, against every offline sequence. A formalization that fixes a closed-form allocation, decouples the queues from the allocations, or restricts the benchmark to static allocations does not count.
  • Needed and reusable. The deterministic single-user queue with its work and monotonicity facts, KKT conditions for an entropic objective over a box-constrained simplex, and elementary exponential and logarithm inequalities. The queue model and the projection closed form are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Perez-Salazar, I. Menache, M. Singh, A. Toriello, Dynamic Resource Allocation in the Cloud with Near-Optimal Efficiency, arXiv:1809.02688v3, 2021 (Operations Research, 2022). https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.02688
  • Y. Freund, R. E. Schapire, A decision-theoretic generalization of on-line learning and an application to boosting, Journal of Computer and System Sciences 55(1), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1006/jcss.1997.1504
  • S. Arora, E. Hazan, S. Kale, The multiplicative weights update method: a meta-algorithm and applications, Theory of Computing 8, 2012. https://doi.org/10.4086/toc.2012.v008a006
  • A. Beck, M. Teboulle, Mirror descent and nonlinear projected subgradient methods for convex optimization, Operations Research Letters 31(3), 2003. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-6377(02)00231-6
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Large Fork-Join Queues with Nearly Deterministic Arrival and Service Times: Fluid Limit of the Maximum Queue Length with a Non-Zero Initial ConditionResearch Paper

Motivation

A fork-join queue splits every incoming job into tasks, sends one task to each of NNN parallel servers, and declares the job complete only when all tasks are done. The model describes assembly systems in which a manufacturer orders parts from NNN suppliers and can only start production when every part has arrived, as well as parallel computing and storage systems in which a request is answered only after all sub-requests return. Because a job waits for its slowest task, the performance of the system is governed by the maximum queue length over the NNN servers, and the question of interest is how this maximum behaves when NNN is large and the system is heavily loaded.

Schol, Vlasiou and Zwart (arXiv:1912.11661, Mathematics of Operations Research 47(2), 2022) study this question in a nearly deterministic regime: arrivals and services happen in almost every time slot, and the traffic intensity of each server tends to 111 at rate N−2N^{-2}N−2. Even in the empty-start case the queue lengths of different servers are dependent, because every server sees the same arrival process; the maximum of NNN dependent random walks has to be analysed directly.

Timeline. Early work treats two service stations and obtains exact asymptotics (Flatto and Hahn, 1984; Baccelli, 1985; Wright, 1992). For more stations the literature turned to approximations and bounds: Nelson and Tantawi (1988) and Baccelli and Makowski (1989) bound the mean response time, and Ko and Serfozo (2004) approximate the response-time distribution in M/M/s fork-join queues. Heavy-traffic process limits for a fixed number of stations were obtained by Varma (1990) and Nguyen (1993, 1994), with reflected Brownian motion limits, and by Lu and Pang (2015–2017) for many-server stations. Sigman and Whitt (2011) analysed nearly deterministic G/G/1 and G/D/N queues. The paper of this mission gives a process-level (fluid) limit for the largest queue when the number of servers NNN itself grows, in the nearly deterministic regime and with a non-zero initial condition.

Setting

Fix α,β>0\alpha,\beta>0α,β>0. For each NNN the system runs in discrete time slots j=1,2,…j=1,2,\dotsj=1,2,…. In slot jjj a task arrives at all NNN servers with probability p(N)=1−α/N−β/N2p^{(N)}=1-\alpha/N-\beta/N^2p(N)=1−α/N−β/N2 (indicator X(N)(j)X^{(N)}(j)X(N)(j)), and server iii completes a task with probability q(N)=1−α/Nq^{(N)}=1-\alpha/Nq(N)=1−α/N (indicator Yi(N)(j)Y_i^{(N)}(j)Yi(N)​(j)), all indicators being independent. The arrival process is A(N)(n)=∑j=1nX(N)(j)A^{(N)}(n)=\sum_{j=1}^{n}X^{(N)}(j)A(N)(n)=∑j=1n​X(N)(j) and the service process of server iii is Si(N)(n)=∑j=1nYi(N)(j)S_i^{(N)}(n)=\sum_{j=1}^{n}Y_i^{(N)}(j)Si(N)​(n)=∑j=1n​Yi(N)​(j).

Server iii starts with Qi(N)(0)=⌊rNUi⌋Q_i^{(N)}(0)=\lfloor r_NU_i\rfloorQi(N)​(0)=⌊rN​Ui​⌋ tasks, where U1,U2,…U_1,U_2,\dotsU1​,U2​,… are i.i.d. random variables, the initial queue lengths are non-negative, and rN≥0r_N\ge0rN​≥0 is a scaling sequence. By Lindley's recursion the maximum queue length at time nnn is

Q(α,β)(N)(n)=max⁡i≤Nmax⁡(sup⁡0≤k≤n[(A(N)(n)−A(N)(k))−(Si(N)(n)−Si(N)(k))],  Qi(N)(0)+A(N)(n)−Si(N)(n)).Q^{(N)}_{(\alpha,\beta)}(n)=\max_{i\le N}\max\Big(\sup_{0\le k\le n}\big[(A^{(N)}(n)-A^{(N)}(k))-(S_i^{(N)}(n)-S_i^{(N)}(k))\big],\;Q_i^{(N)}(0)+A^{(N)}(n)-S_i^{(N)}(n)\Big).Q(α,β)(N)​(n)=i≤Nmax​max(0≤k≤nsup​[(A(N)(n)−A(N)(k))−(Si(N)​(n)−Si(N)​(k))],Qi(N)​(0)+A(N)(n)−Si(N)​(n)).

The first term alone is the maximum queue length of the system started empty. The initial condition is assumed to satisfy Q(α,β)(N)(0)/(Nlog⁡N)→q(0)≥0Q^{(N)}_{(\alpha,\beta)}(0)/(N\log N)\to q(0)\ge0Q(α,β)(N)​(0)/(NlogN)→q(0)≥0 in probability (Assumption 2.3), and either UiU_iUi​ has a finite right endpoint (Assumption 2.4) or UiU_iUi​ is continuous with −log⁡P(Ui>vt)/−log⁡P(Ui>t)→h(v)-\log\mathbb P(U_i>vt)/-\log\mathbb P(U_i>t)\to h(v)−logP(Ui​>vt)/−logP(Ui​>t)→h(v) as t→∞t\to\inftyt→∞ for all v∈[0,1]v\in[0,1]v∈[0,1] (Assumption 2.5, the Gumbel-domain case).

The fluid limit is

q(t)=max⁡((2αt−βt)1(t<α2β2)+α2β1(t≥α2β2),  g(t,q(0))−βt),q(t)=\max\Big(\big(\sqrt{2\alpha t}-\beta t\big)\mathbb 1\big(t<\tfrac{\alpha}{2\beta^2}\big)+\tfrac{\alpha}{2\beta}\mathbb 1\big(t\ge\tfrac{\alpha}{2\beta^2}\big),\;g(t,q(0))-\beta t\Big),q(t)=max((2αt​−βt)1(t<2β2α​)+2βα​1(t≥2β2α​),g(t,q(0))−βt),

with g(t,q(0))=q(0)+2αtg(t,q(0))=q(0)+\sqrt{2\alpha t}g(t,q(0))=q(0)+2αt​ under Assumption 2.4 and g(t,q(0))=sup⁡{2αt u+q(0)v:u2+h(v)≤1, 0≤u,v≤1}g(t,q(0))=\sup\{\sqrt{2\alpha t}\,u+q(0)v : u^2+h(v)\le1,\ 0\le u,v\le1\}g(t,q(0))=sup{2αt​u+q(0)v:u2+h(v)≤1, 0≤u,v≤1} under Assumption 2.5. In Lean these are fluid, fluidEmpty, gFinite and gGumbel; the queue is maxQueue and the empty-start queue maxQueueEmpty.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.1 (fluid limit)

For every T>0T>0T>0 and ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0,

P(sup⁡0≤t≤T∣Q(α,β)(N)(tN3log⁡N)Nlog⁡N−q(t)∣>ϵ)→N→∞0,\mathbb P\left(\sup_{0\le t\le T}\left|\frac{Q^{(N)}_{(\alpha,\beta)}(tN^3\log N)}{N\log N}-q(t)\right|>\epsilon\right)\xrightarrow{N\to\infty}0,P​0≤t≤Tsup​​NlogNQ(α,β)(N)​(tN3logN)​−q(t)​>ϵ​N→∞​0,

under Assumptions 2.1–2.3 and either Assumption 2.4 or Assumption 2.5 (one conjunct per case).

Milestones

  1. Section 4.2 tools. The pathwise oscillation bound of Lemma 4.1; the non-uniform Berry–Esseen rate of Lemma 4.2 for the standardized service process; the moment bound of Lemma 4.3; the extreme-value Lemma B.1 for sums of independent relatively stable variables and its consequence Lemma 4.4 for the Gaussian surrogate of the initial condition.
  2. Pointwise convergence (Section 4.3). Lemmas 4.6 and 4.8 (bounds for the empty-start system), Lemma 4.5 (its pointwise limit), Lemma 4.9 (the initial-condition part) and Theorem 4.1: Q(α,β)(N)(tN3log⁡N)/(Nlog⁡N)→q(t)Q^{(N)}_{(\alpha,\beta)}(tN^3\log N)/(N\log N)\to q(t)Q(α,β)(N)​(tN3logN)/(NlogN)→q(t) in probability for each t>0t>0t>0.
  3. Tightness (Section 4.4). Lemma 4.10 (maxima preserve uniform convergence), Lemmas 4.11–4.12 (moduli of continuity of the two parts) and Corollary 4.1 (tightness of the scaled process on [0,T][0,T][0,T]).

Significance

The result. Theorem 2.1 identifies the scaling under which the maximum queue length of a large, heavily loaded fork-join system follows a deterministic curve: time of order N3log⁡NN^3\log NN3logN and space of order Nlog⁡NN\log NNlogN. The limit separates the contribution of the empty-start dynamics, which saturate at the steady-state level α/(2β)\alpha/(2\beta)α/(2β) after time α/(2β2)\alpha/(2\beta^2)α/(2β2), from the contribution of the initial backlog, which is governed by the extreme-value class of the initial condition. For instance, with h(v)=vh(v)=vh(v)=v and q(0)=α/(2β)q(0)=\alpha/(2\beta)q(0)=α/(2β) the system "starts and stays in steady state" on an initial interval (p. 12). The theorem gives the transient behaviour needed to judge how long a backlog at the slowest supplier persists.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; no part of it has a machine-checked proof. The mission produces a formal statement of the model and of the fluid limit, and the intermediate results of Section 4. The proof combines a non-uniform Berry–Esseen inequality, extreme-value theory for maxima of sums, Doob's maximal inequality and a tightness criterion; formalizing it would give reusable Lean versions of several of these tools.

Difficulty

The obvious argument treats the NNN queues as independent reflected random walks and applies extreme-value theory to their maximum. It fails because all servers share the arrival process, so the queues are dependent. The paper handles this by splitting each queue into a common arrival term and an individual service term, but the individual terms are maxima of NNN centred random walks evaluated at a time of order N3log⁡NN^3\log NN3logN, and their Gaussian approximation must be accurate at the scale of the maximum: a uniform Berry–Esseen bound is too weak, and a non-uniform bound with the right rate in NNN is needed (Lemma 4.2). Upgrading pointwise convergence to uniform convergence on [0,T][0,T][0,T] requires a modulus-of-continuity estimate for a maximum of NNN processes (Lemmas 4.11–4.12), where the number of processes grows with NNN. The initial-condition term requires an extreme-value result for maxima of sums of two independent coordinates with different tails (Lemma B.1).

Formalization scope

All objects are defined in one module, LargeForkJoin.FluidLimit.Model. Times are natural numbers, and Q(tN3log⁡N)Q(tN^3\log N)Q(tN3logN) is evaluated at ⌊tN3log⁡N⌋\lfloor tN^3\log N\rfloor⌊tN3logN⌋, which is the paper's own convention Q(n)=Q(⌊n⌋)Q(n)=Q(\lfloor n\rfloor)Q(n)=Q(⌊n⌋). Servers are indexed 0,…,N−10,\dots,N-10,…,N−1. All variables live on one probability space; the Bernoulli laws are imposed for N≥N0N\ge N_0N≥N0​ (for small NNN, p(N)p^{(N)}p(N) can be negative), and within each N≥N0N\ge N_0N≥N0​ the arrival indicators, service indicators and initial-condition variables UiU_iUi​ used by that system are mutually independent. The independence of (Ui)(U_i)(Ui​) from arrivals and services is an added assumption: the paper uses it in its proofs but does not state it. Initial queue lengths are non-negative almost surely. Assumption 2.5 adds P(Ui>t)>0\mathbb P(U_i>t)>0P(Ui​>t)>0 for all ttt, without which its ratio is undefined; "continuous" means "no atoms". Convergence in probability to a constant is written with ϵ\epsilonϵ-events, and sup⁡0≤t≤T∣⋅∣>ϵ\sup_{0\le t\le T}|\cdot|>\epsilonsup0≤t≤T​∣⋅∣>ϵ as "some t∈[0,T]t\in[0,T]t∈[0,T] has ∣⋅∣>ϵ|\cdot|>\epsilon∣⋅∣>ϵ", the same event. Lemmas 4.4 and 4.9 speak of Gaussian variables outside the model; they are stated for the law of NNN independent pairs (standard normal, law of U1U_1U1​).

The goal is stated about the maximum queue length built from the Bernoulli indicators through (2.3), uniformly on [0,T][0,T][0,T]. A statement about a Gaussian or reflected-Brownian surrogate (the heuristics of Sections 2.2–2.3), or a pointwise statement (Theorem 4.1), would not be Theorem 2.1.

Not included: Propositions 2.1–2.3 (other scalings and the steady state), the variant of Theorem 2.1 under Assumption 2.6, Theorem 4.2 (finite-dimensional distributions, a generic fact), and Lemma 4.7, whose statement includes the stationary case t=∞t=\inftyt=∞ and needs a stationary-queue object. Contributions of general tools are welcome: a non-uniform Berry–Esseen inequality for Bernoulli sums, extreme-value results for maxima of i.i.d. sequences (relative stability, Gumbel-domain tails), and the tightness criterion of Billingsley's Theorem 7.3.

Selected references

  • D. Schol, M. Vlasiou, B. Zwart, Large fork-join queues with nearly deterministic arrival and service times, Mathematics of Operations Research 47(2), 2022; arXiv:1912.11661v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.11661v3
  • L. Flatto, S. Hahn, Two parallel queues created by arrivals with two demands I, SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 44(5), 1984. https://doi.org/10.1137/0144072
  • F. Baccelli, A. M. Makowski, Queueing models for systems with synchronization constraints, Proceedings of the IEEE 77(1), 1989. https://doi.org/10.1109/5.21076
  • R. Nelson, A. N. Tantawi, Approximate analysis of fork/join synchronization in parallel queues, IEEE Transactions on Computers 37(6), 1988. https://doi.org/10.1109/12.2212
  • K. Sigman, W. Whitt, Heavy-traffic limits for nearly deterministic queues, Journal of Applied Probability 48(3), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1239/jap/1316796905
  • S.-S. Ko, R. F. Serfozo, Response times in M/M/s fork-join networks, Advances in Applied Probability 36(3), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1239/aap/1093962240
  • P. Billingsley, Convergence of Probability Measures, 2nd ed., Wiley, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316962
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Costly Interpretation of Asset Prices: With Costly Price Interpretation There Is a Unique Linear Financial Market Equilibrium, and Its Price Carries Endogenous NoiseResearch Paper

Motivation

A central question of financial economics is how much of the information dispersed among traders ends up in market prices. The workhorse model is the noisy rational expectations equilibrium (REE): investors with private signals trade a risky asset, the price aggregates their information, and each investor learns from the price as well as from her own signal (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Hellwig 1980). In that tradition the price is a free public signal: every investor reads off from it exactly what it contains.

Vives and Yang (SSRN 2763813; published with Mondria as Mondria, Vives and Yang 2021) drop that assumption. Extracting information from a price takes effort, so each investor observes the price signal only through her own interpretation error, and can buy sophistication to reduce that error. The interpretation errors share a common component, and the paper's first result is that this common error re-enters the price. Even with no exogenous noise traders, costly interpretation makes the price noisy. This mission formalizes that first result: the existence, uniqueness and closed form of the linear financial-market equilibrium (Proposition 1, with the remark au>0a_u > 0au​>0 that follows it).

Setting

A risky asset pays V~=v~+ξ~\tilde V = \tilde v + \tilde\xiV~=v~+ξ~​, with independent v~∼N(0,τv−1)\tilde v \sim N(0,\tau_v^{-1})v~∼N(0,τv−1​) (learnable) and ξ~∼N(0,τξ−1)\tilde\xi \sim N(0,\tau_\xi^{-1})ξ~​∼N(0,τξ−1​) (unlearnable). A continuum i∈[0,1]i\in[0,1]i∈[0,1] of investors have CARA utility with risk aversion γ\gammaγ. Investor iii observes:

  1. a private signal s~i=v~+ε~i\tilde s_i = \tilde v + \tilde\varepsilon_is~i​=v~+ε~i​, with ε~i∼N(0,τε−1)\tilde\varepsilon_i \sim N(0,\tau_\varepsilon^{-1})ε~i​∼N(0,τε−1​);
  2. a personalized price signal s~p,i=s~p+u~+e~i\tilde s_{p,i} = \tilde s_p + \tilde u + \tilde e_is~p,i​=s~p​+u~+e~i​, where s~p\tilde s_ps~p​ is the information in the price, u~∼N(0,τu−1)\tilde u \sim N(0,\tau_u^{-1})u~∼N(0,τu−1​) is a common interpretation error and e~i∼N(0,τe−1)\tilde e_i \sim N(0,\tau_e^{-1})e~i​∼N(0,τe−1​) an idiosyncratic one;
  3. an interpretation signal z~i=u~+e~i+η~i\tilde z_i = \tilde u + \tilde e_i + \tilde\eta_iz~i​=u~+e~i​+η~​i​, with η~i∼N(0,τη−1)\tilde\eta_i \sim N(0,\tau_\eta^{-1})η~​i​∼N(0,τη−1​), where τη\tau_\etaτη​ is the common sophistication level.

All shocks are independent and centred, and all precisions and γ\gammaγ are positive. A linear price function is p~=avv~+auu~\tilde p = a_v\tilde v + a_u\tilde up~​=av​v~+au​u~; when av≠0a_v\ne 0av​=0 it is equivalent to the signal s~p=v~+αu~\tilde s_p = \tilde v + \alpha\tilde us~p​=v~+αu~ with α=au/av\alpha = a_u/a_vα=au​/av​. Each investor demands Di=(E(V~∣s~i,s~p,i,z~i)−p~)/(γ Var(V~∣s~i,s~p,i,z~i))D_i = (E(\tilde V\mid \tilde s_i,\tilde s_{p,i},\tilde z_i) - \tilde p)/(\gamma\,\mathrm{Var}(\tilde V\mid \tilde s_i,\tilde s_{p,i},\tilde z_i))Di​=(E(V~∣s~i​,s~p,i​,z~i​)−p~​)/(γVar(V~∣s~i​,s~p,i​,z~i​)), computed by Bayes' rule from the jointly Gaussian signals. A linear equilibrium is a pair (av,au)(a_v,a_u)(av​,au​), av≠0a_v\neq0av​=0, such that aggregate demand ∫01Di di\int_0^1 D_i\,di∫01​Di​di is zero for every realization of (v~,u~)(\tilde v,\tilde u)(v~,u~).

The paper's closed forms use the precision of the combined price information,

τp=τeτu+(τe+τu)τητu+τe(α+1)2+α2τη,\tau_p = \frac{\tau_e\tau_u + (\tau_e+\tau_u)\tau_\eta}{\tau_u + \tau_e(\alpha+1)^2 + \alpha^2\tau_\eta},τp​=τu​+τe​(α+1)2+α2τη​τe​τu​+(τe​+τu​)τη​​,

and the cubic

f(α)=(τeτε+τετη)α3+2τeτεα2+(τeτε+τeτη+τuτε)α−τeτu.f(\alpha) = (\tau_e\tau_\varepsilon + \tau_\varepsilon\tau_\eta)\alpha^3 + 2\tau_e\tau_\varepsilon\alpha^2 + (\tau_e\tau_\varepsilon + \tau_e\tau_\eta + \tau_u\tau_\varepsilon)\alpha - \tau_e\tau_u.f(α)=(τe​τε​+τε​τη​)α3+2τe​τε​α2+(τe​τε​+τe​τη​+τu​τε​)α−τe​τu​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1 and the noise remark

There is exactly one linear equilibrium (av,au)(a_v,a_u)(av​,au​). In it

av=τε+τpτv+τε+τp,au=τpτv+τε+τp⋅τu(τe+ατe+ατη)τeτu+τeτη+τuτη,a_v = \frac{\tau_\varepsilon+\tau_p}{\tau_v+\tau_\varepsilon+\tau_p},\qquad a_u = \frac{\tau_p}{\tau_v+\tau_\varepsilon+\tau_p}\cdot\frac{\tau_u(\tau_e+\alpha\tau_e+\alpha\tau_\eta)}{\tau_e\tau_u+\tau_e\tau_\eta+\tau_u\tau_\eta},av​=τv​+τε​+τp​τε​+τp​​,au​=τv​+τε​+τp​τp​​⋅τe​τu​+τe​τη​+τu​τη​τu​(τe​+ατe​+ατη​)​,

with τp\tau_pτp​ evaluated at α=au/av\alpha = a_u/a_vα=au​/av​; α\alphaα lies in (0,αˉ)(0,\bar\alpha)(0,αˉ), αˉ=τeτu/(τeτε+τeτη+τuτε)\bar\alpha = \tau_e\tau_u/(\tau_e\tau_\varepsilon+\tau_e\tau_\eta+\tau_u\tau_\varepsilon)αˉ=τe​τu​/(τe​τε​+τe​τη​+τu​τε​), and is the unique positive root of fff; and au>0a_u > 0au​>0.

Milestones, in the order of the paper's proof

  1. The Bayes coefficients (βs,βp,βz)(\beta_s,\beta_p,\beta_z)(βs​,βp​,βz​) of E(v~∣⋅)E(\tilde v\mid\cdot)E(v~∣⋅) in closed form (proof of Proposition 1, p. 55).
  2. Equation (17): Var(V~∣⋅)=(τv+τε+τp)−1+τξ−1\mathrm{Var}(\tilde V\mid\cdot) = (\tau_v+\tau_\varepsilon+\tau_p)^{-1} + \tau_\xi^{-1}Var(V~∣⋅)=(τv​+τε​+τp​)−1+τξ−1​ (p. 18).
  3. Market clearing holds iff av=βs+βpa_v = \beta_s+\beta_pav​=βs​+βp​ and au=βp(α+1)+βza_u = \beta_p(\alpha+1)+\beta_zau​=βp​(α+1)+βz​ (p. 56).
  4. These sums equal the closed forms of ava_vav​, aua_uau​ (p. 56).
  5. α av(α)=au(α)\alpha\,a_v(\alpha) = a_u(\alpha)αav​(α)=au​(α) iff f(α)=0f(\alpha)=0f(α)=0 (p. 56).
  6. f(0)<0<f(αˉ)f(0) < 0 < f(\bar\alpha)f(0)<0<f(αˉ), hence a root in (0,αˉ)(0,\bar\alpha)(0,αˉ) (p. 56).
  7. The discriminant of fff is the printed 25-term expression Δ<0\Delta<0Δ<0, hence fff has one real root (p. 56).

