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Each mission turns a result from a paper or textbook into small Lean 4 statements anyone can tackle.

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Campaigns group missions around a shared mathematical goal. Each one tracks a quantity, such as an upper or lower bound. Have a good candidate in mind? Ping us on Slack, Zulip, or WeChat.

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Campaigns (experimental)

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Campaigns group missions around a shared mathematical goal. Each one tracks a quantity, such as an upper or lower bound. Have a good candidate in mind? Ping us on Slack, Zulip, or WeChat.

Quantum Max-Cut

Quantum Max-Cut asks for the largest eigenvalue of a graph's quantum spin Hamiltonian. For a graph GGG with nonnegative rational edge weights, write

HG=∑i<jwij(I−SWAPij),OPT(G)=λmax⁡(HG).H_G=\sum_{i<j}w_{ij}(I-\mathrm{SWAP}_{ij}),\qquad\mathrm{OPT}(G)=\lambda_{\max}(H_G).HG​=i<j∑​wij​(I−SWAPij​),OPT(G)=λmax​(HG​).

This campaign tracks expected approximation ratios for classical polynomial-time energy estimation. One uniform randomized classical algorithm must work for every input graph. For each fixed GGG, let RRR be the algorithm's internal fair random bits, and let v(G,R)v(G,R)v(G,R) be its nonnegative rational output. A ratio α\alphaα requires

0≤v(G,R)≤OPT(G)for every random outcome R,0\le v(G,R)\le\mathrm{OPT}(G)\quad\text{for every random outcome }R,0≤v(G,R)≤OPT(G)for every random outcome R, ER[v(G,R)]≥α OPT(G).\mathbb E_R[v(G,R)]\ge\alpha\,\mathrm{OPT}(G).ER​[v(G,R)]≥αOPT(G).

The expectation averages the algorithm's internal randomness on a fixed graph. Its running time is bounded by a polynomial on every run. A high-probability approximation guarantee is a separate claim requiring an explicit probability bound. The optimum includes entangled states. Higher ratios are better.

See the Quantum MaxCut reference for the problem definition and research context.

≥ 0.5Formalized record
1 prover on it3 of 3 missions formalized

Block Sensitivity vs. Sensitivity

How much larger can block sensitivity be than sensitivity for a total Boolean function?

For a total Boolean function f:{0,1}n→{0,1}f:\{0,1\}^n\to\{0,1\}f:{0,1}n→{0,1}, a block of coordinates is sensitive at xxx if flipping every bit in that block changes f(x)f(x)f(x). Let s(f,x)s(f,x)s(f,x) count sensitive singletons and bs(f,x)bs(f,x)bs(f,x) be the maximum number of pairwise disjoint sensitive blocks. Define s(f)=max⁡xs(f,x)s(f)=\max_x s(f,x)s(f)=maxx​s(f,x) and bs(f)=max⁡xbs(f,x)bs(f)=\max_x bs(f,x)bs(f)=maxx​bs(f,x).

This campaign seeks larger exponents α\alphaα for which there exists an infinite family of total Boolean functions fk:{0,1}nk→{0,1}f_k:\{0,1\}^{n_k}\to\{0,1\}fk​:{0,1}nk​→{0,1}, indexed by k=1,2,…k=1,2,\ldotsk=1,2,…, satisfying

s(fk)→∞,bs(fk)≥s(fk)α−o(1)as k→∞.s(f_k)\to\infty,\qquad bs(f_k)\ge s(f_k)^{\alpha-o(1)}\quad\text{as }k\to\infty.s(fk​)→∞,bs(fk​)≥s(fk​)α−o(1)as k→∞.

Here o(1)o(1)o(1) denotes a quantity tending to zero as k→∞k\to\inftyk→∞. Higher is better. The classical exponent is 222, and Huang's bound gives a ceiling of 444.

OpenAI's construction achieves an exponent strictly greater than 222.

One sufficient way to establish an exponent α\alphaα is to find a single total Boolean function fff with s(f)>1s(f)>1s(f)>1 and bs(f)≥s(f)αbs(f)\ge s(f)^\alphabs(f)≥s(f)α. Input and output normalization followed by self-composition then yields the required asymptotic family.

≥ 2.13981Formalized record→≥ 2.15Open frontier
11 provers on it22 of 23 missions formalized

Integer Multiplication Below n log n

Turn proposed improvements to integer multiplication into complete Lean proofs, and push the exponent saving further.

Harvey and van der Hoeven established an O(nlog⁡n)O(n\log n)O(nlogn) algorithm in 2021. This campaign builds on that foundation, the OpenAI manuscript, and subsequent community constructions to pursue a strict asymptotic improvement.

For two nnn-bit integers, the target is

T(n)=O ⁣(n L(n)1−κ),L(n)=max⁡(⌈log⁡2n⌉,1).T(n)=O\!\left(n\,L(n)^{1-\kappa}\right),\qquad L(n)=\max(\lceil\log_2 n\rceil,1).T(n)=O(nL(n)1−κ),L(n)=max(⌈log2​n⌉,1).

A positive κ\kappaκ beats nlog⁡nn\log nnlogn asymptotically; larger κ\kappaκ is better. Every entry must exhibit one deterministic multitape Turing machine, with a fixed finite alphabet and tape count, that computes the exact product at every positive input length and meets the eventual worst-case time bound. The tracked number measures an asymptotic exponent saving.

≥ 3.6 × 10−5Formalized record→≥ 5.1 × 10−5Open frontier
8 provers on it4 of 7 missions formalized

3SUM Exponent

Classical algorithms solve 3SUM in O(n2)O(n^2)O(n2) time. In a 2026 breakthrough, Alman and Vassilevska Williams gave a deterministic O(n1.9992)O(n^{1.9992})O(n1.9992) algorithm, refuting the integer 3SUM hypothesis. How low can the exponent go?

Building on existing Lean formalizations, this campaign tracks upper bounds for 3SUM on polynomially bounded integers, using a word RAM with O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn)-bit words, and pursues smaller exponents.

≤ 1.960614Formalized record→≤ 1.9202796Open frontier
4 provers on it7 of 8 missions formalized

All-Pairs Shortest Paths (APSP) Exponent

Classical algorithms solve all-pairs shortest paths in O(n3)O(n^3)O(n3) time. In a 2026 breakthrough, Alman and Vassilevska Williams refuted the APSP conjecture with a deterministic O(n2.99942)O(n^{2.99942})O(n2.99942) algorithm. How low can the exponent go?

Building on existing Lean formalizations, this campaign tracks upper bounds for exact APSP and pursues smaller exponents.

≤ 2.995561Formalized record
3 provers on it5 of 5 missions formalized

The irrationality measure of π

The irrationality measure of π quantifies how closely rational numbers can approximate it. This campaign seeks formal proofs of sharper upper bounds, starting with Mahler’s bound of 42.

≤ 2Formalized record
19 provers on it9 of 9 missions formalized

Sharp diagonal Hlawka constant

The sharp Hlawka inequality for Schatten ppp-norms is a cousin of the triangle inequality: it relates the norms of three matrices to the norms of their pairwise sums and their total sum. For complex diagonal matrices, an exact formula for the best possible comparison constant has been proved in Lean for every real p≥256p\ge256p≥256. We conjecture that the same formula holds for all p≥2p\ge2p≥2.

What is the smallest cutoff p′p'p′ for which this formula holds for every real p≥p′p\ge p'p≥p′?

References:

  • Wolfram MathWorld, Hlawka's Inequality.
  • Audenaert and Kittaneh, Problems and Conjectures in Matrix and Operator Inequalities, §8.2 (2017).
  • Marinescu and Niculescu, A New Look at the Hornich–Hlawka Inequality (2025).
  • Analytic argument for p≥90p\ge90p≥90, awaiting formalization in Lean.
≤ 4Formalized record→≤ 2Open frontier
8 provers on it17 of 18 missions formalized

Odd numbers as sums of primes

Is every odd number a sum of kkk primes? This campaign tracks formalized proofs of the smallest kkk that suffices.

Schnirelmann (1930) showed some finite kkk works. Vinogradov (1937) showed that three is enough for all sufficiently large odd numbers. Tao (2012) proved k=5k = 5k=5 unconditionally. Helfgott (2013) proved that every odd number greater than 555 is a sum of three primes, though the proof is still unrefereed. Ideally, we can formalize this statement here. Note that three is optimal: 272727 is neither prime nor 222 + prime.

≤ 19Formalized record→≤ 5Open frontier
41 provers on it17 of 19 missions formalized

Matrix multiplication exponent

Schoolbook matrix multiplication takes n3n^3n3 operations. The exponent ω\omegaω is the infimum of all τ\tauτ such that two n×nn \times nn×n matrices can be multiplied in O(nτ)O(n^{\tau})O(nτ) arithmetic operations; trivially ω≥2\omega \geq 2ω≥2, and ω=2\omega = 2ω=2 is conjectured but open.

Strassen gave the first nontrivial bound, ω<2.81\omega < 2.81ω<2.81, in 1969, and introduced the laser method in 1986 to reach ω<2.48\omega < 2.48ω<2.48. Coppersmith and Winograd's 1990 bound of 2.3762.3762.376 stood for two decades. Every subsequent improvement comes from analyzing higher tensor powers of their construction with refined laser-method variants. That line reached ω<2.371339\omega < 2.371339ω<2.371339 in 2025, and the current record is ω<2.371177\omega < 2.371177ω<2.371177, from August 2026. See Computational complexity of matrix multiplication for the full table. Can we formalize these results and even improve on them?

≤ 2.25Formalized record
16 provers on it9 of 9 missions formalized

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Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

METRIC: A Multi-Echelon Technique for Recoverable Item Control 1: The Marginal Conditions on the Convex Hull of Each Item's Decreasing Cost Function Determine a Unique Optimal AllocationResearch Paper

Why marginal allocation needs a convex hull

Service organizations keep repairable spare parts at a depot and at operating bases. Stock has a purchase or holding cost, while insufficient stock leaves backorders. Craig Sherbrooke's METRIC study describes how to evaluate such a system and distribute additional units among item types. Its fifth computational stage compares the reduction in expected backorders from the next unit with the cost of that unit. The comparison is delicate because the backorder function after optimizing the depot–base split can fail to be convex as a function of total item stock, even though a fixed depot-stock version is convex. Sherbrooke therefore introduces a convex extension before applying marginal analysis (Sherbrooke 1968, pp. 134–135).

This mission isolates the theorem in the paper's Appendix. It concerns abstract item functions with the properties needed for the allocation rule, so the result can be studied independently of the queueing assumptions and the FORTRAN procedure that produced those functions in METRIC. The paper supplies a proof of the Appendix theorem; the mission seeks a machine-checked formalization of its precise mathematical content (Sherbrooke 1968, pp. 140–141).

Setting: stock levels, costs, and the lower boundary

There is a finite collection of items indexed by iii. A decision assigns each item a stock level mi∈Nm_i\in\mathbb Nmi​∈N, where 000 is permitted. Item iii has a unit cost cic_ici​ and a real-valued function Ξi(m)\Xi_i(m)Ξi​(m) representing the backorder contribution associated with stock level mmm. In the METRIC application, Ξi\Xi_iΞi​ is obtained after choosing the best allocation of mmm units between depot and bases. The Appendix theorem uses only that Ξi\Xi_iΞi​ is nonincreasing and has a finite lower bound. “Decreasing” is read weakly: the paper's justification says that adding a unit “cannot exceed” the backorders at the previous level (Sherbrooke 1968, p. 136).

For a function g:N→Rg:\mathbb N\to\mathbb Rg:N→R, write Δg(m)=g(m+1)−g(m)\Delta g(m)=g(m+1)-g(m)Δg(m)=g(m+1)−g(m). The function is discretely convex when Δg(m+1)≥Δg(m)\Delta g(m+1)\ge\Delta g(m)Δg(m+1)≥Δg(m) at every level. The lower convex hull HiH_iHi​, written Ξi′\Xi_i'Ξi′​ in the paper, is the greatest discretely convex function at or below Ξi\Xi_iΞi​. It follows the lower boundary of the convex hull of the points (m,Ξi(m))(m,\Xi_i(m))(m,Ξi​(m)); a point above that boundary is lowered, while a contact point keeps its original value (Sherbrooke 1968, pp. 135–136, 140). The existing ServiceParts.StockLevels.Basic definition supplies Δ\DeltaΔ and Δ2\Delta^2Δ2 for real stock-level functions; this mission reuses it.

The original objective is the separable sum

J(m)=∑i(cimi+Ξi(mi)).J(m)=\sum_i\bigl(c_i m_i+\Xi_i(m_i)\bigr).J(m)=i∑​(ci​mi​+Ξi​(mi​)).

For each item, conditions (12) select the first level mˉi\bar m_imˉi​ where adding another unit no longer lowers the convexified cost:

ci+Hi(mˉi+1)−Hi(mˉi)≥0,mˉi>0⟹ci+Hi(mˉi)−Hi(mˉi−1)<0.c_i+H_i(\bar m_i+1)-H_i(\bar m_i)\ge0,\qquad \bar m_i>0\Longrightarrow c_i+H_i(\bar m_i)-H_i(\bar m_i-1)<0.ci​+Hi​(mˉi​+1)−Hi​(mˉi​)≥0,mˉi​>0⟹ci​+Hi​(mˉi​)−Hi​(mˉi​−1)<0.

The second condition is automatic at mˉi=0\bar m_i=0mˉi​=0, following the paper's convention Hi(−1)=+∞H_i(-1)=+\inftyHi​(−1)=+∞ (Sherbrooke 1968, p. 140, Eqs. (11)–(12)).

Formalization targets

The Appendix goal is that each item's conditions (12) have exactly one solution and that the vector formed from those solutions minimizes the original, possibly nonconvex objective:

∀i  ∃!mˉi∈N satisfying (12),J(mˉ)≤J(m)for every m∈NI.\forall i\;\exists!\bar m_i\in\mathbb N\text{ satisfying (12)}, \qquad J(\bar m)\le J(m)\quad\text{for every }m\in\mathbb N^I.∀i∃!mˉi​∈N satisfying (12),J(mˉ)≤J(m)for every m∈NI.

The milestone list follows the Appendix's claims: the lower boundary is a convex minorant; its marginal changes approach zero; (12) has a solution and that solution is unique; it minimizes the convexified single-item cost; and the selected level is a contact point where Hi(mˉi)=Ξi(mˉi)H_i(\bar m_i)=\Xi_i(\bar m_i)Hi​(mˉi​)=Ξi​(mˉi​). The final comparison is with JJJ, not just with the objective formed from HiH_iHi​ (Sherbrooke 1968, pp. 140–141).

What the result establishes

The theorem licenses the paper's marginal allocation rule even when an item's original backorder function has nonconvex points. The rule can use a convex lower boundary to identify a level, yet the resulting allocation is optimal for the original function. Without the contact-point conclusion, optimality of the modified objective alone would not give that guarantee. The theorem is stated for any finite number of independent items with the listed properties, so it is reusable beyond the specific depot–base model (Sherbrooke 1968, pp. 134–136, 140–141).

The paper proves the result informally. This mission's definitions and theorem statements compile locally as open Lean goals; they do not yet constitute a machine-checked proof. A related published Prove2Me result, ServiceParts.Allocation.allocOpt_correct, proves correctness of an allocation algorithm for piecewise-linear functions assumed convex. It does not address the convexification or contact claim here. The platform's posed ServiceParts.StockLevels.optimal_stock_criterion and greedy_fill_rate_optimal concern other marginal criteria and likewise do not settle this Appendix theorem. A successful development would provide reusable Lean infrastructure for lower convex envelopes of integer sequences, their forward differences, and separable finite allocations.

Difficulty

A one-step marginal comparison on the raw Ξi\Xi_iΞi​ is insufficient when its forward differences can fall and then rise: an apparent local stopping point need not minimize the full sequence. Replacing Ξi\Xi_iΞi​ by a convex minorant restores ordered marginal changes, but a minimizer of a smaller function need not minimize the original function. The central burden is therefore the exact relation between the lower boundary and the original points at a level selected by the strict condition in (12). Ties in the objective add a second precision issue: the selected level is unique under the rule even when the objective has more than one minimizer (Sherbrooke 1968, pp. 135, 140–141).

Formalization scope and conventions

Stock levels are natural numbers, item contributions and costs are real, and the item type is finite; the empty item type is allowed, making both the sum and the coordinatewise statement trivial. The functions Ξi\Xi_iΞi​ are nonincreasing and bounded below, as in the Appendix. The lower hull is a pointwise real supremum over all discretely convex minorants. Its defining family is nonempty and bounded at each point under the lower-bound hypothesis, which every hull theorem carries. The hull is therefore fixed by the input function rather than supplied as an arbitrary minorant. The goal compares every vector in NI\mathbb N^INI, without a budget restriction. The formalization does not use a default value for Hi(−1)H_i(-1)Hi​(−1): the predecessor condition applies only to positive stock levels.

The paper prints ci≥0c_i\ge0ci​≥0 with at least one positive cost. Its existence assertion fails when a particular ci=0c_i=0ci​=0: for Ξi(m)=1/(m+1)\Xi_i(m)=1/(m+1)Ξi​(m)=1/(m+1), a bounded, decreasing, convex sequence, the first inequality of (12) never holds. The goal and existence milestone therefore require ci>0c_i>0ci​>0 for every present item. The paper's phrase “unique optimizing” is interpreted as uniqueness of the stock vector determined by (12), together with its optimality. It cannot assert uniqueness among all minimizers: with c=1c=1c=1, Ξ(0)=1\Xi(0)=1Ξ(0)=1, and Ξ(m)=0\Xi(m)=0Ξ(m)=0 for m≥1m\ge1m≥1, levels 000 and 111 tie. The proof's own wording identifies (12) as the unique selection rule (Sherbrooke 1968, p. 140).

The formalization contains separate definitions for discrete convexity, the greatest lower hull, conditions (12), and objective (11). It welcomes proofs and general lemmas about convex integer sequences and finite separable sums. The METRIC computation, empirical Air Force data, equations (7)–(9), and the discussion of Lagrangian versus combinatorial solutions are context rather than goals of this mission. A definition that simply sets Hi=ΞiH_i=\Xi_iHi​=Ξi​, or a conclusion that minimizes only the hull objective, would omit the theorem's content.

Selected references

  • Craig C. Sherbrooke, METRIC: A Multi-Echelon Technique for Recoverable Item Control, Operations Research 16(1), 122–141, 1968. DOI: 10.1287/opre.16.1.122.
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Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov ChainOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Discrete Dynamic Programming with Sensitive Discount Optimality Criteria 1: If Every Stationary Policy Is Transient, Some Stationary Policy Maximizes the Expected Total Reward over All PoliciesResearch Paper

Motivation

A finite dynamic program with total reward is the basic model of sequential decision making without discounting: a system moves among finitely many states, a decision maker picks an action in each state, collects a reward, and the system moves on or stops. The quantity of interest is the expected total reward of a policy, summed over the whole (possibly infinite) horizon, and the question is whether a simple policy — one that uses the same decision rule at every step — is as good as any other.

For discounted or strictly substochastic models the answer has long been known. Shapley (1953) showed by successive approximations that, when every transition matrix has row sums strictly below one, some stationary policy maximizes the total reward among stationary policies; Howard (1960) gave the policy-improvement method for finding one; Blackwell (1962) showed that the maximum over all policies is attained among stationary ones. All of these rest on a contraction hypothesis ∥P(f)∥<1\|P(f)\|<1∥P(f)∥<1.

Veinott's 1969 paper (DOI 10.1214/aoms/1177697379), best known for its sensitive discount optimality criteria, opens in §2 by proving these classical results under the much weaker hypothesis that each stationary policy is transient, and without requiring the transition weights to be substochastic at all. Partial results in this direction were due to Eaton and Zadeh, Derman, and Denardo. The total-reward model without a contraction assumption covers stopping problems, shortest-path type problems and models in which "transition weights" are not probabilities (growth factors, populations), which is why the generalized model is of independent interest.

Setting

There are S≥1S\ge 1S≥1 states 1,…,S1,\dots,S1,…,S. In state sss a finite nonempty set AsA_sAs​ of actions is available; taking action aaa earns the real reward r(s,a)r(s,a)r(s,a) and assigns the transition weight p(t∣s,a)≥0p(t\mid s,a)\ge 0p(t∣s,a)≥0 to each state ttt. No bound on ∑tp(t∣s,a)\sum_t p(t\mid s,a)∑t​p(t∣s,a) is assumed. The set of decision rules is F=×s=1SAsF=\times_{s=1}^S A_sF=×s=1S​As​; for f∈Ff\in Ff∈F, r(f)r(f)r(f) is the vector (r(s,f(s)))s(r(s,f(s)))_s(r(s,f(s)))s​ and P(f)P(f)P(f) the matrix (p(t∣s,f(s)))s,t(p(t\mid s,f(s)))_{s,t}(p(t∣s,f(s)))s,t​.

A policy is a sequence π=(f1,f2,… )\pi=(f_1,f_2,\dots)π=(f1​,f2​,…) of decision rules. The policy f∞=(f,f,… )f^\infty=(f,f,\dots)f∞=(f,f,…) is stationary; (g,π)=(g,f1,f2,… )(g,\pi)=(g,f_1,f_2,\dots)(g,π)=(g,f1​,f2​,…) uses ggg first and then follows π\piπ; Nπ{}^N\piNπ repeats the first NNN rules of π\piπ forever and is called periodic. Let P0(π)=IP^0(\pi)=IP0(π)=I and PN(π)=P(f1)⋯P(fN)P^N(\pi)=P(f_1)\cdots P(f_N)PN(π)=P(f1​)⋯P(fN​). The policy π\piπ is transient if ∑N≥0PN(π)\sum_{N\ge0}P^N(\pi)∑N≥0​PN(π) converges, and then its vector of total returns is

V(π)=∑N=0∞PN(π) r(fN+1).V(\pi)=\sum_{N=0}^\infty P^N(\pi)\,r(f_{N+1}).V(π)=N=0∑∞​PN(π)r(fN+1​).

The one-step comparison v(g,π∗)=V(g,π∗)−V(π∗)v(g,\pi^*)=V(g,\pi^*)-V(\pi^*)v(g,π∗)=V(g,π∗)−V(π∗) measures the gain from deviating to ggg for one step. Vectors are compared coordinatewise, and x>yx>yx>y means x≥yx\ge yx≥y, x≠yx\ne yx=y. For a matrix BBB, ∥B∥=max⁡i∑j∣bij∣\|B\|=\max_i\sum_j|b_{ij}|∥B∥=maxi​∑j​∣bij​∣ and ∣σ(B)∣|\sigma(B)|∣σ(B)∣ is its spectral radius. Finally V∗=max⁡fV(f∞)V^*=\max_f V(f^\infty)V∗=maxf​V(f∞) and ℜV=max⁡g[r(g)+P(g)V]\Re V=\max_g[r(g)+P(g)V]ℜV=maxg​[r(g)+P(g)V], both coordinatewise.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 6

If every stationary policy is transient, there is f∈Ff\in Ff∈F with

V(π)≤V(f∞)for every policy π.V(\pi)\le V(f^\infty)\qquad\text{for every policy }\pi.V(π)≤V(f∞)for every policy π.

The hypothesis concerns only the finitely many stationary policies; the conclusion compares against every policy, stationary or not.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1. For transient π=(gi)\pi=(g_i)π=(gi​) and π∗\pi^*π∗: V(π)−V(π∗)=∑NPN(π) v(gN+1,π∗)V(\pi)-V(\pi^*)=\sum_N P^N(\pi)\,v(g_{N+1},\pi^*)V(π)−V(π∗)=∑N​PN(π)v(gN+1​,π∗), and V(g∞)−V(π∗)=[I−P(g)]−1v(g,π∗)V(g^\infty)-V(\pi^*)=[I-P(g)]^{-1}v(g,\pi^*)V(g∞)−V(π∗)=[I−P(g)]−1v(g,π∗).
  2. Lemma 2. If every stationary policy is transient and f∈Ff\in Ff∈F: either v(g,f∞)>0v(g,f^\infty)>0v(g,f∞)>0 for some ggg, and then V(g∞)>V(f∞)V(g^\infty)>V(f^\infty)V(g∞)>V(f∞), or v(g,f∞)≤0v(g,f^\infty)\le0v(g,f∞)≤0 for all ggg, which holds iff f∞f^\inftyf∞ is best among stationary policies.
  3. Corollary 1. If every stationary policy is transient, some stationary policy maximizes VVV over the stationary policies.
  4. Corollary 2. Under the same hypothesis, V∗V^*V∗ is the unique fixed point of ℜ\Reℜ.
  5. Lemma 3 (Hoffman). For every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 and every program there is a positively similar program with max⁡g∥P~(g)∥<max⁡g∣σ(P(g))∣+ε\max_g\|\tilde P(g)\|<\max_g|\sigma(P(g))|+\varepsilonmaxg​∥P~(g)∥<maxg​∣σ(P(g))∣+ε.
  6. Corollary 4, read with "every" and with "some": stationary, periodic and arbitrary policies are transient together, and this is equivalent to ∥PN(π)∥<1\|P^N(\pi)\|<1∥PN(π)∥<1 for some N≥1N\ge1N≥1; with ∥P(g)∥≤1\|P(g)\|\le1∥P(g)∥≤1 also to ∥PS(π)∥<1\|P^S(\pi)\|<1∥PS(π)∥<1.
  7. Theorem 1. If every stationary policy is transient and π∗\pi^*π∗ is any policy: v(g,π∗)>0v(g,\pi^*)>0v(g,π∗)>0 implies V(g∞)>V(π∗)V(g^\infty)>V(\pi^*)V(g∞)>V(π∗), and v(⋅,π∗)≤0v(\cdot,\pi^*)\le0v(⋅,π∗)≤0 iff V(π)≤V(π∗)V(\pi)\le V(\pi^*)V(π)≤V(π∗) for all π\piπ.

Significance

Corollary 6 is the existence half of the theory of total-reward Markov decision processes: it says that the search for an optimal policy can be restricted to the finite set of stationary policies, and, together with Corollary 2 and Theorem 1, that such a policy is characterized by the optimality equation ℜV=V\Re V=VℜV=V and by the absence of one-step improvements. Corollary 4, which the paper's introduction singles out as the section's main new result, shows that transience of the finitely many stationary policies already forces transience of every policy, uniformly; this is what makes V(π)V(\pi)V(π) well defined for all policies. Hoffman's Lemma 3 converts transience into a contraction in a rescaled norm, the device behind geometric convergence of value iteration (Corollary 3 of the paper).

On the formal side, Mathlib has matrices, summability and spectral radii but no total-reward decision model. These results are proved in the 1969 paper and are standard in the textbook literature on Markov decision processes; none of them has a machine-checked proof that we know of. Related platform items concern other models: the stochastic shortest path results of Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (a cost model with a termination state, stochastic rows and an infinite-cost assumption on improper policies) and Blackwell's discounted model; neither covers nonnegative, non-substochastic weights.

Difficulty

Without a contraction, the standard argument — ℜ\Reℜ is a contraction, so it has a unique fixed point attained by a stationary policy — has nothing to start from: ∥P(g)∥\|P(g)\|∥P(g)∥ may exceed one for every ggg, and the transition weights need not be probabilities, so no probabilistic coupling or stopping-time argument applies directly. Transience of each stationary policy is a statement about finitely many matrix powers P(g)NP(g)^NP(g)N, whereas the goal concerns infinite products of different matrices P(f1)P(f2)⋯P(f_1)P(f_2)\cdotsP(f1​)P(f2​)⋯, whose behaviour is not controlled by the spectral radii of the factors in general. Passing from the stationary policies to all policies is the step where the obvious argument fails.

Formalization scope

The Lean development fixes these conventions.

  • States are a nonempty finite type St; actions are a family of nonempty finite types A : St → Type, so FFF is the dependent function type (s : St) → A s, not a common action set.
  • A program is a structure Program St A with real rewards and nonnegative weights; no row-sum bound is part of the structure. Only 5° of Corollary 4 assumes ∥P(g)∥≤1\|P(g)\|\le1∥P(g)∥≤1.
  • Policies are deterministic Markov sequences ℕ → F, indexed from 000: π 0 is f1f_1f1​. "All policies" means all such sequences.
  • Transience is Summable of N↦PN(π)N\mapsto P^N(\pi)N↦PN(π) in the entrywise topology. VVV is a tsum; it is the genuine series exactly for transient policies.
  • >>> on vectors is written out as ≥\ge≥ and ≠\ne=; ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ is the maximum absolute row sum, defined explicitly; ∣σ(⋅)∣|\sigma(\cdot)|∣σ(⋅)∣ is Mathlib's spectralRadius ℂ of the complexified matrix, valued in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞].
  • V∗V^*V∗ and ℜ\Reℜ are coordinatewise Finset.sup' over the finite set FFF.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the goal and Theorem 1 do not assume the competing policies transient (that would hide Corollary 4 inside the hypothesis), and since a non-summable tsum is 000, no statement compares VVV of a policy whose transience is not either assumed or implied by the hypotheses. The hypothesis "every stationary policy is transient" is satisfiable (for instance when all weights are zero) and is not implied by any row-sum bound.

A complete development needs Neumann series for nonnegative matrices, the Perron–Frobenius-type fact that a nonnegative matrix with spectral radius below one has a nonnegative (I−B)−1=∑BN(I-B)^{-1}=\sum B^N(I−B)−1=∑BN, and finite-dimensional spectral theory relating ∣σ(B)∣<1|\sigma(B)|<1∣σ(B)∣<1 to BN→0B^N\to0BN→0. These are reusable well beyond this mission; contributions of such lemmas, and of proofs of the milestones in any order, are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. F. Veinott, Jr., Discrete dynamic programming with sensitive discount optimality criteria, Ann. Math. Statist. 40(5):1635–1660, 1969. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177697379
  • D. Blackwell, Discrete dynamic programming, Ann. Math. Statist. 33(2):719–726, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177704593
  • L. S. Shapley, Stochastic games, Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. 39(10):1095–1100, 1953. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.39.10.1095
  • R. A. Howard, Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes, MIT Press, 1960.
  • E. V. Denardo, Contraction mappings in the theory underlying dynamic programming, SIAM Review 9(2):165–177, 1967. https://doi.org/10.1137/1009030
  • C. Derman, On sequential decisions and Markov chains, Management Sci. 9(1):16–24, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.9.1.16
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Operations ResearchStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Some Theoretical Aspects of Road Traffic Research I: Time-Mean Speed Equals Space-Mean Speed plus σₛ²/v̄ₛ, so v̄ₜ ≥ v̄ₛ with Equality Only Without Speed VariationResearch Paper

Why two traffic speed averages differ

A speed recorded as a vehicle passes a fixed point and a speed recorded among vehicles occupying a road segment answer different questions. Fast vehicles pass a detector more often per unit time; slow vehicles remain visible along the segment for longer. Traffic studies therefore need to identify which distribution a measurement samples before comparing average speeds. J. G. Wardrop made this distinction explicit in his 1952 treatment of road traffic, then quantified it through the variance of the spatial speed distribution (Wardrop 1952, pp. 327–331 and Appendix II).

The result belongs to the paper's mathematical account of traffic flow. It is useful even when the subsidiary streams do not describe a random vehicle process: the identities concern finite positive flows and speeds. The paper also applies the same distributions to speed samples from radar and aerial photographs and to an idealized count of overtaking events (Wardrop 1952, pp. 330, 333–334).

Traffic streams and their two distributions

A road's traffic stream is divided into CCC subsidiary streams, indexed by i=1,…,Ci=1,\ldots,Ci=1,…,C. Stream iii has flow qiq_iqi​, the number of vehicles passing a point per unit time, and speed viv_ivi​. Its concentration is ki=qi/vik_i=q_i/v_iki​=qi​/vi​, the number of vehicles occupying a unit road length. Total flow and concentration are Q=∑iqiQ=\sum_i q_iQ=∑i​qi​ and K=∑ikiK=\sum_i k_iK=∑i​ki​. The time frequency fi=qi/Qf_i=q_i/Qfi​=qi​/Q weights each stream by how often its vehicles pass a point. The space frequency fi′=ki/Kf'_i=k_i/Kfi′​=ki​/K weights it by the fraction of vehicles present along the road.

The time-mean speed is vˉt=∑iqivi/Q=∑ifivi\bar v_t=\sum_i q_i v_i/Q=\sum_i f_i v_ivˉt​=∑i​qi​vi​/Q=∑i​fi​vi​. The space-mean speed is vˉs=∑ikivi/K=∑ifi′vi\bar v_s=\sum_i k_i v_i/K=\sum_i f'_i v_ivˉs​=∑i​ki​vi​/K=∑i​fi′​vi​. Both are averages of the same speeds; the weights differ. Wardrop defines the space-distribution variance independently as σs2=∑iki(vi−vˉs)2/K\sigma_s^2=\sum_i k_i(v_i-\bar v_s)^2/Kσs2​=∑i​ki​(vi​−vˉs​)2/K, and the corresponding coefficient of variation as cs=σs/vˉsc_s=\sigma_s/\bar v_scs​=σs​/vˉs​ (equations (1)–(3), (7), pp. 328–331).

These are finite sums, not limits of a stochastic process. The model requires at least one subsidiary stream and positive flow and speed for each stream. Positive flows ensure that every speed in the equality criterion belongs to a present stream; positive speeds make concentration meaningful. The count CCC is allowed to be one. In that case both means coincide and the variance is zero, as the formulas require.

Formalization targets

The main target is Wardrop's equation (6), together with its stated comparison and equality case (p. 330; Appendix II, p. 356):

vˉt=vˉs+σs2vˉs,vˉs≤vˉt,vˉt=vˉs  ⟺  vi=vj for every i,j.\bar v_t=\bar v_s+\frac{\sigma_s^2}{\bar v_s},\qquad \bar v_s\le\bar v_t,\qquad \bar v_t=\bar v_s\iff v_i=v_j\text{ for every }i,j.vˉt​=vˉs​+vˉs​σs2​​,vˉs​≤vˉt​,vˉt​=vˉs​⟺vi​=vj​ for every i,j.

The subsidiary targets follow the paper's order. Equation (4) says kivi=qik_i v_i=q_iki​vi​=qi​ for each stream, giving equation (5), Q=KvˉsQ=K\bar v_sQ=Kvˉs​. Appendix II then uses the centered identity ∑ifi′(vi−vˉs)=0\sum_i f'_i(v_i-\bar v_s)=0∑i​fi′​(vi​−vˉs​)=0 and rewrites the time mean as vˉt=(∑ifi′vi2)/vˉs\bar v_t=(\sum_i f'_i v_i^2)/\bar v_svˉt​=(∑i​fi′​vi2​)/vˉs​. These three claims are the mission milestones. Equation (8) is included as a companion formulation:

vˉt=vˉs(1+cs2).\bar v_t=\bar v_s(1+c_s^2).vˉt​=vˉs​(1+cs2​).

The mission also records the paper's formulas for equally weighted time and space speed samples and the equivalent space- and time-frequency formulas for the idealized overtaking count. These companions use the same definitions without changing the main target (pp. 330–334).

What the result supplies

The identity gives an exact size and direction for the difference between the two averages. Since the variance is nonnegative and vˉs\bar v_svˉs​ is positive, the time mean cannot fall below the space mean. If all constituent speeds are equal, the difference vanishes; if any two present streams have different speeds, the difference is positive. The formula therefore lets a reader decide whether two reported speed averages can be compared directly, and it identifies the spatial variance as the quantity needed to convert between them.

The sample formulas sharpen that interpretation. Equal weights among vehicles passing a point make the time mean the arithmetic mean of the sampled speeds and the space mean their harmonic mean. Equal concentrations reverse which mean is arithmetic; the time mean becomes ∑ivi2/∑ivi\sum_i v_i^2/\sum_i v_i∑i​vi2​/∑i​vi​. The overtaking formulas express a single pairwise count using either frequency system, provided the speeds are ordered and the paper's assumption of no interference with overtaking is used (Wardrop 1952, pp. 330, 333–334).

