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Campaigns group missions around a shared mathematical goal. Each one tracks a quantity, such as an upper or lower bound. Have a good candidate in mind? Ping us on Slack, Zulip, or WeChat.

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Campaigns (experimental)

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Campaigns group missions around a shared mathematical goal. Each one tracks a quantity, such as an upper or lower bound. Have a good candidate in mind? Ping us on Slack, Zulip, or WeChat.

Block Sensitivity vs. Sensitivity

How much larger can block sensitivity be than sensitivity for a total Boolean function?

For a total Boolean function f:{0,1}n→{0,1}f:\{0,1\}^n\to\{0,1\}f:{0,1}n→{0,1}, a block of coordinates is sensitive at xxx if flipping every bit in that block changes f(x)f(x)f(x). Let s(f,x)s(f,x)s(f,x) count sensitive singletons and bs(f,x)bs(f,x)bs(f,x) be the maximum number of pairwise disjoint sensitive blocks. Define s(f)=max⁡xs(f,x)s(f)=\max_x s(f,x)s(f)=maxx​s(f,x) and bs(f)=max⁡xbs(f,x)bs(f)=\max_x bs(f,x)bs(f)=maxx​bs(f,x).

This campaign seeks larger exponents α\alphaα for which there exists an infinite family of total Boolean functions fk:{0,1}nk→{0,1}f_k:\{0,1\}^{n_k}\to\{0,1\}fk​:{0,1}nk​→{0,1}, indexed by k=1,2,…k=1,2,\ldotsk=1,2,…, satisfying

s(fk)→∞,bs(fk)≥s(fk)α−o(1)as k→∞.s(f_k)\to\infty,\qquad bs(f_k)\ge s(f_k)^{\alpha-o(1)}\quad\text{as }k\to\infty.s(fk​)→∞,bs(fk​)≥s(fk​)α−o(1)as k→∞.

Here o(1)o(1)o(1) denotes a quantity tending to zero as k→∞k\to\inftyk→∞. Higher is better. The classical exponent is 222, and Huang's bound gives a ceiling of 444.

OpenAI's construction achieves an exponent strictly greater than 222.

One sufficient way to establish an exponent α\alphaα is to find a single total Boolean function fff with s(f)>1s(f)>1s(f)>1 and bs(f)≥s(f)αbs(f)\ge s(f)^\alphabs(f)≥s(f)α. Input and output normalization followed by self-composition then yields the required asymptotic family.

≥ 2.131121719190Formalized record→≥ 2.15Open frontier
9 provers on it18 of 19 missions formalized

Integer Multiplication Below n log n

Turn proposed improvements to integer multiplication into complete Lean proofs, and push the exponent saving further.

Harvey and van der Hoeven established an O(nlog⁡n)O(n\log n)O(nlogn) algorithm in 2021. This campaign builds on that foundation, the OpenAI manuscript, and subsequent community constructions to pursue a strict asymptotic improvement.

For two nnn-bit integers, the target is

T(n)=O ⁣(n L(n)1−κ),L(n)=max⁡(⌈log⁡2n⌉,1).T(n)=O\!\left(n\,L(n)^{1-\kappa}\right),\qquad L(n)=\max(\lceil\log_2 n\rceil,1).T(n)=O(nL(n)1−κ),L(n)=max(⌈log2​n⌉,1).

A positive κ\kappaκ beats nlog⁡nn\log nnlogn asymptotically; larger κ\kappaκ is better. Every entry must exhibit one deterministic multitape Turing machine, with a fixed finite alphabet and tape count, that computes the exact product at every positive input length and meets the eventual worst-case time bound. The tracked number measures an asymptotic exponent saving.

≥ 3.6 × 10−5Formalized record→≥ 5.1 × 10−5Open frontier
8 provers on it4 of 7 missions formalized

3SUM Exponent

Classical algorithms solve 3SUM in O(n2)O(n^2)O(n2) time. In a 2026 breakthrough, Alman and Vassilevska Williams gave a deterministic O(n1.9992)O(n^{1.9992})O(n1.9992) algorithm, refuting the integer 3SUM hypothesis. How low can the exponent go?

Building on existing Lean formalizations, this campaign tracks upper bounds for 3SUM on polynomially bounded integers, using a word RAM with O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn)-bit words, and pursues smaller exponents.

≤ 1.960614Formalized record→≤ 1.9202796Open frontier
4 provers on it7 of 8 missions formalized

All-Pairs Shortest Paths (APSP) Exponent

Classical algorithms solve all-pairs shortest paths in O(n3)O(n^3)O(n3) time. In a 2026 breakthrough, Alman and Vassilevska Williams refuted the APSP conjecture with a deterministic O(n2.99942)O(n^{2.99942})O(n2.99942) algorithm. How low can the exponent go?

Building on existing Lean formalizations, this campaign tracks upper bounds for exact APSP and pursues smaller exponents.

≤ 2.995561Formalized record
3 provers on it5 of 5 missions formalized

The irrationality measure of π

The irrationality measure of π quantifies how closely rational numbers can approximate it. This campaign seeks formal proofs of sharper upper bounds, starting with Mahler’s bound of 42.

≤ 7.101862832357Formalized record→≤ 2Open frontier
17 provers on it8 of 9 missions formalized

Sharp diagonal Hlawka constant

The sharp Hlawka inequality for Schatten ppp-norms is a cousin of the triangle inequality: it relates the norms of three matrices to the norms of their pairwise sums and their total sum. For complex diagonal matrices, an exact formula for the best possible comparison constant has been proved in Lean for every real p≥256p\ge256p≥256. We conjecture that the same formula holds for all p≥2p\ge2p≥2.

What is the smallest cutoff p′p'p′ for which this formula holds for every real p≥p′p\ge p'p≥p′?

References:

  • Wolfram MathWorld, Hlawka's Inequality.
  • Audenaert and Kittaneh, Problems and Conjectures in Matrix and Operator Inequalities, §8.2 (2017).
  • Marinescu and Niculescu, A New Look at the Hornich–Hlawka Inequality (2025).
  • Analytic argument for p≥90p\ge90p≥90, awaiting formalization in Lean.
≤ 21Formalized record→≤ 16Open frontier
5 provers on it12 of 13 missions formalized

Odd numbers as sums of primes

Is every odd number a sum of kkk primes? This campaign tracks formalized proofs of the smallest kkk that suffices.

Schnirelmann (1930) showed some finite kkk works. Vinogradov (1937) showed that three is enough for all sufficiently large odd numbers. Tao (2012) proved k=5k = 5k=5 unconditionally. Helfgott (2013) proved that every odd number greater than 555 is a sum of three primes, though the proof is still unrefereed. Ideally, we can formalize this statement here. Note that three is optimal: 272727 is neither prime nor 222 + prime.

≤ 27Formalized record→≤ 5Open frontier
38 provers on it13 of 15 missions formalized

Matrix multiplication exponent

Schoolbook matrix multiplication takes n3n^3n3 operations. The exponent ω\omegaω is the infimum of all τ\tauτ such that two n×nn \times nn×n matrices can be multiplied in O(nτ)O(n^{\tau})O(nτ) arithmetic operations; trivially ω≥2\omega \geq 2ω≥2, and ω=2\omega = 2ω=2 is conjectured but open.

Strassen gave the first nontrivial bound, ω<2.81\omega < 2.81ω<2.81, in 1969, and introduced the laser method in 1986 to reach ω<2.48\omega < 2.48ω<2.48. Coppersmith and Winograd's 1990 bound of 2.3762.3762.376 stood for two decades. Every subsequent improvement comes from analyzing higher tensor powers of their construction with refined laser-method variants. That line reached ω<2.371339\omega < 2.371339ω<2.371339 in 2025, and the current record is ω<2.371177\omega < 2.371177ω<2.371177, from August 2026. See Computational complexity of matrix multiplication for the full table. Can we formalize these results and even improve on them?

≤ 2.25Formalized record
16 provers on it9 of 9 missions formalized

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Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

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Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Projection and Rescaling Algorithm for Finding Maximum Support Solutions to Polyhedral Conic Systems: The Maximum Support Algorithm Is Correct and Terminates Within Condition-Measure BoundsResearch Paper

Motivation

Finding a nonzero nonnegative point in a linear subspace is the feasibility core of linear optimization. For a subspace L⊆RnL \subseteq \mathbb R^nL⊆Rn with orthogonal complement L⊥L^\perpL⊥, the pair of problems

find x∈L∩R+nandfind x^∈L⊥∩R+n\text{find } x \in L \cap \mathbb R^n_+ \qquad\text{and}\qquad \text{find } \hat x \in L^\perp \cap \mathbb R^n_+find x∈L∩R+n​andfind x^∈L⊥∩R+n​

subsumes every polyhedral feasibility problem and every linear program through standard homogenization. A maximum support solution of the pair, a point of each cone with as many positive coordinates as possible, always exists, and identifies which coordinates can be positive at all. Rescaling algorithms solve such problems with elementary steps (a simple "basic procedure" interleaved with a reconditioning step) and with running-time bounds in terms of a condition measure of the input.

Timeline of the results this mission builds on, as described in the source (arXiv:2003.08911v3, pp. 1–3):

  • Chubanov (2012, 2015) developed a projection-based algorithm with periodic rescaling for {x:Ax=0}\{x : Ax = 0\}{x:Ax=0} (Math. Program. 134, 2012; Math. Program. 153, 2015).
  • Peña and Soheili (2017), Solving conic systems via projection and rescaling (Math. Program. 166), gave the projection and rescaling algorithm. It finds a point of L∩R++nL \cap \mathbb R^n_{++}L∩R++n​ (or of L⊥∩R++nL^\perp \cap \mathbb R^n_{++}L⊥∩R++n​) when one exists, the full support problem, with a bound in terms of a condition measure of LLL.
  • Peña and Soheili (2019) implemented a variant aimed at maximum support solutions and reported computational evidence of its success. Its correctness was proved only when one of the two full-support problems is feasible.
  • Dadush, Végh and Zambelli gave maximum support algorithms that rescale A↦MAA \mapsto MAA↦MA while leaving LLL unchanged.
  • Peña and Soheili (2022), the source of this mission, prove correctness and condition-based bounds for a projection and rescaling algorithm that finds maximum support solutions in full generality, rescaling L↦DLL \mapsto DLL↦DL by positive diagonal matrices. Their condition measures σ(L)\sigma(L)σ(L), σ(L⊥)\sigma(L^\perp)σ(L⊥) are variants of a measure of Ye (Math. Oper. Res. 19, 1994).

Setting

Let L⊆RnL \subseteq \mathbb R^nL⊆Rn be a linear subspace and L⊥L^\perpL⊥ its orthogonal complement. The support of x∈R+nx \in \mathbb R^n_+x∈R+n​ is {j:xj>0}\{j : x_j > 0\}{j:xj​>0}. The maximum support index set is

J(L)={j∈{1,…,n}:xj>0 for some x∈L∩R+n},J(L) = \{ j \in \{1,\dots,n\} : x_j > 0 \text{ for some } x \in L \cap \mathbb R^n_+ \},J(L)={j∈{1,…,n}:xj​>0 for some x∈L∩R+n​},

and a maximum support point is an x∈L∩R+nx \in L \cap \mathbb R^n_+x∈L∩R+n​ whose support is J(L)J(L)J(L). For each coordinate iii, σi(L)=max⁡{xi:x∈L∩R+n, ∥x∥∞≤1}\sigma_i(L) = \max\{x_i : x \in L\cap\mathbb R^n_+,\ \|x\|_\infty \le 1\}σi​(L)=max{xi​:x∈L∩R+n​, ∥x∥∞​≤1}, and the condition measure is σ(L)=min⁡j∈J(L)σj(L)\sigma(L) = \min_{j \in J(L)} \sigma_j(L)σ(L)=minj∈J(L)​σj​(L), with σ(L)=1\sigma(L) = 1σ(L)=1 when J(L)=∅J(L) = \emptysetJ(L)=∅.

For J⊆{1,…,n}J \subseteq \{1,\dots,n\}J⊆{1,…,n} let RJ\mathbb R^JRJ be the vectors vanishing off JJJ, Δ(J)={x∈RJ:x≥0, ∥x∥1=1}\Delta(J) = \{x \in \mathbb R^J : x \ge 0,\ \|x\|_1 = 1\}Δ(J)={x∈RJ:x≥0, ∥x∥1​=1}, and, for a positive diagonal matrix DDD, PDL∣JP_{DL|J}PDL∣J​ the orthogonal projection onto DL∩RJDL \cap \mathbb R^JDL∩RJ.

Algorithm 1 (partial support) takes (L,σ)(L, \sigma)(L,σ) with a guess σ∈(0,1)\sigma \in (0,1)σ∈(0,1) of σ(L)\sigma(L)σ(L). It starts from D=ID = ID=I, J={1,…,n}J = \{1,\dots,n\}J={1,…,n} and repeatedly calls a basic procedure, which returns either u∈Δ(J)u \in \Delta(J)u∈Δ(J) with (PDL∣Ju)J>0(P_{DL|J}u)_J > 0(PDL∣J​u)J​>0, in which case the algorithm halts with x=D−1PDL∣Jux = D^{-1}P_{DL|J}ux=D−1PDL∣J​u and JJJ; or z∈Δ(J)z \in \Delta(J)z∈Δ(J) with ∥(PDL∣Jz)+∥1≤12∥z∥∞\|(P_{DL|J}z)^+\|_1 \le \tfrac12\|z\|_\infty∥(PDL∣J​z)+∥1​≤21​∥z∥∞​, in which case it doubles DiiD_{ii}Dii​ for a maximizer iii of zzz (a rescaling step), drops iii from JJJ if Dii>1/σD_{ii} > 1/\sigmaDii​>1/σ, and halts with x=0x = 0x=0, J=∅J = \emptysetJ=∅ if JJJ becomes empty. Its output is written J(L,σ)\mathcal J(L,\sigma)J(L,σ).

Algorithm 2 (maximum support) starts with σ=1/2\sigma = 1/2σ=1/2 and in each main iteration computes (x,J)=J(L,σ)(x,J) = \mathcal J(L,\sigma)(x,J)=J(L,σ) and (x^,J^)=J(L⊥,σ)(\hat x,\hat J) = \mathcal J(L^\perp,\sigma)(x^,J^)=J(L⊥,σ); it halts if J∪J^={1,…,n}J \cup \hat J = \{1,\dots,n\}J∪J^={1,…,n} and otherwise replaces σ\sigmaσ by σ2\sigma^2σ2.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 8), with two printed bounds corrected

With m=min⁡{σ(L),σ(L⊥)}m = \min\{\sigma(L),\sigma(L^\perp)\}m=min{σ(L),σ(L⊥)} and k=max⁡{1,⌈log⁡2log⁡2(1/m)⌉+1}k = \max\{1, \lceil\log_2\log_2(1/m)\rceil + 1\}k=max{1,⌈log2​log2​(1/m)⌉+1}, for every n≥1n \ge 1n≥1, every subspace LLL and every admissible behaviour of the basic procedure: Algorithm 2 never gets stuck, has no infinite execution, never starts main iteration k+1k+1k+1, performs at most

2n (2k−1+k)2n\,(2^k - 1 + k)2n(2k−1+k)

rescaling steps, and upon termination returns J=J(L)J = J(L)J=J(L), J^=J(L⊥)\hat J = J(L^\perp)J^=J(L⊥) and points x∈L∩R+nx \in L \cap \mathbb R^n_+x∈L∩R+n​, x^∈L⊥∩R+n\hat x \in L^\perp \cap \mathbb R^n_+x^∈L⊥∩R+n​ with xJ>0x_J > 0xJ​>0, x^J^>0\hat x_{\hat J} > 0x^J^​>0.

Milestones

  1. Partition claim (§2, p. 4): J(L)∩J(L⊥)=∅J(L) \cap J(L^\perp) = \emptysetJ(L)∩J(L⊥)=∅ and J(L)∪J(L⊥)={1,…,n}J(L) \cup J(L^\perp) = \{1,\dots,n\}J(L)∪J(L⊥)={1,…,n}.
  2. σi\sigma_iσi​ observation (§2, p. 5): J(L)={i:σi(L)>0}J(L) = \{i : \sigma_i(L) > 0\}J(L)={i:σi​(L)>0} and σ(L)=min⁡i∈J(L)σi(L)\sigma(L) = \min_{i\in J(L)}\sigma_i(L)σ(L)=mini∈J(L)​σi​(L).
  3. Lemma 1 (pp. 5–6): a certificate zzz with ∥(Pz)+∥1≤12∥z∥∞=12zi\|(Pz)^+\|_1 \le \tfrac12\|z\|_\infty = \tfrac12 z_i∥(Pz)+∥1​≤21​∥z∥∞​=21​zi​ gives xi≤∥x∥∞/2x_i \le \|x\|_\infty/2xi​≤∥x∥∞​/2 on L∩R+nL\cap\mathbb R^n_+L∩R+n​, so that σi(DL)=2σi(L)\sigma_i(DL) = 2\sigma_i(L)σi​(DL)=2σi​(L) and σj(DL)=σj(L)\sigma_j(DL) = \sigma_j(L)σj​(DL)=σj​(L) (j≠ij \ne ij=i) for D=I+eieiTD = I + e_ie_i^{\mathsf T}D=I+ei​eiT​.
  4. Proposition 1 (p. 6, corrected): Algorithm 1 halts within n(⌊log⁡2(1/σ)⌋+1)n(\lfloor\log_2(1/\sigma)\rfloor + 1)n(⌊log2​(1/σ)⌋+1) rescaling steps with x∈L∩R+nx \in L\cap\mathbb R^n_+x∈L∩R+n​, xJ>0x_J > 0xJ​>0, J⊆J(L)J \subseteq J(L)J⊆J(L); and if σ≤σ(L)\sigma \le \sigma(L)σ≤σ(L) then J=J(L)J = J(L)J=J(L) with the refined count ∑i∈J(L)⌈log⁡2(1/σi(L))⌉+(n−∣J(L)∣)(⌊log⁡2(1/σ)⌋+1)\sum_{i\in J(L)}\lceil\log_2(1/\sigma_i(L))\rceil + (n - |J(L)|)(\lfloor\log_2(1/\sigma)\rfloor + 1)∑i∈J(L)​⌈log2​(1/σi​(L))⌉+(n−∣J(L)∣)(⌊log2​(1/σ)⌋+1).
  5. Corollary 1 (p. 7): if J∪J^={1,…,n}J \cup \hat J = \{1,\dots,n\}J∪J^={1,…,n} for outputs of J(L,σ)\mathcal J(L,\sigma)J(L,σ) and J(L⊥,σ)\mathcal J(L^\perp,\sigma)J(L⊥,σ), then J=J(L)J = J(L)J=J(L), J^=J(L⊥)\hat J = J(L^\perp)J^=J(L⊥) and both outputs are maximum support points.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 gives an algorithm for the maximum support problem whose cost depends only on m=min⁡{σ(L),σ(L⊥)}m = \min\{\sigma(L),\sigma(L^\perp)\}m=min{σ(L),σ(L⊥)}, without knowing either quantity: O(log⁡log⁡(1/m))O(\log\log(1/m))O(loglog(1/m)) guessing rounds and O(nlog⁡(1/m))O(n\log(1/m))O(nlog(1/m)) rescaling steps, each of which is a call of the basic procedure on a projected problem. Because the pair of problems subsumes polyhedral feasibility and linear programming, a maximum support solution is a certificate of which inequalities of a homogenized system can hold strictly. The duality behind the stopping test, that J(L)J(L)J(L) and J(L⊥)J(L^\perp)J(L⊥) partition the coordinates, is a theorem of the alternative for subspaces of the Goldman–Tucker type.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the source; nothing here is open. No part of it is machine-checked: there is no formal development of projection-and-rescaling algorithms, of condition measures for subspaces, or of the subspace form of the strict-complementarity partition. Checking the source against the formal statements already found that the printed bounds (5), (6) and (7) are false for some subspaces (counterexamples are recorded in the corresponding items); the targets above carry the minimal corrections, so a complete proof certifies the corrected bounds.

Difficulty

The correctness part reduces to the partition claim and to Corollary 1. The partition requires a theorem of the alternative for the pair (L,L⊥)(L, L^\perp)(L,L⊥) and the nonnegative orthant, which is not literally the LP form of Farkas' lemma available in libraries.

The counting part is where the printed argument breaks. The proof of Proposition 1 asserts σi(DL)=Dii σi(L)\sigma_i(DL) = D_{ii}\,\sigma_i(L)σi​(DL)=Dii​σi​(L) "throughout the algorithm", by applying Lemma 1 to each rescaling step. But the basic procedure certifies only the subspace DL∩RJDL \cap \mathbb R^JDL∩RJ, not DLDLDL. As long as J⊇J(L)J \supseteq J(L)J⊇J(L) the two cones DL∩R+nDL\cap\mathbb R^n_+DL∩R+n​ and DL∩RJ∩R+nDL\cap\mathbb R^J\cap\mathbb R^n_+DL∩RJ∩R+n​ coincide and the identity holds. Once an index of J(L)J(L)J(L) has been trimmed, which can happen when σ>σ(L)\sigma > \sigma(L)σ>σ(L), it does not. The count of rescalings must also use ⌊log⁡2(1/σ)⌋+1\lfloor\log_2(1/\sigma)\rfloor + 1⌊log2​(1/σ)⌋+1 doublings per trimmed index rather than ⌈log⁡2(1/σ)⌉\lceil\log_2(1/\sigma)\rceil⌈log2​(1/σ)⌉, which matters precisely because Algorithm 2 uses guesses σ=2−2i−1\sigma = 2^{-2^{i-1}}σ=2−2i−1 for which 1/σ1/\sigma1/σ is a power of 222. The obvious induction on steps therefore has to carry the invariant J⊇J(L)J \supseteq J(L)J⊇J(L) and works only under σ≤σ(L)\sigma \le \sigma(L)σ≤σ(L). For larger guesses, which Algorithm 2 makes in its early iterations, only the coarse count is available.

Formalization scope

Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) and LLL a Submodule; L⊥L^\perpL⊥ is Mathlib's orthogonal complement. The Euclidean norm is never used for the paper's norms: ∥x∥∞\|x\|_\infty∥x∥∞​ and ∥(v)+∥1\|(v)^+\|_1∥(v)+∥1​ are written coordinatewise, and σi(L)\sigma_i(L)σi​(L) maximizes over the ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​ unit box, not the Euclidean ball. Index sets are Finset (Fin n). DDD is stored as its diagonal. PDL∣JP_{DL|J}PDL∣J​ is the orthogonal projection of Rn\mathbb R^nRn onto DL∩RJDL \cap \mathbb R^JDL∩RJ, which agrees with the paper's map on RJ\mathbb R^JRJ. σ(L)=1\sigma(L) = 1σ(L)=1 when J(L)=∅J(L) = \emptysetJ(L)=∅, as in the source. Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 assume n≥1n \ge 1n≥1, since Algorithm 1 cannot run on R0\mathbb R^0R0.

Both algorithms are transition relations whose states carry the rescaling and iteration counters, and the basic procedure is nondeterministic: every admissible answer and every maximizer iii is a possible step, and both branches may be available at once. Every statement quantifies over all executions. Progress (no reachable non-halted state is stuck) and the absence of infinite executions are stated explicitly. This rules out the trivializing formalizations: a relation with no transitions (which would make "upon termination" vacuous), a fixed deterministic basic procedure, σi\sigma_iσi​ over the Euclidean ball, bounds for a single execution, and termination as "some execution halts". A sorry-free check exhibits, for n=1n = 1n=1 and L=RL = \mathbb RL=R, a reachable halted state of Algorithm 2 after two rescaling steps, which also witnesses that the printed (7) fails.

A complete development needs the theorem of the alternative for subspaces, orthogonal projections onto intersections of subspaces, a variant/measure argument for termination of nondeterministic relations, and logarithm and floor arithmetic for the schedule σ=2−2i−1\sigma = 2^{-2^{i-1}}σ=2−2i−1. The partition claim and the condition-measure lemmas are reusable for other rescaling and condition-number analyses. Proofs of the milestones, alternative arguments for the partition, and the sharper count of Proposition 1 are all welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Peña, N. Soheili, Projection and rescaling algorithm for finding maximum support solutions to polyhedral conic systems, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022; preprint arXiv:2003.08911v3 (the version read here). https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.08911
  • J. Peña, N. Soheili, Solving conic systems via projection and rescaling, Mathematical Programming 166:87–111, 2017.
  • J. Peña, N. Soheili, Computational performance of a projection and rescaling algorithm, Optimization Methods and Software, 2019.
  • S. Chubanov, A strongly polynomial algorithm for linear systems having a binary solution, Mathematical Programming 134:533–570, 2012.
  • S. Chubanov, A polynomial projection algorithm for linear feasibility problems, Mathematical Programming 153:687–713, 2015.
  • D. Dadush, L. A. Végh, G. Zambelli, Rescaling algorithms for linear conic feasibility, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2020.
  • Y. Ye, Toward probabilistic analysis of interior-point algorithms for linear programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 19:38–52, 1994.
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CombinatoricsGraph TheoryOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Large Independent Sets in Recursive Markov Random Graphs: For Every r < 1 and ε > 0, With High Probability α(G^r_{n,p}) ≥ ((1 − r)/(2 + ε))·n/log nResearch Paper

Motivation

The stability number α(G)\alpha(G)α(G) of a graph, the largest number of pairwise non-adjacent vertices, is one of the basic parameters of combinatorial optimization: computing it is NP-hard, and random graphs are the standard test bed for what typical instances look like. For the Erdős–Rényi–Gilbert graph Gn,pG_{n,p}Gn,p​, in which every edge is present independently, the behaviour of α\alphaα is known to first order in the dense regime (Grimmett–McDiarmid 1975) and in the sparse regime (Frieze 1990). Independence of the edges is what all these arguments use, and it is also the feature that real networks most obviously lack.

A. Gupte and Y. Zhu (arXiv:2207.04514, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025) introduce a random graph in which the edges at a vertex are dependent through a Markov chain, and ask which classical properties survive. Their first main result is a lower bound on α\alphaα of order n/log⁡nn/\log nn/logn that holds with high probability. This mission formalizes that result, read in the arXiv version v4 (24 May 2024).

Setting

Fix an initial probability p∈(0,1]p\in(0,1]p∈(0,1] and a decay parameter r∈(0,1)r\in(0,1)r∈(0,1), and write γ:=1−r\gamma:=1-rγ:=1−r. The recursive Markov random graph Gn,prG^r_{n,p}Gn,pr​ (Definition 1 of the paper) has vertices v1,…,vnv_1,\dots,v_nv1​,…,vn​ and is generated vertex by vertex. When viv_ivi​ arrives, its edges to the earlier vertices form a row of Bernoulli variables X1i,…,Xi−1iX^i_1,\dots,X^i_{i-1}X1i​,…,Xi−1i​, with Xji=1X^i_j=1Xji​=1 when the edge (vj,vi)(v_j,v_i)(vj​,vi​) is present. Rows of different vertices are independent. Within a row:

  1. the first edge (v1,vi)(v_1,v_i)(v1​,vi​) is present with probability ppp;
  2. given the previous edge of the row, the edge (vj,vi)(v_j,v_i)(vj​,vi​) is present with probability pj−1ip^i_{j-1}pj−1i​ if (vj−1,vi)(v_{j-1},v_i)(vj−1​,vi​) is absent, and with probability r pj−1ir\,p^i_{j-1}rpj−1i​ if it is present, where pj−1i=P{Xj−1i=1}p^i_{j-1}=\mathbb P\{X^i_{j-1}=1\}pj−1i​=P{Xj−1i​=1}.

So each row is a non-homogeneous Markov chain whose transition matrix (display (2) of the paper) depends on the marginal of the previous edge. The marginals then obey the recursion pji=fγ(pj−1i)p^i_j=f_\gamma(p^i_{j-1})pji​=fγ​(pj−1i​) with fa(x)=x(1−ax)f_a(x)=x(1-ax)fa​(x)=x(1−ax), and a present edge lowers the chance of the next one by the factor rrr. At r=1r=1r=1 the model is Gn,pG_{n,p}Gn,p​; the paper assumes r<1r<1r<1 throughout.

The average degree is d(G)=2∣E(G)∣/nd(G)=2|E(G)|/nd(G)=2∣E(G)∣/n. A property holds with high probability (w.h.p.) if its probability tends to 111 as n→∞n\to\inftyn→∞, and ξn\xi_nξn​ concentrates to ccc if P{∣ξn−c∣≤ε}→1\mathbb P\{|\xi_n-c|\le\varepsilon\}\to1P{∣ξn​−c∣≤ε}→1 for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0. The logarithm is natural.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.1

For every p∈(0,1]p\in(0,1]p∈(0,1], r∈(0,1)r\in(0,1)r∈(0,1) and ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0,

lim⁡n→∞P{α(Gn,pr) ≥ γ2+ε⋅nlog⁡n}=1.\lim_{n\to\infty}\mathbb P\Bigl\{\alpha(G^r_{n,p})\ \ge\ \frac{\gamma}{2+\varepsilon}\cdot\frac{n}{\log n}\Bigr\}=1 .n→∞lim​P{α(Gn,pr​) ≥ 2+εγ​⋅lognn​}=1.

The constant γ/(2+ε)\gamma/(2+\varepsilon)γ/(2+ε) is the paper's, and the statement is required for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 and every admissible ppp, rrr.

Milestones

In attack order:

  • the recursion xn+1=fa(xn)x_{n+1}=f_a(x_n)xn+1​=fa​(xn​): Lemma 4.1 (elementary properties of faf_afa​), Lemma 4.2 (the terms are of order 1/n1/n1/n), Lemma 4.3 (the partial sums are 1alog⁡n+O(1)\frac1a\log n+O(1)a1​logn+O(1));
  • the edge probabilities: Lemma 3.1 (pji=pj−1i(1−γpj−1i)p^i_j=p^i_{j-1}(1-\gamma p^i_{j-1})pji​=pj−1i​(1−γpj−1i​)), Lemma 6.1 (two-sided bounds of order 1/(γj)1/(\gamma j)1/(γj)), Lemma 6.2 (bounds on conditional probabilities along a row), Lemma 3.2 (one Markov chain represents every row);
  • the decay chain: Lemmas 10.1–10.4 (second moment, a Chebyshev step, a Slutsky step, ESn2/(ESn)2→1\mathbb E S_n^2/(\mathbb E S_n)^2\to1ESn2​/(ESn​)2→1) and Corollary 4.6, a law of large numbers Sn/log⁡n→1/βS_n/\log n\to1/\betaSn​/logn→1/β for Markov chains of Bernoulli variables with the decay transitions;
  • the graph: Theorem 2.2 (d(Gn,pr)/log⁡nd(G^r_{n,p})/\log nd(Gn,pr​)/logn concentrates to 2/γ2/\gamma2/γ), Lemma 5.1 (α(G)≥max⁡{n2/(n+2m),(2n−m)/3}\alpha(G)\ge\max\{n^2/(n+2m),(2n-m)/3\}α(G)≥max{n2/(n+2m),(2n−m)/3} for every graph), and display (11), which combines them.

Significance

The theorem shows that the dependence between consecutive edges does not destroy the n/log⁡nn/\log nn/logn scale of the stability number. Combined with the paper's upper bound α≤cn\alpha\le cnα≤cn (Theorem 2.4) and its analysis of the greedy algorithm (Proposition 2.3), it places Gn,prG^r_{n,p}Gn,pr​ between the dense and the sparse regimes of Gn,pG_{n,p}Gn,p​. Theorem 2.2, a milestone here, is of independent interest: the graph has average degree (2/γ+o(1))log⁡n(2/\gamma+o(1))\log n(2/γ+o(1))logn, and Corollaries 2.5–2.7 of the paper derive from it bounds on the minimum degree and the chromatic number and the existence of large clique minors.

The formalization adds a checked account of a proof whose printed version has gaps. Several printed lemmas are false as stated: Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 lose a scaling factor, Lemma 6.2 has a wrong upper bound, Lemmas 10.1 and 10.4 are stated in a setting where they fail and Lemma 10.1 has a wrong constant, Theorem 4.4 is false without a Markov hypothesis, and the stochastic-dominance step (5) in the printed proof of Theorem 2.2 is false. Each affected milestone is stated in a minimally corrected form. Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 2.2 themselves are true. None of these results has a machine-checked proof.

Difficulty

A first idea is to transfer Gn,pG_{n,p}Gn,p​ arguments directly. For Gn,pG_{n,p}Gn,p​ with p≈clog⁡n/np\approx c\log n/np≈clogn/n the bound comes from Turán's theorem plus concentration of the edge count, and the edge count is a sum of independent indicators. In Gn,prG^r_{n,p}Gn,pr​ the edges at a vertex are strongly dependent: the edge count of a row is the partial sum Si−1S_{i-1}Si−1​ of a non-homogeneous Markov chain whose marginals decay like 1/(γj)1/(\gamma j)1/(γj), so its mean grows only like log⁡i/γ\log i/\gammalogi/γ. Standard laws of large numbers do not apply, and concentration of a row sum around log⁡i/γ\log i/\gammalogi/γ needs a second-moment bound that uses the Markov structure; the marginal recursion alone does not suffice (a comonotone coupling with the same marginals has row sums that stay bounded). The heart of the mission is therefore Corollary 4.6, a law of large numbers for this chain, built from the recursion estimates of Lemmas 4.2–4.3 and the second-moment bound of Lemma 10.1, and its transfer to the average degree through the independence of the rows.

Formalization scope

The vertex set is Fin n, the paper's vkv_kvk​ being k − 1, and the edge (vj,vi)(v_j,v_i)(vj​,vi​) is G.Adj (j−1) (i−1). The law of Gn,prG^r_{n,p}Gn,pr​ is an explicit finite weight rmrgWeight n p r G on SimpleGraph (Fin n). It is a product over rows, each row's weight being the Markov chain above with the transition out of edge jjj using the jjj-th iterate of fγf_\gammafγ​ from ppp. Probabilities are rmrgProb n p r E, the sum of the weights of the graphs in EEE. Definition 1's phrase "independent of all other edges" cannot hold for the next edge of the same row; it is read through the paper's generation process (rows independent, each row a Markov chain with transition matrix (2)). Lemma 3.1 is the milestone certifying that the marginals of this weight obey the recursion. A sanity file checks that the weights sum to 111 for n=2,3n=2,3n=2,3 and that the first two edge marginals are ppp and p(1−γp)p(1-\gamma p)p(1−γp).

The decay chain is IsDecayChain P Y β on a probability space: {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1}-valued measurable variables, the Markov property, and the two transition rules, with conditional probabilities written multiplicatively. Expectations are Bochner integrals, and "w.h.p." and concentration are limits of probabilities of the events {∣⋅−c∣≤ε}\{|\cdot-c|\le\varepsilon\}{∣⋅−c∣≤ε}, as defined on p. 4 of the paper. Variances in Lemma 10.2 come with square integrability for all large nnn, so the hypothesis σn2=o(μn2)\sigma_n^2=o(\mu_n^2)σn2​=o(μn2​) is not met by the junk value 000.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the weight is exactly the law of Definition 1, not one favouring sparse graphs, and no hypothesis of the goal pins the graph or the probability.

The corrections, each with a counterexample satisfying the paper's hypotheses, are declared on the items:

  • Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3 use ℓn(ax1)\ell_n(ax_1)ℓn​(ax1​) and f1(ax1)f_1(ax_1)f1​(ax1​), and the bound xn≤1/(4a)x_n\le1/(4a)xn​≤1/(4a) is non-strict;
  • Lemma 6.2's first upper bound is 1−r pj−1i1-r\,p^i_{j-1}1−rpj−1i​;
  • Lemmas 10.1 and 10.4 are stated for the decay chain of Corollary 4.6 (Lemma 10.4 for every β∈[0,1]\beta\in[0,1]β∈[0,1], which keeps §10's range (0,1](0,1](0,1]), and Lemma 10.1's constant is 1+2/γ1+2/\gamma1+2/γ.

Theorem 4.4 is false as stated and is not an item; Corollary 4.6, which the proof of Theorem 2.2 cites, replaces it. Displays (5)–(10), Proposition 2.3, Theorem 2.4 and Corollaries 2.5–2.7, 4.5, 4.7 and 5.2 are out of scope.

A complete development needs:

  • a law of large numbers for non-homogeneous Bernoulli Markov chains;
  • the finite-law calculus for rmrgProb: marginals, independence of rows, the row-to-chain identification;
  • Caro–Wei/Turán-type lower bounds on SimpleGraph.indepNum, which Mathlib does not yet have.

The last two are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone are welcome, as are alternative proofs of Theorem 2.2 that avoid the printed stochastic-dominance step.

Selected references

  • A. Gupte, Y. Zhu, Large independent sets in recursive Markov random graphs, arXiv:2207.04514v4, 2024; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.04514
  • Y. Caro, P. Hansen, D. Sopena (CHS03 in the paper), cited for Lemma 5.1, Theorems 10 and 11; see the paper's bibliography.
  • G. R. Grimmett, C. J. H. McDiarmid, On colouring random graphs, Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 77, 1975. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305004100051124
  • A. M. Frieze, On the independence number of random graphs, Discrete Mathematics 81, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1016/0012-365X(90)90149-C
  • O. Frank, D. Strauss, Markov graphs, Journal of the American Statistical Association 81, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1986.10478342
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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Value Loss in Allocation Systems with Provider Guarantees: Under Pareto-Efficient Provider Guarantees the Relative Value Loss Is at Most max{δ, (n−1)/(n+(1−δ)(n−1))}Research Paper

Why restricting allocations costs value

Centralized platforms that assign work to independent service providers, such as ride-hailing and freelance marketplaces, sales organisations distributing leads, and firms sourcing from several suppliers, are often asked to give their providers guarantees: a minimum income, a max-min fair share of the work, or another fairness criterion. A guarantee shrinks the set of allocations the system may use, so it can lower the total value the system generates. The question is how much value can be lost.

Many settings of this kind have no bound at all on the price of fairness or the price of anarchy (Bertsimas, Farias and Trichakis 2011; Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 2009). Gur, Iancu and Warnes (SSRN 3351509, published in Management Science in 2020) identify a broad class of job-allocation systems and guarantees for which the relative loss is bounded by a quantity that depends only on the number of providers and on how different they are. This mission formalizes that bound, Theorem 1 of the paper, and the steps of its proof.

Setting

A job ddd in a finite set DDD has an intrinsic value v(d)∈Rv(d) \in \mathbb Rv(d)∈R. Values may be negative. A set of jobs S⊆DS \subseteq DS⊆D has value v(S)=∑d∈Sv(d)v(S) = \sum_{d \in S} v(d)v(S)=∑d∈S​v(d). There are nnn providers N={1,…,n}N = \{1, \dots, n\}N={1,…,n}. An allocation is a tuple A=(A1,…,An)A = (A_1, \dots, A_n)A=(A1​,…,An​) of subsets of DDD, where AiA_iAi​ is the set of jobs given to provider iii. Provider iii turns its jobs into value γiv(Ai)\gamma_i v(A_i)γi​v(Ai​). The heterogeneity profile γ\gammaγ lies in [γmin⁡,γmax⁡]n[\gamma_{\min}, \gamma_{\max}]^n[γmin​,γmax​]n with 0<γmin⁡≤γmax⁡0 < \gamma_{\min} \le \gamma_{\max}0<γmin​≤γmax​, and the degree of heterogeneity is

δ=γmax⁡−γmin⁡γmax⁡∈[0,1).\delta = \frac{\gamma_{\max} - \gamma_{\min}}{\gamma_{\max}} \in [0, 1).δ=γmax​γmax​−γmin​​∈[0,1).

The feasible allocations form a set F\mathcal FF that satisfies Assumption 1:

  • (i) indivisibility: bundles are pairwise disjoint;
  • (ii) symmetry: permuting the bundles among the providers keeps an allocation feasible;
  • (iii) monotonicity: any one provider's bundle may be shrunk;
  • (iv) provider independence: if A,B∈FA, B \in \mathcal FA,B∈F and AiA_iAi​ meets no BjB_jBj​ with j≠ij \ne ij=i, then replacing BiB_iBi​ by AiA_iAi​ in BBB is feasible.

