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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

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🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Precommitments in Two-Sided Market Competition 1: Committing to a Matching Capacity, Then Competing in Price and Wage, Yields the Quantity-Competition OutcomeResearch Paper

A service platform makes decisions on two sides of a market. It charges consumers a price and pays independent providers a wage, then earns a margin only when it can match a consumer with a provider. Capacity is another decision available to the platform: it can limit how many matches it will carry, for example by limiting the active provider pool. Hu and…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality Signaling Through Crowdfunding Pricing II: With Price Commitment and a Small Quality Gap, the Unique Refined Separating Equilibrium Lowers the Funding Price and Raises the Regular PriceResearch Paper

In reward-based crowdfunding, a seller asks customers to pay before the product's quality is known to them. A high-quality seller can try to communicate private quality through the prices he posts. That signal is costly because a price that deters imitation may also reduce the seller's own expected revenue. Bolandifar, Chen, Kouvelis and Zhou study this…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryDynamical Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Network Externalities and Market Dominance: Under In/Out Demand the Impulse Selects the Introspective Equilibrium by Its Position Relative to the Middle EquilibriumResearch Paper

Markets with network externalities can support several levels of adoption at the same price. A consumer's willingness to buy may rise when many other consumers buy, while the ordinary price effect still works in the opposite direction. A price and an aggregate demand curve can therefore identify several self-consistent quantities without identifying which…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity II: A Token Pre-Sale with Revenue Share t/(t+c) Induces Monopoly Output, Has a Unique Break-Even Size, and Leaves the Entrepreneur the NPVResearch Paper

Entrepreneurs sometimes sell claims on a product before it exists. A token can represent a claim on a future unit, and its eventual market price can depend on how much the entrepreneur produces. That link creates a production incentive absent from a simple sale of equity. Malinova and Park study whether the token allocation can fund a venture while…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Output-Oriented Agricultural Subsidy Design I: Under a Combined Subsidy, More Dispersed Farmer Productivity Gives More Dispersed Outputs and ProfitsResearch Paper

Agricultural subsidies can raise total crop supply while changing which farmers produce it. A payment tied to planted input gives a larger reward per unit of harvested output to a farmer who needs more input for that output. A payment tied to harvested output gives the same reward per unit of output to every farmer. These differences matter when a…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality Signaling Through Crowdfunding Pricing I: Without Price Commitment, a Low Enough Funding Price Is the Unique Separating Equilibrium That Survives the Intuitive CriterionResearch Paper

In reward based crowdfunding, customers must decide whether to back a product before its quality is known to them. The entrepreneur knows that quality and chooses a funding price. A high quality entrepreneur may therefore use price to convey information, but the same price is available to a low quality entrepreneur. The choice also changes the chance that…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization V: The Seller Earns More Under A-Learning, Buyers Earn More Under O-Learning, and Small Fixed Costs Reverse Both When Selling Is CheapResearch Paper

A firm can learn a customer's preference before choosing a customized product, or it can let the customer choose a requested design. The two approaches assign the design decision to different parties. That matters when design changes both the value of a sale and a cost the seller must incur before the price is negotiated. Guo's study of customer voice in…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Courier Dispatch in On-Demand Delivery II: In a Crowded Market with Endogenous Demand, Batch Delivery Earns More Exactly Below One Threshold in Wait Cost and in Service RadiusResearch Paper

A delivery vendor controls both how a courier serves orders and what customers pay. Serving one order per trip avoids waiting for a second order, but serving two together can save travel time when demand is high. If the vendor can change its price, it also changes the rate at which customers join the system. The preferred dispatch rule therefore depends on…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization I: Under A-Learning, Truthful Cheap-Talk Communication Is an Equilibrium If and Only If θH/θL ≥ ΔResearch Paper

Sellers often ask customers what they want before designing a product or service. The answer can affect both the quality delivered and the price paid. Because a customer can send a costless, unverifiable message, the seller cannot assume that a stated preference is true. Guo's customization model asks when the customer's own incentives make truthful…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Management in Crowdfunding 2: Optimal Pledge Level and Campaign Duration When Each Backer Type Shares One Valuation and Herding Is WeakResearch Paper

