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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

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🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Contract Unobservability and Downstream Competition: Under Unobservable Contracts and Passive Beliefs, Wholesale Prices Beat Two-Part Tariffs for the Manufacturer iff θ ≥ 2√2Research Paper

A manufacturer selling through several retailers rarely publishes the terms it gives each of them. Wholesale prices, slotting fees and rebates are negotiated bilaterally, and a retailer usually sees its own contract but not its rival's. Much of the supply-chain contracting literature nevertheless assumes observable contracts, and under that assumption a…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Customization and Returns: Allowing Returns of Customized Products Can Increase Profits and Reduce Total ReturnsResearch Paper

Many sellers accept returns of standard goods but restrict returns of customized goods. A customized item is more likely to fit its buyer, yet it may be harder for the seller to recover value when it comes back. Choosing a return policy therefore changes both what customers buy and how many units they return. Esenduran, Letizia, and Ovchinnikov study this…

5 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

An Axiomatization of the Proportional Rule in Financial Networks: The Proportional Rule Is the Unique Bankruptcy Rule Satisfying the Five Basic Axioms and Invariance to MitosisResearch Paper

When a bank or firm in a network of mutual obligations cannot meet its liabilities, some rule must decide how much each debtor pays each creditor. The rule used almost universally in the systemic-risk literature is the proportional rule of Eisenberg and Noe (2001): every agent pays its liabilities in full if it can, and otherwise distributes its whole asset…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Loot Box Pricing and Design: The Optimal Normalized Revenue of Traditional Loot Boxes Converges to μ/e as the Number of Items GrowsResearch Paper

Loot boxes are a selling format for virtual items in video games and digital collectibles: the customer pays a fixed price for a box whose content is a random item from a catalog. They generate a large share of revenue in the game industry and have drawn regulatory attention because the customer does not know what they are buying. From the seller's side…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents: The Trading Post Mechanism with a Small Entrance Fee Has Price of Anarchy at Most 1 + ε for Leontief UtilitiesResearch Paper

Allocating divisible resources among agents with money-like budgets is the setting of Fisher markets. When agents report their preferences, a central planner can compute a market equilibrium, and by the Eisenberg–Gale convex program that equilibrium maximizes the Nash social welfare, the budget-weighted geometric mean of utilities. This objective is a…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Outcome-Based Pricing for New Pharmaceuticals via Rebates: A Firm-to-Payer Transfer Makes Outcome-Based Pricing Better for Both Firm and Payer if and only if the Drug Is High-RiskResearch Paper

New brand-name drugs, in particular biologics, are expensive. Their benefit is also uncertain: a given patient cannot know in advance whether the treatment will work for her. Outcome-based pricing (also called performance-based or risk-sharing agreements) responds to this. The manufacturer is paid only when the treatment reaches a pre-specified goal and…

17 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Leasing, Modularity, and the Circular Economy: Optimal Joint Choice of Business Model and Architecture — Lease Modular at Low Cost, Else Sell Modular/Integral (γ ≤ 1) or Lease Integral (γ > 1)Research Paper

The circular economy movement argues that manufacturers should keep control of their products after use (by leasing instead of selling) and design them so that worn parts can be replaced individually (a modular architecture). Each of the two levers has a long literature in operations management and economics. Leasing versus selling durable goods is studied…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Enabling Entrepreneurial Choice: A Strategy-Biased Test (λ_s = 1) Is Preferred to an Idea-Biased Test (λ_v = 1) if (1 − p₀)e₀(1 − λ_s)C > (1 − λ_v)p₀(1 − e₀)(e₀v − C)Research Paper

A new venture rarely knows two things at once: whether its core idea is worth anything, and whether the particular way it has chosen to bring the idea to market — its strategy — will work. A failed pilot, a disappointing A/B test or a lukewarm customer experiment can mean either, and the founder cannot tell which. Work on entrepreneurial experimentation…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Sustainability in the Fast Fashion Industry: With Endogenous Variety, Optimal Quality Falls as Consumers Grow More Fashion-Sensitive, New Styles Get Cheaper to Design, or the Market GrowsResearch Paper

