Motivation
Ride-hailing platforms match riders with drivers who choose for themselves whether to work. Autonomous vehicles (AVs) would replace part of this self-scheduling labor with capital whose fleet size the platform chooses. Lian and van Ryzin study when, and under which market configuration, the cost savings of AVs reach riders. Their comparison needs a benchmark: the market served by human drivers (HVs) alone. This mission formalizes that benchmark, Proposition 1 of the paper, together with the lemmas on minimal supply and utilization that the rest of the paper uses.
Two economic forces drive the benchmark. The first is the density effect: in a denser market an idle car is closer to the next rider, so pickups are shorter and each driver spends more of the hour on paid trips. The second is the supply effect of labor: a larger fleet requires higher hourly earnings to attract the marginal driver. Proposition 1 describes how the equilibrium demand, fleet size, utilization and price respond to market size when both forces are present.
The source is the authors' 2023 SSRN working paper (abstract 3716491, version of 23 August 2023); all theorem, lemma and equation numbers refer to that version, not to the 2025 Management Science article.
Setting
A market has an ETA function t1(s)=as−r with a>0 and 0≤r<1, the expected pickup time when s cars are open (idle); r is the ETA elasticity, and r>0 means a density effect. A trip lasts t2>0 hours. Rider values for a ride hour are uniform on [0,V], V>0. HVs have the supply curve w(n)=w0+αn, w0>0, α≥0: a fleet of n drivers participates when hourly earnings are w(n).
There are I demand scenarios with potential demand masses 0<m1<⋯<mI. In scenario i, the inverse demand at demand rate d∈[0,mi] is pi(d)=V(1−d/mi), and the market revenue per hour is ri(d)=dpi(d)t2.
To serve demand d with s open cars, Little's law requires s+d(t1(s)+t2) cars. The minimal supply level is
n(d)=a~dr+11+t2d,a~=rr+11ar+11+r−r+1rar+11,
and the maximal utilization is uˉ(d)=dt2/n(d). A demand rate d∈[0,mi] is an equilibrium when revenue covers exactly the minimal driver cost,
ri(d)=w(n(d))n(d).(13)
It is stable (Definition 1) if there is no ϵ>0 with ri(d−ϵ)<w(n(d−ϵ))n(d−ϵ) and ri(d+ϵ)>w(n(d+ϵ))n(d+ϵ). The maximal stable equilibrium dHV,i∗ is the greatest stable equilibrium; then nHV,i∗=n(dHV,i∗), uHV,i∗=uˉ(dHV,i∗) and pHV,i∗=pi(dHV,i∗). The loose labor market condition of scenario i is
ri(mi/2)>w(n(mi/2))n(mi/2),(33)
the paper's restatement of its Assumption 2: the revenue curve meets the cost curve on its decreasing branch.
In Lean the parameters form the structure MarketParams, and the objects above are aTilde, nMin, uBar, priceFn, revenue, wage, hvCost, IsEquilibrium, IsStable, IsMaxStableEq and LooseMarket, in the namespace AVRideHail.PureHV.
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 1 (p. 14)
Under the standing parameter assumptions and (33) in every scenario, each scenario has a unique maximal stable equilibrium, and for the family dHV,i∗:
dHV,i∗>0,ri(dHV,i∗)=w(nHV,i∗)nHV,i∗,pHV,i∗=uHV,i∗w(nHV,i∗),
dHV,i∗ and nHV,i∗ strictly increasing in i,uHV,i∗ {strictly increasing in i,constant in i,r>0,r=0.
Milestones
- Lemma 1 Item 1 (p. 38, with (26)): n(d) is the minimum of s+d(as−r+t2) over s>0, attained only at s=(ra)1/(r+1)d1/(r+1).
- Lemma 1 Item 2 (p. 38): n is a strictly increasing bijection of [0,∞), so its inverse dˉ(n) exists.
- Lemma 2 (p. 39): uˉ is strictly increasing and strictly concave, uˉ(0)=0 and uˉ(d)→1.
- App. B.1.1 (p. 42): under (33), (13) has exactly one root in [mi/2,mi], and it is the maximal stable equilibrium.
- App. B.1.3 (p. 43): dHV,i∗ is strictly increasing in mi.
- App. B.1.6 (pp. 45–46): pHV,i∗ is strictly increasing in mi when r=0, α>0, and strictly decreasing when r>0, α=0.
Significance
Proposition 1 is the reference point for every comparison in the paper: the AV markets of Sections 5–6 (common platform, independent platforms, monopoly AV supplier) are judged by how far their prices and served demand move from pHV,i∗ and dHV,i∗. Its Item 3 isolates the density effect as the source of rising utilization, and the special cases of Item 5 show that the HV price can rise or fall with market size, so neither direction can be assumed in the AV analysis. Lemmas 1 and 2 are used throughout the appendices.
The paper proves these results by hand; to our knowledge none of them has a machine-checked proof. The mission produces a checked version of the benchmark and of the two technical lemmas, with every boundary case (r=0, α=0, d=0) stated explicitly.
Difficulty
The equation (13) always has the root d=0, and it can have a second, unstable positive root below the stable one; the naive reading "the equilibrium is the root of (13)" therefore picks the wrong point. The work is to show that the greatest stable root exists, lies on the decreasing branch of the revenue curve, and moves monotonically with mi. This requires strict monotonicity of the cost curve w(n(d))n(d), which combines a real power d1/(r+1) with the linear supply curve, and continuity on [mi/2,mi]. Lemma 2 needs strict concavity of a quotient of real powers on a closed half-line including 0, where the function is defined by its limit.
Formalization scope
All quantities are real numbers; fleet sizes and demands are continuous, as in the paper. Powers are Real.rpow. Scenarios are indexed by Fin I, 0-based. The maximal stable equilibrium is never chosen by Classical.choose: statements take a family dstar with IsMaxStableEq in each scenario.
Committed conventions and pinned hypotheses:
- a,t2,V,w0>0 and 0≤r<1, α≥0 are explicit binders. Lemma 1 Item 1 and Lemma 2 add r>0, which the page leaves implicit and without which they fail.
- The loose-market condition (33) is a hypothesis of the goal in every scenario. Proposition 1's printed statement omits it, but its proof uses it, and without it a thin scenario has dHV,i∗=0.
- In Definition 1, ϵ ranges over 0<ϵ≤d with d+ϵ≤mi, keeping d±ϵ in the domain [0,mi] of pi.
- At r=0,
Real.rpow gives a~=a and n(d)=(a+t2)d; uˉ(0)=0/0=0 agrees with Lemma 2.
- "Increasing" means strictly increasing.
- The uniqueness in "unique maximal stable equilibrium" is automatic for a greatest element; the content of the first conjunct is existence.
Encoding the equilibrium as "the root of (13) in [mi/2,mi]" would make the goal follow from its own hypotheses; the goal instead quantifies over greatest stable equilibria, and that root is the conclusion of a milestone.
A complete development needs the intermediate value theorem on [mi/2,mi], strict monotonicity and concavity facts for real powers, and limits at infinity. The minimal-supply and utilization lemmas are reusable in any model with a pickup-time function as−r. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are proofs of the remark of Item 5 in other parameter regimes.
Selected references
- Z. Lian and G. van Ryzin, Capturing the Benefits of Autonomous Vehicles in Ride-Hailing: The Role of Market Configuration, SSRN working paper 3716491, version of 23 August 2023. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3716491
- Z. Lian and G. van Ryzin, Capturing the Benefits of Autonomous Vehicles in Ride-Hailing: The Role of Market Configuration, Management Science, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.03112