Wardrop proved these formulas in print. The remaining work in this mission is a machine-checked proof of the finite-sum identities and their strict equality case. The proposal supplies typed statements and definitions, but the theorem proofs are open. The resulting concentration and frequency definitions are reusable in other traffic-flow formalizations; the statements also provide small algebraic interfaces for testing more elaborate traffic models.

Where the formal proof needs care

The relation looks like a routine identity for weighted means, but the two weight systems are coupled through ki=qi/vik_i=q_i/v_iki​=qi​/vi​. One cannot treat the time and space frequencies as independent arbitrary probability vectors and still obtain equation (6). The strict case needs more than nonnegativity of the variance: it needs the fact that every space weight is positive, so zero variance forces every constituent speed to equal the mean. The single-stream case and every denominator need the same attention.

The overtaking statement has a separate modelling boundary. Its algebraic equalities use a rate defined by pairwise speed differences. Wardrop's physical interpretation of that rate assumes that overtaking does not interfere with other overtaking. The mission records the identities for that idealized rate, without claiming that a measured road necessarily meets the physical assumption.

Formalization scope

Lean uses Fin C for the streams and real numbers for qiq_iqi​, viv_ivi​, kik_iki​, both means, the variance, and the overtaking rate. Finite sums are taken over all streams. The theorem hypotheses require 0<C0<C0<C, 0<qi0<q_i0<qi​, and 0<vi0<v_i0<vi​ for every iii. These requirements make QQQ, KKK, and vˉs\bar v_svˉs​ positive; Lean's total division would otherwise assign a zero value at a zero denominator that has no meaning in the paper's model. For the overtaking identity, StrictMono v retains Wardrop's ordering v1<⋯<vCv_1<\cdots<v_Cv1​<⋯<vC​.

The variance is defined from equation (7), ∑iki(vi−vˉs)2/K\sum_i k_i(v_i-\bar v_s)^2/K∑i​ki​(vi​−vˉs​)2/K. Defining it by rearranging equation (6) would make the target true by definition and would erase the mathematical claim. The standard deviation uses the real square root of that variance. An observation in the sample companion is represented as one subsidiary stream of equal time or space weight; this is the formal reading of the paper's sampling paragraphs. No probability-measure library is needed, since fif_ifi​ and fi′f'_ifi′​ are explicit finite weights.

A complete proof needs finite-sum rearrangements, elementary real division under positive denominators, nonnegative weighted squares, and the equality case of a positive weighted sum of squares. The definitions and the mean identities are welcome as separate reusable contributions. The mission does not include the paper's normal approximation for overtaking density in equation (11), which Wardrop presents as an approximation rather than an exact finite-sum theorem.

Selected references

  • J. G. Wardrop, Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research, Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Part II 1 (1952), 325–362. DOI: 10.1680/ipeds.1952.11259.
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Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov ChainOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

On Finding Optimal Policies in Discrete Dynamic Programming with No Discounting 1: If G(f) ∪ H(f) Is Empty, f Maximizes the Gain and Then the Bias, and Each Improvement Step Raises (x, y, z)Research Paper

Motivation

A controller observes a finite system period after period, chooses an action in each state, earns an income and moves the system at random. When future income is not discounted, the natural criterion is the average return per unit time (the gain), but many policies share the maximal gain while differing in their transient income. Blackwell (1962) showed that the policies that are optimal as the discount factor tends to one, the 1-optimal policies, are exactly the stationary policies that first maximize the gain and then, among those, the bias. He gave no finite procedure for the second maximization. Veinott (1966) supplied one: an extension of Howard's policy improvement method in which a second improvement test, on the bias, is run after the gain test is exhausted, with a third vector z(f)z(f)z(f) guaranteeing termination. The method and its sensitivity hierarchy became the starting point of the nnn-discount optimality theory developed by Veinott (1969) and treated in Puterman's Markov Decision Processes (1994), Chapter 10.

Timeline:

  • 1960: Howard, Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes: policy improvement for the discounted and the average-return problems.
  • 1962: Blackwell, Discrete Dynamic Programming: existence of stationary policies optimal for all discount factors near one; the expansion Vβ(f∞)=x(f)/(1−β)+y(f)+o(1)V_\beta(f^\infty)=x(f)/(1-\beta)+y(f)+o(1)Vβ​(f∞)=x(f)/(1−β)+y(f)+o(1); nearly optimal (1-optimal) policies characterized by lexicographic maximization of (x,y)(x,y)(x,y).
  • 1966: Veinott, this paper: the extended policy improvement method that finds a 1-optimal stationary policy in finitely many steps (Theorem 6), and a finite-horizon characterization of the same policies (Theorem 7).
  • 1969: Veinott, Discount optimality and sensitive optimality: the full hierarchy of nnn-discount optimal policies and the corresponding nested improvement method.

Setting

There are finitely many states sss and a finite set of actions. Choosing action aaa in state sss earns the income i(s,a)i(s,a)i(s,a) and moves the system to state s′s's′ with probability q(s′∣s,a)q(s'\mid s,a)q(s′∣s,a). A decision rule f∈Ff\in Ff∈F picks an action f(s)f(s)f(s) in each state; r(f)r(f)r(f) is the vector with entries i(s,f(s))i(s,f(s))i(s,f(s)) and Q(f)Q(f)Q(f) the stochastic matrix with entries q(s′∣s,f(s))q(s'\mid s,f(s))q(s′∣s,f(s)). A policy is a sequence (f1,f2,… )(f_1,f_2,\dots)(f1​,f2​,…) of decision rules, f∞=(f,f,… )f^\infty=(f,f,\dots)f∞=(f,f,…) is a stationary policy, and for 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1

Vβ(π)=∑n=0∞βnQ(f1)⋯Q(fn) r(fn+1)V_\beta(\pi)=\sum_{n=0}^\infty \beta^n Q(f_1)\cdots Q(f_n)\,r(f_{n+1})Vβ​(π)=n=0∑∞​βnQ(f1​)⋯Q(fn​)r(fn+1​)

is the vector of expected discounted returns. For vectors, u≥vu\ge vu≥v is coordinatewise and u>vu>vu>v means u≥vu\ge vu≥v and u≠vu\ne vu=v.

Let Q∗(f)Q^*(f)Q∗(f) be the Cesàro limit of the powers of Q(f)Q(f)Q(f). The gain x(f)x(f)x(f) and the bias y(f)y(f)y(f) are the unique solutions of

[I−Q(f)]x=0,Q∗(f)x=Q∗(f)r(f);[I−Q(f)]y=r(f)−x(f),Q∗(f)y=0,[I-Q(f)]x=0,\quad Q^*(f)x=Q^*(f)r(f);\qquad [I-Q(f)]y=r(f)-x(f),\quad Q^*(f)y=0,[I−Q(f)]x=0,Q∗(f)x=Q∗(f)r(f);[I−Q(f)]y=r(f)−x(f),Q∗(f)y=0,

and z(f)z(f)z(f) is the unique solution of [I−Q(f)]z=−y(f)[I-Q(f)]z=-y(f)[I−Q(f)]z=−y(f), Q∗(f)z=0Q^*(f)z=0Q∗(f)z=0. Write F′F'F′ for the decision rules of maximal gain and F′′⊂F′F''\subset F'F′′⊂F′ for those of maximal bias within F′F'F′.

The two improvement sets compare fff with a decision rule ggg through the state-by-state tests

(i) [Q(g)x(f)]s≥[x(f)]s,(ii) [r(g)+Q(g)y(f)]s≥[x(f)+y(f)]s.\text{(i) } [Q(g)x(f)]_s\ge[x(f)]_s,\qquad \text{(ii) } [r(g)+Q(g)y(f)]_s\ge[x(f)+y(f)]_s .(i) [Q(g)x(f)]s​≥[x(f)]s​,(ii) [r(g)+Q(g)y(f)]s​≥[x(f)+y(f)]s​.

G(f)G(f)G(f) consists of the ggg for which (i) holds everywhere, (ii) holds wherever (i) is an equality, some inequality is strict, and g(s)=f(s)g(s)=f(s)g(s)=f(s) wherever both are equalities. E(f)E(f)E(f) consists of the ggg for which (i) and (ii) are equalities at every state. For g∈E(f)g\in E(f)g∈E(f),

(iii) [−y(f)+Q(g)z(f)]s≥[z(f)]s,\text{(iii) } [-y(f)+Q(g)z(f)]_s\ge[z(f)]_s,(iii) [−y(f)+Q(g)z(f)]s​≥[z(f)]s​,

and H(f)H(f)H(f) consists of the g∈E(f)g\in E(f)g∈E(f) for which (iii) holds everywhere, strictly somewhere, with g(s)=f(s)g(s)=f(s)g(s)=f(s) wherever it is an equality.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6 (p. 1290)

For every f∈Ff\in Ff∈F:

  1. G(f)=∅ ⇒ f∈F′G(f)=\varnothing\ \Rightarrow\ f\in F'G(f)=∅ ⇒ f∈F′;
  2. G(f)∪H(f)=∅ ⇒ f∈F′′G(f)\cup H(f)=\varnothing\ \Rightarrow\ f\in F''G(f)∪H(f)=∅ ⇒ f∈F′′;
  3. g∈G(f) ⇒ x(g)>x(f)g\in G(f)\ \Rightarrow\ x(g)>x(f)g∈G(f) ⇒ x(g)>x(f), or x(g)=x(f)x(g)=x(f)x(g)=x(f) and y(g)>y(f)y(g)>y(f)y(g)>y(f);
  4. g∈H(f) ⇒ x(g)=x(f)g\in H(f)\ \Rightarrow\ x(g)=x(f)g∈H(f) ⇒ x(g)=x(f), and y(g)>y(f)y(g)>y(f)y(g)>y(f), or y(g)=y(f)y(g)=y(f)y(g)=y(f) and z(g)>z(f)z(g)>z(f)z(g)>z(f).

Part 2 is the stopping certificate and parts 3 and 4 are the progress guarantee; together they say that the extended method raises (x,y,z)(x,y,z)(x,y,z) lexicographically and stops at a decision rule in F′′F''F′′.

Milestones

  • Theorem 3 (Blackwell): Vβ(f∞)=x(f)/(1−β)+y(f)+ϵ(β,f)V_\beta(f^\infty)=x(f)/(1-\beta)+y(f)+\epsilon(\beta,f)Vβ​(f∞)=x(f)/(1−β)+y(f)+ϵ(β,f) with ϵ(β,f)→0\epsilon(\beta,f)\to0ϵ(β,f)→0 as β→1−\beta\to1^-β→1−, and the unique-solution characterizations of x(f)x(f)x(f), y(f)y(f)y(f) (already posed on the platform, referenced).
  • Lemma 1 (Blackwell): g∈E(f)⇒x(g)=x(f)g\in E(f)\Rightarrow x(g)=x(f)g∈E(f)⇒x(g)=x(f), and y(g)=y(f)y(g)=y(f)y(g)=y(f) if moreover Q∗(g)Q∗(f)=Q∗(g)Q^*(g)Q^*(f)=Q^*(g)Q∗(g)Q∗(f)=Q∗(g) (referenced).
  • Theorem 1: for fixed 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1, exactly one of "f∞f^\inftyf∞ has no one-step improvement and is β\betaβ-optimal" and "some ggg gives Vβ(g,f∞)>Vβ(f∞)V_\beta(g,f^\infty)>V_\beta(f^\infty)Vβ​(g,f∞)>Vβ​(f∞) and Vβ(g∞)>Vβ(f∞)V_\beta(g^\infty)>V_\beta(f^\infty)Vβ​(g∞)>Vβ​(f∞)".
  • Theorem 4: F′′F''F′′ is the nonempty set of fff with f∞f^\inftyf∞ 1-optimal.
  • Theorem 5 and Corollary 1: G(f)=∅⇒f∈F′G(f)=\varnothing\Rightarrow f\in F'G(f)=∅⇒f∈F′; g∈G(f)⇒Vβ(g∞)>Vβ(f∞)g\in G(f)\Rightarrow V_\beta(g^\infty)>V_\beta(f^\infty)g∈G(f)⇒Vβ​(g∞)>Vβ​(f∞) for β\betaβ near one, hence the lexicographic increase of (x,y)(x,y)(x,y).
  • Lemma 4: for g∈E(f)g\in E(f)g∈E(f), y(g)=y(f)+w(g)y(g)=y(f)+w(g)y(g)=y(f)+w(g), where w(g)w(g)w(g) is the unique solution of [I−Q(g)]w=0[I-Q(g)]w=0[I−Q(g)]w=0, Q∗(g)w=Q∗(g)(−y(f))Q^*(g)w=Q^*(g)(-y(f))Q∗(g)w=Q∗(g)(−y(f)).
  • (12): z(f)z(f)z(f) is the unique solution of its system.
  • Lemma 5: G(f)=∅G(f)=\varnothingG(f)=∅ and y(f)≥y(g)y(f)\ge y(g)y(f)≥y(g) for all g∈E(f)g\in E(f)g∈E(f) imply f∈F′′f\in F''f∈F′′.
  • Two steps of the proof of Theorem 6: H(f)=∅⇒y(g)≤y(f)H(f)=\varnothing\Rightarrow y(g)\le y(f)H(f)=∅⇒y(g)≤y(f) on E(f)E(f)E(f); and g∈H(f)⇒w(g)>w(f)=0g\in H(f)\Rightarrow w(g)>w(f)=0g∈H(f)⇒w(g)>w(f)=0, or w(g)=w(f)=0w(g)=w(f)=0w(g)=w(f)=0 and z(g)>z(f)z(g)>z(f)z(g)>z(f).

Significance

Theorem 6 turns Blackwell's existence result into an algorithm. Blackwell's characterization requires maximizing the bias over F′F'F′, a set with no explicit description; Lemma 5 shows that maximizing over the explicitly available set E(f)E(f)E(f) suffices, and Lemma 4 shows that this maximization has the same form as the original gain maximization, so the familiar policy improvement machinery applies a second time. The same mechanism, iterated, gives the nnn-discount optimal policies of the later sensitivity theory and the lexicographic policy improvement algorithms in standard texts.

The results are proved in the paper (with a correction to the proof of Lemma 5 credited to Bruce Miller). They are not formalized in any proof assistant known to the mission. A complete development yields machine-checked policy improvement for average and bias optimality on top of the published Blackwell model, including the convergence-free closed forms of gain, bias and zzz and the facts about the limit matrix Q∗Q^*Q∗ and the deviation matrix they rest on.

Difficulty

Parts 1 and 3 are Blackwell's policy improvement for the gain, transported to Veinott's set G(f)G(f)G(f). The new content is in parts 2 and 4, and in both the obvious argument fails at the same place: the bias of g∈E(f)g\in E(f)g∈E(f) cannot be compared with the bias of fff by a state-by-state test in the original problem, because E(f)E(f)E(f) is a product of action sets E(s,f)E(s,f)E(s,f) different from the original ones, and Blackwell's comparison works only after a reduction to a problem in which the reward is −y(f)-y(f)−y(f) and the role of the gain is played by w(g)w(g)w(g). A second difficulty is Lemma 5: E(f)E(f)E(f) may be a proper subset of F′F'F′ (Example 3 of the paper), so maximizing the bias over E(f)E(f)E(f) does not obviously maximize it over F′F'F′. The certificate does not follow from the gain and bias tests at fff alone, and the paper's original proof of it contained an error (corrected, as the paper records, by Bruce Miller).

Formalization scope

Everything is built on the published Blackwell definitions (BlackwellDiscreteDP.NearOne.Model, LimitMatrix, GainBias): one finite action type available in every state (Veinott's AsA_sAs​ are all equal to it), decision rules St → Act, policies indexed from 000 (π 0 is f1f_1f1​), real vectors St → ℝ with the pointwise order, and VecGt for the paper's >>> (not coordinatewise strict). Q∗(f)Q^*(f)Q∗(f) is the published Cesàro limit lim⁡(N+1)−1∑i=0NQ(f)i\lim (N+1)^{-1}\sum_{i=0}^N Q(f)^ilim(N+1)−1∑i=0N​Q(f)i, the same limit as Veinott's N−1∑i=0N−1N^{-1}\sum_{i=0}^{N-1}N−1∑i=0N−1​. The gain and bias are the published closed forms x(f)=Q∗(f)r(f)x(f)=Q^*(f)r(f)x(f)=Q∗(f)r(f) and y(f)=H(f)r(f)y(f)=H(f)r(f)y(f)=H(f)r(f) with the deviation matrix H(f)H(f)H(f); the new vectors are closed forms too: w(g)=Q∗(g)(−y(f))w(g)=Q^*(g)(-y(f))w(g)=Q∗(g)(−y(f)) and z(f)=H(f)(−y(f))z(f)=H(f)(-y(f))z(f)=H(f)(−y(f)), and their characterizations by (10) and (12) are milestones. 1-optimality is the published IsNearlyOptimal, which compares against every policy. Veinott's set H(f)H(f)H(f) is HSet, to keep it apart from the deviation matrix Hf.

G(f)G(f)G(f) and H(f)H(f)H(f) are defined literally from the paper's inequalities, including the clauses "at least one strict" and "g(s)=f(s)g(s)=f(s)g(s)=f(s) where the tests are equalities". Dropping either clause makes parts 3 and 4 false (a ggg that only reshuffles ties would count as an improvement); replacing F′′F''F′′ or G(f)G(f)G(f) by a set defined through the conclusion of the theorem would make the goal trivial. Neither is acceptable.

The reduction "replace AsA_sAs​ by E(s,f)E(s,f)E(s,f) and r(g)r(g)r(g) by −y(f)-y(f)−y(f)" is not instantiated, since the published model has a single action set; its two uses in the proof of Theorem 6 are milestones stated in the original model. A development of the general model with state-dependent action sets, and of the limit-matrix identities Q∗Q=QQ∗=Q∗Q∗=Q∗Q^*Q=QQ^*=Q^*Q^*=Q^*Q∗Q=QQ∗=Q∗Q∗=Q∗, (I−Q)H=I−Q∗(I-Q)H=I-Q^*(I−Q)H=I−Q∗, Q∗H=0Q^*H=0Q∗H=0, would be reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as is a proof of the published Theorem 3 and Lemma 1, on which most of the mission rests.

Selected references

  • D. Blackwell, Discrete Dynamic Programming, Ann. Math. Statist. 33(2):719–726, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177704593
  • A. F. Veinott, Jr., On Finding Optimal Policies in Discrete Dynamic Programming with No Discounting, Ann. Math. Statist. 37(5):1284–1294, 1966. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177699272
  • R. A. Howard, Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes, MIT Press, 1960.
  • A. F. Veinott, Jr., Discount Optimality and Sensitive Optimality, Ann. Math. Statist. 40(5):1635–1660, 1969. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177697379
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions 2: Strategy-Proof Voting Procedures Correspond One-to-One to Social Welfare Functions Satisfying CS, NNR and IIAResearch Paper

Motivation

Two impossibility theorems frame the theory of collective choice. Arrow's theorem (1951) says that a rule aggregating individual preference orderings into a social ordering, subject to a short list of reasonable conditions, must be dictatorial. The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard 1973, Satterthwaite 1975) says that a voting procedure selecting a single alternative, which no voter can manipulate by misreporting, must be dictatorial once at least three outcomes are possible. Both conclusions are the same, and the two conditions—Arrow's axioms and strategy-proofness—look unrelated: one is about the coherence of a social ranking, the other about voters' incentives.

Satterthwaite's paper (Northwestern Discussion Paper No. 122, 1974; J. Econ. Theory 10, 1975) shows that the two conditions are in fact the same condition. Section 4 constructs a one-to-one correspondence between strict strategy-proof voting procedures with full range and strict social welfare functions satisfying Arrow's conditions, under which each social welfare function's top choice is the voting procedure's outcome. This mission formalizes that correspondence.

Timeline. Arrow (1951, 2nd ed. 1963) proved the general possibility theorem with conditions of non-negative response (NNR), citizens' sovereignty (CS), independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and non-dictatorship. Gibbard (1973) proved that strategy-proof game forms with at least three outcomes are dictatorial, by first showing that a strategy-proof procedure induces an Arrovian social welfare function and then applying Arrow's theorem. Satterthwaite (1974/75) gave an independent direct proof of the voting-procedure theorem and proved the correspondence theorem (Theorem 2), which turns Gibbard's construction into an exact equivalence.

Setting

A committee InI_nIn​ of nnn individuals chooses from a finite set SmS_mSm​ of mmm alternatives. A strong order on SmS_mSm​ is a complete, transitive relation RRR with no indifference between distinct alternatives; x Rˉ yx\,\bar R\,yxRˉy denotes strict preference. Let ρm\rho_mρm​ be the set of strong orders and ρmn\rho_m^nρmn​ the set of strict ballot sets B=(B1,…,Bn)B=(B_1,\dots,B_n)B=(B1​,…,Bn​).

  • A strict voting procedure is a map v:ρmn→Smv:\rho_m^n\to S_mv:ρmn​→Sm​; its range is Tp={v(B):B∈ρmn}T_p=\{v(B):B\in\rho_m^n\}Tp​={v(B):B∈ρmn​}. It is strategy-proof if no individual iii, at any BBB, has a ballot Bi′B_i'Bi′​ with v(B1,…,Bi′,…,Bn) Bˉi v(B)v(B_1,\dots,B_i',\dots,B_n)\,\bar B_i\,v(B)v(B1​,…,Bi′​,…,Bn​)Bˉi​v(B).
  • A strict social welfare function is a map u:ρmn→ρmu:\rho_m^n\to\rho_mu:ρmn​→ρm​; AB=u(B)A_B=u(B)AB​=u(B) is the social ordering.
  • For W⊆SmW\subseteq S_mW⊆Sm​, ΨW(R)\Psi_W(R)ΨW​(R) is the set of RRR-best elements of WWW, and θW(R)\theta_W(R)θW​(R) is the restriction of RRR to WWW.
  • uuu underlies vvv, and vvv is derived from uuu, if ΨSm[u(B)]={v(B)}\Psi_{S_m}[u(B)]=\{v(B)\}ΨSm​​[u(B)]={v(B)} for every BBB.

Arrow's conditions on uuu: CS—for all x≠yx\ne yx=y some BBB gives x AˉB yx\,\bar A_B\,yxAˉB​y; IIA—if θW(Ci)=θW(Di)\theta_W(C_i)=\theta_W(D_i)θW​(Ci​)=θW​(Di​) for all iii then ΨW(AC)=ΨW(AD)\Psi_W(A_C)=\Psi_W(A_D)ΨW​(AC​)=ΨW​(AD​); NNR—raising an alternative xxx in individual ballots, with the order of the other alternatives unchanged, never lowers xxx against any other alternative in the social ordering. PO (Pareto optimality): unanimous strict preference for xxx over yyy yields x Aˉ yx\,\bar A\,yxAˉy.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 35)

For n≥2n\ge2n≥2 and m≥3m\ge3m≥3 there is a bijection

λ:{v strict, strategy-proof, Tp=Sm} ⟶ {u strict, CS, NNR, IIA}\lambda:\{v \text{ strict, strategy-proof},\ T_p=S_m\}\ \longrightarrow\ \{u \text{ strict},\ \text{CS},\ \text{NNR},\ \text{IIA}\}λ:{v strict, strategy-proof, Tp​=Sm​} ⟶ {u strict, CS, NNR, IIA}

with ΨSm[λ(v)(B)]={v(B)}\Psi_{S_m}[\lambda(v)(B)]=\{v(B)\}ΨSm​​[λ(v)(B)]={v(B)} for every vvv and every B∈ρmnB\in\rho_m^nB∈ρmn​.

Milestones

  1. CS, NNR and IIA imply PO (p. 31, after Arrow), and PO implies CS (p. 31).
  2. Lemma 7 (p. 30): the voting procedure derived from a strict uuu with CS, NNR, IIA exists, is strategy-proof and has range SmS_mSm​.
  3. Gibbard's claim (p. 33): for a strict strategy-proof vvv with range SmS_mSm​ and a fixed strong order QQQ, the relation P(B)P(B)P(B) defined by x Pˉ y  ⟺  x=v[Δxy(B1),…,Δxy(Bn)]x\,\bar P\,y\iff x=v[\Delta_{xy}(B_1),\dots,\Delta_{xy}(B_n)]xPˉy⟺x=v[Δxy​(B1​),…,Δxy​(Bn​)] is a strong order, and μ:B↦P(B)\mu:B\mapsto P(B)μ:B↦P(B) underlies vvv and satisfies PO and IIA.
  4. Uniqueness (p. 34): at most one strict uuu with PO and IIA underlies a strict strategy-proof vvv.
  5. NNR (p. 34): such an underlying uuu satisfies NNR.
  6. Lemma 8 (p. 35): a strict strategy-proof vvv with range SmS_mSm​ has exactly one underlying strict uuu with CS, NNR, IIA.

Significance

The correspondence explains why the two impossibility theorems have the same conclusion: for strict preferences, a strategy-proof procedure with full range and an Arrovian social welfare function are two descriptions of one object. In particular either impossibility theorem, together with Theorem 2, yields the other. The paper draws a second consequence: a social welfare function violating rationality or IIA has a derived voting procedure that is manipulable, so Arrow's much-debated conditions are forced by the practical requirement of strategy-proofness.

On the formal side, the platform already has machine-checked proofs of the strict Arrow theorem (AGT.arrow_theorem, unanimity and pairwise IIA) and of the strict full-range Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (AGT.gibbard_satterthwaite). Together these determine both sides of Theorem 2 as sets of dictatorships, but neither states the correspondence, the derived/underlying relation, Gibbard's construction or NNR, and nothing on the platform states Lemmas 7 or 8. The milestones here formalize the paper's direct argument, which does not pass through the impossibility theorems.

Difficulty

The obvious argument fails in two places. First, a strategy-proof voting procedure determines only the top of a social ordering, and the whole ordering must be recovered; Gibbard's relation PPP does this, but proving that PPP is transitive is the core of Gibbard's proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem, which the paper cites rather than proves. Second, NNR as stated allows many individuals to move xxx at once, while the manipulation argument works with one ballot at a time; one must pass from a single-voter change to an arbitrary one without losing IIA or PO along the way.

A newcomer's first idea is to prove both sides are dictatorships and match dictators. That proves the bijection but needs both impossibility theorems as inputs, and the correspondence must still carry the underlying relation for every procedure.

Formalization scope

  • Alternatives and individuals are finite types A, ι with decidable equality; n=∣ι∣≥2n=|\iota|\ge2n=∣ι∣≥2, m=∣A∣≥3m=|A|\ge3m=∣A∣≥3 throughout.
  • Weak orders are a structure (relation, completeness, transitivity); strong orders are the subtype with no indifference between distinct elements. Strict ballot sets are functions ι → StrongOrder A, and voting procedures and social welfare functions are defined only on them. Two social welfare functions are therefore equal exactly when they agree on every strict ballot set; this is what makes uniqueness in Lemma 8 and the bijection in Theorem 2 meaningful.
  • The range TpT_pTp​ is the image of strict ballot sets; "Tp≡SmT_p\equiv S_mTp​≡Sm​" is Set.range v = Set.univ.
  • θW(Ci)=θW(Di)\theta_W(C_i)=\theta_W(D_i)θW​(Ci​)=θW​(Di​) is agreement of the two relations on W×WW\times WW×W.
  • CS is stated for x≠yx\ne yx=y: as printed ("for every x,yx,yx,y") it is unsatisfiable at x=yx=yx=y for a strict social ordering, and every statement would become vacuous. NNR's "for some xxx" is read as "for every xxx".
  • "Derived from" and "underlies" are the same relation ΨSm[u(B)]={v(B)}\Psi_{S_m}[u(B)]=\{v(B)\}ΨSm​​[u(B)]={v(B)}; Lemma 7 asserts existence of the derived procedure and its properties for every derived procedure.
  • Gibbard's Δxy\Delta_{xy}Δxy​ and PPP are definitions; PPP is the reflexive closure of the paper's Pˉ\bar PPˉ.
  • The PO claim, PO ⇒ CS, uniqueness and the NNR claim are unconditional in the paper; they are stated under §4's standing n≥2n\ge2n≥2, m≥3m\ge3m≥3, since with no individuals PO fails.
  • Theorem 2 is stated as an Equiv together with "λ(v)\lambda(v)λ(v) underlies vvv" for every vvv. A bare existence of a bijection between the two sets is a cardinality fact and is not the theorem.

Reusable beyond this mission: the strict-preference vocabulary (strong orders, ΨW\Psi_WΨW​, Arrow's conditions in the paper's form) and Gibbard's Δxy\Delta_{xy}Δxy​ construction. Contributions welcome: proofs of each milestone, and bridges to AGT.arrow_theorem and AGT.gibbard_satterthwaite.

Selected references

  • M. A. Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions, Northwestern University CMS-EMS Discussion Paper No. 122, rev. Dec. 12, 1974; J. Econ. Theory 10 (1975) 187–217. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2
  • A. Gibbard, Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, Econometrica 41 (1973) 587–601. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914083
  • K. J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed., Wiley, 1963.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions 4: With Indifference Allowed, a Social Welfare Function Satisfying CS, NNR and IIA Is DictatorialResearch Paper

Motivation

A social welfare function turns the rankings of the members of a committee into one ranking for the committee. Arrow's general possibility theorem (Arrow, 1951/1963) shows that, once there are at least three alternatives, no such rule satisfies a short list of conditions that each look harmless unless it follows a single member's ranking. The theorem is the starting point of social choice theory and underlies the study of voting rules, preference aggregation in economics, and rank aggregation in computer science.

Arrow's own setting allows indifference: ballots and the social ordering are weak orders, and the conditions he imposed are citizens' sovereignty, non-negative response, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Many textbook proofs, and the existing machine-checked versions, instead take strict ballots and replace the first two conditions by the Pareto condition.

Satterthwaite's discussion paper (Satterthwaite, Northwestern DP No. 122, 1974, journal version J. Econ. Theory 10 (1975)) gives a new proof of Arrow's theorem. Strict Arrovian social welfare functions correspond one-to-one to strategy-proof voting procedures with full range, and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem then forces a dictator. His §6 extends the argument to weak orders by decomposing a social welfare function into a tie-breaking step followed by a strict one. This mission formalizes that weak-order extension and the strict theorem it rests on.

Timeline.

  • 1951: Arrow proves the general possibility theorem for weak orders under CS, NNR, IIA and non-dictatorship. The second edition (1963) corrects the first edition's statement.
  • 1973: Gibbard proves that every strategy-proof game form with at least three outcomes is dictatorial (Econometrica 41).
  • 1975: Satterthwaite proves the same independently for voting procedures, and shows that strategy-proof procedures and Arrovian social welfare functions correspond. This gives a proof of Arrow's theorem by way of strategy-proofness.

Setting

A committee InI_nIn​ of nnn individuals ranks a finite set SmS_mSm​ of mmm alternatives. A weak order RRR on SmS_mSm​ is a complete, transitive relation, and x R yx\,R\,yxRy reads "xxx is preferred or indifferent to yyy". Its strict part is x Rˉ yx\,\bar R\,yxRˉy: x R yx\,R\,yxRy and not y R xy\,R\,xyRx. The weak orders form πm\pi_mπm​. A strong order is a weak order with no indifference between distinct alternatives, and the strong orders form ρm\rho_mρm​. A ballot set is B=(B1,…,Bn)∈πmnB=(B_1,\dots,B_n)\in\pi_m^nB=(B1​,…,Bn​)∈πmn​.

A social welfare function uuu assigns to every ballot set a social ordering A=u(B)∈πmA=u(B)\in\pi_mA=u(B)∈πm​. A strict social welfare function μ\muμ is defined only on strong ballot sets ρmn\rho_m^nρmn​ and takes values in ρm\rho_mρm​. For W⊆SmW\subseteq S_mW⊆Sm​, ΨW(R)\Psi_W(R)ΨW​(R) is the set of RRR-best elements of WWW, and θW(R)\theta_W(R)θW​(R) is the restriction of RRR to WWW.

  • CS (citizens' sovereignty): for all distinct x,yx,yx,y some ballot set yields x Aˉ yx\,\bar A\,yxAˉy.
  • IIA (independence of irrelevant alternatives): if θW(Ci)=θW(Di)\theta_W(C_i)=\theta_W(D_i)θW​(Ci​)=θW​(Di​) for every iii, then ΨW(AC)=ΨW(AD)\Psi_W(A_C)=\Psi_W(A_D)ΨW​(AC​)=ΨW​(AD​).
  • NNR (non-negative response): if DDD differs from CCC only by raising an alternative xxx on some ballots, then x AˉC zx\,\bar A_C\,zxAˉC​z implies x AˉD zx\,\bar A_D\,zxAˉD​z for all z≠xz\neq xz=x.
  • Dictatorial: some iii exists such that x Bˉi yx\,\bar B_i\,yxBˉi​y implies x Aˉ yx\,\bar A\,yxAˉy for every ballot set and all x,yx,yx,y.

A tie-breaking function α\alphaα maps every weak ballot set to a strong one while keeping every strict preference. It is regular if each individual's ties are broken by a fixed strong order QiQ_iQi​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3' (p. 49)

For n≥2n\ge 2n≥2, m≥3m\ge 3m≥3 and any social welfare function uuu on weak ballot sets,

u satisfies CS, NNR, IIA  ⟹  ∃ i  ∀B  ∀x,y:  x Bˉi y⇒x u(B)‾ y.u \text{ satisfies CS, NNR, IIA} \;\Longrightarrow\; \exists\, i\;\forall B\;\forall x,y:\; x\,\bar B_i\,y \Rightarrow x\,\overline{u(B)}\,y .u satisfies CS, NNR, IIA⟹∃i∀B∀x,y:xBˉi​y⇒xu(B)​y.

The converse is false with indifference, so the goal is one-directional.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 3 (p. 36): for strict μ\muμ, CS, NNR and IIA hold if and only if μ\muμ is dictatorial.
  2. Lemma 10, first sentence (p. 44): if uuu has range in ρm\rho_mρm​ and u=μ∘γu=\mu\circ\gammau=μ∘γ with γ\gammaγ regular and μ\muμ strict Arrovian, then uuu satisfies IIA, CS and NNR.
  3. Lemma 10, second sentence (p. 44): if uuu has range in ρm\rho_mρm​ and satisfies IIA, CS and NNR, then u=μ∘αu=\mu\circ\alphau=μ∘α for a tie-breaking function α\alphaα and a strict μ\muμ satisfying IIA, CS and NNR.
  4. Lemma 11 (p. 48): breaking the ties of each social ordering u(B)u(B)u(B) by a strong order QQQ preserves CS, NNR and IIA and gives range in ρm\rho_mρm​.

Significance

Theorem 3' is Arrow's theorem in the setting Arrow stated it: weak-order ballots, a weak social ordering, and the conditions CS and NNR instead of the Pareto condition. Lemma 10 and Lemma 11 together say that Arrovian social welfare functions with indifference are determined by strict ones up to tie-breaking. This is the structural fact the paper also uses for its weak-order correspondence (Theorem 2').

All results here are proved in the paper. None is formalized as stated. The platform holds a proved strict Arrow theorem, AGT.arrow_theorem, for social welfare functions on strict total orders under unanimity and pairwise IIA. Theorem 3's only-if half follows from it once CS, NNR and IIA are shown to imply the Pareto condition and the two encodings are bridged. The weak-order statement, the tie-breaking lemmas, and the "if" half of Theorem 3 are new to the platform.

Difficulty

Passing from strict to weak orders is the hard step. Restricting a weak ordering to a pair of alternatives does not determine its choice sets on larger sets once ties are present. A social welfare function that satisfies IIA on weak orders need not induce one on strong orders through an arbitrary tie-breaker. Breaking ties ballot by ballot with a non-regular rule can destroy IIA, and breaking ties in the social ordering can destroy NNR unless the same fixed order is used throughout. The obvious reduction is "break all ties and apply the strict theorem", and it fails: the dictator of the tie-broken function could depend on the tie-breaking order. The fact that it does not is part of what must be shown.