The apparel industry is a large source of carbon emissions, water use and landfill waste, and much of that footprint comes from garments being discarded early. Fast-fashion retailers such as Zara and H&M combine two operational choices: they offer a very large number of styles each season, and they replenish the styles that turn out to be popular through qui…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Growth in Two-Sided Markets: The Optimal Market Balance Depends Only on Market Size and Moves Monotonically Between the Output- and Durability-Maximizing BalancesResearch Paper

A two-sided platform (a ride-hailing service, a marketplace, a payment network) earns money only when its two sides transact, so its value depends on the stock of participants on both sides. A young platform has to decide not only how fast to grow but also which side to grow, and it does so through the prices it sets on each side. Whether to subsidize…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Demand Pooling in Omnichannel Operations: When the Online Waiting Cost Is Relatively Low and the Store Visiting Cost Even Lower, Buy-Online-Pickup-at-Store Benefits the RetailerResearch Paper

Retailers that sell both through physical stores and online increasingly offer buy-online-pickup-at-store (BOPS): a customer reserves an item online against the store's inventory and collects it in the store. Whether this helps the retailer is not obvious. BOPS changes which customers draw on the store inventory, and therefore how much stock the store…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisControl TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Knowledge Accumulation, Privacy, and Growth in a Data Economy: The Decentralized Economy Grows at the Socially Optimal Rate on the Balanced Growth PathResearch Paper

Data have become an input to innovation: firms use consumer data, together with research labor, to develop new products. Data differ from labor and capital in two ways. They are a by-product of consumption, so their supply is endogenous, and selling them costs consumers privacy. Cong, Xie and Zhang (arXiv:2109.10028, published in Management Science) put…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Strategic Benefit of Request for Proposal/Quotation: Sequential Bargaining with an Iterative RFx Stage Gives the Buyer at Least Her Most Favorable Bargaining ProfitResearch Paper

Industrial buyers rarely negotiate with suppliers from scratch. A common practice is to issue a request for proposal/quotation (RFx): suppliers first submit quotations, and the buyer then negotiates contracts with them one after another, possibly using the quotations as fallback options. Chu, Rong and Zheng (SSRN 3200030; Operations Research, doi:10.1287/opr…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Evolution of Shares in a Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrency: Under Coin Rewards R_t = ρN_{t−1}^γ, Limiting Investor Shares Concentrate at the Initial Share as N → ∞ if and only if γ < 1Research Paper

In a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) cryptocurrency, new coins are not mined with computing power: before each date the protocol picks one coin holder at random, with probability equal to the fraction of coins she holds, and pays her a reward of new coins. A common claim in the cryptocurrency press is that this makes the rich richer: larger holders are selected more…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Initial Coin Offerings, Speculation, and Asset Tokenization: A Utility-Token ICO Fails When v ≤ 2c and Otherwise Has a Unique Equilibrium with Cap n* in (mc/v, m/2) and No Fund DiversionResearch Paper

A firm can sell utility tokens before it has produced the good those tokens will buy. The sale supplies cash for production, but the firm can keep some or all of that cash instead. Speculators anticipate both the later value of a token and this diversion incentive when deciding whether to buy. Gan, Tsoukalas and Netessine study the resulting financing and…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Signaling to the Crowd: Private Quality Information and Rewards-Based Crowdfunding: A Separating Equilibrium Always Exists, and the High Type Charges v_H and Signals by Raising Its Target to C*(α)Research Paper

Rewards-based crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter and Indiegogo let a creator pre-sell a product before it exists. Most backers cannot judge the product's quality from a campaign page, while some (experts, early adopters, people who have seen a prototype) can. A creator who knows her product is good therefore faces a classical signaling problem: how…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryAnalysisOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Managing Congestion in Matching Markets: The Unique Mean-Field Equilibrium Has Acceptance Probability min(p̂, p̄) and Explicit Welfare for Both SidesResearch Paper

