Motivation
An apportionment method distributes the H seats of a house among n states in proportion to their populations. Exact proportionality is impossible with integer seats, so methods are judged by axioms. Two axioms date back to the debates over the seats of the US House of Representatives. Quota compliance asks that each state receive its exact proportional share rounded down or up. House monotonicity asks that no state lose a seat when the house grows; the Alabama paradox of 1880, in which Hamilton's method took a seat from Alabama when the house was enlarged, is the classic failure. The two axioms can hold together. Balinski and Young (Mathematics of Operations Research, 1979) and Still (SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics, 1979) characterized the methods satisfying both through a recursive, seat-by-seat construction. Gölz, Peters and Procaccia (EC 2022) later gave a description by a fractional matching polytope.
Cembrano, Correa, Schmidt-Kraepelin, Tsigonias-Dimitriadis and Verdugo (arXiv:2410.23869, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025) give a third characterization, by a network-flow linear program. It replaces the recursive construction with the vertex set of a polytope that can be written down and optimized over. This mission formalizes that characterization, Theorem 3 of the paper.
Setting
An instance is a pair (p,H). Here p=(p1,…,pn) is a vector of n≥1 strictly positive integers (the populations of the states) and H≥1 is an integer, the house size. Write P=∑ipi; the quota of state i is qi=PpiH.
A solution f assigns to every instance one vector f(p,H)∈N0n with ∑ifi(p,H)=H. It is defined for every number of states n and every population vector. It is quota-compliant if fi(p,H)∈{⌊qi⌋,⌈qi⌉} always. It is house-monotone if f(p,H1)≤f(p,H2)≤f(p,H3) componentwise whenever H1<H2<H3. The set of apportionments such solutions produce is
A(p,H)={f(p,H):f a house-monotone and quota-compliant solution}.
For L seats, the network-flow linear program (1)–(4) has a variable x(i,t)≥0 for each state i and seat t∈[L], subject to
i=1∑nx(i,t)=1,⌊Ptpi⌋≤ℓ=1∑tx(i,ℓ)≤⌈Ptpi⌉.
Its feasible region is K(p,L) and its set of extreme points is E(p,L). The count Ai(x,T)=∑ℓ=1Tx(i,ℓ) is the number of seats state i holds after T seats.
The lookahead Φ(p,H) is the number of seats the LP must model so that its first H seats are exactly the house-monotone, quota-compliant ones. For a vector y and k≥1, let Sk(p,H,y)={i:⌊pi(H+k)/P⌋>yi}. Let k⋆(p,H,y) be the least k≥1 with ∑i∈Sk(⌊pi(H+k)/P⌋−yi)≥k. Set τ=k⋆ unless Sk⋆=[n], in which case τ=1. Then Φ(p,0)=0, Φ(p,1)=min{k≥1:∑i⌊pik/P⌋≥k}, and
Φ(p,H+1)=T∈[H]max{T+max{τ(p,T,A(x,T)):x∈E(p,Φ(p,H))}}.
The Lean names are IsPop, Solution, QuotaCompliant, HouseMonotone, calA, K, calE, A, S, kStar, tau, Phi, all in the namespace MonoApport.Flow.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 3
A(p,H)={A(x,H):x∈E(p,Φ(p,H))}for every instance (p,H).
Milestones
- Proposition 8. A solution is house-monotone if and only if f(p,H)≤f(p,H+1) for every p and H.
- Total unimodularity (proof of Lemma 3). The matrix with rows ei,t, −ei,t, et′, −et′ is totally unimodular. Here ei,t is the prefix-sum row of state i up to seat t, and et′ is the column-sum row of seat t.
- Lemma 3. The linear program (1)–(4) is integral: every extreme point has integer coordinates.
- Remark after Lemma 3. E(p,L) is exactly the set of integer points of K(p,L).
- Balinski–Young characterization (§C.4). f is a house-monotone and quota-compliant solution if and only if, with f(p,0)=0, each seat H+1 goes to one state of L(p,H,f(p,H))∩U(p,H,f(p,H)). Here L(p,H,y)={i:⌊Ppi(H+k⋆(p,H,y))⌋>yi} and U(p,H,y)={i:Ppi(H+1)>yi}.
- Lemma 5. If x∈E(p,Φ(p,H)) and T≤H−1, then x(i,T+1)=0 for every i∈/L(p,T,A(x,T))∩U(p,T,A(x,T)).