The allocations with guarantees form a non-empty subset FG⊆F\mathcal F_G \subseteq \mathcal FFG​⊆F that satisfies Assumption 2 (Pareto efficiency): if B∈FGB \in \mathcal F_GB∈FG​, A∈FA \in \mathcal FA∈F and v(Ai)≥v(Bi)v(A_i) \ge v(B_i)v(Ai​)≥v(Bi​) for every iii, then A∈FGA \in \mathcal F_GA∈FG​. Income guarantees under monotone payments, max-min fairness and α-fairness are of this kind (§2.3 of the paper). The value loss under provider guarantees is

Lγ(F,FG)=max⁡A∈F∑i=1nγiv(Ai)−max⁡B∈FG∑i=1nγiv(Bi)max⁡A∈F∑i=1nγiv(Ai).(1)\mathbf L_\gamma(\mathcal F, \mathcal F_G) = \frac{\max_{A \in \mathcal F} \sum_{i=1}^n \gamma_i v(A_i) - \max_{B \in \mathcal F_G} \sum_{i=1}^n \gamma_i v(B_i)}{\max_{A \in \mathcal F} \sum_{i=1}^n \gamma_i v(A_i)}. \qquad (1)Lγ​(F,FG​)=maxA∈F​∑i=1n​γi​v(Ai​)maxA∈F​∑i=1n​γi​v(Ai​)−maxB∈FG​​∑i=1n​γi​v(Bi​)​.(1)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 16)

For every γ∈[γmin⁡,γmax⁡]n\gamma \in [\gamma_{\min}, \gamma_{\max}]^nγ∈[γmin​,γmax​]n and all F\mathcal FF, FG\mathcal F_GFG​ satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2,

Lγ(F,FG)≤max⁡{δ,n−1n+(1−δ)(n−1)}.(5)\mathbf L_\gamma(\mathcal F, \mathcal F_G) \le \max\left\{\delta, \frac{n-1}{n + (1-\delta)(n-1)}\right\}. \qquad (5)Lγ​(F,FG​)≤max{δ,n+(1−δ)(n−1)n−1​}.(5)

The statement fixes nothing beyond the paper's model: every finite job set, every real-valued vvv, every number of providers and every profile in the box.

Milestones

These are the steps of the proof in Appendix A, in attack order:

  1. Lemma 1 (p. 35): for optimal A∈F∗A \in \mathcal F^*A∈F∗ and B∈FG∗B \in \mathcal F_G^*B∈FG∗​, v(Ai∖(B1∪⋯∪Bn))≤v(Bj∖Ai)v(A_i \setminus (B_1 \cup \dots \cup B_n)) \le v(B_j \setminus A_i)v(Ai​∖(B1​∪⋯∪Bn​))≤v(Bj​∖Ai​) for all i,ji, ji,j.
  2. The reduction (pp. 36–37): with xi=v(Ai∖∪kBk)x_i = v(A_i \setminus \cup_k B_k)xi​=v(Ai​∖∪k​Bk​), yi=v(Bi∖∪kAk)y_i = v(B_i \setminus \cup_k A_k)yi​=v(Bi​∖∪k​Ak​) and wij=v(Ai∩Bj)w_{ij} = v(A_i \cap B_j)wij​=v(Ai​∩Bj​), the inequalities (11) hold, these numbers are non-negative, and the loss equals the linear-fractional expression (12).
  3. The LP bound (pp. 37–38): the loss is at most the optimal value V(γ)V(\gamma)V(γ) of the linear program (14).
  4. Well-posedness (p. 38): (14) is feasible, its objective is at most 111, and V(γ)∈[0,1]V(\gamma) \in [0, 1]V(γ)∈[0,1].
  5. Strong duality (p. 38): V(γ)V(\gamma)V(γ) equals the optimal value f(γ)f(\gamma)f(γ) of the dual program (15)/(16), and both programs attain their values.
  6. Quasiconvexity (pp. 38–39): fff is quasiconvex on [γmin⁡,γmax⁡]n[\gamma_{\min}, \gamma_{\max}]^n[γmin​,γmax​]n, with values in [0,1][0, 1][0,1].
  7. Vertex reduction (p. 39): a function quasiconvex on a box is dominated at every point by its value at some vertex.
  8. Lemma 2 (p. 39, corrected): at the vertex with n0n_0n0​ entries γmax⁡\gamma_{\max}γmax​, the value of (14) is max⁡{δ,n−1n+n0+(1−δ)(n−n0)−1}\max\{\delta, \frac{n-1}{n + n_0 + (1-\delta)(n-n_0) - 1}\}max{δ,n+n0​+(1−δ)(n−n0​)−1n−1​}. This holds when n0<nn_0 < nn0​<n, or when δ≤n−12n−1\delta \le \frac{n-1}{2n-1}δ≤2n−1n−1​.
  9. Monotonicity in n0n_0n0​ (p. 39): this value is non-increasing in n0n_0n0​, and at n0=1n_0 = 1n0​=1 it equals the bound (5).

Significance

The result. With homogeneous providers (δ=0\delta = 0δ=0) any Pareto-efficient guarantee costs less than half of the optimal value, since n−12n−1<12\frac{n-1}{2n-1} < \frac122n−1n−1​<21​. For every fixed δ\deltaδ the loss stays below 12−δ\frac{1}{2-\delta}2−δ1​. A system designer may therefore choose among income guarantees, max-min fairness and similar rules knowing that none of them can destroy more than a fixed fraction of value. Theorem 2 of the paper shows that the bound is tight. Theorem 1 is the paper's main result.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; nothing in this mission is open mathematically. The work is the formal proof. On the way it produces reusable pieces:

  • an axiomatic model of allocations with guarantees;
  • an explicit linear program with its dual and their duality;
  • the quasiconvexity of an LP value as a function of its coefficients;
  • the vertex principle for quasiconvex functions on a box, which Mathlib does not have.

Two printed gaps get settled:

  • Lemma 2 as printed is false at n0=nn_0 = nn0​=n when δ>n−12n−1\delta > \frac{n-1}{2n-1}δ>2n−1n−1​. The mission states it with the minimal correction.
  • The proof's use of relabelling and rescaling of γ\gammaγ is left implicit on the page.

Difficulty

The obvious attempt is to compare an optimal unrestricted allocation with an optimal guaranteed one job by job. This gives no bound, because F\mathcal FF and FG\mathcal F_GFG​ are arbitrary sets subject only to the axioms: there is no explicit allocation rule to compare against. The paper's route has several steps that each need care.

  • Exchange argument. Lemma 1 combines symmetry, monotonicity, provider independence and Pareto efficiency in one exchange.
  • Non-negativity. The reduction to (13) needs x,y,w≥0x, y, w \ge 0x,y,w≥0 although vvv may be negative. This holds only for optimal allocations, and the page does not say so.
  • Rescaling. Passing from the fractional program (13) to the linear program (14) is a homogeneity argument.
  • Duality and quasiconvexity. The value of the dual must be shown quasiconvex in the coefficients γ\gammaγ, through partial minimization of a jointly quasiconvex function.
  • Vertices. Lemma 2 needs explicit primal and dual certificates in two regimes (δ\deltaδ above or below the second term). The worst vertex must then be identified, using that the LP is invariant under permuting providers and under scaling γ\gammaγ.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace ProviderGuarantee.Bound. The definitions are in the single file ProviderGuarantee.Bound.Model:

  • Jobs and allocations. DDD is a Fintype, and v:D→Rv : D \to \mathbb Rv:D→R carries no sign condition. An allocation is a function Fin n → Finset D, so provider iii of the paper is the index i−1i - 1i−1.
  • The assumptions. Assumption 1 is stated clause by clause. Symmetry permutes bundles (fun i => A (σ i)), and monotonicity and provider independence use Function.update. Assumption 2 includes FG⊆F\mathcal F_G \subseteq \mathcal FFG​⊆F.
  • Maxima. A maximum over a set of allocations is a real sSup. Every set of allocations is finite, so this is a true maximum on non-empty sets, and FG≠∅\mathcal F_G \ne \emptysetFG​=∅ is a hypothesis of the goal.
  • The loss. It uses Lean's division: when max⁡F=0\max_{\mathcal F} = 0maxF​=0 the page's ratio is 0/00/00/0 and Lean's value is 000. No hypothesis max⁡F>0\max_{\mathcal F} > 0maxF​>0 is added.
  • The linear programs. The value of (14) is a real sSup and the dual value fff is a real sInf over (15). (15) is (16) with sss explicit. The milestones state feasibility, boundedness and attainment, so neither value is a default.

The goal is about the value loss of the allocation model over all admissible γ\gammaγ, F\mathcal FF and FG\mathcal F_GFG​. A formalization stating Theorem 1 about the LP value, at a single vertex, at n0=1n_0 = 1n0​=1, with v≥0v \ge 0v≥0, or with a weakened Assumption 1 or 2 would prove a different and easier statement, and is ruled out.

A complete development needs:

  • finite-set bookkeeping (disjoint unions and sums over Finset.biUnion);
  • LP duality for this program, for which the platform's general-form strong duality (LinearOptimization.lp_strong_duality) is a possible tool;
  • quasiconvexity of linear-fractional maps and of partial minima;
  • the box vertex principle;
  • the algebra of the two certificate families of Lemma 2.

Contributions are welcome for any milestone, and for the invariance of (14) under permutation and positive scaling of γ\gammaγ, which the goal's proof needs and the paper uses tacitly.

Selected references

  • Y. Gur, D. Iancu, X. Warnes, Value Loss in Allocation Systems with Provider Guarantees, SSRN 3351509 (version of March 24, 2020); Management Science, 2020. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3351509, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3656
  • D. Bertsimas, V. F. Farias, N. Trichakis, The Price of Fairness, Operations Research 59(1), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1100.0865
  • E. Koutsoupias, C. Papadimitriou, Worst-case equilibria, Computer Science Review 3(2), 2009. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosrev.2009.04.003
  • D. P. Bertsekas, A. Nedić, A. E. Ozdaglar, Convex Analysis and Optimization, Athena Scientific, 2003.
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Operations ResearchReinforcement LearningTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Speeding up Policy Simulation in Supply Chain RL: Picard Iteration for Fulfillment Converges in at Most One More Iteration than the Number of Nodes That Run Out of CapacityResearch Paper

Motivation

Training and back-testing a reinforcement-learning policy for a supply chain requires policy simulation: given an initial state, a horizon TTT and a sequence of exogenous events, compute the actions the policy takes when the system evolves under its own decisions. In large online retail networks the horizon is the number of customer orders, in the millions, and each step needs one evaluation of a neural-network policy. Sequential simulation therefore costs TTT policy evaluations in series, and this dominates the cost of training and evaluating such policies (Farias et al., 2025).

Parallel discrete-event simulation methods such as Time Warp (Jefferson, 1985) parallelise a single trajectory by optimistic execution and rollback, but they rely on local causality that fulfillment problems lack: every order can interact with every other through shared node capacities. Farias, Gijsbrechts, Khojandi, Peng and Zheng propose the Picard iteration: split the time steps among many processes, let each process evaluate the policy only on its own steps while replaying cached actions elsewhere, and iterate until the cache stops changing. For the fulfillment optimization (FO) problem, the central example of the paper and a standard model of online order fulfillment (Acimovic & Farias, 2019), the paper proves that the number of iterations is bounded independently of TTT. This mission formalizes that bound.

Setting

A controlled dynamical system has states SSS, actions AAA, disturbances Ω\OmegaΩ, a set of feasible actions at each state, an always-feasible action aϕa_\phiaϕ​, and a transition map f:S×A×Ω→Sf : S \times A \times \Omega \to Sf:S×A×Ω→S. A policy is a map π:S×Ω→A\pi : S \times \Omega \to Aπ:S×Ω→A. Given s1s_1s1​ and disturbances ω1,ω2,…\omega_1, \omega_2, \dotsω1​,ω2​,…, the sequential run is atseq=π(st,ωt)a^{\mathrm{seq}}_t = \pi(s_t, \omega_t)atseq​=π(st​,ωt​), st+1=f(st,atseq,ωt)s_{t+1} = f(s_t, a^{\mathrm{seq}}_t, \omega_t)st+1​=f(st​,atseq​,ωt​).

In the FO problem there are III products and JJJ nodes. A state s=(x,c)s = (x, c)s=(x,c) records inventories xi,j∈Rx_{i,j} \in \mathbb Rxi,j​∈R and remaining capacities cj∈Rc_j \in \mathbb Rcj​∈R. Each disturbance ωt\omega_tωt​ is an order for a product i(ωt)i(\omega_t)i(ωt​). An action is a node jjj, feasible when cj>0c_j > 0cj​>0 and xi(ωt),j>0x_{i(\omega_t), j} > 0xi(ωt​),j​>0, or the action 0=aϕ0 = a_\phi0=aϕ​ (do not fulfil). Fulfilling from node jjj removes one unit of capacity at jjj and one unit of the ordered product's inventory at jjj; action 000 changes nothing.

The Picard iteration (Algorithm 1 of the paper) assigns each time step to a process. In the FO problem the assignment is by products: each product is owned by one process, and every order of that product is handled by its owner. The cache starts as αt0=aϕ\alpha^0_t = a_\phiαt0​=aϕ​. In iteration k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 every process mmm re-simulates from s1s_1s1​. On its own orders it evaluates the policy. On every other order it replays the cached action αtk−1\alpha^{k-1}_tαtk−1​ if that action is feasible in its own state, and takes aϕa_\phiaϕ​ otherwise. The new cache αtk\alpha^k_tαtk​ takes each order's action from the process that owns it. The algorithm stops when αk=αk−1\alpha^k = \alpha^{k-1}αk=αk−1.

The theorem assumes three properties of the policy:

  1. Inventory Independence: the decision for an order of product iii depends on inventories only through those of product iii.
  2. Consistency: changing the inventory and capacity of a single node j′j'j′ that the policy did not choose moves the decision, if at all, to j′j'j′.
  3. Monotonicity: adding a unit of inventory at the chosen node, or a unit of capacity at any node with positive capacity, does not change the decision.

Bid-price policies (Talluri & van Ryzin, 1998) satisfy all three. Write QTQ_TQT​ for the set of nodes with positive initial capacity whose capacity is no longer positive at some time t≤Tt \le Tt≤T in the sequential run.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2 (corrected)

For every feasible policy satisfying Assumptions 1–3, every real initial state, every order sequence, every horizon TTT and every product-to-process assignment,

k≥∣QT∣+1  ⟹  αtk=atseqfor all t≤T,k \ge |Q_T| + 1 \;\Longrightarrow\; \alpha^k_t = a^{\mathrm{seq}}_t \quad \text{for all } t \le T,k≥∣QT​∣+1⟹αtk​=atseq​for all t≤T,

and whenever the stopping test succeeds at an iteration k≥1k \ge 1k≥1, the returned cache is aseqa^{\mathrm{seq}}aseq on [T][T][T]. Since ∣QT∣≤J|Q_T| \le J∣QT​∣≤J, this gives the paper's informal Theorem 3.1 (at most J+1J + 1J+1 iterations).

Milestones, in proof order

  1. Capacity conservation (§A.2.1): along every run, capacity consumed at a node equals the total inventory consumed there.
  2. The skip step of Lemma A.1's proof (corrected): a process holds at least as much inventory of a product it does not own as the owner held in the previous iteration.
  3. The exchange step, eqs. (8)–(10): replacing the sequential state by a state that dominates it by whole units off the exhausted nodes moves the policy's decision only to an exhausted node or to a node with strictly more inventory.
  4. Eq. (5): the same alternative for each process's decision on its own orders.
  5. Lemma A.1: off QtQ_tQt​, every process's inventories and capacities dominate the sequential ones.
  6. Eq. (3) (corrected): αtk=atseq\alpha^k_t = a^{\mathrm{seq}}_tαtk​=atseq​ whenever ∣Qt∣<k|Q_t| < k∣Qt​∣<k.

Significance

The bound makes the parallel speed-up concrete. One iteration costs about max⁡m∣Tm∣≈T/M\max_m |T_m| \approx T/Mmaxm​∣Tm​∣≈T/M sequential policy evaluations with MMM processes, so convergence in ∣QT∣+1|Q_T| + 1∣QT​∣+1 iterations gives an effective speed-up of order M/(∣QT∣+1)M/(|Q_T| + 1)M/(∣QT​∣+1). This is independent of TTT and depends on the instance only through the number of nodes that run out of capacity. When supply exceeds demand this number can be much smaller than JJJ, which the paper uses to explain the speed-ups of several hundred times it measures on a GPU.

Formalizing the result adds three things. First, it fixes the statement. As printed, with τj\tau_jτj​ defined as the first time ct,jseq=0c^{\mathrm{seq}}_{t,j} = 0ct,jseq​=0, the theorem is false for the real capacities the paper allows: a capacity of 3/23/23/2 goes to 1/21/21/2 and then to −1/2-1/2−1/2 without ever being 000. Two steps of the appendix also fail as printed: eq. (3) at t=τ~kt = \tilde\tau_kt=τ~k​, and the equality in the skip step, which ignores the feasibility fallback of Algorithm 1. The mission states the corrected forms, each checked by randomized brute-force search on small instances. Second, it produces a checked version of an argument that the paper presents compactly, with a mixed indexing of states. Third, the definitions give a reusable model of the Picard iteration for general dynamical systems. As far as is known, no part of this result has been machine-checked.

Difficulty

A wrong cached action from another process changes a process's state, and through it all of the process's later decisions. In the special case treated in §3.1, a greedy policy with unlimited inventory, every wrong action goes to a node that runs out in the sequential run (Lemma 3.2). Each iteration then fixes the cache up to the next exhaustion time. That invariant does not hold for policies that depend on inventory: a wrong action can go to a node that never runs out, and the paper notes that Lemma 3.2 "no longer holds". The general argument has to control inventories, not actions, across all processes and iterations at once. It must also cope with the fallback to aϕa_\phiaϕ​ when a replayed action is infeasible, which makes non-owner processes lag behind the owner's run rather than copy it.

Over real data, Assumption 3 gives invariance only under whole-unit increments of capacity. The policy need not depend on capacities only through their signs.

Formalization scope

The Lean development uses the following conventions.

  • Data. Products are Fin I and nodes Fin J; inventories are Fin I → Fin J → ℝ and capacities Fin J → ℝ, of any sign. Actions are Option (Fin J), with none the paper's action 000.
  • Orders and processes. Orders form a sequence ω : ℕ → Ω with product map prod : Ω → Fin I. Processes form an arbitrary type with an ownership map own : Fin I → ι. Orders are 0-based: Lean order t is the paper's order t+1t + 1t+1, and seqState … t is the state before it.
  • Horizon. Runs are defined for all orders; the horizon enters only through QTQ_TQT​ and t<Tt < Tt<T.
  • Assumption 2 excludes j′=π((x,c),ω)j' = \pi((x, c), \omega)j′=π((x,c),ω). Read literally, only the policy that never fulfils satisfies it, and every theorem would be vacuous.
  • The sets QtQ_tQt​ count only nodes with positive initial capacity, and "runs out" means "capacity no longer positive".

Ruled-out formalizations. The theorem would become trivial if processes evaluated the policy on every order (that is sequential simulation), and it would describe a different algorithm if the infeasibility fallback were dropped or the cache were taken from a fixed process; replacing ∣QT∣|Q_T|∣QT​∣ by JJJ would give the weaker Theorem 3.1. The definitions follow Algorithm 1 line by line.

Definitions. There are two definition files: a general Picard iteration for any controlled dynamical system and assignment of time steps to processes (reusable beyond this mission), and the FO instance with Assumptions 1–3 and QtQ_tQt​. A local check confirms that the hypotheses are satisfiable by a policy that actually fulfils orders.

Contributions welcome. Proofs of the milestones in the order listed, and alternative proofs of the goal.

Selected references

  • V. F. Farias, J. Gijsbrechts, A. Khojandi, T. Peng, A. Zheng, Speeding up Policy Simulation in Supply Chain RL, arXiv:2406.01939v2, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.01939
  • J. Acimovic, V. F. Farias, The Fulfillment-Optimization Problem, INFORMS TutORials in Operations Research, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1287/educ.2019.0199
  • K. T. Talluri, G. J. van Ryzin, An Analysis of Bid-Price Controls for Network Revenue Management, Management Science 44(11), 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.44.11.1577
  • D. R. Jefferson, Virtual Time, ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems 7(3), 1985. https://doi.org/10.1145/3916.3988
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Machine LearningOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Secretary Problem with Predictions: Learned Dynkin Is max{0.215, (1−ε)/(1+ε)}-CompetitiveResearch Paper

Motivation

The secretary problem asks how to hire the best of nnn candidates who are interviewed one at a time in random order, when every hiring decision must be made irrevocably at the interview. It is the standard model of online selection under uncertainty, and its answer, Dynkin's rule, hires the maximum with probability 1/e1/e1/e (Dynkin 1963; see the survey of Ferguson 1989). No algorithm does better without further information.

In many applications that further information exists: a recommender system, a past auction, or a résumé screen gives a prediction of every candidate's value before the interviews start. The learning-augmented (algorithms-with-predictions) framework asks for algorithms that exploit predictions when they are accurate (consistency) while keeping a worst-case guarantee when they are not (robustness) (Lykouris and Vassilvitskii 2021; Mitzenmacher and Vassilvitskii 2022). Fujii and Yoshida (arXiv:2306.08340, Mathematics of Operations Research 2024) give such an algorithm for the secretary problem with a guarantee that degrades smoothly with the prediction error. This mission formalizes their main result for the classical (single-choice) problem.

Setting

There are nnn candidates. Candidate iii has a value v(i)≥0v(i)\ge 0v(i)≥0, revealed at its interview, and a prediction v^(i)≥0\hat v(i)\ge 0v^(i)≥0, known in advance. In the continuous-time model each candidate independently receives an arrival time tit_iti​ uniform on [0,1][0,1][0,1], and candidates are interviewed in increasing order of tit_iti​.

For a threshold θ\thetaθ, candidate iii deviates if its multiplicative error exceeds θ\thetaθ:

∣1−v^(i)v(i)∣>θ,written asθ v(i)<∣v(i)−v^(i)∣.\left|1-\frac{\hat v(i)}{v(i)}\right|>\theta,\qquad\text{written as}\qquad \theta\,v(i)<|v(i)-\hat v(i)|.​1−v(i)v^(i)​​>θ,written asθv(i)<∣v(i)−v^(i)∣.

The deviating candidates form the set MMM, and m=∣M∣m=|M|m=∣M∣. The prediction error is ϵ=max⁡i∣1−v^(i)/v(i)∣\epsilon=\max_i|1-\hat v(i)/v(i)|ϵ=maxi​∣1−v^(i)/v(i)∣, so that (1−ϵ)v(i)≤v^(i)≤(1+ϵ)v(i)(1-\epsilon)v(i)\le\hat v(i)\le(1+\epsilon)v(i)(1−ϵ)v(i)≤v^(i)≤(1+ϵ)v(i) for all iii.

Algorithm 1 (learned Dynkin) takes a time τ\tauτ, the threshold θ\thetaθ, and a maximizer ı^\hat\imath^ of v^\hat vv^. It starts in Prediction mode. When candidate iii arrives, it first switches to Secretary mode for good if iii deviates; then, in Prediction mode it hires iii if i=ı^i=\hat\imathi=^, and in Secretary mode it hires iii if ti>τt_i>\tauti​>τ and iii is the best so far (better than every earlier arrival). Hiring ends the process. Writing E[ALG]\mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}]E[ALG] for the expected value of the hired candidate (000 if nobody is hired), the algorithm is α\alphaα-competitive if E[ALG]≥αmax⁡iv(i)\mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}]\ge\alpha\max_i v(i)E[ALG]≥αmaxi​v(i) for every instance.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 6)

With θ=0.646\theta=0.646θ=0.646 and τ=0.313\tau=0.313τ=0.313, for every nnn, all values and predictions, and every maximizer ı^\hat\imath^ of v^\hat vv^,

E[ALG]  ≥  max⁡{0.215, 1−ϵ1+ϵ}⋅max⁡iv(i).\mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}]\;\ge\;\max\Bigl\{0.215,\ \frac{1-\epsilon}{1+\epsilon}\Bigr\}\cdot\max_i v(i).E[ALG]≥max{0.215, 1+ϵ1−ϵ​}⋅imax​v(i).

Both clauses are part of the goal: the constant 0.2150.2150.215 for every instance, and (1−ϵ)/(1+ϵ)(1-\epsilon)/(1+\epsilon)(1−ϵ)/(1+ϵ) for every ϵ\epsilonϵ bounding the prediction error.

Milestones

The proof splits on whether MMM is empty, whether ı^\hat\imath^ is the best candidate i∗i^*i∗, and whether ı^\hat\imath^ and i∗i^*i∗ lie in MMM. The milestones are its labelled steps, stated for general θ≥0\theta\ge 0θ≥0 and τ∈(0,1)\tau\in(0,1)τ∈(0,1):

  1. M=∅M=\emptysetM=∅: the algorithm hires ı^\hat\imath^, and v(ı^)≥1−ϵ1+ϵv(i∗)v(\hat\imath)\ge\frac{1-\epsilon}{1+\epsilon}v(i^*)v(^)≥1+ϵ1−ϵ​v(i∗) (inequality (1)).
  2. Cases (i)–(v): lower bounds on the probability that i∗i^*i∗ is hired, from τln⁡(1/τ)\tau\ln(1/\tau)τln(1/τ) in cases (i) and (iii) to binomial sums in mmm in cases (ii), (iv), (v).
  3. Inequality (2) and case (vi): when neither ı^\hat\imath^ nor i∗i^*i∗ deviates, a lower bound on E[ALG]/v(i∗)\mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}]/v(i^*)E[ALG]/v(i∗) combining the hire of ı^\hat\imath^ and of i∗i^*i∗.
  4. The numerical step: at θ=0.646\theta=0.646θ=0.646, τ=0.313\tau=0.313τ=0.313, every case bound is at least 0.2150.2150.215 for every m≥1m\ge 1m≥1.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 shows that a single, simple algorithm is both consistent and robust: as the predictions become exact its ratio tends to 111, far above the 1/e1/e1/e barrier, and whatever the predictions, it never falls below 0.2150.2150.215. The same paper shows that the trade-off cannot be avoided entirely: no algorithm achieves 1−O(ϵ)1-O(\epsilon)1−O(ϵ) together with a robust constant above 0.250.250.25 (deterministic) or 0.3480.3480.348 (randomized) (Theorems 2 and 3). The analysis also gives a template for the continuous-time analysis of mode-switching stopping rules.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper, with a case analysis whose last step is numerical. No part is machine-checked. A complete formalization would contribute a continuous-time secretary model with iid uniform arrival times, the continuous-time Dynkin bound τln⁡(1/τ)\tau\ln(1/\tau)τln(1/τ), and a checked version of the numerical step, whose margins are about 3⋅10−53\cdot10^{-5}3⋅10−5. The argument has gaps that a formalization must close. The proof's claim of 0.21510.21510.2151-competitiveness whenever ϵ>θ\epsilon>\thetaϵ>θ is false for n=2n=2n=2. Theorem 1 is not affected, since it asks only for max⁡{0.215,(1−ϵ)/(1+ϵ)}\max\{0.215,(1-\epsilon)/(1+\epsilon)\}max{0.215,(1−ϵ)/(1+ϵ)}, but for θ<ϵ<0.64605\theta<\epsilon<0.64605θ<ϵ<0.64605 that maximum is slightly above 0.2150.2150.215 and the six case bounds alone do not deliver it. The statement here is the theorem as printed.

Difficulty

The natural argument, "follow the prediction until a deviating candidate appears, then run Dynkin's rule", does not inherit Dynkin's guarantee. The Prediction phase may pass over the best early candidate, the switch time is random and correlated with which candidates have arrived, and ı^\hat\imath^ may be hired even when it is not optimal. Each of the six cases therefore needs its own sufficient event, together with the distribution of the first arrival of MMM and the fact that the arrival time of the best of the candidates before a given time is uniform. The final step requires a bound uniform in mmm: monotonicity in mmm plus finitely many evaluations, with very small margins.

Formalization scope

Candidates are Fin n (0-based). The arrival law is Lebesgue measure on Fin n → ℝ restricted to the unit cube [0,1]n[0,1]^n[0,1]n. Expectations are Bochner integrals against it, and probabilities are its Measure.real. The deviation test is the division-free θ v(i)<∣v(i)−v^(i)∣\theta\,v(i)<|v(i)-\hat v(i)|θv(i)<∣v(i)−v^(i)∣, which agrees with the paper when v(i)>0v(i)>0v(i)>0. The prediction-error clause quantifies over every ϵ≥0\epsilon\ge 0ϵ≥0 with ∣v(i)−v^(i)∣≤ϵ v(i)|v(i)-\hat v(i)|\le\epsilon\,v(i)∣v(i)−v^(i)∣≤ϵv(i) for all iii. When all values are positive this is the paper's clause, and it also covers zero values, where the paper's ϵ\epsilonϵ is undefined. The benchmark max⁡iv(i)\max_i v(i)maxi​v(i) is written as α v(j)≤E[ALG]\alpha\,v(j)\le\mathbb E[\mathrm{ALG}]αv(j)≤E[ALG] for every jjj. ı^\hat\imath^ is universally quantified over all maximizers of v^\hat vv^.

"Best so far" compares candidates in the strict order larger value, then smaller index, and i∗i^*i∗ is the top candidate of that order. The paper does not address ties, and both untied readings make Theorem 1 false: with all values equal, a strict comparison of values hires almost nobody. The mode at an arrival is Secretary when a deviating candidate has arrived at the same time or earlier, the candidate itself included. The value of a run sums the values of all candidates that are first to stop, which differs from a single hire only on the null set of tied arrival times.

The goal bounds the expected value of the hired candidate under the algorithm of p. 6, with both clauses. A formalization in which the value of a run is max⁡iv(i)\max_i v(i)maxi​v(i) whenever someone is hired, in which ı^\hat\imath^ is always hired, or in which the goal is reduced to the case M=∅M=\emptysetM=∅ does not state this theorem.

Infrastructure that a complete development needs, and that is reusable beyond this mission: order statistics of iid uniform times on [0,1]n[0,1]^n[0,1]n (the law of the first arrival of a set, uniformity of the arrival time of the best candidate among those before a given time), the continuous-time Dynkin bound, and certified evaluation of alternating binomial sums. Proofs of individual cases and of the numerical milestone are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • K. Fujii, Y. Yoshida, The Secretary Problem with Predictions, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024. arXiv:2306.08340v1. https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.08340v1
  • T. S. Ferguson, Who solved the secretary problem?, Statistical Science 4(3), 1989. https://doi.org/10.1214/ss/1177012493
  • R. Kleinberg, A multiple-choice secretary algorithm with applications to online auctions, SODA 2005. https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1070432.1070519
  • T. Lykouris, S. Vassilvitskii, Competitive caching with machine learned advice, Journal of the ACM 68(4), 2021. https://doi.org/10.1145/3447579
  • M. Mitzenmacher, S. Vassilvitskii, Algorithms with predictions, Communications of the ACM 65(7), 2022. https://doi.org/10.1145/3528087
  • A. Antoniadis, T. Gouleakis, P. Kleer, P. Kolev, Secretary and online matching problems with machine learned advice, NeurIPS 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.01026
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Control TheoryLinear OptimizationOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Optimal Control Framework for Online Job Scheduling with General Cost Functions: Algorithm 2 Is 2K-Speed 2-Competitive for Monotone Substitute Cost FunctionsResearch Paper

Motivation

A single machine receives jobs over time. Each job jjj arrives at its release time rjr_jrj​ with a length vjv_jvj​ and a cost function gjg_jgj​, and all three become known only at arrival. The machine may interrupt a job and resume it later (preemption). The objective is the total delay cost ∑jgj(Cj)\sum_j g_j(C_j)∑j​gj​(Cj​), where CjC_jCj​ is the completion time of job jjj. Weighted flow time (gj(t)=wj(t−rj)g_j(t)=w_j(t-r_j)gj​(t)=wj​(t−rj​)), weighted completion time and tardiness are special cases. With arbitrary nondecreasing gjg_jgj​ the problem is the generalized integral completion time problem, GICS.

Even offline, with general nondecreasing costs and arbitrary release times, this problem is strongly NP-hard. The best known approximation is O(log⁡log⁡nP)O(\log\log nP)O(loglognP) (Bansal and Pruhs, 2014). Online, no algorithm has a bounded competitive ratio on a unit-speed machine even for weighted flow time (Bansal and Chan, 2009). The standard remedy is speed augmentation: the online machine is sss times faster than the offline optimum it is compared with.

Prior speed-augmented results covered special cost structures. Im, Moseley and Pruhs (SICOMP 2014) treated gj=wjgg_j=w_jggj​=wj​g with one function ggg shared by all jobs. Angelopoulos, Lucarelli and Thang (Algorithmica 2019) treated convex or concave ggg, identical job densities, and FIFO or HDF policies. Etesami (Operations Research, 2022; arXiv:1906.02644) gave the first speed-augmented competitive algorithm for job-dependent nondecreasing gjg_jgj​ on a single machine, subject to a structural condition on the class of cost functions. This mission formalizes that result.

Setting

Jobs are j=1,…,nj=1,\dots,nj=1,…,n with 0≤r1≤⋯≤rn0\le r_1\le\cdots\le r_n0≤r1​≤⋯≤rn​ and vj>0v_j>0vj​>0. On [rj,∞)[r_j,\infty)[rj​,∞) each gjg_jgj​ is nonnegative, nondecreasing and differentiable, with gj(rj)=0g_j(r_j)=0gj​(rj​)=0 (§II, p. 5). A fractional schedule with machine capacity ccc assigns a processing rate xj(t)≥0x_j(t)\ge 0xj​(t)≥0 to every job and time. Rates vanish before rjr_jrj​, satisfy ∑jxj(t)≤c\sum_jx_j(t)\le c∑j​xj​(t)≤c, and process every job fully: ∫xj≥vj\int x_j\ge v_j∫xj​≥vj​. After the integration by parts on p. 6 and the rescaling gj←gj/vjg_j\leftarrow g_j/v_jgj​←gj​/vj​, the fractional cost is the linear objective

cost(x)=∑j∫rj∞gj(t) xj(t) dt.\mathrm{cost}(x)=\sum_j\int_{r_j}^\infty g_j(t)\,x_j(t)\,dt .cost(x)=j∑​∫rj​∞​gj​(t)xj​(t)dt.

The benchmark OPTc\mathrm{OPT}_cOPTc​ is the infimum of this cost over all fractional schedules: the value of LP (1) for c=1c=1c=1, and of the slower LP (21) for c=1/(1+ϵ)c=1/(1+\epsilon)c=1/(1+ϵ). Its dual (2) has one variable αj≥0\alpha_j\ge 0αj​≥0 per job and a density βt≥0\beta_t\ge 0βt​≥0 on the time axis, with constraints αj/vj≤βt+gj(t)\alpha_j/v_j\le\beta_t+g_j(t)αj​/vj​≤βt​+gj​(t) for t≥rjt\ge r_jt≥rj​.

For a time sss, GFCS(s) is the offline problem in which a set AAA of jobs, with lengths ρj\rho_jρj​, all start at sss. Its optimal value is RNF\mathrm{RNF}RNF (Definition 3). An optimal integral schedule processes one job at a time.

Algorithm 2 re-solves at every arrival. When job kkk arrives, it takes the jobs still alive, with their residual lengths, together with job kkk. It solves GFCS(rkr_krk​) for them as if no further job would come, and follows an optimal integral schedule of that instance until the next arrival.

A class HHH of cost functions is monotone substitute (Definition 5) if adding a job to an identical-release instance can only postpone the optimal processing of the existing jobs. The curvature of the class enters through

K=1+sup⁡ℓ, t≥rℓ(t−rℓ) gℓ′′(t)gℓ′(t).K=1+\sup_{\ell,\,t\ge r_\ell}\frac{(t-r_\ell)\,g''_\ell(t)}{g'_\ell(t)} .K=1+ℓ,t≥rℓ​sup​gℓ′​(t)(t−rℓ​)gℓ′′​(t)​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 20)

Cost(Alg)  ≤  2 OPT1/(2K)\mathrm{Cost(Alg)}\;\le\;2\,\mathrm{OPT}_{1/(2K)}Cost(Alg)≤2OPT1/(2K)​

for every run of Algorithm 2 on an instance whose cost functions lie in a monotone substitute class. This is the statement that Algorithm 2 is 2K2K2K-speed 222-competitive. The goal takes any K≥1K\ge1K≥1 with (t−rℓ)gℓ′′(t)≤(K−1)gℓ′(t)(t-r_\ell)g''_\ell(t)\le(K-1)g'_\ell(t)(t−rℓ​)gℓ′′​(t)≤(K−1)gℓ′​(t), not a closed formula for KKK.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. Weak duality for the slower LP (21), p. 21.
  2. Strong duality with attainment for GFCS(s), and the existence of a maximal optimal dual (largest ∫β\int\beta∫β), p. 12 and p. 17.
  3. Lemma 6: the cost increment Δn(Alg)=RNF′(rn)−RNF(rn)\Delta_n(\mathrm{Alg})=\mathrm{RNF}'(r_n)-\mathrm{RNF}(r_n)Δn​(Alg)=RNF′(rn​)−RNF(rn​) is at most the new dual variable αn′\alpha'_nαn′​.
  4. Lemma 4: the new optimal β′\beta'β′ dominates the old β\betaβ on [rn,∞)[r_n,\infty)[rn​,∞).
  5. Lemma 5: the duals generated by Algorithm 2 are feasible for (2).
  6. (20): optimal βt\beta_tβt​ is at most β^t\hat\beta_tβ^​t​, the total increase of the cost functions over the processing remaining after ttt.
  7. Replacing the β-tails by β^\hat\betaβ^​ keeps the generated dual feasible.
  8. (24): ∫rn∞β^t dt=∑ℓ∫Iℓ(t−rn)gℓ′(t) dt\int_{r_n}^\infty\hat\beta_t\,dt=\sum_\ell\int_{I_\ell}(t-r_n)g'_\ell(t)\,dt∫rn​∞​β^​t​dt=∑ℓ​∫Iℓ​​(t−rn​)gℓ′​(t)dt.
  9. The (26) bound: ∫rn∞(β^t′−β^t) dt≤K Δn(Alg)\int_{r_n}^\infty(\hat\beta'_t-\hat\beta_t)\,dt\le K\,\Delta_n(\mathrm{Alg})∫rn​∞​(β^​t′​−β^​t​)dt≤KΔn​(Alg).
  10. The trade-off: Cost(Alg)≤1+ϵ1+ϵ−K OPT1/(1+ϵ)\mathrm{Cost(Alg)}\le\frac{1+\epsilon}{1+\epsilon-K}\,\mathrm{OPT}_{1/(1+\epsilon)}Cost(Alg)≤1+ϵ−K1+ϵ​OPT1/(1+ϵ)​ whenever 1+ϵ>K1+\epsilon>K1+ϵ>K; the goal is the case 1+ϵ=2K1+\epsilon=2K1+ϵ=2K.

Significance

The result covers job-dependent nondecreasing cost functions. Previous speed-augmented guarantees needed a single shared function or a fixed convexity type. It applies to any monotone substitute class: dominating families, classes for which HDF or HRDF is offline-optimal, and classes with an insertion-type optimal offline policy (p. 20). Combined with the black-box reduction of Lemma 1, it gives a speed-augmented guarantee for the integral objective ∑jgj(Cj)\sum_jg_j(C_j)∑j​gj​(Cj​). For concave costs, K=1K=1K=1 and the bound becomes (1+ϵ)(1+\epsilon)(1+ϵ)-speed 1+ϵϵ\frac{1+\epsilon}{\epsilon}ϵ1+ϵ​-competitive (Example 3).

The result is proved in the paper, and no machine-checked proof of it or of any of its lemmas is known. The paper argues in a time-discretized network-flow model whose quantization error it describes only as "negligible" (Remark 2). A formal proof must therefore carry out the continuous version: strong duality for a semi-infinite assignment LP, the monotonicity of the optimal dual, and the bound (20) without the value function's differentiability.