Significance

Proposition 1 is the foundation of the rest of the paper. Every comparative static on price informativeness, volatility, return predictability, disagreement and trading volume (Propositions 2–3), and the analysis of the sophistication-acquisition game (Propositions 4–6), is computed from the closed forms of ava_vav​, aua_uau​ and the root α\alphaα. The remark au>0a_u>0au​>0 is the paper's mechanism: the common interpretation error is a source of price noise generated by the traders themselves, which vanishes only in the limit of full sophistication (Corollary 1).

The result is proved in the paper; nothing here is open. To our knowledge no part of it, nor any noisy-REE equilibrium with Bayesian price learning, has been machine-checked. The mission produces a formal account of the equilibrium construction of the noisy REE literature, from Gaussian conditioning to market clearing to a polynomial fixed point. The same pattern (conjecture a linear price, condition, match coefficients, solve for the fixed point) recurs throughout that literature.

Difficulty

Each step is elementary, but each is a large symbolic computation. Inverting the 3×33\times33×3 covariance matrix and simplifying Σ−1c\Sigma^{-1}cΣ−1c to the printed fractions involves rational functions in seven variables. The discriminant of fff is a polynomial of degree ten with 25 terms, and its sign has to be established for all positive parameters.

The conceptual pitfall is uniqueness. Showing that fff has one positive root is not enough: a linear equilibrium may a priori have α=au/av≤0\alpha = a_u/a_v \le 0α=au​/av​≤0, so uniqueness among all linear equilibria needs fff to have one real root, which is what the discriminant gives. The fixed-point condition α=au(α)/av(α)\alpha = a_u(\alpha)/a_v(\alpha)α=au​(α)/av​(α) also needs av(α)≠0a_v(\alpha)\neq0av​(α)=0 at every candidate, which has to be proved rather than assumed.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real. A parameter structure carries τv,τξ,τε,τe,τu,τη,γ\tau_v,\tau_\xi,\tau_\varepsilon,\tau_e,\tau_u,\tau_\eta,\gammaτv​,τξ​,τε​,τe​,τu​,τη​,γ; the standing assumption is that all seven are positive, and nothing else is assumed. The model is encoded in reduced form:

  • Conditioning. The conditional mean coefficients are the linear projection Σ(α)−1c\Sigma(\alpha)^{-1}cΣ(α)−1c, with Σ(α)\Sigma(\alpha)Σ(α) the covariance matrix of (s~i,s~p,i,z~i)(\tilde s_i,\tilde s_{p,i},\tilde z_i)(s~i​,s~p,i​,z~i​) and ccc their covariance with v~\tilde vv~. The conditional variance is τv−1−c⊤Σ−1c+τξ−1\tau_v^{-1} - c^\top\Sigma^{-1}c + \tau_\xi^{-1}τv−1​−c⊤Σ−1c+τξ−1​. No probability space is built.
  • Market clearing. It is stated for every (v~,u~)∈R2(\tilde v,\tilde u)\in\mathbb R^2(v~,u~)∈R2 rather than almost surely, which is equivalent for linear functions of a nondegenerate Gaussian pair. Aggregate demand is the demand at the cross-sectional mean (v~, v~+(α+1)u~, u~)(\tilde v,\ \tilde v+(\alpha+1)\tilde u,\ \tilde u)(v~, v~+(α+1)u~, u~) of the signals, the usual continuum convention.
  • The equilibrium predicate. It requires av≠0a_v\neq0av​=0, as on p. 17 of the paper.
  • Equation (4). As printed, it attaches the law N(0,τη−1)N(0,\tau_\eta^{-1})N(0,τη−1​) to z~i\tilde z_iz~i​; (5) and (15) show it belongs to η~i\tilde\eta_iη~​i​, which is the reading used.

The equilibrium predicate is defined from Bayesian demands and market clearing only. Defining it by the closed forms of ava_vav​, aua_uau​, or as "α\alphaα is a root of (18)", would make Proposition 1 a statement about a cubic and is ruled out. Likewise the Bayes coefficients are Σ−1c\Sigma^{-1}cΣ−1c, never the printed fractions.

A complete development needs 3×33\times33×3 matrix inversion over R\mathbb RR (Mathlib's Matrix.inv), rational-function simplification, Mathlib's Cubic and its discriminant, and the intermediate value theorem. A reusable lemma "a real cubic with negative discriminant has exactly one real root" would serve beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative proofs of uniqueness, are welcome.

Selected references

  • X. Vives and L. Yang, Costly Interpretation of Asset Prices, SSRN working paper 2763813, September 2018 version (the version cited throughout). https://ssrn.com/abstract=2763813
  • J. Mondria, X. Vives and L. Yang, Costly Interpretation of Asset Prices, Management Science, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3871
  • S. J. Grossman and J. E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, American Economic Review 70(3), 1980. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1805228
  • M. F. Hellwig, On the Aggregation of Information in Competitive Markets, Journal of Economic Theory 22(3), 1980. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(80)90065-5
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Stochastic Knapsack Revisited: The Service Level Perspective: Anticipative Policies Need at Most 2Δ More Capacity Than Adaptive Policies to Meet Type-I Service LevelsResearch Paper

Motivation

A central planner holds a single pool of QQQ units of a product and must supply NNN customers whose demands d~1,…,d~N\tilde d_1, \dots, \tilde d_Nd~1​,…,d~N​ are random. Each customer iii asks to be fully served, i.e. to receive her entire demand, with probability at least a target αi\alpha_iαi​. This Type-I service level (the persistency value of the stochastic knapsack) is the standard requirement in supply-chain allocation and in humanitarian logistics. The planner's question is how much capacity the targets require.

The answer depends on when the planner learns the demands. Lyu, Chou, Teo, Zheng and Zhong (SSRN 3674463, 2021) compare three information regimes:

  • a responsive policy sees every demand before allocating;
  • an adaptive policy learns a customer's demand only once it has decided to serve her, and may choose the next customer in light of what it has seen (Dean, Goemans and Vondrák, 2008);
  • an anticipative policy fixes a priority order before any demand is realized (Alptekinoğlu, Banerjee, Paul and Jain, M&SOM 15(1), 2013).

Anticipative rules are the ones used in practice, because they are simple to announce and to audit. The paper's main result quantifies what they cost in capacity compared with adaptive rules.

Timeline. Alptekinoğlu et al. (2013) introduced capacity pooling with differentiated service probabilities under anticipative priority rules. Dean, Goemans and Vondrák (2008) bounded the adaptivity gap of the stochastic knapsack for revenue maximization by a constant factor. Zhong, Zheng, Chou and Teo (Management Science 64(4), 2018) treated the Type-II (fill-rate) version, in which partial service counts in proportion. They showed that its achievable region is a polymatroid Γ(Q)\Gamma(Q)Γ(Q) and that anticipative policies are optimal there. Lyu et al. (2021) use this Type-II system to compare the Type-I classes.

Setting

Customers are i∈{1,…,N}i \in \{1, \dots, N\}i∈{1,…,N}. The demands are random variables on a probability space (Ω,F,P)(\Omega, \mathcal F, \mathbf P)(Ω,F,P). An allocation run with capacity Q≥0Q \ge 0Q≥0 serves customers one at a time. A chosen customer is fully served if her demand does not exceed the remaining capacity, and her demand is then deducted. Otherwise she is not fully served, and the run stops.

  • A deterministic adaptive policy chooses the next customer as a function of the customers chosen so far and their realized demands.
  • A deterministic anticipative policy is a priority order σ\sigmaσ, fixed in advance.
  • A randomized policy in either class is a finite mixture ∑kwkAk\sum_k w_k A_k∑k​wk​Ak​ of deterministic ones, drawn independently of the demands.

The optimal Type-I capacities are

QIAdap=inf⁡{Q≥0:some randomized adaptive policy has P(i fully served)≥αi ∀i},Q^{\mathrm{Adap}}_I = \inf\{Q \ge 0 : \text{some randomized adaptive policy has } \mathbf P(i \text{ fully served}) \ge \alpha_i\ \forall i\},QIAdap​=inf{Q≥0:some randomized adaptive policy has P(i fully served)≥αi​ ∀i},

and QIAntiQ^{\mathrm{Anti}}_IQIAnti​ is defined in the same way with anticipative policies. These are the optimal values of problem (CPP-A) of the paper.

On the Type-II side, Γ(Q)\Gamma(Q)Γ(Q) is the set of α\alphaα with ∑i∈UαiE[d~i]≤E[min⁡(Q,∑i∈Ud~i)]\sum_{i \in U} \alpha_i \mathbf E[\tilde d_i] \le \mathbf E[\min(Q, \sum_{i\in U} \tilde d_i)]∑i∈U​αi​E[d~i​]≤E[min(Q,∑i∈U​d~i​)] for every U⊆{1,…,N}U \subseteq \{1,\dots,N\}U⊆{1,…,N}. QIIQ_{II}QII​ is the least Q≥0Q \ge 0Q≥0 with α∈Γ(Q)\alpha \in \Gamma(Q)α∈Γ(Q). For a priority order σ\sigmaσ, the greedy fill xi∗(σ,d~,Q)=min⁡{d~i,max⁡(0,Q−∑j ahead of id~j)}x^*_i(\sigma, \tilde d, Q) = \min\{\tilde d_i, \max(0, Q - \sum_{j \text{ ahead of } i} \tilde d_j)\}xi∗​(σ,d~,Q)=min{d~i​,max(0,Q−∑j ahead of i​d~j​)} solves the fractional knapsack (CPP-F).

Standing assumptions (§3.3): the demands are independent and positive, and almost surely max⁡id~i≤Δ\max_i \tilde d_i \le \Deltamaxi​d~i​≤Δ for a constant Δ>0\Delta > 0Δ>0. The targets satisfy 0≤αi≤10 \le \alpha_i \le 10≤αi​≤1.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5

QIAnti−QIAdap≤2Δ.Q^{\mathrm{Anti}}_I - Q^{\mathrm{Adap}}_I \le 2\Delta.QIAnti​−QIAdap​≤2Δ.

The bound is uniform in NNN and in the joint law of the demands, subject only to the standing assumptions.

The two halves: Theorems 3 and 4

QIAnti≤QII+Δ,QIAdap≥QII−Δ.Q^{\mathrm{Anti}}_I \le Q_{II} + \Delta, \qquad Q^{\mathrm{Adap}}_I \ge Q_{II} - \Delta.QIAnti​≤QII​+Δ,QIAdap​≥QII​−Δ.

Milestones inside the proofs

  1. Achievability of Γ(Q)\Gamma(Q)Γ(Q) in fill rate by randomized priority orders (p. 21, from Zhong et al. 2018).
  2. Structure of the greedy fill: it is fractional for at most one customer, and positive exactly when the demand ahead is below QQQ (p. 17).
  3. E[xi∗]/E[d~i]≤P(xi∗>0)\mathbf E[x^*_i]/\mathbf E[\tilde d_i] \le \mathbf P(x^*_i > 0)E[xi∗​]/E[d~i​]≤P(xi∗​>0) (p. 17).
  4. Theorem 3.
  5. The rounded adaptive policy A′A'A′, which also serves the one customer the run turns away, satisfies E[∑k∈Ud~kykA′]≥∑k∈UE[d~k]αk\mathbf E[\sum_{k\in U}\tilde d_k y^{A'}_k] \ge \sum_{k \in U} \mathbf E[\tilde d_k]\alpha_kE[∑k∈U​d~k​ykA′​]≥∑k∈U​E[d~k​]αk​ (p. 37).
  6. Adaptive feasibility of QQQ implies α∈Γ(Q+Δ)\alpha \in \Gamma(Q + \Delta)α∈Γ(Q+Δ) (p. 37). The page writes QIAdptQ^{\mathrm{Adpt}}_IQIAdpt​, a misprint for QIAdapQ^{\mathrm{Adap}}_IQIAdap​.
  7. Theorem 4.

Significance

The result. Theorem 5 says that the information an adaptive planner gains costs at most two maximal demands of capacity, independently of the number of customers. Anticipative priority rules are therefore near-optimal for Type-I service whenever individual demands are small relative to the pool. This contrasts with the responsive regime: Example 1 of the paper shows that QIAdapQ^{\mathrm{Adap}}_IQIAdap​ can exceed QIRespQ^{\mathrm{Resp}}_IQIResp​ by an unbounded factor. In Theorems 3–4 the Type-II capacity QIIQ_{II}QII​ serves as a common yardstick, so each policy class is compared with an explicitly computable polymatroid quantity.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved on paper. To our knowledge none of it is machine-checked. A formal development has to make precise what the paper leaves informal: what a randomized adaptive policy is, why the event "customer iii is reached" is independent of d~i\tilde d_id~i​, and why the infima defining the optimal capacities are over non-empty sets. The milestones on the greedy fill and the polymatroid Γ(Q)\Gamma(Q)Γ(Q) can be reused for other fill-rate and persistency problems.

Difficulty

The obvious comparison fails because the two classes face different constraints. A Type-I requirement is an all-or-nothing event, so a deterministic priority order cannot hedge. With three identical unit-demand customers and targets 1/31/31/3, any fixed order needs Q=3Q = 3Q=3, while QII=1Q_{II} = 1QII​=1. Randomization over orders is therefore essential on the anticipative side, and the link between a Type-I requirement and the Type-II region Γ(Q)\Gamma(Q)Γ(Q) is not a statement about any single order. On the adaptive side, the decisions depend on revealed demands. Whether customer kkk is fully served is correlated with d~k\tilde d_kd~k​, so a Type-I service probability does not translate directly into a bound on the expected demand served, which is what Γ(Q)\Gamma(Q)Γ(Q) constrains. Conditioning arguments that ignore this correlation give false inequalities.

Formalization scope

  • Demands are a vector d : Fin N → Ω → ℝ on a probability space. Probabilities are μ.real, expectations are Bochner integrals. The standing assumptions are bundled in Standing μ d Δ α: measurable, iIndepFun, almost surely positive, almost surely ≤ Δ, 0 < Δ, and α i ∈ [0, 1].
  • A run has at most NNN steps. A demand equal to the remaining capacity is served. Every run, anticipative ones included, stops at the first customer not fully served.
  • Adaptive policies are functions of the chosen list and the demand vector that depend only on the chosen customers' demands, with measurable decision events. Anticipative policies are permutations, embedded as adaptive policies that ignore the demands.
  • Randomized policies are finite mixtures. Service levels are probabilities, not the long-run scenario frequencies of p. 11.
  • QIAdapQ^{\mathrm{Adap}}_IQIAdap​, QIAntiQ^{\mathrm{Anti}}_IQIAnti​ and QIIQ_{II}QII​ are real infima. Under the standing assumptions every feasible set is non-empty (Q=NΔQ = N\DeltaQ=NΔ works) and bounded below by 000, so no value is a junk default. QIIQ_{II}QII​ uses the subset form Γ(Q)\Gamma(Q)Γ(Q), which p. 17 shows equals the Type-II problem (CPP-B).
  • The greedy fill is stated for a priority order σ\sigmaσ rather than for weights θ′\theta'θ′. It equals x∗(θ′,d~,Q)x^*(\theta', \tilde d, Q)x∗(θ′,d~,Q) for every θ′\theta'θ′ whose decreasing order, ties broken by index, is σ\sigmaσ.
  • Two encodings would trivialize the goal, and both are excluded. Restricting to deterministic priority orders makes Theorem 3 false. Letting adaptive runs skip an oversized customer and continue enlarges the adaptive class beyond the paper's.

The infrastructure the proofs need: measurability of runs, independence of functions of disjoint coordinates, continuity of Q↦E[min⁡(Q,S)]Q \mapsto \mathbf E[\min(Q, S)]Q↦E[min(Q,S)] (so that QIIQ_{II}QII​ is attained), and the greedy description of a polymatroid's base polytope. Proofs of any milestone are welcome. So are alternative proofs of milestone 1 that avoid the general polymatroid theorem.

Selected references

  • G. Lyu, M. C. Chou, C.-P. Teo, Z. Zheng, Y. Zhong, Stochastic Knapsack Revisited: The Service Level Perspective, SSRN working paper 3674463, 2021. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3674463
  • Y. Zhong, Z. Zheng, M. C. Chou, C.-P. Teo, Resource Pooling and Allocation Policies to Deliver Differentiated Service, Management Science 64(4), 1555–1573, 2018.
  • A. Alptekinoğlu, A. Banerjee, A. Paul, N. Jain, Inventory Pooling to Deliver Differentiated Service, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 15(1), 33–44, 2013.
  • B. C. Dean, M. X. Goemans, J. Vondrák, Approximating the Stochastic Knapsack Problem: The Benefit of Adaptivity, Mathematics of Operations Research 33(4), 945–964, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1080.0330
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Discrete Dividend Payments in Continuous Time: The Value Function Is the Unique Fixed Point of the One-Period Dividend-and-Issuance OperatorResearch Paper

Why periodic dividends matter

A firm can return cash to shareholders by paying dividends, but a payment reduces the reserves available to survive future losses. If cash can be distributed only at scheduled dates while equity can be raised between those dates, the firm must coordinate a discrete dividend decision with a continuous-time financing decision. Keppo, Reppen and Soner study this combination for a firm whose cash flow is a Brownian motion with drift. Their preprint identifies the firm's optimal value through an operator that first solves the financing problem between dividend dates and then chooses the next dividend. The mission concerns that characterization, Theorem 3.4, together with the regularity results on which it depends.

The cash reserve model

Let x≥0x\ge0x≥0 be the initial reserve and let Ct=μt+σWtC_t=\mu t+\sigma W_tCt​=μt+σWt​, where WWW is a one-dimensional Brownian motion, μ>0\mu>0μ>0 is profitability, and σ>0\sigma>0σ>0 is volatility. Dividends of amounts ℓn≥0\ell_n\ge0ℓn​≥0 may be paid at dates nTnTnT, with T>0T>0T>0. Equity issues have sizes ζk≥0\zeta_k\ge0ζk​≥0 and occur at stopping times τk\tau_kτk​; the issue times are locally finite. A positive issue costs

c(ζ)=λf+(1+λp)ζ,λf,λp>0,c(\zeta)=\lambda_f+(1+\lambda_p)\zeta,\qquad \lambda_f,\lambda_p>0,c(ζ)=λf​+(1+λp​)ζ,λf​,λp​>0,

while no issue costs zero. The cash reserve after actions at time ttt is Xt=x+Ct−Lt+ItX_t=x+C_t-L_t+I_tXt​=x+Ct​−Lt​+It​. The ruin time θ\thetaθ is the first strictly positive time that Xt<0X_t<0Xt​<0. A dividend cannot exceed the reserve immediately before its date, and no action is taken after ruin. These conditions define the admissible controls Ax\mathcal A_xAx​.

The firm's value function is the supremum, over admissible controls, of expected discounted dividends less expected discounted issue costs:

V(x)=sup⁡(L,I)∈AxEx[∑n≥0e−ρnTℓn−∑ke−ρτkc(ζk)],ρ>0.V(x)=\sup_{(L,I)\in\mathcal A_x}\mathbb E_x\left[\sum_{n\ge0}e^{-\rho nT}\ell_n-\sum_k e^{-\rho\tau_k}c(\zeta_k)\right],\qquad \rho>0.V(x)=(L,I)∈Ax​sup​Ex​[n≥0∑​e−ρnTℓn​−k∑​e−ρτk​c(ζk​)],ρ>0.

The first sum includes a possible dividend at time zero, following the displayed objective in §3.1 of the preprint. An issue at time TTT belongs to the next period. Thus the one-period financing operator Lϕ\mathcal L\phiLϕ charges issues on [0,T)[0,T)[0,T) and evaluates its continuation reward ϕ\phiϕ at the reserve immediately before TTT. The dividend operator is

Dϕ(x)=sup⁡0≤ℓ≤x{ϕ(x−ℓ)+ℓ},T=D∘L.\mathcal D\phi(x)=\sup_{0\le\ell\le x}\{\phi(x-\ell)+\ell\},\qquad \mathcal T=\mathcal D\circ\mathcal L.Dϕ(x)=0≤ℓ≤xsup​{ϕ(x−ℓ)+ℓ},T=D∘L.

The continuation class CA\mathcal C_ACA​ consists of the continuous, nondecreasing functions ϕ:[0,∞)→[0,∞)\phi:[0,\infty)\to[0,\infty)ϕ:[0,∞)→[0,∞) that satisfy the issuance boundary condition of Definition 3.2, are bounded above by x+Ax+Ax+A, and have ϕ(x)−x\phi(x)-xϕ(x)−x nondecreasing and bounded in absolute value by AAA. Its larger class C^A\widehat{\mathcal C}_ACA​ omits the last condition. The intervention value in the boundary condition is Iϕ(x)=sup⁡ζ>0{ϕ(x+ζ)−c(ζ)}\mathcal I\phi(x)=\sup_{\zeta>0}\{\phi(x+\zeta)-c(\zeta)\}Iϕ(x)=supζ>0​{ϕ(x+ζ)−c(ζ)}.

Formalization targets

The first target is the mapping statement in Theorem 3.3: D:C^A→CA\mathcal D:\widehat{\mathcal C}_A\to\mathcal C_AD:CA​→CA​ for A≥0A\ge0A≥0. With

A∗=μTeρT−1,A^*=\frac{\mu T}{e^{\rho T}-1},A∗=eρT−1μT​,

the next targets are the one-period bound 0≤Lϕ(x)≤e−ρTx+A0\le\mathcal L\phi(x)\le e^{-\rho T}x+A0≤Lϕ(x)≤e−ρTx+A for A≥A∗A\ge A^*A≥A∗, the classical one-period characterization of Theorem 3.6, and the remaining mapping and contraction assertions of Theorem 3.3. In particular, T\mathcal TT contracts the uniform distance between functions in CA\mathcal C_ACA​ by the factor e−ρTe^{-\rho T}e−ρT.

The goal is Theorem 3.4:

V∈CA∗,TV=V,ϕ∈CA∗ and Tϕ=ϕ ⟹ ϕ=V.V\in\mathcal C_{A^*},\qquad \mathcal T V=V,\qquad \phi\in\mathcal C_{A^*}\ \text{and}\ \mathcal T\phi=\phi\ \Longrightarrow\ \phi=V.V∈CA∗​,TV=V,ϕ∈CA∗​ and Tϕ=ϕ ⟹ ϕ=V.

This identifies the fixed point with the value defined from admissible controls. It also asserts that the value is finite at every nonnegative initial reserve.

What the characterization gives

Theorem 3.4 turns an infinite-horizon control problem into repeated one-period calculations. Since Theorem 3.3 makes T\mathcal TT a strict contraction on CA∗\mathcal C_{A^*}CA∗​, iterating it determines the value in that class. The source connects this characterization to a numerical method when the one-period financing problem can be computed efficiently. A proof in Lean would also provide reusable statements about locally finite impulse controls, periodic actions, ruin, and discounted extended-real objectives. The preprint proves the mathematical results; this mission records their statements as open Lean theorems for machine-checked proofs.

Where the difficulty lies

The dividend operator is an elementary supremum over one payment, but the financing operator ranges over adapted impulses before ruin. Its regularity is central: the paper invokes Theorem 3.6 to show that Lϕ\mathcal L\phiLϕ is continuous and satisfies the issuance boundary condition. That theorem characterizes the arbitrary-maturity issuance value as the unique classical solution of a parabolic equation with a nonlocal boundary condition. The fixed-point conclusion alone would leave an additional gap: Theorem 3.4 must identify that fixed point with the original control supremum, including the limit over dividend periods and its terminal reward.