Formalization scope

  • Alternatives and individuals are finite types A and ι with decidable equality. nnn = Fintype.card ι, mmm = Fintype.card A, and n≥2n\ge 2n≥2, m≥3m\ge 3m≥3 are hypotheses as printed. All statements live in StrategyProofArrow.WeakArrow.
  • A weak order is a structure (a relation with completeness and transitivity). A strong order is the subtype with no indifference between distinct elements. Strong ballot sets are functions into that subtype, so a strict social welfare function is defined on admissible profiles only.
  • θW(C)=θW(D)\theta_W(C)=\theta_W(D)θW​(C)=θW​(D) is agreement of the two relations on W×WW\times WW×W. ΨW\Psi_WΨW​ is a set, compared as a set, since weak orders can have several best elements.
  • CS is stated for distinct x≠yx\neq yx=y. As printed ("for every x,yx,yx,y") it is unsatisfiable at x=yx=yx=y, and every theorem would become vacuous. No other trivializing reading is possible: the dictator conclusion is the paper's one-directional negation of ND, not u(B)=Biu(B)=B_iu(B)=Bi​, which would be false for weak orders.
  • Lemma 11's tie-breaker acts on a single ordering. It is encoded as breaking the ties of u(B)u(B)u(B) by a strong order QQQ, the "tie-breaking order for γ\gammaγ" of the proof of Theorem 3'.
  • Lemma 10's printed unm(B)=unm[γ(B)]u^{nm}(B)=u^{nm}[\gamma(B)]unm(B)=unm[γ(B)] is read u(B)=μ(γ(B))u(B)=\mu(\gamma(B))u(B)=μ(γ(B)), following the proof.

The definitions duplicate objects drafted in the sibling missions of this series (weak and strong orders, CS, NNR, IIA). Proofs of the strict theorem from the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem, bridges to AGT.arrow_theorem, and reusable lemmas about tie-breaking of weak orders are all welcome.

Selected references

  • M. A. Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions, Northwestern University CMS-EMS Discussion Paper No. 122, 1974 (rev. Dec. 12, 1974); J. Econ. Theory 10 (1975) 187–217. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2
  • K. J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed., Yale University Press, 1963. https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300186987
  • A. Gibbard, Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, Econometrica 41 (1973) 587–601. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914083
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Dual Approach to Solving Nonlinear Programming Problems by Unconstrained Optimization 3: Under Second-Order Conditions, Tolerances αₖ ≤ q[sup g_r − g_r(yᵏ)] Give |xᵏ − x̄| ≤ s|yᵏ − ȳ|Research Paper

Motivation

The method of multipliers (augmented Lagrangian method), proposed independently by Hestenes and Powell in 1969, solves a constrained optimization problem by a sequence of unconstrained minimizations of a penalized Lagrangian, updating a multiplier estimate between them. It became one of the standard algorithms of nonlinear programming and is the ancestor of ADMM and of the proximal-point view of dual methods. Rockafellar's 1973 paper (Math. Programming 5, 354–373) extended the method to inequality constraints with the penalty Lagrangian LrL_rLr​ and reinterpreted it as unconstrained maximization of a smooth concave dual function grg_rgr​. Its §4 shows that primal points recovered from any maximizing dual sequence are asymptotically minimizing; its §5, the subject of this mission, asks how fast they converge.

Timeline. 1969: Hestenes and Powell introduce multiplier methods for equality constraints. 1973: Rockafellar treats inequality constraints in the convex case through LrL_rLr​ and its dual (this paper), and in the same year applies the multiplier method of Hestenes and Powell to convex programming (J. Optim. Theory Appl. 12). 1976: Rockafellar's "Augmented Lagrangians and applications of the proximal point algorithm in convex programming" (Math. Oper. Res. 1) gives the general convergence theory.

Setting

Let X⊂RnX \subset \mathbb R^nX⊂Rn be convex and f0,f1,…,fm:X→Rf_0, f_1, \dots, f_m : X \to \mathbb Rf0​,f1​,…,fm​:X→R convex. The problem is

(P)minimize f0(x) over x∈X subject to fi(x)≤0, i=1,…,m.\text{(P)}\qquad \text{minimize } f_0(x) \text{ over } x \in X \text{ subject to } f_i(x) \le 0,\ i = 1, \dots, m.(P)minimize f0​(x) over x∈X subject to fi​(x)≤0, i=1,…,m.

With θ(t)=max⁡{0,t}\theta(t) = \max\{0, t\}θ(t)=max{0,t} and a parameter r>0r > 0r>0, the penalty Lagrangian is

Lr(x,y)=f0(x)+14r∑i=1m[θ(yi+2rfi(x))2−yi2],x∈X, y∈Rm,L_r(x, y) = f_0(x) + \frac{1}{4r}\sum_{i=1}^m \big[\theta(y_i + 2 r f_i(x))^2 - y_i^2\big], \qquad x \in X,\ y \in \mathbb R^m,Lr​(x,y)=f0​(x)+4r1​i=1∑m​[θ(yi​+2rfi​(x))2−yi2​],x∈X, y∈Rm,

and the dual problem (Dr)(D_r)(Dr​) maximizes gr(y)=inf⁡x∈XLr(x,y)g_r(y) = \inf_{x \in X} L_r(x, y)gr​(y)=infx∈X​Lr​(x,y) over all y∈Rmy \in \mathbb R^my∈Rm; sup⁡gr\sup g_rsupgr​ is its supremum. A maximizing sequence is a sequence {yk}\{y^k\}{yk} with gr(yk)→sup⁡grg_r(y^k) \to \sup g_rgr​(yk)→supgr​. The dual method of Theorem 4.1 takes a bounded maximizing sequence {yk}\{y^k\}{yk} and, for each kkk, a point xk∈Xx^k \in Xxk∈X that minimizes Lr(⋅,yk)L_r(\cdot, y^k)Lr​(⋅,yk) to within a tolerance αk\alpha_kαk​:

Lr(xk,yk)−gr(yk)≤αk,αk→0.(4.7)L_r(x^k, y^k) - g_r(y^k) \le \alpha_k, \qquad \alpha_k \to 0. \qquad (4.7)Lr​(xk,yk)−gr​(yk)≤αk​,αk​→0.(4.7)

The standing assumptions of §5 concern a point xˉ∈int⁡X\bar x \in \operatorname{int} Xxˉ∈intX that is an optimal solution of (P), near which f0,…,fmf_0, \dots, f_mf0​,…,fm​ are twice continuously differentiable, and a multiplier vector yˉ\bar yyˉ​ satisfying with xˉ\bar xxˉ the Kuhn–Tucker conditions (yˉi≥0\bar y_i \ge 0yˉ​i​≥0, fi(xˉ)≤0f_i(\bar x) \le 0fi​(xˉ)≤0, yˉifi(xˉ)=0\bar y_i f_i(\bar x) = 0yˉ​i​fi​(xˉ)=0, and xˉ\bar xxˉ minimizes f0+∑iyˉifif_0 + \sum_i \bar y_i f_if0​+∑i​yˉ​i​fi​ over XXX). With I={i:fi(xˉ)=0}I = \{i : f_i(\bar x) = 0\}I={i:fi​(xˉ)=0} the active set and H(x,y)=∇2f0(x)+∑i∈Iyi∇2fi(x)H(x, y) = \nabla^2 f_0(x) + \sum_{i \in I} y_i \nabla^2 f_i(x)H(x,y)=∇2f0​(x)+∑i∈I​yi​∇2fi​(x), they are: (i) yˉi≠0\bar y_i \ne 0yˉ​i​=0 for i∈Ii \in Ii∈I; (ii) the ∇fi(xˉ)\nabla f_i(\bar x)∇fi​(xˉ), i∈Ii \in Ii∈I, are linearly independent; (iii) z⋅H(xˉ,yˉ)z>0z \cdot H(\bar x, \bar y) z > 0z⋅H(xˉ,yˉ​)z>0 for every nonzero zzz with z⋅∇fi(xˉ)=0z \cdot \nabla f_i(\bar x) = 0z⋅∇fi​(xˉ)=0 for all i∈Ii \in Ii∈I.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 5.3

Under the standing assumptions, with {yk},{xk},{αk}\{y^k\}, \{x^k\}, \{\alpha_k\}{yk},{xk},{αk​} as in (4.7), if for some q>0q > 0q>0

αk≤q [sup⁡gr−gr(yk)]for all sufficiently large k,(5.18)\alpha_k \le q\,[\sup g_r - g_r(y^k)] \quad \text{for all sufficiently large } k, \qquad (5.18)αk​≤q[supgr​−gr​(yk)]for all sufficiently large k,(5.18)

then there is a constant s>0s > 0s>0 with

∣xk−xˉ∣≤s ∣yk−yˉ∣for all sufficiently large k.(5.19)|x^k - \bar x| \le s\,|y^k - \bar y| \quad \text{for all sufficiently large } k. \qquad (5.19)∣xk−xˉ∣≤s∣yk−yˉ​∣for all sufficiently large k.(5.19)

No rate for {yk}\{y^k\}{yk} is fixed: the statement compares the primal error with the dual error, whatever method produces the dual sequence.

Milestones

  1. xˉ\bar xxˉ is the unique optimal solution to (P) and yˉ\bar yyˉ​ the unique optimal solution to the ordinary dual (D0)(D_0)(D0​) and every (Dr)(D_r)(Dr​) for r>0r > 0r>0 (§5, after (5.1)).
  2. Theorem 5.1 (i)–(iii): for every r,β>0r, \beta > 0r,β>0 there are ε,α>0\varepsilon, \alpha > 0ε,α>0 such that sup⁡gr−gr(y)≤ε\sup g_r - g_r(y) \le \varepsilonsupgr​−gr​(y)≤ε and Lr(x,y)−gr(y)≤αL_r(x, y) - g_r(y) \le \alphaLr​(x,y)−gr​(y)≤α force (x,y)(x, y)(x,y) into a β\betaβ-neighborhood of (xˉ,yˉ)(\bar x, \bar y)(xˉ,yˉ​) with x∈int⁡Xx \in \operatorname{int} Xx∈intX, where LrL_rLr​ is C2C^2C2, given locally by (5.4), and ∇x2Lr(x,y)\nabla_x^2 L_r(x, y)∇x2​Lr​(x,y) is positive definite.
  3. Theorem 5.1 (iv): the unique minimizer ξ(y)\xi(y)ξ(y) of Lr(⋅,y)L_r(\cdot, y)Lr​(⋅,y) over XXX is C1C^1C1 in yyy with derivative (5.5).
  4. Theorem 5.1 (v): grg_rgr​ is C2C^2C2 with negative definite Hessian (5.6)–(5.7).
  5. Corollary 5.2 (5.14): xk→xˉx^k \to \bar xxk→xˉ and yk→yˉy^k \to \bar yyk→yˉ​.
  6. Corollary 5.2 (5.15)–(5.17): a∣xk−ξ(yk)∣2≤αka|x^k - \xi(y^k)|^2 \le \alpha_ka∣xk−ξ(yk)∣2≤αk​, b1∣yk−yˉ∣I≤∣ξ(yk)−xˉ∣≤b2∣yk−yˉ∣Ib_1|y^k - \bar y|_I \le |\xi(y^k) - \bar x| \le b_2|y^k - \bar y|_Ib1​∣yk−yˉ​∣I​≤∣ξ(yk)−xˉ∣≤b2​∣yk−yˉ​∣I​, and c1∣yk−yˉ∣2≤gr(yˉ)−gr(yk)≤c2∣yk−yˉ∣2c_1|y^k - \bar y|^2 \le g_r(\bar y) - g_r(y^k) \le c_2|y^k - \bar y|^2c1​∣yk−yˉ​∣2≤gr​(yˉ​)−gr​(yk)≤c2​∣yk−yˉ​∣2.

Significance

Corollary 5.3 is the paper's answer to the practical question of how accurately each inner minimization must be done. A tolerance proportional to the current dual gap costs nothing in the order of convergence: the primal iterates then converge at least as fast as the dual ones. Since grg_rgr​ is C2C^2C2 with a negative definite Hessian near yˉ\bar yyˉ​ (Theorem 5.1 (v)), any locally linearly or superlinearly convergent unconstrained method applied to grg_rgr​ yields a primal sequence with the same rate. The estimates (5.15)–(5.17) are the quantitative bridge between inner accuracy, dual error and primal error, and reappear in later analyses of inexact augmented Lagrangian methods.

The results are proved in the paper (1973) and in textbook treatments; none of them has a machine-checked proof on this platform or in Mathlib. The mission produces a formal statement of the second-order theory of the penalty Lagrangian: the local smooth structure of LrL_rLr​ and grg_rgr​, the implicit minimizer map ξ\xiξ, and the rate comparison. Complete formal proofs of each milestone are the remaining work.

Difficulty

The obvious argument linearizes everything at (xˉ,yˉ)(\bar x, \bar y)(xˉ,yˉ​), but LrL_rLr​ is only C1C^1C1 globally: θ2\theta^2θ2 has a kink in its second derivative, so smoothness of LrL_rLr​ must first be established on a neighborhood of (xˉ,yˉ)(\bar x, \bar y)(xˉ,yˉ​), using complementary slackness and strict complementarity (i) to fix which branch of (2.4) each constraint follows. The sequence {(xk,yk)}\{(x^k, y^k)\}{(xk,yk)} is not assumed to converge; localizing it into that neighborhood requires the uniform statement of Theorem 5.1 (i) (with ε,α\varepsilon, \alphaε,α chosen after r,βr, \betar,β) and the uniqueness of xˉ\bar xxˉ and yˉ\bar yyˉ​. The minimizer map ξ\xiξ then comes from the implicit function theorem applied to ∇xLr(x,y)=0\nabla_x L_r(x, y) = 0∇x​Lr​(x,y)=0, and the formula for ∇2gr\nabla^2 g_r∇2gr​ needs the derivative of the envelope gr(y)=Lr(ξ(y),y)g_r(y) = L_r(\xi(y), y)gr​(y)=Lr​(ξ(y),y).

Formalization scope

  • Spaces. Primal points lie in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n), multipliers in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin m); constraint indices are Fin m (0-based), and f0f_0f0​ is a separate argument.
  • Functions. The fif_ifi​ are total functions on Rn\mathbb R^nRn; convexity is assumed on XXX only (ConvexOn ℝ X, an explicit hypothesis of every theorem, the paper's standing assumption of p. 358), and twice continuous differentiability only on a neighborhood of xˉ\bar xxˉ. Smoothness of LrL_rLr​ and grg_rgr​ is always a conclusion, never a hypothesis.
  • Extended values. g0g_0g0​, grg_rgr​, sup⁡gr\sup g_rsupgr​ and the infimum in (P) are computed in EReal, so (4.7), (5.2), (5.3) and (5.18) are differences in [−∞,+∞][-\infty, +\infty][−∞,+∞]; r>0r > 0r>0 is explicit for the penalty Lagrangian, while L0L_0L0​ is defined separately.
  • Derivatives. Hessians are quadratic forms z⋅D(∇φ)(x)zz \cdot D(\nabla\varphi)(x) zz⋅D(∇φ)(x)z; every inverse matrix appears together with positive definiteness of the same matrix, so Lean's convention that a non-invertible map has inverse 000 never applies. Local identities such as (5.4) are stated as equality on a neighborhood, not globally.
  • Choices. The assumption of Theorem 4.1 that the asymptotic optimal value is finite is omitted because it holds under the §5 assumptions. "Generated as in Theorem 4.1" is spelled out as its hypotheses. In (5.15)–(5.17), ξ\xiξ is any function that picks a minimizer of Lr(⋅,y)L_r(\cdot, y)Lr​(⋅,y) over XXX whenever one exists; along yky^kyk it eventually coincides with the paper's unique minimizer. In (iv) and (v), the conclusions are stated for every yyy with sup⁡gr−gr(y)≤ε\sup g_r - g_r(y) \le \varepsilonsupgr​−gr​(y)≤ε, since they do not depend on xxx.
  • Ruled out. The goal does not assume that xkx^kxk or yky^kyk converge, nor that yk≠yˉy^k \ne \bar yyk=yˉ​, and s>0s > 0s>0 is one constant valid for all large kkk; a formalization assuming convergence, or one with an unsatisfiable second-order hypothesis, would be trivial. The standing assumptions and all sequence hypotheses are satisfiable (checked on f0(x)=∣x∣2f_0(x) = |x|^2f0​(x)=∣x∣2, f1(x)=1−e⋅xf_1(x) = 1 - e\cdot xf1​(x)=1−e⋅x in R1\mathbb R^1R1).
  • Infrastructure. The proofs need the implicit function theorem (Mathlib's Analysis/Calculus/Implicit), second derivatives of compositions, envelope differentiation, and the quadratic-growth estimates of a C2C^2C2 function with definite Hessian. Results on Hessian forms and on strict complementarity are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • R. T. Rockafellar, A dual approach to solving nonlinear programming problems by unconstrained optimization, Mathematical Programming 5 (1973) 354–373. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01580138
  • M. R. Hestenes, Multiplier and gradient methods, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 4 (1969) 303–320. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00927673
  • M. J. D. Powell, A method for nonlinear constraints in minimization problems, in R. Fletcher (ed.), Optimization, Academic Press, 1969, 283–298.
  • R. T. Rockafellar, The multiplier method of Hestenes and Powell applied to convex programming, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 12 (1973) 555–562. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00934777
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Augmented Lagrangians and applications of the proximal point algorithm in convex programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 1 (1976) 97–116. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1.2.97
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AnalysisProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Estimating Variance From High, Low and Closing Prices II: Under the Overshoot Law (9), E(Z ∨ Z′) = aσ√h and E(Z ∨ Z′)² = bσ²hResearch Paper

Motivation

Volatility estimates from daily high, low and closing prices have been used since Parkinson (1980) and Garman and Klass (1980): the range of a day's log-price carries much more information about the volatility σ\sigmaσ than the close alone. Rogers and Satchell (1991) propose an estimator, S1(S1−X1)+I1(I1−X1)S_1(S_1-X_1)+I_1(I_1-X_1)S1​(S1​−X1​)+I1​(I1​−X1​), that is unbiased for σ2\sigma^2σ2 whatever the drift of the log-price. The companion mission (Part I) formalizes that unbiasedness.

Every such estimator meets the same practical problem. The true high and low of the continuous path are never observed; one sees the maximum and minimum of the path sampled at NNN times. The sampled maximum SSS falls short of the true maximum S1S_1S1​ by an amount Δ=S1−S≥0\Delta = S_1 - S \ge 0Δ=S1​−S≥0, and the resulting downward bias is large in practice (Garman and Klass, and Beckers (1983), identified it). Section 3 of Rogers and Satchell proposes a correction: model Δ\DeltaΔ by a random variable with an explicit law, compute its first two moments exactly, and subtract their effect. The constants that appear,

a=2π[14−2−16],b=1+3π/412,a=\sqrt{2\pi}\Big[\tfrac14-\tfrac{\sqrt2-1}{6}\Big],\qquad b=\frac{1+3\pi/4}{12},a=2π​[41​−62​−1​],b=121+3π/4​,

enter the corrected estimator directly. Their simulations (Tables 1–3 of the paper) show that the correction removes most of the bias.

Setting

Fix a volatility σ>0\sigma>0σ>0 and a sampling mesh h>0h>0h>0 (in the paper h=1/Nh=1/Nh=1/N). For a level α≥0\alpha\ge0α≥0 define

Gσ,h(α)=∫0he−2α2/(uσ2) du(4uh)1/2.G_{\sigma,h}(\alpha)=\int_0^h e^{-2\alpha^2/(u\sigma^2)}\,\frac{du}{(4uh)^{1/2}} .Gσ,h​(α)=∫0h​e−2α2/(uσ2)(4uh)1/2du​.

The factor e−2α2/(uσ2)e^{-2\alpha^2/(u\sigma^2)}e−2α2/(uσ2) is the probability that a Brownian bridge of duration uuu and volatility σ\sigmaσ climbs above level α\alphaα. The factor (4uh)−1/2(4uh)^{-1/2}(4uh)−1/2 is a probability density on (0,h](0,h](0,h]. Since Gσ,h(0)=1G_{\sigma,h}(0)=1Gσ,h​(0)=1 and Gσ,hG_{\sigma,h}Gσ,h​ decreases continuously to 000, it is the survival function of a law on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞). This law is the paper's display (9).

A real random variable ZZZ has distribution (9) if it is measurable and P(Z>α)=Gσ,h(α)P(Z>\alpha)=G_{\sigma,h}(\alpha)P(Z>α)=Gσ,h​(α) for every α≥0\alpha\ge0α≥0. In the paper, ZZZ is the overshoot of the continuous maximum over the sampled maximum xxx in the sampling interval to the left of the time ttt at which xxx is attained, and Z′Z'Z′ is the overshoot in the interval to the right. The paper then assumes (p. 508) that ZZZ and Z′Z'Z′ are independent, each with distribution (9), and approximates Δ\DeltaΔ by Z∨Z′=max⁡(Z,Z′)Z\vee Z'=\max(Z,Z')Z∨Z′=max(Z,Z′). Write Z∧Z′=min⁡(Z,Z′)Z\wedge Z'=\min(Z,Z')Z∧Z′=min(Z,Z′).

In Lean, overshootSurvival σ h α is Gσ,h(α)G_{\sigma,h}(\alpha)Gσ,h​(α), HasOvershootLaw P σ h Z is "ZZZ has distribution (9) under PPP", and constA, constB are aaa and bbb.

Formalization targets

Goal: the two moments of Z∨Z′Z\vee Z'Z∨Z′ (Eq. (11), p. 508, and the display on p. 509)

For σ,h>0\sigma,h>0σ,h>0 and Z,Z′Z,Z'Z,Z′ independent with distribution (9), the variables Z∨Z′Z\vee Z'Z∨Z′ and (Z∨Z′)2(Z\vee Z')^2(Z∨Z′)2 are integrable, and

E(Z∨Z′)=a σh,E[(Z∨Z′)2]=b σ2h.E(Z\vee Z')=a\,\sigma\sqrt h,\qquad E\big[(Z\vee Z')^2\big]=b\,\sigma^2h .E(Z∨Z′)=aσh​,E[(Z∨Z′)2]=bσ2h.

Milestones, in the order the paper uses them

  1. (9), p. 507. The two integral forms of the survival function agree:
∫0he−2α2/(uσ2)du(4uh)1/2=∫h−1∞e−2α2s/σ2ds(4hs3)1/2.\int_0^h e^{-2\alpha^2/(u\sigma^2)}\frac{du}{(4uh)^{1/2}}=\int_{h^{-1}}^\infty e^{-2\alpha^2s/\sigma^2}\frac{ds}{(4hs^3)^{1/2}} .∫0h​e−2α2/(uσ2)(4uh)1/2du​=∫h−1∞​e−2α2s/σ2(4hs3)1/2ds​.
  1. (10), p. 508. EZ=σ(2πh)1/2/8EZ=\sigma(2\pi h)^{1/2}/8EZ=σ(2πh)1/2/8.
  2. Display before (11), p. 508. E(Z∧Z′)=2πh (2−1) σ/6E(Z\wedge Z')=\sqrt{2\pi h}\,(\sqrt2-1)\,\sigma/6E(Z∧Z′)=2πh​(2​−1)σ/6.
  3. (12), p. 508. EZ2=σ2h/6EZ^2=\sigma^2h/6EZ2=σ2h/6.
  4. (13), p. 509. E[(Z∧Z′)2]=σ2h4(1−π4)E[(Z\wedge Z')^2]=\frac{\sigma^2h}{4}\big(1-\frac\pi4\big)E[(Z∧Z′)2]=4σ2h​(1−4π​).

The goal combines milestones 2–5 through Z∨Z′=Z+Z′−Z∧Z′Z\vee Z'=Z+Z'-Z\wedge Z'Z∨Z′=Z+Z′−Z∧Z′, which the paper uses in (11).

Significance

The result. The two identities are the coefficients of the corrected estimator (5): replacing Δ\DeltaΔ and Δ2\Delta^2Δ2 by aσha\sigma\sqrt haσh​ and bσ2hb\sigma^2hbσ2h turns the high–low estimator into an equation whose positive root σ^h\hat\sigma_hσ^h​ largely removes the discretization bias. The same constants correct the Garman–Klass estimator (p. 509). Without exact values for aaa and bbb the correction has no concrete form.

Formalizing it. The paper does each of the four double integrals in a line and says "after some calculation" twice. A machine-checked derivation confirms the printed constants, which are reused in the high–low volatility literature. It also states precisely what is exact (moments of the model law (9) under independence) and what is approximation (that the model describes Δ\DeltaΔ). To our knowledge none of these identities has been formalized before.

Difficulty

The statements are elementary but none of them is a one-line identity. Each moment is a double or triple improper integral with singular weights (4hs3)−1/2(4hs^3)^{-1/2}(4hs3)−1/2 on an unbounded domain. The minimum of ZZZ and Z′Z'Z′ couples two such integrals, and the resulting kernels (s+u)−1/2(s+u)^{-1/2}(s+u)−1/2 and st/(s+t)\sqrt{st}/(s+t)st​/(s+t) have to be integrated in closed form over the unit square. Matching 2−1\sqrt2-12​−1 and 1−π/41-\pi/41−π/4 exactly leaves no room for slack. In Lean, every exchange of integration order, change of variables and passage from survival functions to moments has to be justified for non-negative but unbounded functions, and the expectations must be shown finite: the Bochner integral of a non-integrable function is 000.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Random variables live on an arbitrary probability space (Ω, P) with [IsProbabilityMeasure P]. "Distribution (9)" is Measurable Z ∧ ∀ α ≥ 0, P.real {α < Z} = G σ h α, imposed only at levels α≥0\alpha\ge0α≥0: the formula is even in α\alphaα, and imposing it at negative levels would make the hypothesis unsatisfiable. Independence is IndepFun Z Z' P. Z∨Z′Z\vee Z'Z∨Z′ and Z∧Z′Z\wedge Z'Z∧Z′ are max and min.
  • Parameters. σ>0\sigma>0σ>0 and h>0h>0h>0 only. The paper's h=1/N≤1h=1/N\le1h=1/N≤1 is not needed and not imposed.
  • Explicit readings. "E" is the Bochner integral, and every expectation identity carries its integrability (Integrable, or MemLp … 2 for second moments). The conditioning "∣t−h<Hx<t, Xt=x\mid t-h<H_x<t,\ X_t=x∣t−h<Hx​<t, Xt​=x" in (9) and (10) is the modelling context in which the paper derives the law, not a hypothesis. The paper's "E(Z∧Z′)2E(Z\wedge Z')^2E(Z∧Z′)2" in (13) is read as E[(Z∧Z′)2]E[(Z\wedge Z')^2]E[(Z∧Z′)2], as its first line shows. The integrals in (9) run over (0,h](0,h](0,h] and [h−1,∞)[h^{-1},\infty)[h−1,∞).
  • Not formalized. The approximate statements EΔ≐aσhE\Delta\doteq a\sigma\sqrt hEΔ≐aσh​ and EΔ2≐bσ2hE\Delta^2\doteq b\sigma^2hEΔ2≐bσ2h, the densities (6) and (7), and the independence remark of p. 508 are modelling approximations about the random walk, not theorems. The estimators (5) and σ^GK,h2\hat\sigma^2_{GK,h}σ^GK,h2​ are definitions with no claim attached. The Brownian-bridge maximum (8) is not stated (its print also has a slip: 1−2/u1-2/u1−2/u for 1−s/u1-s/u1−s/u). Section 4 (simulations) is out of scope.
  • Non-triviality. The hypotheses are satisfiable for every σ,h>0\sigma,h>0σ,h>0: a probability measure on R\mathbb RR with survival function Gσ,hG_{\sigma,h}Gσ,h​ exists, and the two coordinates under its product measure are independent copies. A formalization that stated the survival condition for all α∈R\alpha\in\mathbb Rα∈R would be vacuous and is ruled out. So is one without the integrability conjuncts, which could hold with both sides 000.
  • Related items. The platform's generic identity survival_mean_ibp (mean as an integral of the survival function, under derivative hypotheses) is related but does not fit this setting. Mathlib's layer-cake formula is the general tool for passing between survival functions and moments.
  • Welcome contributions. Closed forms for ∫01 ⁣∫01(s+t)−1/2 ds dt\int_0^1\!\int_0^1(s+t)^{-1/2}\,ds\,dt∫01​∫01​(s+t)−1/2dsdt and ∫01 ⁣∫01st/(s+t) ds dt\int_0^1\!\int_0^1\sqrt{st}/(s+t)\,ds\,dt∫01​∫01​st​/(s+t)dsdt, which are reusable lemmas, and a general "moments of max⁡\maxmax and min⁡\minmin of independent variables from their survival functions" lemma.

Selected references

  • L. C. G. Rogers and S. E. Satchell, Estimating variance from high, low and closing prices, The Annals of Applied Probability 1(4) (1991), 504–512. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoap/1177005835
  • M. B. Garman and M. J. Klass, On the estimation of security price volatilities from historical data, Journal of Business 53(1) (1980), 67–78. https://doi.org/10.1086/296072
  • M. Parkinson, The extreme value method for estimating the variance of the rate of return, Journal of Business 53(1) (1980), 61–65. https://doi.org/10.1086/296071
  • S. Beckers, Variances of security price returns based on high, low and closing prices, Journal of Business 56(1) (1983), 97–112.
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Mathematical PhysicsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Concentration of Measure and Isoperimetric Inequalities in Product Spaces XIII: The Sherrington–Kirkpatrick Model at High Temperature — Deviations of log Z_N from β²N/4Textbook

Motivation

The Sherrington–Kirkpatrick model assigns random interactions to every pair of spins in a system. Its partition function aggregates the weights of all spin configurations, and the logarithm of that partition function is the free energy. For a finite system, the free energy is a random quantity because the interactions are random. A useful question is therefore how far it can move from a deterministic high-temperature scale. Aizenman, Lebowitz and Ruelle (1987), and Comets and Neveu (1995) for Gaussian couplings, proved that for β<1\beta<1β<1 the variable log⁡ZN−β2N/4\log Z_N-\beta^2N/4logZN​−β2N/4 converges in law to a normal random variable ALR 1987; Talagrand asks instead for tail estimates valid for every NNN. Talagrand's Chapter 12 gives a finite-size tail bound and a bound on the expected free energy per site under explicit moment conditions on the interaction law Talagrand 1995.

The chapter belongs to a larger study of concentration inequalities on product spaces. Its relevance to the spin model is concrete: each pair interaction is an independent coordinate, while every spin configuration uses all those coordinates. The number of coordinates grows quadratically with the number of spins. A uniform estimate must respect both this growing dimension and the normalization in the energy Talagrand 1995, pp. 191–195.

Setting

Fix an integer N≥1N\ge1N≥1. A spin configuration is a vector ε=(εi)1≤i≤N\varepsilon=(\varepsilon_i)_{1\le i\le N}ε=(εi​)1≤i≤N​ with each εi∈{−1,1}\varepsilon_i\in\{-1,1\}εi​∈{−1,1}. Each unordered pair of sites i<ji<ji<j has a real coupling hijh_{ij}hij​. For an inverse temperature β>0\beta>0β>0, the normalized partition function is

ZN(h)=2−N∑ε∈{−1,1}Nexp⁡(βN∑1≤i<j≤Nhijεiεj).Z_N(h)=2^{-N}\sum_{\varepsilon\in\{-1,1\}^N} \exp\left(\frac{\beta}{\sqrt N}\sum_{1\le i<j\le N} h_{ij}\varepsilon_i\varepsilon_j\right).ZN​(h)=2−Nε∈{−1,1}N∑​exp​N​β​1≤i<j≤N∑​hij​εi​εj​​.

Write FN(h)=log⁡ZN(h)F_N(h)=\log Z_N(h)FN​(h)=logZN​(h). The factor 2−N2^{-N}2−N averages over configurations. Since every summand is positive, ZN(h)>0Z_N(h)>0ZN​(h)>0 for every array hhh, so this logarithm is defined without excluding any coupling array.

The couplings are independent with a common probability law ν\nuν on R\mathbb RR; their joint law is PN=ν⊗(N2)P_N=\nu^{\otimes\binom N2}PN​=ν⊗(2N​). Under ν\nuν, a single coupling HHH satisfies EH=EH3=0\mathbb EH=\mathbb EH^3=0EH=EH3=0 and EH2=1\mathbb EH^2=1EH2=1. The chapter also assumes Eeα∣H∣<∞\mathbb E e^{\alpha|H|}<\inftyEeα∣H∣<∞ for some α>0\alpha>0α>0. Its main theorem adds EeH<2\mathbb Ee^H<2EeH<2 and Ee−H<2\mathbb Ee^{-H}<2Ee−H<2. These inequalities describe a class of interaction laws rather than one chosen distribution. A median MNM_NMN​ of FNF_NFN​ means that both PN(FN≤MN)P_N(F_N\le M_N)PN​(FN​≤MN​) and PN(FN≥MN)P_N(F_N\ge M_N)PN​(FN​≥MN​) are at least 1/21/21/2 Talagrand 1995, pp. 191–193.

Formalization targets

The goal is Theorem 12.1. There is one absolute constant K>0K>0K>0 such that, for 0<β<10<\beta<10<β<1 and 0<t<N/K0<t<N/K0<t<N/K,

PN(∣FN−β2N4∣≥K(t+log⁡K1−β2)N)≤2e−t2,P_N\left(\left|F_N-\frac{\beta^2N}{4}\right|\ge K\left(t+\sqrt{\log\frac K{1-\beta^2}}\right)\sqrt N\right) \le 2e^{-t^2},PN​(​FN​−4β2N​​≥K(t+log1−β2K​​)N​)≤2e−t2,

and the same constant satisfies

−KNlog⁡21−β2≤1NEFN−β24≤KN.-\frac K{\sqrt N}\sqrt{\log\frac2{1-\beta^2}} \le \frac1N\mathbb EF_N-\frac{\beta^2}{4} \le \frac KN.−N​K​log1−β22​​≤N1​EFN​−4β2​≤NK​.

The first formula controls deviations at finite NNN; the second locates the expected free energy per site. The theorem leaves the absolute value of KKK unspecified, as the source does Talagrand 1995, Theorem 12.1.

Four numbered displays form the supporting targets. Equation (12.6) bounds the change in FNF_NFN​ when all couplings are changed. Equation (12.5) bounds deviations about any median. Equations (12.7) and (12.8) give first- and second-moment estimates for ZNZ_NZN​. Together these specify the deterministic regularity and probabilistic estimates used by the chapter Talagrand 1995, pp. 192–195.

Significance

The theorem gives a nonasymptotic probability estimate, valid for each finite size and each law meeting the stated conditions. It also bounds the difference between the mean free energy per site and β2/4\beta^2/4β2/4 as NNN grows, for fixed β<1\beta<1β<1. The moment estimates separately describe the scale of the partition function and limit its relative second moment. These conclusions keep the coupling law general within the stated moment class Talagrand 1995, Theorem 12.1 and Eqs. (12.7)–(12.8).

The result is proved in the cited paper; the open work here is its Lean formalization. A completed development would connect product-measure concentration, finite spin sums, exponential-moment bounds, and real-valued expectations in one reusable interface. The coupling product space and median conventions can also serve other finite random-interaction models. No machine-checked proof of this chapter's target is claimed by this proposal.

Difficulty

A direct bounded-differences estimate cannot be applied to this model as stated: the couplings are real and may be unbounded. An estimate that handles each coordinate must account for the law's exponential moments while still retaining the NNN and β\betaβ factors in the chapter's explicit bounds. The normalization by N\sqrt NN​ makes a single coupling's influence small, but there are (N2)\binom N2(2N​) couplings, so treating the total sensitivity as dimension-free would lose the scale of the theorem. The first moment alone also does not control the lower tail of ZNZ_NZN​; this is why the second-moment target is present Talagrand 1995, pp. 192–195.