Difficulty

Every LP in the argument has one variable per job and per time instant, so finite-dimensional LP duality does not apply directly. Dual attainment, and the existence of a dual with maximal ∫β\int\beta∫β, must be proved for this time-indexed LP. The paper's Lemma 4 argument splits the time axis into the set where the new dual exceeds the old one and its complement; in continuous time these are measurable sets defined only almost everywhere. The bound (20) is a one-sided derivative of the value function, and the paper uses it without proving differentiability. The final step is a layer-cake comparison: postponed processing intervals and a nonincreasing integrand give a smaller integral. It needs the right notion of postponement. Monotone substitution is used only there; the rest of the chain holds for every nondecreasing cost.

A first idea is to treat Algorithm 2 as a fixed policy such as HDF and analyze it with potential functions. That fails here, because the algorithm is defined only through optimal offline solutions, and their structure depends on the class of cost functions.

Formalization scope

All declarations live in the namespace GenCostSched.GFCS and import one definitions file, GenCostSched.GFCS.Model.

Representation. Jobs are Fin n and times are real. The cost functions are the scaled gj/vjg_j/v_jgj​/vj​ of p. 6, supplied as data together with their first and second derivatives, which are tied to them by within-derivatives on [rj,∞)[r_j,\infty)[rj​,∞).

Conventions committed to:

  • Schedules are measurable rate functions; integral schedules have rates in {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1}, process each job exactly its length, and finish in finite time.
  • Costs, processed amounts, OPTc\mathrm{OPT}_cOPTc​ and RNF\mathrm{RNF}RNF are valued in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞].
  • Dual variables are per unit length (aj=αj/vja_j=\alpha_j/v_jaj​=αj​/vj​). β\betaβ is an integrable density, and dual feasibility holds for almost every ttt.
  • A machine 2K2K2K times faster is encoded as the online machine at capacity 111 against the LP benchmark at capacity 1/(2K)1/(2K)1/(2K), the normalization of (21).

Readings:

  • Monotone substitute is read as follows: for every identical-release instance from HHH and every optimal integral schedule, adding a job leaves an optimal integral schedule that has processed at most as much of each old job by every time.
  • Runs of Algorithm 2 re-solve with an optimal integral schedule (optimal among all fractional schedules) that postpones the continuing one.
  • KKK is any real ≥1\ge1≥1 with (t−rℓ)gℓ′′≤(K−1)gℓ′(t-r_\ell)g''_\ell\le(K-1)g'_\ell(t−rℓ​)gℓ′′​≤(K−1)gℓ′​.
  • Lemma 4 is posed as printed, for every pair of optimal duals of the continuous LPs of Definition 3. The proof's choice of the maximal β′\beta'β′ matters only in its time-discretized model; with continuous cost functions the continuous dual optimum is unique up to null sets.

Ruled-out trivializations. OPTc\mathrm{OPT}_cOPTc​ is an infimum over all fractional schedules of capacity ccc, which form a nonempty set, never over an empty set or over Algorithm 2's own schedules. The re-solve at an arrival sees only the alive jobs and the new one, and its schedule must be optimal, not merely feasible. A sorry-free sanity file exhibits an instance, H={0}H=\{0\}H={0}, K=1K=1K=1 and an explicit run satisfying every hypothesis of the goal.

Infrastructure. A complete development needs:

  • Tonelli/Fubini on R\mathbb RR;
  • duality for the time-indexed assignment LP;
  • the layer-cake inequality for stochastically ordered processing measures;
  • absolute continuity of everywhere-differentiable monotone functions.

The first three are reusable for other continuous-time scheduling LPs. Milestones 1, 8 and 9 are self-contained measure theory, milestones 2–7 form the duality core, and milestone 10 assembles the chain.

Selected references

  • S. R. Etesami, An Optimal Control Framework for Online Job Scheduling with General Cost Functions, Operations Research, 2022; arXiv:1906.02644v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.02644
  • S. Im, B. Moseley, K. Pruhs, Online scheduling with general cost functions, SIAM Journal on Computing 43(1), 126–143, 2014.
  • S. Angelopoulos, G. Lucarelli, T. N. Kim, Primal–dual and dual-fitting analysis of online scheduling algorithms for generalized flow-time problems, Algorithmica 81(9), 3391–3421, 2019.
  • S. Anand, N. Garg, A. Kumar, Resource augmentation for weighted flow-time explained by dual fitting, Proc. SODA 2012, 1228–1241.
  • N. Bansal, K. Pruhs, The geometry of scheduling, SIAM Journal on Computing 43(5), 1684–1698, 2014.
  • N. Bansal, H.-L. Chan, Weighted flow time does not admit O(1)-competitive algorithms, Proc. SODA 2009, 1238–1244.
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Throughput-Optimal Scheduling Algorithms for LLM Inference and AI Agents: Above Load b_max/t_{b_max} Every Scheduler Diverges, Below It Every Work-Conserving K-FCFS Scheduler Is Positive RecurrentResearch Paper

Motivation

A large language model (LLM) answers a request in two phases. In the prefill phase it reads the whole prompt; in the decode phase it generates the answer one token at a time, because each new token depends on all previous ones. Serving engines such as vLLM, SGLang and Sarathi-Serve run the GPU in iterations: each iteration processes one batch that may mix prefill tokens of some requests with single decode tokens of others, up to a token budget bmax⁡b_{\max}bmax​. Which tokens enter each batch is decided by a batch scheduling algorithm, and providers want to know how much traffic a given server can sustain and which scheduling rules achieve that.

Dai, Deng, Li and Peng (arXiv:2504.07347v3, 2026) cast this as a queueing problem: a two-class batch-service queue in which one batch couples the two classes through a shared budget, and a request contributes many tokens per batch in prefill but at most one in decode. Their Theorem 2 identifies the maximal throughput of a single server and shows that a broad class of practical schedulers attains it. The proof method is the fluid-limit approach to stability of stochastic processing networks (Dai 1995; Dai and Harrison, Processing Networks, 2020).

Setting

Time is divided into integer slots. A batch with token load bbb (its number of tokens) takes

tb=c+a⌈bb0⌉t_b = c + a\left\lceil \frac{b}{b_0}\right\rceiltb​=c+a⌈b0​b​⌉

slots (eq. (4)). Here c,a≥0c,a\ge 0c,a≥0 are integers and b0≥1b_0\ge 1b0​≥1 is a block size dividing bmax⁡b_{\max}bmax​ (Assumption 1).

Requests are labelled 0,1,2,…0,1,2,\dots0,1,2,… in order of arrival. Request iii brings vp(i)∈{1,…,vpmax⁡}v_p(i)\in\{1,\dots,v_p^{\max}\}vp​(i)∈{1,…,vpmax​} prefill tokens and vd(i)∈{1,…,vdmax⁡}v_d(i)\in\{1,\dots,v_d^{\max}\}vd​(i)∈{1,…,vdmax​} decode tokens. The arrival counts ana_nan​ of the slots are i.i.d. with mean λ\lambdaλ, the sizes are i.i.d. with means mp,mdm_p, m_dmp​,md​, and the two sequences are independent.

The state at the start of a slot is

X(n)=(R(n),{(Pi(n),Di(n)):i∈Qn}),X(n)=\big(R(n),\{(P_i(n),D_i(n)) : i\in Q_n\}\big),X(n)=(R(n),{(Pi​(n),Di​(n)):i∈Qn​}),

where R(n)R(n)R(n) is the remaining time of the current batch, QnQ_nQn​ the set of requests in the system, and Pi,DiP_i, D_iPi​,Di​ the unprocessed prefill and decode tokens of request iii. When R(n)=0R(n)=0R(n)=0 the algorithm picks (δip,δid)i∈Qn(\delta^p_i,\delta^d_i)_{i\in Q_n}(δip​,δid​)i∈Qn​​ subject to the following feasibility rules (eq. (6)):

  • prefill before decode;
  • δip≤Pi\delta^p_i\le P_iδip​≤Pi​;
  • δid≤1\delta^d_i\le 1δid​≤1;
  • total load b=∑i(δip+δid)≤bmax⁡b=\sum_i(\delta^p_i+\delta^d_i)\le b_{\max}b=∑i​(δip​+δid​)≤bmax​.

The batch then runs for tbt_btb​ slots. When it finishes, requests with no tokens left depart, and new arrivals join at the end of every slot. The total number of unprocessed tokens is ∣X(n)∣=∑i∈Qn(Pi(n)+Di(n))|X(n)|=\sum_{i\in Q_n}(P_i(n)+D_i(n))∣X(n)∣=∑i∈Qn​​(Pi​(n)+Di​(n)).

An algorithm is work-conserving if it forms a full batch (b=bmax⁡b=b_{\max}b=bmax​) whenever the supply ∑i(Pi+1(Pi=0))\sum_i\big(P_i+\mathbf 1(P_i=0)\big)∑i​(Pi​+1(Pi​=0)) is at least bmax⁡b_{\max}bmax​. It is K-FCFS if, whenever a request jjj receives a decode token, every request i≤j−Ki\le j-Ki≤j−K still in the system receives at least one token.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2

  1. If λ(mp+md)>bmax⁡/tbmax⁡\lambda(m_p+m_d)>b_{\max}/t_{b_{\max}}λ(mp​+md​)>bmax​/tbmax​​, then under every scheduling algorithm and from every initial state
P{lim⁡n→∞∣X(n)∣=∞}=1.\mathbb P\Big\{\lim_{n\to\infty}|X(n)|=\infty\Big\}=1 .P{n→∞lim​∣X(n)∣=∞}=1.
  1. If λ(mp+md)<bmax⁡/tbmax⁡\lambda(m_p+m_d)<b_{\max}/t_{b_{\max}}λ(mp​+md​)<bmax​/tbmax​​, then for every work-conserving K-FCFS algorithm there is a finite set FFF of label-free configurations whose hitting time has finite expectation from every initial state whose requests respect the size bounds vpmax⁡,vdmax⁡v_p^{\max}, v_d^{\max}vpmax​,vdmax​:
∃F finite, ∀x:Ex[τF]<∞,τF=min⁡{n≥1:(R(n),(Pi(n),Di(n))i)∈F}.\exists F \text{ finite},\ \forall x:\quad \mathbb E_x\big[\tau_F\big]<\infty,\qquad \tau_F=\min\{n\ge 1: (R(n),(P_i(n),D_i(n))_{i})\in F\}.∃F finite, ∀x:Ex​[τF​]<∞,τF​=min{n≥1:(R(n),(Pi​(n),Di​(n))i​)∈F}.

Part 2 is the corrected form of the paper's "the DTMC {X(n)}\{X(n)\}{X(n)} is positive recurrent". The labelled state cannot recur, because each new request carries a new label.

Milestones

These follow the order of the paper's argument:

  1. The rate bound: b/tb≤bmax⁡/tbmax⁡b/t_b\le b_{\max}/t_{b_{\max}}b/tb​≤bmax​/tbmax​​ for 1≤b≤bmax⁡1\le b\le b_{\max}1≤b≤bmax​ (proof sketch, p. 16).
  2. The cumulative processing bound Bf(n2tbmax⁡)−Bf(n1tbmax⁡)≤(n2−n1+1)bmax⁡B_f(n_2t_{b_{\max}})-B_f(n_1t_{b_{\max}})\le (n_2-n_1+1)b_{\max}Bf​(n2​tbmax​​)−Bf​(n1​tbmax​​)≤(n2​−n1​+1)bmax​ (eq. (43), corrected).
  3. The strong law E(n)/n→λE(n)/n\to\lambdaE(n)/n→λ, Vf(N)/N→mfV_f(N)/N\to m_fVf​(N)/N→mf​ almost surely (eq. (56)).
  4. Bounded overtaking in departure order under K-FCFS (Lemma 11, corrected to departures).
  5. Stability of the work-conserving fluid model (Proposition 15, with nonnegative fluid levels).

Significance

Theorem 2 gives a sharp stability threshold for a single LLM server: the arriving token workload per slot, λ(mp+md)\lambda(m_p+m_d)λ(mp​+md​), against the maximal processing rate bmax⁡/tbmax⁡b_{\max}/t_{b_{\max}}bmax​/tbmax​​ of full batches. It shows that every work-conserving K-FCFS scheduler, a class containing Sarathi-Serve-style chunked-prefill schedulers, is throughput-optimal. Schedulers that do not mix prefill and decode tokens in one batch can lose throughput. The result is the base case for the paper's multi-server, multi-class and agent-network extensions.

The paper proves part (a) in a sketch and part (b) by the fluid-limit method, with a separate Lyapunov argument in Appendix C. No part of the result has a machine-checked proof. Several printed steps are false as stated:

  • the strict monotonicity of the step-endpoint rates;
  • the constant in eq. (43);
  • the prefill clause of Lemma 11;
  • Proposition 15 without nonnegativity;
  • the recurrence of the labelled chain.

A formalization fixes the exact statements that hold and supplies a complete argument.

Difficulty

Part (a) reduces to the rate bound, a pathwise count of completed batches, and the strong law. Part (b) is where the difficulty lies. A Lyapunov drift on the total token count fails directly: while a batch is in progress no tokens are completed, so the one-slot drift is positive whenever R(n)>0R(n)>0R(n)>0. A drift argument must account for the batch in progress. The naive bound "every slot completes bmax⁡/tbmax⁡b_{\max}/t_{b_{\max}}bmax​/tbmax​​ tokens on average when the system is large" also needs the supply condition (9) to hold. Requests in decode contribute at most one token per batch, so many tokens can sit in few decode-phase requests. The fluid-limit route needs bounded overtaking, and the paper's prefill version of that is false.

Formalization scope

The Lean development (namespace LLMThroughput.TokenBudget) commits to the following:

  • Slots and labels are 0-based, and c,a,b0,bmax⁡c, a, b_0, b_{\max}c,a,b0​,bmax​ are natural numbers with b0≥1b_0\ge 1b0​≥1, b0∣bmax⁡b_0\mid b_{\max}b0​∣bmax​, bmax⁡≥1b_{\max}\ge 1bmax​≥1 and tbmax⁡≥1t_{b_{\max}}\ge 1tbmax​​≥1.
  • The state is a list of requests (label, PiP_iPi​, DiD_iDi​) in label order, together with RRR and the next label.
  • A policy is any function from states to batch configurations. It must be feasible (and, where assumed, work-conserving and K-FCFS) at every admissible state.
  • Feasibility adds δid≤Di\delta^d_i\le D_iδid​≤Di​.
  • The dynamics is a pathwise recursion driven by sequences ana_nan​ and (vp(i),vd(i))(v_p(i),v_d(i))(vp​(i),vd​(i)).
  • The randomness is a probability space with measurable, i.i.d., mutually independent sequences and integrable a1a_1a1​.
  • The expectation of a hitting time is the Lebesgue integral of an N∪{∞}\mathbb N\cup\{\infty\}N∪{∞}-valued time, so a time that is infinite with positive probability has infinite expectation.
  • Positive recurrence is stated for the label-free configuration, with the finite set FFF chosen before the initial state. In part 2 the initial requests obey the source's size bounds Pi≤vpmax⁡P_i\le v_p^{\max}Pi​≤vpmax​, Di≤vdmax⁡D_i\le v_d^{\max}Di​≤vdmax​; part 1 allows any admissible initial state.

A finite set FFF is essential. The set of all states with small token count is infinite once labels are included, and hitting it would be a much weaker claim. Quantifying over a single named policy instead of all work-conserving K-FCFS policies would also change the theorem.

A complete development needs:

  • sample-path lemmas for the recursion (admissibility is preserved, tokens are conserved);
  • the strong law from Mathlib (ProbabilityTheory.strong_law_ae);
  • a Foster–Lyapunov criterion for a process that is not a Markov kernel on the policy's input type;
  • for the fluid route, Lipschitz calculus for the fluid model.

The pathwise model and the bounded-overtaking lemma can be reused for other batch-service systems. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative proofs of part (b) (a direct drift argument on an augmented workload), are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. G. Dai, Y. Deng, Z. Li, Z. Peng, Throughput-Optimal Scheduling Algorithms for LLM Inference and AI Agents, arXiv:2504.07347v3, 2026. https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.07347
  • J. G. Dai, On positive Harris recurrence of multiclass queueing networks: a unified approach via fluid limit models, Annals of Applied Probability 5(1), 1995. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoap/1177004828
  • J. G. Dai, J. M. Harrison, Processing Networks: Fluid Models and Stability, Cambridge University Press, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108772662
  • A. Agrawal et al., Taming Throughput-Latency Tradeoff in LLM Inference with Sarathi-Serve, OSDI 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.02310
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CombinatoricsLinear OptimizationOperations Research+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Improved Guarantees for the A Priori TSP: Random Sampling with Probability 1 − (1 − p)^0.663 and a 3/2-Approximate Master Tour Has Approximation Guarantee Below 3.1 on Instances with a DepotResearch Paper

Motivation

In the a priori traveling salesman problem with independent activation, a tour through all customers must be fixed before it is known which customers need a visit; each customer is active independently with a known probability, and the fixed tour is afterwards cut short to the active ones. The model, introduced by Jaillet and by Bertsimas as the probabilistic TSP, describes routing planned once and executed many times. The quantity of interest is the expected length of the cut-short tour, and the benchmark OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is the smallest such expectation over all tours.

All known approximation algorithms for the problem build a master route solution: choose a set SSS of customers, compute a TSP tour on SSS (the master tour), and attach every other customer to a nearest customer of SSS by a pair of parallel edges. Shmoys and Talwar (2008) choose SSS by including each customer with its own activation probability. With a 3/23/23/2-approximate master tour (Christofides–Serdyukov) this gives a randomized 3.53.53.5-approximation. Blauth, Neuwohner, Puhlmann and Vygen (2023) show that sampling less than the activation probability is better, and give the guarantee 3.13.13.1.

Timeline:

  • Jaillet (thesis 1985; 1988) and Bertsimas (thesis 1988): the probabilistic TSP.
  • Shmoys and Talwar (2008): a randomized 444-approximation by sampling with f(p)=pf(p) = pf(p)=p and a double-tree master tour; a deterministic 888-approximation.
  • With Christofides–Serdyukov as the master-tour subroutine, the randomized algorithm becomes a 3.53.53.5-approximation; van Zuylen (2011) derandomizes to 6.56.56.5.
  • Blauth, Neuwohner, Puhlmann and Vygen (2023): sampling with 1−(1−p)0.6631 - (1-p)^{0.663}1−(1−p)0.663 gives a guarantee below 3.13.13.1; a lower bound of 2.6552.6552.655 for every choice of the sampling function; the master route ratio is below 2.62.62.6.

Setting

A finite semi-metric space (V,c)(V, c)(V,c) has c(v,v)=0c(v,v) = 0c(v,v)=0, c(u,v)=c(v,u)c(u,v) = c(v,u)c(u,v)=c(v,u) and c(u,w)≤c(u,v)+c(v,w)c(u,w) \le c(u,v) + c(v,w)c(u,w)≤c(u,v)+c(v,w); distinct customers may be at distance 000. Each customer vvv has an activation probability 0<p(v)≤10 < p(v) \le 10<p(v)≤1, and an instance with depot has a customer ddd with p(d)=1p(d) = 1p(d)=1. A tour TTT is a cyclic order of all of VVV; for a set AAA of active customers, T[A]T[A]T[A] is TTT cut short to AAA, and c(T[A])c(T[A])c(T[A]) is its length. The a priori cost is EA∼p[c(T[A])]\mathbb E_{A\sim p}[c(T[A])]EA∼p​[c(T[A])], where AAA contains each vvv independently with probability p(v)p(v)p(v), and

OPT(V,c,p)=min⁡TEA∼p[c(T[A])].\mathrm{OPT}(V, c, p) = \min_T \mathbb E_{A\sim p}[c(T[A])].OPT(V,c,p)=Tmin​EA∼p​[c(T[A])].

For S⊆VS \subseteq VS⊆V, OPTTSP(S,c)\mathrm{OPT}_{\mathrm{TSP}}(S, c)OPTTSP​(S,c) is the length of a shortest tour through SSS and c(v,S)=min⁡s∈Sc(v,s)c(v, S) = \min_{s\in S} c(v,s)c(v,S)=mins∈S​c(v,s).

The sampling algorithm for f:(0,1]→[0,1]f : (0,1] \to [0,1]f:(0,1]→[0,1] with f(1)=1f(1) = 1f(1)=1 samples SSS by including each vvv independently with probability f(p(v))f(p(v))f(p(v)), computes an α\alphaα-approximate TSP tour on SSS, and connects the rest. Its expected approximation ratio on an instance is at most

1OPT⋅ES∼f∘p[α⋅OPTTSP(S,c)+2∑v∈Vp(v) c(v,S)](2)\frac{1}{\mathrm{OPT}}\cdot\mathbb E_{S\sim f\circ p}\Big[\alpha\cdot\mathrm{OPT}_{\mathrm{TSP}}(S,c) + 2\sum_{v\in V}p(v)\,c(v,S)\Big]\qquad(2)OPT1​⋅ES∼f∘p​[α⋅OPTTSP​(S,c)+2v∈V∑​p(v)c(v,S)](2)

with 0/0:=10/0 := 10/0:=1. An instance is ε\varepsilonε-normalized if it has a depot and every other customer has activation probability ε\varepsilonε.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

For α=1.5\alpha = 1.5α=1.5 and f(p)=1−(1−p)0.663f(p) = 1 - (1-p)^{0.663}f(p)=1−(1−p)0.663 there is a constant ρ<3.1\rho < 3.1ρ<3.1 such that on every instance with a depot

ES∼f∘p[1.5⋅OPTTSP(S,c)+2∑v∈Vp(v) c(v,S)]≤ρ⋅OPT(V,c,p).\mathbb E_{S\sim f\circ p}\Big[1.5\cdot\mathrm{OPT}_{\mathrm{TSP}}(S,c) + 2\sum_{v\in V}p(v)\,c(v,S)\Big] \le \rho\cdot\mathrm{OPT}(V,c,p).ES∼f∘p​[1.5⋅OPTTSP​(S,c)+2v∈V∑​p(v)c(v,S)]≤ρ⋅OPT(V,c,p).

The constant is uniform over all instance sizes, semi-metrics and activation probabilities. The paper's certificate gives ρ=3.094\rho = 3.094ρ=3.094; the goal keeps the stated 3.13.13.1.

Milestones

The chain of the paper's proof, in attack order:

  1. Proposition 10: on a ppp-normalized instance, the a priori cost of a tour from the depot equals ∑i≥1(1−p)i−1Ci\sum_{i\ge1}(1-p)^{i-1}C_i∑i≥1​(1−p)i−1Ci​, with hop sums Ck=p2∑j∈Zc(vj,vj+k)C_k = p^2\sum_{j\in\mathbb Z}c(v_j, v_{j+k})Ck​=p2∑j∈Z​c(vj​,vj+k​).
  2. Lemma 11: the reciprocal of the value of the optimization problem (Sampling-OP) bounds (2) for f(p)=σpf(p) = \sigma pf(p)=σp on all ppp-normalized instances.
  3. Proposition 12 and Lemma 13: aggregating the CkC_kCk​ into buckets of odd size bbb preserves the triangle inequality and bounds the connection-cost part of the sampling constraint.
  4. Lemma 18 and Lemma 14: buckets beyond index NNN contribute at most δ1∑k≤Ne−(k−1)σβBk+δ2B1\delta_1\sum_{k\le N}e^{-(k-1)\sigma\beta}B_k + \delta_2B_1δ1​∑k≤N​e−(k−1)σβBk​+δ2​B1​.
  5. Proposition 31, Lemmas 32 and 33, Lemma 9 (ii): an upper bound on (2) over εi\varepsilon_iεi​-normalized instances with εi→0\varepsilon_i \to 0εi​→0 for f(p)=σpf(p) = \sigma pf(p)=σp transfers to all instances with depot for f(p)=1−(1−p)σf(p) = 1 - (1-p)^\sigmaf(p)=1−(1−p)σ.
  6. Lemma 15: the reciprocal of the optimum value of the finite linear program (Sampling-LP) bounds (2) on all instances with depot.
  7. Corollary 16: every feasible solution (x,y,v,w)(x, y, v, w)(x,y,v,w) of the dual (Dual-Sampling-LP) certifies the bound σ2/y\sigma^2/yσ2/y.

Significance

Theorem 3 is the mathematical content of the paper's headline result: together with the paper's depot reduction (Theorem 1) it gives a randomized polynomial-time 3.13.13.1-approximation for the a priori TSP, improving the 3.53.53.5 that had stood since the Shmoys–Talwar analysis. It also separates the sampling rule from the activation probability: Theorem 2 of the paper shows that no sampling function beats 2.6552.6552.655, so the right choice of fff is a genuine question and Theorem 3 is its current best answer.

The proof method is reusable. It encodes an unbounded family of instances by finitely many aggregated variables (hop sums, then buckets), controls the truncation error explicitly, and reduces the guarantee to the feasibility of one dual solution. The same pattern proves the paper's master-route-ratio bound (Theorem 6). The result is proved on paper with a computer-generated certificate; no part of it has a machine-checked proof. A formalization makes the reduction chain (Lemma 9 to Corollary 16) checkable independently of the numerical certificate, and reduces the remaining trust to the feasibility of one explicit point.

Difficulty

The obvious argument compares the sampling algorithm with an optimum a priori tour on each instance, but the instance size is unbounded and the activation probabilities are arbitrary, so no finite optimization problem captures all instances directly. Three reductions are needed and each fails in a naive form: normalization (Lemma 9) requires replacing a customer by many copies whose activation and sampling probabilities match p(v)p(v)p(v) and 1−(1−p(v))σ1 - (1-p(v))^\sigma1−(1−p(v))σ only up to a factor 1+λ1 + \lambda1+λ; the passage from ppp-dependent problems to one linear program requires bucketing and the limit p→0p \to 0p→0; and truncating to NNN buckets requires an error bound that uses only the triangle inequality.

The final step is not an argument but a certificate. A full proof of the goal must exhibit some feasible solution of (Dual-Sampling-LP) with σ2/y<3.1\sigma^2/y < 3.1σ2/y<3.1 at α=1.5\alpha = 1.5α=1.5, σ=0.663\sigma = 0.663σ=0.663, and check its feasibility, which involves exponential coefficients. The paper's certificate (computed with Gurobi; data and checker at doi:10.60507/FK2/JCUIRI) has β=1/100\beta = 1/100β=1/100 and N=2500N = 2500N=2500, about 7.8⋅1067.8\cdot10^67.8⋅106 variables. A proof may use any certificate.

Formalization scope

Everything is finite: the customers form a Fintype V, and expectations are finite sums over subsets with explicit product weights, without measure theory. The definitions cover the instance with depot (six named hypotheses: semi-metric, 0<p≤10 < p \le 10<p≤1, p(d)=1p(d) = 1p(d)=1), tours as duplicate-free lists of all customers with cyclic cost and cutting short by filtering, the a priori cost and OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT, OPTTSP(S,c)\mathrm{OPT}_{\mathrm{TSP}}(S, c)OPTTSP​(S,c), c(v,S)c(v, S)c(v,S), the sampling cost in (2), the sampling functions 1−(1−x)σ1 - (1-x)^\sigma1−(1−x)σ and σx\sigma xσx (with f(1)=1f(1) = 1f(1)=1), ε\varepsilonε-normalized instances, the hop sums CkC_kCk​, (Sampling-OP), buckets, δ1\delta_1δ1​ and δ2\delta_2δ2​, (Sampling-LP) and its dual.

Conventions committed to:

  • The ratio (2) is never formed; every bound reads "expectation ≤ρ⋅OPT\le \rho\cdot\mathrm{OPT}≤ρ⋅OPT", which is the 0/0:=10/0 := 10/0:=1 convention made exact.
  • OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT, OPTTSP\mathrm{OPT}_{\mathrm{TSP}}OPTTSP​ and c(v,S)c(v, S)c(v,S) are infima of finite sets, attained.
  • Series are indexed from 000 with the shift k↦k+1k \mapsto k+1k↦k+1; they converge under the stated hypotheses, and Lemma 18 is stated with HasSum.
  • "The reciprocal of the value of an optimization problem" is formalized as "for every positive lower bound μ\muμ on the value, 1/μ1/\mu1/μ is a bound".
  • The TSP approximation factor α\alphaα is any α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0, and σ\sigmaσ any value in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), in the milestones; the goal fixes α=1.5\alpha = 1.5α=1.5, σ=0.663\sigma = 0.663σ=0.663.
  • N≥1N \ge 1N≥1 in (Sampling-LP) and its dual, whose constraints use B1B_1B1​; y>0y > 0y>0 in Corollary 16.

Ruled out as trivializations: an OPTTSP\mathrm{OPT}_{\mathrm{TSP}}OPTTSP​ or c(v,S)c(v, S)c(v,S) that takes a junk value 000; dividing by OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT; a depot sampled with probability below 111; a constant ρ\rhoρ chosen after the instance; tours that omit customers; and Corollary 16 at y=0y = 0y=0.

No TSP algorithm, polynomial-time notion or numerical certificate is formalized. The semi-metric and finite-expectation infrastructure, and the LP weak-duality step, are reusable for other master-route and sampling analyses. Contributions are welcome on each milestone, and on a formally checked dual certificate.

Selected references

  • J. Blauth, M. Neuwohner, L. Puhlmann, J. Vygen, Improved guarantees for the a priori TSP, arXiv:2309.10663v1, 2023; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.10663
  • D. Shmoys, K. Talwar, A constant approximation algorithm for the a priori traveling salesman problem, IPCO 2008. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68891-4_23
  • A. van Zuylen, Deterministic sampling algorithms for network design, Algorithmica 60, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-009-9344-x
  • P. Jaillet, Probabilistic traveling salesman problems, PhD thesis, MIT, 1985. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/15231
  • P. Jaillet, A priori solution of a traveling salesman problem in which a random subset of the customers are visited, Operations Research 36(6), 1988. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.36.6.929
  • D. Bertsimas, Probabilistic combinatorial optimization problems, PhD thesis, MIT, 1988. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/14386
  • Certificate data: J. Blauth et al., dual solution and checker, doi:10.60507/FK2/JCUIRI. https://doi.org/10.60507/FK2/JCUIRI
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsLinear Optimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

New Combinatorial Insights for Monotone Apportionment: House-Monotone and Quota-Compliant Apportionments Are the Seat Counts of Extreme Points of a Network Flow LP with Lookahead Φ(p, H)Research Paper

Motivation

An apportionment method distributes the HHH seats of a house among nnn states in proportion to their populations. Exact proportionality is impossible with integer seats, so methods are judged by axioms. Two axioms date back to the debates over the seats of the US House of Representatives. Quota compliance asks that each state receive its exact proportional share rounded down or up. House monotonicity asks that no state lose a seat when the house grows; the Alabama paradox of 1880, in which Hamilton's method took a seat from Alabama when the house was enlarged, is the classic failure. The two axioms can hold together. Balinski and Young (Mathematics of Operations Research, 1979) and Still (SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics, 1979) characterized the methods satisfying both through a recursive, seat-by-seat construction. Gölz, Peters and Procaccia (EC 2022) later gave a description by a fractional matching polytope.

Cembrano, Correa, Schmidt-Kraepelin, Tsigonias-Dimitriadis and Verdugo (arXiv:2410.23869, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025) give a third characterization, by a network-flow linear program. It replaces the recursive construction with the vertex set of a polytope that can be written down and optimized over. This mission formalizes that characterization, Theorem 3 of the paper.

Setting

An instance is a pair (p,H)(p,H)(p,H). Here p=(p1,…,pn)p=(p_1,\dots,p_n)p=(p1​,…,pn​) is a vector of n≥1n\ge1n≥1 strictly positive integers (the populations of the states) and H≥1H\ge1H≥1 is an integer, the house size. Write P=∑ipiP=\sum_i p_iP=∑i​pi​; the quota of state iii is qi=piPHq_i=\frac{p_i}{P}Hqi​=Ppi​​H.

A solution fff assigns to every instance one vector f(p,H)∈N0nf(p,H)\in\mathbb N_0^nf(p,H)∈N0n​ with ∑ifi(p,H)=H\sum_i f_i(p,H)=H∑i​fi​(p,H)=H. It is defined for every number of states nnn and every population vector. It is quota-compliant if fi(p,H)∈{⌊qi⌋,⌈qi⌉}f_i(p,H)\in\{\lfloor q_i\rfloor,\lceil q_i\rceil\}fi​(p,H)∈{⌊qi​⌋,⌈qi​⌉} always. It is house-monotone if f(p,H1)≤f(p,H2)≤f(p,H3)f(p,H_1)\le f(p,H_2)\le f(p,H_3)f(p,H1​)≤f(p,H2​)≤f(p,H3​) componentwise whenever H1<H2<H3H_1<H_2<H_3H1​<H2​<H3​. The set of apportionments such solutions produce is

A(p,H)={f(p,H):f a house-monotone and quota-compliant solution}.\mathcal A(p,H)=\{f(p,H): f\text{ a house-monotone and quota-compliant solution}\}.A(p,H)={f(p,H):f a house-monotone and quota-compliant solution}.

For LLL seats, the network-flow linear program (1)–(4) has a variable x(i,t)≥0x(i,t)\ge0x(i,t)≥0 for each state iii and seat t∈[L]t\in[L]t∈[L], subject to

∑i=1nx(i,t)=1,⌊tpiP⌋≤∑ℓ=1tx(i,ℓ)≤⌈tpiP⌉.\sum_{i=1}^n x(i,t)=1,\qquad \Big\lfloor\frac{tp_i}{P}\Big\rfloor\le\sum_{\ell=1}^t x(i,\ell)\le\Big\lceil\frac{tp_i}{P}\Big\rceil .i=1∑n​x(i,t)=1,⌊Ptpi​​⌋≤ℓ=1∑t​x(i,ℓ)≤⌈Ptpi​​⌉.

Its feasible region is K(p,L)K(p,L)K(p,L) and its set of extreme points is E(p,L)\mathcal E(p,L)E(p,L). The count Ai(x,T)=∑ℓ=1Tx(i,ℓ)A_i(x,T)=\sum_{\ell=1}^T x(i,\ell)Ai​(x,T)=∑ℓ=1T​x(i,ℓ) is the number of seats state iii holds after TTT seats.

The lookahead Φ(p,H)\Phi(p,H)Φ(p,H) is the number of seats the LP must model so that its first HHH seats are exactly the house-monotone, quota-compliant ones. For a vector yyy and k≥1k\ge1k≥1, let Sk(p,H,y)={i:⌊pi(H+k)/P⌋>yi}S_k(p,H,y)=\{i:\lfloor p_i(H+k)/P\rfloor>y_i\}Sk​(p,H,y)={i:⌊pi​(H+k)/P⌋>yi​}. Let k⋆(p,H,y)k^\star(p,H,y)k⋆(p,H,y) be the least k≥1k\ge1k≥1 with ∑i∈Sk(⌊pi(H+k)/P⌋−yi)≥k\sum_{i\in S_k}(\lfloor p_i(H+k)/P\rfloor-y_i)\ge k∑i∈Sk​​(⌊pi​(H+k)/P⌋−yi​)≥k. Set τ=k⋆\tau=k^\starτ=k⋆ unless Sk⋆=[n]S_{k^\star}=[n]Sk⋆​=[n], in which case τ=1\tau=1τ=1. Then Φ(p,0)=0\Phi(p,0)=0Φ(p,0)=0, Φ(p,1)=min⁡{k≥1:∑i⌊pik/P⌋≥k}\Phi(p,1)=\min\{k\ge1:\sum_i\lfloor p_ik/P\rfloor\ge k\}Φ(p,1)=min{k≥1:∑i​⌊pi​k/P⌋≥k}, and

Φ(p,H+1)=max⁡T∈[H]{T+max⁡{τ(p,T,A(x,T)):x∈E(p,Φ(p,H))}}.\Phi(p,H+1)=\max_{T\in[H]}\Big\{T+\max\{\tau(p,T,A(x,T)):x\in\mathcal E(p,\Phi(p,H))\}\Big\}.Φ(p,H+1)=T∈[H]max​{T+max{τ(p,T,A(x,T)):x∈E(p,Φ(p,H))}}.

The Lean names are IsPop, Solution, QuotaCompliant, HouseMonotone, calA, K, calE, A, S, kStar, tau, Phi, all in the namespace MonoApport.Flow.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

A(p,H)={A(x,H):x∈E(p,Φ(p,H))}for every instance (p,H).\mathcal A(p,H)=\big\{A(x,H): x\in\mathcal E(p,\Phi(p,H))\big\}\qquad\text{for every instance }(p,H).A(p,H)={A(x,H):x∈E(p,Φ(p,H))}for every instance (p,H).

Milestones

  1. Proposition 8. A solution is house-monotone if and only if f(p,H)≤f(p,H+1)f(p,H)\le f(p,H+1)f(p,H)≤f(p,H+1) for every ppp and HHH.
  2. Total unimodularity (proof of Lemma 3). The matrix with rows ei,te_{i,t}ei,t​, −ei,t-e_{i,t}−ei,t​, et′e'_tet′​, −et′-e'_t−et′​ is totally unimodular. Here ei,te_{i,t}ei,t​ is the prefix-sum row of state iii up to seat ttt, and et′e'_tet′​ is the column-sum row of seat ttt.
  3. Lemma 3. The linear program (1)–(4) is integral: every extreme point has integer coordinates.
  4. Remark after Lemma 3. E(p,L)\mathcal E(p,L)E(p,L) is exactly the set of integer points of K(p,L)K(p,L)K(p,L).
  5. Balinski–Young characterization (§C.4). fff is a house-monotone and quota-compliant solution if and only if, with f(p,0)=0f(p,0)=0f(p,0)=0, each seat H+1H+1H+1 goes to one state of L(p,H,f(p,H))∩U(p,H,f(p,H))\mathcal L(p,H,f(p,H))\cap\mathcal U(p,H,f(p,H))L(p,H,f(p,H))∩U(p,H,f(p,H)). Here L(p,H,y)={i:⌊piP(H+k⋆(p,H,y))⌋>yi}\mathcal L(p,H,y)=\{i:\lfloor\frac{p_i}{P}(H+k^\star(p,H,y))\rfloor>y_i\}L(p,H,y)={i:⌊Ppi​​(H+k⋆(p,H,y))⌋>yi​} and U(p,H,y)={i:piP(H+1)>yi}\mathcal U(p,H,y)=\{i:\frac{p_i}{P}(H+1)>y_i\}U(p,H,y)={i:Ppi​​(H+1)>yi​}.
  6. Lemma 5. If x∈E(p,Φ(p,H))x\in\mathcal E(p,\Phi(p,H))x∈E(p,Φ(p,H)) and T≤H−1T\le H-1T≤H−1, then x(i,T+1)=0x(i,T+1)=0x(i,T+1)=0 for every i∉L(p,T,A(x,T))∩U(p,T,A(x,T))i\notin\mathcal L(p,T,A(x,T))\cap\mathcal U(p,T,A(x,T))i∈/L(p,T,A(x,T))∩U(p,T,A(x,T)).

Significance

The result. Theorem 3 turns a recursive definition into a polyhedral one. The apportionments at house size HHH that some house-monotone, quota-compliant solution can produce are the projections of the vertices of a network-flow polytope with Φ(p,H)\Phi(p,H)Φ(p,H) seats. Optimizing a linear objective over all such apportionments is then a linear program of size O(n Φ(p,H))O(n\,\Phi(p,H))O(nΦ(p,H)). The paper also bounds the lookahead: Φ(p,H)−H≤max⁡i⌈P/pi⌉\Phi(p,H)-H\le\max_i\lceil P/p_i\rceilΦ(p,H)−H≤maxi​⌈P/pi​⌉ for H≥2H\ge2H≥2, and the bound is tight up to constants. Through the correspondence between methods and solutions (Lemma 2 of the paper), the theorem also characterizes house-monotone, quota-compliant methods. It underlies the paper's construction of randomized methods that are house-monotone, quota-compliant and ex-ante proportional (Theorem 4).

The formalization. The paper proves Theorem 3. None of the statements here has a machine-checked proof, and the Balinski–Young characterization is cited by the paper rather than proved in it. A formal development would check the full chain: total unimodularity of an interval-type constraint matrix, integrality of the polytope, the lookahead bound of Lemma 5, and the combination with the Balinski–Young construction. It would also make the network-flow polytope and the lookahead Φ\PhiΦ available to later work on apportionment.

Difficulty

The inclusion A(p,H)⊆{A(x,H)}\mathcal A(p,H)\subseteq\{A(x,H)\}A(p,H)⊆{A(x,H)} looks routine: the seat increments of a house-monotone, quota-compliant solution give a 0/1 feasible point. But that point must have Φ(p,H)\Phi(p,H)Φ(p,H) seats, and it must be an extreme point, which requires the integrality of (1)–(4).