Formalization scope

Lean represents nonnegative reserves by R≥0\mathbb R_{\ge0}R≥0​ and the discount, costs and function values by real numbers. Control values and one-period rewards are suprema in extended real numbers, with dividends and issue costs integrated separately as nonnegative quantities. The L\mathcal LL bound proves the finiteness needed before converting to real values. An expression with both expected dividends and expected costs infinite takes the extended-real value −∞-\infty−∞ and cannot improve a supremum with a finite admissible alternative.

The paper's cumulative processes are represented by nonnegative dividend amounts and a locally finite impulse sequence of nonnegative issues. This makes explicit that equity cannot be supplied by an uncharged continuous component. Simultaneous impulses are allowed; merging them cannot increase the cost. The Brownian cash flow uses the published AtaBarjesteh23.Workload.IsDriftBM definition. The model requires a probability measure, adaptation to a filtration, and positive ρ,μ,σ,λf,λp,T\rho,\mu,\sigma,\lambda_f,\lambda_p,Tρ,μ,σ,λf​,λp​,T. The filtration is right-continuous and its initial σ-algebra contains all subsets of ambient null measurable sets, as required by the usual conditions. A dividend at time zero follows the objective's sum. In L\mathcal LL, the continuation value uses XT−X_{T-}XT−​, resolving the free-issue-at-TTT ambiguity in the printed formula. The arbitrary-maturity problem retains its separately printed non-strict survival indicator.

The value VVV is defined solely from admissible controls, never from T\mathcal TT or its iterates. Theorem 3.6 uses time to maturity and states smoothness only on the interior rectangle; uniqueness is restricted to the closed nonnegative time-state rectangle. Reusable work includes stopping-time measurability, impulse summation and parabolic regularity. Contributions proving the goal or the four listed milestones are within scope; §4's random-profitability model and §3.4's numerical experiments are outside this mission.

Selected references

  • J. Keppo, A. M. Reppen and H. M. Soner, Discrete Dividend Payments in Continuous Time, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2021; preprint arXiv:1805.05077v2, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.05077v2
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Risk Guarantees for End-to-End Prediction and Optimization Processes: The Excess Squared-Loss Risk Bounds the Squared Excess Optimality-Gap Risk, Scaled by the Squared Diameter of the Feasible SetResearch Paper

Motivation

Many operational decisions are optimization problems whose cost vector is unknown when the decision is made but can be predicted from observed features: shortest paths under predicted travel times, portfolios under predicted returns, production plans under predicted prices. The common practice, predict-then-optimize, first fits a regression model ggg mapping features www to a cost estimate g(w)g(w)g(w) and then solves the optimization problem with g(w)g(w)g(w) in place of the true cost ccc. What the decision maker cares about is not the prediction error but the optimality gap of the resulting decision under the true cost. Elmachtoub and Grigas (arXiv:1710.08005, Management Science 2022) introduced the SPO+ surrogate to train predictors against that gap directly, and established its Fisher consistency.

Ho-Nguyen and Kılınç-Karzan (arXiv:2012.15046, Management Science 2022) ask which surrogate losses give quantitative guarantees: when does a small excess surrogate risk force a small excess optimality-gap risk, uniformly over a class of data distributions? Their answer adapts the calibration theory of Steinwart (Constructive Approximation 26, 2007) to the end-to-end setting, and its most striking consequence concerns the ordinary squared loss.

Setting

Let X⊂RmX \subset \mathbb R^mX⊂Rm be a non-empty convex compact set and fff a convex function, continuous on XXX. For a cost vector ccc the decision maker solves

min⁡x∈X {f(x)+c⊤x}.\min_{x \in X}\ \{ f(x) + c^\top x \}.x∈Xmin​ {f(x)+c⊤x}.

An argmin selection is a fixed map x∗:Rm→Xx^* : \mathbb R^m \to Xx∗:Rm→X with x∗(d)x^*(d)x∗(d) a minimizer of f(x)+d⊤xf(x) + d^\top xf(x)+d⊤x over XXX for every ddd. Using a prediction ddd instead of the true cost ccc incurs the true loss

L(d,c)=f(x∗(d))+c⊤x∗(d)−min⁡x∈X{f(x)+c⊤x} ≥0.L(d,c) = f(x^*(d)) + c^\top x^*(d) - \min_{x \in X}\{f(x) + c^\top x\} \ \ge 0 .L(d,c)=f(x∗(d))+c⊤x∗(d)−x∈Xmin​{f(x)+c⊤x} ≥0.

Features and costs form a random pair (w,c)∈W×Rm(w,c) \in W \times \mathbb R^m(w,c)∈W×Rm with joint law P\mathbb PP. For a loss ℓ\ellℓ and a measurable predictor g:W→Rmg : W \to \mathbb R^mg:W→Rm, the risk is Rℓ(g,P)=E[ℓ(g(w),c)]R_\ell(g,\mathbb P) = \mathbb E[\ell(g(w),c)]Rℓ​(g,P)=E[ℓ(g(w),c)] and the Bayes risk is Rℓ(P)=inf⁡gRℓ(g,P)R_\ell(\mathbb P) = \inf_g R_\ell(g,\mathbb P)Rℓ​(P)=infg​Rℓ​(g,P) over measurable ggg; for ℓ=L\ell = Lℓ=L these are written R(g,P)R(g,\mathbb P)R(g,P) and R(P)R(\mathbb P)R(P). The squared loss is ℓLS(d,c)=∥d−c∥22\ell_{LS}(d,c) = \|d - c\|_2^2ℓLS​(d,c)=∥d−c∥22​.

Given a set C⊂RmC \subset \mathbb R^mC⊂Rm, the class P\mathcal PP consists of the laws for which every conditional law P[⋅∣w]\mathbb P[\cdot \mid w]P[⋅∣w] is concentrated on CCC, is square integrable, and has mean E[c∣w]∈Conv(C)\mathbb E[c \mid w] \in \mathrm{Conv}(C)E[c∣w]∈Conv(C). Assumption 2 asks that CCC be bounded. The constants are BX=max⁡x,x′∈X∥x−x′∥2B_X = \max_{x,x' \in X}\|x - x'\|_2BX​=maxx,x′∈X​∥x−x′∥2​, Bf=max⁡x,x′∈X{f(x)−f(x′)}B_f = \max_{x,x' \in X}\{f(x) - f(x')\}Bf​=maxx,x′∈X​{f(x)−f(x′)} and BC=max⁡c∈C∥c∥2B_C = \max_{c \in C}\|c\|_2BC​=maxc∈C​∥c∥2​.

A loss ℓ\ellℓ is P\mathcal PP-uniformly calibrated if for every ϵ>0\epsilon > 0ϵ>0 there is δ>0\delta > 0δ>0 such that, for every law in P\mathcal PP, every www and every ddd, a conditional excess ℓ\ellℓ-risk E[ℓ(d,c)∣w]−inf⁡d′E[ℓ(d′,c)∣w]\mathbb E[\ell(d,c)\mid w] - \inf_{d'}\mathbb E[\ell(d',c)\mid w]E[ℓ(d,c)∣w]−infd′​E[ℓ(d′,c)∣w] below δ\deltaδ forces a conditional excess true risk below ϵ\epsilonϵ. The largest such δ\deltaδ is the calibration function δℓ(ϵ;P)\delta_\ell(\epsilon;\mathcal P)δℓ​(ϵ;P).

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 3 (p. 22)

For every law P∈P\mathbb P \in \mathcal PP∈P with E∥c∥22<∞\mathbb E\|c\|_2^2 < \inftyE∥c∥22​<∞ and every measurable predictor ggg,

(R(g,P)−R(P))2 ≤ BX2 (RℓLS(g,P)−RℓLS(P)).\big(R(g,\mathbb P) - R(\mathbb P)\big)^2 \ \le\ B_X^2\,\big(R_{\ell_{LS}}(g,\mathbb P) - R_{\ell_{LS}}(\mathbb P)\big).(R(g,P)−R(P))2 ≤ BX2​(RℓLS​​(g,P)−RℓLS​​(P)).

Milestones

  • Lemma 2 (p. 10): g∗(w)=E[c∣w]g^*(w) = \mathbb E[c \mid w]g∗(w)=E[c∣w] attains R(P)R(\mathbb P)R(P), and R(P)=E[min⁡d′E[L(d′,c)∣w]]R(\mathbb P) = \mathbb E[\min_{d'}\mathbb E[L(d',c)\mid w]]R(P)=E[mind′​E[L(d′,c)∣w]].
  • Remark 5 (p. 19): the conditional excess true risk equals f(x∗(d))−f(x∗(cˉ))+cˉ⊤(x∗(d)−x∗(cˉ))f(x^*(d)) - f(x^*(\bar c)) + \bar c^\top(x^*(d) - x^*(\bar c))f(x∗(d))−f(x∗(cˉ))+cˉ⊤(x∗(d)−x∗(cˉ)) with cˉ=E[c∣w]\bar c = \mathbb E[c\mid w]cˉ=E[c∣w], and is at most Bf+BCBXB_f + B_C B_XBf​+BC​BX​.
  • Lemma 3 (p. 20): uniform calibration holds iff δℓ(ϵ;P)>0\delta_\ell(\epsilon;\mathcal P) > 0δℓ​(ϵ;P)>0 for all ϵ>0\epsilon > 0ϵ>0.
  • Lemma 4 (p. 21): the alternative form (14) of δℓ\delta_\ellδℓ​.
  • Lemma 5 (p. 21): ∥d−cˉ∥2≥max⁡{0,f(x)−f(x′)+cˉ⊤(x−x′)}/∥x−x′∥2\|d - \bar c\|_2 \ge \max\{0, f(x) - f(x') + \bar c^\top(x - x')\}/\|x - x'\|_2∥d−cˉ∥2​≥max{0,f(x)−f(x′)+cˉ⊤(x−x′)}/∥x−x′∥2​ when x∗(d)=x≠x′=x∗(cˉ)x^*(d) = x \ne x' = x^*(\bar c)x∗(d)=x=x′=x∗(cˉ).
  • Lemma 6 (p. 22): δℓLS(ϵ;P)\delta_{\ell_{LS}}(\epsilon;\mathcal P)δℓLS​​(ϵ;P) is the purely geometric infimum of ∥d−cˉ∥22\|d - \bar c\|_2^2∥d−cˉ∥22​.
  • Theorem 4 (p. 22): ℓLS\ell_{LS}ℓLS​ is P\mathcal PP-uniformly calibrated, with δℓLS(ϵ;P)≥ϵ2/BX2>0\delta_{\ell_{LS}}(\epsilon;\mathcal P) \ge \epsilon^2/B_X^2 > 0δℓLS​​(ϵ;P)≥ϵ2/BX2​>0.
  • Theorem 3 (p. 20): for any uniformly calibrated ℓ\ellℓ, δℓ∗∗(R(g,P)−R(P))≤Rℓ(g,P)−Rℓ(P)\delta^{**}_\ell(R(g,\mathbb P) - R(\mathbb P)) \le R_\ell(g,\mathbb P) - R_\ell(\mathbb P)δℓ∗∗​(R(g,P)−R(P))≤Rℓ​(g,P)−Rℓ​(P), with δℓ∗∗\delta^{**}_\ellδℓ∗∗​ the convex minorant of δℓ\delta_\ellδℓ​ on (0,Bf+BCBX](0, B_f + B_C B_X](0,Bf​+BC​BX​].

The goal is stated with the constant BX2B_X^2BX2​ and no other problem data: it is independent of fff, of CCC beyond boundedness, and of the law of the data.

Significance

The corollary says that a predictor trained by ordinary least squares, without any information about fff or XXX, has excess optimality-gap risk at most BXRℓLS(g,P)−RℓLS(P)B_X\sqrt{R_{\ell_{LS}}(g,\mathbb P) - R_{\ell_{LS}}(\mathbb P)}BX​RℓLS​​(g,P)−RℓLS​​(P)​. Since the excess squared-loss risk separates over coordinates, coordinate-wise regression bounds suffice for end-to-end guarantees (Remark 7). Any learning-theoretic rate for least-squares regression therefore transfers to a rate for the decision problem, up to a square root. Theorem 3 gives the same transfer for any uniformly calibrated surrogate, and is the template for the paper's further results on separable symmetric losses.

The results are proved in the paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them requires a measure-theoretic treatment of conditional risks through kernels, a Lean version of Steinwart's convexified calibration inequality in this setting, and the geometric bound of Lemma 5. Each milestone is a self-contained target.

Difficulty

The true loss L(d,c)L(d,c)L(d,c) is neither convex nor continuous in ddd (Lemma 1): the decision x∗(d)x^*(d)x∗(d) jumps between faces of XXX. A pointwise comparison between ∥d−c∥22\|d - c\|_2^2∥d−c∥22​ and L(d,c)L(d,c)L(d,c) fails, since a prediction close to ccc can still select a far-away vertex when ccc lies near a tie. The comparison only holds after conditioning on www and averaging over ccc, and it must hold uniformly over all conditional laws in P\mathcal PP, not for a fixed distribution. The step from conditional comparisons to the integrated risks is where the uniform bound Bf+BCBXB_f + B_C B_XBf​+BC​BX​ on the conditional excess true risk and the convention at ϵ=0\epsilon = 0ϵ=0 in δ∗∗\delta^{**}δ∗∗ matter; Bayes risks are infima over predictors, so this step also needs the conditional minimizers to assemble into a measurable predictor.

Formalization scope

Vectors live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin m). The standing setting (Standing X f) bundles convexity, compactness and non-emptiness of XXX, convexity of fff on XXX and continuity of fff on XXX; IsArgminSelection X f xstar is the selection property. A joint law is μ ⊗ₘ κ, with μ the law of www and κ a Markov kernel giving P[⋅∣w]\mathbb P[\cdot \mid w]P[⋅∣w]; E[c∣w]\mathbb E[c \mid w]E[c∣w] is the Bochner integral against κ w. Risks are [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued lower integrals of ENNReal.ofReal of the non-negative losses, Bayes risks are infima over measurable predictors, and excess risks are truncated differences. The class P\mathcal PP is lsClass C, a set of conditional laws concentrated on C‘;thecalibrationfunction‘deltaL‘and‘UniformlyCalibrated‘rangeoversuchaset,whichmatchesthepage′s"forallC`; the calibration function `deltaL` and `UniformlyCalibrated` range over such a set, which matches the page's "for all C‘;thecalibrationfunction‘deltaL‘and‘UniformlyCalibrated‘rangeoversuchaset,whichmatchesthepage′s"forall\mathbb P \in \mathcal P,, ,w \in W"whenever" whenever "wheneverWisnon−empty.is non-empty.isnon−empty.B_X$ is Metric.diam X.

Added or pinned conventions:

  • measurability of xstar (the paper uses Lebesgue measurability, Lemma EC.4) and of predictors;
  • E∥c∥22<∞\mathbb E\|c\|_2^2 < \inftyE∥c∥22​<∞ in the goal, explicit though implied by support on bounded CCC, to make the extended-real Bayes-risk subtraction finite;
  • 1/BX21/B_X^21/BX2​ multiplied out in the goal; Theorem 4 carries BX>0B_X>0BX​>0 for its printed quotient;
  • the conclusion of (12) read conditionally on www;
  • δ∗∗\delta^{**}δ∗∗ constrained by h′(0)≤0h'(0) \le 0h′(0)≤0 (the convention δℓ(0)=0\delta_\ell(0) = 0δℓ​(0)=0 of p. 19);
  • in Theorem 3, the identity Rℓ(P)=E[inf⁡d′E[ℓ(d′,c)∣w]]R_\ell(\mathbb P) = \mathbb E[\inf_{d'}\mathbb E[\ell(d',c)\mid w]]Rℓ​(P)=E[infd′​E[ℓ(d′,c)∣w]] and finiteness of Rℓ(P)R_\ell(\mathbb P)Rℓ​(P).

The Bayes risks are genuine infima over measurable predictors and the conditional excess risks are defined generically. Neither is defined by the closed form that Lemma 2 or Lemma 6 establishes, so neither lemma holds by definition.

Needed infrastructure: lower integrals against μ ⊗ₘ κ and their disintegration, measurability of the conditional mean and of the optimal value c↦min⁡x{f(x)+c⊤x}c \mapsto \min_x\{f(x) + c^\top x\}c↦minx​{f(x)+c⊤x}, Jensen's inequality for real convex functions on a bounded interval, and the distance from a point to a half-space. The bias–variance decomposition for laws on Rm\mathbb R^mRm and the half-space distance formula are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are alternative arguments for the goal that bypass Theorem 3.

Selected references

  • N. Ho-Nguyen and F. Kılınç-Karzan, Risk guarantees for end-to-end prediction and optimization processes, Management Science 68(12), 2022. arXiv:2012.15046v1. https://arxiv.org/abs/2012.15046
  • A. N. Elmachtoub and P. Grigas, Smart "predict, then optimize", Management Science 68(1), 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.08005
  • I. Steinwart, How to compare different loss functions and their risks, Constructive Approximation 26, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00365-006-0662-3
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Algebraic GeometryConvex OptimizationOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

On Computing the Nonlinearity Interval in Parametric Semidefinite Optimization: The Set of Transition Points of the Optimal Partition Is FiniteResearch Paper

Motivation

Sensitivity analysis asks how the solution of an optimization problem changes when its data move. For linear optimization the answer has been known since the 1990s: as the objective is perturbed along a fixed direction, the optimal partition (which variables can be positive at an optimum and which slacks can) stays constant on open intervals and changes only at finitely many breakpoints, and the optimal value is piecewise linear with breakpoints exactly there (Adler and Monteiro, Algorithmica 8, 1992; Jansen, Roos and Terlaky, 1993). Semidefinite optimization (SDO) is used throughout control, combinatorial relaxations and polynomial optimization, and its parametric behaviour is less regular. The optimal partition can stay constant while the optimal sets move (a nonlinearity interval), and the optimal value need not be piecewise linear.

Mohammad-Nezhad and Terlaky (Optimization 69, 2020) defined invariancy intervals, nonlinearity intervals and transition points for parametric SDO. Hauenstein, Mohammad-Nezhad, Tang and Terlaky (arXiv:1908.10499v3; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022) prove that there are only finitely many transition points (Theorem 1, p. 8) and then compute nonlinearity intervals with numerical algebraic geometry. Finiteness is what makes a computational description possible: without it, the interior of the domain need not decompose into finitely many intervals of each kind.

Timeline:

  • 1992–1993: Adler and Monteiro, and Jansen, Roos and Terlaky, start the optimal partition approach to parametric linear optimization.
  • 1999: Goldfarb and Scheinberg extend the optimal partition approach to parametric SDO (Applied Numerical Mathematics 29).
  • 2020: Mohammad-Nezhad and Terlaky introduce the optimal partition approach to parametric SDO (Definitions 3–5 of the present paper are taken from there).
  • 2019–2022: Hauenstein, Mohammad-Nezhad, Tang and Terlaky prove that the transition points are finite (Theorem 1) and give the nonlinearity-interval algorithm.

Setting

Let Sn\mathbb S^nSn be the real symmetric n×nn\times nn×n matrices with ⟨M,X⟩=tr⁡(MX)\langle M,X\rangle=\operatorname{tr}(MX)⟨M,X⟩=tr(MX). Data: A1,…,Am,C,Cˉ∈SnA^1,\dots,A^m,C,\bar C\in\mathbb S^nA1,…,Am,C,Cˉ∈Sn and b∈Rmb\in\mathbb R^mb∈Rm. For a real parameter ϵ\epsilonϵ consider

(Pϵ) inf⁡X{⟨C+ϵCˉ,X⟩: ⟨Ai,X⟩=bi, X⪰0},(Dϵ) sup⁡(y,S){bTy: ∑iyiAi+S=C+ϵCˉ, S⪰0}.(\mathrm P_\epsilon)\ \inf_X\{\langle C+\epsilon\bar C,X\rangle:\ \langle A^i,X\rangle=b_i,\ X\succeq0\},\qquad (\mathrm D_\epsilon)\ \sup_{(y,S)}\Big\{b^Ty:\ \textstyle\sum_i y_iA^i+S=C+\epsilon\bar C,\ S\succeq0\Big\}.(Pϵ​) Xinf​{⟨C+ϵCˉ,X⟩: ⟨Ai,X⟩=bi​, X⪰0},(Dϵ​) (y,S)sup​{bTy: ∑i​yi​Ai+S=C+ϵCˉ, S⪰0}.

The primal feasible set P\mathcal PP does not depend on ϵ\epsilonϵ; the dual one is D(ϵ)\mathcal D(\epsilon)D(ϵ). The optimal value function v(ϵ)∈R∪{±∞}v(\epsilon)\in\mathbb R\cup\{\pm\infty\}v(ϵ)∈R∪{±∞} is the infimum of (Pϵ)(\mathrm P_\epsilon)(Pϵ​), its domain is E={ϵ: v(ϵ)>−∞}\mathcal E=\{\epsilon:\ v(\epsilon)>-\infty\}E={ϵ: v(ϵ)>−∞}, and the optimal sets are P∗(ϵ)={X∈P:⟨C+ϵCˉ,X⟩=v(ϵ)}\mathcal P^*(\epsilon)=\{X\in\mathcal P:\langle C+\epsilon\bar C,X\rangle=v(\epsilon)\}P∗(ϵ)={X∈P:⟨C+ϵCˉ,X⟩=v(ϵ)} and D∗(ϵ)={(y,S)∈D(ϵ):bTy=v(ϵ)}\mathcal D^*(\epsilon)=\{(y,S)\in\mathcal D(\epsilon):b^Ty=v(\epsilon)\}D∗(ϵ)={(y,S)∈D(ϵ):bTy=v(ϵ)}.

Standing assumptions (p. 2): Assumption 1, the AiA^iAi are linearly independent; Assumption 2, there are X∘∈PX^\circ\in\mathcal PX∘∈P, (y∘,S∘)∈D(0)(y^\circ,S^\circ)\in\mathcal D(0)(y∘,S∘)∈D(0) with X∘,S∘≻0X^\circ,S^\circ\succ0X∘,S∘≻0.

For ϵ∈int⁡(E)\epsilon\in\operatorname{int}(\mathcal E)ϵ∈int(E), a maximally complementary optimal solution (X∗(ϵ),y∗(ϵ),S∗(ϵ))(X^*(\epsilon),y^*(\epsilon),S^*(\epsilon))(X∗(ϵ),y∗(ϵ),S∗(ϵ)) has X∗(ϵ)∈ri⁡P∗(ϵ)X^*(\epsilon)\in\operatorname{ri}\mathcal P^*(\epsilon)X∗(ϵ)∈riP∗(ϵ) and (y∗(ϵ),S∗(ϵ))∈ri⁡D∗(ϵ)(y^*(\epsilon),S^*(\epsilon))\in\operatorname{ri}\mathcal D^*(\epsilon)(y∗(ϵ),S∗(ϵ))∈riD∗(ϵ) (Definition 1). A point ϵˉ∈int⁡(E)\bar\epsilon\in\operatorname{int}(\mathcal E)ϵˉ∈int(E) is a transition point if every interval (ϵˉ−δ,ϵˉ+δ)∩int⁡(E)(\bar\epsilon-\delta,\bar\epsilon+\delta)\cap\operatorname{int}(\mathcal E)(ϵˉ−δ,ϵˉ+δ)∩int(E) contains an ϵ\epsilonϵ with rank⁡X∗(ϵ)≠rank⁡X∗(ϵˉ)\operatorname{rank}X^*(\epsilon)\ne\operatorname{rank}X^*(\bar\epsilon)rankX∗(ϵ)=rankX∗(ϵˉ) or rank⁡S∗(ϵ)≠rank⁡S∗(ϵˉ)\operatorname{rank}S^*(\epsilon)\ne\operatorname{rank}S^*(\bar\epsilon)rankS∗(ϵ)=rankS∗(ϵˉ) (Definition 5).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 8)

{ϵˉ∈R: ϵˉ is a transition point} is finite.\{\bar\epsilon\in\mathbb R:\ \bar\epsilon\ \text{is a transition point}\}\ \text{is finite.}{ϵˉ∈R: ϵˉ is a transition point} is finite.