Formalization scope

Lean indexes sites by Fin N and interactions by pairs with i<ji<ji<j. A spin is a Boolean choice interpreted as −1-1−1 or 111, and the configuration sum is normalized by 2N2^N2N. The coupling array is a function on the pair type, carrying the finite product measure of the common law ν\nuν. The theorem uses N≥1N\ge1N≥1, 0<β<10<\beta<10<β<1, and exactly the common-law moment assumptions above; the median deviation milestone uses N≥2N\ge2N≥2 because its denominator contains N−1N-1N−1. The main theorem places its single universal KKK before every size, temperature, law, and deviation level.

Expectations are Bochner integrals, so integrability is explicit in the law predicates or in each conclusion that needs it. Probability expressions are real values of measurable events under the product measure. This avoids relying on Lean's default value for a nonintegrable integral. The model retains the entire real coupling law and does not replace it with a finite alphabet or a Gaussian special case. The partition function is built from the couplings and spins, rather than supplied as an unconstrained variable.

The source's displayed (12.5) omits β\betaβ, whereas the derivation following (12.6) gives, for each tail separately, the range 0<t≤4βN(N−1)0<t\le4\beta\sqrt N(N-1)0<t≤4βN​(N−1) and the exponent −t2/(32β2(N−1))-t^2/(32\beta^2(N-1))−t2/(32β2(N−1)) with the factor 222. The formal milestone states exactly these two one-sided bounds, while its milestone text preserves the printed display verbatim. The first- and second-moment displays are kept with an absolute constant; the second-moment target uses the proof's N≥8N\ge8N≥8 range, since for smaller sizes the chapter's interaction-law assumptions do not ensure that ZN2Z_N^2ZN2​ is integrable. Integrability of FNF_NFN​ is a conclusion of the main theorem, never a hypothesis, and the median is quantified universally, so neither the expectation in (12.4) nor the deviation bound can hold by a default value of an undefined integral or by an unsatisfiable hypothesis; the Rademacher law ν=12(δ−1+δ1)\nu=\frac12(\delta_{-1}+\delta_1)ν=21​(δ−1​+δ1​) satisfies every assumption. Reusable contributions include integrability and measurability of ZNZ_NZN​ and FNF_NFN​, product-law estimates, and the source's numbered inequalities.

Selected references

  • Michel Talagrand, Concentration of measure and isoperimetric inequalities in product spaces, Publications Mathématiques de l'IHÉS 81 (1995), 73–205. DOI: 10.1007/BF02699376.
  • Michael Aizenman, Joel L. Lebowitz, David Ruelle, Some rigorous results on the Sherrington–Kirkpatrick spin glass model, Communications in Mathematical Physics 112 (1987), 3–20. DOI: 10.1007/BF01217677.
  • Francis Comets, Jacques Neveu, The Sherrington–Kirkpatrick model of spin glasses and stochastic calculus: the high temperature case, Communications in Mathematical Physics 166 (1995), 549–564. DOI: 10.1007/BF02099887.
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Concentration of Measure and Isoperimetric Inequalities in Product Spaces VI: The Symmetric Group — ∫ exp(f(A,σ)/16) dP_N ≤ 1/P_N(A) for the Convex Distance on S_NTextbook

Motivation

Concentration of measure on the symmetric group concerns random permutations. A uniformly random permutation of NNN objects appears in random assignment problems, in sampling without replacement, in the longest increasing subsequence and in the analysis of randomized algorithms. A tail bound for a function of a random permutation is useful when it does not require computing the function's distribution. The symmetric group is not a product space, so the inequalities proved for product spaces do not apply to it directly.

Timeline. B. Maurey [Maurey 1979] gave the first concentration inequality on SNS_NSN​, for distances that count the coordinates in which two permutations differ. Every permutation can be written uniquely as σ=tN,i(N)∘⋯∘t2,i(2)\sigma=t_{N,i(N)}\circ\cdots\circ t_{2,i(2)}σ=tN,i(N)​∘⋯∘t2,i(2)​ with i(j)≤ji(j)\le ji(j)≤j, where ti,jt_{i,j}ti,j​ is the transposition of iii and jjj. Through this decomposition the Hamming bound (2.1.3) for product spaces carries over to SNS_NSN​. Milman and Schechtman present the result in their monograph [Milman–Schechtman 1986]. In Chapter 5 of his 1995 memoir Talagrand 1995, M. Talagrand proves the analogue on SNS_NSN​ of his convex hull inequality (Theorem 4.1.1 of the memoir). In the author's words, it improves Maurey's result in the way that Theorem 4.1.1 improves Proposition 2.1.1.

Setting

SNS_NSN​ is the group of permutations of {1,…,N}\{1,\dots,N\}{1,…,N} and PNP_NPN​ is the uniform probability on it. Fix A⊆SNA\subseteq S_NA⊆SN​ and σ∈SN\sigma\in S_Nσ∈SN​. A 0–1 vector sss is admissible if some τ∈A\tau\in Aτ∈A agrees with σ\sigmaσ at every coordinate where sss is zero:

UA(σ)={s∈{0,1}N: ∃τ∈A, ∀ℓ≤N, sℓ=0⇒τ(ℓ)=σ(ℓ)}.U_A(\sigma)=\bigl\{s\in\{0,1\}^N:\ \exists\tau\in A,\ \forall\ell\le N,\ s_\ell=0\Rightarrow\tau(\ell)=\sigma(\ell)\bigr\}.UA​(σ)={s∈{0,1}N: ∃τ∈A, ∀ℓ≤N, sℓ​=0⇒τ(ℓ)=σ(ℓ)}.

VA(σ)⊆[0,1]NV_A(\sigma)\subseteq[0,1]^NVA​(σ)⊆[0,1]N is the convex hull of UA(σ)U_A(\sigma)UA​(σ), and

f(A,σ)=inf⁡{∑ℓ≤Nsℓ2: s∈VA(σ)}f(A,\sigma)=\inf\Bigl\{\sum_{\ell\le N}s_\ell^2:\ s\in V_A(\sigma)\Bigr\}f(A,σ)=inf{ℓ≤N∑​sℓ2​: s∈VA​(σ)}

is the squared convex distance from σ\sigmaσ to AAA. Unlike fcf_cfc​ of Chapter 4, fff here is already squared. If σ∈A\sigma\in Aσ∈A, then 0∈UA(σ)0\in U_A(\sigma)0∈UA​(σ) and f(A,σ)=0f(A,\sigma)=0f(A,σ)=0. A permutation that agrees with some element of AAA outside kkk coordinates has f(A,σ)≤kf(A,\sigma)\le kf(A,σ)≤k.

The proof uses three variants. f(A,σ,p)f(A,\sigma,p)f(A,σ,p) counts coordinate ppp twice, sp2+∑ℓsℓ2s_p^2+\sum_\ell s_\ell^2sp2​+∑ℓ​sℓ2​. f(A,σ,p,m)f(A,\sigma,p,m)f(A,σ,p,m), for p≠mp\ne mp=m, restricts that infimum to the face sm=0s_m=0sm​=0 (Eq. (5.5)). g(A,σ,i,j)g(A,\sigma,i,j)g(A,σ,i,j) drops coordinates iii and jjj (Eq. (5.6)). In SN+1S_{N+1}SN+1​, Gi={σ:σ(i)=N+1}G_i=\{\sigma:\sigma(i)=N+1\}Gi​={σ:σ(i)=N+1} and Gi′={σ:σ(N+1)=i}G'_i=\{\sigma:\sigma(N+1)=i\}Gi′​={σ:σ(N+1)=i}, with uniform probabilities QiQ_iQi​ and Qi′Q'_iQi′​. tit_iti​ is the transposition of N+1N+1N+1 and iii. The maps R(ρ)=ρ∘tiR(\rho)=\rho\circ t_iR(ρ)=ρ∘ti​ and R′(ρ)=ti∘ρR'(\rho)=t_i\circ\rhoR′(ρ)=ti​∘ρ send GiG_iGi​ and Gi′G'_iGi′​, respectively, onto the permutations fixing N+1N+1N+1, that is, onto SNS_NSN​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1

For every NNN and every A⊆SNA\subseteq S_NA⊆SN​,

∫SNexp⁡116f(A,σ) dPN(σ)≤1PN(A).(5.2)\int_{S_N}\exp\frac1{16}f(A,\sigma)\,dP_N(\sigma)\le\frac1{P_N(A)}.\tag{5.2}∫SN​​exp161​f(A,σ)dPN​(σ)≤PN​(A)1​.(5.2)

The constant 1/161/161/16 is the paper's.

Stronger: Proposition 5.2

For every A⊆SNA\subseteq S_NA⊆SN​ and every p≤Np\le Np≤N,

∫exp⁡116f(A,σ,p) dPN≤1PN(A)(5.3)N,∫exp⁡116f(A,σ,σ−1(p)) dPN≤1PN(A)(5.4)N.\int\exp\tfrac1{16}f(A,\sigma,p)\,dP_N\le\tfrac1{P_N(A)}\quad(5.3)_N,\qquad\int\exp\tfrac1{16}f(A,\sigma,\sigma^{-1}(p))\,dP_N\le\tfrac1{P_N(A)}\quad(5.4)_N.∫exp161​f(A,σ,p)dPN​≤PN​(A)1​(5.3)N​,∫exp161​f(A,σ,σ−1(p))dPN​≤PN​(A)1​(5.4)N​.

Since f(A,σ)≤f(A,σ,p)f(A,\sigma)\le f(A,\sigma,p)f(A,σ)≤f(A,σ,p), this pair implies Theorem 5.1.

Milestones

The milestones are the numbered results of the induction step from NNN to N+1N+1N+1, in the order of the paper:

  • the deterministic inequalities Lemma 5.3 (5.7) and Lemma 5.7 (5.14);
  • the transfer lemmas Lemma 5.4 (5.8) and Lemma 5.8 (5.15);
  • the integral bounds Corollary 5.5 (5.10), Lemma 5.6 (5.11), Corollary 5.9 (5.16) and Lemma 5.10 (5.17).

Significance

The result. Theorem 5.1 has the same form as Theorem 4.1.1. By Markov's inequality, PN(A) PN{f(A,⋅)≥t}≤e−t/16P_N(A)\,P_N\{f(A,\cdot)\ge t\}\le e^{-t/16}PN​(A)PN​{f(A,⋅)≥t}≤e−t/16. Any function on SNS_NSN​ that is controlled by the convex distance therefore concentrates around its median with Gaussian tails whose scale does not depend on NNN. Because the convex distance weighs coordinates by an arbitrary unit vector, this includes functions that are Lipschitz only in a weighted, configuration-dependent sense, which a Hamming-distance bound does not reach. This is the setting of random permutation problems such as the longest increasing subsequence and the assignment problem.

Formalizing it. The result has been proved since 1995. To the best of current knowledge none of Chapter 5 has a machine-checked proof, and the platform has no concentration statement on SNS_NSN​. This mission formalizes the statements and the induction of the chapter. Its reusable output is the convex distance on SNS_NSN​ and the embedding of SNS_NSN​ into SN+1S_{N+1}SN+1​ through the blocks GiG_iGi​, Gi′G'_iGi′​.

Difficulty

SNS_NSN​ sits inside {1,…,N}N\{1,\dots,N\}^N{1,…,N}N through σ↦(σ(i))i≤N\sigma\mapsto(\sigma(i))_{i\le N}σ↦(σ(i))i≤N​. If SNS_NSN​ were the whole product, (5.2) would follow from Theorem 4.1.1. But SNS_NSN​ is a very small subset of that product, and the uniform measure on SNS_NSN​ is not a product measure. The decomposition into transpositions does give a product structure, but it is highly non-commutative. Coordinate distances in the decomposition do not match coordinate distances of the permutations, so it transfers only the weaker Hamming-type bound. The paper notes that a direct induction on NNN for (5.2) itself apparently fails. The strengthened pair (5.3)N(5.3)_N(5.3)N​, (5.4)N(5.4)_N(5.4)N​ is needed, and its two halves cross: (5.4)N+1(5.4)_{N+1}(5.4)N+1​ is proved from (5.3)N(5.3)_N(5.3)N​, and (5.3)N+1(5.3)_{N+1}(5.3)N+1​ from (5.4)N(5.4)_N(5.4)N​.

Formalization scope

  • SNS_NSN​ is Equiv.Perm (Fin N), with indices from 000. In SN+1S_{N+1}SN+1​ the point N+1N+1N+1 is Fin.last N, and composition is the group product, so ρ∘ti\rho\circ t_iρ∘ti​ is ρ * t N i.
  • UA(σ)⊆RNU_A(\sigma)\subseteq\mathbb R^NUA​(σ)⊆RN, and VA(σ)V_A(\sigma)VA​(σ) is convexHull ℝ. The functionals fff, f(⋅,⋅,p)f(\cdot,\cdot,p)f(⋅,⋅,p), f(⋅,⋅,p,m)f(\cdot,\cdot,p,m)f(⋅,⋅,p,m) and ggg are infima of explicit sums of squares, so the sup norm on Fin N → ℝ plays no role. They take values in [0,+∞][0,+\infty][0,+∞], so an empty infimum is +∞+\infty+∞ and f(∅,σ)=+∞f(\emptyset,\sigma)=+\inftyf(∅,σ)=+∞. The integrand exp⁡(z/16)\exp(z/16)exp(z/16) is computed in EReal, so exp⁡(+∞)=+∞\exp(+\infty)=+\inftyexp(+∞)=+∞.
  • The uniform probabilities PNP_NPN​, QiQ_iQi​ and Qi′Q'_iQi′​ are explicit finite averages over SNS_NSN​, GiG_iGi​ and Gi′G'_iGi′​. Qi(A)Q_i(A)Qi​(A) means ∣A∩Gi∣/∣Gi∣|A\cap G_i|/|G_i|∣A∩Gi​∣/∣Gi​∣. 1/PN(A)1/P_N(A)1/PN​(A) is computed in ℝ≥0∞, so A=∅A=\emptysetA=∅ gives +∞+\infty+∞ on both sides.
  • R(σ)R(\sigma)R(σ) and R′(σ)R'(\sigma)R′(σ) enter through the relation Restricts ρ τ (ρ(ℓ)=τ(ℓ)\rho(\ell)=\tau(\ell)ρ(ℓ)=τ(ℓ) for ℓ≤N\ell\le Nℓ≤N). R(Ai)R(A_i)R(Ai​) and R′(Ai′)R'(A'_i)R′(Ai′​) are the corresponding image sets.
  • The integral bounds 5.5, 5.6, 5.9 and 5.10 are stated in the paper inside the induction step. Each carries the induction hypothesis it uses as an explicit binder: (5.3)N(5.3)_N(5.3)N​, (5.4)N(5.4)_N(5.4)N​, or "either" as a disjunction.
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out. The distance is the convex-hull distance with sums of squares, not a sup norm or Hamming count. The constant 1/161/161/16 is kept, and the infimum over the empty set is +∞+\infty+∞, not a junk 000.
  • Lemma 4.1.3, the numerical inequality used in the Hölder step, belongs to mission V of this series and is not posed again here.

Contributions are welcome at every level: proofs of the deterministic lemmas, the bijections Gi→SNG_i\to S_NGi​→SN​ and their measure-transport facts, and the final Hölder–Lemma 4.1.3 step.

Selected references

  • M. Talagrand, Concentration of measure and isoperimetric inequalities in product spaces, Publ. Math. IHÉS 81 (1995), 73–205, Chapter 5, pp. 144–150. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02699376
  • B. Maurey, Construction de suites symétriques, C. R. Acad. Sci. Paris Sér. A 288 (1979), 679–681 (reference [M1] of the memoir; no DOI).
  • V. D. Milman, G. Schechtman, Asymptotic theory of finite dimensional normed spaces, Lecture Notes in Math. 1200, Springer, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-38822-7
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A Dual Approach to Solving Nonlinear Programming Problems by Unconstrained Optimization 1: Approximate Minimizers of L_r(·, yᵏ) along a Bounded Maximizing Dual Sequence Are Asymptotically MinimizingResearch Paper

Motivation

Constrained convex programs are routinely solved by turning them into a sequence of unconstrained problems. The classical route is the ordinary Lagrangian L0(x,y)=f0(x)+∑iyifi(x)L_0(x, y) = f_0(x) + \sum_i y_i f_i(x)L0​(x,y)=f0​(x)+∑i​yi​fi​(x), whose dual function g0g_0g0​ is in general nonsmooth and equal to −∞-\infty−∞ off the orthant y≥0y \ge 0y≥0, so maximizing it requires a constrained, nonsmooth method. In 1969 Hestenes (JOTA 4, 1969) and Powell (in Optimization, ed. Fletcher, Academic Press, 1969) proposed the method of multipliers for equality constraints, which adds a quadratic penalty to the Lagrangian. Rockafellar's paper (Math. Programming 5, 1973) gives the inequality-constrained version, the penalty Lagrangian LrL_rLr​, and shows that for convex programs its dual is a smooth, unconstrained, concave maximization problem with the same solutions and value as the ordinary dual. The method of multipliers built on this Lagrangian, now called the augmented Lagrangian method, underlies ADMM and many large-scale solvers.

Timeline. Hestenes and Powell (1969): multiplier method for equality constraints. Rockafellar (1973, this paper; and JOTA 12, 1973): the inequality-constrained penalty Lagrangian, its duality theory, and convergence of the multiplier method for convex programs. Rockafellar (Math. Oper. Res. 1, 1976): the method of multipliers identified as the proximal point algorithm applied to the dual. Bertsekas (Constrained Optimization and Lagrange Multiplier Methods, 1982): the general nonconvex theory.

This mission covers the first half of the paper: the duality theory of LrL_rLr​ (§3) and the theorem that maximizing the penalty dual yields asymptotically optimal primal sequences (§4, Theorem 4.1).

Setting

Let XXX be a nonempty convex subset of a real vector space EEE and f0,f1,…,fmf_0, f_1, \dots, f_mf0​,f1​,…,fm​ convex real functions on XXX. The problem is

(P)minimize f0(x) over x∈X subject to fi(x)≤0, i=1,…,m.\text{(P)}\qquad \text{minimize } f_0(x) \text{ over } x \in X \text{ subject to } f_i(x) \le 0,\ i = 1, \dots, m.(P)minimize f0​(x) over x∈X subject to fi​(x)≤0, i=1,…,m.

Multipliers yyy range over Rm\mathbb R^mRm, with Euclidean norm ∣⋅∣|\cdot|∣⋅∣ and inner product u⋅yu \cdot yu⋅y. With θ(t)=max⁡{0,t}\theta(t) = \max\{0, t\}θ(t)=max{0,t} and a parameter r>0r > 0r>0, the penalty Lagrangian is

Lr(x,y)=f0(x)+14r∑i=1m[θ(yi+2rfi(x))2−yi2],L_r(x, y) = f_0(x) + \frac{1}{4r} \sum_{i=1}^m \big[\theta(y_i + 2 r f_i(x))^2 - y_i^2\big],Lr​(x,y)=f0​(x)+4r1​i=1∑m​[θ(yi​+2rfi​(x))2−yi2​],

defined for all y∈Rmy \in \mathbb R^my∈Rm with no sign restriction. The dual function is gr(y)=inf⁡x∈XLr(x,y)g_r(y) = \inf_{x \in X} L_r(x, y)gr​(y)=infx∈X​Lr​(x,y), and the dual problem (Dr)(D_r)(Dr​) maximizes grg_rgr​ over Rm\mathbb R^mRm; g0g_0g0​ and (D0)(D_0)(D0​) are the same with L0L_0L0​, and sup⁡g0\sup g_0supg0​ is the dual optimal value. In Lean these objects are Lr, L0, gr, g0, dualValue, and Fr is the perturbed objective Fr(x,u)=f0(x)+r∣u∣2F_r(x, u) = f_0(x) + r|u|^2Fr​(x,u)=f0​(x)+r∣u∣2 if u≥f(x)u \ge f(x)u≥f(x), +∞+\infty+∞ otherwise.

A sequence {xk}\{x^k\}{xk} in XXX is asymptotically feasible if lim sup⁡kfi(xk)≤0\limsup_k f_i(x^k) \le 0limsupk​fi​(xk)≤0 for every iii. The asymptotic optimal value (asympValue) is the infimum of lim sup⁡kf0(xk)\limsup_k f_0(x^k)limsupk​f0​(xk) over asymptotically feasible sequences, and a sequence attaining it is asymptotically minimizing (IsAsympMinimizing). A maximizing sequence for (Dr)(D_r)(Dr​) is a sequence {yk}\{y^k\}{yk} with gr(yk)→sup⁡grg_r(y^k) \to \sup g_rgr​(yk)→supgr​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.1

Suppose the asymptotic optimal value in (P) is finite, r>0r > 0r>0, {yk}\{y^k\}{yk} is a bounded maximizing sequence for (Dr)(D_r)(Dr​), and xk∈Xx^k \in Xxk∈X satisfies

Lr(xk,yk)−gr(yk)≤αk,αk→0.L_r(x^k, y^k) - g_r(y^k) \le \alpha_k, \qquad \alpha_k \to 0.Lr​(xk,yk)−gr​(yk)≤αk​,αk​→0.

Then {xk}\{x^k\}{xk} is asymptotically minimizing for (P).

Milestones

  1. Theorem 3.1: Lr(x,y)=min⁡u{Fr(x,u)+u⋅y}L_r(x, y) = \min_u \{F_r(x, u) + u \cdot y\}Lr​(x,y)=minu​{Fr​(x,u)+u⋅y}; LrL_rLr​ is convex in xxx and concave in yyy.
  2. Theorem 3.2: gr(y)=max⁡z{g0(z)−14r∣z−y∣2}g_r(y) = \max_z \{g_0(z) - \frac{1}{4r}|z - y|^2\}gr​(y)=maxz​{g0​(z)−4r1​∣z−y∣2}; (Dr)(D_r)(Dr​) and (D0)(D_0)(D0​) have the same supremum and optimal solutions; if g0≢−∞g_0 \not\equiv -\inftyg0​≡−∞, grg_rgr​ is finite and C1C^1C1 with ∂gr/∂yi=max⁡{−yi/2r,fi(x)}\partial g_r/\partial y_i = \max\{-y_i/2r, f_i(x)\}∂gr​/∂yi​=max{−yi​/2r,fi​(x)} at any xxx attaining gr(y)g_r(y)gr​(y).
  3. Corollary 3.3: gr(y)+(y′−y)⋅∇gr(y)≥gr(y′)≥gr(y)+(y′−y)⋅∇gr(y)−14r∣y′−y∣2g_r(y) + (y' - y)\cdot\nabla g_r(y) \ge g_r(y') \ge g_r(y) + (y'-y)\cdot\nabla g_r(y) - \frac{1}{4r}|y'-y|^2gr​(y)+(y′−y)⋅∇gr​(y)≥gr​(y′)≥gr​(y)+(y′−y)⋅∇gr​(y)−4r1​∣y′−y∣2.
  4. §4 (p. 364): the asymptotic optimal value equals the dual optimal value when the latter is not −∞-\infty−∞ or asymptotically feasible sequences exist.
  5. Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3: r∣∇gr(y)∣2≤sup⁡gr−gr(y)r|\nabla g_r(y)|^2 \le \sup g_r - g_r(y)r∣∇gr​(y)∣2≤supgr​−gr​(y), and r∣∇yLr(x,y)−∇gr(y)∣2≤αr|\nabla_y L_r(x, y) - \nabla g_r(y)|^2 \le \alphar∣∇y​Lr​(x,y)−∇gr​(y)∣2≤α under (4.7).
  6. (4.9)–(4.11): u↦F0(x,u)+u⋅y+r∣u∣2u \mapsto F_0(x, u) + u \cdot y + r|u|^2u↦F0​(x,u)+u⋅y+r∣u∣2 has the unique minimizer ∇yLr(x,y)\nabla_y L_r(x, y)∇y​Lr​(x,y).

Significance

Theorem 4.1 says that any procedure that drives the smooth, unconstrained dual grg_rgr​ to its supremum, while computing Lr(⋅,yk)L_r(\cdot, y^k)Lr​(⋅,yk)-minimizers only approximately, produces an asymptotically optimal primal sequence. It needs no constraint qualification, no existence of a dual or primal optimal solution, and not even feasibility of (P): only that the asymptotic optimal value is finite. Together with Theorem 3.2 it justifies the multiplier method as a dual ascent on a C1C^1C1 concave function with Lipschitz gradient, and it is the starting point of the convergence theory of augmented Lagrangian methods.

None of these statements is formalized on Prove2Me or in Mathlib, which has Lagrangian duality only in special forms and no theory of the penalty Lagrangian or of asymptotic optimal values. The Qi–Sun augmented Lagrangian items on the platform (NonsmoothNewton.AugLagrangian.*) use the (r/2)(r/2)(r/2)-scaled function on Rn\mathbb R^nRn and concern smoothness in (x,y)(x, y)(x,y), not the dual function. The results of this paper are classical and proved; this mission formalizes them.

Difficulty

The obvious argument compares the primal iterates with a saddle point: if yˉ\bar yyˉ​ is a dual optimal solution and (P) is normal, approximate minimizers of Lr(⋅,yˉ)L_r(\cdot, \bar y)Lr​(⋅,yˉ​) are approximately optimal. Theorem 4.1 assumes neither. The function grg_rgr​ need not attain its supremum, (P) need not be normal or even feasible, and there may be no Kuhn–Tucker vector, so there is no saddle point to compare with; the only data are the dual values gr(yk)g_r(y^k)gr​(yk), the boundedness of {yk}\{y^k\}{yk} and the tolerances αk\alpha_kαk​. The difficulty is to obtain primal feasibility and optimality information from dual convergence alone, measured against the asymptotic optimal value rather than the infimum in (P). Every ingredient is extended-real-valued: g0g_0g0​ is −∞-\infty−∞ off the orthant, grg_rgr​ may be identically −∞-\infty−∞, and the asymptotic optimal value may be ±∞\pm\infty±∞. Mathlib does not package this part of convex analysis (partial conjugates, envelopes of extended-real concave functions, the asymptotic duality theorem).

Formalization scope

EEE is a bare real vector space (AddCommGroup E, Module ℝ E) with no topology, as in the paper. The functions fif_ifi​ are total functions E→RE \to \mathbb RE→R assumed convex on XXX; only their values on XXX enter. Constraint indices are Fin m (0-based) and f0f_0f0​ is a separate argument. Multipliers live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin m). The standing assumption of §3 (XXX nonempty convex, all fif_ifi​ convex) is a hypothesis of every theorem.

Explicit choices:

  • grg_rgr​, g0g_0g0​, the dual value, the asymptotic optimal value and every lim sup⁡\limsuplimsup are computed in EReal, so ±∞\pm\infty±∞ are represented and no infimum is replaced by a junk real value.
  • r>0r > 0r>0 is an explicit hypothesis wherever LrL_rLr​ is used; L0L_0L0​ is a separate definition.
  • (4.7) is written Lr(xk,yk)≤gr(yk)+αkL_r(x^k, y^k) \le g_r(y^k) + \alpha_kLr​(xk,yk)≤gr​(yk)+αk​ in EReal, equivalent to the printed difference; only αk→0\alpha_k \to 0αk​→0 is assumed.
  • Concavity or convexity of extended-real functions is stated through convex hypographs and epigraphs; "max" in (3.5) is attainment of the greatest value.
  • Gradients are taken of the real coercion of grg_rgr​, and only under hypotheses that make grg_rgr​ finite.
  • Dual optimal solutions do not exist when gr≡−∞g_r \equiv -\inftygr​≡−∞ (the paper's convention, p. 361).
  • Lemmas 4.2, 4.3 and (4.9)–(4.11) are stated for one point rather than along a sequence; the paper's statements are their instances.
  • Misprints: "concave in y∈Yy \in Yy∈Y" (Theorem 3.1) reads Rm\mathbb R^mRm; the lost minus sign in Lemma 4.2 is restored.

The goal must not be replaced by "f0(xk)→inf⁡(P)f_0(x^k) \to \inf\text{(P)}f0​(xk)→inf(P) and lim sup⁡fi(xk)≤0\limsup f_i(x^k) \le 0limsupfi​(xk)≤0": that is the special case of normal problems with feasible solutions. Nor may it assume a Slater point, a Kuhn–Tucker vector, or feasibility of (P), each of which makes it a special case.

A complete development needs extended-real convex analysis on Rm\mathbb R^mRm (partial conjugates, Moreau envelopes of concave functions, the asymptotic duality theorem), which is reusable beyond this mission. Contributions proving any milestone, or general lemmas on Moreau envelopes of extended-real concave functions, are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. T. Rockafellar, A dual approach to solving nonlinear programming problems by unconstrained optimization, Mathematical Programming 5 (1973) 354–373. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01580138
  • M. R. Hestenes, Multiplier and gradient methods, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 4 (1969) 303–320. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00927673
  • M. J. D. Powell, A method for nonlinear constraints in minimization problems, in R. Fletcher (ed.), Optimization, Academic Press, 1969, 283–298.
  • R. T. Rockafellar, The multiplier method of Hestenes and Powell applied to convex programming, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 12 (1973) 555–562. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00934777
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Augmented Lagrangians and applications of the proximal point algorithm in convex programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 1 (1976) 97–116. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1.2.97
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1970. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873173
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Constrained Optimization and Lagrange Multiplier Methods, Academic Press, 1982.
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AnalysisCombinatoricsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Concentration of Measure and Isoperimetric Inequalities in Product Spaces I: Control by One Point — ∫ e^{t f(A,x)} dP ≤ P(A)^{−α} exp(Nt²(1+1/α)/8) for the Hamming Distance to ATextbook

Motivation

Concentration of measure is the observation that, on a high-dimensional product probability space, any set that is not too small already contains most of the space within a small neighbourhood. For functions of many independent random variables this yields Gaussian-type tail bounds without any explicit computation of the distribution, and these bounds are the working tool behind the analysis of random combinatorial optimisation problems (bin packing, the travelling salesman problem, the longest increasing subsequence, the assignment problem), random graphs, and empirical processes.

M. Talagrand's 1995 memoir Talagrand 1995 develops a family of such inequalities that hold on an arbitrary product of probability spaces and are proved by induction on the number of coordinates. Chapter 2 opens with the simplest instance, control by one point: the distance from xxx to a set AAA is measured by the number of coordinates in which xxx differs from the best single point y∈Ay \in Ay∈A. The method of this chapter is the template for every later chapter of the memoir.

Timeline. Bounds of the form (2.2.7) for the Hamming distance were first obtained with martingale (bounded differences) methods, collected in McDiarmid's survey McDiarmid 1989. Talagrand's 1995 memoir gives the induction proof reproduced here, with exponent −2N(k−N2log⁡1P(A))2-\tfrac2N(k-\sqrt{\tfrac N2\log\tfrac1{P(A)}})^2−N2​(k−2N​logP(A)1​​)2, which the paper notes is exactly the best bound obtained by martingales. Earlier, the isoperimetric inequality on the discrete cube (Harper, 1966) settles the case of the uniform measure on {0,1}N\{0,1\}^N{0,1}N.

Setting

Let (Ω,Σ,μ)(\Omega,\Sigma,\mu)(Ω,Σ,μ) be a probability space and N≥0N \ge 0N≥0 an integer. Points of the product ΩN\Omega^NΩN are written x=(x1,…,xN)x=(x_1,\dots,x_N)x=(x1​,…,xN​), and P=μNP=\mu^NP=μN denotes the product probability. For a set A⊆ΩNA \subseteq \Omega^NA⊆ΩN and a point xxx, the Hamming distance to AAA is

f(A,x)=min⁡{card⁡{i≤N: xi≠yi} : y∈A},f(A,x)=\min\big\{\operatorname{card}\{i\le N:\ x_i\ne y_i\}\ :\ y\in A\big\},f(A,x)=min{card{i≤N: xi​=yi​} : y∈A},

the least number of coordinates that must be changed to move xxx into AAA; it is +∞+\infty+∞ when AAA is empty. Given positive weights (ai)i≤N(a_i)_{i\le N}(ai​)i≤N​, the weighted Hamming distance replaces the count by ∑{ai:xi≠yi}\sum\{a_i: x_i\neq y_i\}∑{ai​:xi​=yi​}.

Two families of constants appear. The first is

a(t)=12+et+e−t4,a(t)=\frac12+\frac{e^t+e^{-t}}4 ,a(t)=21​+4et+e−t​,

and the second, for α>0\alpha>0α>0 and t>0t>0t>0,

a(α,t)=αα(α+1)α+1 (et−e−t/α)1+α(1−e−t/α)(et−1)α,a(\alpha,t)=\frac{\alpha^{\alpha}}{(\alpha+1)^{\alpha+1}}\,\frac{(e^t-e^{-t/\alpha})^{1+\alpha}}{(1-e^{-t/\alpha})(e^t-1)^{\alpha}},a(α,t)=(α+1)α+1αα​(1−e−t/α)(et−1)α(et−e−t/α)1+α​,

extended by its limit a(α,0)=1a(\alpha,0)=1a(α,0)=1; one checks a(1,t)=a(t)a(1,t)=a(t)a(1,t)=a(t).

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 2.2.3

For every measurable A⊆ΩNA\subseteq\Omega^NA⊆ΩN, every α>0\alpha>0α>0 and every t≥0t\ge0t≥0,

∫etf(A,x) dP(x) ≤ 1P(A)αexp⁡(Nt28(1+1α)),(2.2.6)\int e^{t f(A,x)}\,dP(x)\ \le\ \frac{1}{P(A)^{\alpha}}\exp\Big(N\frac{t^2}{8}\Big(1+\frac1\alpha\Big)\Big), \tag{2.2.6}∫etf(A,x)dP(x) ≤ P(A)α1​exp(N8t2​(1+α1​)),(2.2.6)

and, when P(A)>0P(A)>0P(A)>0, for every k≥N2log⁡1P(A)k\ge\sqrt{\tfrac N2\log\tfrac1{P(A)}}k≥2N​logP(A)1​​,

P({f(A,⋅)≥k}) ≤ exp⁡(−2N(k−N2log⁡1P(A))2).(2.2.7)P\big(\{f(A,\cdot)\ge k\}\big)\ \le\ \exp\Big(-\frac2N\Big(k-\sqrt{\tfrac N2\log\tfrac1{P(A)}}\Big)^2\Big). \tag{2.2.7}P({f(A,⋅)≥k}) ≤ exp(−N2​(k−2N​logP(A)1​​)2).(2.2.7)

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Lemma 2.1.2 — for measurable 0≤g≤10\le g\le10≤g≤1 on Ω\OmegaΩ: ∫min⁡(et,1/g) dμ∫g dμ≤a(t)\int\min(e^t,1/g)\,d\mu\int g\,d\mu\le a(t)∫min(et,1/g)dμ∫gdμ≤a(t).
  2. Proposition 2.1.1 — ∫etf(A,x)dP≤a(t)N/P(A)≤et2N/4/P(A)\int e^{tf(A,x)}dP\le a(t)^N/P(A)\le e^{t^2N/4}/P(A)∫etf(A,x)dP≤a(t)N/P(A)≤et2N/4/P(A) for t>0t>0t>0, and P(f(A,⋅)≥k)≤e−k2/N/P(A)P(f(A,\cdot)\ge k)\le e^{-k^2/N}/P(A)P(f(A,⋅)≥k)≤e−k2/N/P(A).
  3. Remark 2.1.3 — the same with the weighted Hamming distance and ∑ai2\sum a_i^2∑ai2​ in place of NNN.
  4. Eq. (2.2.3) — a(α,t)=sup⁡0≤u≤1(1+u(et−1))(1−u(1−e−t/α))αa(\alpha,t)=\sup_{0\le u\le1}(1+u(e^t-1))(1-u(1-e^{-t/\alpha}))^{\alpha}a(α,t)=sup0≤u≤1​(1+u(et−1))(1−u(1−e−t/α))α.
  5. Proposition 2.2.1 — ∫etf(A,x)dP≤a(α,t)N/P(A)α\int e^{tf(A,x)}dP\le a(\alpha,t)^N/P(A)^{\alpha}∫etf(A,x)dP≤a(α,t)N/P(A)α for t≥0t\ge0t≥0.
  6. Lemma 2.2.2 — a(α,t)≤exp⁡t28(1+1α)a(\alpha,t)\le\exp\frac{t^2}8(1+\frac1\alpha)a(α,t)≤exp8t2​(1+α1​).