The reverse inclusion is the hard part. A vertex of the LP with HHH seats need not extend to a quota-compliant sequence: a seat assignment can respect every quota bound up to HHH and still force a violation a few seats later. The lookahead Φ\PhiΦ is designed so that this cannot happen. However, Φ\PhiΦ is defined by a recursion over extreme points of LPs of other sizes, and it is not monotone in HHH: for p=(1,2)p=(1,2)p=(1,2) the values are Φ=0,3,2,3,4,…\Phi=0,3,2,3,4,\dotsΦ=0,3,2,3,4,…. An argument that truncates a vertex for Φ(p,H)\Phi(p,H)Φ(p,H) seats to one for Φ(p,H−1)\Phi(p,H-1)Φ(p,H−1) seats, or assumes Φ(p,H)≥Φ(p,H−1)\Phi(p,H)\ge\Phi(p,H-1)Φ(p,H)≥Φ(p,H−1), is therefore unavailable.

Closing the inclusion also needs the Balinski–Young construction never to get stuck: L∩U\mathcal L\cap\mathcal UL∩U must be nonempty along every sequence it builds. The paper takes this from Balinski and Young without stating it separately.

Formalization scope

Populations are p : Fin n → ℕ with IsPop p (n>0n>0n>0 and every pi>0p_i>0pi​>0); house sizes carry 0 < H. A solution is one Lean function Solution := ∀ {n}, (Fin n → ℕ) → ℕ → (Fin n → ℕ) defined on vectors of every length. A(p,H)\mathcal A(p,H)A(p,H) quantifies over such families, exactly as in the paper; a per-ppp sequence of apportionments would be a different object. House monotonicity is axiom (c) with three house sizes; the one-step form is Proposition 8, a milestone. LP points with LLL seats are x : Fin n → Fin L → ℝ. Seats are 0-indexed, so column ttt is seat t+1t+1t+1, and the quota bounds at column ttt use t+1t+1t+1. Floors and ceilings are Nat.floor/Nat.ceil of the nonnegative rational quantity computed in R\mathbb RR. E(p,L)\mathcal E(p,L)E(p,L) is Set.extremePoints ℝ (K p L). The minima and maxima defining k⋆k^\stark⋆ and Φ\PhiΦ are sInf/sSup on N\mathbb NN, whose sets are nonempty, and finite where a maximum is taken, wherever they are used. The convention f(p,0)=0f(p,0)=0f(p,0)=0 is the function ext. The goal compares subsets of Rn\mathbb R^nRn: the image of A(p,H)\mathcal A(p,H)A(p,H) under the cast equals {A(x,H)}\{A(x,H)\}{A(x,H)}.

The goal must not be read with integer vectors on both sides. Writing A(p,H)={y:(yi:R)=Ai(x,H) for some x}\mathcal A(p,H)=\{y : (y_i:\mathbb R)=A_i(x,H)\text{ for some }x\}A(p,H)={y:(yi​:R)=Ai​(x,H) for some x} would silently ignore non-integral A(x,H)A(x,H)A(x,H) and empty the inclusion ⊇\supseteq⊇ of its content.

A complete development needs:

  • total unimodularity and the integrality of polytopes with totally unimodular constraints (Hoffman–Kruskal), partly available in Mathlib through Matrix.IsTotallyUnimodular;
  • the finiteness of the extreme points of a polytope;
  • a formal proof of the Balinski–Young characterization, including the nonemptiness of L∩U\mathcal L\cap\mathcal UL∩U along the construction.

The first two are reusable well beyond apportionment. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, and so are proofs of the cited Balinski–Young theorem and of the properties of Φ\PhiΦ the paper uses (Φ(p,H)≥H\Phi(p,H)\ge HΦ(p,H)≥H, and the finiteness and nonemptiness of the sets in its recursion).

Selected references

  • J. Cembrano, J. Correa, U. Schmidt-Kraepelin, A. Tsigonias-Dimitriadis, V. Verdugo, New Combinatorial Insights for Monotone Apportionment, arXiv:2410.23869v1, 2024; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.23869
  • M. Balinski, H. P. Young, Quotatone apportionment methods, Mathematics of Operations Research 4(1):31–38, 1979. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.4.1.31
  • M. Balinski, H. P. Young, The quota method of apportionment, The American Mathematical Monthly 82(7):701, 1975.
  • M. Balinski, H. P. Young, Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote, Brookings Institution Press, 2010.
  • J. W. Still, A class of new methods for congressional apportionment, SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 37(2):401–418, 1979.
  • P. Gölz, D. Peters, A. D. Procaccia, In this apportionment lottery, the house always wins, Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 2022.
  • A. Ghouila-Houri, Caractérisation des matrices totalement unimodulaires, C. R. Acad. Sci. Paris 254:1192–1194, 1962.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Solving Strong-Substitutes Product-Mix Auctions: Allocate Splits the Target Bundle into Demanded Bundles within |J|·C(n+1,2) IterationsResearch Paper

Motivation

The product-mix auction was developed in 2007–8 for the Bank of England (Klemperer 2010) to sell many differentiated goods (loans against different qualities of collateral) in a single round. Each bidder submits a list of simple bids, each naming a price for every good and a quantity, and the auctioneer chooses prices and allocations that respect every bid. Baldwin, Goldberg, Klemperer and Lock (arXiv:1909.07313v3, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024) make the auction usable with positive and negative bids, a bidding language that expresses every strong-substitutes valuation (Baldwin–Klemperer 2019). The auctioneer then faces two computational tasks: finding a market-clearing price, and splitting the goods at that price among the bidders so that every bidder receives a bundle it demands. This mission formalizes the second task, the allocation algorithm ALLOCATE and its correctness and iteration bound (Theorem 19, p. 23).

Setting

There are nnn goods [n]={1,…,n}[n]=\{1,\dots,n\}[n]={1,…,n} and a notional reject good 000; [n]0={0,…,n}[n]_0=\{0,\dots,n\}[n]0​={0,…,n}. A price is p∈Rnp\in\mathbb R^np∈Rn, extended by p0=0p_0=0p0​=0. A bid b=(b1,…,bn;w)b=(b_1,\dots,b_n;w)b=(b1​,…,bn​;w) has integer entries and weight w(b)=±1w(b)=\pm1w(b)=±1, with b0=0b_0=0b0​=0. At prices ppp it demands the goods arg⁡max⁡i∈[n]0(bi−pi)\arg\max_{i\in[n]_0}(b_i-p_i)argmaxi∈[n]0​​(bi​−pi​) and is marginal if it demands more than one. Where no bid of a list B\mathcal BB is marginal, the list demands the bundle ∑bw(b)ei(b)\sum_{b}w(b)e^{i(b)}∑b​w(b)ei(b), with i(b)i(b)i(b) the good bbb demands. In general the demand DB(p)D_{\mathcal B}(p)DB​(p) is the discrete convex hull conv⁡(X)∩Zn\operatorname{conv}(X)\cap\mathbb Z^nconv(X)∩Zn of the set XXX of bundles demanded at non-marginal prices arbitrarily close to ppp. The indirect utility function is

fB(p)=∑b∈Bw(b)max⁡i∈[n]0(bi−pi),f_{\mathcal B}(p)=\sum_{b\in\mathcal B}w(b)\max_{i\in[n]_0}(b_i-p_i),fB​(p)=b∈B∑​w(b)i∈[n]0​max​(bi​−pi​),

and B\mathcal BB is valid if fBf_{\mathcal B}fB​ is convex. It is ε\varepsilonε-valid at ppp if fBf_{\mathcal B}fB​ is convex on the open L∞L^\inftyL∞-ball B(p;ε)B(p;\varepsilon)B(p;ε), and locally valid if it is ε\varepsilonε-valid for some ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0.

Each bidder j∈Jj\in Jj∈J has a valid list Bj\mathcal B^jBj; the aggregate list B\mathcal BB is their concatenation. The allocation problem (§2.5): given an integral price ppp and a target bundle t∈DB(p)t\in D_{\mathcal B}(p)t∈DB​(p), find bundles tj∈DBj(p)t^j\in D_{\mathcal B^j}(p)tj∈DBj​(p) with ∑jtj=t\sum_j t^j=t∑j​tj=t.

ALLOCATE works on generalised allocation problems A=[p,(Bj),(mj),r]\mathcal A=[p,(\mathcal B^j),(m^j),r]A=[p,(Bj),(mj),r] (Definition 4), with partial allocations mjm^jmj and residual supply rrr. Its progress is measured by the marginal bids graph GAG_{\mathcal A}GA​: the multigraph on [n]0[n]_0[n]0​ with an edge {i,i′}\{i,i'\}{i,i′} labelled jjj whenever bidder jjj has a bid demanding both iii and i′i'i′. Each loop iteration calls FindParams, which returns either a demand cluster (a connected component of the jjj-labelled edges) with at most one link good, or a cycle-link good i∗i^*i∗ of a multi-bidder cycle with an incident label j∗j^*j∗. It then runs UnambiguousMarginals on the cluster or ShiftProjectUnshift on (i∗,j∗)(i^*,j^*)(i∗,j∗), followed by NonMarginals. ShiftProjectUnshift shifts j∗j^*j∗'s bids by 110ei∗\tfrac1{10}e^{i^*}101​ei∗ and finds a nearby price pεp^\varepsilonpε by submodular function minimisation (SFM) on the Lyapunov function g(q)=fB′(q)+r⋅qg(q)=f_{\mathcal B'}(q)+r\cdot qg(q)=fB′​(q)+r⋅q. It then projects every bid, undoes the shift, and returns to ppp.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 19

For valid integral bid lists with weights ±1\pm1±1, an integral ppp and t∈DB(p)t\in D_{\mathcal B}(p)t∈DB​(p), any FindParams output rule meeting Lemma 10 and any SFM oracle that minimises submodular functions, there is

k≤∣J∣(n+12)k\le |J|\binom{n+1}{2}k≤∣J∣(2n+1​)

such that after kkk loop iterations every bid list is empty, every SFM call made was on a submodular function, and the partial allocations satisfy ∑jmj=t\sum_j m^j=t∑j​mj=t with mj∈DBj(p)m^j\in D_{\mathcal B^j}(p)mj∈DBj​(p).

Milestones

  • Proposition 6 (local validity criterion) and Lemma 9 (surplus gaps give a radius of validity).
  • Theorem 4, posed for valid bid lists: some partition t=∑jtjt=\sum_j t^jt=∑j​tj with tj∈DBj(p)t^j\in D_{\mathcal B^j}(p)tj∈DBj​(p) exists.
  • Lemma 11 (NonMarginals), Lemma 10 (FindParams' outputs), Lemma 12 (UnambiguousMarginals deletes an edge).
  • Lemma 13 (shifting keeps local validity), Lemma 26 (inverses of strong-substitutes matrices), Proposition 14 (after a shift, rrr is demanded at some p±εeSp\pm\varepsilon e^Sp±εeS, found by SFM), Lemma 16 (projection).
  • Lemma 18 (ShiftProjectUnshift is a reduction) and Lemma 17 (it deletes an edge).

Significance

Theorem 19 is the paper's main contribution (p. 5). With the price-finding method of §3 it makes the strong-substitutes product-mix auction computable in polynomial time, using only the bids. The allocation step is the delicate one: at a market-clearing price, bidders cannot simply be given any bundle they demand (p. 12), and random perturbation would need exponentially small amounts. The authors report Haskell and Python implementations of both algorithms and experiments on random instances (pp. 5, 27–28).

The paper proves the result, but no part of it is machine-checked. The mission adds to the platform a bidding-language layer (bids, demand as a discrete convex hull, local validity) and an algorithmic layer (allocation problems, valid reductions, the marginal bids multigraph, an SFM oracle). Both layers are reusable for later work on product-mix auctions and on discrete-convex equilibrium computation. Formalizing the proof will also check two printed slips found during planning: the definition of a closed path in FindParams, and the second Lyapunov difference h−h^-h−.

Difficulty

Dividing ttt bid by bid fails: each bid's choice among its demanded goods is constrained by the others, and independent choices can leave DBj(p)D_{\mathcal B^j}(p)DBj​(p) (p. 10). The two procedures that allocate directly cover only demand clusters with at most one link good. When ties form a cycle through several bidders, the algorithm must change the problem without losing a solution. The step to justify is Proposition 14: after a 110\tfrac1{10}101​-shift of one bidder, the residual supply is still demanded at a price of the special form p±εeSp\pm\varepsilon e^Sp±εeS. This needs local strong-substitutes valuations, the matrix identity of Lemma 26 and an integrality argument. The edge count drops in Lemma 17 because the shift enters a telescoped cycle identity exactly once. Local validity must also be tracked through every removal of bids (Proposition 6, Lemma 9), since global validity is lost after the first NonMarginals call.

Formalization scope

Goods [n]0[n]_0[n]0​ are Fin (n + 1), with 0 the reject good. Prices are Fin n → ℝ, extended by p0=0p_0=0p0​=0; the L∞L^\inftyL∞ ball is Metric.ball on Fin n → ℝ. Input bids are integral (IntBid). The run uses real bid vectors (Bid), because of the 110\tfrac1{10}101​ shifts, and does not force the reject entry to 000: ShiftProjectUnshift is read literally when i∗=0i^*=0i∗=0. Bid lists are Lists. Bundles, partial allocations and residuals are ℤ-valued and carry a reject coordinate; the goal drops it. Demand is one definition, the discrete convex hull of nearby non-marginal bundles, used at every price.

FindParams is "not fully specified" (p. 23). The goal quantifies over every selector that returns what Lemma 10 allows, which covers every walk of FindParams and PriorityParams. Lemma 10 is posed with the corrected notion of a closed path; a counterexample to the printed one is in its statement. The SFM oracle is arbitrary on non-submodular inputs, and the goal asserts that every call it receives is submodular. Running time is rendered as the iteration bound ∣J∣(n+12)|J|\binom{n+1}2∣J∣(2n+1​) together with the per-iteration structure (one selector call, at most two SFM calls). No machine model is formalized. Submodularity is the published NonmonotoneSubmod.Shared.Submodular.

The goal is not "an allocation exists" (that is Theorem 4) and not "the loop terminates" (that drops the bound). It is not posed for one fixed FindParams implementation or for an oracle correct on every input, which would narrow the quantifiers. It does not leave the oracle unconstrained without the genuineness clause, which would let a junk price through.

Contributions welcome: the bid-list layer (Proposition 6, Lemmas 9, 13, 16), the combinatorics of GAG_{\mathcal A}GA​ (Lemmas 10, 12, 17) and the matrix Lemma 26 are independent entry points.

Selected references

  • E. Baldwin, P. W. Goldberg, P. Klemperer, E. Lock, Solving Strong-Substitutes Product-Mix Auctions, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024; arXiv:1909.07313v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.07313v3
  • E. Baldwin, P. Klemperer, Understanding Preferences: "Demand Types", and the Existence of Equilibrium with Indivisibilities, Econometrica 87(3), 2019. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA13693
  • P. Klemperer, The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods, Journal of the European Economic Association 8(2–3), 2010. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00531.x
  • A. Shioura, A. Tamura, Gross Substitutes Condition and Discrete Concavity for Multi-Unit Valuations: A Survey, Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan 58(1), 2015. https://doi.org/10.15807/jorsj.58.61
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Markov ChainProbabilityReinforcement Learning+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Offline Estimation of Controlled Markov Chains: Minimaxity and Sample Complexity: Under Geometric Mixing the Empirical Estimator Is ε-Accurate After Order dT/ε² Samples, and This Rate Is MinimaxResearch Paper

Learning the dynamics from logged data

Offline reinforcement learning and off-policy evaluation start from a single logged trajectory of a controlled system. The policy that generated the log is often unknown, history-dependent and not stationary. Model-based methods first estimate the transition probabilities of the system from this log, then plan or evaluate policies in the estimated model (Agarwal, Kakade & Yang, 2020; Li et al., 2024). How many samples that estimate needs is the question of Banerjee, Honnappa & Rao.

For an uncontrolled, geometrically ergodic Markov chain on ddd states, Wolfer & Kontorovich (2021) showed that the transition matrix can be learned to accuracy ε\varepsilonε in the ∞\infty∞-norm from of order d/(π⋆ε2)d/(\pi_\star\varepsilon^2)d/(π⋆​ε2) samples, where π⋆\pi_\starπ⋆​ is the smallest stationary probability, and that this rate is minimax. Banerjee, Honnappa and Rao extend this to controlled chains whose controls may depend arbitrarily on the past. Stationarity, irreducibility and aperiodicity then need not hold.

Controlled Markov chains and the empirical estimator

A controlled Markov chain with ddd states and kkk controls consists of:

  1. a state process X0,X1,…X_0,X_1,\dotsX0​,X1​,… in χ={1,…,d}\chi=\{1,\dots,d\}χ={1,…,d};
  2. a control process a0,a1,…a_0,a_1,\dotsa0​,a1​,… in I={1,…,k}\mathbb I=\{1,\dots,k\}I={1,…,k};
  3. a row-stochastic transition matrix M(l)M^{(l)}M(l) for each control lll.

Both processes are adapted to a filtration {Fi}\{\mathcal F_i\}{Fi​}, and

P(Xi+1=t∣Fi)=MXi,t(ai).\mathbb P(X_{i+1}=t\mid\mathcal F_i)=M^{(a_i)}_{X_i,t}.P(Xi+1​=t∣Fi​)=MXi​,t(ai​)​.

The controls are otherwise arbitrary.

From a sample of length mmm, the visit counts are Ns(l)=∑i=1m1[Xi=s,ai=l]N^{(l)}_s=\sum_{i=1}^m\mathbb 1[X_i=s,a_i=l]Ns(l)​=∑i=1m​1[Xi​=s,ai​=l] and Ns,t(l)=∑i=1m1[Xi=s,Xi+1=t,ai=l]N^{(l)}_{s,t}=\sum_{i=1}^m\mathbb 1[X_i=s,X_{i+1}=t,a_i=l]Ns,t(l)​=∑i=1m​1[Xi​=s,Xi+1​=t,ai​=l]. The empirical estimator is M^s,t(l)=Ns,t(l)/Ns(l)\hat M^{(l)}_{s,t}=N^{(l)}_{s,t}/N^{(l)}_sM^s,t(l)​=Ns,t(l)​/Ns(l)​, and its error is measured by

sup⁡l∥M^(l)−M(l)∥∞,∥A∥∞=max⁡s∑t∣As,t∣.\sup_{l}\big\|\hat M^{(l)}-M^{(l)}\big\|_\infty,\qquad \|A\|_\infty=\max_s\sum_t|A_{s,t}| .lsup​​M^(l)−M(l)​∞​,∥A∥∞​=smax​t∑​∣As,t​∣.

Three conditions control the chain:

  1. Assumption 1 asks for sets SiS_iSi​ of state–control pairs with 0<ζ2≤P((Xi,ai)∈Si)≤ζ1<10<\zeta_2\le\mathbb P((X_i,a_i)\in S_i)\le\zeta_1<10<ζ2​≤P((Xi​,ai​)∈Si​)≤ζ1​<1. Put ζ(max⁡)=max⁡{ζ1,1−ζ2}\zeta^{(\max)}=\max\{\zeta_1,1-\zeta_2\}ζ(max)=max{ζ1​,1−ζ2​}.
  2. Assumption 2 bounds the return times. Let H0=0H_0=0H0​=0 and let HiH_iHi​ be the iii-th time n≥1n\ge1n≥1 with (Xn,an)=(s,l)(X_n,a_n)=(s,l)(Xn​,an​)=(s,l). The return times τs,l(i)=Hi−Hi−1\tau^{(i)}_{s,l}=H_i-H_{i-1}τs,l(i)​=Hi​−Hi−1​ must satisfy sup⁡s,l,iE[τs,l(i)∣FHi−1]<T\sup_{s,l,i}\mathbb E[\tau^{(i)}_{s,l}\mid\mathcal F_{H_{i-1}}]<Tsups,l,i​E[τs,l(i)​∣FHi−1​​]<T almost surely.
  3. Assumption 4 asks for geometric decay of the weak mixing coefficient ηˉi,j\bar\eta_{i,j}ηˉ​i,j​. This coefficient is the largest change, caused by changing (Xi,ai)(X_i,a_i)(Xi​,ai​) while the history before iii is kept fixed, in the conditional probability of an event of the window (Xj,aj),…,(Xm,am)(X_j,a_j),\dots,(X_m,a_m)(Xj​,aj​),…,(Xm​,am​). The decay is ηˉi,j≤((CΔ−1)/CΔ)j−i\bar\eta_{i,j}\le((\mathbb C_\Delta-1)/\mathbb C_\Delta)^{j-i}ηˉ​i,j​≤((CΔ​−1)/CΔ​)j−i for a constant CΔ>1\mathbb C_\Delta>1CΔ​>1.

The uniform mixing coefficient ϕi,j\phi_{i,j}ϕi,j​ compares the conditional law of the window given the whole history up to iii with its unconditional law. With ρ⋆=max⁡s,lsup⁡1≤i≤mP(Xi=s,ai=l)\rho_\star=\max_{s,l}\sup_{1\le i\le m}\mathbb P(X_i=s,a_i=l)ρ⋆​=maxs,l​sup1≤i≤m​P(Xi​=s,ai​=l) the paper defines

CT=64(CΔρ⋆T2+2T)Cpel,Cζ=8(2CΔρ⋆(1−ζ(max⁡))−2+(1−ζ(max⁡))−1)Cpel,\mathbb C_T=\frac{64(\mathbb C_\Delta\rho_\star T^2+2T)}{\mathbb C_{pel}},\qquad \mathbb C_\zeta=\frac{8(2\mathbb C_\Delta\rho_\star(1-\zeta^{(\max)})^{-2}+(1-\zeta^{(\max)})^{-1})}{\mathbb C_{pel}},CT​=Cpel​64(CΔ​ρ⋆​T2+2T)​,Cζ​=Cpel​8(2CΔ​ρ⋆​(1−ζ(max))−2+(1−ζ(max))−1)​,

and CT,δ=CTlog⁡(6dk/δ)\mathbb C_{T,\delta}=\mathbb C_T\log(6dk/\delta)CT,δ​=CT​log(6dk/δ), Cζ,δ=Cζlog⁡(6dk/δ)\mathbb C_{\zeta,\delta}=\mathbb C_\zeta\log(6dk/\delta)Cζ,δ​=Cζ​log(6dk/δ). Here Cpel\mathbb C_{pel}Cpel​ depends on CΔ\mathbb C_\DeltaCΔ​ only.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2, both clauses

(a) Sample complexity. There are a universal c>1c>1c>1 and a positive function Cpel(CΔ)\mathbb C_{pel}(\mathbb C_\Delta)Cpel​(CΔ​) such that every controlled Markov chain satisfying Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 has, for ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 and δ∈(0,1)\delta\in(0,1)δ∈(0,1),

m>cmax⁡{4dε2(1+ζ(max⁡)),dTε2,Tε2log⁡dkTε2δ,CT,δ(log⁡CT,δ)2,Cζ,δ(log⁡Cζ,δ)2} ⟹ P(sup⁡l∥M^(l)−M(l)∥∞>ε)<δ.m>c\max\Big\{\tfrac{4d}{\varepsilon^2(1+\zeta^{(\max)})},\tfrac{dT}{\varepsilon^2},\tfrac{T}{\varepsilon^2}\log\tfrac{dkT}{\varepsilon^2\delta},\mathbb C_{T,\delta}(\log\mathbb C_{T,\delta})^2,\mathbb C_{\zeta,\delta}(\log\mathbb C_{\zeta,\delta})^2\Big\}\ \Longrightarrow\ \mathbb P\Big(\sup_l\|\hat M^{(l)}-M^{(l)}\|_\infty>\varepsilon\Big)<\delta .m>cmax{ε2(1+ζ(max))4d​,ε2dT​,ε2T​logε2δdkT​,CT,δ​(logCT,δ​)2,Cζ,δ​(logCζ,δ​)2} ⟹ P(lsup​∥M^(l)−M(l)∥∞​>ε)<δ.

The printed threshold lacks the second and third terms and is false without them: i.i.d. uniform states satisfy all assumptions with T=d+1T=d+1T=d+1, but the printed threshold is then O(d(log⁡d)3)O(d(\log d)^3)O(d(logd)3), far below the d2d^2d2 samples that are needed.

(b) Minimaxity. This is the paper's Appendix G.3 Part 1. For d≥d0d\ge d_0d≥d0​ (a universal threshold), 0<p⋆<1/(d+1)0<p_\star<1/(d+1)0<p⋆​<1/(d+1) and σ∈{−1,1}⌊d/2⌋\sigma\in\{-1,1\}^{\lfloor d/2\rfloor}σ∈{−1,1}⌊d/2⌋, let MσM_\sigmaMσ​ be the transition matrix on d+1d+1d+1 states whose first ddd rows are b=((1−p⋆)/d,…,(1−p⋆)/d,p⋆)b=((1-p_\star)/d,\dots,(1-p_\star)/d,p_\star)b=((1−p⋆​)/d,…,(1−p⋆​)/d,p⋆​) and whose last row is bbb perturbed by ±16σiε/d\pm16\sigma_i\varepsilon/d±16σi​ε/d in consecutive pairs of coordinates (the page takes ddd even; for odd ddd the leftover coordinate is left unperturbed). These chains exist. They satisfy the three assumptions with ζ1=ζ2=p⋆\zeta_1=\zeta_2=p_\starζ1​=ζ2​=p⋆​, T=⌈3/p⋆⌉T=\lceil3/p_\star\rceilT=⌈3/p⋆​⌉ and CΔ=4/3\mathbb C_\Delta=4/3CΔ​=4/3. For 0<ε<1/320<\varepsilon<1/320<ε<1/32 and δ<1/2\delta<1/2δ<1/2,

m≤c2(1−2δ)dp⋆ε2 ⟹ ∀ M~ ∃ σ: Pσ(∥M~−Mσ∥∞>ε)>δ.m\le c_2(1-2\delta)\frac{d}{p_\star\varepsilon^2}\ \Longrightarrow\ \forall\,\tilde M\ \exists\,\sigma:\ \mathbb P_\sigma\big(\|\tilde M-M_\sigma\|_\infty>\varepsilon\big)>\delta .m≤c2​(1−2δ)p⋆​ε2d​ ⟹ ∀M~ ∃σ: Pσ​(∥M~−Mσ​∥∞​>ε)>δ.

Since T≍1/p⋆T\asymp1/p_\starT≍1/p⋆​ on this family, the term dT/ε2dT/\varepsilon^2dT/ε2 of (a) cannot be improved beyond a universal constant.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 1 (row error at bounded visit counts, corrected).
  2. Lemma 2 (bounds on E[Ns(l)]\mathbb E[N^{(l)}_s]E[Ns(l)​]).
  3. Lemma 1 (weak vs. uniform mixing, corrected).
  4. Lemma 9 (covariance inequality, corrected).
  5. Proposition 3 (a Bernstein bound for Ns(l)N^{(l)}_sNs(l)​, corrected).
  6. The elementary step m≥2x(log⁡x)2⇒m/(log⁡m)2≥xm\ge2x(\log x)^2\Rightarrow m/(\log m)^2\ge xm≥2x(logx)2⇒m/(logm)2≥x.
  7. The Varshamov–Gilbert packing.
  8. The bound KL(η(σ)∥b)≤512ε2\mathrm{KL}(\eta(\sigma)\|b)\le512\varepsilon^2KL(η(σ)∥b)≤512ε2.
  9. The chain rule (G.22).
  10. The stationary distribution (G.23).

Significance

Clause (a) gives an estimate of all kkk transition matrices from one trajectory logged by an arbitrary adapted policy, with explicit dependence on the return-time constant TTT, the visitation constants ζ1,ζ2\zeta_1,\zeta_2ζ1​,ζ2​ and the mixing constant. Error bounds for off-policy evaluation and for recovering optimal values follow from it in the paper's Section 5. Clause (b) shows that no estimator does better than the empirical one by more than a universal factor in the leading term.

Neither clause has a machine-checked proof. Four printed statements on the path are false as stated and are posed here in corrected form, each with a counterexample in its item:

  • the threshold of Theorem 2;
  • Proposition 1;
  • Lemma 1;
  • Lemma 9.

Proposition 3 is posed in the regime where its printed bound holds. A complete formalization would give the first checked minimax result for estimating a controlled Markov chain. It would also give the first checked concentration inequality for visit counts of a non-stationary mixing process.

Difficulty

Under arbitrary adapted controls the visit counts are not sums of independent or stationary terms, and the number of transitions observed from a state is random and correlated with the transitions themselves. Applying a fixed-sample-size concentration bound row by row therefore fails. The deviation of Ns(l)N^{(l)}_sNs(l)​ around its mean has to be controlled by a Bernstein-type inequality for non-stationary, geometrically mixing bounded sequences, with constants that depend on the mixing rate alone. The constants must not depend on ddd, kkk or the chain. Such an inequality is not in Mathlib. The lower bound needs Fano's method, or an equivalent, for path laws of Markov chains.

Formalization scope

  • States are Fin d and controls Fin k, with d,k≥1d,k\ge1d,k≥1, and time is N\mathbb NN from 000.
  • The chain is a structure on a probability space with a Mathlib Filtration ℕ. It carries adapted XXX, aaa, row-stochastic matrices and the conditional transition law.
  • The counts run over i=1,…,mi=1,\dots,mi=1,…,m and Ns,t(l)N^{(l)}_{s,t}Ns,t(l)​ reads Xm+1X_{m+1}Xm+1​. M^\hat MM^ uses Lean's 0/0=00/0=00/0=0.
  • ∥⋅∥∞\|\cdot\|_\infty∥⋅∥∞​ is the maximum row ℓ1\ell^1ℓ1 sum, not the largest entry: under the largest-entry norm the hard family's members are only 32ε/d32\varepsilon/d32ε/d apart and clause (b) is false.
  • Visit times take values in N∪{∞}\mathbb N\cup\{\infty\}N∪{∞}, with the first visit at a time n≥1n\ge1n≥1.
  • Assumption 2 uses Mathlib's conditional expectation with respect to the σ-algebra at the previous visit. It requires the return times to be almost surely finite and integrable, and bounds the supremum strictly by TTT.
  • ηˉ\bar\etaηˉ​ and ϕ\phiϕ are finite maxima over the window up to mmm, using elementary conditional probabilities. Assumption 4 holds for 0≤i<j≤m0\le i<j\le m0≤i<j≤m, and Assumption 1 at the times 1≤i≤m1\le i\le m1≤i≤m.
  • The constants ccc, c2c_2c2​, d0d_0d0​ and the function Cpel\mathbb C_{pel}Cpel​ are quantified before the chain. A ccc or Cpel\mathbb C_{pel}Cpel​ that depends on ddd, kkk, TTT or the chain would make (a) a different, weaker statement.
  • Clause (b) quantifies over every estimator, i.e. every function of X0,…,Xm+1X_0,\dots,X_{m+1}X0​,…,Xm+1​, and asserts that the hard chains exist. A family that cannot be realized would make (b) vacuous.

A complete development needs several pieces of infrastructure, all reusable beyond this mission:

  • the strong Markov property at visit times;
  • a Bernstein inequality for ϕ\phiϕ-mixing sequences;
  • Fano's inequality with a packing;
  • KL chain rules for Markov path laws.

Contributions of any of these, and proofs of the milestones, are welcome.

Selected references

  • I. Banerjee, H. Honnappa, V. Rao, Offline Estimation of Controlled Markov Chains: Minimaxity and Sample Complexity, Operations Research, 2025; arXiv:2211.07092v5. https://arxiv.org/abs/2211.07092
  • G. Wolfer, A. Kontorovich, Statistical estimation of ergodic Markov chain kernel over discrete state space, Bernoulli 27(1), 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.00080
  • F. Merlevède, M. Peligrad, E. Rio, Bernstein inequality and moderate deviations under strong mixing conditions, High Dimensional Probability V, IMS Collections 5, 2009. https://arxiv.org/abs/0902.0582
  • A. B. Tsybakov, Introduction to Nonparametric Estimation, Springer, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1007/b13794
  • A. Agarwal, S. Kakade, L. F. Yang, Model-based reinforcement learning with a generative model is minimax optimal, COLT 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.03804
  • G. Li, L. Shi, Y. Chen, Y. Chi, Y. Wei, Settling the sample complexity of model-based offline reinforcement learning, Annals of Statistics 52(1), 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.05275
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Algorithmic Game TheoryLinear algebraOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Decomposition of Games: Some Strategic Considerations: Duplicating a Strategy Commutes with the (μ,γ)-Decomposition into Potential, Harmonic and Nonstrategic ComponentsResearch Paper

Motivation

A finite game can be split into simpler pieces. Candogan, Menache, Ozdaglar and Parrilo (Math. Oper. Res. 36 (2011)) showed that the space of finite games is the direct sum of potential, harmonic and nonstrategic games: potential games have pure equilibria and well-behaved learning dynamics, harmonic games generalize matching pennies, and nonstrategic games do not affect anyone's incentives. The decomposition is used to approximate a game by the closest potential game and to transfer equilibrium and dynamics results from the potential component to the original game.

Their decomposition depends on a uniform measure on each strategy set and an unweighted inner product. As a result it is not invariant under transformations that leave the strategic content of a game unchanged. The most basic such transformation is duplicating a strategy: giving a player a second, payoff-identical copy of one of her strategies. Abdou, Pnevmatikos, Scarsini and Venel (arXiv:1901.06048v2, 2020; Math. Oper. Res. 2022) introduce a weighted family of decompositions, parametrized by a measure vector and a co-measure vector, and show that duplication commutes with it once the weights are transformed accordingly. This mission formalizes that result together with the weighted decomposition it rests on.

Setting

There is a finite set NNN of players. Player iii has a finite strategy set SiS^iSi; S=∏i∈NSiS=\prod_{i\in N}S^iS=∏i∈N​Si is the set of profiles sss, s−is^{-i}s−i is sss without player iii, and (ti,s−i)(t^i,s^{-i})(ti,s−i) is sss with player iii's strategy replaced by tit^iti. A game is a vector g=(gi)i∈Ng=(g^i)_{i\in N}g=(gi)i∈N​ of payoff functions gi:S→Rg^i:S\to\mathbb Rgi:S→R; the games form a real vector space G\mathcal GG.

A measure vector μ=(μi)i∈N\mu=(\mu^i)_{i\in N}μ=(μi)i∈N​ assigns a strictly positive weight μi(si)\mu^i(s^i)μi(si) to every strategy; μ(s)=∏iμi(si)\mu(s)=\prod_i\mu^i(s^i)μ(s)=∏i​μi(si) is the product measure and μi(Si)\mu^i(S^i)μi(Si) the total mass. A co-measure vector γ=(γi)i∈N\gamma=(\gamma^i)_{i\in N}γ=(γi)i∈N​ assigns to player iii a strictly positive function γi(s−i)\gamma^i(s^{-i})γi(s−i) of the other players' strategies. A game ggg is

  • nonstrategic if each gi(si,s−i)g^i(s^i,s^{-i})gi(si,s−i) does not depend on sis^isi;
  • μ\muμ-normalized if ∑siμi(si)gi(si,s−i)=0\sum_{s^i}\mu^i(s^i)g^i(s^i,s^{-i})=0∑si​μi(si)gi(si,s−i)=0 for every iii and s−is^{-i}s−i;
  • γ\gammaγ-potential if some Ψ:S→R\Psi:S\to\mathbb RΨ:S→R satisfies γi(s−i)(gi(ti,s−i)−gi(si,s−i))=Ψ(ti,s−i)−Ψ(si,s−i)\gamma^i(s^{-i})\big(g^i(t^i,s^{-i})-g^i(s^i,s^{-i})\big)=\Psi(t^i,s^{-i})-\Psi(s^i,s^{-i})γi(s−i)(gi(ti,s−i)−gi(si,s−i))=Ψ(ti,s−i)−Ψ(si,s−i);
  • (μ,γ)(\mu,\gamma)(μ,γ)-harmonic if ∑i∑tiμi(ti)γi(s−i)(gi(si,s−i)−gi(ti,s−i))=0\sum_i\sum_{t^i}\mu^i(t^i)\gamma^i(s^{-i})\big(g^i(s^i,s^{-i})-g^i(t^i,s^{-i})\big)=0∑i​∑ti​μi(ti)γi(s−i)(gi(si,s−i)−gi(ti,s−i))=0 for every sss.

Games carry the inner product ⟨g1,g2⟩μ,γ=∑iμi(Si)∑sμ(s)γi(s−i)2g1i(s)g2i(s)\langle g_1,g_2\rangle_{\mu,\gamma}=\sum_i\mu^i(S^i)\sum_s\mu(s)\gamma^i(s^{-i})^2g_1^i(s)g_2^i(s)⟨g1​,g2​⟩μ,γ​=∑i​μi(Si)∑s​μ(s)γi(s−i)2g1i​(s)g2i​(s).

Duplication. Collapse each strategy set by a map πj:S′j→Sj\pi^j:S'^j\to S^jπj:S′j→Sj. The extended game is gˇj(s′)=gj(π(s′))\check g^j(s')=g^j(\pi(s'))gˇ​j(s′)=gj(π(s′)), the extended co-measure is γˇj(s′)=γj(π(s′))\check\gamma^j(s')=\gamma^j(\pi(s'))γˇ​j(s′)=γj(π(s′)), and an extension μˇ\check\muμˇ​ of μ\muμ is any strictly positive measure vector whose mass on each fibre (πj)−1(a)(\pi^j)^{-1}(a)(πj)−1(a) is μj(a)\mu^j(a)μj(a). Duplicating s1is^i_1s1i​ into s0i,s1is^i_0,s^i_1s0i​,s1i​ is the case S′i=Si∪{s0i}S'^i=S^i\cup\{s^i_0\}S′i=Si∪{s0i​}, πi(s0i)=s1i\pi^i(s^i_0)=s^i_1πi(s0i​)=s1i​, all other maps the identity: then μˇi(s0i)+μˇi(s1i)=μi(s1i)\check\mu^i(s^i_0)+\check\mu^i(s^i_1)=\mu^i(s^i_1)μˇ​i(s0i​)+μˇ​i(s1i​)=μi(s1i​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.15

Write (gNS,gP,gH)(g_{\text{NS}},g_{\text{P}},g_{\text{H}})(gNS​,gP​,gH​) for the (μ,γ)(\mu,\gamma)(μ,γ)-decomposition of ggg. Then

(gˇ)(μˇ,γˇ)-NS=gˇNS,(gˇ)(μˇ,γˇ)-P=gˇP,(gˇ)(μˇ,γˇ)-H=gˇH,\big(\check g\big)_{(\check\mu,\check\gamma)\text{-NS}}=\check g_{\text{NS}},\qquad \big(\check g\big)_{(\check\mu,\check\gamma)\text{-P}}=\check g_{\text{P}},\qquad \big(\check g\big)_{(\check\mu,\check\gamma)\text{-H}}=\check g_{\text{H}},(gˇ​)(μˇ​,γˇ​)-NS​=gˇ​NS​,(gˇ​)(μˇ​,γˇ​)-P​=gˇ​P​,(gˇ​)(μˇ​,γˇ​)-H​=gˇ​H​,

stated as: a triple of games on S′S'S′ is a (μˇ,γˇ)(\check\mu,\check\gamma)(μˇ​,γˇ​)-decomposition of gˇ\check ggˇ​ if and only if it equals the extension of (gNS,gP,gH)(g_{\text{NS}},g_{\text{P}},g_{\text{H}})(gNS​,gP​,gH​). Both directions are content: one is uniqueness for the extended weights, the other the invariance of each class.

The weighted decomposition: Theorem 2.11

G=(μ-NoG∩γ-PG)⊕μ,γ(μ-NoG∩(μ,γ)-HG)⊕μ,γNSG,\mathcal G=(\mu\text{-NoG}\cap\gamma\text{-PG})\oplus_{\mu,\gamma}(\mu\text{-NoG}\cap(\mu,\gamma)\text{-HG})\oplus_{\mu,\gamma}\mathsf{NSG},G=(μ-NoG∩γ-PG)⊕μ,γ​(μ-NoG∩(μ,γ)-HG)⊕μ,γ​NSG,

every game having exactly one decomposition and the three classes being pairwise orthogonal. Proposition 2.10 (G=μ-NoG⊕μ,γNSG\mathcal G=\mu\text{-NoG}\oplus_{\mu,\gamma}\mathsf{NSG}G=μ-NoG⊕μ,γ​NSG) and Lemma 3.14 (each class is preserved by extension) are the other main milestones; Lemmas A.1–A.11 and Propositions A.3–A.9 of the appendix are the intermediate steps, in the order of the milestone list.