The statement names no bound on the number of transition points; it asserts finiteness only.

Milestones, in the order of the paper's argument

  1. Remark 1 (p. 2): strictly feasible primal and dual solutions exist at every ϵ∈int⁡(E)\epsilon\in\operatorname{int}(\mathcal E)ϵ∈int(E).
  2. p. 2: E\mathcal EE is an interval with at least two points; vvv is finite and concave on E\mathcal EE and continuous on int⁡(E)\operatorname{int}(\mathcal E)int(E).
  3. p. 2: for ϵ∈int⁡(E)\epsilon\in\operatorname{int}(\mathcal E)ϵ∈int(E), P∗(ϵ)\mathcal P^*(\epsilon)P∗(ϵ) and D∗(ϵ)\mathcal D^*(\epsilon)D∗(ϵ) are nonempty and compact (strong duality).
  4. (1), p. 2: on int⁡(E)\operatorname{int}(\mathcal E)int(E), a primal–dual triple is optimal iff it is feasible and XS=0XS=0XS=0.
  5. Appendix, p. 22: the ranks at relative-interior optimal points are maximal on the optimal sets.
  6. (19), p. 22: int⁡(E)=⋃θ+σ≤nS(θ,σ)\operatorname{int}(\mathcal E)=\bigcup_{\theta+\sigma\le n}\mathcal S_{(\theta,\sigma)}int(E)=⋃θ+σ≤n​S(θ,σ)​, where S(θ,σ)\mathcal S_{(\theta,\sigma)}S(θ,σ)​ is the set of ϵ∈int⁡(E)\epsilon\in\operatorname{int}(\mathcal E)ϵ∈int(E) at which some (X,y,S)∈ri⁡(P∗(ϵ)×D∗(ϵ))(X,y,S)\in\operatorname{ri}(\mathcal P^*(\epsilon)\times\mathcal D^*(\epsilon))(X,y,S)∈ri(P∗(ϵ)×D∗(ϵ)) has ranks (θ,σ)(\theta,\sigma)(θ,σ).
  7. p. 22: ϵˉ\bar\epsilonϵˉ is a transition point iff ϵˉ∈bd⁡(S(θ,σ))∩int⁡(E)\bar\epsilon\in\operatorname{bd}(\mathcal S_{(\theta,\sigma)})\cap\operatorname{int}(\mathcal E)ϵˉ∈bd(S(θ,σ)​)∩int(E) for some θ+σ≤n\theta+\sigma\le nθ+σ≤n.
  8. p. 23: every S(θ,σ)\mathcal S_{(\theta,\sigma)}S(θ,σ)​ is a semi-algebraic subset of R\mathbb RR.
  9. [Basu–Pollack–Roy, Theorem 5.22], cited p. 22: a semi-algebraic subset of R\mathbb RR has finitely many boundary points.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 implies that int⁡(E)\operatorname{int}(\mathcal E)int(E) is a finite union of invariancy intervals, nonlinearity intervals and transition points (p. 8). This is the structural fact behind the paper's algorithm, which follows the optimal solution along a nonlinearity interval and detects its end points, and it extends to SDO the finite-breakpoint picture of parametric linear optimization. Without finiteness, a sensitivity report would have no finite description.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; nothing here is open. It has no machine-checked proof that we know of. A complete development would bring parametric conic duality into Lean (the interior point condition moving along a direction, strong duality with attainment, compactness of optimal sets), and it would connect convex analysis to semi-algebraic geometry: relative interiors, ranks of positive semidefinite matrices, and the one-dimensional case of Tarski–Seidenberg. Each of these is useful beyond this paper.

Difficulty

The obvious argument says that ranks are integers between 000 and nnn, so they can change only finitely often. That is false for arbitrary integer-valued functions on an interval: a rank pair could alternate on a sequence accumulating at a point, producing infinitely many transition points. Finiteness needs a structural reason why each level set S(θ,σ)\mathcal S_{(\theta,\sigma)}S(θ,σ)​ is a finite union of points and intervals. That reason is semi-algebraicity. Proving it requires showing that the relative interior of the optimal set, and the parameter values where a rank is attained there, can be described by a first-order formula over the reals, and then eliminating the quantifiers. Mathlib has no Tarski–Seidenberg theorem, and the one-variable structure theorem for semi-algebraic sets (milestone 9) is itself missing.

A second difficulty is the parametric duality: strict feasibility is assumed only at ϵ=0\epsilon=0ϵ=0, and propagating it to all of int⁡(E)\operatorname{int}(\mathcal E)int(E) (Remark 1) uses a theorem of the alternative for SDO.

Formalization scope

Matrices are Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ; X⪰0X\succeq0X⪰0 is PosSemidef (which includes symmetry) and X≻0X\succ0X≻0 is PosDef. Symmetry of AiA^iAi, CCC, Cˉ\bar CCˉ is a hypothesis of every theorem, as are Assumptions 1–2. The optimal value vvv is an EReal infimum over P\mathcal PP, so v=−∞v=-\inftyv=−∞ is represented faithfully and E\mathcal EE is not a junk set. D∗(ϵ)\mathcal D^*(\epsilon)D∗(ϵ) compares bTyb^TybTy with the primal value v(ϵ)v(\epsilon)v(ϵ), as printed. The relative interior is Mathlib's intrinsicInterior. Definition 1 lets X∗(ϵ)X^*(\epsilon)X∗(ϵ) be any maximally complementary solution. The formalization removes this choice by taking the supremum of ranks over relative-interior points, and milestone 5 shows that every such point has that rank. S(θ,σ)\mathcal S_{(\theta,\sigma)}S(θ,σ)​ uses the relative interior of the product, as printed. A subset of R\mathbb RR is semi-algebraic when its copy in R1\mathbb R^1R1 is a finite union of sets {p=0, g<0}\{p=0,\ g<0\}{p=0, g<0} with real polynomials.

Trivializing formalizations are excluded:

  • ranks are taken at relative-interior points only, never at arbitrary optimal points;
  • vvv is an extended-real infimum, never a real sInf (which would make an unbounded problem look finite with value 000);
  • transition points are defined by Definition 5 itself, not as boundary points of S(θ,σ)\mathcal S_{(\theta,\sigma)}S(θ,σ)​.

The paper also states that E\mathcal EE is closed. Under Assumptions 1–2 this is false: n=2n=2n=2, m=1m=1m=1, A1=diag⁡(1,0)A^1=\operatorname{diag}(1,0)A1=diag(1,0), b=1b=1b=1, C=(0111)C=\begin{pmatrix}0&1\\1&1\end{pmatrix}C=(01​11​), Cˉ=diag⁡(0,1)\bar C=\operatorname{diag}(0,1)Cˉ=diag(0,1) gives E=(−1,∞)\mathcal E=(-1,\infty)E=(−1,∞). Milestone 2 omits closedness. The paper's proof of Theorem 1 does not use it.

Contributions welcome: proofs of any milestone; a semi-algebraic toolkit in Lean (closure under Boolean operations, projections from RN+1\mathbb R^{N+1}RN+1 to R\mathbb RR, the one-dimensional structure theorem); conic duality for standard-form SDO.

Selected references

  • J. D. Hauenstein, A. Mohammad-Nezhad, T. Tang, T. Terlaky, On computing the nonlinearity interval in parametric semidefinite optimization, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022. arXiv:1908.10499v3
  • A. Mohammad-Nezhad, T. Terlaky, Parametric analysis of semidefinite optimization, Optimization 69 (2020), 187–216.
  • I. Adler, R. D. C. Monteiro, A geometric view of parametric linear programming, Algorithmica 8 (1992), 161–176.
  • D. Goldfarb, K. Scheinberg, On parametric semidefinite programming, Applied Numerical Mathematics 29 (1999), 361–377.
  • S. Basu, R. Pollack, M.-F. Roy, Algorithms in Real Algebraic Geometry, Springer, 2006.
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1970.
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Use and Replenishment of Two Substitutable Raw Materials in a Stochastic Capacitated Make-to-Order Production System: A Use-Down-To/Balancing Production Policy Is OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

Make-to-order manufacturers may use two substitutable raw materials to satisfy demand when production capacity and material deliveries are uncertain. A cheaper material may yield less finished product per unit, and the firm must decide how much of each material to preserve for later periods. A production rule based only on current unit costs can be wrong because using one material changes the inventory state from which future orders and production will be chosen. Chen, Duenyas, and Jasin study this coupled replenishment and production problem and characterize the form of an optimal production decision. Their result gives a state-dependent rule described by four curves, rather than requiring a separate optimization for every inventory state. This mission formalizes that production result from the 2016 working-paper version of their study.

Setting

There are T≥1T\ge1T≥1 periods and two substitutable materials. A unit of finished product requires aj>0a^j>0aj>0 units of type-jjj material, with a1<a2a^1<a^2a1<a2. Before production in period ttt, the available material is a vector yt=(yt1,yt2)∈R+2y_t=(y_t^1,y_t^2)\in\mathbb R_+^2yt​=(yt1​,yt2​)∈R+2​. Demand DtD_tDt​ and production capacity RtR_tRt​ are nonnegative random quantities with finite support. A unit of satisfied demand earns revenue ete_tet​; a unit of lost demand incurs penalty σt>0\sigma_t>0σt​>0. Holding costs are htjh_t^jhtj​ and material purchasing costs are ctjc_t^jctj​. Ordered amounts are limited by random availabilities qtjq_t^jqtj​, whose finite supports may include +∞+\infty+∞.

The production decision is the remaining inventory wtw_twt​ after material use. The feasible set E2(yt,Dt,Rt)E_2(y_t,D_t,R_t)E2​(yt​,Dt​,Rt​) contains vectors satisfying 0≤wt≤yt0\le w_t\le y_t0≤wt​≤yt​, the demand limit, and the capacity limit:

a1wt1+a2wt2≥a1yt1+a2yt2−Dt,wt1+wt2≥yt1+yt2−Rt.a^1w_t^1+a^2w_t^2\ge a^1y_t^1+a^2y_t^2-D_t,\qquad w_t^1+w_t^2\ge y_t^1+y_t^2-R_t.a1wt1​+a2wt2​≥a1yt1​+a2yt2​−Dt​,wt1​+wt2​≥yt1​+yt2​−Rt​.

The objective Jt(wt)J_t(w_t)Jt​(wt​) adds the current cost coefficients (ajpt+htj−ct+1j)wtj(a^jp_t+h_t^j-c_{t+1}^j)w_t^j(ajpt​+htj​−ct+1j​)wtj​, where pt=et+σtp_t=e_t+\sigma_tpt​=et​+σt​, to the next-period value Vt+1(wt)V_{t+1}(w_t)Vt+1​(wt​). The value functions are determined backward from VT+1(x)=cT+11x1+cT+12x2V_{T+1}(x)=c_{T+1}^1x^1+c_{T+1}^2x^2VT+1​(x)=cT+11​x1+cT+12​x2 by the production and replenishment equations (1)–(5). Thus JtJ_tJt​ is an object computed from the model data and the dynamic program. These definitions follow §3 of the working paper.

Formalization targets

Optimal production rule

The goal is Theorem 1, pp. 15–16. There are two nonincreasing switching curves γt1,γt2\gamma_t^1,\gamma_t^2γt1​,γt2​ and two balancing curves αt,βt\alpha_t,\beta_tαt​,βt​ meeting at wˉt\bar w_twˉt​. Together they define the use-down-to and balancing (UB) rule of Definition 1. For every nonnegative D,RD,RD,R and every y∈R+2y\in\mathbb R_+^2y∈R+2​, the prescribed decision is feasible and optimal:

wt∗(y,D,R)∈arg min⁡w∈E2(y,D,R)Jt(w).w_t^*(y,D,R)\in\operatorname*{arg\,min}_{w\in E_2(y,D,R)}J_t(w).wt∗​(y,D,R)∈w∈E2​(y,D,R)argmin​Jt​(w).

The goal also includes the theorem's four minimization characterizations: wˉt\bar w_twˉt​ minimizes JtJ_tJt​ on the whole nonnegative orthant; each γtj\gamma_t^jγtj​ minimizes a one-coordinate section; αt(x)\alpha_t(x)αt​(x) minimizes on a1w1+a2w2=xa^1w^1+a^2w^2=xa1w1+a2w2=x; and βt(x)\beta_t(x)βt​(x) minimizes on w1+w2=xw^1+w^2=xw1+w2=x, for every x≥0x\ge0x≥0. The milestones retain Lemma 3(a), Lemma 3(d), the backward-induction claim for HtH_tHt​, Proposition 1 for the strictly convex perturbation, and Proposition 2 for the limiting policy.

Significance

The theorem identifies which material-use rule solves the production stage for any observed demand, capacity, and inventory. Its curves are independent of that period's realized DDD and RRR; those realizations enter the region boundaries and the rule's arguments. This structure supports the paper's later ordering-policy and computational work without replacing the original dynamic program with an unrelated one. The same formal definitions of feasible production, finite-support expectations, and coordinatewise value-function structure can be reused in other two-resource inventory models.

The working paper proves the result mathematically; the requested machine-checked work is to prove the Lean statements. The present proposal supplies definitions and theorem targets with sorry proof bodies. It does not claim that Theorem 1 or its milestones already have Lean proofs. A completed development would connect the backward dynamic program to the curve characterization and then prove that the region-specific action is optimal.

Difficulty

The replenishment-stage objective GtG_tGt​ is generally neither convex nor supermodular even when the subsequent value function has those properties, as the paper notes after Lemma 3. Consequently, taking a minimum in the replenishment recursion does not preserve the desired shape by an immediate standard argument. At the production stage, demand and capacity impose different coupled linear constraints on the two materials. Minimizing each material coordinate separately therefore does not produce a feasible or optimal decision in general. The source's region boundaries must account for which of these constraints binds and for their changes at D=a1RD=a^1RD=a1R and D=a2RD=a^2RD=a2R.

Formalization scope

Lean uses R×R\mathbb R\times\mathbb RR×R with componentwise order for two-material vectors. Each random quantity is a finite support with nonnegative real weights summing to one; expectations are finite sums. The two availability laws are multiplied as independent laws at each period, and +∞+\infty+∞ availability is represented by WithTop ℝ. The joint law of (Dt,Rt)(D_t,R_t)(Dt​,Rt​) need not factor. The dynamic program has periods 1,…,T1,\ldots,T1,…,T, and the terminal value is set at T+1T+1T+1. Its minima are defined as infima of feasible objective images; attainment is content of the results, not part of the definitions. Lower-growth claims use eventual real inequalities for every positive error, with the other inventory coordinate fixed and nonnegative.

The paper describes revenues and costs as monetary amounts and uses sign conditions in its proof of Lemma 3. The Lean standing predicate makes explicit et,htj,ctj≥0e_t,h_t^j,c_t^j\ge0et​,htj​,ctj​≥0, ctj+htj>0c_t^j+h_t^j>0ctj​+htj​>0, aj>0a^j>0aj>0, and T>0T>0T>0, in addition to the paper's σt>0\sigma_t>0σt​>0 and a1<a2a^1<a^2a1<a2. These assumptions are disclosed because without them the stated coercivity and attainment claims may fail. The objective in the goal is precisely JtJ_tJt​ produced by the full backward recursion; allowing an arbitrary objective with assumed structural properties would omit the dynamic-programming content.

Definition 1 calls its six regions a partition. At D≤a1RD\le a^1RD≤a1R, two printed regions can overlap; a concrete Lean check is included locally. The formal policy follows the page's displayed order when more than one region matches. Region coverage is asserted for all nonnegative D,RD,RD,R, and pairwise disjointness is asserted only when a1R<Da^1R<Da1R<D. The first-match convention and corrected partition claim are documented with the counterexample for review. The piecewise formulas for KjK^jKj, LjL^jLj, and γˉj\bar\gamma^jγˉ​j retain their source inequalities. Contributions establishing feasibility, curve existence, uniqueness for the perturbed problem, and the induction step are all useful to the mission.

Selected references

  • Q. Chen, I. Duenyas, and S. Jasin, Optimal Use and Replenishment of Two Substitutable Raw Materials in a Nonstationary Capacitated Make-to-Order Production System, SSRN working paper 2801786, version of 2016-06-28. SSRN.
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🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Consensus Halving for Sets of Items: For n Agents with Additive Utilities a Consensus Halving That Cuts at Most min{n, m} of the m Items Always ExistsResearch Paper

Motivation

Consensus halving asks for a division of a resource into two parts that every one of nnn agents values equally, so that a group with heterogeneous preferences can agree that the two parts are of the same worth. The classical setting is a divisible interval (a cake or a necklace), where Simmons and Su (2003), building on Hobby and Rice (1965), showed that nnn cuts always suffice. The question has a direct application to fair division: once a consensus halving is found, two parties can each take a part without either side of a group of stakeholders preferring the other part. Since Filos-Ratsikas and Goldberg (2018) proved that approximate consensus halving on an interval is PPA-complete, the problem has also become a central example in the complexity theory of total search problems.

Goldberg, Hollender, Igarashi, Manurangsi and Suksompong (arXiv:2007.06754, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022) study the same question for a set of items with no spatial order: houses, children's custody days, or a portfolio of assets, where an item may be shared fractionally but each shared item is a cost. Their first result, for additive utilities, is the subject of this mission.

Setting

There is a set of nnn agents and a set of mmm items. Agent iii values item jjj at ui(j)u_i(j)ui​(j), and §2 of the paper assumes ui(j)≥0u_i(j)\ge 0ui​(j)≥0.

  • A fractional set of items holds a fraction xj∈[0,1]x_j\in[0,1]xj​∈[0,1] of each item jjj; it is written as the vector x=(x1,…,xm)x=(x_1,\dots,x_m)x=(x1​,…,xm​).
  • Utilities are additive: agent iii values the fractional set xxx at ui(x)=∑jxj ui(j)u_i(x)=\sum_j x_j\,u_i(j)ui​(x)=∑j​xj​ui​(j).
  • A partition into two fractional sets M1,M2M_1,M_2M1​,M2​ gives every item fractions summing to exactly 111, so it is determined by M1=xM_1=xM1​=x: the set M2M_2M2​ holds 1−xj1-x_j1−xj​ of item jjj.
  • A consensus halving (Definition 2.1) is such a partition with ui(M1)=ui(M2)u_i(M_1)=u_i(M_2)ui​(M1​)=ui​(M2​) for every agent iii, that is,
∑jxj ui(j)=∑j(1−xj) ui(j)for all i.\sum_j x_j\,u_i(j)=\sum_j (1-x_j)\,u_i(j)\qquad\text{for all } i .j∑​xj​ui​(j)=j∑​(1−xj​)ui​(j)for all i.

Equivalently (display (1) of the paper), ∑jxj ui(j)=12∑jui(j)\sum_j x_j\,u_i(j)=\tfrac12\sum_j u_i(j)∑j​xj​ui​(j)=21​∑j​ui​(j) for all iii.

  • Item jjj is cut if a positive fraction of it lies in each part, i.e. 0<xj<10<x_j<10<xj​<1.

In the Lean development these are util, IsFractional, IsConsensusHalving, IsCut and numCuts in the namespace ConsHalving.Additive.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.2 (existence form)

For nnn agents with nonnegative additive utilities over mmm items there is a consensus halving with at most min⁡{n,m}\min\{n,m\}min{n,m} cut items:

∃ x∈[0,1]m:∑jxj ui(j)=∑j(1−xj) ui(j)  ∀i,#{j:0<xj<1}≤min⁡{n,m}.\exists\,x\in[0,1]^m:\quad \sum_j x_j\,u_i(j)=\sum_j(1-x_j)\,u_i(j)\ \ \forall i,\qquad \#\{j:0<x_j<1\}\le\min\{n,m\}.∃x∈[0,1]m:j∑​xj​ui​(j)=j∑​(1−xj​)ui​(j)  ∀i,#{j:0<xj​<1}≤min{n,m}.

The paper states:

Theorem 2.2. For n agents with additive utilities, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a consensus halving with at most min{n, m} cuts.

The mission formalizes the existence of the algorithm's output. The polynomial-time clause is not formalized: the paper fixes no machine model, and its complexity argument is a reference to Gaussian elimination.

Milestones

The milestones follow the steps of the paper's proof (p. 5), which runs an iterative procedure starting from x≡12x\equiv\tfrac12x≡21​:

  1. display (1): the equal-value condition is the linear system ∑jxjui(j)=12∑jui(j)\sum_j x_j u_i(j)=\tfrac12\sum_j u_i(j)∑j​xj​ui​(j)=21​∑j​ui​(j);
  2. the case n≥mn\ge mn≥m: halving every item gives a consensus halving with m=min⁡{n,m}m=\min\{n,m\}m=min{n,m} cuts;
  3. the combination (1−γ)x+γy(1-\gamma)x+\gamma y(1−γ)x+γy of two solutions of (1) solves (1);
  4. the bounds of Step 3(c): the new point stays in [0,1]m[0,1]^m[0,1]m and the minimizing item j∗j^*j∗ becomes uncut;
  5. one pass of Step 3 preserves the invariants (consensus halving, every frozen item uncut) and freezes a new item;
  6. if the current point is the unique solution of the system S∪TS\cup TS∪T, then ∣T∣≥m−n|T|\ge m-n∣T∣≥m−n.

Significance

The result. Splitting every item in half is always a consensus halving, but it cuts all mmm items. Theorem 2.2 shows that, however many items there are, sharing at most as many items as there are agents is enough. This matches the nnn-cut bound of Hobby–Rice and Simmons–Su for the interval, and the paper shows it is tight: Theorem 2.5 proves that when the utilities are drawn independently from non-atomic distributions, almost surely every consensus halving cuts at least min⁡{n,m}\min\{n,m\}min{n,m} items. The paper generalizes it to consensus kkk-splitting (Theorem 5.3, at most (k−1)min⁡{n,m}(k-1)\min\{n,m\}(k−1)min{n,m} cuts).

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version exists on Prove2Me or, to our knowledge, elsewhere. The mission produces a checked consensus-halving model for additive utilities over unordered items and a checked proof of the min⁡{n,m}\min\{n,m\}min{n,m} bound, together with a reusable fact about linear systems: a system of n+∣T∣n+|T|n+∣T∣ equations in mmm unknowns with a unique solution has n+∣T∣≥mn+|T|\ge mn+∣T∣≥m.

Difficulty

The obvious approach is to note that the consensus halvings form a polytope in [0,1]m[0,1]^m[0,1]m cut out by nnn equations, and that a vertex of that polytope has at most nnn fractional coordinates. The difficulty is to make "vertex" precise and nonempty in Lean: one must show that the polytope (nonempty, since it contains x≡12x\equiv\tfrac12x≡21​) has a point where enough box constraints are tight, which needs either an extreme-point argument for compact convex sets or the paper's explicit procedure. The procedure in turn needs a termination argument: each pass freezes one new coordinate at 000 or 111, and when no further move exists, a dimension count on the solution set of S∪TS\cup TS∪T is required. The step coefficient γj∗\gamma_{j^*}γj∗​ may exceed 111, so the "convex combination" of the paper is an affine one, and the bound s∈[0,1]ms\in[0,1]^ms∈[0,1]m comes from the minimality of γj∗\gamma_{j^*}γj∗​, not from convexity.