The goal is the weakest statement of the section that is stated with fully explicit, closed-form constants; the milestones are the steps the paper's proof passes through.

Significance

The result. Inequality (2.2.7) shows that if P(A)P(A)P(A) is bounded below, the set of points at Hamming distance at least N/2⋅log⁡(1/P(A))+s\sqrt{N/2\cdot\log(1/P(A))}+sN/2⋅log(1/P(A))​+s from AAA has probability at most e−2s2/Ne^{-2s^2/N}e−2s2/N, with no assumption on Ω\OmegaΩ or μ\muμ. Applied to A={F≤M}A=\{F\le M\}A={F≤M} for a function FFF that changes by at most one when a coordinate changes, it gives concentration of FFF around its median at scale N\sqrt NN​. The exponential moment bound (2.2.6) is the form that composes with other estimates, and the free parameter α\alphaα is what makes the constant 2/N2/N2/N in (2.2.7) attainable rather than 1/N1/N1/N as in (2.1.3).

Formalizing it. The results are classical and fully proved in the paper; they are not available in Mathlib, and no machine-checked proof of them is known. A formalization supplies the one-coordinate inequalities (Lemma 2.1.2 and its α\alphaα-version) and the induction over ΩN+1=ΩN×Ω\Omega^{N+1}=\Omega^N\times\OmegaΩN+1=ΩN×Ω as reusable components: every later chapter of the memoir (two-point space, penalties, qqq points, convex hull distance) follows the same induction with a different one-coordinate lemma.

Difficulty

The bound does not follow from a union bound or from independence of coordinates, because f(A,⋅)f(A,\cdot)f(A,⋅) depends on all coordinates jointly through an arbitrary set AAA: changing one coordinate of xxx changes f(A,x)f(A,x)f(A,x) by at most one, but which point of AAA is nearest can change completely. A naive coordinate-by-coordinate estimate loses either the dependence on P(A)P(A)P(A) or a constant factor in the exponent, and the constant 2/N2/N2/N in (2.2.7) is the sharp one, so no slack is available. The one-dimensional inequalities (Lemma 2.1.2 and its α\alphaα-version) are extremal problems over all measurable functions 0≤g≤10\le g\le10≤g≤1 rather than over numbers, and Lemma 2.2.2 is a two-parameter inequality in which the closed form (2.2.2) is not convenient. On the measure-theoretic side, all integrands take values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] and f(A,⋅)f(A,\cdot)f(A,⋅) need not be measurable in general.

Formalization scope

  • Space. (Ω,Σ,μ)(\Omega,\Sigma,\mu)(Ω,Σ,μ) is an arbitrary measurable space with a probability measure; ΩN\Omega^NΩN is Fin N → Ω (0-based coordinates) and PPP is Measure.pi (fun _ => μ). Ω\OmegaΩ is never restricted to a finite or countable set.
  • Measurability. The paper ignores measurability and states Proposition 2.1.1 with an upper integral and outer probability. Here AAA carries MeasurableSet A and the map x↦f(A,x)x\mapsto f(A,x)x↦f(A,x) carries an explicit Measurable hypothesis; probabilities of arbitrary sets are Mathlib's outer measure.
  • Values. Distances are in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] (ℝ≥0∞), so f(∅,x)=+∞f(\emptyset,x)=+\inftyf(∅,x)=+∞; integrals are lower Lebesgue integrals ∫⁻ in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; etze^{tz}etz is EReal.exp; P(A)−1P(A)^{-1}P(A)−1 and P(A)−αP(A)^{-\alpha}P(A)−α are computed in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], so P(A)=0P(A)=0P(A)=0 makes the right-hand sides +∞+\infty+∞.
  • Constants. a(α,t)a(\alpha,t)a(α,t) is formula (2.2.2) for t≠0t\ne0t=0 and 111 at t=0t=0t=0. Every constant (1/41/41/4, 1/81/81/8, 2/N2/N2/N) is the paper's.
  • Ruled out. Defining fff through a real infimum (whose junk value on ∅\emptyset∅ is 000), or letting a(α,0)=0/0=0a(\alpha,0)=0/0=0a(α,0)=0/0=0, would make several statements false or trivial; neither is done.

Needed infrastructure: Fubini/Tonelli for Measure.pi split as ΩN×Ω\Omega^N\times\OmegaΩN×Ω, Chebyshev–Markov for ∫⁻, and one-variable calculus for (2.2.3)–(2.2.5). The one-coordinate lemmas and the induction scheme are reusable in the later missions of this series. Proofs of individual milestones and alternative proofs (for example via martingales for (2.2.7)) are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. Talagrand, Concentration of measure and isoperimetric inequalities in product spaces, Publ. Math. IHÉS 81 (1995), 73–205. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02699376
  • C. McDiarmid, On the method of bounded differences, Surveys in Combinatorics, LMS Lecture Note Ser. 141 (1989), 148–188. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107359949.008
  • L. H. Harper, Optimal numberings and isoperimetric problems on graphs, J. Combin. Theory 1 (1966), 385–393. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0021-9800(66)80059-5
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CombinatoricsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Concentration of Measure and Isoperimetric Inequalities in Product Spaces IV: Control by q Points — ∫ q^{f(A_1,…,A_q,x)} dP ≤ 1/∏ P(A_i)Textbook

Motivation

A recurring phenomenon in probability is concentration of measure: on a product of many probability spaces, a set of non-negligible measure has a neighbourhood that carries almost all of the mass. M. Talagrand's 1995 memoir Concentration of measure and isoperimetric inequalities in product spaces developed a systematic method — induction over the number of coordinates — that yields such statements for several different ways of measuring "how far" a point is from a set. These inequalities underlie sharp tail bounds for combinatorial optimization problems (bin packing, travelling salesman, longest increasing subsequence), for empirical processes, and for spin glasses, and Part II of the memoir develops several of these applications.

This mission formalizes Section 3 of the memoir, Control by q points. In Section 2 the distance from a point xxx to a set AAA counts the coordinates of xxx that a single point of AAA fails to reproduce (the Hamming distance). Section 3 lets several points cooperate: a coordinate of xxx is captured if any one of qqq chosen points agrees with xxx there. The memoir's introduction (p. 79) presents Theorem 3.1.1 as a much simpler substitute for the isoperimetric inequality of Talagrand's earlier work on sums of independent Banach-space valued random variables (Talagrand, Ann. Probab. 17 (1989), 1546–1570), whose phenomenon "had a major impact in Probability in Banach spaces"; Chapter 13 of the memoir applies it to tails of such sums.

Setting

Let (Ω,μ)(\Omega,\mu)(Ω,μ) be a probability space, N≥0N\ge0N≥0 an integer, and P=μ⊗NP=\mu^{\otimes N}P=μ⊗N the product probability on ΩN\Omega^NΩN. Fix an integer q≥2q\ge2q≥2; this is a standing assumption throughout the section. For x∈ΩNx\in\Omega^Nx∈ΩN and points y1,…,yq∈ΩNy^1,\dots,y^q\in\Omega^Ny1,…,yq∈ΩN, coordinate iii of xxx is captured if xi∈{yi1,…,yiq}x_i\in\{y^1_i,\dots,y^q_i\}xi​∈{yi1​,…,yiq​}. For subsets A1,…,Aq⊆ΩNA_1,\dots,A_q\subseteq\Omega^NA1​,…,Aq​⊆ΩN the qqq-point control is

f(A1,…,Aq,x)=inf⁡{#{i≤N:xi∉{yi1,…,yiq}}; y1∈A1,…,yq∈Aq}(3.1.1),f(A_1,\dots,A_q,x)=\inf\big\{\#\{i\le N: x_i\notin\{y^1_i,\dots,y^q_i\}\};\ y^1\in A_1,\dots,y^q\in A_q\big\}\qquad(3.1.1),f(A1​,…,Aq​,x)=inf{#{i≤N:xi​∈/{yi1​,…,yiq​}}; y1∈A1​,…,yq∈Aq​}(3.1.1),

the least number of coordinates of xxx that remain uncaptured when one point is chosen in each AjA_jAj​. It is a whole number between 000 and NNN, or +∞+\infty+∞ when some AjA_jAj​ is empty.

For the sharpening of Section 3.2, given α>1\alpha>1α>1, the number a(q,α)a(q,\alpha)a(q,α) is the unique x>1x>1x>1 with

x+qα x−1/α=1+qα(3.2.2).x+q\alpha\,x^{-1/\alpha}=1+q\alpha\qquad(3.2.2).x+qαx−1/α=1+qα(3.2.2).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1.1

For all subsets A1,…,AqA_1,\dots,A_qA1​,…,Aq​ of ΩN\Omega^NΩN,

∫qf(A1,…,Aq,x) dP(x)≤1∏i≤qP(Ai)(3.1.2),\int q^{f(A_1,\dots,A_q,x)}\,dP(x)\le\frac{1}{\prod_{i\le q}P(A_i)}\qquad(3.1.2),∫qf(A1​,…,Aq​,x)dP(x)≤∏i≤q​P(Ai​)1​(3.1.2),

and in particular, for A⊆ΩNA\subseteq\Omega^NA⊆ΩN and k≥0k\ge0k≥0,

P({f(A,…,A,x)≥k})≤1qk P(A)q(3.1.3).P(\{f(A,\dots,A,x)\ge k\})\le\frac{1}{q^k\,P(A)^q}\qquad(3.1.3).P({f(A,…,A,x)≥k})≤qkP(A)q1​(3.1.3).

The constant is exact: the base of the exponential moment is qqq itself, and the dimension NNN does not appear.

Milestones on the way

  1. Lemma 3.1.2: for 1/q≤g≤11/q\le g\le11/q≤g≤1, ∫g−1 dμ (∫g dμ)q≤1\int g^{-1}\,d\mu\,(\int g\,d\mu)^q\le1∫g−1dμ(∫gdμ)q≤1.
  2. Corollary 3.1.3: for 0≤gi≤10\le g_i\le10≤gi​≤1, ∫min⁡i≤q(q,1/gi) dμ∏i≤q∫gi dμ≤1\int\min_{i\le q}(q,1/g_i)\,d\mu\prod_{i\le q}\int g_i\,d\mu\le1∫mini≤q​(q,1/gi​)dμ∏i≤q​∫gi​dμ≤1.
  3. Eq. (3.1.6): the two pointwise comparisons between fff on ΩN+1\Omega^{N+1}ΩN+1 and fff on ΩN\Omega^NΩN for sections and projections of the sets.

Sharpening (Section 3.2)

  1. Eq. (3.2.2): a(q,α)a(q,\alpha)a(q,α) is well defined.
  2. Eq. (3.2.1): ∫a(q,α)f(A1,…,Aq,x) dP(x)≤1/∏i≤qP(Ai)α\int a(q,\alpha)^{f(A_1,\dots,A_q,x)}\,dP(x)\le1/\prod_{i\le q}P(A_i)^\alpha∫a(q,α)f(A1​,…,Aq​,x)dP(x)≤1/∏i≤q​P(Ai​)α for α>1\alpha>1α>1.
  3. Proposition 3.2.1: there is a universal q0q_0q0​ such that for q≥q0q\ge q_0q≥q0​
P({f(A,…,A,x)≥k})≤(e(e−1) qlog⁡q)k(1P(A))qlog⁡q.P(\{f(A,\dots,A,x)\ge k\})\le\Big(\frac{e}{(e-1)\,q\log q}\Big)^k\Big(\frac1{P(A)}\Big)^{q\log q}.P({f(A,…,A,x)≥k})≤((e−1)qlogqe​)k(P(A)1​)qlogq.

Significance

Theorem 3.1.1 gives an exponential tail for f(A,…,A,x)f(A,\dots,A,x)f(A,…,A,x) whose rate q−kq^{-k}q−k is independent of the dimension NNN and of the space Ω\OmegaΩ. Applied with a set AAA of probability at least 1/21/21/2, it says that outside an event of probability 2qq−k2^q q^{-k}2qq−k a random point agrees, on all but kkk coordinates, with one of qqq points of AAA. This is the form in which the memoir (Chapter 13) bounds the tail of ∥∑i≤NXi∥\|\sum_{i\le N}X_i\|∥∑i≤N​Xi​∥ for independent Banach-space valued XiX_iXi​: taking A={∥∑ixi∥≤a}A=\{\|\sum_i x_i\|\le a\}A={∥∑i​xi​∥≤a}, on most of the space the sum is controlled by qqq points of AAA up to the kkk largest terms. Proposition 3.2.1 shows the base can be improved from qqq to order qlog⁡qq\log qqlogq for large qqq, and the memoir's example on Ω={0,1}\Omega=\{0,1\}Ω={0,1} shows that this is sharp up to a universal constant in the base.

None of these results has a machine-checked proof. A formalization produces reusable Lean infrastructure for the induction method on product measures (sections and projections of subsets of ΩN+1\Omega^{N+1}ΩN+1, Fubini on Measure.pi, one-coordinate functional inequalities) that the other chapters of the memoir — the Hamming distance of Section 2, penalties of Section 3.3, the convex hull distance of Section 4 — share.

Difficulty

The inequality cannot be obtained by a union bound over choices of qqq points or by a coordinate-wise martingale argument with bounded differences: both lose a factor depending on NNN, while (3.1.2) has none. The induction on NNN needs a functional inequality on one coordinate that holds uniformly over qqq functions at once, with the exact constant qqq, and the induction step has to pass through the projections BiB_iBi​ of the sets — which, for measurable AiA_iAi​, need not be measurable. The exact constant e/((e−1)qlog⁡q)e/((e-1)q\log q)e/((e−1)qlogq) in Proposition 3.2.1 additionally requires quantitative control of the root of (3.2.2) as q→∞q\to\inftyq→∞.

Formalization scope

  • ΩN\Omega^NΩN is Fin N → Ω (coordinates 0,…,N−10,\dots,N-10,…,N−1), PPP is Measure.pi (fun _ => μ) with [IsProbabilityMeasure μ], and (x,ω)∈ΩN+1(x,\omega)\in\Omega^{N+1}(x,ω)∈ΩN+1 is Fin.snoc x ω.
  • fff is computed as an infimum in ℕ∞, so an empty AjA_jAj​ gives +∞+\infty+∞, not 000; q+∞=+∞q^{+\infty}=+\inftyq+∞=+∞; integrals are ∫⁻ and probabilities are in ℝ≥0∞, where 1/0=+∞1/0=+\infty1/0=+∞. Hence the degenerate case P(Ai)=0P(A_i)=0P(Ai​)=0 makes the right sides infinite and cannot trivialize any statement.
  • The memoir ignores measurability and prints (3.2.1) with an upper integral. The formal statements take the sets measurable and assume x↦f(A1,…,Aq,x)x\mapsto f(A_1,\dots,A_q,x)x↦f(A1​,…,Aq​,x) measurable, which is the memoir's stated convention (Section 2.1).
  • q≥2q\ge2q≥2 is a hypothesis of every statement; in Proposition 3.2.1 the constant q0q_0q0​ is quantified before every other object, so it is universal.
  • a(q,α)a(q,\alpha)a(q,α) is defined as sup⁡{x>1:x+qαx−1/α≤1+qα}\sup\{x>1: x+q\alpha x^{-1/\alpha}\le1+q\alpha\}sup{x>1:x+qαx−1/α≤1+qα}; that this is the unique root is a milestone, not an assumption.

A complete development needs the induction step over Measure.pi on Fin (N+1) (splitting off the last coordinate), measurability of sections, and the one-coordinate inequalities. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are alternative proofs of the goal.

Selected references

  • M. Talagrand, Concentration of measure and isoperimetric inequalities in product spaces, Publications Mathématiques de l'IHÉS 81 (1995), 73–205. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02699376
  • M. Talagrand, A new look at independence, Annals of Probability 24 (1996), 1–34. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1042644705
  • M. Talagrand, Isoperimetry and integrability of the sum of independent Banach-space valued random variables, Annals of Probability 17 (1989), 1546–1570 (reference [T2] of the memoir).
  • M. Ledoux, The Concentration of Measure Phenomenon, Mathematical Surveys and Monographs 89, AMS, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1090/surv/089
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AnalysisProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Concentration of Measure and Isoperimetric Inequalities in Product Spaces III: Penalties — Exponential Moments of the Penalized Distance f_h(A, x)Textbook

Motivation

Concentration of measure in a product space ΩN\Omega^NΩN asks how much of the space lies close to a set AAA of non-negligible probability. In the simplest setting closeness is the Hamming distance: the number of coordinates of xxx that cannot be matched by a point of AAA. Talagrand's 1995 memoir in Publications Mathématiques de l'IHÉS develops a family of such inequalities with one method, induction over the number of coordinates, and applies them to combinatorial optimization, random graphs, spin glasses and sums of Banach-space-valued random vectors.

Counting a missed coordinate as 111 ignores how far apart the two coordinate values are. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 of the memoir replace the unit cost by a penalty h(xi,yi)h(x_i, y_i)h(xi​,yi​) that depends on the values being matched. The resulting bounds have the shape of Bernstein's inequality: a Gaussian tail for moderate deviations, governed by the L2L^2L2 size of the penalty, and an exponential tail for large ones, governed by its sup norm. Theorem 2.4.1 is used again in Chapter 11 of the memoir, Corollary 2.4.4 in the study of the Sherrington–Kirkpatrick model in Chapter 12, and Theorem 2.5.1 in Section 11.5.

Setting

Let (Ω,μ)(\Omega, \mu)(Ω,μ) be a probability space, N≥0N \ge 0N≥0 an integer, and P=μ⊗NP = \mu^{\otimes N}P=μ⊗N the product probability on ΩN\Omega^NΩN. A penalty is a measurable function h:Ω×Ω→[0,∞)h : \Omega \times \Omega \to [0, \infty)h:Ω×Ω→[0,∞) with h(ω,ω)=0h(\omega, \omega) = 0h(ω,ω)=0 for every ω\omegaω (the paper's standing assumption (2.4.2)). For A⊆ΩNA \subseteq \Omega^NA⊆ΩN and x∈ΩNx \in \Omega^Nx∈ΩN the penalized distance is

fh(A,x)=inf⁡{∑i≤Nh(xi,yi) 1{xi≠yi}  ;  y∈A},f_h(A, x) = \inf\Big\{ \sum_{i \le N} h(x_i, y_i)\,\mathbf 1_{\{x_i \ne y_i\}} \;;\; y \in A \Big\},fh​(A,x)=inf{i≤N∑​h(xi​,yi​)1{xi​=yi​}​;y∈A},

with fh(∅,x)=+∞f_h(\emptyset, x) = +\inftyfh​(∅,x)=+∞. For h=1h = 1h=1 off the diagonal this is the Hamming distance. Theorem 2.4.1 also uses the symmetrized penalty v(ω,ω′)=max⁡(h(ω,ω′),h(ω′,ω))v(\omega, \omega') = \max(h(\omega, \omega'), h(\omega', \omega))v(ω,ω′)=max(h(ω,ω′),h(ω′,ω)).

Section 2.5 measures the penalty against sets: for B⊆ΩB \subseteq \OmegaB⊆Ω,

h(ω,B)=inf⁡{h(ω,ω′)  ;  ω′∈B},h(\omega, B) = \inf\{ h(\omega, \omega') \;;\; \omega' \in B \},h(ω,B)=inf{h(ω,ω′);ω′∈B},

the infimum being over the second variable, as in fhf_hfh​. The one-coordinate steps of the two inductions use the transforms g^(x)=inf⁡y(g(y)+t h(x,y))\hat g(x) = \inf_{y}(g(y) + t\,h(x,y))g^​(x)=infy​(g(y)+th(x,y)) (2.4.5) and g^(x)=inf⁡s>0s+t h(x,Bs)\hat g(x) = \inf_{s>0} s + t\,h(x, B_s)g^​(x)=infs>0​s+th(x,Bs​) with Bs={g≤s}B_s = \{g \le s\}Bs​={g≤s} (2.5.7), for a function g≥0g \ge 0g≥0 on Ω\OmegaΩ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.4.1

For each measurable A⊆ΩNA \subseteq \Omega^NA⊆ΩN and each t>0t > 0t>0 with ∬exp⁡th(x,y) dμ(x) dμ(y)<∞\iint \exp t h(x,y)\, d\mu(x)\, d\mu(y) < \infty∬expth(x,y)dμ(x)dμ(y)<∞,

∫ΩNetfh(A,x) dP(x)≤1P(A)(12∫Ω2(etv(ω,ω′)+e−tv(ω,ω′)) dμ(ω) dμ(ω′))N.\int_{\Omega^N} e^{t f_h(A,x)}\, dP(x) \le \frac{1}{P(A)} \Big( \frac12 \int_{\Omega^2} \big(e^{t v(\omega,\omega')} + e^{-t v(\omega,\omega')}\big)\, d\mu(\omega)\, d\mu(\omega') \Big)^N.∫ΩN​etfh​(A,x)dP(x)≤P(A)1​(21​∫Ω2​(etv(ω,ω′)+e−tv(ω,ω′))dμ(ω)dμ(ω′))N.

It is the most general exponential-moment bound of the section; every tail bound of Section 2.4 is derived from it.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 2.4.2, the one-coordinate inequality ∫eg^ dμ∫e−g dμ≤12∬(etv+e−tv) dμ dμ\int e^{\hat g}\, d\mu \int e^{-g}\, d\mu \le \frac12 \iint (e^{tv} + e^{-tv})\, d\mu\, d\mu∫eg^​dμ∫e−gdμ≤21​∬(etv+e−tv)dμdμ for g≥0g \ge 0g≥0.
  2. Theorem 2.4.3: if ∬eh<∞\iint e^{h} < \infty∬eh<∞, then for 0≤t≤10 \le t \le 10≤t≤1
∫etfh(A,x) dP(x)≤1P(A)exp⁡(Nt2∬(eh+e−h−2) dμ dμ).\int e^{t f_h(A,x)}\, dP(x) \le \frac{1}{P(A)} \exp\Big( N t^2 \iint (e^{h} + e^{-h} - 2)\, d\mu\, d\mu \Big).∫etfh​(A,x)dP(x)≤P(A)1​exp(Nt2∬(eh+e−h−2)dμdμ).
  1. Corollary 2.4.4: if ∬eh≤2\iint e^{h} \le 2∬eh≤2, then P(fh(A,⋅)≥u)≤P(A)−1e−u2/4NP(f_h(A,\cdot) \ge u) \le P(A)^{-1} e^{-u^2/4N}P(fh​(A,⋅)≥u)≤P(A)−1e−u2/4N for 0≤u≤2N0 \le u \le 2N0≤u≤2N.
  2. Corollary 2.4.5: if ∥h∥∞=sup⁡h<∞\|h\|_\infty = \sup h < \infty∥h∥∞​=suph<∞, then
P(fh(A,⋅)≥u)≤1P(A)exp⁡(−min⁡(u28N∥h∥22, u2∥h∥∞)).P(f_h(A,\cdot) \ge u) \le \frac{1}{P(A)} \exp\Big( -\min\Big( \frac{u^2}{8N\|h\|_2^2},\ \frac{u}{2\|h\|_\infty} \Big) \Big).P(fh​(A,⋅)≥u)≤P(A)1​exp(−min(8N∥h∥22​u2​, 2∥h∥∞​u​)).
  1. Proposition 2.5.2, the one-coordinate inequality ∫eg^ dμ∫e−g dμ≤e3t2\int e^{\hat g}\, d\mu \int e^{-g}\, d\mu \le e^{3t^2}∫eg^​dμ∫e−gdμ≤e3t2 for the transform (2.5.7), under condition (2.5.2) below.
  2. Theorem 2.5.1: if ∫Ωexp⁡2h(x,B) dμ(x)≤e/μ(B)\int_\Omega \exp 2h(x, B)\, d\mu(x) \le e/\mu(B)∫Ω​exp2h(x,B)dμ(x)≤e/μ(B) for each B⊆ΩB \subseteq \OmegaB⊆Ω (condition (2.5.2)), then for 0≤t≤10 \le t \le 10≤t≤1
∫etfh(A,x) dP(x)≤e3t2NP(A).\int e^{t f_h(A,x)}\, dP(x) \le \frac{e^{3t^2 N}}{P(A)}.∫etfh​(A,x)dP(x)≤P(A)e3t2N​.

Significance

The results. Theorem 2.4.1 turns a single integrability condition on the penalty into a bound on the exponential moment of the distance to any set, uniform over all sets of a given probability and factorized over coordinates. Chebyshev's inequality then gives the Bernstein-type tails of Corollaries 2.4.4 and 2.4.5, which hold for every set AAA, not only for half-spaces or for sums of independent variables. Theorem 2.5.1 replaces exponential integrability of hhh by condition (2.5.2) on the set functional h(x,B)h(x, B)h(x,B), which is much weaker: when Ω\OmegaΩ is itself a product of mmm spaces, m−1/2m^{-1/2}m−1/2 times the Hamming distance on Ω\OmegaΩ satisfies (2.5.2) but not (2.4.12). Applied to blocks of coordinates, it shows that the coordinates a typical point misses in AAA are concentrated in few blocks.

Formalizing them. All six results are proved in the memoir with short arguments. None of them has a machine-checked proof. A complete development would give a general-alphabet version of Talagrand's induction on product measures, written once for a cost function, that later chapters (the qqq-point control, the convex-hull distance) also rely on.

Difficulty

The induction over NNN requires a one-coordinate inequality whose right-hand side does not depend on the set. The difficulty is that the natural one-coordinate quantity, a section measure P(A(ω))P(A(\omega))P(A(ω)), can vanish on part of Ω\OmegaΩ, so the function g=−log⁡P(A(ω))g = -\log P(A(\omega))g=−logP(A(ω)) takes the value +∞+\infty+∞, and a statement proved for finite ggg must be extended by truncation. The other subtle point is measure theoretic: fh(A,⋅)f_h(A, \cdot)fh​(A,⋅) need not be measurable even when AAA is, and the paper's convention of ignoring measurability has to be matched by explicit hypotheses. In Section 2.5 the integrand x↦h(x,B)x \mapsto h(x, B)x↦h(x,B) in condition (2.5.2) may be non-measurable for the sets the proof uses, and Fubini's theorem is applied to the function (x,y)↦h(x,Bg(y))(x, y) \mapsto h(x, B_{g(y)})(x,y)↦h(x,Bg(y)​).

Formalization scope

Points of ΩN\Omega^NΩN are functions Fin N → Ω (coordinates indexed from 000), PPP is Measure.pi (fun _ => μ) for a probability measure μ, and double integrals are over μ.prod μ. The penalty is a real function h : Ω → Ω → ℝ with explicit hypotheses h≥0h \ge 0h≥0, h(ω,ω)=0h(\omega,\omega) = 0h(ω,ω)=0 and joint measurability, in every statement. The distance fhf_hfh​ is defined by (2.4.1) with the indicator and takes values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], so fh(∅,x)=+∞f_h(\emptyset, x) = +\inftyfh​(∅,x)=+∞; likewise h(ω,B)h(\omega, B)h(ω,B) and the transform (2.5.7). All integrals are Lebesgue integrals of [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued functions, e+∞=+∞e^{+\infty} = +\inftye+∞=+∞, and 1/P(A)=+∞1/P(A) = +\infty1/P(A)=+∞ when P(A)=0P(A) = 0P(A)=0.

Measurability follows the paper's convention (pp. 81–82) as explicit hypotheses: AAA is measurable and x↦fh(A,x)x \mapsto f_h(A, x)x↦fh​(A,x) is measurable; in the propositions, ggg and g^\hat gg^​ are measurable. Condition (2.5.2) is stated for every subset BBB with the upper integral ∫∗\int^*∫∗, which the paper prescribes when measurability fails. In Corollary 2.4.5, the quotients are computed in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], so a quotient by ∥h∥2=0\|h\|_2 = 0∥h∥2​=0, ∥h∥∞=0\|h\|_\infty = 0∥h∥∞​=0 or N=0N = 0N=0 is +∞+\infty+∞ when its numerator is positive. The bound is +∞+\infty+∞ when P(A)=0P(A)=0P(A)=0, as the printed factor 1/P(A)1/P(A)1/P(A) intends. No statement is restricted to a finite or countable Ω\OmegaΩ: restricting it would turn the general theorems into their finite-alphabet special cases. Dropping h(x,x)=0h(x,x) = 0h(x,x)=0 or defining the distance by a real infimum (whose value on the empty set is 000) would change the theorems and is ruled out.

A complete development needs product measures on Fin (N+1) → Ω split as ΩN×Ω\Omega^N \times \OmegaΩN×Ω, sections of measurable sets, Tonelli's theorem, and the elementary convexity inequalities used in the proofs; the induction scaffold is reusable for the other distance functionals of the memoir. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are proofs of the extension of Proposition 2.4.2 to ggg with values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], which the paper states without number on p. 92.

Selected references

  • M. Talagrand, Concentration of measure and isoperimetric inequalities in product spaces, Publications Mathématiques de l'IHÉS 81 (1995), 73–205. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02699376
  • M. Talagrand, A new look at independence, Annals of Probability 24 (1996), 1–34. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1042644705
  • M. Ledoux, The Concentration of Measure Phenomenon, Mathematical Surveys and Monographs 89, AMS, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1090/surv/089
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Formal VerificationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Reaching Agreement in the Presence of Faults 3: With Authenticated Messages, the S_pq Procedure Assures Interactive Consistency for m Faults for Every n ≥ mResearch Paper

Motivation

Processors in a distributed system may hold separate readings of a sensor, clock, or diagnostic result while some processors give misleading reports. The aim of interactive consistency is for every functioning processor to compute the same vector of reported values and to put each functioning processor's actual private value in its corresponding position. A shared vector can then be used for a common decision. Pease, Shostak, and Lamport formulated this problem for isolated processors communicating by two-party messages; their paper discusses clock synchronization, input stabilization, and diagnostic tests as concrete applications Pease–Shostak–Lamport 1980.

In the paper's oral-message model, faulty processors can invent reports about values they received from others. The other two missions in this series formalize the recursive majority procedure for n≥3m+1n\ge 3m+1n≥3m+1 and the matching impossibility result below that bound. Section 5 changes the communication assumption: a faulty processor may refuse to pass on a received value but cannot pass on an altered value as if it came from its original sender. Under that assumption, the authors give a procedure for every n≥mn\ge mn≥m, including configurations outside the oral-message threshold Pease–Shostak–Lamport 1980, §§3–5.

Setting

Let PPP be a finite set of nnn processors and VVV a type of private values. Each processor q∈Pq\in Pq∈P has a value σ(q)∈V\sigma(q)\in Vσ(q)∈V. A scenario σ\sigmaσ records the values reported along chains of processors. A string p1p2⋯prp_1p_2\cdots p_rp1​p2​⋯pr​ is read from receiver to originator: p1p_1p1​ receives a report ultimately attributed to prp_rpr​. A recorded value may be NIL, meaning that no authenticated value is available. The view available to receiver ppp is its ppp-scenario, the restriction w↦σ(pw)w\mapsto\sigma(pw)w↦σ(pw); it contains no report that begins with a different receiver.

Choose a set N⊆PN\subseteq PN⊆P of nonfaulty processors. At most mmm processors may be faulty, expressed as ∣P∣≤∣N∣+m|P|\le |N|+m∣P∣≤∣N∣+m. An authenticated scenario consistent with NNN obeys two conditions whenever the displayed strings are in the (m+1)(m+1)(m+1)-level scenario. If p∈Np\in Np∈N and q∈Pq\in Pq∈P, the report made by nonfaulty relay ppp is truthful: σ(qpw)=σ(pw)\sigma(qpw)=\sigma(pw)σ(qpw)=σ(pw). For any prefix w′w'w′, a chain passing through nonfaulty ppp carries either the value at ppp or NIL: σ(w′pw)∈{σ(pw),NIL}\sigma(w'pw)\in\{\sigma(pw),\mathrm{NIL}\}σ(w′pw)∈{σ(pw),NIL}. The second condition allows omission by later relays while excluding a changed value falsely attributed to ppp Pease–Shostak–Lamport 1980, p. 233.

For each receiver ppp and originator qqq, the procedure forms SpqS_{pq}Spq​, the set of all non-NIL values in ppp's view on strings pwqpwqpwq. The intermediate string www has at most mmm distinct letters, all in P∖{p,q}P\setminus\{p,q\}P∖{p,q}. Receiver ppp records the sole value in SpqS_{pq}Spq​ when this set is a singleton; otherwise it records NIL. The resulting entries, one for each q∈Pq\in Pq∈P, form ppp's proposed consistency vector Pease–Shostak–Lamport 1980, p. 233.

Formalization targets

The first milestone covers a nonfaulty originator qqq: every nonfaulty receiver ppp sees exactly its true value. The second covers a faulty originator: the set of non-NIL values seen by one nonfaulty receiver is contained in the set seen by another. The same statement with the receivers exchanged gives equality of their sets.

The goal is the procedure's full interactive-consistency guarantee, for every choice of NNN and every authenticated scenario satisfying the conditions above:

Rp(q)=σ(q)(p,q∈N),Rp(r)=Rp′(r)(p,p′∈N, r∈P).\begin{aligned} R_p(q)&=\sigma(q) &&(p,q\in N),\\ R_p(r)&=R_{p'}(r) &&(p,p'\in N,\ r\in P). \end{aligned}Rp​(q)Rp​(r)​=σ(q)=Rp′​(r)​​(p,q∈N),(p,p′∈N, r∈P).​

Here Rp(r)R_p(r)Rp​(r) is the optional value recorded by processor ppp for processor rrr. Both clauses matter: agreement alone could be achieved by always recording NIL, while correct nonfaulty entries alone would leave faulty entries inconsistent.

Significance

The result identifies an exact communication assumption under which the paper's 3m+13m+13m+1 oral-message bound no longer governs the procedure. Even if a faulty originator gives conflicting values, nonfaulty receivers finish with identical entries for that originator; if an originator is nonfaulty, they retain its actual value. The paper describes authenticators as a practical approximation to the assumption, but the guarantee here is a mathematical statement about scenarios satisfying its two conditions, not a probability claim about a cryptographic implementation Pease–Shostak–Lamport 1980, §5.

Formalizing this result supplies precise interfaces for authenticated scenario consistency, local views, the set SpqS_{pq}Spq​, and the recording rule. The paper proves the result on pp. 233–234; this mission asks for a machine-checked proof of those statements in Lean. The scenario and local-view definitions can support later formalizations of message-passing protocols with truthful or omissible relays. Contributions that establish the two source milestones and the final guarantee, or develop reusable list and finite-set facts needed by them, are within scope.

Difficulty

The case of a faulty originator is the central difficulty. Its private value has no required relationship to what different nonfaulty receivers hear, so simply asserting that every receiver obtains the same direct report is unjustified. A faulty relay may also omit a report, which makes equality of raw scenario entries too strong. The target must compare sets of non-NIL values obtained along admissible relay chains. At the longest allowed chain, the length bound prevents adding another relay, and the number of faulty processors is needed to establish that an admissible nonfaulty relay occurs in the chain Pease–Shostak–Lamport 1980, p. 234.