Significance

The result says that the potential, harmonic and nonstrategic parts of a game are properties of its strategic content and not of the way it is written down, provided the measure is split among copies of a strategy and the co-measure is copied. Duplicate strategies appear whenever a game is derived from an extensive form or a mechanism, so a decomposition that is not invariant under duplication assigns different "closest potential games" to the same strategic situation. The same weighted machinery gives the paper's invariance results for relabellings and scalings and the elimination of duplicates (Theorem 3.19, derived from Theorem 3.15).

All results are proved in the paper. None of them is formalized: the platform has the uniform-weight decomposition of Candogan et al. (Theorem 4.1 of that paper, proved), with an unweighted inner product and a pseudo-inverse-based definition of the projections, but no weighted classes, no co-measures and no statement about duplication. This mission adds the weighted definitions, the weighted decomposition with its uniqueness and orthogonality, and the commutation theorem.

Difficulty

The commutation is an immediate consequence of two facts, and both carry the work. The first is uniqueness of the (μˇ,γˇ)(\check\mu,\check\gamma)(μˇ​,γˇ​)-decomposition on the larger profile set: this is Theorem 2.11 itself, whose proof needs the weighted flow operators, their adjoints and the orthogonality of normalized potential and normalized harmonic games under ⟨⋅,⋅⟩μ,γ\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle_{\mu,\gamma}⟨⋅,⋅⟩μ,γ​. The second is that extension preserves each class, which fails for the obvious guess at the extended co-measure: the definition printed in the paper splits γj\gamma^jγj between the two copies, and with that choice a potential game's extension is no longer potential. Only the copied co-measure works. The weights also matter for normalization: without splitting μi(s1i)\mu^i(s^i_1)μi(s1i​) between the copies the extended game is not normalized.

Formalization scope

  • Players are a finite type ι, strategy sets finite types S i, profiles ∀ i, S i, and (ti,s−i)(t^i,s^{-i})(ti,s−i) is Function.update s i t. A game is ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ.
  • Measures are point-mass functions μ i : S i → ℝ with strict positivity as a hypothesis; a co-measure γ i is a positive function of the full profile that is invariant under changing coordinate i.
  • The standing assumptions n≥2n\ge2n≥2 and ∣Si∣≥2|S^i|\ge2∣Si∣≥2 are dropped; all statements hold without them.
  • The (μ,γ)(\mu,\gamma)(μ,γ)-decomposition is the predicate IsDecomposition μ γ g n p h in the order (nonstrategic, potential, harmonic) of (2.18); no decomposition function is defined, since Theorem 2.11 makes the triple unique.
  • Inner products are explicit finite sums: ⟨⋅,⋅⟩0\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle_0⟨⋅,⋅⟩0​ with the unnormalized product measure, ⟨⋅,⋅⟩μ,γ\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle_{\mu,\gamma}⟨⋅,⋅⟩μ,γ​ with the factor μi(Si)\mu^i(S^i)μi(Si), and ⟨⋅,⋅⟩1\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle_1⟨⋅,⋅⟩1​ on flows with the factor 12\tfrac1221​. Flows are functions on pairs with a skew-symmetry hypothesis; δi∗\delta^{i*}δi∗ is defined by its explicit formula, and Proposition A.3 states that it is the adjoint.
  • Duplication is generalized to arbitrary collapsing maps π\piπ, which covers Definition 3.13 and iterated duplications. The extended co-measure is the copy γ∘π\gamma\circ\piγ∘π; the paper's printed sum version makes Lemma 3.14 and Theorem 3.15 false, and the copy is what its proof uses.
  • Lemma A.11 is stated for every solution of the normal equation δ∗δφ=δ∗D(g)\delta^*\delta\varphi=\delta^*D(g)δ∗δφ=δ∗D(g), together with existence of a solution, instead of through the Moore–Penrose pseudo-inverse.

A statement asserting only that the extended triple is a (μˇ,γˇ)(\check\mu,\check\gamma)(μˇ​,γˇ​)-decomposition of gˇ\check ggˇ​ would be Lemma 3.14 and not the goal: the goal also excludes every other decomposition.

The weighted classes, inner products and flow operators are reusable for the paper's other invariance results (relabelling, pseudo-translations, scalings, elimination of duplicates) and for weighted versions of the closest-potential-game problem. Proofs of any milestone are welcome; the appendix lemmas are independent finite linear-algebra statements.

Selected references

  • J. Abdou, N. Pnevmatikos, M. Scarsini, X. Venel, Decomposition of Games: Some Strategic Considerations, arXiv:1901.06048v2, 2020; Mathematics of Operations Research 47(1), 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/1901.06048v2
  • O. Candogan, I. Menache, A. Ozdaglar, P. A. Parrilo, Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games, Mathematics of Operations Research 36(3), 474–503, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1110.0500
  • D. Monderer, L. S. Shapley, Potential Games, Games and Economic Behavior 14(1), 124–143, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0044
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Search for an Immobile Hider on a Binary Tree with Unreliable Locational Information: The Value Is 2qμ + (p − q)D, Attained by the Recursive Hider Distribution and the Favoring-Bias SearcherResearch Paper

Searching a tree with unreliable directions

Search games model a Searcher looking for an object or a person whose location is chosen adversarially: a lost hiker, a mine, a hidden explosive device, a fugitive. In the classic search game on a tree, a Hider stands still at a point of a tree network, and a Searcher starts from the root and moves at unit speed. The payoff is the time to find the Hider. Gal (1979) solved this game for every tree. Its value is the total length μ\muμ of the tree, and an optimal Searcher randomizes over depth-first searches.

In practice, searchers often get hints: a witness who saw the hiker turn left, a sensor reading, a dog that picks one trail. Such hints are useful but fallible. Alpern and Lidbetter (arXiv:2303.13378, Operations Research, 2025) model this by a signal at each branching point. The signal points to the branch containing the Hider and is correct with a known probability p>12p>\tfrac12p>21​. They solve the resulting game exactly on every binary tree. The value, the optimal Hider distribution and the optimal Searcher strategy are all given in closed form by a recursion on the tree.

Timeline. Gal (1979) solved the game without signals on trees, with value μ\muμ. Biased depth-first strategies of the Searcher were introduced in other contexts by Alpern (2010) and by Alpern and Lidbetter (2014). Alpern and Lidbetter (2025) solved the game with signals of accuracy ppp, which as p→12p\to\tfrac12p→21​ reduces to Gal's.

The game G(Q,O,p)G(Q,O,p)G(Q,O,p)

A rooted tree (Q,O)(Q,O)(Q,O) is a finite tree whose arcs have positive lengths, with a distinguished root OOO. Write μ=μ(Q)\mu=\mu(Q)μ=μ(Q) for its total length and d(O,v)d(O,v)d(O,v) for the distance from the root to a node vvv. Every node other than the root has degree three (a branch node) or one (a leaf node). The root has degree one or two, and in the second case it is also a branch node. At a branch node jjj, the part of the tree beyond jjj splits into two branches Q1Q_1Q1​ and Q2Q_2Q2​.

The Hider picks a leaf node. The Searcher performs a depth-first search from OOO at unit speed. On her first arrival at a branch node jjj on the way to the Hider she receives a signal, either 1 or 2, naming the branch that contains the Hider. It is correct with probability ppp and wrong with probability q=1−pq=1-pq=1−p, where 12<p≤1\tfrac12<p\le121​<p≤1. She then chooses which branch to search first, as a function of the signal. There are four such actions: [1,1][1,1][1,1] and [2,2][2,2][2,2] ignore the signal, [1,2][1,2][1,2] follows it, and [2,1][2,1][2,1] does the opposite. If she enters the wrong branch first she searches all of it and returns, which costs twice its length. The payoff TTT is the time until she reaches the Hider. The Hider maximizes TTT and the Searcher minimizes its expectation.

The mean depth of QQQ with respect to a probability distribution λ\lambdaλ on its leaf nodes LLL is

D(Q,O,λ)=∑v∈Lλ(v) d(O,v).D(Q,O,\lambda)=\sum_{v\in L}\lambda(v)\,d(O,v).D(Q,O,λ)=v∈L∑​λ(v)d(O,v).

The Hider distribution λˉQ\bar\lambda_QλˉQ​ is defined by recursion on the tree. On a single arc it is the point mass at its leaf. At a root of degree one it is the distribution of the subtree. At a branch root with branches Q1,Q2Q_1,Q_2Q1​,Q2​ of lengths μ1,μ2\mu_1,\mu_2μ1​,μ2​, call Q1Q_1Q1​ the favored branch if DQ1≥DQ2D_{Q_1}\ge D_{Q_2}DQ1​​≥DQ2​​, where DQi=D(Qi,λˉQi)D_{Q_i}=D(Q_i,\bar\lambda_{Q_i})DQi​​=D(Qi​,λˉQi​​). Then

λˉ(v)=pμ1pμ1+qμ2 λˉQ1(v)  (v∈Q1),λˉ(v)=qμ2pμ1+qμ2 λˉQ2(v)  (v∈Q2).\bar\lambda(v)=\frac{p\mu_1}{p\mu_1+q\mu_2}\,\bar\lambda_{Q_1}(v)\ \ (v\in Q_1),\qquad \bar\lambda(v)=\frac{q\mu_2}{p\mu_1+q\mu_2}\,\bar\lambda_{Q_2}(v)\ \ (v\in Q_2).λˉ(v)=pμ1​+qμ2​pμ1​​λˉQ1​​(v)  (v∈Q1​),λˉ(v)=pμ1​+qμ2​qμ2​​λˉQ2​​(v)  (v∈Q2​).

Write DQ=D(Q,O,λˉQ)D_Q=D(Q,O,\bar\lambda_Q)DQ​=D(Q,O,λˉQ​). At a branch node with favored branch Q1Q_1Q1​, the favoring bias is

β=(p−q)(DQ1−DQ2)2(pμ1+qμ2).\beta=\frac{(p-q)(D_{Q_1}-D_{Q_2})}{2(p\mu_1+q\mu_2)}.β=2(pμ1​+qμ2​)(p−q)(DQ1​​−DQ2​​)​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7

For every rooted tree with positive arc lengths and every 12<p≤1\tfrac12<p\le121​<p≤1:

  1. the value of G(Q,O,p)G(Q,O,p)G(Q,O,p) is
V(Q)=2qμ+(p−q)DQ;V(Q)=2q\mu+(p-q)D_Q;V(Q)=2qμ+(p−q)DQ​;
  1. λˉ\bar\lambdaλˉ is an optimal Hider strategy;
  2. the Searcher strategy that, at every branch node, searches the favored branch first with probability β\betaβ and otherwise follows the signal is optimal.

All three parts are stated, for every tree and every ppp in the model's range. Nothing is fixed to a special tree or a special ppp.

Milestones

  • V(Q)=ℓ+V(Q′)V(Q)=\ell+V(Q')V(Q)=ℓ+V(Q′) at a root of degree one (proof of Theorem 7, p. 10).
  • Proposition 6: DQ=ℓ+DQ′D_Q=\ell+D_{Q'}DQ​=ℓ+DQ′​ at a degree-one root, and DQ=pμ1DQ1+qμ2DQ2pμ1+qμ2D_Q=\dfrac{p\mu_1D_{Q_1}+q\mu_2D_{Q_2}}{p\mu_1+q\mu_2}DQ​=pμ1​+qμ2​pμ1​DQ1​​+qμ2​DQ2​​​ at a branch root with Q1Q_1Q1​ favored.
  • Table 1: at a branch root, the game has the value of a 2×42\times42×4 matrix game whose entries are the lengths and values of the two branches (pp. 10–11).
  • "Follow" dominates "opposite": the two columns differ by (2μ2(2p−1), 2μ1(2p−1))(2\mu_2(2p-1),\,2\mu_1(2p-1))(2μ2​(2p−1),2μ1​(2p−1)) (p. 11).
  • Lemma 2: the game has a value, and it is at most μ\muμ.

What the result gives

The theorem gives a complete closed-form solution of a search game with imperfect information, on every tree. The value interpolates between Gal's μ\muμ (as p→12p\to\tfrac12p→21​) and the mean depth DQD_QDQ​ (at p=1p=1p=1). It quantifies how much a signal of accuracy ppp is worth to the Searcher. It also shows that always following the signal is almost never optimal: the Searcher should sometimes go to the favored branch without looking at the signal. The paper derives explicit formulas for penultimate nodes (Corollary 8), monotonicity of the value in ppp (Proposition 9) and the value on trees of constant depth (Corollary 10) from it.

The result is proved in the paper. To our knowledge no part of it has a machine-checked proof, and Gal's theorem for the game without signals is not formalized either. This mission produces a formal model of depth-first search games on weighted trees together with the full solution of the signal game. The model consists of trees as an inductive type, leaves and branch nodes as finite types, and the expected search time of a pure strategy.

Where the difficulty lies

The natural induction on the tree has to compare games of different sizes. At a branch root, the Searcher's pure strategies on the whole tree are combinations of a root action and arbitrary pure strategies on both branches. Reducing this game to the 2×42\times42×4 matrix of Table 1 requires an argument that optimal play in the branches can be composed with the root choice in both directions. A Hider strategy must be shown to guarantee the value against every combination, not only against strategies of the β-form. The mixing weights of the Hider distribution also depend on mean depths that are themselves defined through the distribution, so the induction must carry the identity of Proposition 6 alongside the value. Solving the 2×42\times42×4 game then needs the sign of the slope (p−q)(DQ1−DQ2)(p-q)(D_{Q_1}-D_{Q_2})(p−q)(DQ1​​−DQ2​​) and Lemma 2's bound V≤μV\le\muV≤μ on each branch. A Hider distribution proportional to lengths, which is optimal without signals, is not optimal here.

Formalization scope

Trees are an inductive type RTree with constructors for a single arc, an arc leading to a subtree, and a fork with two branches. This also admits interior nodes of degree two and forks whose branches start with a fork, which is the paper's own conversion of arbitrary trees to binary trees by arcs of length zero. Every arc has positive length. Signals and branches are booleans, and an action is a map from signals to the branch searched first. A pure Searcher strategy assigns an action to every branch node. The payoff is the expected search time. Signals off the path to the Hider do not matter, so it is computed from the marginal law of each signal on the path, and no joint law is assumed. Mixed strategies are probability vectors over all pure strategies. Value and optimality are the published matrix-game notions ZeroSumLP.DantzigExt.MatrixGame (min-max and max-min strategies of a finite zero-sum game). On a tie DQ1=DQ2D_{Q_1}=D_{Q_2}DQ1​​=DQ2​​ branch 1 is favored, and then β=0\beta=0β=0.

Neither the value nor the mean depth is defined by the formulas being proved. The value is the matrix-game value of the expected-time matrix. The mean depth is the sum of Definition 3, not the recursion of Proposition 6. The Hider's optimality must hold against every pure Searcher strategy.

A complete development needs finite sums over the leaves of a tree, the expected-time recursion, minimax for the 2×42\times42×4 game, and the induction of Theorem 7. The tree model and the fact that a finite game's value composes over subtrees can be reused for other search games on trees. Contributions to any milestone, or to Gal's theorem as a by-product, are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Alpern, T. Lidbetter, Search for an Immobile Hider on a Binary Tree with Unreliable Locational Information, Operations Research, 2025; arXiv:2303.13378v2 (2024). https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.13378
  • S. Gal, Search games with mobile and immobile hider, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization 17(1), 99–122, 1979. https://doi.org/10.1137/0317009
  • S. Alpern, Search games on trees with asymmetric travel times, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization 48(8), 5547–5563, 2010.
  • S. Alpern, T. Lidbetter, Searching a variable speed network, Mathematics of Operations Research 39(3), 697–711, 2014.
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Differential GeometryFunctional Analysis·Captain: xwh

K24: full geometric change of slice and inverse transferResearch Paper

This problem asks for a formal proof of the complete conditional geometric K24 change-of-slice result, including its regularity obstruction. The source gives informal analytic arguments; this publication does not claim a new proof or a new unsolved conjecture for the standard perturbation lemma. It does not assert existence of the still-missing geometric organizer in the four-dimensional Einstein research program.

Let MMM be a closed smooth real four-manifold with an actual common smooth circle action. Write Π0\Pi_0Π0​ for its normalized Haar average on the relevant tensor, covector, or vector bundle and Π⊥=I−Π0\Pi_\perp=I-\Pi_0Π⊥​=I−Π0​. Let the positive metrics g^\widehat gg​ and zzz be invariant under that same action; the actual nearby positive metric ggg need not be invariant. The scalar λ\lambdaλ is arbitrary. Define

E(q)=Ric⁡q−λq,Ψg^(q)=E(q)+δq∗Π⊥βg^(q−g^),E(q)=\operatorname{Ric}_q-\lambda q,\qquad \Psi_{\widehat g}(q)=E(q)+\delta_q^*\Pi_\perp\beta_{\widehat g}(q-\widehat g),E(q)=Ricq​−λq,Ψg​​(q)=E(q)+δq∗​Π⊥​βg​​(q−g​),

where βhu=−div⁡hu+12dtr⁡hu\beta_h u=-\operatorname{div}_h u+\tfrac12d\operatorname{tr}_h uβh​u=−divh​u+21​dtrh​u, δh∗\delta_h^*δh∗​ is the symmetrized covariant derivative with factor 1/21/21/2, and KhY=LYh\mathcal K_hY=\mathcal L_YhKh​Y=LY​h. These are actual geometric differential operators, not freely supplied linear maps.

Fix the numerical data for a uniformly bounded local finite-cover system, metric ellipticity and coefficient bounds, 0<α<10<\alpha<10<α<1, and a uniform pullback bound H≥1H\ge1H≥1 for the common action. These bounds are fixed before the conclusion constants are chosen. Covering degree is not globally bounded, and the downstairs overlap count is kept separate from the internal coordinate atlas on each covering manifold. The proposition requires all of the following.

  1. Exact tensor identities and genuine differentiation. Prove the full product rule
DΨg^(z)u=DE(z)u+(Dδ∗)z[u] Π⊥βg^(z−g^)+δz∗Π⊥βg^u.D\Psi_{\widehat g}(z)u=DE(z)u+(D\delta^*)_z[u]\,\Pi_\perp\beta_{\widehat g}(z-\widehat g)+\delta_z^*\Pi_\perp\beta_{\widehat g}u.DΨg​​(z)u=DE(z)u+(Dδ∗)z​[u]Π⊥​βg​​(z−g​)+δz∗​Π⊥​βg​​u.

Invariance makes the middle term vanish. On the genuine zero-Haar-mean tensor sector, identify the difference of the fixed-reference and re-anchored derivatives as

Rg^,zu=δz∗(βg^−βz)u.R_{\widehat g,z}u=\delta_z^*(\beta_{\widehat g}-\beta_z)u.Rg​,z​u=δz∗​(βg​​−βz​)u.

The target also includes the actual connection/Bianchi coefficient expansions, principal-symbol identification by a quadratic-jet test and its intrinsic norm bound, sector preservation and equivariance. It requires the displayed variation to be the Fréchet derivative in the specified section norms on a positive-radius metric neighborhood, not just a pointwise or directional derivative.

  1. Uniform tensor estimates in both scales. For one uniform CTC_TCT​,
∥Rg^,zu∥Ccov0,α≤CT∥g^−z∥Ccov2,α∥u∥Ccov2,α.\|R_{\widehat g,z}u\|_{C^{0,\alpha}_{\rm cov}} \le C_T\|\widehat g-z\|_{C^{2,\alpha}_{\rm cov}}\|u\|_{C^{2,\alpha}_{\rm cov}}.∥Rg​,z​u∥Ccov0,α​​≤CT​∥g​−z∥Ccov2,α​​∥u∥Ccov2,α​​.

For every real s>4s>4s>4, with the corresponding fixed local Sobolev coefficient/atlas bounds, require a uniform CSC_SCS​ with

∥Rg^,zu∥Hcovs−2≤CS∥g^−z∥Hcovs∥u∥Hcovs.\|R_{\widehat g,z}u\|_{H^{s-2}_{\rm cov}} \le C_S\|\widehat g-z\|_{H^s_{\rm cov}}\|u\|_{H^s_{\rm cov}}.∥Rg​,z​u∥Hcovs−2​​≤CS​∥g​−z∥Hcovs​​∥u∥Hcovs​​.

The Sobolev clause is not restricted to integer order and does not impose higher Hölder regularity on the metric. It uses local real-order metric and inverse-metric bounds; it does not impose a fixed global bound on the degree-dependent norm of the whole metric.

  1. Both vector errors and the correct regularity. For the actual projected operator Bg^,gY=Π⊥βg^LYgB_{\widehat g,g}Y=\Pi_\perp\beta_{\widehat g}\mathcal L_YgBg​,g​Y=Π⊥​βg​​LY​g, retain both terms:
Bg^,g−Bz,z=Π⊥[(βg^−βz)Kz+βg^L(⋅)(g−z)].B_{\widehat g,g}-B_{z,z}=\Pi_\perp\big[(\beta_{\widehat g}-\beta_z)\mathcal K_z+ \beta_{\widehat g}\mathcal L_{(\cdot)}(g-z)\big].Bg​,g​−Bz,z​=Π⊥​[(βg​​−βz​)Kz​+βg​​L(⋅)​(g−z)].

Prove the natural C2,α→C0,αC^{2,\alpha}\to C^{0,\alpha}C2,α→C0,α estimate by a uniform constant times (∥g^−z∥C2,α+∥g−z∥C2,α)∥Y∥C2,α(\|\widehat g-z\|_{C^{2,\alpha}}+\|g-z\|_{C^{2,\alpha}})\|Y\|_{C^{2,\alpha}}(∥g​−z∥C2,α​+∥g−z∥C2,α​)∥Y∥C2,α​. For the shifted C3,α→C1,αC^{3,\alpha}\to C^{1,\alpha}C3,α→C1,α pair, both metric differences must instead be controlled in C3,αC^{3,\alpha}C3,α. The actual Bianchi–Killing/rough-Laplacian identity is also included.

  1. Geometric inverse transfer. In each stated pair of actual zero-mean section spaces, suppose the re-anchored projected operator is a bounded linear isomorphism with inverse bound CAC_ACA​ (or CBC_BCB​). If that bound times the norm of the actual difference operator is strictly below 1/21/21/2, prove that the fixed-reference operator is an isomorphism with inverse bound at most 2CA2C_A2CA​ (respectively 2CB2C_B2CB​), including surjectivity and the corresponding Banach-dual gap. Mere absence of kernel is not substituted for the initial isomorphism. Norm, completeness, Haar integrability/boundedness and projection facts needed for this argument are requested conclusions about the concrete spaces; they are not assumed copies of the desired theorem.

  2. Actual flat-torus sharpness. On the genuine four-torus with coordinates of period 2π2\pi2π, use the flat metric, the circle translation in x2x_2x2​, V=sin⁡(x2)∂x1V=\sin(x_2)\partial_{x_1}V=sin(x2​)∂x1​​ and

fn=n−(3+α)sin⁡(nx1)(dx1⊗dx2+dx2⊗dx1).f_n=n^{-(3+\alpha)}\sin(nx_1)(dx_1\otimes dx_2+dx_2\otimes dx_1).fn​=n−(3+α)sin(nx1​)(dx1​⊗dx2​+dx2​⊗dx1​).

Require positivity of gn=g0+fng_n=g_0+f_ngn​=g0​+fn​ for n≥2n\ge2n≥2, finite norms, ∥fn∥C2,α→0\|f_n\|_{C^{2,\alpha}}\to0∥fn​∥C2,α​→0, bounded C3,αC^{3,\alpha}C3,α norms, and a lower bound π−α\pi^{-\alpha}π−α for the C1,αC^{1,\alpha}C1,α norm of the projected actual vector-operator difference tested on VVV. Consequently no uniform shifted estimate using only the C2,αC^{2,\alpha}C2,α metric difference can hold. This is a statement about genuine torus tensors and operators, not an abstract sequence of scalar exponents.

Norm and formalization choices. The definition packages specify full big Hölder norms from actual iterated derivatives and top-order Hölder seminorms, hierarchical local finite covers, and real-order Bessel–Sobolev norms with explicit partitions. Sobolev carriers use the continuous/C² representatives justified by the requested ranges; their completeness and norm properties remain to be proved. The adapted Sobolev norm is an explicit upstairs sum and is not identified with downstairs L2L^2L2 independently of covering degree. Haar averaging is pointwise in finite-dimensional fibers, avoiding an unsupported assumption of norm-continuous action on big Hölder space. The projection bounds are HHH and 1+H1+H1+H; 111 and 222 apply only in the isometric case. Raw inverse, derivative and integral definitions are totalized in Lean, while positivity, regularity, integrability and the analytic properties are enforced by the full statement's hypotheses or required conclusions. Definitions have no admissions or new axioms. There is exactly one intentional unproved theorem placeholder.

Remaining application boundary. K24 does not construct the common marked action, the required same-window C2C^2C2/C3C^3C3 closeness, or the adapted re-anchored inverse from an arbitrary Einstein degeneration. Those organizer inputs remain open. The nonlinear diffeomorphism-chart and quadratic-remainder applications in K16/K21 are separate supporting questions; they require their own loss-aware regularity hypotheses/proofs. Neither those applications nor the original Einstein conjecture is claimed proved by this publication.

14 thms1 active userReviewed
Theoretical Computer Science·Captain: marwahaha

3SUM below 1.921: deterministic exponent 1.9202796 on the word RAMResearch Paper

Motivation

The 3SUM problem — does an integer array contain three values, at three distinct positions, that sum to zero — is a canonical benchmark of fine-grained complexity. Hundreds of reductions sit beneath it in the 3SUM-hardness lattice, so its worst-case exponent governs the reported complexity of convex-hull degeneracies, motion planning, and many computational-geometry tasks. On the real-RAM side the best known bounds are barely subquadratic; on the integer side, Alman and Vassilevska Williams opened a line of subquadratic deterministic word-RAM exponents built on truly subquadratic triangle detection in lopsided graphs.

A recent development is that the entire algorithmic pipeline — data structure, compiled word-RAM program, and runtime certificate — has been written down in Lean 4 and machine-checked, turning a numerical-exponent claim into a verified theorem. Along the way a refinement ladder formed, each step exported as a theorem EndStatement.ThreeSum.SolvedInTime r against the same benchmark specification:

  • 2026-10: full deterministic formalization at 1.9621.9621.962 (c0ldzy17/three-sum-lean), refining earlier 1.999x1.999x1.999x entries already formalized on this platform;
  • 2026-10: platform-side 1.9606141.9606141.960614 (the ThreeSum1960614 tree here);
  • 2026-10: margin refinement to 1.9211.9211.921 and then 1.92031.92031.9203 (fringewidth/three-sum-lean);
  • 2026-10: tightened logarithm and entropy intervals to 4800699/2500000=1.92027964800699/2500000 = 1.92027964800699/2500000=1.9202796 (JoshuaQFEX/3sum-bound), the source of this mission.

Setting

The benchmark model is the source word RAM of the Alman–Vassilevska Williams formalization (EndStatement, already on the platform in TrulySubcubicAPSP_SourceSpecification): a deterministic machine over signed words of width WWW with arithmetic, memory, and conditional-jump instructions. One says SolvedInTime r when for every magnitude exponent κ\kappaκ there is a single finite program PPP, a width bound bbb, and a time function TTT with T(n)r.den≤K nr.numT(n)^{r.\mathrm{den}} \le K\, n^{r.\mathrm{num}}T(n)r.den≤Knr.num for some KKK — the rational-power encoding of O(nr)O(n^r)O(nr) — such that PPP, run at every width W≥b(⌊log⁡2n⌋+1)W \ge b(\lfloor\log_2 n\rfloor + 1)W≥b(⌊log2​n⌋+1), decides 3SUM on every instance of nnn integers of absolute value at most nκn^\kappanκ within T(n)T(n)T(n) steps. Instances are functions Fin n → Int; yes requires the three summands at three distinct indices.

Formalization targets

Goal

EndStatement.ThreeSum.SolvedInTime  ((4800699:Q)/2500000)\texttt{EndStatement.ThreeSum.SolvedInTime}\;((4800699 : \mathbb Q)/2500000)EndStatement.ThreeSum.SolvedInTime((4800699:Q)/2500000)

i.e. deterministic 3SUM in O(n1.9202796)O(n^{1.9202796})O(n1.9202796) word-RAM steps. The constant is hard-coded: this mission certifies this exact exponent, the sharpest point of the current chain.

Chain of margins (milestones)

The proof is the ternary-radix refinement of the 1.9621.9621.962 construction: the same color-coding data structure reorganized around base-3 digits, banks, and queries, compiled to an explicit machine program, with the runtime charged combinatorially stage by stage. The milestone list follows the costing chain of the source: radix-3 machinery and the ternary data structure, the principal-cost certificate (<1.92027946< 1.92027946<1.92027946, the bank term 156432807976/81463563795156432807976/81463563795156432807976/81463563795), the finite-block certificate (1.920279571.920279571.92027957), the frontend budget (1.920279581.920279581.92027958), the executed colored solver (1.920279591.920279591.92027959), and the exported benchmark target (1.920279601.920279601.92027960).

Significance

The result is, at the time of writing, the best formalized deterministic 3SUM exponent available anywhere: previous formalized entries on this platform bottom out at 1.9606141.9606141.960614. Once proved end to end here it becomes the platform's record value for this benchmark, and every lemma of the ternary layer becomes reusable platform infrastructure — falsifiable, importable, and improvable by others, since a cheaper stage immediately yields a better SolvedInTime value by the same costing bridge.

Formalizing it also stress-tests something beyond the number: an end-to-end compiled program execution with a certified asymptotic runtime, not just an abstract algorithm. The runtime margins are certified against strict gaps (10−710^{-7}10−7 at the largest scale), so the verification is quantitative, not just qualitative.

Difficulty

The difficulty is not one deep lemma but a long, load-bearing chain: thousands of small Meets-specifications about program fragments, the radix-3 generalization of the binary machinery, entropy and logarithm interval arithmetic for the exponent, and the assembly of a single compiled program whose correctness and runtime must both hold simultaneously. A tempting shortcut is to postulate the data-structure spec and prove only the runtime analysis — but the benchmark statement is about one concrete word-RAM program, so nothing may be assumed about the implementation: the compiler, the machine semantics, and the runtime ledger are all part of the statement's content.

Formalization scope

This mission is a transplant of an existing, checked Lean 4 development (Apache-2.0) pinned to this platform's default environment (Lean 4.33.1, Mathlib 0df444a…). Statements keep the source's model and names; the benchmark Problem/SolvedInTime layer is reused from the platform's existing TrulySubcubicAPSP_SourceSpecification and the preceding 3SUM trees, and only the new ternary layer is added. No sorry, no assumed oracle, no weakening of SolvedInTime to a per-instance or per-width reading is admissible.

Selected references

  • J. Alman and V. Vassilevska Williams, Truly Subquadratic 3SUM and Truly Subcubic APSP via Triangles in Sparse Lopsided Graphs. Source paper of the benchmark and the original exponent.
  • c0ldzy17, three-sum-lean: full Lean formalization of deterministic O(n1.962)O(n^{1.962})O(n1.962) integer 3SUM. https://github.com/c0ldzy17/three-sum-lean
  • fringewidth (H. S. Bojnal), three-sum-lean: exponent-margin refinement to 1.92031.92031.9203. https://github.com/proof-factory/three-sum-lean
  • J. Wharton (QFEX), A sharper exponent for deterministic integer 3SUM, note and Lean sources. https://github.com/JoshuaQFEX/3sum-bound
1 thm1 active userReviewed
Graph TheoryOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Differences-in-Neighbors for Network Interference in Experiments: The DN Estimator Has Bias at Most d²ε Under ε-Smooth Neighborhood InterferenceResearch Paper

Motivation

Online platforms, social networks and marketplaces run randomized experiments (A/B tests) to estimate the effect of a new feature. The standard analysis assumes that one unit's treatment does not affect another unit's outcome. On a network this fails: a treated user changes what their friends see, a treated seller changes what competing sellers sell. The resulting interference biases the naive difference-in-means estimator, often by more than the effect being measured.

Two classical answers sit at opposite ends of a trade-off. The difference-in-means (DM) estimator ignores interference: its variance is small, but its bias is first order in the interference strength. The Horvitz–Thompson (HT) estimator removes the bias by importance weighting over each unit's whole neighbourhood, at a variance exponential in the degree. Peng, Ye and Zheng (arXiv:2503.02271v1, ACM EC 2025) propose the Differences-in-Neighbors (DN) estimator, which sits in between: its bias is second order in the interference strength, and its variance is polynomial in the degree. DN extends the Differences-in-Q estimator for Markovian interference of Farias et al. (2022) to general interference graphs.

This mission formalizes DN's bias bound, Theorem 1 of the paper, and the steps of its proof.

Setting

There are NNN units. Interference is an undirected graph GGG without self-loops: Ni\mathcal N_iNi​ is the set of neighbours of unit iii, and d=max⁡i∣Ni∣d = \max_i |\mathcal N_i|d=maxi​∣Ni​∣ is the maximum degree. A treatment vector is z∈{0,1}Nz \in \{0,1\}^Nz∈{0,1}N, and unit iii has a potential outcome function fi:{0,1}N→Rf_i : \{0,1\}^N \to \mathbb Rfi​:{0,1}N→R, with observed outcome Yi=fi(z)Y_i = f_i(z)Yi​=fi​(z).

Assumption 1 (neighborhood interference). fi(z)f_i(z)fi​(z) depends only on ziz_izi​ and on (zj)j∈Ni(z_j)_{j \in \mathcal N_i}(zj​)j∈Ni​​. The paper assumes this throughout.

The target is the average treatment effect

ATE=1N∑i=1N(fi(1⃗)−fi(0⃗)),\mathrm{ATE} = \frac1N \sum_{i=1}^N \bigl(f_i(\vec 1) - f_i(\vec 0)\bigr),ATE=N1​i=1∑N​(fi​(1)−fi​(0)),

the average difference between global treatment and global control. The conditional outcome functions fi1f^1_ifi1​, fi0f^0_ifi0​ are unit iii's outcome when its own treatment is 111 or 000, as a function of the other treatments.

The design draws ziz_izi​ i.i.d. Bernoulli(p)(p)(p), 0<p<10 < p < 10<p<1. The DN estimator is

ATEDN=1N∑i=1N(zip−1−zi1−p)(∑j∈NiYj ξj+Yi),ξj=zj(1−p)p+(1−zj)p1−p.\mathrm{ATE}_{\mathrm{DN}} = \frac1N \sum_{i=1}^N \Bigl(\frac{z_i}{p} - \frac{1 - z_i}{1 - p}\Bigr)\Bigl(\sum_{j \in \mathcal N_i} Y_j\, \xi_j + Y_i\Bigr), \qquad \xi_j = \frac{z_j(1-p)}{p} + \frac{(1 - z_j)p}{1 - p}.ATEDN​=N1​i=1∑N​(pzi​​−1−p1−zi​​)(j∈Ni​∑​Yj​ξj​+Yi​),ξj​=pzj​(1−p)​+1−p(1−zj​)p​.

Smoothness is measured by second-order finite differences. For h:{0,1}N→Rh : \{0,1\}^N \to \mathbb Rh:{0,1}N→R and units j,kj, kj,k,

Δjkh(z)=h(z(zj=1,zk=1))−h(z(zj=0,zk=1))−h(z(zj=1,zk=0))+h(z(zj=0,zk=0)),\Delta_{jk} h(z) = h(z^{(z_j=1,z_k=1)}) - h(z^{(z_j=0,z_k=1)}) - h(z^{(z_j=1,z_k=0)}) + h(z^{(z_j=0,z_k=0)}),Δjk​h(z)=h(z(zj​=1,zk​=1))−h(z(zj​=0,zk​=1))−h(z(zj​=1,zk​=0))+h(z(zj​=0,zk​=0)),

where z(zj=a,zk=b)z^{(z_j=a,z_k=b)}z(zj​=a,zk​=b) is zzz with entries j,kj, kj,k set to a,ba, ba,b. The function hhh is ϵ\epsilonϵ-smooth if ∣Δjkh(z)∣≤ϵ|\Delta_{jk} h(z)| \le \epsilon∣Δjk​h(z)∣≤ϵ for all zzz, jjj, kkk.

The proof uses the multilinear extension F(w)=∑z∏j(zjwj+(1−zj)(1−wj))h(z)F(w) = \sum_{z} \prod_j \bigl(z_j w_j + (1 - z_j)(1 - w_j)\bigr) h(z)F(w)=∑z​∏j​(zj​wj​+(1−zj​)(1−wj​))h(z), the expectation of h(Z)h(Z)h(Z) when the ZjZ_jZj​ are independent Bernoulli(wj)(w_j)(wj​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 9)

Under Assumption 1 and the Bernoulli(p)(p)(p) design, if fi1f^1_ifi1​ and fi0f^0_ifi0​ are ϵ\epsilonϵ-smooth for every unit iii, then

∣ATE−E[ATEDN]∣≤d2ϵ.\bigl|\mathrm{ATE} - \mathbb E[\mathrm{ATE}_{\mathrm{DN}}]\bigr| \le d^2 \epsilon.​ATE−E[ATEDN​]​≤d2ϵ.

Milestones (proof of Theorem 1, §3, §3.3)

The proof has no numbered lemmas. The milestones are its displayed claims, in the order the proof uses them:

  1. Credit assignment (5): ATEDN=1N∑i(ηi+ξi∑j∈Niηj)Yi\mathrm{ATE}_{\mathrm{DN}} = \frac1N \sum_i \bigl(\eta_i + \xi_i \sum_{j \in \mathcal N_i} \eta_j\bigr) Y_iATEDN​=N1​∑i​(ηi​+ξi​∑j∈Ni​​ηj​)Yi​ with ηj=zj/p−(1−zj)/(1−p)\eta_j = z_j/p - (1 - z_j)/(1 - p)ηj​=zj​/p−(1−zj​)/(1−p).
  2. First partial derivative: ∂F/∂wj=E[h(Z)∣Zj=1]−E[h(Z)∣Zj=0]\partial F/\partial w_j = \mathbb E[h(Z) \mid Z_j = 1] - \mathbb E[h(Z) \mid Z_j = 0]∂F/∂wj​=E[h(Z)∣Zj​=1]−E[h(Z)∣Zj​=0].
  3. Propensity weights: E[fi1(Z)]=E[(Zi/p)Yi]\mathbb E[f^1_i(Z)] = \mathbb E[(Z_i/p) Y_i]E[fi1​(Z)]=E[(Zi​/p)Yi​], E[fi0(Z)]=E[((1−Zi)/(1−p))Yi]\mathbb E[f^0_i(Z)] = \mathbb E[((1 - Z_i)/(1 - p)) Y_i]E[fi0​(Z)]=E[((1−Zi​)/(1−p))Yi​], and E[fia(Z)∣Zj=b]=E[1{Zi=a}Pr⁡(Zi=a)1{Zj=b}Pr⁡(Zj=b)Yi]\mathbb E[f^a_i(Z) \mid Z_j = b] = \mathbb E\bigl[\frac{\mathbf 1\{Z_i = a\}}{\Pr(Z_i = a)} \frac{\mathbf 1\{Z_j = b\}}{\Pr(Z_j = b)} Y_i\bigr]E[fia​(Z)∣Zj​=b]=E[Pr(Zi​=a)1{Zi​=a}​Pr(Zj​=b)1{Zj​=b}​Yi​].
  4. Unbiasedness for the first-order approximation: E[ATEDN]\mathbb E[\mathrm{ATE}_{\mathrm{DN}}]E[ATEDN​] equals the node average of the first-order Taylor approximations of Fi1(1)−Fi0(0)F^1_i(1) - F^0_i(0)Fi1​(1)−Fi0​(0) around ppp.
  5. Second partial derivatives: ∂2F/∂wj∂wk=E[Δjkh(Z)]\partial^2 F/\partial w_j \partial w_k = \mathbb E[\Delta_{jk} h(Z)]∂2F/∂wj​∂wk​=E[Δjk​h(Z)] for j≠kj \neq kj=k, and ∂2F/∂wj2=0\partial^2 F/\partial w_j^2 = 0∂2F/∂wj2​=0.
  6. Taylor remainder (corrected): the error of the first-order approximation to Fa(a)F^a(a)Fa(a) is 12(a−p)⊤Ha(p′)(a−p)\frac12 (a - p)^\top H^a(p')(a - p)21​(a−p)⊤Ha(p′)(a−p) for some p′p'p′ between (p,…,p)(p, \dots, p)(p,…,p) and (a,…,a)(a, \dots, a)(a,…,a).
  7. Remainder bound: ∣∑j≠k∈Ni(a−p)2 Ep′[Δjkfia(Z)]∣≤d2ϵ\bigl|\sum_{j \neq k \in \mathcal N_i} (a - p)^2\, \mathbb E_{p'}[\Delta_{jk} f^a_i(Z)]\bigr| \le d^2 \epsilon​∑j=k∈Ni​​(a−p)2Ep′​[Δjk​fia​(Z)]​≤d2ϵ.