Formalization scope

  • Agents are Fin n, items Fin m (the paper's [n][n][n], [m][m][m], indexed from 000). The bounds n,m≥1n,m\ge1n,m≥1 are not assumed; every statement remains true for n=0n=0n=0 or m=0m=0m=0.
  • Utilities are u : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ. Nonnegativity, a standing assumption of §2, is a hypothesis of the goal only; the milestones hold for real utilities of any sign, as the paper remarks on p. 6 for combinations of goods and chores.
  • A partition is encoded by xxx alone, with M2M_2M2​ holding 1−xj1-x_j1−xj​; IsConsensusHalving includes x∈[0,1]mx\in[0,1]^mx∈[0,1]m. Without that bound every solution of (1) would count, and the cut count would be meaningless, so a formalization dropping it is ruled out.
  • A cut is 0<xj∧0<1−xj0<x_j\wedge 0<1-x_j0<xj​∧0<1−xj​, not xj≠0x_j\ne0xj​=0. numCuts is the cardinality of the set of cut items.
  • gamma x y j is the γj\gamma_jγj​ of Step 3(a). At yj=xjy_j=x_jyj​=xj​ it takes the junk value 000, and every statement using it quantifies over yj≠xjy_j\ne x_jyj​=xj​ only and assumes yj∗≠xj∗y_{j^*}\ne x_{j^*}yj∗​=xj∗​, so the junk value never enters.
  • In the termination milestone the current point is assumed to solve SSS, so that the uniqueness hypothesis cannot hold vacuously for an infeasible system. The inequality ∣T∣≥m−n|T|\ge m-n∣T∣≥m−n is written m≤n+∣T∣m\le n+|T|m≤n+∣T∣.
  • Mathlib supplies the needed linear algebra (finite-dimensional kernels, rank–nullity). The step lemmas carry the loop invariants as explicit hypotheses rather than formalizing the while loop itself. Solvers may close the goal along the paper's procedure, through the milestones, or by any other argument, such as an extreme-point argument.

Selected references

  • P. W. Goldberg, A. Hollender, A. Igarashi, P. Manurangsi, W. Suksompong, Consensus Halving for Sets of Items, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022; preprint arXiv:2007.06754v1, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.06754
  • C. R. Hobby, J. R. Rice, A moment problem in L1 approximation, Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society 16(4):665–670, 1965. https://doi.org/10.2307/2033900
  • F. W. Simmons, F. E. Su, Consensus-halving via theorems of Borsuk–Ulam and Tucker, Mathematical Social Sciences 45(1), 2003. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00087-2
  • A. Filos-Ratsikas, P. W. Goldberg, Consensus halving is PPA-complete, Proceedings of the 50th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), 51–64, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1145/3188745.3188880
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CombinatoricsGraph TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Hypergraph k-Cut for Fixed k in Deterministic Polynomial Time: A Maximal Minimum k-Partition's First Part Is the Source-Maximal Minimum (S, T)-Terminal Cut for Some |S| = 2k − 2Research Paper

Why this question matters

The hypergraph k-cut problem asks for a least-cost way to split the vertices of a hypergraph into kkk nonempty groups. An edge of a hypergraph may contain more than two vertices, so the graph version does not capture the behavior of every input. For fixed kkk, randomized polynomial-time algorithms for hypergraph k-cut were known before the deterministic result of Chandrasekaran and Chekuri. Their paper identifies a structural property of optimal partitions that makes one of their deterministic approaches possible. This mission isolates that property as a mathematical theorem about finite hypergraphs.

The same paper explains why the distinction between hypergraph k-cut and partitioning by a general symmetric submodular set function matters. The hypergraph cut function is symmetric and submodular, but the cost of a k-partition counts each crossing hyperedge once; it is generally different from the sum of the cut values of the parts. The paper also gives a counterexample to a proposed extension of its uncrossing theorem to general submodular functions. The target here therefore uses the actual hyperedge crossing cost throughout. Chandrasekaran and Chekuri, §§1.1 and 3.

Finite hypergraphs and terminal cuts

Let G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) be a finite unit-cost hypergraph. A hyperedge is a subset of the vertex set VVV, and EEE may contain parallel copies. For a vertex set AAA, its cut value d(A)d(A)d(A) is the number of edge copies meeting both AAA and its complement A‾=V∖A\overline A=V\setminus AA=V∖A. Thus empty edges, singleton edges, and edges lying entirely on one side contribute zero. This is the paper's convention after it reduces to unit costs in §1.1. Source, pp. 3 and 7.

An ordered k-partition P=(V1,…,Vk)P=(V_1,\ldots,V_k)P=(V1​,…,Vk​) has kkk nonempty, pairwise disjoint parts whose union is VVV. Its cost counts each hyperedge once if that edge meets at least two distinct parts. A minimum k-partition has least cost among all such ordered partitions. It is maximal minimum when there is no other minimum k-partition whose first part strictly contains V1V_1V1​. The order matters because the theorem singles out V1V_1V1​. Source, p. 4.

For disjoint vertex sets (S,T)(S,T)(S,T), an (S,T)(S,T)(S,T)-terminal cut is a source set UUU with S⊆U⊆V∖TS\subseteq U\subseteq V\setminus TS⊆U⊆V∖T. A minimum terminal cut has the smallest d(U)d(U)d(U) among these sets. The source-maximal minimum terminal cut is the minimum cut whose source set contains the source set of every other minimum (S,T)(S,T)(S,T)-terminal cut. This condition identifies one set, even when several minimum cuts have the same value. Source, p. 3.

Formalization targets

The structural theorem

For k≥2k\ge 2k≥2, let P=(V1,…,Vk)P=(V_1,\ldots,V_k)P=(V1​,…,Vk​) be a maximal minimum k-partition with ∣V1∣≥2k−2|V_1|\ge 2k-2∣V1​∣≥2k−2. For every T⊆V1‾T\subseteq\overline{V_1}T⊆V1​​ that meets every VjV_jVj​ with j≥2j\ge 2j≥2, the goal is

∃S⊆V1,∣S∣=2k−2andV1 is the source-maximal minimum (S,T)-terminal cut.\exists S\subseteq V_1,\quad |S|=2k-2 \quad\text{and}\quad V_1\text{ is the source-maximal minimum }(S,T)\text{-terminal cut}.∃S⊆V1​,∣S∣=2k−2andV1​ is the source-maximal minimum (S,T)-terminal cut.

This is Theorem 1.2, p. 4. The size is an equality, and the set SSS may depend on TTT. Source maximality is part of the conclusion.

Supporting statements

The milestone list includes symmetry and submodularity of ddd, uniqueness of the source-maximal minimum terminal cut, the counting statements of §3 (Proposition 3.1, the identity d(Y1∪W)+d(Y2∪W)=σ(Y1,Y2,W,Z)d(Y_1\cup W)+d(Y_2\cup W)=\sigma(Y_1,Y_2,W,Z)d(Y1​∪W)+d(Y2​∪W)=σ(Y1​,Y2​,W,Z); Lemma 3.1, the one-step refinement bound on σ\sigmaσ; Lemma 3.2, the σ\sigmaσ bound for uncrossed minimum terminal cuts; Lemma 3.3, the selection of k−1k-1k−1 parts), and the containment and extremal claims used in §4 (Lemma 4.1, Claims 4.1 and 4.2). The principal intermediate target is Theorem 3.1: under its specified family of minimum terminal cuts, it produces a k-partition PPP whose last part strictly contains a given complement U‾\overline UU, and whose cost is at most half of every pair sum d(Ai)+d(Aj)d(A_i)+d(A_j)d(Ai​)+d(Aj​). These are separate theorem statements with the same finite hypergraph model.

What the result provides

Theorem 1.2 says that a part of a suitably chosen optimum partition can be specified by a bounded-size source set and a sink set meeting the other parts. It gives a finite certificate for recovering that part via a minimum terminal-cut problem. Unlike a statement about one specially chosen low-cut-value part, it applies to the first part of any maximal minimum k-partition that meets the size condition. The paper uses this theorem to derive its first deterministic polynomial-time algorithm. Chandrasekaran and Chekuri, Theorem 2.1 and §2.

This mission formalizes the known structural result, not a new conjecture. The Lean statements are compiled with proof placeholders; the mathematical proofs remain work for solvers. A complete development would produce reusable definitions and lemmas for hypergraph cut values, minimum terminal cuts, uncrossing, and counting edges crossing a partition. These objects are also useful for checking related claims about graph cuts and constrained partitions.

Where the proof is difficult

For a graph edge, crossing a partition has only two endpoints to track. A hyperedge may meet several parts at once, and the relationship between the sum of part cut values and the cost of the whole partition changes with that pattern. A direct submodularity argument does not control all the needed costs. Section 3 introduces an auxiliary count σ\sigmaσ that distinguishes edge patterns, and Theorem 3.1 combines minimum terminal cuts with a partition cost bound. Section 4 then uses that bound to rule out a failed choice of the source set in Theorem 1.2. The paper explicitly shows that the corresponding uncrossing statement fails for arbitrary symmetric submodular functions. Source, §§3–4, especially Remark 3.2.

Formalization scope

Vertices have a finite Lean type, vertex subsets are Finset V, and hyperedges form a Multiset (Finset V). The multiset preserves parallel copies under unit costs. Partitions are functions Fin k → Finset V; their parts are required to be nonempty, disjoint, and exhaustive, with P 0 representing V1V_1V1​. Complements are relative to all vertices. All counts are natural numbers. The theorem assumes k≥2k\ge2k≥2, so 2k−22k-22k−2 is the ordinary nontruncated value. It counts a crossing edge when that edge meets at least two parts, following the explicit mathematical test in the paper's definition.

The source-maximal predicate requires both minimum cut value and containment of every other minimum terminal source set. Neither a merely minimum cut nor an arbitrary maximal minimum cut is accepted as the target. The cost and d functions count edge copies, including duplicate hyperedges, so replacing the multiset by a set would change the problem. The published predicates for symmetric and submodular real-valued set functions are reused after casting the cut counts to real numbers.

Theorem 1.1, the polynomial-time algorithm claim, is outside this mission. It would need a precise machine and running-time model; an unqualified existential algorithm claim would also be satisfied by exhaustive search. The algorithms and running-time theorems of §§2 and 6, and the distinct structural results of §§5–6, are not represented here. Contributions toward proofs of the source-maximal cut theorem, the §3 counting estimates, and the §4 containment argument are within scope.

Selected references

  • Karthekeyan Chandrasekaran and Chandra Chekuri, Hypergraph k-cut for fixed k in deterministic polynomial time, arXiv:2009.12442v1, 2020; published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022. arXiv.
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EconomicsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Mechanism Design for Managing Hidden Rebates and Inflated Quotes of a Procurement Service Provider: Paying a Fee Equal to the Hidden Rebate Is the Optimal Truthful Contract for Small RebatesResearch Paper

Motivation

Retailers that source apparel and other consumer goods from contract manufacturers in developing countries often work through a procurement service provider, an intermediary that solicits quotes, negotiates and manages production on the retailer's behalf. A documented problem in this industry is the hidden rebate: some manufacturers pay the intermediary a covert "referral commission" whenever they win an order. The intermediary then has a reason to favour those manufacturers, and, because the retailer sees quotes only through the intermediary, it can inflate the quotes of manufacturers that pay nothing. The retailer ends up buying from a more expensive source.

Fan, Chen and Tang (SSRN 3514358; Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2020) ask what a retailer can do about this with contracts alone, without audits or penalties, when it can verify a quote only with the manufacturer it finally selects. Their answer for the base model is an explicit contract: a selection rule that handicaps the rebate-paying manufacturer by the size of the rebate, together with a service fee equal to the rebate. The paper relates to the literature on middlemen and corruption in procurement (Burguet and Che 2004; Burguet and Perry 2007) and on mechanism design with partial verification, where Strausz (2016) showed that the revelation principle survives when only the selected party's report can be checked.

Setting

A retailer must buy one order from one of two manufacturers. Manufacturer SSS is known to be ethical; manufacturer WWW pays the intermediary a fixed hidden rebate r≥0r \ge 0r≥0 if and only if WWW wins. The manufacturers' prices xS,xW≥0x_S, x_W \ge 0xS​,xW​≥0 are independent draws from a common distribution μ\muμ with density ggg and survival function Gˉ(t)=μ((t,∞))\bar G(t) = \mu((t,\infty))Gˉ(t)=μ((t,∞)). Because WWW builds the rebate into its quote, the true quotes are

q=(qS,qW)=(xS, xW+r).q = (q_S, q_W) = (x_S,\ x_W + r).q=(qS​,qW​)=(xS​, xW​+r).

The intermediary observes qqq and reports z=(zS,zW)z = (z_S, z_W)z=(zS​,zW​) to the retailer. A deterministic contract ⟨A,F⟩\langle A, F\rangle⟨A,F⟩ is a selection rule A(z)∈{S,W}A(z) \in \{S, W\}A(z)∈{S,W} and a non-negative service fee F(z)F(z)F(z). After choosing A(z)A(z)A(z), the retailer checks the selected manufacturer's quote: if zA(z)=qA(z)z_{A(z)} = q_{A(z)}zA(z)​=qA(z)​, the intermediary is paid F(z)F(z)F(z) and, if WWW was selected, also collects rrr from WWW; otherwise it receives nothing. Its ex post payoff (1) is

π(z;⟨A,F⟩)=(r 1A(z)=W+F(z)) 1zA(z)=qA(z).\pi(z; \langle A,F\rangle) = \big(r\,\mathbf 1_{A(z)=W} + F(z)\big)\,\mathbf 1_{z_{A(z)} = q_{A(z)}}.π(z;⟨A,F⟩)=(r1A(z)=W​+F(z))1zA(z)​=qA(z)​​.

A contract is incentive compatible (13) when truthful reporting z=qz = qz=q maximizes this payoff for every pair of true prices; ties are resolved in favour of truth-telling. Under truthful reporting the retailer pays qA(q)+F(q)q_{A(q)} + F(q)qA(q)​+F(q), and its problem (14) is to minimize the expected value of this cost over incentive-compatible contracts.

The threshold of footnote 15 is

rˉ=min⁡{inf⁡a>0, T≥aE((xS−xW)1xS>xW>T)+E((xW−xS)1T>xW>xS>a)Gˉ(T) Gˉ(a), inf⁡T≥0[E(xW1xW<T)+E(xS) Gˉ(T)−Emin⁡{xS,xW}]}.\bar r = \min\Big\{ \inf_{a>0,\,T\ge a} \frac{E\big((x_S-x_W)\mathbf 1_{x_S>x_W>T}\big) + E\big((x_W-x_S)\mathbf 1_{T>x_W>x_S>a}\big)}{\bar G(T)\,\bar G(a)},\ \inf_{T\ge 0} \Big[E\big(x_W \mathbf 1_{x_W<T}\big) + E(x_S)\,\bar G(T) - E\min\{x_S,x_W\}\Big] \Big\}.rˉ=min{a>0,T≥ainf​Gˉ(T)Gˉ(a)E((xS​−xW​)1xS​>xW​>T​)+E((xW​−xS​)1T>xW​>xS​>a​)​, T≥0inf​[E(xW​1xW​<T​)+E(xS​)Gˉ(T)−Emin{xS​,xW​}]}.

In the Lean development these objects are quote, payoff, IsIC, Feasible, cost, contractStar, Gbar and rbar, in the namespace HiddenRebate.Fixed.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 12)

Let ⟨A∗,F∗⟩\langle A^*, F^*\rangle⟨A∗,F∗⟩ be the contract (15):

A∗(z)={SzS≤zW−rWzS>zW−r,F∗(z)={rA∗(z)=S0otherwise.A^*(z) = \begin{cases} S & z_S \le z_W - r\\ W & z_S > z_W - r\end{cases},\qquad F^*(z) = \begin{cases} r & A^*(z) = S\\ 0 & \text{otherwise.}\end{cases}A∗(z)={SW​zS​≤zW​−rzS​>zW​−r​,F∗(z)={r0​A∗(z)=Sotherwise.​

If 0≤r<rˉ0 \le r < \bar r0≤r<rˉ, then ⟨A∗,F∗⟩\langle A^*, F^*\rangle⟨A∗,F∗⟩ is incentive compatible, its expected cost is finite, and

E C(q;⟨A∗,F∗⟩)≤E C(q;⟨A,F⟩)E\,C(q;\langle A^*,F^*\rangle) \le E\,C(q;\langle A,F\rangle)EC(q;⟨A∗,F∗⟩)≤EC(q;⟨A,F⟩)

for every admissible incentive-compatible deterministic contract ⟨A,F⟩\langle A,F\rangle⟨A,F⟩.

Milestones

  1. §5.1, p. 12. Under (15) the intermediary collects rrr in every state, so (15) is incentive compatible.
  2. §5.1, p. 12. In cost coordinates, A∗(xS,xW+r)=SA^*(x_S, x_W + r) = SA∗(xS​,xW​+r)=S if and only if xS≤xWx_S \le x_WxS​≤xW​.
  3. (19), p. 13. E C(q;⟨A∗,F∗⟩)=E[min⁡{xS,xW}+r]E\,C(q;\langle A^*,F^*\rangle) = E[\min\{x_S,x_W\} + r]EC(q;⟨A∗,F∗⟩)=E[min{xS​,xW​}+r].

Significance

Theorem 1 gives the retailer a contract that can be written down and implemented: it removes quote inflation entirely, selects the cheaper manufacturer in every state (no distortion), and lowers the retailer's expected cost from E(xW)+rE(x_W) + rE(xW​)+r under "lowest quote wins" to Emin⁡{xS,xW}+rE\min\{x_S, x_W\} + rEmin{xS​,xW​}+r (Corollaries 1 and 2 of the paper). The price of honesty is exactly the rebate, paid as a fee. The optimality half says that no other deterministic incentive-compatible contract does better as long as the rebate is below rˉ\bar rrˉ.

The paper's proof of Theorem 1, including the characterization of incentive-compatible contracts and the optimal contract for r>rˉr > \bar rr>rˉ, is in an appendix that is not part of the preprint held for this mission. Formalizing the theorem therefore means reconstructing the optimality argument, not transcribing it. No machine-checked proof of this result, or of any result of the paper, is known.

Difficulty

Incentive compatibility of (15) is a short case check. The difficulty is optimality: the class of competitors is every pair of measurable maps on R2\mathbb R^2R2 satisfying (13), and the obvious comparison with the first-best cost Emin⁡{xS,xW}E\min\{x_S,x_W\}Emin{xS​,xW​} fails, because a competitor can pay less than rrr in some states. One has to understand which contracts are incentive compatible under partial verification, where the intermediary can freely misreport the quote of the manufacturer that is not selected, and show that every such contract costs at least Emin⁡{xS,xW}+rE\min\{x_S,x_W\} + rEmin{xS​,xW​}+r when r<rˉr < \bar rr<rˉ. The threshold rˉ\bar rrˉ is an infimum over a two-parameter family, so the comparison must hold uniformly over that family.

Formalization scope

Prices live in R\mathbb RR with μ((−∞,0))=0\mu((-\infty,0)) = 0μ((−∞,0))=0; μ\muμ is a probability measure absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure (the density ggg); the joint law of (xS,xW)(x_S, x_W)(xS​,xW​) is μ⊗μ\mu \otimes \muμ⊗μ. Reports range over all of R2\mathbb R^2R2, and (13) is required for every pair xS,xW≥0x_S, x_W \ge 0xS​,xW​≥0 and every report, pointwise. A contract is a pair A : ℝ × ℝ → Supplier, F : ℝ × ℝ → ℝ with F≥0F \ge 0F≥0, {A=S}\{A = S\}{A=S} measurable and FFF measurable. The cost (14) is the Bochner integral over (xS,xW)(x_S, x_W)(xS​,xW​) of qA(q)+F(q)q_{A(q)} + F(q)qA(q)​+F(q) at q=(xS,xW+r)q = (x_S, x_W + r)q=(xS​,xW​+r).

Conventions and additions relative to the page, all disclosed in the item statements:

  • E[xS]<∞E[x_S] < \inftyE[xS​]<∞ and r≥0r \ge 0r≥0 are assumed;
  • competitors are required to have an integrable cost (a non-integrable non-negative cost is infinite and cannot beat (15)), and integrability of (15)'s cost is part of the conclusion;
  • each "min" in footnote 15 is an infimum, and pairs with Gˉ(T)Gˉ(a)=0\bar G(T)\bar G(a) = 0Gˉ(T)Gˉ(a)=0 are excluded from the first one;
  • footnote 15 is stated as printed: its second term is not divided by Gˉ(T)\bar G(T)Gˉ(T). This can only make rˉ\bar rrˉ smaller, so the hypothesis is at least as strong as the evidently intended one;
  • the reduction from general mechanisms to deterministic direct ones (Strausz 2016) is cited by the paper and is not part of the statement.

The goal compares the cost of (15) with each competitor's cost directly; it is not stated with Emin⁡{xS,xW}+rE\min\{x_S, x_W\} + rEmin{xS​,xW​}+r substituted for the left side, and it is not reduced to incentive compatibility alone, which is milestone 1. For iid Exp(1) prices rˉ=1/2−1/e≈0.132\bar r = 1/2 - 1/e \approx 0.132rˉ=1/2−1/e≈0.132, so the hypothesis r<rˉr < \bar rr<rˉ is satisfiable; for prices with bounded support rˉ=0\bar r = 0rˉ=0 and the theorem is vacuous, as on the page.

Needed infrastructure: product measures and Bochner integrals on R2\mathbb R^2R2 (in Mathlib), and a characterization of incentive-compatible contracts under partial verification, which would be reusable for other models in which only the selected agent is audited. Contributions of intermediate lemmas, such as lower bounds on the cost of incentive-compatible contracts, are welcome as linked theorems.

Selected references

  • X. Fan, Y.-J. Chen, C. S. Tang, Mechanism design for managing hidden rebates and inflated quotes of a procurement service provider, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2020; preprint SSRN 3514358. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3514358
  • R. Strausz, Mechanism design with partially verifiable information, working paper, Humboldt University of Berlin, 2016 (as cited in the paper).
  • R. Burguet, Y.-K. Che, Competitive procurement with corruption, RAND Journal of Economics 35(1), 50–68, 2004.
  • R. Burguet, M. Perry, Bribery and favoritism by auctioneers in sealed-bid auctions, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 7(1), 1–27, 2007.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Price/Advertising Menus for Two-Sided Media Platforms: In Duopoly with Multi-Item Menus the Unique Equilibrium Is a Symmetric Two-Item Menu on Which Both Consumer Types Multi-HomeResearch Paper

Motivation

Ad-supported media and digital services (streaming music and video, news sites, social platforms) sell to two sides at once. Consumers value the content, advertisers value the consumers' attention, and consumers usually regard advertising as a nuisance whose cost differs from one person to the next. Many such platforms answer this with menu pricing: a free tier with ads next to a paid tier with few or no ads, so that consumers sort themselves by how much they mind advertising.

DeValve and Pekeč (SSRN 2715531; Operations Research 70(3), 2022, doi:10.1287/opre.2021.2230) characterize revenue-maximizing price/advertising menus when the platform does not observe a consumer's advertising disutility, first for a monopoly and then for a duopoly in which consumers decide endogenously whether to use one platform (single-homing), both (multi-homing) or neither. Earlier models of competing ad-supported platforms either fix homing behaviour through Hotelling competition (Anderson and Coate 2005; Armstrong 2006) or allow multi-homing with homogeneous ad disutility (Ambrus, Calvano and Reisinger 2016). This mission targets the paper's duopoly result, Proposition 3: the equilibrium with menus exists, is unique, and is symmetric, with both consumer types multi-homing.