Formalization scope

Lean represents processors by a finite set P : Finset α, values by a type V, strings by List α, and NIL by none : Option V. A scenario is a total function from strings to optional values. Only strings over PPP of length at most m+2m+2m+2 are constrained by authenticated consistency, matching the (m+1)(m+1)(m+1)-level scenario that the procedure reads. A single-letter string has a non-NIL private value for every processor in PPP. Conditions (i) and (ii) constrain nonfaulty relays only; condition (ii) allows either the original value or NIL for every prefix over PPP, including an empty prefix.

The procedure is applied only to ppp's view w↦σ(pw)w\mapsto\sigma(pw)w↦σ(pw), so it has no access to the full scenario or to NNN. Its intermediate strings are repetition-free, exclude both ppp and qqq, and have length at most mmm. The set SpqS_{pq}Spq​ contains values in VVV, not NIL; an empty set and a set with multiple values both cause a NIL record. The formal theorem retains the printed n≥mn\ge mn≥m condition, although it is not needed in the proof of the stated set relationships. It also covers p=qp=qp=q, m=0m=0m=0, and empty or singleton processor sets when their quantified conditions apply. These conventions rule out an always-NIL decision rule and the trivial rule that reads σ(q)\sigma(q)σ(q) from outside the receiver's view.

The cryptographic maps ApA_pAp​, their message encodings, and the paper's assertion that practical authenticators can meet the assumption with arbitrarily high probability are outside scope. The formal result assumes the two exact authenticated-scenario conditions. A complete development needs finite-set cardinality and list facts, especially about distinct relay strings and bounded concatenation; these facts can be reused for other authenticated relay models.

Selected references

  • M. Pease, R. Shostak, and L. Lamport, Reaching Agreement in the Presence of Faults, Journal of the ACM 27(2), 1980, 228–234. DOI: 10.1145/322186.322188.
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Reaching Agreement in the Presence of Faults 2: If |V| ≥ 2 and 3 ≤ n ≤ 3m, No Family {F_p} Assures Interactive Consistency for m Faults, However Many Rounds Are UsedResearch Paper

Motivation

A fault-tolerant system built from several processors must let its working processors act on the same data, even though some processors may have failed in ways nobody can predict: a failed processor may stop relaying information, relay something it invented, or tell different processors different things. Pease, Shostak and Lamport (J. ACM 27 (1980) 228–234) isolated the core question in the setting of the SIFT aircraft-control computer: each of nnn processors holds a private value, at most mmm processors are faulty, and processors communicate only by two-party messages. Can the nonfaulty processors each compute a vector of values, one entry per processor, such that all nonfaulty processors compute the same vector and the entry of each nonfaulty processor is its true private value? This requirement is called interactive consistency.

The paper answers with a sharp threshold. Interactive consistency can be achieved when n≥3m+1n\ge 3m+1n≥3m+1 (Section 3), and it cannot be achieved when n≤3mn\le 3mn≤3m, however many rounds of message exchange are allowed (Section 4). With unforgeable signatures it can be achieved for every n≥mn\ge mn≥m (Section 5). The impossibility half is the origin of the "3m+13m+13m+1" bound that appears throughout Byzantine fault tolerance, popularised two years later as the Byzantine Generals Problem (Lamport, Shostak, Pease, ACM TOPLAS 4 (1982)). This mission is the impossibility theorem.

Timeline:

  • 1980: Pease, Shostak and Lamport prove the threshold n≥3m+1n\ge 3m+1n≥3m+1 for interactive consistency with oral messages, including the impossibility for n≤3mn\le 3mn≤3m stated in terms of scenarios.
  • 1982: Lamport, Shostak and Pease restate the problem as the Byzantine Generals Problem, with the same bound.
  • 1985–1986: Fischer, Lynch and Merritt give a short "hexagon" proof of the same bound for several agreement problems (Distributed Computing 1 (1986)).

Setting

Let PPP be a finite set of nnn processors and VVV a set of values. Write P∗P^*P∗ for the set of strings over PPP (the empty string included) and P+P^+P+ for the nonempty strings. A string p1p2⋯prp_1p_2\cdots p_rp1​p2​⋯pr​ is read as a chain of reports: p1p_1p1​ was told by p2p_2p2​ that …\dots… pr−1p_{r-1}pr−1​ was told by prp_rpr​ that prp_rpr​'s private value is the recorded value.

A scenario is a map σ:P+→V\sigma: P^+\to Vσ:P+→V. The value σ(p)\sigma(p)σ(p) is processor ppp's private value, and σ(p1⋯pr)\sigma(p_1\cdots p_r)σ(p1​⋯pr​) is the value p1p_1p1​ received for the chain p2⋯prp_2\cdots p_rp2​⋯pr​. For p∈Pp\in Pp∈P, the ppp-scenario σp\sigma_pσp​ is the restriction of σ\sigmaσ to the strings beginning with ppp: everything ppp ever learns.

For a set N⊆PN\subseteq PN⊆P of nonfaulty processors, σ\sigmaσ is consistent with NNN if

σ(pqw)=σ(qw)for all q∈N, p∈P, w∈P∗,\sigma(pqw)=\sigma(qw)\qquad\text{for all }q\in N,\ p\in P,\ w\in P^*,σ(pqw)=σ(qw)for all q∈N, p∈P, w∈P∗,

that is, every nonfaulty processor reports truthfully what it knows or hears. Faulty processors are unconstrained.

A decision family assigns to each p∈Pp\in Pp∈P a map FpF_pFp​ that takes a ppp-scenario and a processor qqq and returns a value Fp(σp,q)∈VF_p(\sigma_p,q)\in VFp​(σp​,q)∈V: the entry ppp computes for qqq. The family assures interactive consistency for mmm faults if for every N⊆PN\subseteq PN⊆P with ∣N∣≥n−m|N|\ge n-m∣N∣≥n−m and every scenario σ\sigmaσ consistent with NNN,

  1. Fp(σp,q)=σ(q)F_p(\sigma_p,q)=\sigma(q)Fp​(σp​,q)=σ(q) for all p,q∈Np,q\in Np,q∈N;
  2. Fp(σp,r)=Fq(σq,r)F_p(\sigma_p,r)=F_q(\sigma_q,r)Fp​(σp​,r)=Fq​(σq​,r) for all p,q∈Np,q\in Np,q∈N, r∈Pr\in Pr∈P.

In the Lean development these are InteractiveConsistency.Impossibility.ConsistentWith P N σ and AssuresIC P m F, with restrict σ p the ppp-scenario.

Formalization targets

Goal: the THEOREM of Section 4

If ∣V∣≥2|V|\ge 2∣V∣≥2 and

3≤n≤3m,3\le n\le 3m,3≤n≤3m,

then no family {Fp∣p∈P}\{F_p\mid p\in P\}{Fp​∣p∈P} assures interactive consistency for mmm faults. Since scenarios are defined on strings of every length, no bound on the number of rounds is assumed.

Milestones, in the order the proof of the paper uses them

  1. If 3≤n≤3m3\le n\le 3m3≤n≤3m, then PPP is the disjoint union of three nonempty sets AAA, BBB, CCC, each with at most mmm members (p. 232).
  2. For such a partition and values v,v′v,v'v,v′, the scenarios α,β,σ\alpha,\beta,\sigmaα,β,σ that the page defines by recursion on the length of strings are consistent with A∪CA\cup CA∪C, B∪CB\cup CB∪C and A∪BA\cup BA∪B respectively (p. 233).
  3. For the same scenarios, α(aw)=σ(aw)\alpha(aw)=\sigma(aw)α(aw)=σ(aw) and β(bw)=σ(bw)\beta(bw)=\sigma(bw)β(bw)=σ(bw) for all a∈Aa\in Aa∈A, b∈Bb\in Bb∈B, w∈P∗w\in P^*w∈P∗ (p. 233).

Significance

The theorem shows that the algorithm of Section 3 is optimal in its fault tolerance: with oral messages, n≥3m+1n\ge 3m+1n≥3m+1 processors are not only sufficient but necessary. Every later lower bound for Byzantine agreement, Byzantine broadcast and approximate agreement with unauthenticated messages rests on this bound or a variant of its argument, and it is the reason replicated state machines tolerating mmm Byzantine faults use 3m+13m+13m+1 replicas. It also explains why Section 5 needs authentication: the argument depends on faulty processors being able to relay fabricated values.

The result has been proved since 1980; what is open here is its formalization. Nothing on Prove2Me models message-passing agreement, and this mission states the theorem in the paper's own model: scenarios on unbounded strings and decision functions of a single ppp-scenario. The mission produces a reusable vocabulary (scenarios, consistency, interactive consistency) and the explicit three-scenario construction.

Difficulty

The obvious attempt is to argue round by round about what a processor can know after kkk rounds; with unboundedly many rounds this never terminates in a contradiction. The paper's argument instead needs three entire scenarios, each a legitimate behaviour for a different set of faulty processors, that two processors cannot tell apart from their own views. Writing these scenarios down so that consistency holds on every string while the indistinguishability survives on every string is the delicate part: the faulty set of each scenario must relay exactly the values that keep the other scenario's view intact, and one of the defining equations (β(paw)=α(aw)\beta(paw)=\alpha(aw)β(paw)=α(aw)) looks like a misprint but is what the argument requires. The counting step is elementary but carries the hypothesis n≥3n\ge 3n≥3 that the printed theorem leaves implicit.

Formalization scope

Processors are a Finset P in a type with decidable equality; strings are lists read left to right (p1p_1p1​ is the head of the list); a scenario is a total function List α → V whose values on the empty list and on lists with a letter outside PPP carry no meaning: every condition quantifies only over strings whose letters lie in PPP. Decision functions have type α → (List α → V) → α → V and are applied only to the ppp-scenario fun w => σ (p :: w), never to σ\sigmaσ; giving FpF_pFp​ the whole scenario would make the problem trivial (output σ(q)\sigma(q)σ(q)). Consistency with NNN constrains only relays by members of NNN, and includes the empty www. The quorum ∣N∣≥n−m|N|\ge n-m∣N∣≥n−m is written ∣P∣≤∣N∣+m|P|\le |N|+m∣P∣≤∣N∣+m, which avoids truncated subtraction on N\mathbb NN. ∣V∣≥2|V|\ge 2∣V∣≥2 is the existence of two distinct values.

Explicit readings of the page:

  • The printed hypothesis "n≥3mn\ge 3mn≥3m" is a misprint for n≤3mn\le 3mn≤3m (the proof opens "Since n≤3mn\le 3mn≤3m", and the section title is "Proof of Impossibility for n<3m+1n<3m+1n<3m+1"); with n≥3mn\ge 3mn≥3m the statement is false.
  • The hypothesis n≥3n\ge 3n≥3 is implicit in the proof's "three nonempty sets". It is necessary: for n≤2n\le 2n≤2 the family Fp(σp,q)=σ(pq)F_p(\sigma_p,q)=\sigma(pq)Fp​(σp​,q)=σ(pq) assures interactive consistency.
  • In the construction, each letter aaa, bbb, ccc ranges independently over AAA, BBB, CCC (so "α(cc)\alpha(cc)α(cc)" covers α(c′c)\alpha(c'c)α(c′c)); the value σ(c′cw)\sigma(c'cw)σ(c′cw), which the page leaves unspecified, is fixed to σ(cw)\sigma(cw)σ(cw).
  • The construction is stated as a definition, and the two "easy" claims about it (consistency, indistinguishability) are separate milestones.

A complete development needs only finite sets and lists from Mathlib. The vocabulary of p. 232 is shared with the other two missions of this series, Reaching Agreement in the Presence of Faults 1 (the algorithm for n≥3m+1n\ge 3m+1n≥3m+1) and 3 (authenticated messages, n≥mn\ge mn≥m), each of which defines it in its own namespace. Proofs of the milestones and of the goal are welcome, as is a proof of the goal by a different route.

Selected references

  • M. Pease, R. Shostak, L. Lamport, Reaching agreement in the presence of faults, Journal of the ACM 27(2) (1980) 228–234. https://doi.org/10.1145/322186.322188
  • L. Lamport, R. Shostak, M. Pease, The Byzantine Generals Problem, ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems 4(3) (1982) 382–401. https://doi.org/10.1145/357172.357176
  • M. J. Fischer, N. A. Lynch, M. Merritt, Easy impossibility proofs for distributed consensus problems, Distributed Computing 1 (1986) 26–39. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01843568
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

An Iterative Method of Solving a Game: For Every Vector System, min U(t)/t and max V(t)/t Converge to the Value of the GameResearch Paper

Motivation

A finite two-person zero-sum game is given by a real pay-off matrix, and its value can be computed by linear programming. In 1949 George W. Brown proposed a much simpler procedure, now called fictitious play: each player in turn plays a best pure reply to the accumulated play of the opponent so far, and the running averages are read off as estimates of the value (Brown, RAND P-78, 1949). Brown conjectured that both estimates converge to the value. Julia Robinson proved the conjecture in An Iterative Method of Solving a Game, Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951).

The result is the starting point of the theory of learning in games. Fictitious play is the basic model of boundedly rational players who best-respond to empirical frequencies, and the question "for which classes of games does it converge?" has driven a long line of work.

Timeline.

  • 1949–1951: Brown proposes the method and conjectures convergence for zero-sum games.
  • 1951: Robinson proves it for every vector system of every zero-sum matrix game; the statement contains no rate.
  • 1958: Shapiro extracts from Robinson's argument a rate: the gap (max⁡V(t)−min⁡U(t))/t(\max V(t) - \min U(t))/t(maxV(t)−minU(t))/t is O(t−1/(m+n−2))O(t^{-1/(m+n-2)})O(t−1/(m+n−2)) (doi:10.1002/cpa.3160110408).
  • 1964: Shapley gives a 3 × 3 bimatrix (non-zero-sum) game in which fictitious play does not converge (doi:10.1515/9781400882014-002).
  • 1996: Monderer and Shapley prove convergence for games with identical interests (doi:10.1006/jeth.1996.0014).
  • 2014: Daskalakis and Pan show that with adversarial tie-breaking the convergence can be much slower than the rate t−1/2t^{-1/2}t−1/2 conjectured by Karlin (arXiv:1412.4840).

Setting

Let A=(aij)A = (a_{ij})A=(aij​) be a real m×nm \times nm×n matrix, m,n≥1m, n \ge 1m,n≥1. The first player chooses a row iii, the second a column jjj, and the second pays the first aija_{ij}aij​. A mixed strategy is a probability vector x=(x1,…,xm)x = (x_1, \dots, x_m)x=(x1​,…,xm​) for the first player, or y=(y1,…,yn)y = (y_1, \dots, y_n)y=(y1​,…,yn​) for the second. For all mixed strategies,

min⁡j∑iaijxi≤max⁡i∑jaijyj.(1)\min_j \sum_i a_{ij} x_i \le \max_i \sum_j a_{ij} y_j. \tag{1}jmin​i∑​aij​xi​≤imax​j∑​aij​yj​.(1)

A pair (X,Y)(X, Y)(X,Y) for which equality holds is a solution, and the common number vvv is the value of the game. The minimax theorem says that a solution exists.

Write Ai⋅A_{i\cdot}Ai⋅​ for the iii-th row, A⋅jA_{\cdot j}A⋅j​ for the jjj-th column, and max⁡W\max WmaxW, min⁡W\min WminW for the largest and smallest component of a vector WWW. A vector system for AAA is a pair of sequences U(0),U(1),…U(0), U(1), \dotsU(0),U(1),… of nnn-vectors and V(0),V(1),…V(0), V(1), \dotsV(0),V(1),… of mmm-vectors with min⁡U(0)=max⁡V(0)\min U(0) = \max V(0)minU(0)=maxV(0) and

U(t+1)=U(t)+Ai⋅,V(t+1)=V(t)+A⋅j,U(t+1) = U(t) + A_{i\cdot}, \qquad V(t+1) = V(t) + A_{\cdot j},U(t+1)=U(t)+Ai⋅​,V(t+1)=V(t)+A⋅j​,

where vi(t)=max⁡V(t)v_i(t) = \max V(t)vi​(t)=maxV(t) and uj(t)=min⁡U(t)u_j(t) = \min U(t)uj​(t)=minU(t). In the alternate vector system the column satisfies uj(t+1)=min⁡U(t+1)u_j(t+1) = \min U(t+1)uj​(t+1)=minU(t+1) instead. A row iii is eligible in the interval (t,t′)(t, t')(t,t′) if vi(t1)=max⁡V(t1)v_i(t_1) = \max V(t_1)vi​(t1​)=maxV(t1​) for some t≤t1≤t′t \le t_1 \le t't≤t1​≤t′, and similarly a column jjj if uj(t2)=min⁡U(t2)u_j(t_2) = \min U(t_2)uj​(t2​)=minU(t2​) for some t≤t2≤t′t \le t_2 \le t't≤t2​≤t′.

With U(0)=V(0)=0U(0) = V(0) = 0U(0)=V(0)=0, U(t)/tU(t)/tU(t)/t is the payoff vector of the first player's empirical mixed strategy against each column, and V(t)/tV(t)/tV(t)/t that of the second player's against each row. In the Lean development these objects are vmax, vmin, IsVectorSystem, IsAltVectorSystem, RowEligible, ColEligible and IsSolution, in the namespace RobinsonFP.Convergence.

Formalization targets

Goal: the Theorem (p. 297)

For every vector system (U,V)(U, V)(U,V) for AAA, and vvv the value of the game,

lim⁡t→∞min⁡U(t)t=lim⁡t→∞max⁡V(t)t=v.\lim_{t\to\infty} \frac{\min U(t)}{t} = \lim_{t\to\infty} \frac{\max V(t)}{t} = v.t→∞lim​tminU(t)​=t→∞lim​tmaxV(t)​=v.

The statement holds for arbitrary initial vectors with min⁡U(0)=max⁡V(0)\min U(0) = \max V(0)minU(0)=maxV(0) and for every way of breaking ties.

Milestones, in the order of the proof

  1. Inequality (1).
  2. Lemma 1: lim inf⁡t→∞(max⁡V(t)−min⁡U(t))/t≥0\liminf_{t\to\infty} (\max V(t) - \min U(t))/t \ge 0liminft→∞​(maxV(t)−minU(t))/t≥0.
  3. Lemma 2: if every row and column is eligible in (s,s+t)(s, s+t)(s,s+t), then max⁡U(s+t)−min⁡U(s+t)≤2at\max U(s+t) - \min U(s+t) \le 2atmaxU(s+t)−minU(s+t)≤2at and max⁡V(s+t)−min⁡V(s+t)≤2at\max V(s+t) - \min V(s+t) \le 2atmaxV(s+t)−minV(s+t)≤2at, where a=max⁡i,j∣aij∣a = \max_{i,j}|a_{ij}|a=maxi,j​∣aij​∣.
  4. Lemma 3: under the same hypothesis, max⁡V(s+t)−min⁡U(s+t)≤4at\max V(s+t) - \min U(s+t) \le 4atmaxV(s+t)−minU(s+t)≤4at.
  5. Display (3) of the proof of Lemma 4: if some row or column is not eligible in (s,s+t∗)(s, s+t^*)(s,s+t∗), the gap max⁡V−min⁡U\max V - \min UmaxV−minU grows by less than 12εt∗\tfrac12 \varepsilon t^*21​εt∗ over that window, given the bound 12εt\tfrac12\varepsilon t21​εt for the vector systems of the submatrices.
  6. Lemma 4: for every ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0 there is t0t_0t0​, uniform over all vector systems for AAA, with max⁡V(t)−min⁡U(t)<εt\max V(t) - \min U(t) < \varepsilon tmaxV(t)−minU(t)<εt for t≥t0t \ge t_0t≥t0​.
  7. (max⁡V(t)−min⁡U(t))/t→0(\max V(t) - \min U(t))/t \to 0(maxV(t)−minU(t))/t→0.
  8. lim sup⁡min⁡U(t)/t≤v\limsup \min U(t)/t \le vlimsupminU(t)/t≤v and lim inf⁡max⁡V(t)/t≥v\liminf \max V(t)/t \ge vliminfmaxV(t)/t≥v.

Two further items are not milestones: the Theorem for the alternate vector system, which the paper says follows by the same proofs, and the bracketing min⁡U(t)/t≤v≤max⁡V(t′)/t′\min U(t)/t \le v \le \max V(t')/t'minU(t)/t≤v≤maxV(t′)/t′ when U(0)=V(0)=0U(0) = V(0) = 0U(0)=V(0)=0 (p. 297).

Significance

The Theorem shows that a payoff-based procedure with no linear algebra finds the value of every zero-sum matrix game. It was one of the first iterative methods for linear programs with a convergence proof, and it is the base case for every later convergence result about fictitious play: potential games, games with identical interests, 2×n2\times n2×n games, and continuous-time best-response dynamics.

The result is proved, and its proof is short. To our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. The mission produces a Lean proof of the Theorem and its four lemmas, together with reusable definitions of vector systems and eligibility. A statement with an explicit rate, such as Shapiro's, or a proof for the alternate system, is a natural extension.

Difficulty

Lemmas 1–3 are elementary estimates. The difficulty is Lemma 4. The obvious approach follows a single run of the iteration and tries to show that the gap max⁡V(t)−min⁡U(t)\max V(t) - \min U(t)maxV(t)−minU(t) grows sublinearly. This fails because a run can spend arbitrarily long windows in which some row or column is never a best reply, and nothing about one fixed run controls the gap over such a window. What is needed is a bound that is uniform over all vector systems, whatever their initial vectors and tie-breaking, which is why t0t_0t0​ in Lemma 4 comes before the vector system, and why display (3) quantifies over every vector system of the smaller matrices. In Lean, this uniformity has to range over matrices of every smaller size, so the statements must be general in the index types.

Formalization scope

  • Rows and columns are indexed by finite nonempty types ι, κ (the paper's m,n≥1m, n \ge 1m,n≥1); Fin m, Fin n is a special case. The matrix is Matrix ι κ ℝ.
  • max⁡W\max WmaxW, min⁡W\min WminW are Finset.sup' and Finset.inf' over all indices, hence attained.
  • A vector system allows any maximizing row and minimizing column at each step (an existential per step). No tie-breaking rule is fixed, and the initial vectors are arbitrary subject to min⁡U(0)=max⁡V(0)\min U(0) = \max V(0)minU(0)=maxV(0). The case U(0)=V(0)=0U(0) = V(0) = 0U(0)=V(0)=0 is not imposed.
  • Time is a natural number. Limits are Tendsto … atTop (𝓝 ·); lim inf and lim sup of real sequences are stated in ε\varepsilonε-form (for every ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0, eventually), with no boundedness side conditions.
  • The value vvv is given by a solution: every statement about vvv assumes IsSolution A x y v, i.e. probability vectors xxx, yyy with min⁡j∑iaijxi=v=max⁡i∑jaijyj\min_j \sum_i a_{ij} x_i = v = \max_i \sum_j a_{ij} y_jminj​∑i​aij​xi​=v=maxi​∑j​aij​yj​. Such a solution exists by the minimax theorem, which is proved on the platform as MatousekLP.ZeroSum.minimax_equality in a different encoding. A statement with vvv free, or with "there exists vvv", would be false or would lose the identification with the value; neither is used.
  • In Lemmas 2 and 3, aaa is any upper bound on the ∣aij∣|a_{ij}|∣aij​∣. This is equivalent to the paper's a=max⁡i,j∣aij∣a = \max_{i,j}|a_{ij}|a=maxi,j​∣aij​∣.
  • In display (3), the bound for submatrices is assumed only for the submatrices that delete one row or one column, which makes the statement at least as strong as the paper's.
  • The paper's closing display on p. 301 prints lim⁡min⁡V(t)/t\lim \min V(t)/tlimminV(t)/t for lim⁡min⁡U(t)/t\lim \min U(t)/tlimminU(t)/t. The goal follows the statement of the Theorem on p. 297.

A general "restriction of a vector system to a submatrix" lemma would be reusable for later work on fictitious play. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are proofs of the two extra items.

Selected references

  • J. Robinson, An Iterative Method of Solving a Game, Annals of Mathematics 54(2), 296–301, 1951. https://doi.org/10.2307/1969530
  • G. W. Brown, Some notes on computation of games solutions, RAND Report P-78, 1949. https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P78.html
  • H. N. Shapiro, Note on a computation method in the theory of games, Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics 11(4), 587–593, 1958. https://doi.org/10.1002/cpa.3160110408
  • L. S. Shapley, Some topics in two-person games, Advances in Game Theory, Annals of Mathematics Studies 52, 1964. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400882014-002
  • D. Monderer, L. S. Shapley, Fictitious play property for games with identical interests, Journal of Economic Theory 68, 258–265, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0014
  • C. Daskalakis, Q. Pan, A counter-example to Karlin's strong conjecture for fictitious play, FOCS 2014. https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.4840
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Some Aspects of the Sequential Design of Experiments III: Optional Stopping — P(Sₙ > αn^½ for Some n₁ ≤ n ≤ n₂) < (1 − Φ(α))/(1 − Φ(α(λ^½ − 1)/(λ − 1)^½))Research Paper

Optional stopping and the size of a test

Section 4 of Herbert Robbins's 1952 address Some aspects of the sequential design of experiments (Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 58, 527–535, doi:10.1090/S0002-9904-1952-09620-8) isolates a problem that every user of significance tests meets: if the sample size is not fixed in advance, an experimenter can keep sampling until the test rejects. Robbins shows that a fixed-sample test then loses all control of its error probability, and he proposes the compromise of allowing the sample size to range over a window n1≤n≤n2n_1\le n\le n_2n1​≤n≤n2​, with an explicit bound on the resulting error.

The question is still current. "Optional stopping" and "peeking" at accumulating data are a standard concern in clinical trials and online A/B testing, and the modern theory of always-valid inference and confidence sequences (for example Howard, Ramdas, McAuliffe and Sekhon, Time-uniform, nonparametric, nonasymptotic confidence sequences, Ann. Statist. 49 (2021), arXiv:1810.08240) answers exactly the question Robbins raises: how large is the probability that a running statistic crosses a boundary at some time in a range. The earlier treatment Robbins cites is Feller's 1940 discussion of the statistics of ESP experiments.

Setting

Let x1,x2,…x_1,x_2,\dotsx1​,x2​,… be independent real random variables on a probability space (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)(Ω,F,P), each normal with mean 000 and variance 111. This is the null hypothesis H0:θ=0H_0:\theta=0H0​:θ=0 for observations that are normal with unknown mean θ\thetaθ and unit variance; the alternative is H1:θ>0H_1:\theta>0H1​:θ>0. Write

Sn=x1+⋯+xn,S0=0.S_n=x_1+\cdots+x_n,\qquad S_0=0 .Sn​=x1​+⋯+xn​,S0​=0.

The fixed-sample test of size nnn rejects H0H_0H0​ if and only if

Sn>αn1/2(21)S_n>\alpha n^{1/2}\qquad(21)Sn​>αn1/2(21)

for a real constant α\alphaα. (In this mission α\alphaα always denotes this test constant; in Section 2 of the paper the same letter is the mean of a coin.) The standard normal distribution function is

Φ(x)=1(2π)1/2∫−∞xe−t2/2 dt.(23)\Phi(x)=\frac{1}{(2\pi)^{1/2}}\int_{-\infty}^{x}e^{-t^2/2}\,dt .\qquad(23)Φ(x)=(2π)1/21​∫−∞x​e−t2/2dt.(23)

For integers n1≤n2n_1\le n_2n1​≤n2​ the window probability is

g(n1,n2,α)=P[Sn>αn1/2 for some n1≤n≤n2],(24)g(n_1,n_2,\alpha)=P\bigl[S_n>\alpha n^{1/2}\ \text{for some}\ n_1\le n\le n_2\bigr],\qquad(24)g(n1​,n2​,α)=P[Sn​>αn1/2 for some n1​≤n≤n2​],(24)

and λ=n2/n1\lambda=n_2/n_1λ=n2​/n1​. In Lean these are Phi, S X n ω = ∑ i ∈ Finset.range n, X i ω and g P X n₁ n₂ α, in the namespace RobbinsSeqDesign.OptionalStopping.

Formalization targets

Goal: the window bound (25)

For integers 1≤n1<n21\le n_1<n_21≤n1​<n2​ and every real α\alphaα, with λ=n2/n1\lambda=n_2/n_1λ=n2​/n1​,

g(n1,n2,α)<1−Φ(α)1−Φ ⁣(α⋅λ1/2−1(λ−1)1/2).g(n_1,n_2,\alpha)<\frac{1-\Phi(\alpha)}{1-\Phi\!\Bigl(\alpha\cdot\dfrac{\lambda^{1/2}-1}{(\lambda-1)^{1/2}}\Bigr)} .g(n1​,n2​,α)<1−Φ(α⋅(λ−1)1/2λ1/2−1​)1−Φ(α)​.

The inequality is strict, as printed, and holds for every real α\alphaα, not only the large values of practical interest.

Milestone: the fixed-sample error (22)

For every n≥1n\ge1n≥1 and real α\alphaα,

ε(α)=P[Sn>αn1/2]=1−Φ(α).\varepsilon(\alpha)=P\bigl[S_n>\alpha n^{1/2}\bigr]=1-\Phi(\alpha).ε(α)=P[Sn​>αn1/2]=1−Φ(α).

Milestone: rejection infinitely often

For every real α\alphaα, with probability 111 the inequality Sn>αn1/2S_n>\alpha n^{1/2}Sn​>αn1/2 holds for infinitely many nnn.

Significance

The results. (22) says that the fixed-sample test has error probability 1−Φ(α)1-\Phi(\alpha)1−Φ(α) whatever nnn is. The infinitely-often statement says that this guarantee is void under unrestricted optional stopping: sampling until (21) holds rejects a true H0H_0H0​ with probability one, however large α\alphaα is. The goal (25) quantifies the compromise: if the stopping time is confined to [n1,n2][n_1,n_2][n1​,n2​], the error probability is at most the fixed-sample error divided by 1−Φ(αcλ)1-\Phi(\alpha c_\lambda)1−Φ(αcλ​), where cλ=(λ1/2−1)/(λ−1)1/2<1c_\lambda=(\lambda^{1/2}-1)/(\lambda-1)^{1/2}<1cλ​=(λ1/2−1)/(λ−1)1/2<1 depends only on the window's ratio. For large α\alphaα and moderate λ\lambdaλ this keeps the error of the same order as the fixed-sample error; Robbins notes that it is useful when λ\lambdaλ is not too large and that sharper inequalities can be devised.

Formalizing it. The three statements are classical and their proofs are short on paper, but none is machine-checked for Gaussian partial sums. The goal needs stopping-time machinery for discrete-time Gaussian random walks; the infinitely-often statement is a consequence of the lower half of the law of the iterated logarithm, which Mathlib does not contain. On the platform, DurrettProbability.brownian_limsup_sqrt (proved) gives lim sup⁡tBt/t=∞\limsup_t B_t/\sqrt t=\inftylimsupt​Bt​/t​=∞ for Brownian motion, a different process, and AzumaWeightedSums.IteratedLog.theorem2_limsup_le_one gives an upper iterated-logarithm bound for weighted sums, the opposite direction; neither states any of the targets here, but both are related infrastructure.

Difficulty

The goal is a maximal inequality over a window of times. The obvious argument, a union bound over n1≤n≤n2n_1\le n\le n_2n1​≤n≤n2​, gives (n2−n1+1)(1−Φ(α))(n_2-n_1+1)(1-\Phi(\alpha))(n2​−n1​+1)(1−Φ(α)), which grows with the window length instead of depending on λ\lambdaλ alone, and exceeds 111 for long windows. The events {Sn>αn1/2}\{S_n>\alpha n^{1/2}\}{Sn​>αn1/2} for different nnn are strongly dependent, and the boundary αn1/2\alpha n^{1/2}αn1/2 is curved, so the bound has to account for when, inside the window, the boundary is first crossed; this requires stopping-time arguments for a discrete-time walk that are not yet available for Gaussian random walks in Mathlib. The strictness of the inequality also has to be tracked through the argument. The infinitely-often statement cannot be obtained from the central limit theorem alone, which gives only P(Sn>αn1/2 i.o.)≥1−Φ(α)>0P(S_n>\alpha n^{1/2}\ \text{i.o.})\ge 1-\Phi(\alpha)>0P(Sn​>αn1/2 i.o.)≥1−Φ(α)>0; upgrading this to probability one needs a zero–one law or the law of the iterated logarithm.

Formalization scope

The observations are X : ℕ → Ω → ℝ on a probability space (Ω, P) with [IsProbabilityMeasure P], iIndepFun X P and ∀ i, HasLaw (X i) (gaussianReal 0 1) P; the paper's xix_ixi​ is X (i - 1). The explicit readings committed to are:

  • Φ\PhiΦ is the integral printed in (23) (a local check shows it equals Mathlib's cdf (gaussianReal 0 1)).
  • "The probability of rejecting H0H_0H0​" is P.real of the event; (22) is stated for n≥1n\ge1n≥1.
  • "With probability 1 … for infinitely many values of nnn" is ∀ᵐ ω ∂P, ∃ᶠ n in atTop, α * √n < S X n ω, for every real α\alphaα.
  • The window of (24) is n1≤n≤n2n_1\le n\le n_2n1​≤n≤n2​ with both endpoints; the stray comma printed in "n1,≤nn_1, \le nn1​,≤n" is a typesetting slip.
  • In (25), λ\lambdaλ is the real quotient n2/n1n_2/n_1n2​/n1​, and the hypotheses 1≤n1<n21\le n_1<n_21≤n1​<n2​ make λ>1\lambda>1λ>1 well defined; the inequality is strict and there is no sign restriction on α\alphaα.
  • The numeric example "α=3.09\alpha=3.09α=3.09 then ε(α)≅.001\varepsilon(\alpha)\cong .001ε(α)≅.001" and the phrase "useful when λ\lambdaλ is not too large" are not formalized.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: ggg is the probability of the union over the whole window (not the event at n=n2n=n_2n=n2​ alone), Φ\PhiΦ is the fixed standard normal distribution function (not an arbitrary monotone function), and the parameter range excludes λ=1\lambda=1λ=1, where Lean's convention x/0=0x/0=0x/0=0 would replace the right side by 2(1−Φ(α))2(1-\Phi(\alpha))2(1−Φ(α)).

A complete development needs the law of a sum of independent Gaussians, the strong Markov property of a Gaussian random walk at a stopping time (or an equivalent first-passage decomposition), and, for the infinitely-often milestone, either the lower law of the iterated logarithm for Gaussian walks or the Hewitt–Savage/Kolmogorov zero–one law combined with the central limit theorem. These pieces are reusable well beyond this mission; contributions of any of them, as separate lemmas, are welcome.

Selected references

  • H. Robbins, Some aspects of the sequential design of experiments, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 58 (1952), 527–535. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9904-1952-09620-8
  • W. Feller, Statistical aspects of ESP, J. Parapsychology 4 (1940), 271–298 (reference [11] of the paper).
  • S. R. Howard, A. Ramdas, J. McAuliffe, J. Sekhon, Time-uniform, nonparametric, nonasymptotic confidence sequences, Ann. Statist. 49 (2021), 1055–1080. https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.08240
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Convex OptimizationLinear OptimizationOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Convex Programming with Set-Inclusive Constraints and Applications to Inexact Linear Programming: The Set-Inclusive LP Has the Same Feasible Set as the LP of Support FunctionalsResearch Paper

Motivation

A linear program max⁡c⋅x\max c\cdot xmaxc⋅x subject to Ax≤bAx\le bAx≤b, x≥0x\ge 0x≥0 assumes that the constraint matrix AAA is known exactly. In practice the columns of AAA — the activity vectors, describing how much of each resource one unit of activity jjj consumes — are estimates. A. L. Soyster's 1973 technical note in Operations Research (doi:10.1287/opre.21.5.1154) asked what a decision xxx should satisfy if every activity vector is known only to lie in a given convex set, and the decision has to be feasible for every possible realisation. He called this inexact linear programming, a term he attributes to K. O. Kortanek.