Milestone 6 corrects the paper. The page states the remainder without the factor 12\frac1221​ of Taylor's theorem, which is false: a unit with two neighbours and f1(z)=z1z2f^1(z) = z_1 z_2f1(z)=z1​z2​ at p=12p = \frac12p=21​ has error 14\frac1441​, while (a−p)⊤H(a−p)=12(a - p)^\top H (a - p) = \frac12(a−p)⊤H(a−p)=21​. With the 12\frac1221​ restored, milestones 6 and 7 bound each treatment's error by 12d2ϵ\frac12 d^2 \epsilon21​d2ϵ, and Theorem 1's d2ϵd^2\epsilond2ϵ is their sum.

Significance

Theorem 1 is the main bias guarantee for DN. Specialized to the paper's outcome model with interference magnitude δ\deltaδ (Corollary 1), it gives bias O(d2δ2)O(d^2 \delta^2)O(d2δ2), compared with Θ(dδ)\Theta(d\delta)Θ(dδ) for DM. Together with the variance bound O(d4/N)O(d^4/N)O(d4/N) of Theorem 2, it places DN strictly between DM and HT in the bias–variance trade-off, and it covers the Markovian interference models of Farias et al. as a special case of the graph.

The proof also shows how DN is derived: DN is the unbiased propensity-weighted estimate of a first-order Taylor expansion of the multilinear extension. Higher-order expansions give higher-order estimators with the same analysis.

As far as a search of Prove2Me shows, no network-interference model, neighbourhood potential-outcome framework or DN-type estimator has been formalized. The platform's experiment-design items are temporal (Markovian or switchback) interference models. The paper's result is proved on paper; it has not been machine-checked. The mission also states one correction (the factor 12\frac1221​ above).

Difficulty

Most of the proof is exact finite algebra: the credit-assignment identity, the propensity-weight identities and unbiasedness are rearrangements of sums over {0,1}N\{0,1\}^N{0,1}N using independence. The analytic step is the Taylor remainder. FFF is a polynomial in NNN variables, and Taylor's theorem must be applied along the diagonal segment from (p,…,p)(p, \dots, p)(p,…,p) to (a,…,a)(a, \dots, a)(a,…,a). The second derivative along that segment must then be identified with the off-diagonal Hessian entries Ep′[Δjkh]\mathbb E_{p'}[\Delta_{jk} h]Ep′​[Δjk​h]. One natural shortcut, bounding each Hessian entry separately and summing over all of {0,1}N\{0,1\}^N{0,1}N, loses the restriction to j,k∈Nij, k \in \mathcal N_ij,k∈Ni​. That restriction is where Assumption 1 enters, and it is what yields d2d^2d2 rather than N2N^2N2. Without Assumption 1 the theorem is false: on the empty graph with two units and f1(z)=z2f_1(z) = z_2f1​(z)=z2​, the ATE is 12\frac1221​, E[ATEDN]=0\mathbb E[\mathrm{ATE}_{\mathrm{DN}}] = 0E[ATEDN​]=0, and d=ϵ=0d = \epsilon = 0d=ϵ=0.

Formalization scope

  • Units are a finite type ι with NNN = Fintype.card ι, and treatments are ι → Bool. The graph is a Mathlib SimpleGraph, with Ni\mathcal N_iNi​ = G.neighborFinset i and ddd = G.maxDegree.
  • Outcomes are f : ι → (ι → Bool) → ℝ. Assumption 1 is the predicate NeighborhoodInterference G f. It is a hypothesis of the goal and is omitted from milestones whose statements hold without it.
  • Expectations are finite sums. mlExt h w is the multilinear extension, and bernExp p h = mlExt h (p, …, p) is the expectation under the design. Conditional expectations given Zj=bZ_j = bZj​=b set coordinate jjj to bbb (Function.update), which is exact by independence.
  • fiaf^a_ifia​ is condOutcome f i a, the function z↦fi(z with zi:=a)z \mapsto f_i(z \text{ with } z_i := a)z↦fi​(z with zi​:=a) on the whole vector. Under Assumption 1 it depends only on zNiz_{\mathcal N_i}zNi​​.
  • ϵ\epsilonϵ-smoothness quantifies all zzz and all j,kj, kj,k, as printed (so Δjj≡0\Delta_{jj} \equiv 0Δjj​≡0 forces ϵ≥0\epsilon \ge 0ϵ≥0). The hypotheses 0<p<10 < p < 10<p<1 make the weights 1/p1/p1/p and 1/(1−p)1/(1-p)1/(1−p) meaningful.
  • The estimator is (3) exactly, with the factor 1/N1/N1/N and the correction ξj\xi_jξj​, for general ppp. It is not the p=12p = \frac12p=21​ form (4).

Two formalizations would make the goal a different theorem and are ruled out. In the first, the expectation is taken at a single fixed treatment vector instead of under the Bernoulli design. In the second, ϵ\epsilonϵ-smoothness is imposed on fif_ifi​ itself instead of on fi1f^1_ifi1​ and fi0f^0_ifi0​: that also constrains the pairs (i,k)(i, k)(i,k), which are not second-order interference terms.

The development needs only Mathlib: finite sums over ι → Bool, HasDerivAt, and Taylor's theorem in one variable (taylor_mean_remainder_lagrange). Lemmas about multilinear extensions of functions on the Boolean cube are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are the variance bound (Theorem 2) and the clustered estimator results (Theorems 3–4) as follow-up statements.

Selected references

  • T. Peng, N. Ye, A. Zheng, Differences-in-Neighbors for Network Interference in Experiments, ACM EC 2025; arXiv:2503.02271v1, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.02271v1
  • V. F. Farias, A. A. Li, T. Peng, A. Zheng, Markovian Interference in Experiments, NeurIPS 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.02371
  • J. Ugander, B. Karrer, L. Backstrom, J. Kleinberg, Graph Cluster Randomization: Network Exposure to Multiple Universes, KDD 2013. https://arxiv.org/abs/1305.6979
  • P. M. Aronow, C. Samii, Estimating Average Causal Effects Under General Interference, with Application to a Social Network Experiment, Annals of Applied Statistics 11(4), 2017. https://doi.org/10.1214/16-AOAS1005
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Internal Capital Allocation, Voluntary Disclosure, and Investment Efficiency: When a Multi-Divisional Firm Beats Two Stand-Alone FirmsResearch Paper

Motivation

Conglomerates and stand-alone firms finance projects differently. A multi-divisional firm runs an internal capital market: headquarters raises funds externally and then decides which division gets them. A stand-alone firm must raise capital project by project. A long line of work in corporate finance asks when the internal market is more efficient: Stein (1997) argues that headquarters can "pick winners", while managers with empire-building motives may over-invest.

Hwang (Management Science, 2025) adds voluntary disclosure to this comparison. Managers may disclose a project's profitability to investors at a cost, and investors set their financing terms from what is disclosed and what is withheld. Withholding information becomes a strategic choice, and the organizational form changes what a manager gains by disclosing. The paper's main result says exactly when a founder should prefer a single multi-divisional firm to two stand-alone firms.

Setting

A founder owns two projects i∈{1,2}i \in \{1,2\}i∈{1,2}. Each needs one unit of capital and pays θiX\theta_i Xθi​X, where X>1X > 1X>1 and θi∈{0,1}\theta_i \in \{0,1\}θi​∈{0,1}. The types are independent, with Pr⁡(θi=1)=p∈(0,1)\Pr(\theta_i = 1) = p \in (0,1)Pr(θi​=1)=p∈(0,1).

  • Disclosure. A manager who knows θi\theta_iθi​ chooses di∈{D,ND}d_i \in \{D, ND\}di​∈{D,ND}. Disclosure is truthful and raises the capital required for project iii by c>0c > 0c>0. Write #D\#D#D for the number of disclosures.
  • Investors are competitive. After observing the disclosures they hold a belief about the undisclosed types: a probability vector on type profiles that agrees with every disclosed value, given by Bayes' rule whenever the message is sent in equilibrium. They fund kkk projects in exchange for a share α∈[0,1]\alpha \in [0,1]α∈[0,1] of cash flows that lets them break even. In the multi-divisional firm (o=mo = mo=m) one manager sees (θ1,θ2)(\theta_1,\theta_2)(θ1​,θ2​). Investors choose k=2k = 2k=2 if some α∈[0,1]\alpha \in [0,1]α∈[0,1] solves
(E[θ1]+E[θ2]) αX=2+c #D,(E[\theta_1] + E[\theta_2])\,\alpha X = 2 + c\,\#D,(E[θ1​]+E[θ2​])αX=2+c#D,

otherwise k=1k = 1k=1 if some α\alphaα solves E[θλ] αX=1+c #DE[\theta_\lambda]\,\alpha X = 1 + c\,\#DE[θλ​]αX=1+c#D, otherwise k=0k = 0k=0. With one unit the manager implements the better project (λ=1\lambda = 1λ=1 iff θ1≥θ2\theta_1 \ge \theta_2θ1​≥θ2​). This choice is the internal capital allocation.

  • Payoffs. The manager receives q(1−α)Xq(1-\alpha)Xq(1−α)X from each profitable implemented project, with q∈(0,1)q \in (0,1)q∈(0,1), plus an empire-building benefit β\betaβ per implemented project, where β>qX\beta > qXβ>qX.
  • Stand-alone firms (o=so = so=s). Each firm has its own manager, who sees only θi\theta_iθi​. Investors fund firm iii iff some αi∈[0,1]\alpha_i \in [0,1]αi​∈[0,1] solves E[θi] αiX=1+c I(di)E[\theta_i]\,\alpha_i X = 1 + c\,I(d_i)E[θi​]αi​X=1+cI(di​).

An equilibrium is a pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The disclosure strategy is a best response for every type. Investors act on admissible, Bayes-consistent beliefs. Ties are broken toward silence: a disclosure is made only if withholding it would strictly lower the manager's payoff. A structure's investment efficiency is the expected net cash flow of the implemented projects. Following the paper, each structure is evaluated at its equilibrium with the highest efficiency. These values are VmV_mVm​ and VsV_sVs​. The founder chooses the structure with the larger value.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3, the founder's choice (corrected on one line)

Assume X≥1+cX \ge 1 + cX≥1+c. Then VmV_mVm​ and VsV_sVs​ exist and:

1−p2p<c<1−p22p2, X<min⁡{2+c,1+pp} ⟹ Vs<Vm,\tfrac{1-p}{2p} < c < \tfrac{1-p^2}{2p^2},\ X < \min\{2+c, \tfrac{1+p}{p}\} \ \Longrightarrow\ V_s < V_m,2p1−p​<c<2p21−p2​, X<min{2+c,p1+p​} ⟹ Vs​<Vm​, c<1−pp, X≥2+c ⟹ Vm<Vs,c < \tfrac{1-p}{p},\ X \ge 2 + c \ \Longrightarrow\ V_m < V_s,c<p1−p​, X≥2+c ⟹ Vm​<Vs​,

and Vm=VsV_m = V_sVm​=Vs​ everywhere else. The first region with c=1−p2pc = \frac{1-p}{2p}c=2p1−p​ included gives Vs≤VmV_s \le V_mVs​≤Vm​. On that line the two values are equal, although the printed statement claims a strict preference there.

Milestones

  1. Appendix B.1: no equilibrium of the multi-divisional firm discloses an unprofitable project.
  2. Proposition 1: the stand-alone equilibria and their efficiencies p(X−1−c)p(X-1-c)p(X−1−c) and pX−1pX-1pX−1.
  3. Proposition 2 (ii), (iii): disclosure of exactly the profitable projects, with efficiencies 2p(X−1−c)2p(X-1-c)2p(X−1−c) and 2p(X+p−2−c)2p(X+p-2-c)2p(X+p−2−c).
  4. Proposition 2 (i): the internal-capital-allocation equilibrium, with efficiency p(2X−p(1+2c))−1p(2X - p(1+2c)) - 1p(2X−p(1+2c))−1.
  5. Proposition 2 (iv): no disclosure and full funding, with efficiency 2(pX−1)2(pX-1)2(pX−1).

Significance

The result. Proposition 3 splits the parameter space into three regions:

  • Where disclosure costs are intermediate and cash flows low, the internal capital market strictly wins. The multi-divisional manager raises one unit without disclosing and directs it to a profitable project, which saves the disclosure cost a stand-alone firm must pay to be funded.
  • Where disclosure is cheap and cash flows high, stand-alone firms strictly win. Disclosing one profitable project lets the empire-building manager fund an unprofitable one as well.
  • Elsewhere the two structures are equally efficient.

The comparison is the paper's answer to when internal capital markets create value under voluntary disclosure. Its extensions (§6) are measured against this baseline.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper by hand. It has no machine-checked proof. The proof's selection argument, "the equilibrium with the highest efficiency", ranges over every equilibrium with arbitrary off-path beliefs, and it is easy to get wrong at the boundaries. A check of the printed statements against an exact enumeration of equilibria found that the strict preference in part (i) fails on c=1−p2pc = \frac{1-p}{2p}c=2p1−p​. The uniqueness claims of Propositions 1 (ii), 2 (i) and 2 (iv) also fail on tie lines. A formal proof settles the corrected statement. The model, a finite signaling game with verifiable costly disclosure and break-even investors, can be reused for other disclosure models.

Difficulty

The selected values are maxima over all pure-strategy equilibria. The off-path beliefs are any admissible beliefs. An upper bound on VmV_mVm​ therefore needs a classification of every equilibrium:

  • first rule out the disclosure of unprofitable projects, which depends on the tie-breaking rule, since a manager with two unprofitable projects is indifferent among many messages;
  • then determine the region in which each remaining disclosure pattern is an equilibrium, and its efficiency.

Lower bounds need explicit belief systems that support the selected equilibrium off the path. Each step mixes a combinatorial case split over 444 types and 444 disclosure vectors with real inequalities in (p,c,X)(p, c, X)(p,c,X). The regions of Proposition 2 meet along several curves. On each curve, every strict comparison must be checked again, because the corrections above sit exactly there. Comparing only the equilibria the paper names does not bound VmV_mVm​: an equilibrium outside that list could have higher efficiency.

Formalization scope

Lean representation (namespace IntCapAlloc.OrgChoice):

  • A type profile and a disclosure vector are Fin 2 → Bool. Project 1 is index 0. A message is Fin 2 → Option Bool.
  • A belief is a function from messages to weights on profiles. It is admissible if it is a probability vector on the profiles consistent with the message. It must satisfy Bayes' rule only after messages that some type sends.
  • Investors' kkk uses the existential break-even rule of the paper. The share is the solution of the break-even equation.
  • IsEquilibrium requires optimality against all four disclosure vectors and the tie rule per project. effSetM is the set of efficiencies of all equilibria. effSetS is the set of sums of two single-firm equilibrium efficiencies.
  • Selected values are stated with IsGreatest, so existence is part of every claim.

Conventions:

  • The standing assumptions 0<p<10<p<10<p<1, X>1X>1X>1, c>0c>0c>0, 0<q<10<q<10<q<1, β>qX\beta > qXβ>qX and the paper's focus X≥1+cX \ge 1 + cX≥1+c are hypotheses. The goal fails without the focus.
  • Footnote 7's "sufficiently high β" is not assumed. The game uses β only through β>qX\beta > qXβ>qX, so the statements cover the footnote's case.
  • The rule λ = 1 iff θ₁ ≥ θ₂ is the paper's (p. 11).
  • Investors' kkk in the milestones is the value after messages sent in equilibrium.
  • Each milestone adds the efficiency its proof states, and posts the uniqueness clause only where it holds.

The goal is not trivial in any of the following ways:

  • Off-path beliefs are not fixed, for example to "an undisclosed project is unprofitable".
  • The equilibrium set is not limited to the paper's named equilibria.
  • VmV_mVm​ and VsV_sVs​ are not defined by formulas.

Any of these would turn the goal into arithmetic.

Needed infrastructure: finite sums over Fin 2 → Bool, case analysis over messages, and real inequalities on the regions. Proofs of the milestones are welcome. So are general lemmas about the break-even rule (investment is monotone in the posterior mean) and about tie-breaking, which several milestones share.

Selected references

  • H. Hwang, Internal Capital Allocation, Voluntary Disclosure, and Investment Efficiency, Management Science, 2025 (author manuscript, March 2025). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01295
  • J. C. Stein, Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources, Journal of Finance 52(1), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04813.x
  • R. A. Dye, Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information, Journal of Accounting Research 23(1), 1985. https://doi.org/10.2307/2490910
  • R. E. Verrecchia, Discretionary Disclosure, Journal of Accounting and Economics 5, 1983. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(83)90011-3
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Dynamic Assortment Optimization in the Presence of Outlier Customers: Active Elimination Has TOTE Regret O(ε̄K²T log T + (K²√ε̄ + √K)√(NT log³T) + K²N log²T) Under ε-ContaminationResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer that learns customer preferences online, for example an e-commerce platform choosing which products to display, observes purchases that are not all generated by the population it is trying to learn. Some arrivals are bots, fraudulent accounts or atypical buyers, and their choices can be arbitrary or deliberately misleading. Standard learning algorithms for dynamic assortment optimization under the multinomial-logit (MNL) model assume every customer follows the same choice model. Chen, Krishnamurthy and Wang (arXiv:1910.04183v2, Operations Research 2024) study what can be guaranteed when an ε\varepsilonε fraction of customers are outliers controlled by an adaptive adversary.

The uncontaminated problem has an established regret theory. Agrawal, Avadhanula, Goyal and Zeevi (Operations Research 2019) proved an O~(NT)\tilde O(\sqrt{NT})O~(NT​) regret bound for an epoch-based UCB policy. Chen and Wang (Operations Research Letters 2018) gave a matching Ω(NT)\Omega(\sqrt{NT})Ω(NT​) lower bound. Robustness to adversarial corruption was first analysed for multi-armed bandits by Lykouris, Mirrokni and Paes Leme (STOC 2018). The present paper carries that question to MNL assortment optimization, where one observation reveals information about a whole offered set.

Setting

There are NNN items. Item iii has a known revenue ri∈[0,1]r_i \in [0,1]ri​∈[0,1] and an unknown utility vi∈[0,1]v_i \in [0,1]vi​∈[0,1]; the no-purchase option has utility v0=1v_0 = 1v0​=1. In each of TTT periods the retailer offers an assortment St⊆[N]S_t \subseteq [N]St​⊆[N] with ∣St∣≤K|S_t| \le K∣St​∣≤K. A typical customer buys item i∈Sti \in S_ti∈St​ with probability vi/(1+∑j∈Stvj)v_i/(1 + \sum_{j\in S_t} v_j)vi​/(1+∑j∈St​​vj​) and nothing with probability 1/(1+∑j∈Stvj)1/(1+\sum_{j\in S_t}v_j)1/(1+∑j∈St​​vj​). The expected revenue of SSS under utilities www is

R(S;w)=∑i∈Sriwi1+∑i∈Swi.R(S; w) = \frac{\sum_{i\in S} r_i w_i}{1 + \sum_{i\in S} w_i}.R(S;w)=1+∑i∈S​wi​∑i∈S​ri​wi​​.

An outlier customer chooses from St∪{0}S_t \cup \{0\}St​∪{0} according to an arbitrary distribution QtQ_tQt​. An adaptive adversary decides, from the whole public past (types, assortments and purchases), whether the period-ttt customer is an outlier and which QtQ_tQt​ it uses, subject to sending at most εT\varepsilon TεT outliers. Performance is measured by the TOTE regret (typically-optimal, typically-evaluated):

RegretTOTE(T)=E[∑t=1TR(S∗;v)−R(St;v)],R(S∗;v)=max⁡∣S∣≤KR(S;v).\mathrm{Regret}_{\mathrm{TOTE}}(T) = \mathbb E\Big[\sum_{t=1}^T R(S^*; v) - R(S_t; v)\Big],\qquad R(S^*;v) = \max_{|S|\le K} R(S;v).RegretTOTE​(T)=E[t=1∑T​R(S∗;v)−R(St​;v)],R(S∗;v)=∣S∣≤Kmax​R(S;v).

Algorithm 1 (active elimination) receives an upper bound εˉ≥ε\bar\varepsilon \ge \varepsilonεˉ≥ε. It runs in doubling epochs Tτ=2τT0T_\tau = 2^\tau T_0Tτ​=2τT0​, T0=128(K+1)2Nln⁡TT_0 = 128(K+1)^2N\ln TT0​=128(K+1)2NlnT, and keeps an active item set A(τ)\mathcal A^{(\tau)}A(τ) and estimates v^(τ)\hat v^{(\tau)}v^(τ). In each epoch it computes, for every active item iii, the best assortment Sτ(i)S_\tau^{(i)}Sτ(i)​ containing iii under the current estimates. It eliminates items whose best assortment falls 2Δ^εˉ(τ)2\hat\Delta_{\bar\varepsilon}(\tau)2Δ^εˉ​(τ) below the best, and then offers Sτ(i)S_\tau^{(i)}Sτ(i)​ for a uniformly drawn active iii. It re-estimates viv_ivi​ by the ratio of purchases of iii to no-purchases, and computes a new error bound Δ^εˉ(τ+1)\hat\Delta_{\bar\varepsilon}(\tau+1)Δ^εˉ​(τ+1).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 12)

There are universal constants C0C_0C0​ and T1T_1T1​ such that the following holds for every T≥T1T \ge T_1T≥T1​, 1≤N≤T1 \le N \le T1≤N≤T, K≥1K \ge 1K≥1, r,v∈[0,1]Nr, v \in [0,1]^Nr,v∈[0,1]N and 0≤ε≤εˉ0 \le \varepsilon \le \bar\varepsilon0≤ε≤εˉ, every adaptive adversary with at most εT\varepsilon TεT outliers and every tie-break in the argmax:

RegretTOTE(T)≤C0(εˉK2Tlog⁡T+(K2εˉ+K)NTlog⁡3T+K2Nlog⁡2T).\mathrm{Regret}_{\mathrm{TOTE}}(T) \le C_0\Big(\bar\varepsilon K^2T\log T + \big(K^2\sqrt{\bar\varepsilon}+\sqrt K\big)\sqrt{NT\log^3T} + K^2N\log^2T\Big).RegretTOTE​(T)≤C0​(εˉK2TlogT+(K2εˉ​+K​)NTlog3T​+K2Nlog2T).

The second clause (6) states that if εˉ≤c1/K3\bar\varepsilon \le c_1/K^3εˉ≤c1​/K3 and K3Nlog⁡T≤c2TK^3N\log T \le c_2TK3NlogT≤c2​T, the regret is O(εˉK2Tlog⁡T+KNTlog⁡3T)O\big(\bar\varepsilon K^2T\log T + \sqrt{KNT\log^3T}\big)O(εˉK2TlogT+KNTlog3T​).

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1 (p. 13): with probability 1−O(τ0N/T2)1 - O(\tau_0N/T^2)1−O(τ0​N/T2), the estimation error of every active item after a completed epoch is at most Δε∗(i,τ+1)\Delta^*_\varepsilon(i,\tau+1)Δε∗​(i,τ+1) of (7).
  2. Lemma 2 (p. 14): ∣R(S;v^)−R(S;v)∣≤2∑i∈S∣v^i−vi∣/(1+∑i∈Svi)|R(S;\hat v) - R(S;v)| \le 2\sum_{i\in S}|\hat v_i - v_i|/(1+\sum_{i\in S}v_i)∣R(S;v^)−R(S;v)∣≤2∑i∈S​∣v^i​−vi​∣/(1+∑i∈S​vi​).
  3. Corollary 1 (p. 14, corrected): on Lemma 1's success events, the revenue error of every candidate assortment is at most the (corrected) computed bound.
  4. Lemma 3 (p. 14): with high probability every optimal assortment survives elimination.
  5. Lemma 4 (p. 14): with high probability every assortment offered in epoch τ\tauτ loses at most 4Δ^εˉ(τ)4\hat\Delta_{\bar\varepsilon}(\tau)4Δ^εˉ​(τ) against S∗S^*S∗.
  6. (8)–(11) (pp. 14–15): the sum ∑τ≤τ04Δ^εˉ(τ)Tτ\sum_{\tau\le\tau_0}4\hat\Delta_{\bar\varepsilon}(\tau)T_\tau∑τ≤τ0​​4Δ^εˉ​(τ)Tτ​ obeys the bound of Theorem 1.

Significance

The theorem shows that a known contamination level costs an additive εˉK2Tlog⁡T\bar\varepsilon K^2T\log TεˉK2TlogT and otherwise leaves the uncontaminated NT\sqrt{NT}NT​ rate intact up to logarithms. Proposition 1 of the paper shows that a cost linear in εT\varepsilon TεT is unavoidable. Theorem 1 is also the base case of the paper's algorithm for unknown ε\varepsilonε (Theorem 2), which runs copies of Algorithm 1 at geometrically spaced levels, and of its gap-dependent bound (Theorem 3).

The result is proved on paper, not formalized. The formalization would give the platform its first contaminated-bandit protocol with an adaptive adversary, and its first elimination policy for MNL assortment. During drafting, three printed statements were found to be false as stated (Corollary 1, clause (6), and line 14 of Algorithm 1); they are posed in corrected form. The printed proofs of Lemmas 3, 4 and Theorem 1 rely on the uncorrected Corollary 1. With the corrected Corollary 1, the printed argument gives Theorem 1 only with K\sqrt KK​ replaced by roughly KKK in the NTlog⁡3T\sqrt{NT\log^3T}NTlog3T​ term. No counterexample to Lemma 3, Lemma 4 or Theorem 1 is known. Completing their proofs at the printed strength is open work in this mission.

Difficulty

The estimator ni/n0(i)n_i/n_0(i)ni​/n0​(i) is a ratio of two counts. An adaptive adversary can choose which periods to corrupt, and it does so after seeing the past and which assortment is about to be offered. The counts are therefore not sums of independent variables. Bounding them needs a martingale (Freedman-type) concentration argument combined with a perturbation bound for the ratio, and the variance depends on the assortment used to estimate each item.

The natural route to Lemmas 3 and 4 is to bound the revenue error of an arbitrary candidate assortment by summing per-item errors, which is what Corollary 1 does. This route breaks for large KKK. The per-item error Δ∗\Delta^*Δ∗ carries the utility mass of the assortment that estimated item iii, not of the candidate assortment. Summing these errors therefore loses a factor K\sqrt KK​. The page's argument therefore does not deliver the stated K\sqrt KK​ dependence, and a sharper joint concentration of the revenue estimate is needed.

Formalization scope

  • Types. Items are Fin N, outcomes Option (Fin N) (none is no purchase), periods 0,…,T−10,\dots,T-10,…,T−1.
  • Revenue. R(S;w)R(S;w)R(S;w) is the published ChoiceCDLP.MNL.mnlObjective w r 1 S.
  • Adversary. The adversary is deterministic, as in Definition 1, and reads the public past. Its outlier model QtQ_tQt​ may depend on the offered assortment, which is a declared generalization. The budget (A1) holds on every public record of the TTT periods.
  • The run. A run is a record of (drawn item, customer type, purchase) per period. Its law is an explicit product of step probabilities, and expectations and probabilities are finite sums. No measure theory is used.
  • Algorithm 1. It is encoded line by line, with the following conventions:
    • T0=⌈128(K+1)2Nln⁡T⌉T_0 = \lceil 128(K+1)^2N\ln T\rceilT0​=⌈128(K+1)2NlnT⌉, and the last epoch τ0\tau_0τ0​ is truncated at TTT;
    • line 14 is read as v^i=min⁡{1,ni/n0(i)}\hat v_i = \min\{1, n_i/n_0(i)\}v^i​=min{1,ni​/n0​(i)}, with v^i=1\hat v_i = 1v^i​=1 when n0(i)=0n_0(i)=0n0​(i)=0 (correction: the printed max⁡\maxmax makes the algorithm eliminate the optimal item);
    • the argmax of line 5 is any routine sel satisfying IsArgmaxSel, and every theorem quantifies over all of them.
  • Constants. "Universal constant" and "sufficiently large TTT" are existentials placed before every other quantifier. "With probability 1−O(τ0N/T2)1-O(\tau_0N/T^2)1−O(τ0​N/T2)" is a bound Cτ0N/T2C\tau_0N/T^2Cτ0​N/T2 on the path-law mass of the bad event (C(τ0+1)N/T2C(\tau_0+1)N/T^2C(τ0​+1)N/T2 in Lemma 1, counting all τ0+1\tau_0+1τ0​+1 epochs).
  • Corrections. Clause (6) carries the added hypothesis K3Nlog⁡T≤c2TK^3N\log T \le c_2TK3NlogT≤c2​T, without which it is false. Corollary 1 multiplies the last term of Δ^\hat\DeltaΔ^ by max⁡{1,K+1/2}\max\{1,\sqrt{K+1}/2\}max{1,K+1​/2}. Its second inequality bounds ∣R(S;v^)−R(S;v)∣|R(S;\hat v)-R(S;v)|∣R(S;v^)−R(S;v)∣ by the bound at max⁡{ε,εˉ}\max\{\varepsilon,\bar\varepsilon\}max{ε,εˉ}, because Δ^\hat\DeltaΔ^ is not monotone in its parameter. Lemma 1 drops its unused condition on εˉ\bar\varepsilonεˉ.
  • Ruling out trivializations. The regret is an expectation over the true law of the run against every adaptive adversary and every tie-break, so a fixed history, an oblivious adversary, a policy that knows vvv, or constants chosen after NNN and KKK do not satisfy the statement.

A complete development needs Freedman's martingale inequality for bounded increments with a predictable variance bound, which several Open platform items state. It also needs a perturbation analysis of ratio estimators and bookkeeping over doubling epochs. The concentration and summation lemmas are reusable for other elimination policies. Proofs of any milestone, and a corrected proof of Corollary 1's consequences at full strength, are welcome.

Selected references

  • X. Chen, A. Krishnamurthy, Y. Wang, Robust Dynamic Assortment Optimization in the Presence of Outlier Customers, Operations Research, 2024; arXiv:1910.04183v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/1910.04183
  • S. Agrawal, V. Avadhanula, V. Goyal, A. Zeevi, MNL-Bandit: A Dynamic Learning Approach to Assortment Selection, Operations Research 67(5), 2019. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1832
  • X. Chen, Y. Wang, A note on a tight lower bound for MNL-bandit assortment selection models, Operations Research Letters 46(5):534–537, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.06109
  • T. Lykouris, V. Mirrokni, R. Paes Leme, Stochastic Bandits Robust to Adversarial Corruptions, STOC 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.09353
  • D. A. Freedman, On Tail Probabilities for Martingales, Annals of Probability 3(1), 1975. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176996452
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EconomicsMachine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Decision Forest: A Nonparametric Approach to Modeling Irrational Choice: Every Customer Choice Model Is a Decision Forest of Depth at Most N + 1Research Paper

Why universal choice models matter

Retailers, airlines and platforms decide which products to offer by predicting how customers substitute among them. Such predictions rest on a discrete choice model: for every set of offered products, a probability distribution over what a customer buys. The classical models are built on random utility maximization (RUM): each customer draws utilities and buys the best offered option. Every RUM model satisfies regularity (adding a product never raises the probability of choosing an existing one), yet observed behavior violates it: the decoy (attraction) effect of Huber, Payne and Puto (1982) is a documented case where adding a dominated product increases the share of another.

This has driven a search for universal choice models, families rich enough to represent every choice model:

  • Block and Marschak (1959) showed that RUM models are exactly the probability distributions over rankings (ranking-based models), a class that is not universal because it obeys regularity.
  • McFadden and Train (2000) showed that mixtures of logit models approximate every RUM model, again inside the RUM class.
  • Farias, Jagabathula and Shah (2013) made the ranking-based model a data-driven tool for revenue prediction.
  • Outside RUM, randomized game-tree models (building on Xu and Zhou (2007)) and the pro-con model of Dogan and Yildiz (2018) represent every choice model; the latter needs signed weights.

Chen and Mišić (arXiv:1904.11532v3) propose the decision forest model, a probability distribution over binary decision trees, which is estimable from transaction data, and prove that it is universal (Theorem 1, p. 11). This mission formalizes that theorem.

Setting

There are NNN products N={1,…,N}\mathcal N=\{1,\dots,N\}N={1,…,N} and the purchase options N+={0,1,…,N}\mathcal N^+=\{0,1,\dots,N\}N+={0,1,…,N}, where 000 is the no-purchase option. An assortment is any S⊆NS\subseteq\mathcal NS⊆N, the empty one included.

A customer choice model P(⋅∣⋅)\mathbf P(\cdot\mid\cdot)P(⋅∣⋅) assigns to every assortment SSS a probability distribution P(⋅∣S)\mathbf P(\cdot\mid S)P(⋅∣S) on N+\mathcal N^+N+, with P(p∣S)=0\mathbf P(p\mid S)=0P(p∣S)=0 for every product p∉Sp\notin Sp∈/S: a customer cannot buy a product that is not offered.

A purchase decision tree ttt is a binary tree. Each split node sss carries a product xsx_sxs​ (Requirement 1); each leaf carries a purchase option. A customer following ttt and offered SSS starts at the root, moves to the left child when the split's product is in SSS and to the right child otherwise, and buys the option at the leaf reached; this option is A^(S,t)∈N+\hat A(S,t)\in\mathcal N^+A^(S,t)∈N+. Two further conditions make the tree meaningful:

  • Requirement 2: a leaf buys either 000 or a product found present on the way down (the product of a split at which the path went left);
  • Requirement 3: no product is tested twice on a root-to-leaf path.

The depth of ttt is the number of nodes on a longest root-to-leaf path, so a single leaf has depth 111. Let FdF_dFd​ be the set of trees satisfying Requirements 1–3 with depth at most ddd. For a finite forest FFF and a probability distribution λ\lambdaλ on FFF, the decision forest model is

P(F,λ)(o∣S)=∑t∈Fλt I{o=A^(S,t)}.(3)\mathbf P^{(F,\lambda)}(o\mid S)=\sum_{t\in F}\lambda_t\,\mathbb I\{o=\hat A(S,t)\}. \tag{3}P(F,λ)(o∣S)=t∈F∑​λt​I{o=A^(S,t)}.(3)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 11)

For every customer choice model P\mathbf PP there is a probability distribution λ\lambdaλ over FN+1F_{N+1}FN+1​ such that

P(o∣S)=P(FN+1,λ)(o∣S)for every assortment S⊆N and option o∈N+.\mathbf P(o\mid S)=\mathbf P^{(F_{N+1},\lambda)}(o\mid S)\qquad\text{for every assortment } S\subseteq\mathcal N \text{ and option } o\in\mathcal N^+ .P(o∣S)=P(FN+1​,λ)(o∣S)for every assortment S⊆N and option o∈N+.

Milestones

  1. Depth and finiteness (§3.2, p. 8). Requirement 3 forces Depth(t)≤N+1\mathrm{Depth}(t)\le N+1Depth(t)≤N+1, so only finitely many trees satisfy Requirements 1–3.
  2. The balanced trees (pp. ec1–ec2). For a tuple o=(oS)S⊆N\mathbf o=(o_S)_{S\subseteq\mathcal N}o=(oS​)S⊆N​ of options, the balanced tree tot_{\mathbf o}to​ tests product kkk at level kkk; it has 2N2^N2N leaves, one per assortment, with A^(S,to)=oS\hat A(S,t_{\mathbf o})=o_SA^(S,to​)=oS​, depth N+1N+1N+1, and it satisfies Requirement 3.
  3. The weights (EC.5): λo=∏SP(oS∣S)\lambda_{\mathbf o}=\prod_{S}\mathbf P(o_S\mid S)λo​=∏S​P(oS​∣S) is nonnegative and sums to one over the (N+1)2N(N+1)^{2^N}(N+1)2N tuples.
  4. Pruning (p. ec2): if tot_{\mathbf o}to​ violates Requirement 2 then λo=0\lambda_{\mathbf o}=0λo​=0.
  5. The marginal identity (p. ec3): ∑oλo I{o=A^(S,to)}=P(o∣S)\sum_{\mathbf o}\lambda_{\mathbf o}\,\mathbb I\{o=\hat A(S,t_{\mathbf o})\}=\mathbf P(o\mid S)∑o​λo​I{o=A^(S,to​)}=P(o∣S) for all SSS and ooo.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 says that a mixture of deterministic tree-shaped decision rules captures any choice behavior, including the decoy effect, preference cycles and every other violation of regularity, while each tree remains interpretable as a customer type. It justifies fitting decision forests to transaction data without first deciding which behavioral anomalies to allow, and it reproves that ranking-based models are decision forest models (Proposition 1, p. 9). The depth bound N+1N+1N+1 is the reference point for the paper's model complexity results (§4), which ask when much shallower forests suffice.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. The mission produces a reusable Lean vocabulary for choice models with an outside option, binary purchase decision trees and the requirements on them, which the paper's later results (Theorem 2 on depth for MMM assortments, Lemma EC.1 on removing repeated products) and other nonparametric choice models can build on.

Difficulty

The paper calls the proof simple, and its individual steps are elementary; the difficulty is bookkeeping that the informal proof leaves implicit. The forest is indexed by all (N+1)2N(N+1)^{2^N}(N+1)2N assignments of options to assortments, and the paper identifies leaves, assortments and tuple coordinates through left-to-right enumerations that a formal proof must make precise. The goal asks for a distribution over trees in FN+1F_{N+1}FN+1​, not over tuples: the constructed trees must be shown to satisfy Requirement 3 and to have depth N+1N+1N+1, the tuples whose trees violate Requirement 2 must carry zero weight, and the weights must be transferred to trees without double counting. The final identity is a rearrangement of a sum of products over a function space with one coordinate held fixed, and it uses the absent-product clause and the normalization of P(⋅∣S)\mathbf P(\cdot\mid S)P(⋅∣S) at every assortment, the empty one included. A formalization that drops any of these points proves a different statement.

Formalization scope

Lean conventions:

  • products are Fin N, so the paper's product kkk is k - 1; options are Option (Fin N) with none the no-purchase option 000; assortments are Finset (Fin N); probabilities are real numbers;
  • a choice model is P : Option (Fin N) → Finset (Fin N) → ℝ with IsChoiceModel P: nonnegative, summing to one over all options for every assortment (the empty one included), and zero on products outside the assortment;
  • trees are the inductive type PTree N with leaf o and split p l r; the left child is taken when p ∈ S. Requirement 1 holds by typing; Req2 and Req3 are computed along paths; depth counts nodes, so depth (leaf o) = 1;
  • FdF_dFd​ is FSet N d; the forest model (3) is forestProb F lam o S for a Finset of trees F and weights lam; a distribution over FN+1F_{N+1}FN+1​ is a finite set of trees contained in FSet N (N + 1) with weights nonnegative on it and summing to one (equivalent, as FN+1F_{N+1}FN+1​ is finite);
  • the balanced tree of a tuple o : Finset (Fin N) → Option (Fin N) is fullTree o, and its weight (EC.5) is prodWeight P o. Leaves are indexed by assortments instead of the paper's left-to-right enumeration.

The goal rules out the trivializing formalizations: the trees must lie in FN+1F_{N+1}FN+1​ (a distribution over arbitrary trees, or over trees violating Requirement 2, would be a different and easier statement); the choice model keeps the absent-product clause and the no-purchase option for every assortment; and the weights are nonnegative and sum to one, never signed.