Setting

A representative consumer has base value vvv for content and is of type θ∈{L,H}\theta\in\{L,H\}θ∈{L,H} with advertising disutility dθd^\thetadθ, 0<dL<dH0<d^L<d^H0<dL<dH. Type HHH occurs with probability r∈(0,1)r\in(0,1)r∈(0,1); write rH=rr^H=rrH=r, rL=1−rr^L=1-rrL=1−r. Two platforms i=1,2i=1,2i=1,2 each offer a menu of two items (s,a)(s,a)(s,a), a subscription price s∈Rs\in\mathbb Rs∈R (negative prices allowed) and an advertising quantity a≥0a\ge 0a≥0; the two items of a menu may coincide.

A consumer who single-homes on platform iii with item (si,ai)(s_i,a_i)(si​,ai​) and consumes xi≥0x_i\ge0xi​≥0 gets vxi−12xi2−(dθai+si)v x_i-\tfrac12x_i^2-(d^\theta a_i+s_i)vxi​−21​xi2​−(dθai​+si​). A consumer who multi-homes with items (s1,a1)(s_1,a_1)(s1​,a1​), (s2,a2)(s_2,a_2)(s2​,a2​) gets

∑i=12(vxi−12xi2−(dθai+si))−γx1x2,\sum_{i=1}^2\big(vx_i-\tfrac12x_i^2-(d^\theta a_i+s_i)\big)-\gamma x_1x_2,i=1∑2​(vxi​−21​xi2​−(dθai​+si​))−γx1​x2​,

where γ∈(0,1)\gamma\in(0,1)γ∈(0,1) measures substitutability between the platforms. The utility of a choice is the supremum over nonnegative consumption; abstaining gives 000. Write cθ(s,a)=dθa+sc^\theta(s,a)=d^\theta a+scθ(s,a)=dθa+s for the cost of an item to type θ\thetaθ.

Advertisers pay a per-type market-clearing price p=w−∑iaip=w-\sum_i a_ip=w−∑i​ai​, the sum over the platforms the consumer uses, and a platform used with item (si,ai)(s_i,a_i)(si​,ai​) earns si+p ais_i+p\,a_isi​+pai​. Each platform maximizes its expected revenue over the two types.

An equilibrium is a menu profile with consumer choices such that: each type maximizes utility; on ties she multi-homes if multi-homing is optimal and participates if participating is optimal; and no platform can raise its expected revenue by switching to another admissible menu, when the consumers respond optimally under the same tie rules, the deviator may select the response most favourable to it, and a type that uses the rival platform before and after the deviation keeps her item there. The paper uses this concept in its proofs without naming it. The mission writes it out.

Let ρ=(1−γ)/(1+γ)\rho=(1-\gamma)/(1+\gamma)ρ=(1−γ)/(1+γ) and α=(w−dH−(1−r)(dH−dL)/r)+\alpha=\big(w-d^H-(1-r)(d^H-d^L)/r\big)^+α=(w−dH−(1−r)(dH−dL)/r)+.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3

With

(sL,aL)=(ρv22−dLaL−(dH−dL)aH, w−dL3),(sH,aH)=(ρv22−dHaH, α3),(s^L,a^L)=\Big(\tfrac{\rho v^2}{2}-d^La^L-(d^H-d^L)a^H,\ \tfrac{w-d^L}{3}\Big),\qquad(s^H,a^H)=\Big(\tfrac{\rho v^2}{2}-d^Ha^H,\ \tfrac{\alpha}{3}\Big),(sL,aL)=(2ρv2​−dLaL−(dH−dL)aH, 3w−dL​),(sH,aH)=(2ρv2​−dHaH, 3α​),

the profile in which both platforms offer {(sL,aL),(sH,aH)}\{(s^L,a^L),(s^H,a^H)\}{(sL,aL),(sH,aH)} and each type θ\thetaθ multi-homes on (sθ,aθ)(s^\theta,a^\theta)(sθ,aθ) is an equilibrium; the two items are distinct; in every equilibrium each menu is exactly these two items and each type multi-homes on her item; and each platform's expected revenue is

ρv22+(1−r)(w−dL)2+rα29.\frac{\rho v^2}{2}+\frac{(1-r)(w-d^L)^2+r\alpha^2}{9}.2ρv2​+9(1−r)(w−dL)2+rα2​.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 6 A–E (p. 45): the multi-homing utility v2/(1+γ)−∑iciθv^2/(1+\gamma)-\sum_i c^\theta_iv2/(1+γ)−∑i​ciθ​, the single-homing utility 12v2−ciθ\tfrac12v^2-c^\theta_i21​v2−ciθ​, the participation threshold (1−γ)v2/(2(1+γ))(1-\gamma)v^2/(2(1+\gamma))(1−γ)v2/(2(1+γ)) for multi- and single-homing, and cost minimization within each platform's menu.
  2. Lemma 8 (p. 47): in every equilibrium both types multi-home.
  3. Consumer choices (pp. 52–53): at the stated menus, multi-homing on the designed items is an admissible response for each type.
  4. Platform best response (pp. 53–56): against the stated menu, no deviation earns more than the stated revenue.
  5. Best response (22)/(24) (pp. 56–58): in every equilibrium, each platform's chosen ad quantities and prices are the explicit best response to the rival's.
  6. Fixed point (pp. 58–59): the best-response equations (22) have the unique solution a1L=a2L=(w−dL)/3a^L_1=a^L_2=(w-d^L)/3a1L​=a2L​=(w−dL)/3, a1H=a2H=α/3a^H_1=a^H_2=\alpha/3a1H​=a2H​=α/3.

Significance

The proposition describes how competition shapes menus. With two platforms, consumers of both types use both platforms, the menus are symmetric, and the low-disutility type is given a price discount while the high-disutility type gets an advertising discount. When α=0\alpha=0α=0 the menu is a "free use with ads / pay for no ads" menu. The paper builds on this characterization: Corollary 1 compares monopoly and duopoly prices by type, and Proposition 4 shows the value of offering a menu instead of a single item can exceed 222 under competition.

No machine-checked version of these results exists. A formal proof checks a uniqueness argument that runs over every combination of homing behaviour and every admissible deviation, and it fixes an equilibrium concept that the paper uses without defining. The model file is reusable for the paper's other duopoly results (Lemma 3, Proposition 4, Corollary 1) and for related two-sided pricing models with quadratic utility.

Difficulty

The consumer has nine possible choices per type, and a platform's deviation changes which of them is optimal. A best response is therefore not one optimization problem but a family indexed by homing behaviour, and the ad price w−∑iaiw-\sum_ia_iw−∑i​ai​ couples the two platforms through every type that multi-homes. Reducing the deviation problem to a single program requires showing that no deviation profitably moves a type from multi-homing to single-homing, which uses the rival's menu and the tie rules. The uniqueness part needs every non-multi-homing configuration ruled out separately (Lemma 8) and then a fixed-point argument for a piecewise-linear best-response map with a pooling regime. Tie-breaking matters: without the multi-homing tie rule or the status-quo rule on the rival platform, the stated profile is not an equilibrium.

Formalization scope

Lean represents platforms and item slots by Fin 2 (the paper's platforms 1, 2 are 0, 1), menus by Fin 2 → ℝ × ℝ with entries (s, a), and all quantities in ℝ. A menu is admissible when every ad quantity is nonnegative; prices are unrestricted. Utilities are suprema over nonnegative consumption, which are finite because γ<1\gamma<1γ<1. They are not defined by the closed forms of Lemma 6. The equilibrium predicate IsEquilibrium encodes the four rules above: consumer optimality, multi-homing and participation on ties, arbitrary admissible deviations with the deviator's most favourable admissible response, and the status-quo rule on the rival platform. The strategy space is two-item menus, as in the paper after Lemma 7. Uniqueness is uniqueness of the chosen items and of each menu as a set, up to which slot holds which item.

Two hypotheses are added to the paper's standing assumptions and disclosed: v>0v>0v>0, and w>dLw>d^Lw>dL, without which the stated aLa^LaL is negative. The condition w>dHw>d^Hw>dH is not assumed; the case α=0\alpha=0α=0 is part of the result.

The goal is not posed as "each menu solves the platform's program (21) given the other". That would assume the reduction from the game to the program, which is the content of Lemma 8 and of the platform-best-response step. The goal quantifies over all equilibria of the game itself. Existence is a conjunct of the goal, so the uniqueness and revenue clauses cannot hold vacuously.

Needed: the model file (provided), elementary calculus of concave quadratics for Lemma 6, and case analysis over finite choice sets. Welcome contributions are proofs of the Lemma 6 parts, the fixed-point algebra, the consumer-choice step, and the two platform best-response steps.

Selected references

  • L. DeValve, S. Pekeč, Optimal Price/Advertising Menus for Two-Sided Media Platforms, SSRN 2715531 (version of 2021-04-15); published in Operations Research 70(3), 2022. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2715531, https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2230
  • A. Ambrus, E. Calvano, M. Reisinger, Either or Both Competition: A "Two-Sided" Theory of Advertising with Overlapping Viewerships, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 8(3), 2016. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20150019
  • S. P. Anderson, S. Coate, Market Provision of Broadcasting: A Welfare Analysis, Review of Economic Studies 72(4), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1111/0034-6527.00356
  • M. Armstrong, Competition in Two-Sided Markets, RAND Journal of Economics 37(3), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00037.x
  • J.-C. Rochet, J. Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, Journal of the European Economic Association 1(4), 2003. https://doi.org/10.1162/154247603322493212
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Machine LearningOptimizationRandom Matrix Theory+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Nonconvex Low-Rank Tensor Completion from Noisy Data: Spectrally Initialized Vanilla Gradient Descent Recovers the Tensor Factors at a Linear Rate to Near-Optimal ℓ2 and ℓ2,∞ AccuracyResearch Paper

Motivation

A partially observed array with three indices appears when data record relationships among triples of objects. If its entries have a low-rank structure, one can hope to recover the full array from far fewer than d3d^3d3 measurements. Cai, Li, Poor and Chen study this problem when the measurements are noisy and only a random subset of entries is seen. Their result gives a statistical error bound for a concrete two-stage method: spectral initialization followed by ordinary gradient descent on a nonconvex loss. It is a known theorem, proved in the pinned preprint, rather than an open conjecture.

Setting

The unknown symmetric order-three tensor is T⋆∈Rd×d×dT^\star\in\mathbb R^{d\times d\times d}T⋆∈Rd×d×d. It has a CP decomposition T⋆=∑s=1r(us⋆)⊗3T^\star=\sum_{s=1}^r(u_s^\star)^{\otimes3}T⋆=∑s=1r​(us⋆​)⊗3, where the nonzero columns us⋆u_s^\starus⋆​ form U⋆∈Rd×rU^\star\in\mathbb R^{d\times r}U⋆∈Rd×r. Each unordered triple of coordinates is sampled independently with probability ppp; its six permutations share one sampling decision. On a sampled triple the observation is Tijk⋆+EijkT^\star_{ijk}+E_{ijk}Tijk⋆​+Eijk​, with symmetric, centered, independent sub-Gaussian noise of variance at most σ2\sigma^2σ2. The observed tensor TTT vanishes outside the sampled set Ω\OmegaΩ.

For a candidate factor matrix U=[u1,…,ur]U=[u_1,\ldots,u_r]U=[u1​,…,ur​], the objective is

f(U)=16p∥PΩ ⁣(∑s=1rus⊗3−T)∥F2.f(U)=\frac{1}{6p}\left\|P_\Omega\!\left(\sum_{s=1}^r u_s^{\otimes3}-T\right)\right\|_F^2.f(U)=6p1​​PΩ​(s=1∑r​us⊗3​−T)​F2​.

Algorithm 2 obtains a leading rrr-dimensional eigenspace from an off-diagonal Gram matrix of the mode-one unfolding of p−1Tp^{-1}Tp−1T. Algorithm 3 uses Gaussian restarts, leading singular vectors, and greedy pruning to turn that subspace into a factor matrix U0U^0U0. Algorithm 1 then applies the gradient step to fff. Eigenvalue ties, leading singular-vector choices, and pruning ties can produce several admissible executions; the result concerns every execution.

Incoherence μ\muμ measures how evenly the tensor and factors spread across coordinates and how nearly orthogonal distinct factors are. The condition number κ\kappaκ is the ratio of the largest to smallest factor norm. Write λmin⁡⋆=min⁡s∥us⋆∥23\lambda^\star_{\min}=\min_s\|u_s^\star\|_2^3λmin⋆​=mins​∥us⋆​∥23​ and λmax⁡⋆=max⁡s∥us⋆∥23\lambda^\star_{\max}=\max_s\|u_s^\star\|_2^3λmax⋆​=maxs​∥us⋆​∥23​. Distances dist⁡F\operatorname{dist}_FdistF​, dist⁡∞\operatorname{dist}_\inftydist∞​, and dist⁡2,∞\operatorname{dist}_{2,\infty}dist2,∞​ minimize their respective matrix norms over permutations of the rrr columns.

Formalization targets

The goal is Theorem 2.4, in the bounded-rank, bounded-incoherence, bounded-condition-number regime. Under its printed sampling, noise, restart, threshold and step-size conditions, for every 0≤t≤d50\le t\le d^50≤t≤d5 it asserts, with probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ,

dist⁡F(Ut,U⋆)≤(C1ρt+C2σλmin⁡⋆dlog⁡dp)∥U⋆∥F,\operatorname{dist}_F(U^t,U^\star)\le\left(C_1\rho^t+C_2\frac{\sigma}{\lambda^\star_{\min}}\sqrt{\frac{d\log d}{p}}\right)\|U^\star\|_F,distF​(Ut,U⋆)≤(C1​ρt+C2​λmin⋆​σ​pdlogd​​)∥U⋆∥F​, dist⁡∞(Ut,U⋆)≤dist⁡2,∞(Ut,U⋆)≤(C3ρt+C4σλmin⁡⋆dlog⁡dp)∥U⋆∥2,∞.\operatorname{dist}_\infty(U^t,U^\star)\le\operatorname{dist}_{2,\infty}(U^t,U^\star)\le\left(C_3\rho^t+C_4\frac{\sigma}{\lambda^\star_{\min}}\sqrt{\frac{d\log d}{p}}\right)\|U^\star\|_{2,\infty}.dist∞​(Ut,U⋆)≤dist2,∞​(Ut,U⋆)≤(C3​ρt+C4​λmin⋆​σ​pdlogd​​)∥U⋆∥2,∞​.

The rate is fixed to ρ=1−λmin⁡⋆,4/3η/5\rho=1-\lambda_{\min}^{\star,4/3}\eta/5ρ=1−λmin⋆,4/3​η/5, consistent with the paper's local-convergence lemmas. Milestones formalize the gradient identity (36), local Hessian bounds (Lemma 5.1), spectral-subspace recovery (Lemma 5.7), factor retrieval (Theorem 5.9), and the paper's general-parameter recovery theorem (Theorem 2.8). The latter makes the dependence on μ\muμ and rrr explicit.

Significance

The inequalities give two guarantees at once: geometric reduction of initialization error and an explicit noise floor. The 2,∞2,\infty2,∞ bound controls the error in each coordinate row, which a Frobenius estimate alone does not supply. Together with the tensor-entry corollaries in the paper, they explain the accuracy of this practical nonconvex method under random subsampling. The authors also specify how the sample probability, noise level, rank and incoherence interact, so the result can be compared to other tensor-completion methods.

This mission asks for a machine-checked version of the known result. Its published ψ₂ norm definition is reused; the paper-specific tensor model, spectral initialization relations, loss and gradient iteration are new. The theorem statements compile with sorry, so none of their proofs is claimed as machine checked here. Proofs of the listed milestones, the main theorem, and faithful auxiliary concentration results are welcome; the paper's numerical experiments are outside this formalization.

Difficulty

The gradient loss is nonconvex, so global convexity cannot justify the iteration bound. The local Hessian estimate applies only near U⋆U^\starU⋆ in both Frobenius and rowwise norm. A Frobenius estimate alone cannot establish the rowwise condition at every iteration. The spectral initializer must also select individual factors from a subspace despite nearly tied eigenvalues and noisy tensor contractions. These are the points where a direct appeal to standard smooth-gradient-descent theory stops short of the stated result.

Formalization scope

Coordinates are Fin d and Fin r, with zero-based indexing; the PDF uses one-based indices. All logarithms are natural. Tensor and matrix norms are explicit finite-coordinate Euclidean norms. Minima over permutations range over all permutations of Fin r, and maxima in the incoherence parameters range over the indices specified by Definition 2.1. Sampling is on sorted triples, then extended by symmetry. The probability model is a single probability space carrying the sampling indicators, noise variables and Gaussian restarts, jointly independent; the paper leaves some cross-family independence implicit. Noise has mean zero, variance at most σ2\sigma^2σ2, and ψ₂ norm at most σ\sigmaσ using the published extended-nonnegative norm. The last bound makes the paper's sub-Gaussian scale explicit.

The statements use d≥d0≥2d\ge d_0\ge2d≥d0​≥2, r≥1r\ge1r≥1, nonzero true factor columns, 0<p≤10<p\le10<p≤1, and σ≥0\sigma\ge0σ≥0. Theorems 2.8 and 5.9 use r≥2r\ge2r≥2 and round their real-valued restart count up to a natural number; this handles the boundary where log⁡r=0\log r=0logr=0. Theorem 2.4 places its claimed absolute error constants before the rank and incoherence bounds and all instance data. Probability is expressed as the outer measure of the bad event, since admissible-execution predicates quantify over choices and need not be measurable. Each good event explicitly asserts that an admissible execution exists before requiring the bounds for every execution; otherwise a failed pruning run would make a universal claim vacuous.

The remaining reusable infrastructure includes concentration for symmetric sampled tensors, finite-dimensional spectral perturbation with ties, and derivative estimates for the cubic factor map. The paper's leave-one-out iteration lemmas and their auxiliary estimators are not included in this initial milestone list; they remain natural contributions toward the full proof.

Selected references

  • C. Cai, G. Li, H. V. Poor and Y. Chen, Nonconvex Low-Rank Tensor Completion from Noisy Data, arXiv:1911.04436v2, 2021; published in Operations Research 70(2), 2022. Preprint.
  • R. Vershynin, High-Dimensional Probability: An Introduction with Applications in Data Science, Cambridge University Press, 2018, Definition 2.5.6 for the ψ₂ norm. Publisher DOI.
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EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Pricing of Debt and Equity in a Financial Network with Comonotonic Endowments: Closed-Form Default Probabilities and Expected Wealth, Debt Payments and Equity under Bankruptcy CostsResearch Paper

Motivation

Banks hold claims on one another. When one bank cannot pay, its creditors receive less, which can push them into default in turn. Clearing models compute the payments and wealths that are consistent across the whole network. Regulators and researchers use them to measure systemic risk and to price interbank debt. The basic model is that of Eisenberg and Noe (2001), doi:10.1287/mnsc.47.2.236.9835. Rogers and Veraart (2013), doi:10.1287/mnsc.1120.1569, added bankruptcy costs: a defaulting bank recovers only part of its assets.

The value of a bank's debt or equity is an expectation over random endowments. For general endowments that expectation requires partitioning the endowment space into up to 2n2^n2n default regions (Gouriéroux, Héam and Monfort 2012), and with bankruptcy costs those regions need not be convex. Banerjee and Feinstein, Pricing of debt and equity in a financial network with comonotonic endowments (Operations Research 2022; arXiv:1810.01372), observe that when all endowments are driven by one factor (they are comonotonic), banks default in a fixed order as the factor falls. Default probabilities and the prices of debt and equity then have closed forms.

Setting

There are nnn banks and an outside society node. Bank iii owes a total of pˉi>0\bar p_i > 0pˉ​i​>0; the fraction πij≥0\pi_{ij} \ge 0πij​≥0 of it is owed to bank jjj (πii=0\pi_{ii} = 0πii​=0), and the fraction 1−∑jπij>01 - \sum_j \pi_{ij} > 01−∑j​πij​>0 to society (Assumption 2.1). The matrix Π=(πij)\Pi = (\pi_{ij})Π=(πij​) is the relative liabilities matrix. Banks start with endowments x∈R+nx \in \mathbb R^n_+x∈R+n​. A bank with negative wealth Vi<0V_i < 0Vi​<0 defaults and keeps a fraction αx∈[0,1]\alpha_x \in [0,1]αx​∈[0,1] of its external assets and αL∈[0,1]\alpha_L \in [0,1]αL​∈[0,1] of its interbank assets.

With V−=max⁡(−V,0)V^- = \max(-V, 0)V−=max(−V,0) componentwise, the clearing process is

Ψi∗(V)=(I{Vi≥0}+I{Vi<0}αx)xi+(I{Vi≥0}+I{Vi<0}αL)∑jπji(pˉj−Vj−)−pˉi,\Psi^*_i(V) = \big(\mathbb I_{\{V_i\ge0\}} + \mathbb I_{\{V_i<0\}}\alpha_x\big)x_i + \big(\mathbb I_{\{V_i\ge0\}} + \mathbb I_{\{V_i<0\}}\alpha_L\big)\sum_{j}\pi_{ji}(\bar p_j - V_j^-) - \bar p_i ,Ψi∗​(V)=(I{Vi​≥0}​+I{Vi​<0}​αx​)xi​+(I{Vi​≥0}​+I{Vi​<0}​αL​)j∑​πji​(pˉ​j​−Vj−​)−pˉ​i​,

and a variant Ψ\PsiΨ, which replaces pˉj−Vj−\bar p_j - V_j^-pˉ​j​−Vj−​ by its positive part, is used in the appendix. The greatest clearing wealth V(x)V(x)V(x) is the largest real solution of V=Ψ∗(V)V = \Psi^*(V)V=Ψ∗(V). Bank iii's payment is pi(x)=pˉi−Vi(x)−p_i(x) = \bar p_i - V_i(x)^-pi​(x)=pˉ​i​−Vi​(x)− and its equity is Ei(x)=Vi(x)+E_i(x) = V_i(x)^+Ei​(x)=Vi​(x)+.

If the set of defaulting banks has indicator z∈{0,1}nz \in \{0,1\}^nz∈{0,1}n, the clearing equations are linear. With diag⁡(z)\operatorname{diag}(z)diag(z) the diagonal 0–1 matrix of zzz,

Δ(z)=(I−(I−(1−αL)diag⁡(z))Π⊤diag⁡(z))−1(I−(1−αx)diag⁡(z)),\Delta(z) = \big(I - (I - (1-\alpha_L)\operatorname{diag}(z))\Pi^\top\operatorname{diag}(z)\big)^{-1}\big(I - (1-\alpha_x)\operatorname{diag}(z)\big),Δ(z)=(I−(I−(1−αL​)diag(z))Π⊤diag(z))−1(I−(1−αx​)diag(z)), δ(z)=(I−(I−(1−αL)diag⁡(z))Π⊤diag⁡(z))−1[I−(I−(1−αL)diag⁡(z))Π⊤]pˉ.\delta(z) = \big(I - (I - (1-\alpha_L)\operatorname{diag}(z))\Pi^\top\operatorname{diag}(z)\big)^{-1}\big[I - (I - (1-\alpha_L)\operatorname{diag}(z))\Pi^\top\big]\bar p .δ(z)=(I−(I−(1−αL​)diag(z))Π⊤diag(z))−1[I−(I−(1−αL​)diag(z))Π⊤]pˉ​.