The note is the earliest formulation of what is now called robust linear optimization. Its answer — replace each uncertain column by its coordinatewise worst case — is the "Soyster model" that later work on robust optimization takes as its point of departure: Ben-Tal and Nemirovski (Math. Oper. Res. 1998; Math. Program. 2000) and Bertsimas and Sim (Oper. Res. 2004) both introduce their less conservative uncertainty sets as alternatives to it.

Setting

Fix integers m,n≥0m,n\ge0m,n≥0. Vectors in Rm\mathbb R^mRm are compared componentwise. For a set S⊆RmS\subseteq\mathbb R^mS⊆Rm and a scalar ttt, tS={ta:a∈S}tS=\{ta: a\in S\}tS={ta:a∈S}, and the sum of sets is Minkowski addition, S+T={s+t:s∈S, t∈T}S+T=\{s+t: s\in S,\ t\in T\}S+T={s+t:s∈S, t∈T}.

Let K1,…,Kn⊆RmK_1,\dots,K_n\subseteq\mathbb R^mK1​,…,Kn​⊆Rm be nonempty convex activity sets and K⊆RmK\subseteq\mathbb R^mK⊆Rm a nonempty convex resource set. Problem (I) is

sup⁡ c⋅xsubject tox1K1+x2K2+⋯+xnKn⊆K,xj≥0,\sup\ c\cdot x\quad\text{subject to}\quad x_1K_1+x_2K_2+\cdots+x_nK_n\subseteq K,\quad x_j\ge0,sup c⋅xsubject tox1​K1​+x2​K2​+⋯+xn​Kn​⊆K,xj​≥0,

and X⊆RnX\subseteq\mathbb R^nX⊆Rn denotes its set of feasible xxx. Problem (Ib) is the special case K=K(b)={y∈Rm:y≤b}K=K(b)=\{y\in\mathbb R^m: y\le b\}K=K(b)={y∈Rm:y≤b} for a right-hand side b∈Rmb\in\mathbb R^mb∈Rm.

The support functional of a set SSS is δ∗(y∣S)=sup⁡a∈Sy⋅a\delta^*(y\mid S)=\sup_{a\in S}y\cdot aδ∗(y∣S)=supa∈S​y⋅a, a value in [−∞,+∞][-\infty,+\infty][−∞,+∞]. With eie_iei​ the iii-th unit vector, the auxiliary matrix Aˉ\bar AAˉ is the m×nm\times nm×n matrix with entries

aˉij=δ∗(ei∣Kj)=sup⁡aj∈Kjaij,\bar a_{ij}=\delta^*(e_i\mid K_j)=\sup_{a_j\in K_j}a_{ij},aˉij​=δ∗(ei​∣Kj​)=aj​∈Kj​sup​aij​,

defined when all of these are finite, and LP(Aˉ)(\bar A)(Aˉ) is the linear program max⁡c⋅x\max c\cdot xmaxc⋅x subject to Aˉx≤b\bar Ax\le bAˉx≤b, x≥0x\ge0x≥0. Finally MMM is the set of m×nm\times nm×n matrices (a1,…,an)(a_1,\dots,a_n)(a1​,…,an​) whose jjj-th column lies in KjK_jKj​.

In the application, the activity sets are Euclidean balls Kj={a∈Rm:∥a−aj∥2≤ρj}K_j=\{a\in\mathbb R^m:\|a-a_j\|_2\le\rho_j\}Kj​={a∈Rm:∥a−aj​∥2​≤ρj​} around nominal columns aja_jaj​ of a matrix A0A_0A0​, with radii ρj≥0\rho_j\ge0ρj​≥0.

Formalization targets

Goal: the THEOREM (p. 1156)

Assume every KjK_jKj​ is nonempty and convex and δ∗(ei∣Kj)<∞\delta^*(e_i\mid K_j)<\inftyδ∗(ei​∣Kj​)<∞ for all i,ji,ji,j. Then

{x:x feasible for (Ib)}={x:Aˉx≤b, x≥0},\{x : x\ \text{feasible for (Ib)}\}=\{x : \bar Ax\le b,\ x\ge 0\},{x:x feasible for (Ib)}={x:Aˉx≤b, x≥0},

and for every objective ccc, the optimal solutions of (Ib) and of LP(Aˉ)(\bar A)(Aˉ) coincide.

Milestones

  1. Feasibility for (I) is equivalent to x≥0x\ge0x≥0 and ∑jxjaj∈K\sum_j x_ja_j\in K∑j​xj​aj​∈K for every choice aj∈Kja_j\in K_jaj​∈Kj​ (p. 1154).
  2. LEMMA (p. 1155): XXX is convex.
  3. If δ∗(ei∣Kj)=∞\delta^*(e_i\mid K_j)=\inftyδ∗(ei​∣Kj​)=∞ for some iii, every feasible xxx of (Ib) has xj=0x_j=0xj​=0 (p. 1155).
  4. Compact activity sets have δ∗(ei∣Kj)<∞\delta^*(e_i\mid K_j)<\inftyδ∗(ei​∣Kj​)<∞ (p. 1156).
  5. xxx is feasible for (Ib) iff Ax≤bAx\le bAx≤b for every A∈MA\in MA∈M and x≥0x\ge0x≥0 (p. 1156).
  6. Every A∈MA\in MA∈M satisfies A≤AˉA\le\bar AA≤Aˉ entrywise (proof of THEOREM).
  7. Feasible for LP(Aˉ)(\bar A)(Aˉ) implies feasible for (Ib) (proof of THEOREM).
  8. Feasible for (Ib) implies ∑jxjsup⁡aj∈Kjaij≤bi\sum_j x_j\sup_{a_j\in K_j}a_{ij}\le b_i∑j​xj​supaj​∈Kj​​aij​≤bi​ for every iii, i.e. feasible for LP(Aˉ)(\bar A)(Aˉ) (proof of THEOREM).
  9. For Euclidean balls, δ∗(ei∣Kj)=aij+ρj\delta^*(e_i\mid K_j)=a_{ij}+\rho_jδ∗(ei​∣Kj​)=aij​+ρj​, so aˉj=aj+ρje\bar a_j=a_j+\rho_jeaˉj​=aj​+ρj​e with eee the all-ones vector (p. 1157).
  10. Inexact LP over balls: (Ib) has the same feasible and optimal solutions as max⁡c⋅x\max c\cdot xmaxc⋅x subject to ∑jxj(aj+ρje)≤b\sum_j x_j(a_j+\rho_je)\le b∑j​xj​(aj​+ρj​e)≤b, x≥0x\ge0x≥0 (p. 1157).

Significance

The THEOREM turns a semi-infinite constraint — one linear inequality for every matrix in MMM, of which there are typically uncountably many — into a single linear program of the original size, whose data are the support functionals of the activity sets. Any LP solver then solves the uncertain problem. The hypersphere corollary shows the cost of this guarantee concretely: every entry of column jjj is inflated by the full radius ρj\rho_jρj​, which is why the model is called conservative and why later robust-optimization work introduced ellipsoidal and budgeted uncertainty sets as less conservative alternatives. The LEMMA classifies (I) as a convex program in general, for resource sets that are not half-space intersections.

The results are proved in the paper and are standard. To our knowledge they have no machine-checked proof in Lean or Mathlib. The mission produces a formal statement of the set-inclusive constraint as an actual Minkowski-sum inclusion, the support-functional reduction with its finiteness hypotheses made explicit, and the Euclidean-ball computation — a base that robust-counterpart results for other uncertainty sets can be compared against.

Difficulty

The individual arguments are short; the work is in the bookkeeping that the paper leaves implicit. The step from "for every A∈MA\in MA∈M" to Aˉ\bar AAˉ uses that the supremum of a sum of independent terms is the sum of suprema, which needs every KjK_jKj​ nonempty and the scalars xjx_jxj​ nonnegative; with an empty activity set the Minkowski sum is empty and every x≥0x\ge0x≥0 becomes feasible. The support functional is valued in the extended reals, and its conversion to a real matrix entry is exact only under the finiteness assumption, which the paper secures by deleting columns. The ball computation needs the Euclidean norm and its dual characterisation of the maximum of a coordinate over a ball.

Formalization scope

  • Vectors are Fin m → ℝ and Fin n → ℝ, with indices 0,…,m−10,\dots,m-10,…,m−1 in place of 1,…,m1,\dots,m1,…,m; the order on vectors is componentwise.
  • Feasibility of (I) is the Minkowski-sum inclusion (∑ j, x j • K j) ⊆ R (pointwise set operations) together with x≥0x\ge0x≥0. It is not defined as "for every choice aj∈Kja_j\in K_jaj​∈Kj​", which would make milestones 1 and 5 trivial, and Aˉ\bar AAˉ is constructed from the KjK_jKj​, not an arbitrary matrix dominating MMM, which would make the goal trivial.
  • δ∗\delta^*δ∗ is valued in EReal. The entries of Aˉ\bar AAˉ are its real conversions, so every statement mentioning Aˉ\bar AAˉ assumes Kj≠∅K_j\neq\emptysetKj​=∅ and δ∗(ei∣Kj)<∞\delta^*(e_i\mid K_j)<\inftyδ∗(ei​∣Kj​)<∞, the paper's standing assumptions (pp. 1154–1156). Convexity of the KjK_jKj​ is also kept as a hypothesis wherever the paper has it, although only the LEMMA uses convexity (of KKK).
  • An optimal solution is a feasible point attaining the maximum of c⋅xc\cdot xc⋅x; the paper writes sup⁡\supsup and does not discuss attainment. Because the goal identifies the feasible sets, the two problems also have equal suprema.
  • Hyperspheres use the Euclidean norm (EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin m)), not the sup norm of Fin m → ℝ, with radii ρj≥0\rho_j\ge0ρj​≥0.
  • The support functional restates the published FenchelRobust.Counterpart.supportFun with the same body.
  • Not formalized: Magnanti's extension to ≥\ge≥ and === rows (p. 1156), and the remarks on (GLP) and stochastic programming. Contributions of proofs of any milestone, and of an EReal statement equating the optimal values, are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. L. Soyster, Convex Programming with Set-Inclusive Constraints and Applications to Inexact Linear Programming, Operations Research 21(5), 1154–1157, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.21.5.1154
  • G. B. Dantzig, Linear Programming and Extensions, Princeton University Press, 1963. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400884179
  • A. Ben-Tal and A. Nemirovski, Robust Convex Optimization, Mathematics of Operations Research 23(4), 769–805, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.23.4.769
  • A. Ben-Tal and A. Nemirovski, Robust solutions of Linear Programming problems contaminated with uncertain data, Mathematical Programming 88, 411–424, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00011380
  • D. Bertsimas and M. Sim, The Price of Robustness, Operations Research 52(1), 35–53, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1030.0065
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Inventory Control in a Fluctuating Demand Environment I: With Linear Order Costs, a World-Dependent Basestock Policy Is Optimal over the Infinite HorizonResearch Paper

Motivation

An inventory controller must decide how much to order while demand changes with an observed external condition. A single demand rate misses that dependence: the same inventory position can justify different orders when the condition changes. Song and Zipkin's 1993 study asks whether a simple policy remains optimal when the condition follows a continuous-time Markov chain and orders arrive after a random lead time. The answer for linear ordering costs is a world-dependent basestock policy: each world state has one target inventory position, and an order raises the current position to that target when it lies below it.

The policy claim concerns an infinite horizon. It is stronger than showing that a particular collection of target levels performs well or that such a policy minimizes a one-step cost. Theorem 2 of Song and Zipkin identifies the targets through a limiting value function and establishes optimality for the full discounted problem. This mission formalizes that theorem and the finite-stage results the authors use to state its limit precisely.

Setting

The world state iii belongs to a nonempty countable set III. The world evolves according to a conservative continuous-time Markov generator Q=(qij)Q=(q_{ij})Q=(qij​), with exit rate qi=−qiiq_i=-q_{ii}qi​=−qii​. When the world is in state iii, customers demand individual units at rate λi≥0\lambda_i\ge0λi​≥0. The exit rates and demand rates are bounded above. Inventory is fully backlogged: a negative inventory level records unmet demand. The controller observes the world state and the inventory position x∈Zx\in\mathbb Zx∈Z, which includes outstanding orders, and chooses an order-up-to position y≥xy\ge xy≥x.

An order has actual unit cost cˉ≥0\bar c\ge0cˉ≥0 and may have fixed cost Kˉ≥0\bar K\ge0Kˉ≥0. This mission takes the linear-cost case, so the discounted fixed cost is K=0K=0K=0. The lead time LLL is a finite nonnegative random time, independent of the world and demand process. Its Laplace transform discounts the ordering costs to c=cˉ E[e−αL]c=\bar c\,E[e^{-\alpha L}]c=cˉE[e−αL], where α>0\alpha>0α>0 is the discount rate. Holding one unit costs h>0h>0h>0 per unit time; backlogging one unit costs p>0p>0p>0.

Write DLiD_L^iDLi​ for the number of demands during the lead time conditional on initial world state iii. The cost rate of an inventory level zzz is C^(z)=−pz\widehat C(z)=-pzC(z)=−pz for z<0z<0z<0 and hzhzhz otherwise. The lead-time cost and myopic cost are

C(i,y)=E[e−αLC^(y−DLi)],G+(i,y)=(1−γ)cy+βC(i,y),C(i,y)=E[e^{-\alpha L}\widehat C(y-D_L^i)],\qquad G^+(i,y)=(1-\gamma)cy+\beta C(i,y),C(i,y)=E[e−αLC(y−DLi​)],G+(i,y)=(1−γ)cy+βC(i,y),

where μ>0\mu>0μ>0 is a uniformization rate at least sup⁡iqi+sup⁡iλi\sup_iq_i+\sup_i\lambda_isupi​qi​+supi​λi​, β=(μ+α)−1\beta=(\mu+\alpha)^{-1}β=(μ+α)−1, and γ=βμ\gamma=\beta\muγ=βμ. The paper's Assumption 1, αcˉ<p\alpha\bar c<pαcˉ<p, applies to the later results. It ensures the myopic cost has finite nonnegative minimizers. The smallest such minimizer in world state iii is y+(i)y^+(i)y+(i), and ymin⁡+=min⁡iy+(i)y^+_{\min}=\min_i y^+(i)ymin+​=mini​y+(i).

With zero fixed cost and zero terminal cost, the nnn-stage transformed cost Wn(i,x)W_n(i,x)Wn​(i,x) minimizes the auxiliary cost Gn(i,y)G_n(i,y)Gn​(i,y) over y≥xy\ge xy≥x. Each GnG_nGn​ combines the myopic cost with the expected discounted continuation after a demand, a world-state jump, or a self-loop. Let W∞W_\inftyW∞​ and G∞G_\inftyG∞​ denote their pointwise limits. A basestock policy π(y)\pi(y)π(y) orders to max⁡{x,y(i)}\max\{x,y(i)\}max{x,y(i)} in state (i,x)(i,x)(i,x); it never cancels an outstanding order.

Formalization targets

The main target is the finite, smallest global minimizer y∗(i)y^*(i)y∗(i) of G∞(i,⋅)G_\infty(i,\cdot)G∞​(i,⋅) for each world state, with the inequalities of Theorem 2(c):

0≤ymin⁡+≤y∗(i)≤y∞∗(i)≤y+(i),G∞(i,y∞∗(i))=min⁡z∈ZG∞(i,z).0\le y^+_{\min}\le y^*(i)\le y^*_\infty(i)\le y^+(i), \qquad G_\infty(i,y^*_\infty(i))=\min_{z\in\mathbb Z}G_\infty(i,z).0≤ymin+​≤y∗(i)≤y∞∗​(i)≤y+(i),G∞​(i,y∞∗​(i))=z∈Zmin​G∞​(i,z).

Here y∞∗(i)y^*_\infty(i)y∞∗​(i) is the limit of the smallest finite-stage minimizers yn∗(i)y^*_n(i)yn∗​(i). Theorem 2(e) then asserts that π(y∗)\pi(y^*)π(y∗) has minimum infinite-horizon expected discounted cost from every state among all feasible policies. The milestone list states Lemmas 1, 2 and 4, Corollaries 1 and 2, all parts of Theorem 1 as identified by the paper's internal references, and the limit and optimality-equation clauses of Theorem 2. Together they fix the finite-stage and limiting objects used by the goal.

Significance

The theorem reduces a decision at every integer inventory position to one integer target for each observed world state. It gives an exact policy structure for a model with a changing demand rate and random lead time, rather than an approximation derived from a constant-demand model. The limiting inequalities also locate an optimal target relative to the myopic target and the finite-stage targets, giving a mathematically specified range for policy computation. These claims are the linear-cost part of Song and Zipkin's analysis; the paper proves the result but supplies no Lean proof.

Formalization will leave reusable definitions for countable-state uniformization with a demand counter, integer convexity of inventory cost functions, and discounted costs of history-dependent policies. The mission's theorem statements compile as open goals. The remaining work is to verify the analytic properties of the lead-time demand law, the finite-stage inequalities, convergence, and the infinite-horizon policy comparison. The fixed-order-cost and monotone-world-state results of the paper are separate missions.

Difficulty

The world can have countably many states, so a continuation value includes a series over possible world jumps. The stage cost grows with inventory position, so a bounded-cost finite-state dynamic-programming theorem does not directly cover the model. The minimization is over an unbounded set of integers, and the minimizers themselves change with the stage number. Convexity of a one-stage cost alone does not establish that the limiting policy beats policies that use the entire observation history. These are the specific gaps the paper's bound, ordered-difference, and limit results address.

Formalization scope

World states are a nonempty countable Lean type, inventory positions and order-up-to levels are integers, and costs are real until policy evaluation. The lead-time law is a probability measure on finite nonnegative real times, independent of world and demand. The demand-count law is defined by exact Poisson uniformization at rate μ\muμ, with demand, world-jump, and self-loop branches. The infinite-horizon policy cost uses extended nonnegative reals and a supremum of finite-horizon costs, so it can express an infinite expected cost without a default real value. Policies may depend on all past observed states; the goal compares its basestock policy against every feasible deterministic policy in this class. Randomized policies are omitted because they cannot improve expected nonnegative costs on this countable state space.

Assumption 1 is attached only to the results that use it. The linear-cost recursion has K=0K=0K=0 and W0=0W_0=0W0​=0. Integer convexity means nondecreasing forward differences. Smallest minimizers and the minimum across world states are asserted to exist; neither is encoded by an integer infimum that returns a default on an empty or unbounded set. The goal requires an actual optimal policy cost comparison from every state, so solving the limiting optimality equation only within basestock policies cannot close it. Contributions to the lead-time mixture, integer convexity, boundedness of the real series and infima, and unrestricted policy comparison all fit this scope.

Selected references

  • Jing-Sheng Song and Paul Zipkin, Inventory Control in a Fluctuating Demand Environment, Operations Research 41(2):351–370, 1993. DOI 10.1287/opre.41.2.351.
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Formal VerificationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Reaching Agreement in the Presence of Faults 1: With n ≥ 3m + 1 Processors, the Recursive Majority Procedure on (m + 1)-Level Scenarios Assures Interactive Consistency for m FaultsResearch Paper

Motivation

A fault-tolerant system often replicates a computation on several processors and needs the nonfaulty ones to act on the same data, even though some processors may fail in arbitrary ways: send wrong values, send different values to different recipients, or lie about what they were told. Pease, Shostak and Lamport posed the question in 1980, motivated by the SIFT fault-tolerant aircraft-control computer under development at SRI (Wensley et al. 1978), where it arises in clock synchronization among other places: nnn processors, at most mmm of them faulty, communicate by two-party messages whose sender is always identifiable, and each holds a private value. Can the nonfaulty processors all compute the same vector of values, one entry per processor, whose entry for every nonfaulty processor is that processor's true value? The paper (J. ACM 27 (1980) 228–234) calls this interactive consistency and settles it: possible if and only if n≥3m+1n \ge 3m+1n≥3m+1 when messages can be forged in relay, and possible for every n≥mn \ge mn≥m when they cannot. The same problem, under the name Byzantine generals, became the standard model of arbitrary ("Byzantine") failures in distributed computing (Lamport, Shostak & Pease 1982); the 3m+13m+13m+1 bound underlies the quorum sizes of later replication protocols.

This mission covers the positive half of the paper's characterization: Section 3's recursive procedure, which achieves interactive consistency with n≥3m+1n\ge 3m+1n≥3m+1 processors in m+1m+1m+1 rounds of message exchange.

Setting

Let PPP be a finite set of n=∣P∣n = |P|n=∣P∣ processors and VVV a set of values. A string over a set SSS is a finite sequence p1p2⋯prp_1p_2\cdots p_rp1​p2​⋯pr​ of elements of SSS, repetitions allowed. For k≥1k\ge 1k≥1 a kkk-level scenario is a map σ\sigmaσ from the nonempty strings over PPP of length at most k+1k+1k+1 to VVV. The value σ(p)\sigma(p)σ(p) is ppp's private value VpV_pVp​; for r≥2r\ge 2r≥2, σ(p1p2⋯pr)\sigma(p_1p_2\cdots p_r)σ(p1​p2​⋯pr​) is the value p2p_2p2​ tells p1p_1p1​ that p3p_3p3​ told p2p_2p2​ … that prp_rpr​ told pr−1p_{r-1}pr−1​ is prp_rpr​'s private value. A kkk-level scenario records the outcome of kkk rounds of message exchange.

Faults are modeled by a set N⊆PN\subseteq PN⊆P of nonfaulty processors, unknown to the processors. Nonfaulty processors relay truthfully, so σ\sigmaσ is consistent with NNN when

σ(pqw)=σ(qw)(q∈N, p∈P, w a string over P, ∣pqw∣≤k+1).\sigma(pqw) = \sigma(qw)\qquad (q\in N,\ p\in P,\ w \text{ a string over } P,\ |pqw|\le k+1).σ(pqw)=σ(qw)(q∈N, p∈P, w a string over P, ∣pqw∣≤k+1).

Faulty processors are otherwise unconstrained. A processor ppp sees only its view σp\sigma_pσp​, the restriction of σ\sigmaσ to strings beginning with ppp.

The procedure (p. 230). Processor ppp computes the entry for processor qqq as follows, with nnn and mmm the current processor count and fault bound:

  1. If some Q⊆PQ\subseteq PQ⊆P with ∣Q∣>(n+m)/2|Q|>(n+m)/2∣Q∣>(n+m)/2 and some vvv satisfy σp(pwq)=v\sigma_p(pwq)=vσp​(pwq)=v for every string www over QQQ of length ≤m\le m≤m, record vvv.
  2. Otherwise apply the procedure for m−1m-1m−1, n−1n-1n−1 to the processor set P−{q}P-\{q\}P−{q} and the view σ^p(pw)=σp(pwq)\hat\sigma_p(pw)=\sigma_p(pwq)σ^p​(pw)=σp​(pwq), obtaining a vector of n−1n-1n−1 entries. If at least ⌊(n+m)/2⌋\lfloor (n+m)/2\rfloor⌊(n+m)/2⌋ of them agree, record the common value; otherwise record NIL.

In Lean this is InteractiveConsistency.OralAlgorithm.record m P τ q with τ = fun w => σ (p :: w), values in Option V with none for NIL.

Formalization targets

Goal: the procedure assures interactive consistency

For n≥3m+1n\ge 3m+1n≥3m+1, for every N⊆PN\subseteq PN⊆P with ∣N∣≥n−m|N|\ge n-m∣N∣≥n−m and every (m+1)(m+1)(m+1)-level scenario σ\sigmaσ consistent with NNN,

record(m,P,σp,q)=σ(q)(p,q∈N),record(m,P,σp,r)=record(m,P,σp′,r)(p,p′∈N, r∈P).\mathrm{record}(m,P,\sigma_p,q)=\sigma(q)\quad(p,q\in N),\qquad \mathrm{record}(m,P,\sigma_p,r)=\mathrm{record}(m,P,\sigma_{p'},r)\quad(p,p'\in N,\ r\in P).record(m,P,σp​,q)=σ(q)(p,q∈N),record(m,P,σp​,r)=record(m,P,σp′​,r)(p,p′∈N, r∈P).

This is procedure_assures_ic. It is the paper's claim about this procedure, not an existence statement.

Milestones, in the order the paper's proof uses them

  1. Nonfaulty qqq (p. 231): for p,q∈Np,q\in Np,q∈N, step (1) succeeds and ppp records VqV_qVq​.
  2. Two step-(1) quorums agree (p. 231): if p,p′∈Np,p'\in Np,p′∈N find quorums Q1,Q2Q_1,Q_2Q1​,Q2​ with values v,v′v,v'v,v′, then v=v′v=v'v=v′.
  3. The subscenario (p. 230): for faulty qqq, σ^(w)=σ(wq)\hat\sigma(w)=\sigma(wq)σ^(w)=σ(wq) is an mmm-level scenario on P−{q}P-\{q\}P−{q} consistent with NNN, and ∣N∣≥(n−1)−(m−1)|N|\ge (n-1)-(m-1)∣N∣≥(n−1)−(m−1).
  4. The Q^\hat QQ^​ claim (p. 231): if Q,vQ,vQ,v satisfy step (1) for p′p'p′ and qqq, then Q^=Q−{q}\hat Q=Q-\{q\}Q^​=Q−{q} has at least ⌊(n+m)/2⌋\lfloor(n+m)/2\rfloor⌊(n+m)/2⌋ members and Q^,v\hat Q, vQ^​,v satisfy step (1) of the recursive call for every q′∈Q^q'\in\hat Qq′∈Q^​.

Significance

The theorem is the upper bound in the tight characterization n≥3m+1n\ge 3m+1n≥3m+1 of when interactive consistency is achievable with unauthenticated messages; the matching impossibility (the paper's Section 4 THEOREM) shows that no procedure, with any number of rounds, does better. The procedure is the ancestor of the "oral messages" algorithm OM(m)\mathrm{OM}(m)OM(m) of the Byzantine generals paper, and its quorum arithmetic (∣Q∣>(n+m)/2|Q|>(n+m)/2∣Q∣>(n+m)/2, intersections of two quorums containing a nonfaulty member) recurs throughout Byzantine fault-tolerant replication.

The result is proved in the paper, in a half-page induction. What this mission adds is a machine-checked proof against an explicit model of scenarios, views and consistency with a bounded number of rounds. Machine-checked proofs exist for the related OM(m)\mathrm{OM}(m)OM(m) algorithm of the later Byzantine generals paper in other proof systems; this procedure, with its quorum-based step (1), has to our knowledge not been formalized in Lean, and nothing on message-passing agreement exists on this platform.

Difficulty

Each step of the paper's proof is short, but the bookkeeping is where an argument breaks. The recursion changes three things at once: the processor set loses qqq, the fault bound drops by one, and the scenario becomes σ^(w)=σ(wq)\hat\sigma(w)=\sigma(wq)σ^(w)=σ(wq) of one level less. The induction hypothesis must therefore be stated for every finite processor set and every scenario, and applied to a subscenario whose consistency is inherited only for strings of the right length. The mixed case, where one nonfaulty processor exits at step (1) and another recurses, is the delicate one: the two processors' computations take different branches, and since qqq is faulty nothing forces either value to be qqq's private value. The thresholds are exact: ∣Q∣>(n+m)/2|Q|>(n+m)/2∣Q∣>(n+m)/2 in step (1) and ⌊(n+m)/2⌋\lfloor(n+m)/2\rfloor⌊(n+m)/2⌋ agreeing entries in step (2), both in the current nnn and mmm; off-by-one changes in either break the case analysis. Finally, step (2)'s majority value must be shown unique, so that two processors with the same vector record the same value.

Formalization scope

Processors form a Finset α with decidable equality; strings are List α, read left to right (the receiver first, the originator last), so σp(pwq)\sigma_p(pwq)σp​(pwq) is σ (p :: (w ++ [q])). A scenario is a total function List α → V; consistency with NNN (ConsistentUpTo P N (m + 1) σ) constrains it only on strings over PPP of length at most m+2m+2m+2, the domain of an (m+1)(m+1)(m+1)-level scenario and all the procedure reads. The procedure receives only the view fun w => σ (p :: w), never σ\sigmaσ or NNN. The fault hypothesis ∣N∣≥n−m|N|\ge n-m∣N∣≥n−m is P.card ≤ N.card + m; m=0m=0m=0 is included.

Explicit readings of the paper's prose: "size >(n+m)/2>(n+m)/2>(n+m)/2" is P.card + m < 2 * Q.card; ⌊(n+m)/2⌋\lfloor(n+m)/2\rfloor⌊(n+m)/2⌋ is natural-number division; "strings over QQQ of length ≤m\le m≤m" includes the empty string and allows repetitions; the step-(2) vector is indexed by P.erase q and includes ppp's own entry; the recorded value in step (1) is σp(pq)\sigma_p(pq)σp​(pq) (the empty string forces it); when several values reach the step-(2) threshold one is chosen deterministically from the vector (under the goal's hypotheses at most one does); for m=0m=0m=0 a failing step (1) records NIL (never reached under the hypotheses). Two printed slips are corrected in the Lean: "records VqV_qVq​ and qqq" (for "for qqq") and "σp′(p′wq′)\sigma_{p'}(p'wq')σp′​(p′wq′)" (for σ^p′\hat\sigma_{p'}σ^p′​).

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: the procedure never sees σ\sigmaσ itself (with it, recording σ(q)\sigma(q)σ(q) would be trivial), consistency constrains only relays by nonfaulty processors, and NNN ranges over every subset of size at least n−mn-mn−m.

The development needs only finite sets and lists; no library beyond Mathlib is required. The quorum-intersection lemmas and the subscenario construction are reusable for other oral-message protocols. Contributions welcome: proofs of the four milestones, the goal by induction on mmm, and a computable version of the procedure for concrete instances. This is mission 1 of a series of three on this paper; mission 2 formalizes the impossibility THEOREM for n≤3mn\le 3mn≤3m (Section 4), and mission 3 the authenticated-message procedure for every n≥mn\ge mn≥m (Section 5).

Selected references

  • M. Pease, R. Shostak, L. Lamport, Reaching agreement in the presence of faults, Journal of the ACM 27(2), 1980, 228–234. https://doi.org/10.1145/322186.322188
  • L. Lamport, R. Shostak, M. Pease, The Byzantine generals problem, ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems 4(3), 1982, 382–401. https://doi.org/10.1145/357172.357176
  • J. H. Wensley et al., SIFT: Design and analysis of a fault-tolerant computer for aircraft control, Proceedings of the IEEE 66(10), 1978, 1240–1255. https://doi.org/10.1109/PROC.1978.11114
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Regenerative Stochastic Processes 3: A Cumulative Process Has Mean (κ₁/μ₁)t + o(t) and Variance (t/μ₁){σ₂² − 2ρσ₁σ₂κ₁/μ₁ + σ₁²(κ₁/μ₁)²} + o(t)Research Paper

Why cumulative-process moments matter

Many stochastic systems accumulate a real-valued quantity while repeatedly returning to a state at which a new cycle begins. A queue may accumulate work or cost, a component may accumulate wear, and a recurrent system may accumulate time in a state. The observations at a fixed clock time usually cut through a cycle. This makes the moments of the observed process different from the moments of a sum stopped exactly at a regeneration epoch. W. L. Smith introduced cumulative processes to state mean, variance, ergodic, and central limit results for this setting in a common language (Smith 1955, §5).

The mean growth rate describes the long-run reward per unit time. The variance growth rate also records the dependence between a cycle's length and its reward. That dependence matters in systems where unusually long cycles tend to accumulate unusually large rewards; assuming the two are independent would erase a term in Smith's formula (Smith 1955, Theorem 8). This mission targets the exact first-order mean and variance asymptotics, along with the source results Smith uses to pass from completed cycles to observations at ordinary times.

Renewal and cumulative-process setting

Work on one probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega,P)(Ω,P). The cycle lengths t1,t2,…t_1,t_2,\ldotst1​,t2​,… are nonnegative, independent, identically distributed random variables whose common law is not concentrated at zero. Set T0=0T_0=0T0​=0 and Tn=t1+⋯+tnT_n=t_1+\cdots+t_nTn​=t1​+⋯+tn​ for n≥1n\geq1n≥1. Thus TnT_nTn​ is the nnnth renewal epoch after the initial renewal at time zero. For t≥0t\geq0t≥0, ntn_tnt​ counts the epochs Tk≤tT_k\leq tTk​≤t, including T0T_0T0​. The corresponding renewal function is HU(t)=E[nt]H_U(t)=\mathbb E[n_t]HU​(t)=E[nt​], where U=δ0U=\delta_0U=δ0​ is Smith's zero-delay law. These conventions come from §2·1 and §5·2 of the paper (Smith 1955, pp. 9 and 23).

A cumulative process wtw_twt​ is real valued, starts at w0=0w_0=0w0​=0, and has almost surely bounded variation on each finite nonnegative time interval. The cycle reward is yn=wTn−wTn−1y_n=w_{T_n}-w_{T_{n-1}}yn​=wTn​​−wTn−1​​. Write w~t\tilde w_tw~t​ for the total variation of the path on [0,t][0,t][0,t] and y~n\tilde y_ny~​n​ for its variation on [Tn−1,Tn][T_{n-1},T_n][Tn−1​,Tn​]. For the moment results, the cycle vectors (tn,yn,y~n)(t_n,y_n,\tilde y_n)(tn​,yn​,y~​n​) are independent and identically distributed across nnn. Their coordinates within one cycle may be dependent. This joint-cycle interpretation is required by Smith's common joint distribution for (ti,yi)(t_i,y_i)(ti​,yi​) in the proof of Lemma 5 (Smith 1955, pp. 23–24).

Let μr=E[t1r]\mu_r=\mathbb E[t_1^r]μr​=E[t1r​], κr=E[y1r]\kappa_r=\mathbb E[y_1^r]κr​=E[y1r​], and κ~r=E[y~1r]\tilde\kappa_r=\mathbb E[\tilde y_1^r]κ~r​=E[y~​1r​] when the moments exist. Put σ12=var⁡(t1)\sigma_1^2=\operatorname{var}(t_1)σ12​=var(t1​), σ22=var⁡(y1)\sigma_2^2=\operatorname{var}(y_1)σ22​=var(y1​), and c=cov⁡(t1,y1)c=\operatorname{cov}(t_1,y_1)c=cov(t1​,y1​). Smith writes c=ρσ1σ2c=\rho\sigma_1\sigma_2c=ρσ1​σ2​, with ρ\rhoρ the cycle length–reward correlation. The covariance remains defined when either variance is zero. The auxiliary sum Yt=∑i=1nt+1yiY_t=\sum_{i=1}^{n_t+1}y_iYt​=∑i=1nt​+1​yi​ includes a reward beyond the cycles completed by time ttt, exactly as in (5·2·1) (Smith 1955, p. 23).

Formalization targets

The first target is the mean part of Theorem 8. If μ1\mu_1μ1​ and κ~1\tilde\kappa_1κ~1​ are finite, then

Ewt=κ1μ1t+o(t)(t→∞).\mathbb E w_t=\frac{\kappa_1}{\mu_1}t+o(t)\qquad(t\to\infty).Ewt​=μ1​κ1​​t+o(t)(t→∞).

The goal includes the variance part under the additional assumptions μ2<∞\mu_2<\inftyμ2​<∞ and κ~2<∞\tilde\kappa_2<\inftyκ~2​<∞:

var⁡(wt)=tμ1{σ22−2cκ1μ1+σ12(κ1μ1)2}+o(t).\operatorname{var}(w_t)=\frac{t}{\mu_1} \left\{\sigma_2^2-2c\frac{\kappa_1}{\mu_1} +\sigma_1^2\left(\frac{\kappa_1}{\mu_1}\right)^2\right\}+o(t).var(wt​)=μ1​t​{σ22​−2cμ1​κ1​​+σ12​(μ1​κ1​​)2}+o(t).