Needed infrastructure is light: Mathlib's Finset sums and products over function types (Finset.prod_univ_sum, Fintype.piFinset), finiteness of trees of bounded depth over a finite label type, and induction on List.finRange N. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are proofs of the goal that bypass the milestones.

Selected references

  • Y.-C. Chen and V. V. Mišić, Decision Forest: A Nonparametric Approach to Modeling Irrational Choice, Management Science, 2022; read as arXiv:1904.11532v3, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.11532v3
  • H. D. Block and J. Marschak, Random Orderings and Stochastic Theories of Response, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 66, 1959. https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d00/d0066.pdf
  • D. McFadden and K. Train, Mixed MNL Models for Discrete Response, Journal of Applied Econometrics 15(5):447–470, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1002/1099-1255(200009/10)15:5%3C447::AID-JAE570%3E3.0.CO;2-1
  • V. F. Farias, S. Jagabathula and D. Shah, A Nonparametric Approach to Modeling Choice with Limited Data, Management Science 59(2):305–322, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1610
  • J. Huber, J. W. Payne and C. Puto, Adding Asymmetrically Dominated Alternatives: Violations of Regularity and the Similarity Hypothesis, Journal of Consumer Research 9(1):90–98, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1086/208899
  • Y. Xu and L. Zhou, Rationalizability of Choice Functions by Game Trees, Journal of Economic Theory 134(1):548–556, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.005
  • S. Dogan and K. Yildiz, Choice Through a Unified Lens: The Prudential Model, SSRN working paper 3085542, 2018. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3085542
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ProbabilityQuantum Information·Captain: mikedeng1

Floating Point Representations in Quantum Circuit Synthesis: Exact Mean and Variance Bound for the Number of U and U† Applications in the Composed Gearbox CircuitResearch Paper

Motivation

Fault-tolerant quantum computers implement Clifford gates cheaply and the non-Clifford T gate expensively, because T gates are obtained by magic-state distillation (Fowler, Stephens and Groszkowski). Single-qubit rotations by small, arbitrary angles appear throughout quantum simulation and must be compiled into Clifford+T circuits, so the T-count of a small rotation is a standard cost measure. Selinger's ancilla-free method uses about 4log⁡2(1/θ)4\log_2(1/\theta)4log2​(1/θ) T gates for a ZZZ-rotation by θ\thetaθ (arXiv:1212.6253), and the paper's own search puts optimal ancilla-free Clifford+T synthesis near 3log⁡2(1/θ)3\log_2(1/\theta)3log2​(1/θ) (Sec. VI).

Wiebe and Kliuchnikov (arXiv:1305.5528) proposed non-deterministic circuits with ancillas and measurement, the gearbox circuit and its recursive composed gearbox circuit, which, like the linear-combination-of-unitaries circuits of Childs and Wiebe, turn a coarse rotation into a much finer one and whose failures are undone by a Clifford gate, so they can be repeated until they succeed. The cost of such a repeat-until-success scheme is a random variable. Theorem 2 of the paper computes its mean exactly and bounds its variance; this mission formalizes that result together with the circuit identities it rests on.

Setting

A qubit has basis ∣0⟩,∣1⟩|0\rangle,|1\rangle∣0⟩,∣1⟩; a gate is a 2×22\times22×2 unitary UUU with entry U1,0=⟨1∣U∣0⟩U_{1,0}=\langle1|U|0\rangleU1,0​=⟨1∣U∣0⟩. Let X=(0110)X=\begin{pmatrix}0&1\\1&0\end{pmatrix}X=(01​10​) and e−iφX=cos⁡φ 1−isin⁡φ Xe^{-i\varphi X}=\cos\varphi\,\mathbb 1-i\sin\varphi\,Xe−iφX=cosφ1−isinφX.

Gearbox circuit C(d)(U1,…,Ud)C^{(d)}(U^1,\dots,U^d)C(d)(U1,…,Ud). Prepare ddd ancillas in ∣0⟩|0\rangle∣0⟩ and a target in ∣ψ⟩|\psi\rangle∣ψ⟩. Apply U1⊗⋯⊗UdU^1\otimes\cdots\otimes U^dU1⊗⋯⊗Ud to the ancillas, then a ddd-controlled −iX-iX−iX on the target (active when every ancilla is ∣1⟩|1\rangle∣1⟩), then U1†⊗⋯⊗Ud†U^{1\dagger}\otimes\cdots\otimes U^{d\dagger}U1†⊗⋯⊗Ud†, and measure the ancillas in the computational basis. Outcome 0⋯00\cdots00⋯0 is success.

Composed gearbox circuit (Definition 1). C∘1(U)C^{\circ1}(U)C∘1(U) is C(1)(U)C^{(1)}(U)C(1)(U), and C∘d(U)=C∘1(C∘(d−1)(U))C^{\circ d}(U)=C^{\circ1}(C^{\circ(d-1)}(U))C∘d(U)=C∘1(C∘(d−1)(U)): the gate fed to the outer gearbox is the rotation the inner composed circuit enacts on success. Write θ0∈[0,π/2]\theta_0\in[0,\pi/2]θ0​∈[0,π/2] for the angle with sin⁡2θ0=∣U1,0∣2\sin^2\theta_0=|U_{1,0}|^2sin2θ0​=∣U1,0​∣2 and, for q≥1q\ge1q≥1,

φq=tan⁡−1(tan⁡2q−1θ0),Pq=sin⁡4φq+cos⁡4φq.\varphi_q=\tan^{-1}\big(\tan^{2^{q-1}}\theta_0\big),\qquad P_q=\sin^4\varphi_q+\cos^4\varphi_q .φq​=tan−1(tan2q−1θ0​),Pq​=sin4φq​+cos4φq​.

Cost. Level qqq of C∘d(U)C^{\circ d}(U)C∘d(U) is attempted until its measurement succeeds; the number of attempts NqN_qNq​ is geometric on {1,2,… }\{1,2,\dots\}{1,2,…}. Each attempt at level q≥2q\ge2q≥2 needs one successful copy of C∘(q−1)(U)C^{\circ(q-1)}(U)C∘(q−1)(U) and one of its inverse. With xdx_dxd​ the number of applications of C∘1(U)C^{\circ1}(U)C∘1(U) before C∘d(U)C^{\circ d}(U)C∘d(U) succeeds, Appendix A's equation (A1) reads

x1=N1,xd=∑i=1Nd(ηi+χi),x_1=N_1,\qquad x_d=\sum_{i=1}^{N_d}(\eta_i+\chi_i),x1​=N1​,xd​=i=1∑Nd​​(ηi​+χi​),

with ηi,χi\eta_i,\chi_iηi​,χi​ distributed as xd−1x_{d-1}xd−1​ and everything independent. Each C∘1(U)C^{\circ1}(U)C∘1(U) uses one UUU and one U†U^\daggerU†, so the number of applications of UUU or U†U^\daggerU† is nd=2xdn_d=2x_dnd​=2xd​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 6)

For every unitary UUU and d≥1d\ge1d≥1,

E(nd)=2dP1⋯Pd,\mathbb E(n_d)=\frac{2^d}{P_1\cdots P_d},E(nd​)=P1​⋯Pd​2d​,

and, for θ0<π/4\theta_0<\pi/4θ0​<π/4,

V(nd)≤22d+1(1−P1)Pd2⋯P12(1+Pd⋯P12dP1).\mathbb V(n_d)\le\frac{2^{2d+1}(1-P_1)}{P_d^2\cdots P_1^2}\left(1+\frac{P_d\cdots P_1}{2^dP_1}\right).V(nd​)≤Pd2​⋯P12​22d+1(1−P1​)​(1+2dP1​Pd​⋯P1​​).

Both clauses are stated as printed; the mean is exact for every θ0∈[0,π/2]\theta_0\in[0,\pi/2]θ0​∈[0,π/2].

Milestones

  1. Theorem 1 (p. 2): on outcome 000 the gearbox circuit leaves cos⁡4θ+sin⁡4θ e−iXtan⁡−1(tan⁡2θ)∣ψ⟩\sqrt{\cos^4\theta+\sin^4\theta}\,e^{-iX\tan^{-1}(\tan^2\theta)}|\psi\ranglecos4θ+sin4θ​e−iXtan−1(tan2θ)∣ψ⟩, where sin⁡2θ=∏ℓ∣U1,0ℓ∣2\sin^2\theta=\prod_\ell|U^\ell_{1,0}|^2sin2θ=∏ℓ​∣U1,0ℓ​∣2; this has probability cos⁡4θ+sin⁡4θ\cos^4\theta+\sin^4\thetacos4θ+sin4θ; every other outcome enacts eiπX/4e^{i\pi X/4}eiπX/4 up to a scalar.
  2. Corollary 1 (p. 5): on success, C∘d(U)=e−itan⁡−1(tan⁡2dθ0)XC^{\circ d}(U)=e^{-i\tan^{-1}(\tan^{2^d}\theta_0)X}C∘d(U)=e−itan−1(tan2dθ0​)X.
  3. Appendix A, p. 14: the level-qqq success probability is PqP_qPq​; E(Nq)=1/Pq\mathbb E(N_q)=1/P_qE(Nq​)=1/Pq​ and V(Nq)=(1−Pq)/Pq2\mathbb V(N_q)=(1-P_q)/P_q^2V(Nq​)=(1−Pq​)/Pq2​.
  4. (A3): E(xd)=2 E(Nd) E(xd−1)\mathbb E(x_d)=2\,\mathbb E(N_d)\,\mathbb E(x_{d-1})E(xd​)=2E(Nd​)E(xd−1​).
  5. (A6): V(xd)=2 V(xd−1) E(Nd)+4 V(Nd) (E(xd−1))2\mathbb V(x_d)=2\,\mathbb V(x_{d-1})\,\mathbb E(N_d)+4\,\mathbb V(N_d)\,(\mathbb E(x_{d-1}))^2V(xd​)=2V(xd−1​)E(Nd​)+4V(Nd​)(E(xd−1​))2.
  6. Appendix A, p. 15: PqP_qPq​ increases with qqq when θ0<π/4\theta_0<\pi/4θ0​<π/4.

Significance

The theorem shows that the composed gearbox reaches a rotation angle of order tan⁡2dθ0\tan^{2^d}\theta_0tan2dθ0​, doubly exponentially small in ddd, while using Θ(2d)\Theta(2^d)Θ(2d) applications of UUU in expectation, with a variance of the same squared order. Since d≈log⁡2log⁡(1/θ)d\approx\log_2\log(1/\theta)d≈log2​log(1/θ) levels give angle θ\thetaθ, the gate cost scales like log⁡(1/θ)\log(1/\theta)log(1/θ) with a constant that depends on UUU only through P1,P2,…P_1,P_2,\dotsP1​,P2​,…; this is the basis of the paper's floating-point synthesis scheme, which combines a mantissa rotation with an exponent rotation produced this way (Sections IV–V).

The result has a complete written proof in Appendix A. As far as is known it has no machine-checked proof. The formalization adds three things: the circuit identities of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 as exact matrix statements, including the boundary case ∣U1,0∣=1|U_{1,0}|=1∣U1,0​∣=1; the identification of the circuit's Born-rule success probabilities with the closed forms PqP_qPq​; and the random-sum identities (A3), (A6) in a form where infinite moments cannot be hidden.

Difficulty

The computational parts are elementary but long. The real difficulty is that the theorem joins two models: a quantum circuit, whose success probabilities come from matrix entries of a post-selected block, and a nested random sum whose summands are themselves random sums. A naive approach postulates the success probabilities PqP_qPq​ and proves a lemma about compound geometric sums. That approach proves nothing about the circuit: the content linking the two is milestone 3, which needs Theorem 1 at every level of the recursion and Corollary 1 to identify the gate fed to level qqq. On the probabilistic side, the variance identity for a random number of independent summands requires finiteness of all second moments, and the bound requires unfolding a recursion whose coefficients 1/Pq1/P_q1/Pq​ vary with the level, which is where the monotonicity of PqP_qPq​ enters.

Formalization scope

States are vectors Fin 2 → ℂ; gates are Matrix (Fin 2) (Fin 2) ℂ, unitarity is membership in Matrix.unitaryGroup, and ∣0⟩,∣1⟩|0\rangle,|1\rangle∣0⟩,∣1⟩ are indices 0, 1. The ddd ancillas are Fin d → Fin 2, and the joint space is (Fin d → Fin 2) × Fin 2 with ancillas first; the controlled gate fires on the all-ones string. The rotation is the matrix cos⁡φ 1−isin⁡φ X\cos\varphi\,\mathbb 1-i\sin\varphi\,Xcosφ1−isinφX, so eiπX/4e^{i\pi X/4}eiπX/4 is the rotation by −π/4-\pi/4−π/4. Because Lean's Real.tan returns 000 at π/2\pi/2π/2, the angles tan⁡−1(tan⁡2θ)\tan^{-1}(\tan^2\theta)tan−1(tan2θ) and tan⁡−1(tan⁡2dθ0)\tan^{-1}(\tan^{2^d}\theta_0)tan−1(tan2dθ0​) are defined to be π/2\pi/2π/2 when the cosine vanishes, the paper's value tan⁡−1(∞)\tan^{-1}(\infty)tan−1(∞); the case ∣U1,0∣=1|U_{1,0}|=1∣U1,0​∣=1 is not excluded. C∘d(U)C^{\circ d}(U)C∘d(U) is the recursively defined success unitary: the outcome-000 block of the one-ancilla gearbox fed with C∘(d−1)(U)C^{\circ(d-1)}(U)C∘(d−1)(U), normalized by the norm of its first column.

The number of applications of UUU or U†U^\daggerU† used to enact C∘d(U)C^{\circ d}(U)C∘d(U) is modelled by Appendix A's recursion (A1): Theorem 2 speaks of "a given attempt", but its proof defines xdx_dxd​ as the count until C∘d(U)C^{\circ d}(U)C∘d(U) succeeds, and that is the quantity formalized. Laws are Mathlib PMF ℕ with independence built into bind; the geometric law is Mathlib's geometricMeasure shifted to {1,2,… }\{1,2,\dots\}{1,2,…}; means and variances are ℝ≥0∞-valued sums.

Three trivializing formalizations are ruled out. The law of ndn_dnd​ uses the circuit's Born-rule success probabilities, never PqP_qPq​ supplied as an input, so Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 are needed for the goal. Moments are in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], so a divergent variance is ∞\infty∞, never the junk value 000 that would make the bound trivially true. The angle convention above excludes the false reading tan⁡(π/2)=0\tan(\pi/2)=0tan(π/2)=0 in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1.

Everything needed is in Mathlib: matrices, unitaryGroup, Real.arctan, PMF.bind/PMF.map, geometricMeasure. Reusable beyond this mission: the moments of the shifted geometric law and the mean and variance identities for a sum of a random number of i.i.d. summands, in ℝ≥0∞ form. Contributions to any milestone are welcome; the probabilistic milestones (3–6) do not depend on the circuit milestones except through part 1 of milestone 3.

Selected references

  • N. Wiebe and V. Kliuchnikov, Floating point representations in quantum circuit synthesis, arXiv:1305.5528v3, 2013. https://arxiv.org/abs/1305.5528v3
  • P. Selinger, Efficient Clifford+T approximation of single-qubit operators, Quantum Inf. Comput. 15, 2015. https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.6253
  • A. M. Childs and N. Wiebe, Hamiltonian simulation using linear combinations of unitary operations, Quantum Inf. Comput. 12, 2012. https://arxiv.org/abs/1202.5822
  • A. G. Fowler, A. M. Stephens and P. Groszkowski, High-threshold universal quantum computation on the surface code, Phys. Rev. A 80, 052312, 2009. https://arxiv.org/abs/0803.0272
9 thms1 active userReviewed
Experimental DesignOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Experimental Design for Staggered Rollouts: S-Shaped, Covariate-Balanced Rollouts Maximize the Trace of the GLS Precision of Instantaneous and Lagged EffectsResearch Paper

Motivation

Firms and public agencies often roll a new product, feature or policy out gradually: a few markets first, more later, every market eventually. When the rollout is itself an experiment, its schedule determines how precisely the effect of the treatment can be estimated. A staggered rollout is the common design in which treatment, once switched on in a unit, stays on. Examples are a ride-sharing feature introduced city by city, a hospital protocol adopted ward by ward, or a stepped-wedge clinical trial. The effect of such a treatment often builds up over several periods, so the analyst wants the instantaneous effect and the lagged ones. The design question is then: in which period should each unit adopt?

Xiong, Athey, Bayati and Imbens (arXiv:1911.03764, Management Science 2024) answer this question in closed form for the trace criterion. Their non-adaptive result, Theorem 3.1, says that an optimal rollout has a treated fraction that follows a fixed S-shaped curve in time, and that each adoption cohort balances the observed and latent covariates.

Setting

There are NNN units and TTT periods. A design assigns to every unit iii an adoption time Ai∈[T]∪{∞}A_i\in[T]\cup\{\infty\}Ai​∈[T]∪{∞}, where ∞\infty∞ means never treated. The treatment indicator is coded zit=+1z_{it}=+1zit​=+1 if Ai≤tA_i\le tAi​≤t and zit=−1z_{it}=-1zit​=−1 otherwise. The outcome model, (3.1) of the paper, is

Yit=αi+βt+Xi⊤θt+τ0zit+τ1zi,t−1+⋯+τℓzi,t−ℓ+ui⊤vt+εit.Y_{it}=\alpha_i+\beta_t+X_i^\top\theta_t+\tau_0z_{it}+\tau_1z_{i,t-1}+\dots+\tau_\ell z_{i,t-\ell}+u_i^\top v_t+\varepsilon_{it}.Yit​=αi​+βt​+Xi⊤​θt​+τ0​zit​+τ1​zi,t−1​+⋯+τℓ​zi,t−ℓ​+ui⊤​vt​+εit​.

It has unit effects αi\alpha_iαi​, time effects βt\beta_tβt​, observed covariates Xi∈RdxX_i\in\mathbb R^{d_x}Xi​∈Rdx​ with period-specific slopes θt\theta_tθt​, and ℓ≥0\ell\ge0ℓ≥0 known lags. Latent covariates ui∈Rduu_i\in\mathbb R^{d_u}ui​∈Rdu​ load on random factors vtv_tvt​ with covariance Σv\Sigma_vΣv​, and the noise εit\varepsilon_{it}εit​ has variance σε2\sigma_\varepsilon^2σε2​. The effects τ=(τ0,…,τℓ)\tau=(\tau_0,\dots,\tau_\ell)τ=(τ0​,…,τℓ​) are estimated by generalized least squares on periods ℓ+1,…,T\ell+1,\dots,Tℓ+1,…,T. The per-period error covariance is Ψ=UΣvU⊤+σε2IN\Psi=U\Sigma_vU^\top+\sigma_\varepsilon^2I_NΨ=UΣv​U⊤+σε2​IN​, and the errors are uncorrelated across periods.

By the Gauss–Markov (Aitken) theorem, which is proved on Prove2Me as VectorSpaceOpt.gauss_markov, the covariance of the GLS estimator is (W⊤Σe−1W)−1(W^\top\Sigma_e^{-1}W)^{-1}(W⊤Σe−1​W)−1 for the regressor matrix WWW. The precision Prec⁡(τ^;A)\operatorname{Prec}(\hat\tau;A)Prec(τ^;A) is therefore a deterministic matrix, (EC.2.1)–(EC.2.2): the Schur complement of the nuisance block. The T-optimal design problem (3.2) is

max⁡A∈([T]∪{∞})N tr⁡Prec⁡(τ^;A).\max_{A\in([T]\cup\{\infty\})^N}\ \operatorname{tr}\operatorname{Prec}(\hat\tau;A).A∈([T]∪{∞})Nmax​ trPrec(τ^;A).

With h=⌊ℓ/2⌋h=\lfloor\ell/2\rfloorh=⌊ℓ/2⌋, the paper defines a vector a(ℓ)=(M(ℓ))−1b(ℓ)a^{(\ell)}=(M^{(\ell)})^{-1}b^{(\ell)}a(ℓ)=(M(ℓ))−1b(ℓ) of length ℓ−h\ell-hℓ−h from explicit M(ℓ)M^{(\ell)}M(ℓ), b(ℓ)b^{(\ell)}b(ℓ) ((EC.1.2)–(EC.1.3)). The S-shaped fraction ωℓ,t∗\omega^*_{\ell,t}ωℓ,t∗​ of (3.4) has five stages: it is −1-1−1 for t≤ht\le ht≤h, equals at−h(ℓ)a^{(\ell)}_{t-h}at−h(ℓ)​ for h<t≤ℓh<t\le\ellh<t≤ℓ, is linear, −1+(2t−(ℓ+1))/(T−ℓ)-1+(2t-(\ell+1))/(T-\ell)−1+(2t−(ℓ+1))/(T−ℓ), for ℓ<t≤T−ℓ\ell<t\le T-\ellℓ<t≤T−ℓ, is antisymmetric in the fourth stage, and is 111 at the end.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1

Assume σε2>0\sigma_\varepsilon^2>0σε2​>0, Σv=σε2I\Sigma_v=\sigma_\varepsilon^2IΣv​=σε2​I, centred rows ∑iXi=0\sum_iX_i=0∑i​Xi​=0 and ∑iui=0\sum_iu_i=0∑i​ui​=0, ∑iXiui⊤=0\sum_iX_iu_i^\top=0∑i​Xi​ui⊤​=0, and, when ℓ>0\ell>0ℓ>0, T>(ℓ3+13ℓ2+7ℓ+3)/(8ℓ)T>(\ell^3+13\ell^2+7\ell+3)/(8\ell)T>(ℓ3+13ℓ2+7ℓ+3)/(8ℓ). If

A∈Aℓ∩AX∩AU,A\in\mathbb A_\ell\cap\mathbb A_X\cap\mathbb A_U,A∈Aℓ​∩AX​∩AU​,

then tr⁡Prec⁡(τ^;A′)≤tr⁡Prec⁡(τ^;A)\operatorname{tr}\operatorname{Prec}(\hat\tau;A')\le\operatorname{tr}\operatorname{Prec}(\hat\tau;A)trPrec(τ^;A′)≤trPrec(τ^;A) for every design A′A'A′. Here Aℓ\mathbb A_\ellAℓ​ is the set of designs whose treated fraction at every ttt is (1+ωℓ,t∗)/2(1+\omega^*_{\ell,t})/2(1+ωℓ,t∗​)/2, and AX\mathbb A_XAX​, AU\mathbb A_UAU​ are the sets of designs whose adoption cohorts in periods 2,…,T2,\dots,T2,…,T have zero sum of XiX_iXi​ (respectively uiu_iui​).

Milestones

  1. Lemma EC.1.2 (corrected): tr⁡Prec⁡(τ^)=−Nσε2∑j(fj,1+fj,X+fj,U)\operatorname{tr}\operatorname{Prec}(\hat\tau)=-\frac N{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}\sum_{j}\big(f_{j,1}+f_{j,X}+f_{j,U}\big)trPrec(τ^)=−σε2​N​∑j​(fj,1​+fj,X​+fj,U​). The first term depends only on the treated fractions, the second only on XXX, the third only on UUU.
  2. The vector a(ℓ)a^{(\ell)}a(ℓ) exists, and the resulting ω∗\omega^*ω∗ is feasible: nondecreasing, with values in [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1], and the stage-2 values lie in [−1,−1+(ℓ+1)/(T−ℓ)][-1,-1+(\ell+1)/(T-\ell)][−1,−1+(ℓ+1)/(T−ℓ)].
  3. ω∗\omega^*ω∗ minimizes f1=∑jfj,1f_1=\sum_jf_{j,1}f1​=∑j​fj,1​ over all nondecreasing paths in [−1,1]T[-1,1]^T[−1,1]T.
  4. The covariate terms are nonnegative, and they vanish when X⊤ztX^\top z_tX⊤zt​ and U⊤ztU^\top z_tU⊤zt​ are constant in ttt.

Significance

The theorem turns a combinatorial design problem over (T+1)N(T+1)^N(T+1)N schedules into explicit conditions. The fraction of treated units follows a universal curve that depends only on (ℓ,T)(\ell,T)(ℓ,T), and the cohorts must balance the covariates. Two features are useful in practice. Without lags the optimal fraction grows linearly. With lags the optimal rollout starts and ends more slowly, which is what the extra stages capture. The paper uses these conditions to build practical designs (rounding the fractions to integers, stratifying on estimated latent factors) and an adaptive version.

The result is proved in the paper; this mission formalizes it. Formalizing it also repairs the record. Two statements in the printed proof are false as printed, and so is one display. The vector bℓb_\ellbℓ​ of Lemma EC.1.2 has an off-by-one, and its observed-covariate term is correct only when X⊤X=N IX^\top X=N\,IX⊤X=NI. The linear term of (EC.2.6) is summed over the wrong range. The mission states the corrected versions, each with a counterexample to the printed one. Theorem 3.1 itself is true as printed. Planning checked it by brute force on small instances, and checked the optimality of ω∗\omega^*ω∗ with an exact certificate for ℓ≤12\ell\le12ℓ≤12. As far as a search of Prove2Me shows, nothing about panel experimental design or GLS precision has been formalized there before.

Difficulty

The objective is a trace of a Schur complement, and the design enters through ±1\pm1±1 entries in a large regression. Expanding that objective into the separable form of Lemma EC.1.2 requires exact control of the projection onto the two-way fixed effects and the period-specific covariate slopes. This is where the printed lemma goes wrong. The relaxed problem in ω\omegaω is a convex quadratic program with monotonicity and box constraints. Its solution is not linear when ℓ>0\ell>0ℓ>0: the stage-2 values solve a linear system whose feasibility (bounds and monotonicity) holds only above a threshold in TTT. That is the role of the cubic threshold. A natural first idea is that "spread adoption evenly" is optimal. It is optimal only for ℓ=0\ell=0ℓ=0; for ℓ>0\ell>0ℓ>0 the KKT system forces nonlinear stages at both ends. A second step must also be checked: the ±1\pm1±1 designs, whose fractions satisfy Aℓ\mathbb A_\ellAℓ​ and whose cohorts satisfy the balance conditions, minimize all three terms at once.

Formalization scope

  • Units and periods are Fin N and Fin T, with periods 0-based. A design is Fin N → WithTop (Fin T), with ⊤ for never treated, and zit=±1z_{it}=\pm1zit​=±1.
  • The precision trace is ∑j=0ℓmin⁡γ\sum_{j=0}^{\ell}\min_\gamma∑j=0ℓ​minγ​ of the Ψ−1\Psi^{-1}Ψ−1-weighted residual sum of squares of the lag-jjj column regressed on the nuisance columns. These are all NNN unit dummies, a time dummy for each observed period, and a slope on XiX_iXi​ for each observed period. This equals the trace of (EC.2.2) wherever that formula is defined. It is defined for every design and every XXX, with no matrix inverse of a possibly singular matrix.
  • The random model enters only through Σe=I⊗Ψ\Sigma_e=I\otimes\PsiΣe​=I⊗Ψ. Assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and 3.1 are encoded by the design type and this covariance; σε2>0\sigma_\varepsilon^2>0σε2​>0 is a hypothesis.
  • The threshold is read as "if ℓ>0\ell>0ℓ>0 then T>…T>\dotsT>…", because the expression is undefined at ℓ=0\ell=0ℓ=0.
  • Lemma EC.1.2 is stated with bℓ,t=(Tℓ+1−2t)/Tℓb_{\ell,t}=(T_\ell+1-2t)/T_\ellbℓ,t​=(Tℓ​+1−2t)/Tℓ​, and its XXX-term is 1Nz⊤(P⊗HX)z\frac1N z^\top(P\otimes H_X)zN1​z⊤(P⊗HX​)z, with HXH_XHX​ the projector onto the column space of XXX, written without a pseudo-inverse.

The comparison design A′A'A′ ranges over all designs, never over Aℓ\mathbb A_\ellAℓ​ or relaxed fractions. The coding is ±1\pm1±1, not 0/10/10/1. The estimator uses only periods ℓ+1,…,T\ell+1,\dots,Tℓ+1,…,T. Coding with 0/10/10/1 or dropping the period-specific slopes would change ω∗\omega^*ω∗ and the covariate term, and would be a different theorem. The set Aopt\mathbb A_{\mathrm{opt}}Aopt​ can be empty for some NNN, in which case the goal holds vacuously, exactly as the paper's "if" allows. A sanity file exhibits nonempty instances, at ℓ=0\ell=0ℓ=0 with dx=du=1d_x=d_u=1dx​=du​=1 and at ℓ=1\ell=1ℓ=1, and reproduces a value of Example EC.1.4.

A complete development needs least-squares projections, Schur complements, centring matrices, and a KKT certificate for a monotone-constrained quadratic program. The first three are reusable well beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. Xiong, S. Athey, M. Bayati, G. Imbens, Optimal Experimental Design for Staggered Rollouts, Management Science, 2024; arXiv:1911.03764v6. https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.03764
  • A. C. Atkinson, V. V. Fedorov, The design of experiments for discriminating between two rival models, Biometrika 62(1), 1975. https://doi.org/10.1093/biomet/62.1.57
  • J. Bai, Inferential theory for factor models of large dimensions, Econometrica 71(1), 2003. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00392
  • M. A. Hussey, J. P. Hughes, Design and analysis of stepped wedge cluster randomized trials, Contemporary Clinical Trials 28(2), 2007. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cct.2006.05.007
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Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Blind Dynamic Resource Allocation in Closed Networks via Mirror Backpressure: Mirror Backpressure Loses at Most O(K/T + 1/K + √(ηK)) Payoff per CustomerResearch Paper

Motivation

Ride-hailing, car-sharing and bike-sharing platforms, as well as scrip systems, move a fixed stock of reusable resources around a network. Each customer that is served relocates one unit, from a pick-up location to a drop-off location. The operator decides, customer by customer, whether to serve and with which unit. Supply can run dry at a location, which forbids serving from there. Demand also varies over the day, and the operator rarely knows the arrival rates.

Kanoria and Qian (arXiv:1903.02764v4; Management Science, 2024) propose Mirror Backpressure (MBP), a policy that uses only the current queue lengths and never estimates the rates. They prove that it is near-optimal against the best policy that knows the rates. Earlier guarantees for closed networks, such as Banerjee, Freund and Lykouris (arXiv:1608.06819), need exact knowledge of stationary rates and bound only the steady state. Classical backpressure (Tassiulas and Ephremides, 1992) and the drift-plus-penalty method (Neely, 2010) address open networks, where the no-underflow constraint is handled by idling, not by a fixed stock of units.

Setting

A closed network has a finite set VVV of m=∣V∣>1m = |V| > 1m=∣V∣>1 nodes and KKK identical supply units. The state is the vector of queue lengths q∈ΩK={q∈Z+m:1⊤q=K}\mathbf q \in \Omega_K = \{\mathbf q \in \mathbb Z_+^m : \mathbf 1^\top \mathbf q = K\}q∈ΩK​={q∈Z+m​:1⊤q=K}. In each period t=0,1,…t = 0, 1, \dotst=0,1,… exactly one customer arrives. Her type τ\tauτ lies in a finite set T\mathcal TT and is drawn from a probability vector ϕt\boldsymbol\phi^tϕt, independently of the past. Type τ\tauτ has nonempty pick-up and drop-off neighborhoods P(τ),D(τ)⊆V\mathcal P(\tau), \mathcal D(\tau) \subseteq VP(τ),D(τ)⊆V.

After seeing τ\tauτ, the controller drops the customer or serves her with a pair (j,k)∈P(τ)×D(τ)(j,k) \in \mathcal P(\tau) \times \mathcal D(\tau)(j,k)∈P(τ)×D(τ). Serving collects a payoff wjτkw_{j\tau k}wjτk​, with ∣wjτk∣≤1|w_{j\tau k}| \le 1∣wjτk​∣≤1, and moves one unit from jjj to kkk. Serving from jjj requires qj>0q_j > 0qj​>0: this is the no-underflow constraint. A feasible policy may randomize, depend on the whole history and the period, and know the rates.

Write JTπ(q)J^\pi_T(\mathbf q)JTπ​(q) for the expected payoff of π\piπ in periods 0,…,T−10, \dots, T-10,…,T−1 from q[0]=q\mathbf q[0] = \mathbf qq[0]=q. The benchmark is WT∗=sup⁡πmax⁡qJTπ(q)/TW^*_T = \sup_\pi \max_{\mathbf q} J^\pi_T(\mathbf q)/TWT∗​=supπ​maxq​JTπ​(q)/T, and a policy is evaluated from its worst initial state, WTπ=min⁡qJTπ(q)/TW^\pi_T = \min_{\mathbf q} J^\pi_T(\mathbf q)/TWTπ​=minq​JTπ​(q)/T. The loss is LTπ=WT∗−WTπL^\pi_T = W^*_T - W^\pi_TLTπ​=WT∗​−WTπ​.

The rates vary η\etaη-slowly if 1T−1∑t∥ϕt+1−ϕt∥1≤η\frac{1}{T-1}\sum_{t} \|\boldsymbol\phi^{t+1} - \boldsymbol\phi^t\|_1 \le \etaT−11​∑t​∥ϕt+1−ϕt∥1​≤η. The connectedness

α(ϕ)=min⁡∅≠S⊊V∑τ: P(τ)∩S≠∅, D(τ)∖S≠∅ϕτ\alpha(\boldsymbol\phi) = \min_{\emptyset \ne S \subsetneq V} \sum_{\tau:\ \mathcal P(\tau) \cap S \ne \emptyset,\ \mathcal D(\tau) \setminus S \ne \emptyset} \phi_\tauα(ϕ)=∅=S⊊Vmin​τ: P(τ)∩S=∅, D(τ)∖S=∅∑​ϕτ​

is the smallest rate of demand that can carry supply out of any proper node set. Condition 1 requires α(ϕt)>0\alpha(\boldsymbol\phi^t) > 0α(ϕt)>0 in every period, and αmin⁡=min⁡tα(ϕt)\alpha_{\min} = \min_t \alpha(\boldsymbol\phi^t)αmin​=mint​α(ϕt).

MBP normalizes queue lengths as qˉi=(qi+K)/K~\bar q_i = (q_i + \sqrt K)/\tilde Kqˉ​i​=(qi​+K​)/K~ with K~=K+mK\tilde K = K + m\sqrt KK~=K+mK​, and uses the congestion function f(x)=−m x−1/2f(x) = -\sqrt m\, x^{-1/2}f(x)=−m​x−1/2. For a type-τ\tauτ customer it picks (j∗,k∗)(j^*, k^*)(j∗,k∗) maximizing the score wjτk+f(qˉj)−f(qˉk)w_{j\tau k} + f(\bar q_j) - f(\bar q_k)wjτk​+f(qˉ​j​)−f(qˉ​k​) over P(τ)×D(τ)\mathcal P(\tau) \times \mathcal D(\tau)P(τ)×D(τ). It serves with that pair if the score is nonnegative and qj∗>0q_{j^*} > 0qj∗​>0, and drops the customer otherwise.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

There are a universal CCC and K1=poly(m,1/αmin⁡)K_1 = \mathrm{poly}(m, 1/\alpha_{\min})K1​=poly(m,1/αmin​) such that for every instance and every K≥K1K \ge K_1K≥K1​,

LTMBP≤Cm(KT+ηK)+Cm2K.L^{\mathrm{MBP}}_T \le Cm\Big(\frac KT + \sqrt{\eta K}\Big) + \frac{Cm^2}{K}.LTMBP​≤Cm(TK​+ηK​)+KCm2​.

The constants are existential and fixed before the instance. A sharper constant is a stronger result that does not invalidate the goal.

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's proof.

  • Lemmas 4–6 and Proposition 1. Any policy's average payoff is at most the value of the static planning LP at the average rate ϕˉ\bar{\boldsymbol\phi}ϕˉ​, with flow balance relaxed by K/TK/TK/T. The relaxation costs at most mK/TmK/TmK/T, so WT∗≤WSPP(ϕˉ)+mK/TW^*_T \le W^{\mathrm{SPP}}(\bar{\boldsymbol\phi}) + mK/TWT∗​≤WSPP(ϕˉ​)+mK/T.
  • Strong duality for the partial dual g(y)=∑τϕτmax⁡j,k(wjτk+yj−yk)+g(\mathbf y) = \sum_\tau \phi_\tau \max_{j,k}(w_{j\tau k} + y_j - y_k)^+g(y)=∑τ​ϕτ​maxj,k​(wjτk​+yj​−yk​)+.
  • Lemmas 1–3. A one-period decomposition of MBP's suboptimality into a potential drift V1\mathcal V_1V1​, a stochastic term V2\mathcal V_2V2​, a dual gap V3\mathcal V_3V3​ and an underflow indicator V4\mathcal V_4V4​. Then V3≤−α(ϕ)[max⁡jyj−min⁡jyj−2m]+\mathcal V_3 \le -\alpha(\boldsymbol\phi)[\max_j y_j - \min_j y_j - 2m]^+V3​≤−α(ϕ)[maxj​yj​−minj​yj​−2m]+ at y=f(qˉ)\mathbf y = \mathbf f(\bar{\mathbf q})y=f(qˉ​), and V2+V3+V4≤Cm2/K~\mathcal V_2 + \mathcal V_3 + \mathcal V_4 \le Cm^2/\tilde KV2​+V3​+V4​≤Cm2/K~.
  • Propositions 3, 4, 2. The policy gap 1T∑tWSPP(ϕt)−WTMBP≤CmK/T+Cm2/K\frac1T\sum_t W^{\mathrm{SPP}}(\boldsymbol\phi^t) - W^{\mathrm{MBP}}_T \le CmK/T + Cm^2/KT1​∑t​WSPP(ϕt)−WTMBP​≤CmK/T+Cm2/K. The variation gap 1T∑tWSPP(ϕt)≥WSPP(ϕˉ)−mηT\frac1T\sum_t W^{\mathrm{SPP}}(\boldsymbol\phi^t) \ge W^{\mathrm{SPP}}(\bar{\boldsymbol\phi}) - m\eta TT1​∑t​WSPP(ϕt)≥WSPP(ϕˉ​)−mηT. Batching them gives LTMBP≤CmK/ΔT+Cm2/K+ΔTmηL^{\mathrm{MBP}}_T \le CmK/\Delta_T + Cm^2/K + \Delta_T m\etaLTMBP​≤CmK/ΔT​+Cm2/K+ΔT​mη for every 0<ΔT<T0 < \Delta_T < T0<ΔT​<T.

Significance

Theorem 1 gives a finite-KKK, finite-horizon guarantee for a policy that is blind to the arrival rates. Its steady-state per-customer loss is O(1/K)O(1/K)O(1/K) for stationary demand, the same order as rate-aware state-independent policies. Under imperfect rate estimates, any state-independent policy suffers a loss of order one (Banerjee, Kanoria and Qian, 2018, Proposition 4). The bound holds for arbitrary slowly varying demand. It does not degrade in the large-market regime where KKK and the demand grow together.

The theorem is proved in the paper; nothing in it is formalized anywhere. This mission would give the platform its first controlled closed-network model: demand types with pick-up and drop-off sets, the no-underflow constraint, and history-dependent randomized policies over a finite horizon. It would also add a fully machine-checked drift-plus-penalty argument with an underflow term. One printed statement is corrected: Lemma 1 as printed has V2\mathcal V_2V2​ with coefficient 1/(2K~)1/(2\tilde K)1/(2K~), which a two-node instance refutes. The milestone uses 1/K~1/\tilde K1/K~, and Theorem 1 is unaffected.

Difficulty

The natural route is the backpressure argument: score each pair by payoff plus congestion difference and bound the Lyapunov drift. That argument assumes that serving from an empty queue is either impossible or harmless. Here the no-underflow constraint binds. The congestion-adjusted score can be positive at an empty queue, so the policy is forced to drop customers that the fluid solution would serve. Virtual-queue workarounds fail in a closed network because fake units never leave. Linear congestion costs, as in regular backpressure, can lose a constant per customer.