Comonotonic endowments are X=f(q)X = f(q)X=f(q) for a nonnegative random factor qqq and a nondecreasing map f:R+→R+nf : \mathbb R_+ \to \mathbb R^n_+f:R+​→R+n​ (Assumption 3.2). The solvency threshold of bank iii is qi∗=inf⁡{q≥0∣Vi(f(q))≥0}q^*_i = \inf\{q \ge 0 \mid V_i(f(q)) \ge 0\}qi∗​=inf{q≥0∣Vi​(f(q))≥0} (Definition 3.4). Banks are numbered so that q1∗≥⋯≥qn∗q^*_1 \ge \dots \ge q^*_nq1∗​≥⋯≥qn∗​, with q0∗=∞q^*_0 = \inftyq0∗​=∞ and qn+1∗=0q^*_{n+1} = 0qn+1∗​=0 (Assumption 3.5). On q∈[qk+1∗,qk∗)q \in [q^*_{k+1}, q^*_k)q∈[qk+1∗​,qk∗​) exactly banks 1,…,k1,\dots,k1,…,k default; Δk\Delta_kΔk​ and δk\delta_kδk​ are Δ\DeltaΔ and δ\deltaδ at that default set, with Δ0=I\Delta_0 = IΔ0​=I and δ0=(I−Π⊤)pˉ\delta_0 = (I - \Pi^\top)\bar pδ0​=(I−Π⊤)pˉ​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.6 (p. 13), with right-continuous fff

With Tk=Δk E[f(q)I{q∈[qk+1∗,qk∗)}]−δk P(q∈[qk+1∗,qk∗))T_k = \Delta_k\,\mathbb E[f(q)\mathbb I_{\{q\in[q^*_{k+1},q^*_k)\}}] - \delta_k\,\mathbb P(q\in[q^*_{k+1},q^*_k))Tk​=Δk​E[f(q)I{q∈[qk+1∗​,qk∗​)}​]−δk​P(q∈[qk+1∗​,qk∗​)), for every bank iii:

P(Vi(X)<0)=P(q<qi∗),E[Vi(X)]=ei⊤∑k=0nTk,\mathbb P(V_i(X)<0) = \mathbb P(q<q^*_i), \qquad \mathbb E[V_i(X)] = e_i^\top\sum_{k=0}^n T_k,P(Vi​(X)<0)=P(q<qi∗​),E[Vi​(X)]=ei⊤​k=0∑n​Tk​, E[pi(X)]=pˉi+ei⊤∑k=inTk,E[Ei(X)]=ei⊤∑k=0i−1Tk.\mathbb E[p_i(X)] = \bar p_i + e_i^\top\sum_{k=i}^n T_k, \qquad \mathbb E[E_i(X)] = e_i^\top\sum_{k=0}^{i-1}T_k .E[pi​(X)]=pˉ​i​+ei⊤​k=i∑n​Tk​,E[Ei​(X)]=ei⊤​k=0∑i−1​Tk​.

The goal is the theorem as printed, with one added hypothesis (see Formalization scope).

Milestones

  1. Proposition A.1 (p. 34): V=Ψ(V)V = \Psi(V)V=Ψ(V) has a greatest and a least solution, and every solution lies in [−pˉ,  x+Π⊤pˉ−pˉ][-\bar p,\; x + \Pi^\top\bar p - \bar p][−pˉ​,x+Π⊤pˉ​−pˉ​].
  2. Proposition A.3 (p. 34): the greatest solution of V=Ψ(V)V = \Psi(V)V=Ψ(V) is the greatest real fixed point of Ψ∗\Psi^*Ψ∗, so it is V(x)V(x)V(x).
  3. Proposition A.6 (p. 36): VVV, ppp and EEE are nondecreasing in xxx.
  4. Corollary A.4 (p. 35): the fictitious default algorithm stops at V(x)V(x)V(x), and every matrix it inverts is nonsingular.
  5. §3.1 display (p. 11): V(x)=Δ(I{V(x)<0})x−δ(I{V(x)<0})V(x) = \Delta(\mathbb I_{\{V(x)<0\}})x - \delta(\mathbb I_{\{V(x)<0\}})V(x)=Δ(I{V(x)<0}​)x−δ(I{V(x)<0}​) for every x∈R+nx \in \mathbb R^n_+x∈R+n​.

Significance

Theorem 3.6 turns the valuation of every bank's debt and equity in a network with bankruptcy costs into n+1n+1n+1 one-dimensional integrals of the factor, replacing the 2n2^n2n default regions of the general case. The default probabilities depend only on the thresholds q∗q^*q∗, which in turn depend only on the map fff and not on the law of qqq. The same formulas price debt and equity in the paper's numerical study of the European banking system, and they are the starting point for the comonotonic bounds of Lemma 4.1, which are not part of this mission.

The paper gives a one-sentence proof of Theorem 3.6 and proves its appendix results largely by citation (Tarski, Milgrom–Roberts, Rogers–Veraart, input–output theory). No part of it has been machine-checked. A formalization supplies the missing steps: the identification of the two clearing maps, the attainment of the thresholds, nonsingularity of the linear systems, and the decomposition of the expectations. It also produces, as a reusable by-product, the Rogers–Veraart clearing model with its greatest fixed point, which other financial-network results can build on.

Difficulty

The obvious argument is: banks default in order, on each interval of qqq the wealth is affine in f(q)f(q)f(q), so integrate piece by piece. Two steps of it fail as stated.

First, the threshold qi∗q^*_iqi∗​ is an infimum, and the paper treats it as attained ("the minimal value such that firm iii is solvent"). With bankruptcy costs the wealth V(f(q))V(f(q))V(f(q)) jumps when a bank defaults, even for continuous fff, so attainment needs an argument about the greatest fixed point under decreasing endowments. Without right-continuity of fff it is false.

Second, the greatest fixed point of Ψ∗\Psi^*Ψ∗ is not reached by Tarski's theorem on [−∞,⋅][-\infty, \cdot][−∞,⋅], because Ψ∗\Psi^*Ψ∗ is not monotone below −pˉ-\bar p−pˉ​. That every real fixed point lies above −pˉ-\bar p−pˉ​ uses Assumption 2.1. Nonsingularity of I−(I−(1−αL)Λ)Π⊤ΛI - (I-(1-\alpha_L)\Lambda)\Pi^\top\LambdaI−(I−(1−αL​)Λ)Π⊤Λ also rests on Assumption 2.1. Matching the default set {1,…,k}\{1,\dots,k\}{1,…,k} to the interval [qk+1∗,qk∗)[q^*_{k+1},q^*_k)[qk+1∗​,qk∗​) then combines monotonicity (Proposition A.6) with the ordering of Assumption 3.5.

Formalization scope

  • Model. The theorem statements assume n>0n>0n>0, as in §2 of the paper. Banks are Fin n; bank i is the paper's bank i+1i+1i+1. The data are Π\PiΠ, pˉ\bar ppˉ​, αx\alpha_xαx​, αL\alpha_LαL​ (structure Network), with the standing assumptions bundled in Network.Standing. V(x)V(x)V(x) is the supremum of the real fixed points of Ψ∗\Psi^*Ψ∗ in the lattice Rn\mathbb R^nRn; payments and equity follow Definition 2.2. Default sets are finite sets of banks. Inverses are Matrix.inv.
  • Thresholds are valued in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]: a bank that is never solvent has qi∗=∞q^*_i = \inftyqi∗​=∞ (the paper writes q∗∈R+nq^* \in \mathbb R^n_+q∗∈R+n​, but its own convention q0∗=∞q^*_0 = \inftyq0∗​=∞ requires the extended value).
  • Added hypothesis: fff is right-continuous on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). As printed, Theorem 3.6 fails: with n=1n=1n=1, Π=0\Pi=0Π=0, pˉ=1\bar p=1pˉ​=1, f=0f=0f=0 on [0,1][0,1][0,1] and f=2f=2f=2 afterwards, and q∈{1,2}q \in \{1,2\}q∈{1,2} with probability 12\tfrac1221​ each, P(V1<0)=12\mathbb P(V_1<0) = \tfrac12P(V1​<0)=21​ but P(q<q1∗)=0\mathbb P(q<q^*_1) = 0P(q<q1∗​)=0.
  • Typo: Corollary A.4 (iv) prints Π⊤ΛV(k)\Pi^\top\Lambda V^{(k)}Π⊤ΛV(k) where αLΠ⊤ΛV(k)\alpha_L\Pi^\top\Lambda V^{(k)}αL​Π⊤ΛV(k) is meant in the default bracket; the closed form on its second line is used.
  • Index shift: the paper's sums over k=i,…,nk = i,\dots,nk=i,…,n and k=0,…,i−1k = 0,\dots,i-1k=0,…,i−1 become k∈{i+1,…,n}k \in \{i+1,\dots,n\}k∈{i+1,…,n} and k∈{0,…,i}k \in \{0,\dots,i\}k∈{0,…,i} for the 0-based bank i.
  • Endowments are X=f(q)X = f(q)X=f(q) literally, with qqq measurable, q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 almost surely, and each fj(q)f_j(q)fj​(q) integrable.
  • Ruled out. VVV is never defined by the piecewise formula, and q∗q^*q∗ is never a free parameter. Both are computed from the clearing map, and only their ordering (Assumption 3.5) is assumed. Integrability and Assumption 2.1 are present wherever an integral or an inverse appears, so neither can collapse to Lean's junk value 000.
  • Infrastructure. The development needs Knaster–Tarski on boxes in Rn\mathbb R^nRn, monotone comparative statics of greatest fixed points, invertibility of I−AI - AI−A for nonnegative AAA with column sums below 111, and decomposition of Bochner integrals over finitely many disjoint events. The clearing model and the greatest-fixed-point lemmas are reusable for other network models. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative routes to the goal, are welcome.

Selected references

  • T. Banerjee, Z. Feinstein, Pricing of debt and equity in a financial network with comonotonic endowments, Operations Research, 2022; preprint arXiv:1810.01372v5. https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.01372
  • L. Eisenberg, T. H. Noe, Systemic risk in financial systems, Management Science 47(2), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.47.2.236.9835
  • L. C. G. Rogers, L. A. M. Veraart, Failure and rescue in an interbank network, Management Science 59(4), 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1569
  • C. Gouriéroux, J.-C. Héam, A. Monfort, Bilateral exposures and systemic solvency risk, Canadian Journal of Economics 45(4):1273–1309, 2012.
  • P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, Comparing equilibria, American Economic Review 84(3), 1994.
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Linear algebraOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Market Efficient Portfolios in a Systemic Economy: f-Efficient Bank Holdings Exist, Attain Mean Squared Deviation (bᵀv)²/(1ᵀG⁻¹1), and Are Unique if and only if There Are Exactly Two BanksResearch Paper

Motivation

When banks are hit by losses they sell assets to restore their leverage targets, and these fire sales depress prices for every other holder of the same assets. The resulting deviation of market capitalization from its fundamental value is a systemic externality: it depends not on any single bank's portfolio but on how the stock of each asset is distributed across banks. Awiszus, Capponi and Weber (arXiv:2003.10121, Operations Research 2022) ask which distribution of a fixed stock of assets among banks with fixed budgets minimizes this externality, as measured by the expected squared deviation of market capitalization from fundamentals. The question matters to macroprudential regulators, who can influence portfolio overlap among banks, and it connects to the literature on overlapping portfolios and price-mediated contagion (Greenwood, Landier and Thesmar, 2015; Capponi and Larsson, 2015).

The paper's answer is explicit: the optimal mean squared deviation has a closed form, the optimum is computed by a two-step "aggregate first, then allocate" procedure, and the optimal allocation is unique exactly when there are two banks.

Setting

There are KKK assets and NNN banks. A holding matrix Q∈RK×NQ\in\mathbb R^{K\times N}Q∈RK×N records in entry QkiQ_{ki}Qki​ the holding of asset kkk by bank iii, so column iii is bank iii's portfolio. Initial prices are normalized to 111.

  • The vector q∈RKq\in\mathbb R^Kq∈RK gives the total initial holdings of each asset in the banking sector, and b∈RNb\in\mathbb R^Nb∈RN gives the banks' budgets. The feasible holding matrices are
D(q,b)={Q∈RK×N∣Q1N=q, 1K⊤Q=b⊤}.\mathscr D(q,b) = \{Q\in\mathbb R^{K\times N} \mid Q\mathbf 1_N = q,\ \mathbf 1_K^\top Q = b^\top\}.D(q,b)={Q∈RK×N∣Q1N​=q, 1K⊤​Q=b⊤}.
  • Price shocks Z1,…,ZKZ_1,\dots,Z_KZ1​,…,ZK​ have means μ∈RK\mu\in\mathbb R^Kμ∈RK and are uncorrelated with variances σk2\sigma_k^2σk2​, σk>0\sigma_k>0σk​>0 (Assumption 2). Their second-moment matrix is
G=μμ⊤+Diag(σ2).G = \mu\mu^\top + \mathrm{Diag}(\sigma^2).G=μμ⊤+Diag(σ2).
  • The systemic significance vector v∈RNv\in\mathbb R^Nv∈RN (the paper's (3.1)) summarizes each bank's leverage targeting, liquidation strategy and the assets' illiquidity. To first order, the deviation of market capitalization from fundamentals is (Qv)⊤Z(Qv)^\top Z(Qv)⊤Z, and its second moment is the mean squared deviation
MSD(Q)=(Qv)⊤G (Qv).\mathrm{MSD}(Q) = (Qv)^\top G\,(Qv).MSD(Q)=(Qv)⊤G(Qv).
  • A holding matrix Q∗∈D(q,b)Q^*\in\mathscr D(q,b)Q∗∈D(q,b) is f-efficient (Definition 1) if it minimizes MSD\mathrm{MSD}MSD over D(q,b)\mathscr D(q,b)D(q,b).
  • Assumption 3: vi≠vjv_i\neq v_jvi​=vj​ for some i,ji,ji,j, and b⊤v≠0b^\top v\neq 0b⊤v=0.
  • The aggregate problem (4.3) minimizes y⊤Gyy^\top G yy⊤Gy over Dy={y∈RK∣1K⊤y=b⊤v}\mathscr D_y = \{y\in\mathbb R^K \mid \mathbf 1_K^\top y = b^\top v\}Dy​={y∈RK∣1K⊤​y=b⊤v}. With z=G−11Kz = G^{-1}\mathbf 1_Kz=G−11K​, put y∗=b⊤v1K⊤z zy^* = \frac{b^\top v}{\mathbf 1_K^\top z}\,zy∗=1K⊤​zb⊤v​z.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.1

Let N,K≥2N,K\ge 2N,K≥2. Then

∃ Q∗ f-efficient withMSD(Q∗)=(b⊤v)21K⊤G−11K,\exists\,Q^*\ \text{f-efficient with}\quad \mathrm{MSD}(Q^*) = \frac{(b^\top v)^2}{\mathbf 1_K^\top G^{-1}\mathbf 1_K},∃Q∗ f-efficient withMSD(Q∗)=1K⊤​G−11K​(b⊤v)2​,

the f-efficient holding matrix is unique if and only if N=2N=2N=2, and in that case it equals

QN=2=1v2−v1( v2q−y∗      y∗−v1q )∈RK×2.Q^{N=2} = \frac{1}{v_2-v_1}\big(\,v_2 q - y^*\;\;\; y^* - v_1 q\,\big)\in\mathbb R^{K\times 2}.QN=2=v2​−v1​1​(v2​q−y∗y∗−v1​q)∈RK×2.

Milestones

  1. GGG is positive definite, G−1G^{-1}G−1 has the Sherman–Morrison form, and 1K⊤G−11K≠0\mathbf 1_K^\top G^{-1}\mathbf 1_K\neq 01K⊤​G−11K​=0 (proof of Lemma 4.1).
  2. Lemma 4.1: y∗y^*y∗ is the unique solution of the aggregate problem (4.3).
  3. Proposition 4.2: for N≥2N\ge2N≥2, K≥1K\ge1K≥1 there is Q∗∈D(q,b)Q^*\in\mathscr D(q,b)Q∗∈D(q,b) with Q∗v=y∗Q^*v=y^*Q∗v=y∗.
  4. Proposition 4.1: Q∗∈D(q,b)Q^*\in\mathscr D(q,b)Q∗∈D(q,b) is f-efficient if and only if Q∗vQ^*vQ∗v solves (4.3).
  5. Remark EC.1.1: Q∗Q^*Q∗ is f-efficient if and only if F vec(Q∗)=(b,q,y∗)F\,\mathrm{vec}(Q^*) = (b,q,y^*)Fvec(Q∗)=(b,q,y∗) for the (2K+N)×KN(2K+N)\times KN(2K+N)×KN matrix FFF of (EC.1.12).
  6. The value computation MSD(Q∗)=(y∗)⊤Gy∗=(b⊤v)2/1K⊤G−11K\mathrm{MSD}(Q^*) = (y^*)^\top G y^* = (b^\top v)^2/\mathbf 1_K^\top G^{-1}\mathbf 1_KMSD(Q∗)=(y∗)⊤Gy∗=(b⊤v)2/1K⊤​G−11K​ (proof of Theorem 4.1 a).
  7. rank(F)=2K+N−2\mathrm{rank}(F) = 2K+N-2rank(F)=2K+N−2 and null(F)=(N−2)(K−1)\mathrm{null}(F) = (N-2)(K-1)null(F)=(N−2)(K−1) (proof of Theorem 4.1 b).

Significance

The result itself. Theorem 4.1 gives the smallest achievable mean squared deviation of market capitalization from fundamentals for a given asset supply, budget profile and systemic significance profile, as an explicit function of the shock moments. It is the benchmark against which the paper measures the inefficiency of observed and diversified holdings (Section 4.2 shows that full diversification is f-efficient only in a degenerate case) and drives the comparative statics of Section 5. Part b) says that with three or more banks efficiency leaves an affine family of optimal allocations of dimension (N−2)(K−1)(N-2)(K-1)(N−2)(K−1), so a regulator has residual freedom to pursue other objectives at no cost in market efficiency.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version is known. The formal development delivers the theorem together with a reusable treatment of minimizing a positive definite quadratic form over a hyperplane, the existence part of the transportation-type linear system Q1N=qQ\mathbf 1_N=qQ1N​=q, 1K⊤Q=b⊤\mathbf 1_K^\top Q=b^\top1K⊤​Q=b⊤, Qv=yQv=yQv=y, and an exact rank computation for the structured matrix FFF. The uniqueness characterization in part b) depends on that rank computation, which the paper carries out by Gaussian elimination on block matrices.

Difficulty

The minimization over D(q,b)\mathscr D(q,b)D(q,b) is a KNKNKN-dimensional quadratic program whose objective is degenerate: it depends on QQQ only through the KKK-vector QvQvQv. Strict convexity therefore cannot give uniqueness, since the objective is constant along every direction in which QvQvQv and the constraints do not change, and the obvious argument for part b) fails. Existence is not automatic either: D(q,b)\mathscr D(q,b)D(q,b) is unbounded, and one must show that every point of the hyperplane Dy\mathscr D_yDy​ is attained as QvQvQv by a feasible QQQ, which fails when vvv is constant. The uniqueness statement is a dimension count: it needs the exact rank of the (2K+N)×KN(2K+N)\times KN(2K+N)×KN constraint matrix FFF, whose rows carry exactly two linear dependencies under Assumption 3, so that the solution set has dimension (N−2)(K−1)(N-2)(K-1)(N−2)(K−1), which is positive as soon as N≥3N\ge3N≥3 and K≥2K\ge2K≥2.

Formalization scope

  • Assets are Fin K, banks are Fin N, all quantities are real; holding matrices are Matrix (Fin K) (Fin N) ℝ. The paper's banks 1 and 2 are the indices 0 and 1.
  • G−1G^{-1}G−1 is Mathlib's Matrix.inv, which returns 000 on singular matrices. Every statement that mentions G−1G^{-1}G−1, zzz or y∗y^*y∗ assumes σk>0\sigma_k>0σk​>0 for all kkk (Assumption 2), and every statement that divides by 1K⊤z\mathbf 1_K^\top z1K⊤​z assumes K≥1K\ge1K≥1.
  • The systemic significance vvv is a free parameter in RN\mathbb R^NRN subject to Assumption 3, not derived from the primitives by (3.1). Every result of Section 4 holds for each such vvv, and vvv does not depend on QQQ.
  • Added hypothesis: ∑kqk=∑ibi\sum_k q_k=\sum_i b_i∑k​qk​=∑i​bi​ appears on the statements that need D(q,b)≠∅\mathscr D(q,b)\neq\emptysetD(q,b)=∅ (Proposition 4.2 and Theorem 4.1). The paper derives it from feasibility on p. 11; without it part a) is false.
  • Statements that use only the first half of Assumption 3 (vvv not constant) assume only that half. The goal carries Assumption 3 in full.
  • f-efficiency is an argmin. It is the minimization over D(q,b)\mathscr D(q,b)D(q,b) of Definition 1, and MSD\mathrm{MSD}MSD is the quadratic form (Qv)⊤G(Qv)(Qv)^\top G(Qv)(Qv)⊤G(Qv). Defining f-efficiency as Qv=y∗Qv=y^*Qv=y∗, or defining MSD\mathrm{MSD}MSD through y∗y^*y∗, would remove the optimization from the goal and is ruled out.
  • vec(Q)\mathrm{vec}(Q)vec(Q) is indexed by pairs (asset, bank) instead of stacked columns, and null(F)\mathrm{null}(F)null(F) is the Module.finrank of the kernel of x↦Fxx\mapsto Fxx↦Fx.
  • QN=2Q^{N=2}QN=2 is defined for v∈R2v\in\mathbb R^2v∈R2; the goal transports it along N=2N=2N=2 with Fin.cast.

The development needs the Sherman–Morrison identity for a diagonal-plus-rank-one matrix, the minimizer of a positive definite quadratic form under one linear constraint, explicit constructions in D(q,b)\mathscr D(q,b)D(q,b), and a rank computation. Contributions of reusable lemmas for these, and of proofs of the milestones in any order, are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. Awiszus, A. Capponi, S. Weber, Market Efficient Portfolios in a Systemic Economy, Operations Research 70(2), 2022. Preprint arXiv:2003.10121v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.10121
  • R. Greenwood, A. Landier, D. Thesmar, Vulnerable Banks, Journal of Financial Economics 115(3), 2015. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.11.006
  • A. Capponi, M. Larsson, Price Contagion through Balance Sheet Linkages, Review of Asset Pricing Studies 5(2), 2015. https://doi.org/10.1093/rapstu/rav006
  • D. S. Bernstein, Matrix Mathematics, Princeton University Press, 2005.
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

A General Framework to Compare Announcement Accuracy: Static vs. LES-Based Announcement: The Static Announcement Has No Larger MSE if and only if the Correlation Is at Most 1/2Research Paper

Why delay announcements matter

A customer who is told that service will be delayed can use the announced wait to decide whether to stay, leave, or plan around the delay. A service operator needs to know whether a changing, customer-specific announcement actually predicts the eventual wait more accurately than a fixed announcement. Bassamboo and Ibrahim studied this question for the last-entered-service (LES) announcement, which reports the wait of the last customer to enter service, and for a static announcement based on the mean wait of delayed customers. Their empirical examples show that neither method wins uniformly across queueing regimes; the comparison depends on how the announcement and the eventual wait move together (Bassamboo and Ibrahim, 2021, §§3–4 of the submitted manuscript).

The mission isolates the paper's general comparison criterion. Its statement needs no particular arrival process, service discipline, or queue length. This makes the result a reusable mathematical test for predictors in other service systems as well as for LES. The paper itself notes that the criterion applies irrespective of the specific queueing model, subject to the moment conditions under which its mean-squared errors and correlations are defined (submitted manuscript, §4.2, p. 14).