Both limits are along real time, and neither assumes that a cycle's length and reward are independent. The milestone list contains the mean and variance limits for YtY_tYt​, the cycle-moment estimate used for the incomplete cycle, and Theorem 8(i) as the explicit mean target (Smith 1955, Lemmas 4, 5, 9 and Theorem 8).

What the result supplies

The theorem gives a linear approximation to the process's expected value and variance, with errors smaller than the observation horizon. The leading variance coefficient separates reward variability, cycle-length variability, and their covariance. It can therefore be used without a false independence assumption when the duration of a cycle affects the amount accumulated during it. The formulas are first-order statements; they do not claim a bounded error or a limiting distribution (Smith 1955, (5·3·6)–(5·3·7)).

Formalizing these statements requires reusable definitions of renewal counts, path variation, random-cycle rewards, and the moment conditions that make expectations and variances genuine. The statement is a draft target, not a claim that Smith's proof already has a machine-checked reconstruction. A completed development would also give formal tools for other regenerative reward models whose observations occur between renewal epochs.

Main mathematical difficulty

The auxiliary sum YtY_tYt​ is sampled at a random index, while wtw_twt​ is observed at a deterministic clock time. They differ by part of a cycle that crosses ttt. Ordinary laws for sums of a fixed number of independent rewards do not directly control either this random index or the crossing-cycle contribution. At second order, a bound on the mean difference alone does not determine the variance difference. The length–reward covariance must also survive the passage from completed cycles to the continuous-time process (Smith 1955, pp. 24–28).

Formalization scope and conventions

Lean uses real time and real-valued paths. Cycle laws are represented by random variables on one probability space; the renewal at zero is explicit. The renewal count takes the value zero on a path with infinitely many renewals before a finite time, a null event under the nondegenerate i.i.d. length law. Variation is represented by Mathlib's extended nonnegative eVariationOn and converted to a real number only under the almost-sure bounded-variation condition. The theorem states integrability of wtw_twt​ and its square as consequences of the cycle-moment assumptions, avoiding default values for divergent real integrals or variance. A finite rrrth moment is an integrability condition, not a comparison between a real number and infinity.

The paper's exact identity (5·2·2) is off by one under its own definitions of ntn_tnt​ and YtY_tYt​; the mission targets its valid asymptotic consequence (5·2·3). The last variance in the printed Lemma 5 coefficient is σ22\sigma_2^2σ22​, while Theorem 8 and the calculation require σ12\sigma_1^2σ12​. Milestone provenance retains the printed text; the Lean statements use the corrected coefficient. Lemma 9 is formalized for the absolute pppth moment E∣y1∣p\mathbb E|y_1|^pE∣y1​∣p of the cycle increment, which is the printed statement for a nonnegative cycle quantity such as the variation y~n\tilde y_ny~​n​ to which Theorem 8 applies it. Solvers may contribute the renewal and random-index estimates needed for the listed targets. A definition that makes rewards independent of cycle lengths would remove the covariance term and would not represent this mission's model.

Selected references

  • W. L. Smith, Regenerative stochastic processes, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series A 232(1188):6–31, 1955. DOI: 10.1098/rspa.1955.0198.
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AnalysisFunctional AnalysisOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Implicit-Function Theorem for a Class of Nonsmooth Functions: Strong Approximation by a Function with Lipschitzian Inverse Yields a Unique Lipschitzian Implicit FunctionResearch Paper

Why a nonsmooth implicit-function theorem

The classical implicit-function theorem solves an equation F(x,y)=0F(x, y) = 0F(x,y)=0 for xxx as a function of a parameter yyy near a known solution (x0,y0)(x_0, y_0)(x0​,y0​), provided FFF is (strongly) Fréchet differentiable in xxx with an invertible partial derivative. Much of optimization does not meet that hypothesis. Optimality conditions of constrained problems, complementarity problems and variational inequalities are routinely rewritten as equations involving the projection onto a convex set, the componentwise min⁡\minmin, or the normal map of a polyhedron. These maps are Lipschitzian and piecewise smooth, but not differentiable. Sensitivity analysis asks whether the solution of such a system moves Lipschitz-continuously with the problem data, and the classical theorem cannot answer it.

Stephen M. Robinson, An Implicit-Function Theorem for a Class of Nonsmooth Functions, Mathematics of Operations Research 16(2), 1991, pp. 292–309, gives a theorem with the same shape as the classical one, in which differentiability is replaced by strong approximation by a function whose inverse is Lipschitzian. The paper's §4 applies it to parametric variational inequalities over polyhedral sets through the normal map.

Timeline. Robinson's Strongly regular generalized equations (Math. Oper. Res. 5, 1980) proved an implicit-function theorem for generalized equations under a linearization hypothesis called strong regularity. The 1991 paper reformulates that idea for single-valued nonsmooth equations: the approximating function fff need not be linear. Lemma 3.1 extends the Banach perturbation lemma for linear operators (Kantorovich–Akilov, Functional Analysis, Th. 4(2.V)) to Lipschitzian functions; after acceptance, A. Ioffe pointed the author to closely related results of Dmitruk, Milyutin and Osmolovskii (Lyusternik's theorem and the theory of extrema, Russian Math. Surveys, 1980, Theorems 1.2, 1.3), credited in the paper's footnote.

Setting

Let XXX, YYY, ZZZ be real normed linear spaces, with XXX complete. Fix x0∈Xx_0 \in Xx0​∈X, y0∈Yy_0 \in Yy0​∈Y, a neighborhood Ξ\XiΞ of x0x_0x0​ and a neighborhood HHH of y0y_0y0​. Let FFF map Ξ×H\Xi \times HΞ×H to ZZZ, with F(x0,y0)=0F(x_0, y_0) = 0F(x0​,y0​)=0, and let fff map Ξ\XiΞ to ZZZ, with f(x0)=0f(x_0) = 0f(x0​)=0. B(x,ρ)B(x, \rho)B(x,ρ) denotes the closed ball of radius ρ\rhoρ about xxx.

Expansion modulus. For a map fff between metric spaces and a set SSS,

δ(f,S)=inf⁡{∥f(x1)−f(x2)∥∥x1−x2∥:x1≠x2, x1,x2∈S}.\delta(f, S) = \inf\left\{ \frac{\|f(x_1) - f(x_2)\|}{\|x_1 - x_2\|} : x_1 \ne x_2,\ x_1, x_2 \in S \right\}.δ(f,S)=inf{∥x1​−x2​∥∥f(x1​)−f(x2​)∥​:x1​=x2​, x1​,x2​∈S}.

If δ(f,S)>0\delta(f,S) > 0δ(f,S)>0, then fff is one-to-one on SSS and its inverse is Lipschitzian with modulus δ(f,S)−1\delta(f,S)^{-1}δ(f,S)−1. In Lean the mission works with lower bounds: ExpansionAtLeast f S d says d ∥x1−x2∥≤∥f(x1)−f(x2)∥d\,\|x_1 - x_2\| \le \|f(x_1) - f(x_2)\|d∥x1​−x2​∥≤∥f(x1​)−f(x2​)∥ on SSS, i.e. d≤δ(f,S)d \le \delta(f,S)d≤δ(f,S).

Strong approximation (Definition 2.4). fff strongly approximates FFF in xxx at (x0,y0)(x_0, y_0)(x0​,y0​), written f≈xFf \approx_x Ff≈x​F (Lean: StronglyApproxInX f F x₀ y₀), if for each ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0 there are neighborhoods UUU of x0x_0x0​ and VVV of y0y_0y0​ with

∥[F(x,y)−f(x)]−[F(x′,y)−f(x′)]∥≤ε∥x−x′∥(x,x′∈U, y∈V).\big\|[F(x, y) - f(x)] - [F(x', y) - f(x')]\big\| \le \varepsilon \|x - x'\| \qquad (x, x' \in U,\ y \in V).​[F(x,y)−f(x)]−[F(x′,y)−f(x′)]​≤ε∥x−x′∥(x,x′∈U, y∈V).

When fff is the partial derivative map x↦Fx(x0,y0)(x−x0)x \mapsto F_x(x_0,y_0)(x - x_0)x↦Fx​(x0​,y0​)(x−x0​) this is strong partial Fréchet differentiability; in general fff may be piecewise linear or any map with a Lipschitzian inverse.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2 (p. 299)

Assume (a) f≈xFf \approx_x Ff≈x​F at (x0,y0)(x_0, y_0)(x0​,y0​); (b) for each x∈Ξx \in \Xix∈Ξ, F(x,⋅)F(x, \cdot)F(x,⋅) is Lipschitzian on HHH with modulus φ\varphiφ; (c) f(Ξ)f(\Xi)f(Ξ) is a neighborhood of 000 in ZZZ; (d) δ(f,Ξ)=:d0>0\delta(f, \Xi) =: d_0 > 0δ(f,Ξ)=:d0​>0. Then for each λ>d0−1φ\lambda > d_0^{-1}\varphiλ>d0−1​φ there are neighborhoods U⊆ΞU \subseteq \XiU⊆Ξ of x0x_0x0​, V⊆HV \subseteq HV⊆H of y0y_0y0​ and a function x:V→Ux : V \to Ux:V→U with

x(y0)=x0,∥x(y1)−x(y2)∥≤λ∥y1−y2∥ (y1,y2∈V),{ξ∈U:F(ξ,y)=0}={x(y)} (y∈V).x(y_0) = x_0, \qquad \|x(y_1) - x(y_2)\| \le \lambda \|y_1 - y_2\| \ (y_1, y_2 \in V), \qquad \{\xi \in U : F(\xi, y) = 0\} = \{x(y)\} \ (y \in V).x(y0​)=x0​,∥x(y1​)−x(y2​)∥≤λ∥y1​−y2​∥ (y1​,y2​∈V),{ξ∈U:F(ξ,y)=0}={x(y)} (y∈V).

Every λ\lambdaλ strictly above φ/d0\varphi/d_0φ/d0​ is claimed; λ=φ/d0\lambda = \varphi/d_0λ=φ/d0​ is not.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 3.1 (p. 298), the Lipschitz perturbation lemma: if fff maps Ω\OmegaΩ onto a ball B(y0,α)B(y_0, \alpha)B(y0​,α), hhh is Lipschitzian with modulus η<δ:=δ(f,Ω)\eta < \delta := \delta(f, \Omega)η<δ:=δ(f,Ω), Ω⊇B(x0,δ−1α)\Omega \supseteq B(x_0, \delta^{-1}\alpha)Ω⊇B(x0​,δ−1α) and θ:=(1−ηδ−1)α−∥h(x0)∥≥0\theta := (1 - \eta\delta^{-1})\alpha - \|h(x_0)\| \ge 0θ:=(1−ηδ−1)α−∥h(x0​)∥≥0, then
(f+h)(B(x0,δ−1α))⊇B(y0,θ),δ(f+h,Ω)≥δ−η>0.(f + h)\big(B(x_0, \delta^{-1}\alpha)\big) \supseteq B(y_0, \theta), \qquad \delta(f + h, \Omega) \ge \delta - \eta > 0.(f+h)(B(x0​,δ−1α))⊇B(y0​,θ),δ(f+h,Ω)≥δ−η>0.
  1. (3.1)–(3.2) in the proof of Theorem 3.2 (p. 300): for every ε∈(0,d0)\varepsilon \in (0, d_0)ε∈(0,d0​) there are α,κ>0\alpha, \kappa > 0α,κ>0 and a neighborhood V⊆HV \subseteq HV⊆H of y0y_0y0​ with Ω=B(x0,d0−1α)⊆Ξ\Omega = B(x_0, d_0^{-1}\alpha) \subseteq \XiΩ=B(x0​,d0−1​α)⊆Ξ such that for each y∈Vy \in Vy∈V
δ(F(⋅,y),Ω)≥d0−ε,F(⋅,y)(Ω)⊇B(0,θ(y))⊇B(0,κ),\delta(F(\cdot, y), \Omega) \ge d_0 - \varepsilon, \qquad F(\cdot, y)(\Omega) \supseteq B(0, \theta(y)) \supseteq B(0, \kappa),δ(F(⋅,y),Ω)≥d0​−ε,F(⋅,y)(Ω)⊇B(0,θ(y))⊇B(0,κ),

where θ(y)=(1−εd0−1)α−∥F(x0,y)∥\theta(y) = (1 - \varepsilon d_0^{-1})\alpha - \|F(x_0, y)\|θ(y)=(1−εd0−1​)α−∥F(x0​,y)∥.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3.2 yields existence, local uniqueness and Lipschitz dependence of solutions of parametrized nonsmooth equations, with an explicit Lipschitz modulus arbitrarily close to φ/d0\varphi/d_0φ/d0​. In the paper it underlies Theorem 3.3 and Corollary 3.4 (approximation and B-differentiation of the implicit function) and the sensitivity results of §4 for parametric variational inequalities over polyhedral convex sets. The same template, an equation approximated by a map with Lipschitzian inverse, is the basis of later strong-regularity and semismooth-Newton analyses in nonlinear programming and complementarity.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; it has not been machine-checked. The platform has the smooth implicit-function theorem (FamousTheorems.implicit_function_theorem, Rudin.ch09_implicit_function) and Mathlib has the contraction mapping principle, but there is no Lipschitz-inverse perturbation result and no notion of strong approximation. The mission produces both, together with the formal Theorem 3.2 that a follow-on mission (Theorem 3.3, Corollary 3.4, §4) would reference.

Difficulty

The obvious approach, differentiate and invert, is unavailable: fff need not have a derivative anywhere near x0x_0x0​, so neither Mathlib's implicit-function theorem nor its inverse-function theorem applies. The difficulty is to obtain surjectivity of F(⋅,y)F(\cdot, y)F(⋅,y) onto a ball uniformly in yyy from information about fff alone. Injectivity transfers directly from fff through the small Lipschitz modulus of F(⋅,y)−fF(\cdot, y) - fF(⋅,y)−f; surjectivity does not, because fff carries no information about F(⋅,y)F(\cdot, y)F(⋅,y) beyond the small Lipschitz modulus of the difference, and the domain ball, the image ball and the parameter neighborhood must be chosen once for all yyy. Completeness of XXX is essential (the paper stresses this on p. 306) and is not available for YYY and ZZZ.

Formalization scope

All statements live in namespace RobinsonNSIFT.Implicit. Committed conventions:

  • Scalars are real; XXX is a complete normed space ([CompleteSpace X]); YYY, ZZZ are normed spaces without completeness. Lemma 3.1's domain is a complete metric space, not a normed one.
  • δ(f,S)\delta(f, S)δ(f,S) via lower bounds. Every statement takes a real ddd with ExpansionAtLeast f S d in place of "d=δ(f,S)d = \delta(f,S)d=δ(f,S)", universally quantified. This is equivalent to the paper's statements and avoids a real infimum that would be 000 on sets with fewer than two points.
  • Total functions. FFF is a curried total function F : X → Y → Z and f:X→Zf : X \to Zf:X→Z; hypotheses constrain them on Ξ×H\Xi \times HΞ×H only, and the conclusions keep the implicit function inside the domain: U⊆ΞU \subseteq \XiU⊆Ξ, V⊆HV \subseteq HV⊆H, x(V)⊆Ux(V) \subseteq Ux(V)⊆U. This makes explicit what the paper leaves implicit (its FFF is only defined on Ξ×H\Xi \times HΞ×H). Likewise Ω⊆Ξ\Omega \subseteq \XiΩ⊆Ξ, used implicitly in the paper's proof, is a conclusion of milestone 2.
  • Closed balls (Metric.closedBall), radii δ−1α\delta^{-1}\alphaδ−1α written α / δ; neighborhoods are filter members ∈ 𝓝 _, not necessarily open; Lipschitz moduli are ℝ≥0 and Lipschitz conditions are LipschitzOnWith on the stated set.
  • Lemma 3.1 keeps the paper's hypothesis that Ω\OmegaΩ is open, although Theorem 3.2's proof applies it to a closed ball.
  • Milestone 2 states as an existence claim, for every ε∈(0,d0)\varepsilon \in (0, d_0)ε∈(0,d0​), the choices the paper makes at the start of its proof.

A formalization in which hypothesis (a) is the weak approximation of Definition 2.1 (only at y=y0y = y_0y=y0​), in which VVV may shrink to {y0}\{y_0\}{y0​}, λ\lambdaλ is existential, or uniqueness is asserted outside Ξ\XiΞ, would be a different and trivial or false statement; the statements here rule these out.

Needed infrastructure: the contraction mapping principle on a closed subset of a complete space (Mathlib's ContractingWith), Lipschitz estimates on sets, and the two definitions of this mission. Lemma 3.1 is reusable for any Lipschitz-perturbation argument. Proofs of either milestone, or a direct proof of the goal, are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. M. Robinson, An Implicit-Function Theorem for a Class of Nonsmooth Functions, Mathematics of Operations Research 16(2), 1991, 292–309. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.16.2.292
  • S. M. Robinson, Strongly Regular Generalized Equations, Mathematics of Operations Research 5(1), 1980, 43–62. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.5.1.43
  • A. V. Dmitruk, A. A. Milyutin, N. P. Osmolovskii, Lyusternik's theorem and the theory of extrema, Russian Mathematical Surveys 1980, No. 6, 11–51 (as cited in Robinson 1991, p. 298).
  • L. V. Kantorovich, G. P. Akilov, Functional Analysis, cited in Robinson 1991 as [17].
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Algorithmic Game TheoryGraph TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Graphs and Cooperation in Games: The Unique Fair Allocation Rule, the Shapley Value of the Graph-Restricted Game, Is Totally Stable for Superadditive GamesResearch Paper

Motivation

Classical cooperative game theory assumes that any coalition of players can form and coordinate. In many settings cooperation is mediated by pairwise relationships: communication lines, contracts, alliances, or trade links. Roger Myerson's discussion paper Graphs and Cooperation in Games (Northwestern University, 1976; published in Mathematics of Operations Research 2(3), 1977, doi:10.1287/moor.2.3.225) models such a cooperation structure as a graph on the set of players and asks how the players should share the worth of the game when only linked players can coordinate directly.

The answer, now called the Myerson value, is the starting point of the literature on communication situations and network games. It underlies later work on network formation (Jackson and Wolinsky, A strategic model of social and economic networks, JET 1996) and on allocation rules for networks, and it is a standard textbook example of an axiomatic solution concept.

Timeline:

  • 1953. Shapley defines the Shapley value φ\varphiφ for transferable-utility games by efficiency, symmetry, a carrier axiom and additivity (Shapley 1953).
  • 1976–1977. Myerson introduces cooperation graphs, the fairness (equal gains from each link) condition, proves existence and uniqueness of the fair allocation rule, identifies it as the Shapley value of the graph-restricted game, proves its total stability for superadditive games, and extends existence and uniqueness to games without transferable utility in graph function form.

Setting

Let NNN be a nonempty finite set of players and CLCLCL the set of nonempty coalitions S⊆NS\subseteq NS⊆N. A game in characteristic function form is a vector v∈RCLv\in\mathbb R^{CL}v∈RCL; vSv_SvS​ is the transferable wealth coalition SSS can divide.

A link n:mn{:}mn:m is an unordered pair of distinct players and a graph ggg is a set of links; GRGRGR is the set of all graphs, gˉN\bar g^Ngˉ​N the complete graph, g∖n:mg\setminus n{:}mg∖n:m the graph with one link removed, and ∣g∣|g|∣g∣ the number of links. Players a,ba,ba,b are connected in SSS by ggg if a=b∈Sa=b\in Sa=b∈S or a path of links of ggg joins them through players of SSS only; the classes form the partition S/gS/gS/g of SSS, and N/gN/gN/g is the set of connected components of ggg. The graph-restricted game is

(v/g)S=∑T∈S/gvT.(v/g)_S=\sum_{T\in S/g}v_T .(v/g)S​=T∈S/g∑​vT​.

An allocation rule is a function Y:GR→RNY:GR\to\mathbb R^NY:GR→RN, with Yn(g)Y_n(g)Yn​(g) the payoff of player nnn under cooperation structure ggg. It is a fair allocation rule for vvv if

  1. (efficiency, (7)) ∑n∈SYn(g)=vS\sum_{n\in S}Y_n(g)=v_S∑n∈S​Yn​(g)=vS​ for every ggg and every component S∈N/gS\in N/gS∈N/g, and
  2. (equity, (10)) Yn(g)−Yn(g∖n:m)=Ym(g)−Ym(g∖n:m)Y_n(g)-Y_n(g\setminus n{:}m)=Y_m(g)-Y_m(g\setminus n{:}m)Yn​(g)−Yn​(g∖n:m)=Ym​(g)−Ym​(g∖n:m) for every ggg and every link n:m∈gn{:}m\in gn:m∈g.

YYY is totally stable if Yn(g)≥Yn(g∖n:m)Y_n(g)\ge Y_n(g\setminus n{:}m)Yn​(g)≥Yn​(g∖n:m) for every ggg and every link n:m∈gn{:}m\in gn:m∈g, and vvv is superadditive if vS∪T≥vS+vTv_{S\cup T}\ge v_S+v_TvS∪T​≥vS​+vT​ for disjoint S,T∈CLS,T\in CLS,T∈CL.

A game in graph function form assigns to every pair (S,g)(S,g)(S,g) with S∈N/gS\in N/gS∈N/g a closed, comprehensive (closed under decreasing coordinates), proper (∅≠W≠RS\emptyset\ne W\ne\mathbb R^S∅=W=RS) set w(S,g)⊆RSw(S,g)\subseteq\mathbb R^Sw(S,g)⊆RS of feasible payoffs; its fair allocation rule replaces (7) by (14), (Yn(g))n∈S∈∂w(S,g)(Y_n(g))_{n\in S}\in\partial w(S,g)(Yn​(g))n∈S​∈∂w(S,g).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 8)

If vvv is superadditive, then the fair allocation rule YYY for vvv is totally stable:

Yn(g)≥Yn(g∖n:m)for all g∈GR, n:m∈g.Y_n(g)\ge Y_n(g\setminus n{:}m)\qquad\text{for all } g\in GR,\ n{:}m\in g .Yn​(g)≥Yn​(g∖n:m)for all g∈GR, n:m∈g.

Theorem 1 (p. 7) and Theorem 4 (p. 10)

Every v∈RCLv\in\mathbb R^{CL}v∈RCL has a unique fair allocation rule; every game www in graph function form has a unique YYY satisfying (14) and (10).

Theorem 2 (p. 8)

The fair allocation rule is

Y(g)=φ(v/g)for all g∈GR,in particular Y(gˉN)=φ(v).Y(g)=\varphi(v/g)\quad\text{for all }g\in GR,\qquad\text{in particular } Y(\bar g^N)=\varphi(v).Y(g)=φ(v/g)for all g∈GR,in particular Y(gˉ​N)=φ(v).

The milestones follow the paper's Section 7: the steps of the proof of Theorem 4 (displays (15)–(17)), Theorem 4, Theorem 1, the decomposition of v/gv/gv/g and the efficiency and equity of φ(v/g)\varphi(v/g)φ(v/g) (proof of Theorem 2), Theorem 2, and the monotonicity of v/gv/gv/g and φ(v/g)\varphi(v/g)φ(v/g) in a link (proof of Theorem 3). Theorem 3 is the goal because its proof uses the formula of Theorem 2, whose proof uses the uniqueness of Theorem 1, which is the transferable-utility case of Theorem 4: all four numbered results lie on one path.

Significance

The theorems give an axiomatic foundation for allocation in networks: two natural requirements, component-wise efficiency and equal gains from each link, single out one rule, and that rule is an explicit formula built from the Shapley value. At the complete graph it recovers the Shapley value itself, so the result is also a new characterization of the Shapley value. Total stability says that, for superadditive games, no player has an incentive to break a link, which connects the allocation rule to the question of which networks form.

The results are proved in the paper. A search of the platform found no formalization of cooperation graphs, the graph-restricted game, the Myerson value or total stability; the Shapley value is available as a platform definition and is reused. This mission produces machine-checked statements of all four theorems and of the intermediate steps of their proofs, together with a reusable definition layer for communication situations.

Difficulty

The equity condition (10) relates the payoff at a graph to the payoff at a graph with one fewer link, and it constrains only pairs of linked players; it is not evident that these conditions, together with efficiency on components, determine the rule at every graph, nor that they are consistent. Uniqueness and existence must hold simultaneously for all 2∣gˉN∣2^{|\bar g^N|}2∣gˉ​N∣ graphs, and the constraints couple each graph to all of its subgraphs and each player to every other player of its component. In the graph function form, efficiency becomes a boundary condition on a closed comprehensive set, and the existence and uniqueness of the relevant extremal point depend on all three properties of w(S,g)w(S,g)w(S,g).

Identifying the rule with φ(v/g)\varphi(v/g)φ(v/g) requires the efficiency of the Shapley value on each component of ggg, which is not the efficiency of φ\varphiφ on NNN, and equity requires tracking how the partitions S/gS/gS/g change when a link is removed. Total stability is false for general games: without superadditivity a player can gain by cutting a link, so the hypothesis cannot be dropped.

Formalization scope

Players are Fin n, with 0<n0<n0<n in every theorem as the paper assumes NNN nonempty; the paper's player kkk is index k−1k-1k−1. The general game carrier has its own definition module, and the graph-specific definitions build on it. Graphs are SimpleGraph (Fin n): gˉN\bar g^Ngˉ​N is ⊤, the empty graph ⊥, h⊆gh\subseteq gh⊆g is h ≤ g and h⊂gh\subset gh⊂g is h < g. A game is a function Finset (Fin n) → ℝ; its value at ∅\emptyset∅ is a junk coordinate that no definition reads, and no theorem assumes v∅=0v_\emptyset=0v∅​=0. Superadditivity quantifies over nonempty coalitions only. The Shapley value is the platform definition Supermodularity.Cooperative.ShapleyValue, applied after resetting the value at ∅\emptyset∅ to 000. RS\mathbb R^SRS is ↥S → ℝ with the product topology, and ∂\partial∂ is the topological frontier.

Explicit readings of the typescript:

  • The printed definition of "connected in SSS by ggg" (p. 3) asks ni∈Sn^i\in Sni∈S only for i≥1i\ge1i≥1; the formalization requires every vertex of the path, including the start, to lie in SSS, which makes S/gS/gS/g the partition of SSS the paper describes.
  • Comprehensiveness (p. 10) prints "∀n∈N\forall n\in N∀n∈N" for coordinates of vectors in RS\mathbb R^SRS; read as n∈Sn\in Sn∈S.
  • Display (17) writes Yn(h)Y_n(h)Yn​(h) under the index m∈Sm\in Sm∈S; read as Ym(h)Y_m(h)Ym​(h), as in (18b).
  • The proof headed "PROOF OF THEOREM 4." on p. 13 is the proof of Theorem 3.
  • "The unique fair allocation rule" in Theorems 2 and 3 is stated for every fair allocation rule; existence and uniqueness are Theorem 1.
  • The paper's NNN is nonempty; every theorem carries the corresponding hypothesis 0<n0<n0<n.

The equity and stability conditions quantify over links of ggg only. Quantifying over all pairs of players would make Theorem 1 false and the goal vacuous, so that reading is ruled out. Likewise (14) is boundary membership, not membership in w(S,g)w(S,g)w(S,g).

Contributions welcome: general lemmas on the partitions S/gS/gS/g (refinement under link deletion, restriction to components), Möbius inversion over the subgraph lattice of a finite simple graph, the carrier and null-player properties of the Shapley value, and the extremal-point lemma for closed comprehensive sets. These are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • R. B. Myerson, Graphs and Cooperation in Games, Discussion Paper No. 246, CMS-EMS, Northwestern University, September 1976; published in Mathematics of Operations Research 2(3):225–229, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2.3.225
  • L. S. Shapley, A Value for n-Person Games, in Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Annals of Mathematics Studies 28, Princeton University Press, 1953, pp. 307–317. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400881970-018
  • M. O. Jackson and A. Wolinsky, A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, Journal of Economic Theory 71(1):44–74, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0108
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Comparison of Threshold Stop Rules and Maximum for Independent Nonnegative Random Variables I: A Median Threshold Rule Achieves EX* ≤ 2E⁺X_τResearch Paper

Why a threshold rule matters

In a finite stopping problem, a decision maker observes rewards one at a time and must accept one without seeing the future. A fully informed observer takes the maximum. This comparison is often called a prophet inequality. The abstract bound that an optimal stopping rule can secure at least half the expected maximum does not say how to choose a simple rule. Samuel-Cahn showed that a threshold chosen from a median of the maximum already gives this guarantee, even when the rewards are independent but differently distributed. The rule requires one number fixed before observations begin. Samuel-Cahn, 1984

The paper builds on earlier comparisons between the maximum and the best stopping value, then narrows attention to rules that accept an observation when it crosses a fixed threshold. This mission isolates its first main result, Theorem 1, and the two cases that determine whether the crossing test is strict or weak. The paper's second main result, concerning the sharpness of the constant for identically distributed rewards, belongs to the next mission in this series. Samuel-Cahn, 1984, pp. 1213–1215

Observations and threshold rules

Let n≥1n\ge1n≥1, and let X1,…,XnX_1,\ldots,X_nX1​,…,Xn​ be independent, nonnegative real random variables. Write Xn∗=max⁡(X1,…,Xn)X_n^*=\max(X_1,\ldots,X_n)Xn∗​=max(X1​,…,Xn​). For a threshold c≥0c\ge0c≥0, the weak threshold rule t(c)t(c)t(c) takes the first XiX_iXi​ with i<ni<ni<n and Xi≥cX_i\ge cXi​≥c; the strict threshold rule s(c)s(c)s(c) uses Xi>cX_i>cXi​>c. If no earlier observation qualifies, either rule takes XnX_nXn​, even when XnX_nXn​ is below the threshold. Hence every rule returns exactly one observed reward.

The paper distinguishes the full stopped reward from its positive threshold reward. In its notation,

E+Xt(c)=E[Xt(c)1{Xt(c)≥c}],E+Xs(c)=E[Xs(c)1{Xs(c)>c}].E^+X_{t(c)}=E[X_{t(c)}\mathbf1_{\{X_{t(c)}\ge c\}}], \qquad E^+X_{s(c)}=E[X_{s(c)}\mathbf1_{\{X_{s(c)}>c\}}].E+Xt(c)​=E[Xt(c)​1{Xt(c)​≥c}​],E+Xs(c)​=E[Xs(c)​1{Xs(c)​>c}​].

The last forced observation may contribute to EXt(c)E X_{t(c)}EXt(c)​ or EXs(c)E X_{s(c)}EXs(c)​ while contributing zero to E+Xt(c)E^+X_{t(c)}E+Xt(c)​ or E+Xs(c)E^+X_{s(c)}E+Xs(c)​. This difference is essential to the theorem's middle bounds. A median mmm of Xn∗X_n^*Xn∗​ means both P(Xn∗<m)≤12P(X_n^*<m)\le\tfrac12P(Xn∗​<m)≤21​ and P(Xn∗>m)≤12P(X_n^*>m)\le\tfrac12P(Xn∗​>m)≤21​. Define the excess sum β=∑i=1nE(Xi−m)+\beta=\sum_{i=1}^n E(X_i-m)^+β=∑i=1n​E(Xi​−m)+, where x+=max⁡(x,0)x^+=\max(x,0)x+=max(x,0). The two median inequalities allow an atom at mmm, and the two threshold rules handle that boundary differently. Samuel-Cahn, 1984, pp. 1213–1214, (1.1)–(1.2)

Formalization targets

Theorem 1: a median threshold

For every median mmm, the goal retains both of the paper's conditional conclusions:

β≥m⟹EXn∗≤2E+Xs(m)≤2EXs(m),β≤m⟹EXn∗≤2E+Xt(m)≤2EXt(m).\begin{aligned} \beta\ge m&\Longrightarrow E X_n^*\le2E^+X_{s(m)}\le2E X_{s(m)},\\ \beta\le m&\Longrightarrow E X_n^*\le2E^+X_{t(m)}\le2E X_{t(m)}. \end{aligned}β≥mβ≤m​⟹EXn∗​≤2E+Xs(m)​≤2EXs(m)​,⟹EXn∗​≤2E+Xt(m)​≤2EXt(m)​.​

At equality β=m\beta=mβ=m, both conclusions apply. The attack path follows the expected maximum bound (1.3), the displayed identities and probability bound in (1.4), and the companion weak threshold display. Each milestone points to an actual line of the paper. The NOTE and ASSERTION give a further interval of working thresholds: if a∗=E(Xn∗−a∗)+a^*=E(X_n^*-a^*)^+a∗=E(Xn∗​−a∗)+ and b∗=∑iE(Xi−b∗)+b^*=\sum_iE(X_i-b^*)^+b∗=∑i​E(Xi​−b∗)+, then every a∗≤c≤b∗a^*\le c\le b^*a∗≤c≤b∗ satisfies the same chain with t(c)t(c)t(c). Remark 1 records the special case of observations taking values in one common two point set. Samuel-Cahn, 1984, pp. 1214–1215

What the result gives

Theorem 1 replaces the unspecified best stopping policy with a specific threshold chosen from the distribution of the maximum. It also shows that the thresholded part of the stopped reward alone meets the factor two bound. That stronger middle statement distinguishes the theorem from an outer comparison EXn∗≤2EXτE X_n^*\le2E X_\tauEXn∗​≤2EXτ​. For a reward distribution with atoms, the theorem says exactly when to use >>> and when to use ≥\ge≥. Its companion ASSERTION shows that a median is not the only useful threshold choice. Samuel-Cahn, 1984, p. 1214

The result is proved in the paper; the work here is to express its assumptions, boundary behavior, and all displayed inequalities as Lean statements that solvers can prove. The milestones expose reusable facts about positive parts, forced stopping, and independence of a current observation from the event that the rule has survived earlier ones. No machine checked proof of these drafted statements is claimed. The second mission can use the completed theorem to formalize why the factor two cannot be improved uniformly over threshold rules, even for identically distributed observations.

Where the formal proof is delicate

The event that a rule reaches index iii depends on the observations before iii. Establishing its independence from the excess of XiX_iXi​ requires mutual independence of the whole family; pairwise independence does not express enough. A forced stop at nnn also makes the positive threshold reward smaller than the full stopped reward whenever the last observation misses the threshold. Ignoring that last case would erase one of the theorem's conclusions. Finally, atoms at the median prevent the strict and weak crossing events from being interchanged. Samuel-Cahn, 1984, (1.1)–(1.4)

Formalization scope

Lean indexes the nnn observations by Fin nnn with n>0n>0n>0. Its index zero is the paper's index one, and the greatest index is the paper's mandatory final stop nnn. The rules are the least qualifying index or that final index. The paper's s(m)>i−1s(m)>i-1s(m)>i−1 and t(m)>i−1t(m)>i-1t(m)>i−1 therefore become i≤s(m)i\le s(m)i≤s(m) and i≤t(m)i\le t(m)i≤t(m). Observations are measurable, nonnegative almost surely, and mutually independent under a probability measure.

Expectations use the extended nonnegative integral of the positive part, taking values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. This keeps infinite expected rewards visible without imposing an integrability assumption absent from Theorem 1. The median has both strict tail inequalities from (1.1). The identities for positive stopped rewards state m≥0m\ge0m≥0 directly; in the goal this follows from nonnegativity and the median condition. The balance thresholds a∗a^*a∗ and b∗b^*b∗ are parameters satisfying the paper's defining equations, with no extra uniqueness hypothesis in statements that do not use it.

The goal cannot be satisfied by replacing E+XτE^+X_\tauE+Xτ​ with EXτE X_\tauEXτ​, by permitting a rule to return no observation, or by making the median predicate empty. Useful contributions include the measurable threshold rule interface, the pathwise excess decomposition, the factorization under mutual independence, and the remaining extended nonnegative arithmetic. Those pieces can also support other finite prophet inequality developments.

Selected references

  • E. Samuel-Cahn, Comparison of Threshold Stop Rules and Maximum for Independent Nonnegative Random Variables, The Annals of Probability 12(4), 1213–1216, 1984. DOI: 10.1214/aop/1176993150
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