The proof needs three ingredients. First, a potential whose gradient is the steep congestion function. Second, the observation that the dual gap V3\mathcal V_3V3​ is very negative exactly when some queue is short. Third, a growth estimate with the K\sqrt KK​ offset showing that V3\mathcal V_3V3​ absorbs V2+V4\mathcal V_2 + \mathcal V_4V2​+V4​ once K≥poly(m,1/α)K \ge \mathrm{poly}(m, 1/\alpha)K≥poly(m,1/α). The finite-horizon benchmark separately requires a flow-decomposition argument and LP sensitivity in the rates.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Nodes and types are Fintypes, with 1 < Fintype.card V. Decisions are Option (V × V). Periods are numbered from 000, with rates phi : ℕ → Ty → ℝ.
  • Policies and payoff. Policies are probability vectors on feasible decisions as a function of the period, the past (state, type, decision) triples, the current state and the current type. The history includes past decisions, so the class contains the paper's. The expected payoff is a finite recursion over types and decisions, with no measure theory.
  • Loss. The loss is stated without a supremum: for every policy π\piπ and initial states q,q′\mathbf q, \mathbf q'q,q′, (JTπ(q)−JTMBP(q′))/T≤(J^\pi_T(\mathbf q) - J^{\mathrm{MBP}}_T(\mathbf q'))/T \le(JTπ​(q)−JTMBP​(q′))/T≤ bound.
  • Constants and tie-breaks. "Poly" is c (m+1/α)Nc\,(m + 1/\alpha)^Nc(m+1/α)N, with C,c,NC, c, NC,c,N quantified before every type and instance. MBP is Algorithm 1 exactly, under every argmax tie-break. Payoffs satisfy ∣w∣≤1|w| \le 1∣w∣≤1 rather than max⁡∣w∣=1\max|w| = 1max∣w∣=1.
  • Readings. Proposition 1's "W∗≤WSPP(ϕˉ)W^* \le W^{\mathrm{SPP}}(\bar{\boldsymbol\phi})W∗≤WSPP(ϕˉ​)" is read as W∗≤lim sup⁡TWSPP(ϕˉT)W^* \le \limsup_T W^{\mathrm{SPP}}(\bar{\boldsymbol\phi}_T)W∗≤limsupT​WSPP(ϕˉ​T​). The maximum of ∣f′∣|f'|∣f′∣ in V2\mathcal V_2V2​ is rendered as any upper bound BBB.

The statement has a trivializing formalization that is excluded. If K1K_1K1​ or CCC could depend on TTT, ϕ\boldsymbol\phiϕ or η\etaη, the choice K1=TK_1 = TK1​=T would make CmK/T≥2≥LTCmK/T \ge 2 \ge L_TCmK/T≥2≥LT​ and the theorem empty. Likewise, a benchmark restricted to Markov or deterministic policies, or a supremum over an unconstrained set, would change what is proved.

The definitions of the closed network, the static planning LP with its relaxed flow balance, acyclic flows and the partial dual are reusable for other closed-network and ride-hailing results. Contributions are welcome on every milestone. The LP lemmas (4–6, strong duality, Lemma 2, Proposition 4) are independent of the policy and can be attacked first. Platform results LinearOptimization.lp_strong_duality and LinearOptimization.network_flow_decomposition_including_zero are available as tools.

Selected references

  • Y. Kanoria, P. Qian, Blind Dynamic Resource Allocation in Closed Networks via Mirror Backpressure, arXiv:1903.02764v4, 2022; Management Science, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.02764v4
  • S. Banerjee, D. Freund, T. Lykouris, Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation Framework, Operations Research, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1608.06819
  • S. Banerjee, Y. Kanoria, P. Qian, Dynamic Assignment Control of a Closed Queueing Network under Complete Resource Pooling, arXiv:1803.04959, 2018 (also ACM SIGMETRICS 2018). https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.04959
  • M. J. Neely, Stochastic Network Optimization with Application to Communication and Queueing Systems, Morgan & Claypool, 2010. https://doi.org/10.2200/S00271ED1V01Y201006CNT007
  • L. Tassiulas, A. Ephremides, Stability Properties of Constrained Queueing Systems and Scheduling Policies for Maximum Throughput in Multihop Radio Networks, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1109/9.182479
  • A. Beck, M. Teboulle, Mirror Descent and Nonlinear Projected Subgradient Methods for Convex Optimization, Operations Research Letters, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-6377(02)00231-6
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Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

When Is Assortment Optimization Optimal?: Under History-Monotone Futures, Assortments Are Optimal Among All IC MechanismsResearch Paper

Why compare assortments with mechanisms

Assortment optimization is the problem of choosing which items to offer a customer who buys at most one item, when each item has a fixed, exogenous price. It is one of the central problems of revenue management: the customer's behaviour is described by a choice model, and a large literature computes optimal assortments under specific models, from the general discrete choice framework of Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) to the Markov Chain choice model of Blanchet, Gallego and Goyal (2016) and Feldman and Topaloglu (2017).

An assortment is one way to sell. A seller can also run a lottery, or ask the customer for their preferences and allocate at random. Ma (arXiv:2105.10433) asks when offering an assortment is already the best a seller can do among all such selling schemes. It is the ordinal analogue of the single-buyer auction setting of Myerson (1981), where an optimal mechanism is a posted price. The answer measures what assortment optimization computes: when assortments are optimal, the optimal assortment's revenue is the economic limit of the seller's revenue, not only the best value within one restricted class. The paper shows by a four-item example (Example 1, p. 2) that a top-2 lottery can strictly beat every assortment, so the question has content.

Setting

There are items N={1,…,n}N = \{1, \dots, n\}N={1,…,n} with prices rj≥0r_j \ge 0rj​≥0. A buyer's private type is a list ℓ\ellℓ, a strictly ordered subset of NNN (most preferred first; items not on the list are worse than buying nothing). Lists are drawn from a list distribution: a finite support L\mathcal LL with probabilities p(ℓ)>0p(\ell) > 0p(ℓ)>0 summing to 111. Write ℓk\ell_kℓk​ for the kkk'th item and ℓ1:k\ell_{1:k}ℓ1:k​ for the first kkk items.

Offering an assortment S⊆NS \subseteq NS⊆N, the buyer buys the first item of SSS on their list; Pr⁡[j⪰S0]\Pr[j \succeq S_0]Pr[j⪰S0​] is the probability that this is jjj, and REV[S]=∑j∈SrjPr⁡[j⪰S0]\mathsf{REV}[S] = \sum_{j \in S} r_j \Pr[j \succeq S_0]REV[S]=∑j∈S​rj​Pr[j⪰S0​]. OPTS\mathsf{OPT}^SOPTS is the largest REV[S]\mathsf{REV}[S]REV[S].

A mechanism assigns, on report ℓ∈L\ell \in \mathcal Lℓ∈L, item j∈ℓj \in \ellj∈ℓ with probability xj(ℓ)x_j(\ell)xj​(ℓ). It is IC (incentive compatible) if for every kkk, reporting truthfully maximizes the probability of receiving one of the buyer's kkk favourite items:

∑j∈ℓ1:kxj(ℓ)≥∑j∈ℓ1:k∩ℓ′xj(ℓ′)∀ℓ,ℓ′∈L, k≤∣ℓ∣,∑j∈ℓxj(ℓ)≤1,xj(ℓ)≥0.\sum_{j \in \ell_{1:k}} x_j(\ell) \ge \sum_{j \in \ell_{1:k} \cap \ell'} x_j(\ell') \quad \forall \ell, \ell' \in \mathcal L,\ k \le |\ell|, \qquad \sum_{j \in \ell} x_j(\ell) \le 1, \qquad x_j(\ell) \ge 0.j∈ℓ1:k​∑​xj​(ℓ)≥j∈ℓ1:k​∩ℓ′∑​xj​(ℓ′)∀ℓ,ℓ′∈L, k≤∣ℓ∣,j∈ℓ∑​xj​(ℓ)≤1,xj​(ℓ)≥0.

REV[x]=∑ℓp(ℓ)∑j∈ℓrjxj(ℓ)\mathsf{REV}[x] = \sum_{\ell} p(\ell) \sum_{j \in \ell} r_j x_j(\ell)REV[x]=∑ℓ​p(ℓ)∑j∈ℓ​rj​xj​(ℓ), and OPTx\mathsf{OPT}^xOPTx is the optimal value of this linear program. Every assortment is an IC mechanism, so OPTS≤OPTx\mathsf{OPT}^S \le \mathsf{OPT}^xOPTS≤OPTx.

A prefix ρ\rhoρ is an ordered subset of NNN; Pr⁡[ρ]\Pr[\rho]Pr[ρ] is the probability that the list starts with ρ\rhoρ, and ρ\rhoρ is realizable if Pr⁡[ρ]>0\Pr[\rho] > 0Pr[ρ]>0. For nonempty ρ\rhoρ, ρend\rho_{\mathrm{end}}ρend​ is its last item and ρpre\rho_{\mathrm{pre}}ρpre​ the items before it. Pr⁡[j⪰S0∣ρ]\Pr[j \succeq S_0 \mid \rho]Pr[j⪰S0​∣ρ] is the probability that jjj is the first item of SSS on the list, given that the list starts with ρ\rhoρ. The future from ρ\rhoρ dominates the future from ρ′\rho'ρ′ if Pr⁡[j⪰S0∣ρ]≥Pr⁡[j⪰S0∣ρ′]\Pr[j \succeq S_0 \mid \rho] \ge \Pr[j \succeq S_0 \mid \rho']Pr[j⪰S0​∣ρ]≥Pr[j⪰S0​∣ρ′] for all S⊆N∖(ρ∪ρ′)S \subseteq N \setminus (\rho \cup \rho')S⊆N∖(ρ∪ρ′) and j∈Sj \in Sj∈S. The distribution has history-monotone futures if, for all realizable ρ,ρ′\rho, \rho'ρ,ρ′ with ρend=ρend′\rho_{\mathrm{end}} = \rho'_{\mathrm{end}}ρend​=ρend′​ and ρpre⊈ρpre′\rho_{\mathrm{pre}} \not\subseteq \rho'_{\mathrm{pre}}ρpre​⊆ρpre′​ as sets, the future from ρ\rhoρ dominates the future from ρ′\rho'ρ′.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 18)

For a list distribution with history-monotone futures and any prices r≥0r \ge 0r≥0, there is an assortment SSS with

REV[S]=max⁡{REV[x]:x IC},i.e. OPTS=OPTx.\mathsf{REV}[S] = \max\{\mathsf{REV}[x] : x \text{ IC}\}, \qquad \text{i.e. } \mathsf{OPT}^S = \mathsf{OPT}^x.REV[S]=max{REV[x]:x IC},i.e. OPTS=OPTx.

Milestones

The proof passes through a chain of relaxations OPTS≤OPTx≤OPTf≤OPTϕ\mathsf{OPT}^S \le \mathsf{OPT}^x \le \mathsf{OPT}^f \le \mathsf{OPT}^\phiOPTS≤OPTx≤OPTf≤OPTϕ, where OPTf\mathsf{OPT}^fOPTf maximizes a revenue over increasing set functions f:2N→[0,1]f : 2^N \to [0,1]f:2N→[0,1] and OPTϕ\mathsf{OPT}^\phiOPTϕ over monotone stopping policies ϕj:2N∖{j}→{0,1}\phi_j : 2^{N \setminus \{j\}} \to \{0,1\}ϕj​:2N∖{j}→{0,1} on the tree of prefixes. The milestones, in attack order:

  1. Proposition 1 (p. 9): assortments are IC mechanisms with the same revenue, and deterministic IC mechanisms are assortments.
  2. Proposition 2 (p. 11): f(S)=max⁡ℓ∑j∈S∩ℓxj(ℓ)f(S) = \max_{\ell} \sum_{j \in S \cap \ell} x_j(\ell)f(S)=maxℓ​∑j∈S∩ℓ​xj​(ℓ) turns an IC mechanism into an increasing set function of equal revenue.
  3. Proposition 3 (p. 14, posed with a corrected clause): OPTf\mathsf{OPT}^fOPTf has a boolean optimum, and boolean fff with f(∅)=0f(\emptyset) = 0f(∅)=0 become stopping policies of equal revenue.
  4. Lemma 1 (p. 19, posed corrected): for SSS inside the set of items where ϕ\phiϕ always stops, REV[ϕ]−REV[S]\mathsf{REV}[\phi] - \mathsf{REV}[S]REV[ϕ]−REV[S] is a weighted sum of SSS-adjusted prices rS(ρ)=rρend−∑j′∈Srj′Pr⁡[j′⪰S0∣ρ]r^S(\rho) = r_{\rho_{\mathrm{end}}} - \sum_{j' \in S} r_{j'} \Pr[j' \succeq S_0 \mid \rho]rS(ρ)=rρend​​−∑j′∈S​rj′​Pr[j′⪰S0​∣ρ].
  5. Lemma 2 (p. 20): under history-monotone futures, the SSS-disjoint prefixes ending in jjj split into tiers ordered by inclusion and by conditional choice probabilities.
  6. Corollary 1 (p. 20): adjusted prices are monotone over the tiers.
  7. Display (43) (p. 45): the identity of Lemma 1 rewritten as a sum over lists.
  8. The extremal claim of §E.2 (p. 43): under history-monotone futures some optimal monotone stopping policy is an assortment, so OPTϕ=OPTS\mathsf{OPT}^\phi = \mathsf{OPT}^SOPTϕ=OPTS.

Significance

History-monotone futures hold for Markov Chain choice models (hence MNL), for Elimination by Aspects, and for MNL mixed with singleton lists (Propositions 4–6). Theorem 2 therefore says that for these widely used models no lottery or other IC selling scheme beats the best assortment, and the many algorithms that compute optimal assortments under them compute the seller's optimal revenue over all mechanisms. Without the condition the conclusion fails (Example 1).

The result is proved on paper; no machine-checked proof exists. A formalization contributes a verified development of the relaxation chain (mechanisms, set functions, stopping policies on a prefix tree), which applies to any list distribution, and pins down the hypotheses of two intermediate statements that are false as printed (Lemma 1 and the "Moreover" clause of Proposition 3; see below).

Difficulty

The natural argument is an exchange argument: if a policy stops on a prefix ρ\rhoρ but continues on ρ′\rho'ρ′ with the same endpoint, history-monotone futures should make it profitable to stop on ρ′\rho'ρ′ as well. This fails: a policy can earn strictly more by continuing from a dominated future than from a dominating one (p. 19, discussing Example 2), because which items it later stops on depends on the history. A pairwise comparison of prefixes is therefore not enough: the condition has to be used on all prefixes with a given endpoint at once, and the relevant quantity is not the revenue of a prefix's future but its price net of the future revenue of an assortment. The relaxation from set functions to boolean set functions (Proposition 3) is a further step that a direct argument does not supply.

Formalization scope

Items are Fin n (0-based), lists are List (Fin n), and a list distribution is a finite support of Nodup lists with positive weights summing to one; n=0n = 0n=0 and the empty list are allowed. Prices satisfy rj≥0r_j \ge 0rj​≥0, the paper's standing assumption. A mechanism is a function of a list and an item, of which only the values at ℓ∈L\ell \in \mathcal Lℓ∈L, j∈ℓj \in \ellj∈ℓ are read. Realizable prefixes are the nonempty prefixes of support lists; domination, history-monotone futures, adjusted prices and tiers quantify over realizable prefixes only, so a conditional probability is never taken at Pr⁡[ρ]=0\Pr[\rho] = 0Pr[ρ]=0. Quantifying over all prefixes would compare Lean's x/0=0x/0 = 0x/0=0 against positive probabilities and make the hypothesis fail for almost every distribution. Stopping policies are Bool-valued.

The goal states attainment: some REV[S]\mathsf{REV}[S]REV[S] is the greatest value of REV[x]\mathsf{REV}[x]REV[x] over IC mechanisms. A weakened IC constraint (only ℓ′=ℓ\ell' = \ellℓ′=ℓ, or only k=∣ℓ∣k = |\ell|k=∣ℓ∣) would admit first-best mechanisms and make the goal false; constraint (3) is stated for every ℓ,ℓ′∈L\ell, \ell' \in \mathcal Lℓ,ℓ′∈L and every k≤∣ℓ∣k \le |\ell|k≤∣ℓ∣.

Two printed statements are corrected. Lemma 1 holds only when ϕj\phi_jϕj​ is the all-1 function for every j∈Sj \in Sj∈S, as in the proof of Theorem 2; it fails for ϕ≡0\phi \equiv 0ϕ≡0 and S≠∅S \ne \emptysetS=∅. The "Moreover" clause of Proposition 3 needs f(∅)=0f(\emptyset) = 0f(∅)=0; it fails for f≡1f \equiv 1f≡1. Each corrected item lists its counterexample.

All definitions live in one module (AssortOpt.HMF.Setting); the list-distribution, mechanism and stopping-policy layer is reusable for the paper's other results (Theorem 1 on Markov Chains, Propositions 4–9, the approximation bounds of §5). Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are follow-up missions on those results.

Selected references

  • W. Ma, When is Assortment Optimization Optimal?, Management Science (forthcoming); arXiv:2105.10433v5, 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.10433
  • J. Blanchet, G. Gallego, V. Goyal, A Markov chain approximation to choice modeling, Operations Research 64(4), 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2016.1505
  • J. B. Feldman, H. Topaloglu, Revenue management under the Markov chain choice model, Operations Research 65(5), 2017. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1628
  • K. Talluri, G. van Ryzin, Revenue management under a general discrete choice model of consumer behavior, Management Science 50(1), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0147
  • R. B. Myerson, Optimal auction design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
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Quantum Error CorrectionQuantum Information·Captain: mikedeng1

A Note on Quantum Error Correction with Continuous Variables: With Infinite Squeezing the Gaussian Three-Mode Repetition Code Reduces the Displacement-Error Probability from γ to γ³Research Paper

Motivation

Quantum information carried by continuous variables, such as the quadratures xxx and ppp of an optical mode, is cheap to manipulate with beam splitters, squeezers and homodyne detectors, but these Gaussian tools cannot protect Gaussian states against Gaussian noise: Niset, Fiurášek and Cerf proved in 2008 that no Gaussian error-correcting code can do better than direct transmission against Gaussian channels (arXiv:0811.3128). Peter van Loock's note (arXiv:0811.3616) shows that this no-go does not cover non-Gaussian noise: a stochastic error that displaces a mode by a fixed amount with probability γ\gammaγ turns a Gaussian state into a discrete mixture, and against it a purely Gaussian three-mode repetition code (offline squeezing, two beam splitters, homodyne detection, feedforward) reduces the error probability from γ\gammaγ to γ3\gamma^3γ3.

The example is the continuous-variable analogue of the three-qubit bit-flip code. Unlike that code, it identifies double errors as well as single ones, so it improves on direct transmission without the qubit code's requirement γ<1/2\gamma<1/2γ<1/2.

Setting

A single optical mode is described by its Wigner function W(x,p)W(x,p)W(x,p), a real function on phase space R2\mathbb R^2R2; three modes by a function of x=(x1,x2,x3)x=(x_1,x_2,x_3)x=(x1​,x2​,x3​) and p=(p1,p2,p3)p=(p_1,p_2,p_3)p=(p1​,p2​,p3​). Units are those in which the vacuum has variance 1/41/41/4.

  • Input: the coherent state with mean (xˉ1,pˉ1)(\bar x_1,\bar p_1)(xˉ1​,pˉ​1​), Win(x1,p1)=2πe−2(x1−xˉ1)2−2(p1−pˉ1)2W_{\mathrm{in}}(x_1,p_1)=\frac2\pi e^{-2(x_1-\bar x_1)^2-2(p_1-\bar p_1)^2}Win​(x1​,p1​)=π2​e−2(x1​−xˉ1​)2−2(p1​−pˉ​1​)2.
  • Ancillas: two x-squeezed vacua with squeezing parameter rrr, Wanc(x,p)=2πe−2e2rx2−2e−2rp2W_{\mathrm{anc}}(x,p)=\frac2\pi e^{-2e^{2r}x^2-2e^{-2r}p^2}Wanc​(x,p)=π2​e−2e2rx2−2e−2rp2.
  • Tritter: the orthogonal matrix DDD with rows (1,1,1)/3(1,1,1)/\sqrt3(1,1,1)/3​, (2/3,−1/6,−1/6)(\sqrt{2/3},-1/\sqrt6,-1/\sqrt6)(2/3​,−1/6​,−1/6​), (0,1/2,−1/2)(0,1/\sqrt2,-1/\sqrt2)(0,1/2​,−1/2​), acting on xxx and on ppp. Encoding maps WWW to W(Dx,Dp)W(Dx,Dp)W(Dx,Dp), decoding maps WWW to W(DTx,DTp)W(D^{\mathsf T}x,D^{\mathsf T}p)W(DTx,DTp).
  • Channel: each mode independently is displaced by xˉ2>0\bar x_2>0xˉ2​>0 in xxx with probability γ∈(0,1)\gamma\in(0,1)γ∈(0,1); on a single mode, W↦(1−γ)W(x,p)+γW(x−xˉ2,p)W\mapsto(1-\gamma)W(x,p)+\gamma W(x-\bar x_2,p)W↦(1−γ)W(x,p)+γW(x−xˉ2​,p).
  • Syndrome and recovery: after decoding, modes 2 and 3 are measured by x-homodyne detection (integrating out p2,p3p_2,p_3p2​,p3​), mode 1 is displaced by a feedforward φ(x2,x3)\varphi(x_2,x_3)φ(x2​,x3​) that depends on the outcomes only, and the outcomes are averaged. The result is the output state Wr(x1,p1)W_r(x_1,p_1)Wr​(x1​,p1​) of mode 1.
  • Fidelity with the pure input: F(W)=π∫WinW dx dpF(W)=\pi\int W_{\mathrm{in}}W\,dx\,dpF(W)=π∫Win​Wdxdp.

An error pattern is a set S⊆{1,2,3}S\subseteq\{1,2,3\}S⊆{1,2,3} of erring channels. After decoding it shifts the signal by ∣S∣xˉ2/3|S|\bar x_2/\sqrt3∣S∣xˉ2​/3​ and the ancillas to a syndrome point σ(S)∈R2\sigma(S)\in\mathbb R^2σ(S)∈R2. The paper's feedforward for pattern SSS is a linear function φS\varphi_SφS​ of (x2,x3)(x_2,x_3)(x2​,x3​) that undoes the signal shift at σ(S)\sigma(S)σ(S).

Formalization targets

Goal: Eq. (10) and the fidelity statements after it

For every measurable φ\varphiφ that equals φS\varphi_SφS​ on the Euclidean disc of radius xˉ2/6\bar x_2/\sqrt6xˉ2​/6​ around σ(S)\sigma(S)σ(S), for each pattern S≠{1,2,3}S\neq\{1,2,3\}S={1,2,3}:

lim⁡r→∞Wr(x1,p1)=(1−γ3) Win(x1,p1)+γ3 Win(x1−3 xˉ2,p1),\lim_{r\to\infty}W_r(x_1,p_1)=(1-\gamma^3)\,W_{\mathrm{in}}(x_1,p_1)+\gamma^3\,W_{\mathrm{in}}(x_1-\sqrt3\,\bar x_2,p_1),r→∞lim​Wr​(x1​,p1​)=(1−γ3)Win​(x1​,p1​)+γ3Win​(x1​−3​xˉ2​,p1​), lim⁡r→∞F(Wr)=1−γ3+γ3e−3xˉ22 ≥ 1−γ3,\lim_{r\to\infty}F(W_r)=1-\gamma^3+\gamma^3e^{-3\bar x_2^2}\ \ge\ 1-\gamma^3,r→∞lim​F(Wr​)=1−γ3+γ3e−3xˉ22​ ≥ 1−γ3,

and this limit exceeds the exact direct-transmission fidelity 1−γ+γe−xˉ221-\gamma+\gamma e^{-\bar x_2^2}1−γ+γe−xˉ22​ if and only if γ2(1+e−xˉ22+e−2xˉ22)<1\gamma^2(1+e^{-\bar x_2^2}+e^{-2\bar x_2^2})<1γ2(1+e−xˉ22​+e−2xˉ22​)<1.

The paper asserts the comparison "for any 0<γ<10<\gamma<10<γ<1" against Fdirect=1−γF_{\mathrm{direct}}=1-\gammaFdirect​=1−γ, an approximation valid for xˉ2≫1\bar x_2\gg1xˉ2​≫1. With the exact direct fidelity the claim fails for small xˉ2\bar x_2xˉ2​ and large γ\gammaγ (γ=0.9\gamma=0.9γ=0.9, xˉ2=0.5\bar x_2=0.5xˉ2​=0.5: 0.6150.6150.615 against 0.8010.8010.801), so the goal poses the comparison in its exact, corrected form. It holds for every γ≤1/3\gamma\le1/\sqrt3γ≤1/3​ and, for each γ<1\gamma<1γ<1, once xˉ2\bar x_2xˉ2​ is large enough.

Milestones

The displays the derivation passes through, in order: the encoded state (6); the eight-term expansion (7) under three independent channels; the decoded state (8); the syndrome table, which shows that only "no error" and "error in every channel" share a syndrome; the homodyne marginal with feedforward (9); and the delta-function limit of the squeezed-ancilla marginals as r→∞r\to\inftyr→∞.

Significance

The result. The code reduces the error probability of a stochastic displacement channel from γ\gammaγ to γ3\gamma^3γ3 using only Gaussian operations, which shows that the Gaussian no-go theorem depends on the noise being Gaussian. The syndrome table also shows that a continuous-variable code has more distinguishable error subspaces than its qubit analogue: double errors are identified and corrected.

Formalizing it. The paper's derivation is a chain of displayed formulas with no stated decision regions and no fidelity formula. A formal version fixes what the feedforward is allowed to know (only the measured (x2,x3)(x_2,x_3)(x2​,x3​)), turns "the Gaussians become delta functions" into a limit theorem, and replaces the comparison with 1−γ1-\gamma1−γ by an exact criterion. To our knowledge none of these statements has been machine-checked.

Difficulty

Eqs. (6)–(9) are Gaussian algebra and Gaussian integrals: tedious but mechanical. The difficulty is the limit. The feedforward is one function of (x2,x3)(x_2,x_3)(x2​,x3​), not a different correction for each error pattern as Eq. (9) is printed, and it is pinned down only near the seven distinct syndrome points. Passing to r→∞r\to\inftyr→∞ needs the squeezed marginals to concentrate on those points while the integrand, which involves the arbitrary measurable φ\varphiφ elsewhere, stays controlled. The fidelity limit then needs a second exchange of limit and integral over phase space.

Formalization scope

  • Phase space is R2\mathbb R^2R2 per mode; three-mode Wigner functions are (Fin 3 → ℝ) → (Fin 3 → ℝ) → ℝ, with the paper's mode jjj at Lean index j−1j-1j−1. Units: vacuum variance 1/41/41/4.
  • The output WrW_rWr​ is computed from the protocol: product state, tritter, three independent single-mode channels, inverse tritter, and a four-dimensional Bochner integral over ((x2,x3),(p2,p3))((x_2,x_3),(p_2,p_3))((x2​,x3​),(p2​,p3​)) of the decoded state with mode 1 displaced by φ(x2,x3)\varphi(x_2,x_3)φ(x2​,x3​). No stage is replaced by the closed forms of Eqs. (6)–(9).
  • The feedforward hypothesis uses the squared Euclidean distance; Mathlib's sup metric on R×R\mathbb R\times\mathbb RR×R would make neighbouring discs overlap and the hypothesis unsatisfiable. The pattern {1,2,3}\{1,2,3\}{1,2,3} is excluded, since its syndrome coincides with that of no error. The radius xˉ2/6\bar x_2/\sqrt6xˉ2​/6​ is half the minimal syndrome distance, so the discs are disjoint and nearest-syndrome decoding satisfies the hypothesis.
  • The feedforward is a function of (x2,x3)(x_2,x_3)(x2​,x3​) alone and is required to be measurable (a non-measurable integrand would have Bochner integral 000). A feedforward that knows the error pattern would give output WinW_{\mathrm{in}}Win​ and fidelity 111; that formalization is ruled out by construction.
  • Fidelity is π∫WinW\pi\int W_{\mathrm{in}}Wπ∫Win​W, the overlap ⟨ψ∣ρ∣ψ⟩\langle\psi|\rho|\psi\rangle⟨ψ∣ρ∣ψ⟩ with the pure coherent input in these units.
  • Standing hypotheses xˉ2>0\bar x_2>0xˉ2​>0 and 0<γ<10<\gamma<10<γ<1 are those of the paper.
  • Needed infrastructure: Gaussian integrals and dominated convergence (Mathlib), an approximate-identity lemma for Gaussian kernels in two variables, and change of variables under an orthogonal matrix. The approximate-identity milestone is reusable for any squeezing limit. Contributions to any milestone, or alternative routes to the goal, are welcome.

Selected references

  • P. van Loock, A note on quantum error correction with continuous variables, arXiv:0811.3616v1, 2008 (later published in J. Mod. Opt.). https://arxiv.org/abs/0811.3616
  • J. Niset, J. Fiurášek, N. J. Cerf, A no-go theorem for Gaussian quantum error correction, Phys. Rev. Lett. 102, 120501, 2009. https://arxiv.org/abs/0811.3128
  • S. L. Braunstein, Error correction for continuous quantum variables, Phys. Rev. Lett. 80, 4084, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.80.4084
  • S. Lloyd, J.-J. E. Slotine, Analog quantum error correction, Phys. Rev. Lett. 80, 4088, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.80.4088
  • M. A. Nielsen, I. L. Chuang, Quantum Computation and Quantum Information, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
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Bandit AlgorithmsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Learning to Rank an Assortment of Products: The Simple Learning Algorithm Hooks Half the Optimal Ranking's Customers up to ε with Probability 1 − δResearch Paper

Why rank an assortment

Online retailers display hundreds of products in a list or a grid, and most visitors never scroll far. A customer who finds nothing appealing near the top leaves without engaging at all, so the order of the first few slots decides whether a visit turns into a click, and through it into a sale. Ferreira, Parthasarathy and Sekar (SSRN 3395992; Management Science, 2021, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.4130) model this with a first impression window: each customer is guaranteed to look at a number of top positions, and is hooked if she clicks at least one product there. The retailer wants a ranking that hooks as many customers as possible, without knowing customer preferences in advance, learning them only from observed clicks.

The paper shows that the offline problem, with full knowledge of the customer distribution, is NP-hard (Proposition 1), that a greedy ranking hooks at least half as many customers as the best ranking (Theorem 1), and that a learning algorithm built on any off-the-shelf PAC bandit algorithm matches that factor up to an arbitrarily small additive error (Theorem 3). This mission formalizes the last result for general customer populations.

Setting

There are nnn products [n]={1,…,n}[n] = \{1,\dots,n\}[n]={1,…,n}. A ranking is a permutation π\piπ of [n][n][n]; π−1(j)\pi^{-1}(j)π−1(j) is the product in position jjj. A customer type is a triple (p,f,k)(p, f, k)(p,f,k):

  • p=(p1,…,pn)p = (p_1,\dots,p_n)p=(p1​,…,pn​) with pi∈[0,1]p_i \in [0,1]pi​∈[0,1], the intrinsic click probabilities;
  • fi:2[n]→[−pi,1−pi]f_i : 2^{[n]} \to [-p_i, 1-p_i]fi​:2[n]→[−pi​,1−pi​], the bias functions, with fi(∅)=0f_i(\emptyset) = 0fi​(∅)=0;
  • k∈[n]k \in [n]k∈[n], the first impression window.

Customers arrive with types drawn independently from an arbitrary distribution D\mathcal DD on types; the three components may be correlated. A customer facing π\piπ inspects positions 1,…,k1,\dots,k1,…,k in order. If χ\chiχ is the set of products she has clicked so far, she clicks the product iii in front of her with probability pi+fi(χ)p_i + f_i(\chi)pi​+fi​(χ). Clicks beyond position kkk are ignored. She is hooked, H(π)=1H(\pi) = 1H(π)=1, if she clicks some product in positions 1,…,k1,\dots,k1,…,k. The objective is the expected hook E[H(π)]\mathbb E[H(\pi)]E[H(π)], the expectation taken over the type and the clicks.

The marginal benefit of placing product iii right after a partial ranking σ\sigmaσ is E[H(σ∪i)]−E[H(σ)]\mathbb E[H(\sigma\cup i)] - \mathbb E[H(\sigma)]E[H(σ∪i)]−E[H(σ)]. The Simple Learning Algorithm (Algorithm 2) fills ranks 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n in order. At rank rrr it runs an (ϵ′,δ′)(\epsilon',\delta')(ϵ′,δ′)-PAC algorithm for the multi-armed bandit problem (Definition 1, after Even-Dar, Mannor and Mansour 2006: with probability at least 1−δ′1-\delta'1−δ′ it returns an arm whose mean is within ϵ′\epsilon'ϵ′ of the best) on the products not yet ranked. The reward of arm iii is H(π~∪i)−H(π~)H(\tilde\pi\cup i) - H(\tilde\pi)H(π~∪i)−H(π~) for the current prefix π~\tilde\piπ~, and the algorithm places the returned product at rank rrr.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3, part 1 (pp. 22–23)

For ϵ,δ>0\epsilon,\delta > 0ϵ,δ>0 and any (ϵ′,δ′)(\epsilon',\delta')(ϵ′,δ′)-PAC black box with ϵ′=2ϵ/n\epsilon' = 2\epsilon/nϵ′=2ϵ/n and δ′=δ/n\delta' = \delta/nδ′=δ/n, with probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ the returned ranking π~\tilde\piπ~ satisfies

E[H(π~)] ≥ 12 E[H(π∗)]−ϵfor every ranking π∗.\mathbb E[H(\tilde\pi)] \ \ge\ \tfrac12\,\mathbb E[H(\pi^*)] - \epsilon \quad\text{for every ranking } \pi^* .E[H(π~)] ≥ 21​E[H(π∗)]−ϵfor every ranking π∗.

Milestones

  1. First-click identity (proof of Lemma 1, p. 53): without a prior click, a click on iii is Bernoulli(pi)(p_i)(pi​). Hence the hook probability given the type is 1−∏j≤k(1−pπ−1(j))1 - \prod_{j\le k}(1-p_{\pi^{-1}(j)})1−∏j≤k​(1−pπ−1(j)​), and equals the probability of the same event under a coupling with one like-coin per product.
  2. (6) (p. 50): E[H(π)]=∑rE[Cˉ(r−1,π)Cπ−1(r)(π)]\mathbb E[H(\pi)] = \sum_{r} \mathbb E[\bar C(r-1,\pi)C_{\pi^{-1}(r)}(\pi)]E[H(π)]=∑r​E[Cˉ(r−1,π)Cπ−1(r)​(π)], where Cˉ(r,π)\bar C(r,\pi)Cˉ(r,π) indicates no click in the top rrr positions. Each term is the marginal benefit of the product at rank rrr.
  3. (10) (p. 51): E[H(π∗)]≤E[H(π)]+∑rE[Cˉ(r−1,π)Cˉ(r−1,π∗)Cπ∗−1(r)(π∗)]\mathbb E[H(\pi^*)] \le \mathbb E[H(\pi)] + \sum_r \mathbb E[\bar C(r-1,\pi)\bar C(r-1,\pi^*)C_{\pi^{*-1}(r)}(\pi^*)]E[H(π∗)]≤E[H(π)]+∑r​E[Cˉ(r−1,π)Cˉ(r−1,π∗)Cπ∗−1(r)​(π∗)] for any rankings π,π∗\pi,\pi^*π,π∗.
  4. (26) (p. 59): each joint term is at most the marginal benefit of π∗−1(r)\pi^{*-1}(r)π∗−1(r) placed after [π~]r−1[\tilde\pi]_{r-1}[π~]r−1​.
  5. Approximate-greedy bound (p. 58, proved by (25)–(28)): a ranking whose every rank is 2ϵ/n2\epsilon/n2ϵ/n-approximately best satisfies E[H(π∗)]≤2E[H(π~)]+2ϵ\mathbb E[H(\pi^*)] \le 2\mathbb E[H(\tilde\pi)] + 2\epsilonE[H(π∗)]≤2E[H(π~)]+2ϵ.
  6. (24) (p. 58): by the union bound, every rank is approximately best with probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ.

Significance

The result says that learning costs nothing in the approximation factor. The best known factor for general customer populations is the greedy algorithm's ½, and a retailer who knows nothing about D\mathcal DD attains it up to ϵ\epsilonϵ by plugging in any PAC bandit algorithm. Sample-efficient best-arm algorithms such as LUCB can be used unchanged, and the learning phase is nnn times the black box's sample complexity (Corollary 1). The same template is reused later in the paper for the threshold-acceptance and revenue variants.

On the formal side, the mission produces a reusable model of position-based browsing with biased sequential clicks, with a proof that the bias functions do not affect the hook probability (milestone 1). It also produces a statement of an "approximate greedy" guarantee that does not pass through submodularity: the paper notes (p. 25) that the hook objective is not presented as a submodular set function. The paper's proofs are on paper only. No machine-checked version of any result of the paper is known.

Difficulty

The obvious route to the ½ factor is to view E[H(⋅)]\mathbb E[H(\cdot)]E[H(⋅)] as a monotone submodular function of the set of displayed products and invoke the greedy guarantee. That route fails here: the objective is a function of an order, the bias functions fif_ifi​ make clicks depend on earlier clicks, and windows vary across customers. Comparing two rankings on the same customer needs a joint law of her clicks under both, which the model does not supply; the paper fixes a coupling (p. 53), and the coupled events must agree with the sequential law, which is where fi(∅)=0f_i(\emptyset) = 0fi​(∅)=0 enters. And the probabilistic step on p. 59 that writes a conditional probability as Et[pi∗t]\mathbb E_t[p_{i^*t}]Et​[pi∗t​] holds only type by type, so (26) has to be argued per type before averaging. On the probabilistic side, the black box's guarantee holds conditionally on the random prefix built so far, and the union bound must be taken over ranks after averaging over prefixes.

Formalization scope

Products are Fin n and rankings are duplicate-free lists of length nnn. Ranks are 0-based in Lean (the paper's rank rrr is index r−1r-1r−1). Probabilities are real numbers. A type is the structure CustomerType n with every constraint above as a field. The type distribution is a probability measure DDD on a measurable space Θ\ThetaΘ together with a type map τ\tauτ. The added hypothesis TypeMeasurable τ asks that every coordinate of the type be measurable; the page treats (p,f,k)∼D(p,f,k)\sim\mathcal D(p,f,k)∼D as a random variable, and without measurability the Bochner integrals would be 000. The expected hook is computed from the sequential click law with bias (an explicit sum over click patterns inside the window), not from a closed form. The comparisons in (6), (10) and (26) use the paper's coupling (p. 53): one Bernoulli(pi)(p_i)(pi​) like-variable per product, shared by all rankings. The maximum in (23) is over unranked products, as in Algorithm 2.

The black box is formalized through its guarantee. A SimpleLearningRun is a random output ranking whose rank-rrr product, conditionally on every prefix already fixed, fails to be ϵ′\epsilon'ϵ′-approximately best with probability at most δ′\delta'δ′. This is Definition 1 applied at each call (p. 58). The black box's sampling and its sample complexity are not modelled, since they enter only Corollaries 1–2. The goal rules out three trivializing readings. It does not assume that all ranks are good with probability 1−δ1-\delta1−δ, which is the conclusion of (24). The expected hook is not the closed form 1−∏(1−p)1-\prod(1-p)1−∏(1−p), which would make the bias decorative. And the optimal ranking is quantified over every ranking inside the event, not chosen after π~\tilde\piπ~.

Not formalized: Theorem 3 part 2 (independent p,f,kp,f,kp,f,k, factor 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e, not proved in the paper), Theorems 1, 2, 4, 5, Proposition 1 and the sample-complexity and regret corollaries. Proofs of any milestone are welcome. Milestone 5 at ϵ=0\epsilon = 0ϵ=0 contains Theorem 1 and could seed a follow-up.

Selected references

  • K. J. Ferreira, S. Parthasarathy, S. Sekar, Learning to Rank an Assortment of Products, Management Science, 2021. SSRN author manuscript: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3395992 ; https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4130
  • E. Even-Dar, S. Mannor, Y. Mansour, Action Elimination and Stopping Conditions for the Multi-Armed Bandit and Reinforcement Learning Problems, JMLR 7, 2006. https://www.jmlr.org/papers/v7/evendar06a.html
  • F. Radlinski, R. Kleinberg, T. Joachims, Learning Diverse Rankings with Multi-Armed Bandits, ICML 2008. https://doi.org/10.1145/1390156.1390255
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