Random waits and predictions

Let WDW_DWD​ be the real-valued waiting time of a delayed customer in steady state. Operationally, the paper takes the virtual waiting time W∞W_\inftyW∞​ and conditions on W∞>0W_\infty>0W∞​>0: WDW_DWD​ has the conditional distribution of a positive wait. Let PPP be a real-valued predictor issued to that customer. To compare a prediction with the outcome, the pair (P,WD)(P,W_D)(P,WD​) must be jointly distributed; their separate marginal distributions cannot determine the correlation. Both are represented as functions on one probability space in Lean.

The static announcement, denoted EA⁡\operatorname{EA}EA, always reports E[WD]\mathbb E[W_D]E[WD​]. A changing predictor can instead respond to the system's current state. The paper's mean-squared error of PPP is the expectation of its squared discrepancy from the outcome:

MSE⁡(P)=E[(WD−P)2].\operatorname{MSE}(P)=\mathbb E[(W_D-P)^2].MSE(P)=E[(WD​−P)2].

Write Var⁡(X)\operatorname{Var}(X)Var(X) and Cov⁡(X,Y)\operatorname{Cov}(X,Y)Cov(X,Y) for variance and covariance. When both variances are positive, the Pearson correlation is r[X,Y]=Cov⁡(X,Y)/Var⁡(X)Var⁡(Y)r[X,Y]=\operatorname{Cov}(X,Y)/\sqrt{\operatorname{Var}(X)\operatorname{Var}(Y)}r[X,Y]=Cov(X,Y)/Var(X)Var(Y)​. The coefficient of variation of the delay is CWD=Var⁡(WD)/E[WD]C_{W_D}=\sqrt{\operatorname{Var}(W_D)}/\mathbb E[W_D]CWD​​=Var(WD​)​/E[WD​]. These are the quantities in §4.2 and equation (3) of the submitted manuscript (published article; mission citations use the submitted manuscript's page and equation numbers).

Formalization targets

The first milestone establishes the error of the static predictor from its definition:

MSE⁡(EA⁡)=Var⁡(WD).\operatorname{MSE}(\operatorname{EA})=\operatorname{Var}(W_D).MSE(EA)=Var(WD​).

The next two milestones give the expanded error identity from the proof of Proposition 1 and its normalized form, equation (4). Suppose E[P]=γE[WD]\mathbb E[P]=\gamma\mathbb E[W_D]E[P]=γE[WD​] and Var⁡(P)=βVar⁡(WD)\operatorname{Var}(P)=\beta\operatorname{Var}(W_D)Var(P)=βVar(WD​) with γ,β≥0\gamma,\beta\ge0γ,β≥0. Proposition 1 states

MSE⁡(P)=Var⁡(WD)(β+1+(γ−1CWD)2−2r[P,WD]β).\operatorname{MSE}(P)=\operatorname{Var}(W_D) \left(\beta+1+\left(\frac{\gamma-1}{C_{W_D}}\right)^2 -2r[P,W_D]\sqrt\beta\right).MSE(P)=Var(WD​)(β+1+(CWD​​γ−1​)2−2r[P,WD​]β​).

The goal is Corollary 1, equation (5). If PPP has the same mean and variance as WDW_DWD​, it compares the two predictors at the exact threshold 1/21/21/2:

MSE⁡(EA⁡)≤MSE⁡(P)⟺r[P,WD]≤12.\operatorname{MSE}(\operatorname{EA})\le\operatorname{MSE}(P) \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad r[P,W_D]\le\frac12.MSE(EA)≤MSE(P)⟺r[P,WD​]≤21​.

Both inequalities are non-strict. The corollary is stated for a general predictor PPP; applying it to LES requires a separate analysis of the LES wait and its correlation with the arriving customer's wait. The submitted manuscript supplies that model-specific analysis later in §5 (Bassamboo and Ibrahim, 2021).

What the criterion gives

Under the corollary's equal-mean and equal-variance assumptions, the comparison of two expected squared errors reduces to one correlation. A predictor with correlation at most 1/21/21/2 offers no mean-squared-error improvement over the static announcement; a predictor above that threshold does. The equality case is included. Proposition 1 also records how a mean shift or a variance change modifies this comparison, which is useful when a proposed announcement is biased or more variable than the delay.

The paper proves these identities. This mission asks for machine-checked proofs of their statements in Lean; the draft theorems themselves are open proof obligations. A completed development would provide reusable definitions of predictor MSE, the constant mean announcement, Pearson correlation, and coefficient of variation, together with exact interfaces for later queueing results. It does not assert that the paper's LES limit theorems are already formalized.

Where the proof work lies

The key mathematical work is passing from the expectation of a squared difference to the variance and covariance terms while keeping the two random variables on the same probability space. In Lean this requires the integrability consequences of square integrability, the relation between covariance and the centered product, and careful handling of the square-root normalization. Merely replacing MSE and correlation by unrelated real parameters would erase that work and yield an elementary numerical equivalence. The proposed definitions are therefore the expectations and covariance stated in the paper, and the goal quantifies over actual random variables.

The boundary β=0\beta=0β=0 also needs attention: the predictor has zero variance and ordinary Pearson correlation has a zero denominator. The term involving correlation is multiplied by β\sqrt\betaβ​, so the displayed identity still has a meaningful value under the Lean convention described below. Proposition 1's other denominator, CWDC_{W_D}CWD​​, requires a positive delay mean and variance in the intended setting.

Formalization scope

Lean uses an arbitrary measurable space with a probability measure and real-valued functions WD,PW_D,PWD​,P on that space. It does not construct the underlying queue; §4.2 makes the comparison at the level of the joint law of the delay and prediction. Each theorem explicitly assumes WD,P∈L2W_D,P\in L^2WD​,P∈L2 where both appear. This supplies finite second moments for the paper's variances and MSE and avoids Lean's default value for a nonintegrable real integral. The EA identity only needs WD∈L2W_D\in L^2WD​∈L2.

Positive variance of WDW_DWD​ is explicit in Proposition 1, its expansion, and the corollary. It gives the intended domain of correlation in the equal-variance corollary and prevents equation (4) from failing under division by zero. Proposition 1 additionally assumes E[WD]>0\mathbb E[W_D]>0E[WD​]>0, as expected for a positive conditional wait, so CWD>0C_{W_D}>0CWD​​>0. No condition β>0\beta>0β>0 is imposed: at β=0\beta=0β=0, Lean evaluates the zero-denominator correlation as zero and the entire correlation term vanishes. The error is defined with (WD−P)2(W_D-P)^2(WD​−P)2 as in equation (3), although the proof writes the reversed difference. Contributions toward the integral identities, covariance normalization, and the final inequality are welcome; the four definitions may also serve other prediction-error formalizations.

Selected references

  • A. Bassamboo and R. Ibrahim, A General Framework to Compare Announcement Accuracy: Static vs. LES-Based Announcement, Management Science, 2021. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2020.3722. Mission theorem numbers and pages refer to the authors' submitted manuscript, §§3.1 and 4.2, pp. 7 and 12–14.
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Algebraic TopologyAlgorithmic Game TheoryTopology·Captain: mikedeng1

Equipartition of a Segment: Every Continuous Function on Subsegments of [0, 1] Vanishing on Degenerate Segments Takes Equal Values on Some Partition of [0, 1] into m SegmentsResearch Paper

Motivation

In fair division, a value may be assigned to each interval that a cut produces. If the value is continuous in the interval's endpoints, an equal-value partition is a natural target. Some valuations are nonnegative and additive, but a difference of competing measures or a signed utility need have neither property. Avvakumov and Karasev establish equal-value partitions even when the value changes sign and is not additive, provided it vanishes on degenerate intervals. Their result is used by Bogomolnaia and Moulin in work on guarantees for fair division. Avvakumov and Karasev, pp. 1–2; Bogomolnaia and Moulin.

The paper identifies earlier special cases: a nonnegative valuation follows from the Knaster–Kuratowski–Mazurkiewicz theorem; prime-power numbers of parts with a valuation of varying sign were known through degree-theoretic results; additive valuations admit an elementary argument. The remaining case permits a sign-changing, nonadditive valuation and an arbitrary positive number of parts. The authors distinguish this from an envy-free division problem with separate valuations for several players, which they state remains open outside prime-power cases. Avvakumov and Karasev, p. 2; Avvakumov and Karasev, Envy-free division using mapping degree; Meunier and Zerbib.

Setting

Write I\mathcal II for the set of all subsegments I=[a,b]I=[a,b]I=[a,b] of [0,1][0,1][0,1] with 0≤a≤b≤10\le a\le b\le10≤a≤b≤1. An interval may be degenerate, meaning a=ba=ba=b. A real-valued function fff on I\mathcal II is continuous when its value varies continuously with the two endpoints. The required boundary condition is f([a,a])=0f([a,a])=0f([a,a])=0 for every a∈[0,1]a\in[0,1]a∈[0,1]. No sign, monotonicity, or additivity condition is imposed. A partition into mmm parts is a sequence 0=x0≤x1≤⋯≤xm=10=x_0\le x_1\le\cdots\le x_m=10=x0​≤x1​≤⋯≤xm​=1, so its parts [xj−1,xj][x_{j-1},x_j][xj−1​,xj​] may also be degenerate. Avvakumov and Karasev, Theorem 1.1, pp. 1–2.

The intermediate setting is a nice multivalued function. Its graph is a compact subset ZZZ of I×(−1,1)\mathcal I\times(-1,1)I×(−1,1). The graph separates the bottom I×{−1}\mathcal I\times\{-1\}I×{−1} from the top I×{1}\mathcal I\times\{1\}I×{1} inside the cylinder C=I×[−1,1]C=\mathcal I\times[-1,1]C=I×[−1,1]: those two sides lie in different connected components of C∖ZC\setminus ZC∖Z. A representation of a nice graph is a continuous real function φ\varphiφ on CCC that is negative on the bottom, positive on the top, and whose zero set is the graph. The paper passes between graphs and representations in Lemma 2.2. Avvakumov and Karasev, Definition 2.1 and Lemma 2.2, p. 2.

For a prime ppp, a segment I=[a,b]I=[a,b]I=[a,b], and a value yyy, a zero partition is a sequence a=x0≤⋯≤xp=ba=x_0\le\cdots\le x_p=ba=x0​≤⋯≤xp​=b such that φ([xj−1,xj],y)=0\varphi([x_{j-1},x_j],y)=0φ([xj−1​,xj​],y)=0 for each j=1,…,pj=1,\ldots,pj=1,…,p. The set Zp(φ)Z_p(\varphi)Zp​(φ) contains exactly those pairs (I,y)(I,y)(I,y) that admit a zero partition. This is the projection to the cylinder of the paper's simultaneous-solution set SSS for labeled partitions. Avvakumov and Karasev, equation (4.1) and Claim 4.4, pp. 7–9.

Formalization targets

The goal is Theorem 1.1: for every positive integer mmm and every continuous fff satisfying the degenerate-interval condition, there are possibly repeated cut points with a common value:

0=x0≤x1≤⋯≤xm=1,f([x0,x1])=⋯=f([xm−1,xm]).0=x_0\le x_1\le\cdots\le x_m=1,\qquad f([x_0,x_1])=\cdots=f([x_{m-1},x_m]).0=x0​≤x1​≤⋯≤xm​=1,f([x0​,x1​])=⋯=f([xm−1​,xm​]).

The theorem is already posed as the Open platform statement FairGuarantees.DivideChoose.theorem_of_4; this mission references that exact statement as its goal. It supplies the paper's supporting statements, including Lemma 2.2 on graph representations, Claim 4.4 on separation by projected zero partitions, and the prime-step Lemma 2.3. The latter asserts that, when φ([a,a],y)=y\varphi([a,a],y)=yφ([a,a],y)=y, there is a represented nice graph with the same degenerate identity whose zeros each yield a zero partition for φ\varphiφ. The milestone list includes the fixed-segment and continuous-family statements used to characterize Zp(φ)Z_p(\varphi)Zp​(φ), and equation (4.2) describing its degenerate boundary. Avvakumov and Karasev, Lemmas 2.2–2.3, pp. 2–3; Claims 4.3–4.4 and equation (4.2), pp. 8–9.

Significance

The theorem guarantees equal values for any positive number of consecutive parts under only endpoint continuity and the zero-on-degenerates condition. It covers valuations for which nonnegative or additive special-case results give no conclusion. It also provides the theorem invoked in the fair-guarantee application cited by the authors. Avvakumov and Karasev, pp. 1–2; Bogomolnaia and Moulin.

The mathematical result was proved in the paper; the platform's theorem statement remains Open and lacks a machine-checked proof there. Formalizing the paper's intermediate claims makes its topological assumptions and its treatment of degenerate parts explicit. The definitions of a separating graph, its representation, and zero partitions can also be reused for related partition problems. The present mission states the paper's prime-step targets, leaving the proofs and the underlying equivariant topology as work for solvers.

Difficulty

For a fixed signed valuation, continuity alone does not select one common value that works across every piece of an arbitrary partition. The nonnegative case has a simplex-covering argument, but that argument does not directly control values of both signs. In the paper's general case, the difficult claim is that the projected simultaneous-zero set separates an entire cylinder, even as the segment varies. Its source proof requires a mod-ppp statement for a space of labeled partitions and control of the resulting solution set. A further boundary issue arises on degenerate segments: a representation of the projected graph must satisfy ψ([a,a],y)=y\psi([a,a],y)=yψ([a,a],y)=y, not merely have the right zeros. Avvakumov and Karasev, pp. 2, 7–10.

Formalization scope

Lean represents I=[a,b]I=[a,b]I=[a,b] by the endpoint pair (a,b)(a,b)(a,b) with 0≤a≤b≤10\le a\le b\le10≤a≤b≤1. The cylinder uses the closed value range [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1]; a nice graph lies in its open interior (−1,1)(-1,1)(−1,1). Functions are total Lean functions, but only their values on this cylinder enter the definitions and results. Continuity is required on the cylinder. Separation uses connected components of its complement, as in Definition 2.1, and explicitly requires the bottom and top to avoid the graph. This prevents a graph containing a boundary side from satisfying separation vacuously.

Every prime-step claim assumes ppp prime, the representation's strict boundary signs, and the degenerate identity. Zero partitions have exactly ppp consecutive parts whose endpoints are pinned to the original segment; repeated cuts are allowed. The goal reference likewise permits degenerate parts and assumes m≥1m\ge1m≥1. The projected set is defined through existence of an ordinary ordered partition, independent of how the paper labels partitions in its configuration space. The needed existing Lean notions include ContinuousOn, IsCompact, connectedComponentIn, finite index types, and Nat.Prime. A complete proof development also needs results about the paper's labeled-partition complex, equivariant cycles and transverse maps. Contributions establishing that reusable topology, as well as proofs of the stated milestones, are within scope. Avvakumov and Karasev, §§2–4.

Selected references

  • Sergey Avvakumov and Roman Karasev, Equipartition of a Segment, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023. arXiv:2009.09862v4.
  • Anna Bogomolnaia and Hervé Moulin, Guarantees in Fair Division: General or Monotone Preferences, 2019. arXiv:1911.10009v3.
  • Sergey Avvakumov and Roman Karasev, Envy-Free Division Using Mapping Degree, Mathematika 67, 2021. arXiv:1907.11183.
  • Frédéric Meunier and Shira Zerbib, Envy-Free Cake Division Without Assuming the Players Prefer Nonempty Pieces, Israel Journal of Mathematics 234, 2019. arXiv:1804.00449.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Multiregional Oligopoly with Capacity Constraints: The Capacity-Constrained Cournot Game Has a Unique Equilibrium, Implementing the Unique Fixed Point of the Marginal-Profit Best ResponseResearch Paper

Motivation

Firms that serve several geographic markets must decide both how much to produce and where to sell it. A capacity limit couples those regional decisions: an extra unit sent to one region cannot also be sent to another. Different transport costs and demand curves make a collection of independent single-region Cournot models inadequate. Alsabah, Bernard, Capponi, Iyengar and Sethuraman study whether this coupled quantity game has a determinate outcome. Their 2020 author version proves a unique equilibrium allocation and characterizes it through firms' marginal profits. This mission concerns that result, Theorem 4.5 on p. 12 of that version.

Setting

There are firms i=1,…,Ni=1,\ldots,Ni=1,…,N and regions r=1,…,Rr=1,\ldots,Rr=1,…,R. Firm iii sells quantity qri≥0q_r^i\ge0qri​≥0 in region rrr. Its total output is qtoti=∑rqriq_{tot}^i=\sum_r q_r^iqtoti​=∑r​qri​, constrained by capacity κi\kappa^iκi. The total sales in region rrr are qrtot=∑iqriq_r^{tot}=\sum_i q_r^iqrtot​=∑i​qri​. The inverse demand function pr(q)p_r(q)pr​(q) gives the price when total sales are qqq. Firm iii pays production cost aia^iai per unit and transport cost trit_r^itri​ per unit sent to region rrr. Its profit at allocation Q=(qri)Q=(q_r^i)Q=(qri​) is

πi(Q)=∑r(pr(qrtot)−tri)qri−aiqtoti.\pi^i(Q)=\sum_r\bigl(p_r(q_r^{tot})-t_r^i\bigr)q_r^i-a^i q_{tot}^i.πi(Q)=r∑​(pr​(qrtot​)−tri​)qri​−aiqtoti​.

A strategy for firm iii is any nonnegative regional allocation whose total is at most κi\kappa^iκi. A Nash equilibrium is a feasible profile at which no firm can gain by changing its entire regional allocation while the others hold theirs fixed. This is the feasible unilateral-deviation definition in the paper's Definition 3.1, p. 8.

The marginal profit in region rrr is

gri(Q)=pr′(qrtot)qri+pr(qrtot)−tri−ai.g_r^i(Q)=p'_r(q_r^{tot})q_r^i+p_r(q_r^{tot})-t_r^i-a^i.gri​(Q)=pr′​(qrtot​)qri​+pr​(qrtot​)−tri​−ai.

For a vector ρ=(ρi)\rho=(\rho^i)ρ=(ρi) of marginal-profit levels, condition (2) says gri(Q)≤ρig_r^i(Q)\le\rho^igri​(Q)≤ρi and qri(gri(Q)−ρi)=0q_r^i(g_r^i(Q)-\rho^i)=0qri​(gri​(Q)−ρi)=0 for every firm and region. Proposition 4.2 gives a unique nonnegative allocation satisfying these conditions, denoted Q^(ρ)\hat Q(\rho)Q^​(ρ), when ρ\rhoρ lies in the box [0,wˉ]N[0,\bar w]^N[0,wˉ]N, where wr=pr(0)w_r=p_r(0)wr​=pr​(0) and wˉ=max⁡rwr\bar w=\max_r w_rwˉ=maxr​wr​. The reduced-form operator Φ\PhiΦ assigns firm iii zero marginal profit if its output at ρi=0\rho^i=0ρi=0 is below capacity. Otherwise it assigns the marginal-profit level at which its output under Q^\hat QQ^​ equals κi\kappa^iκi. This is the two-case definition on p. 11; it depends on the other firms' marginal-profit levels through Q^\hat QQ^​.

Formalization targets

Fixed point of the reduced-form operator

Lemma 4.3 asserts that Φ\PhiΦ has exactly one fixed point in the marginal-profit box:

∃!ρ∗∈[0,wˉ]N:Φ(ρ∗)=ρ∗.\exists!\rho^*\in[0,\bar w]^N:\quad\Phi(\rho^*)=\rho^*.∃!ρ∗∈[0,wˉ]N:Φ(ρ∗)=ρ∗.

Unique equilibrium allocation

Theorem 4.5 identifies every equilibrium of the original quantity game with the allocation at that fixed point:

Q is a Nash equilibrium⟺Q=Q^(ρ∗).Q\text{ is a Nash equilibrium}\quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad Q=\hat Q(\rho^*).Q is a Nash equilibrium⟺Q=Q^​(ρ∗).

The goal includes existence of ρ∗\rho^*ρ∗ and the equivalence, so it asserts both existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium allocation. Its milestones follow the paper's supporting statements: existence of a pure equilibrium, marginal-profit conditions, existence and uniqueness of Q^\hat QQ^​, continuity and comparative statics, fixed points of Φ\PhiΦ, and the link from an equilibrium to a fixed point. The Algorithm 4.1 computation clause of Proposition 4.2 and the iteration-convergence clause of Lemma C.5 are identified as partial milestones; their full printed text is retained in the milestone provenance.

Significance

The result establishes that capacities, regional demand, and unequal shipping costs still lead to a single predicted sales allocation under the paper's regularity conditions. It also gives a common language for comparing the original game with a smaller game in marginal-profit vectors. Subsequent results in the paper analyze changes in costs, capacities, prices, and consumer surplus relative to this equilibrium Alsabah et al., §§5–6; those later comparative-statics claims are outside this mission.

The mathematical result is proved in the cited paper. The goal here is a machine-checked Lean development of its model, its fixed-point characterization, and the existence and uniqueness theorem. The current proposal contains definitions and theorem statements, with proofs open. The pure-Nash relation is a published reusable definition; the market model, complementarity allocation, and operator are new interfaces that could also support later formalizations of the paper's comparative-statics results.

Difficulty

An equilibrium of the quantity game satisfies the marginal-profit conditions, but those conditions alone describe candidate allocations and do not replace feasible unilateral deviations. Conversely, a fixed point of Φ\PhiΦ does not become an equilibrium merely from the fixed-point equation: the capacity-constrained regional payoff problem still has to be connected to the allocation Q^\hat QQ^​. Uniqueness also requires control of how all firms' regional sales respond when one marginal-profit coordinate changes. Lemma C.4 records weak and strict changes, including boundary cases where a firm stops selling in a region. The existence lemma invokes a general pure-strategy equilibrium argument; the statement is kept even though that infrastructure is substantial in Lean.

Formalization scope

Lean uses Fin N and Fin R for zero-based firm and region indices. An allocation has type Fin N → Fin R → ℝ, with the firm coordinate first, the transpose of the matrix orientation in the paper. Finite sums give firm and region totals. The inverse demands are C2C^2C2 on R\mathbb RR, strictly decreasing and concave on nonnegative quantities; deriv is therefore the ordinary derivative at the quantities used here. The paper phrases Assumption 1 for direct demand drd_rdr​ on [0,wr][0,w_r][0,wr​] and then uses regularity of its inverse prp_rpr​. The formal model makes that inverse-demand regularity an explicit assumption. It also states wr=pr(0)≥0w_r=p_r(0)\ge0wr​=pr​(0)≥0, as implicit in the interval [0,wr][0,w_r][0,wr​], positive capacities, and nonnegative production and transport costs. Those sign assumptions are needed for the box and the two branches of Φ\PhiΦ to have the stated meaning. No positivity of prices at all quantities or finite choke quantity is assumed.

IsEquilibrium uses the published CarbonDoubleCount.Planner.IsPureNash relation, testing every feasible full strategy deviation. Qhat is chosen as the unique solution of condition (2), and Phi is computed from that allocation and the market capacities. On the stated box, the proposal's milestones establish that the selection and inverse branches denote the paper's objects. The intended theorem excludes encodings that choose an active set freely, pass Φ\PhiΦ or ρ∗\rho^*ρ∗ as arbitrary parameters, or substitute first-order conditions or coordinatewise deviations for Nash equilibrium. The definition layer and results on continuity, monotonicity, and fixed points are reusable parts of the development. Contributions that prove these stated targets or provide supporting analysis of the firm's concave payoff problem are within scope.

Selected references

  • H. Alsabah, B. Bernard, A. Capponi, G. Iyengar and J. Sethuraman, Multiregional Oligopoly with Capacity Constraints, SSRN 3280688, author version dated June 6, 2020; published in Management Science, 2021. SSRN author version.
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