Significance
The result. Theorem 3 turns a recursive definition into a polyhedral one. The apportionments at house size H that some house-monotone, quota-compliant solution can produce are the projections of the vertices of a network-flow polytope with Φ(p,H) seats. Optimizing a linear objective over all such apportionments is then a linear program of size O(nΦ(p,H)). The paper also bounds the lookahead: Φ(p,H)−H≤maxi⌈P/pi⌉ for H≥2, and the bound is tight up to constants. Through the correspondence between methods and solutions (Lemma 2 of the paper), the theorem also characterizes house-monotone, quota-compliant methods. It underlies the paper's construction of randomized methods that are house-monotone, quota-compliant and ex-ante proportional (Theorem 4).
The formalization. The paper proves Theorem 3. None of the statements here has a machine-checked proof, and the Balinski–Young characterization is cited by the paper rather than proved in it. A formal development would check the full chain: total unimodularity of an interval-type constraint matrix, integrality of the polytope, the lookahead bound of Lemma 5, and the combination with the Balinski–Young construction. It would also make the network-flow polytope and the lookahead Φ available to later work on apportionment.
Difficulty
The inclusion A(p,H)⊆{A(x,H)} looks routine: the seat increments of a house-monotone, quota-compliant solution give a 0/1 feasible point. But that point must have Φ(p,H) seats, and it must be an extreme point, which requires the integrality of (1)–(4).
The reverse inclusion is the hard part. A vertex of the LP with H seats need not extend to a quota-compliant sequence: a seat assignment can respect every quota bound up to H and still force a violation a few seats later. The lookahead Φ is designed so that this cannot happen. However, Φ is defined by a recursion over extreme points of LPs of other sizes, and it is not monotone in H: for p=(1,2) the values are Φ=0,3,2,3,4,…. An argument that truncates a vertex for Φ(p,H) seats to one for Φ(p,H−1) seats, or assumes Φ(p,H)≥Φ(p,H−1), is therefore unavailable.
Closing the inclusion also needs the Balinski–Young construction never to get stuck: L∩U must be nonempty along every sequence it builds. The paper takes this from Balinski and Young without stating it separately.
Formalization scope
Populations are p : Fin n → ℕ with IsPop p (n>0 and every pi>0); house sizes carry 0 < H. A solution is one Lean function Solution := ∀ {n}, (Fin n → ℕ) → ℕ → (Fin n → ℕ) defined on vectors of every length. A(p,H) quantifies over such families, exactly as in the paper; a per-p sequence of apportionments would be a different object. House monotonicity is axiom (c) with three house sizes; the one-step form is Proposition 8, a milestone. LP points with L seats are x : Fin n → Fin L → ℝ. Seats are 0-indexed, so column t is seat t+1, and the quota bounds at column t use t+1. Floors and ceilings are Nat.floor/Nat.ceil of the nonnegative rational quantity computed in R. E(p,L) is Set.extremePoints ℝ (K p L). The minima and maxima defining k⋆ and Φ are sInf/sSup on N, whose sets are nonempty, and finite where a maximum is taken, wherever they are used. The convention f(p,0)=0 is the function ext. The goal compares subsets of Rn: the image of A(p,H) under the cast equals {A(x,H)}.
The goal must not be read with integer vectors on both sides. Writing A(p,H)={y:(yi:R)=Ai(x,H) for some x} would silently ignore non-integral A(x,H) and empty the inclusion ⊇ of its content.
A complete development needs:
- total unimodularity and the integrality of polytopes with totally unimodular constraints (Hoffman–Kruskal), partly available in Mathlib through
Matrix.IsTotallyUnimodular;
- the finiteness of the extreme points of a polytope;
- a formal proof of the Balinski–Young characterization, including the nonemptiness of L∩U along the construction.
The first two are reusable well beyond apportionment. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, and so are proofs of the cited Balinski–Young theorem and of the properties of Φ the paper uses (Φ(p,H)≥H, and the finiteness and nonemptiness of the sets in its recursion).
Selected references
- J. Cembrano, J. Correa, U. Schmidt-Kraepelin, A. Tsigonias-Dimitriadis, V. Verdugo, New Combinatorial Insights for Monotone Apportionment, arXiv:2410.23869v1, 2024; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.23869
- M. Balinski, H. P. Young, Quotatone apportionment methods, Mathematics of Operations Research 4(1):31–38, 1979. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.4.1.31
- M. Balinski, H. P. Young, The quota method of apportionment, The American Mathematical Monthly 82(7):701, 1975.
- M. Balinski, H. P. Young, Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote, Brookings Institution Press, 2010.
- J. W. Still, A class of new methods for congressional apportionment, SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 37(2):401–418, 1979.
- P. Gölz, D. Peters, A. D. Procaccia, In this apportionment lottery, the house always wins, Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 2022.
- A. Ghouila-Houri, Caractérisation des matrices totalement unimodulaires, C. R. Acad. Sci. Paris 254:1192–1194, 1962.