Online matching platforms (labor platforms such as Upwork or TaskRabbit, dating sites, short-term rental platforms) make it cheap to contact potential partners, but not cheap to find one who is still available. A worker who has already accepted a job, or a listing that is already booked, keeps receiving applications and keeps being screened. Arnosti, Johari…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Is Personalized Pricing Profitable When Firms Can Differentiate? II: If Personalized Pricing Is Decided Before Positioning, Neither Firm Adopts It at Any Cost F ≥ 0Research Paper

Firms can use information about individual customers to quote different prices. That ability changes their price competition, but it can also change where they locate their products or services in a market. For a firm deciding whether to invest in personalized pricing (PP), the order of those decisions matters: a positioning choice made after the investment…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Is Personalized Pricing Profitable When Firms Can Differentiate? I: With Costless Personalized Pricing Both Firms Adopt It and Locate at 1/4 and 3/4, Each Earning t/8Research Paper

Firms that collect data on individual consumers can price each one separately. This is personalized pricing (PP): targeted coupons, individualized offers, prices that depend on a customer's browsing or purchase history. Whether competing firms gain from this ability is a long-standing question in industrial organization. When firm positions are fixed, the…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Aggregating Distributed Energy Resources: Efficiency and Market Power II: Prosumer Participation Raises Welfare and Shrinks the Welfare Loss from Generators' Strategic BiddingResearch Paper

Households and small firms increasingly own distributed energy resources (DERs): rooftop solar, batteries, small generators. A household that owns a DER is a prosumer: it consumes electricity and can also sell its surplus. Whether prosumers should be allowed to sell into the wholesale market, directly or through an aggregator that pools many small units, is…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Aggregating Distributed Energy Resources: Efficiency and Market Power I: A Profit-Seeking Aggregator with Two-Part Pricing Attains the Benchmark Welfare, Dispatch and PricesResearch Paper

Distributed energy resources (DERs) — rooftop solar, home batteries, electric vehicles — turn electricity consumers into prosumers who can both buy and sell power. Their individual capacities are far too small to bid in a wholesale electricity market directly, so regulators have opened these markets to DER aggregators, intermediaries that pool many small…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization II: On Low-Moreishness, Near-Constant-Value Manifolds, Engagement Maximization Is Near-OptimalResearch Paper

Recommender systems on online platforms are usually trained to maximize engagement: time spent, items consumed, sessions returned. The implicit justification is revealed preference: a user who consumes more must value the content more. Behavioural economics questions that inference when a person's choices are driven by two conflicting processes, a…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Improving Access to Rare Disease Treatments: Subsidy, Pricing, and Payment Schemes I: With Manufacturer Pricing, Subsidize Only the Manufacturer; Outcome-Based Pay Raises the Price iff B < k − 1/8Research Paper

Treatments for rare diseases can require substantial research and development spending while reaching a small patient population. A public subsidy can cover part of the manufacturer's development cost, part of the patient's price, or both. Which recipient should receive the subsidy depends on how the manufacturer responds. A further design choice is whether…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization I: Engagement Beats Utility Only Through Higher Moreishness, or Higher Span with Lower ValueResearch Paper

Online platforms rank content by what they can measure: clicks, watch time, session length. The implicit justification is revealed preference: if users stay longer, they must like what they see. Kleinberg, Mullainathan and Raghavan (arXiv:2202.11776v3, Management Science 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.03683) question this justification with a model of a user…

4 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Output-Oriented Agricultural Subsidy Design II: The Combined Subsidy Needs the Least Budget, and the Selective Subsidy Needs Less Than Either Single SubsidyResearch Paper

Governments sometimes pay crop producers to increase supply. A payment for each unit planted and a payment for each unit harvested create different incentives when farmers have different yields. An agency choosing among those formats needs to know how much it must spend to attain the same total output. Fan, Feng, Li, Shanthikumar, and Wu study that question…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
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