On reward-based crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter, a project creator fixes two numbers before launch: the pledge level ppp, the amount a backer commits, and the campaign duration TTT. Both are set once and cannot be revised. A higher pledge earns more per backer but turns away backers whose valuation falls short, and a longer campaign reaches more…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Sharing Sequentially Triggered Losses: Automated Conflict Resolution Through Smart Contracts 2: For Equal Losses the Midpoint Fixed-Fraction Rule Is Equidistant from All Ideal AllocationsResearch Paper

When a contract breach propagates along a supply chain, one failure triggers the next: a supplier delivers late, the manufacturer misses its own delivery, the distributor misses its, and so on. Each link suffers a loss caused by its predecessor, and the question is who should be liable for what. Gudmundsson, Hougaard and Ko (Management Science 70(3), 2024)…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 3: Sensitivities of Equilibrium Hash Rates to Mining Capacity and Reward, and Shares Shift to Smaller MinersResearch Paper

Bitcoin and other proof-of-work cryptocurrencies rely on miners, who spend computing power ("hash rate") to win the right to append a block and collect a reward. The security argument for such systems assumes that no single miner, or small coalition, controls a large share of the total hash rate. Whether the economics of mining push the system towards or…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Marketplace Leakage 4: The Marketplace Prefers Not to Impose a Price-Parity Clause If and Only If q < 1/2 and μ > (v − c)/2Research Paper

Online marketplaces (Amazon, Booking.com, Airbnb, Upwork) charge sellers a fee on every transaction they intermediate. Once a buyer has found a seller on the marketplace, both have an incentive to complete the sale off the platform and split the fee they save. This is leakage (also called disintermediation or showrooming), and it limits the fees a…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Sharing Sequentially Triggered Losses: Automated Conflict Resolution Through Smart Contracts 1: Additive, Zero-Truncating, Merging-Proof, Population-Monotonic Rules Are the Fixed-Fraction RulesResearch Paper

Contract breaches in supply chains rarely stay isolated. A supplier that delivers late forces its customer to breach its own downstream contract, which in turn harms the next firm, and so on. Each firm in such a chain both suffers a loss and causes one, and a court, an arbitrator or a self-executing smart contract has to decide who pays for what.…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Marketplace Leakage 2: Optimal Investment in Transaction Benefits Decreases in Its Cost and Is First Constant, Then Decreasing, Then Increasing in Switching CostsResearch Paper

Online marketplaces for services (home repair, tutoring, beauty appointments, freelancing) earn a fee on each transaction they intermediate. After a buyer has found a seller on the marketplace, both sides can often complete the transaction, or the next one, off the platform and avoid the fee. This leakage (also called disintermediation) is a central…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

A Strongly Polynomial Algorithm for Linear Exchange Markets I: Over Revealed Edges, the Prices of an F-Equilibrium Support a Market EquilibriumResearch Paper

The linear exchange market (the linear Arrow–Debreu model) is the basic model of general equilibrium with linear utilities: each agent brings goods to the market, sells them at the going prices, and spends the proceeds on the goods that give the most utility per unit of money. Computing its equilibrium is a classical problem in algorithmic game theory and…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Partial Vertical Ownership, Capacity Investment, and Information Exchange in a Supply Chain II: Truthful Cheap Talk Is an Equilibrium Iff the Ownership Share β Is at Least β̳Research Paper

A supplier who must build capacity before a selling season would like to know how large demand will be, and the retailer downstream often knows better. Under a simple wholesale-price contract, however, the retailer gains from overstating demand: more capacity means more sales for her, and the cost of idle capacity falls on the supplier. Since the retailer's…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Partial Vertical Ownership, Capacity Investment, and Information Exchange in a Supply Chain I: Under Complete Information the Retailer Finances the Entire Capacity Iff β ≥ β̲, and β̲ < 1Research Paper

Firms in a supply chain often hold equity in one another. A retailer may own a minority stake in a supplier without controlling it: the stake is passive, but it changes what the retailer cares about, because part of the supplier's profit now accrues to her. Avinadav and Shamir (Management Science, 2023) study how such partial vertical ownership (PVO) affects…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamical SystemsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimum Earnings Regulation and the Stability of Marketplaces II: Without Subsidies a Utilization Shock u₀ Can Be Absorbed Exactly When u₀ ≥ M/J(C(M))Research Paper

In 2018 New York City's Taxi and Limousine Commission adopted a minimum earnings rule for ride-hailing drivers: each platform must pay drivers, per hour spent with a passenger, at least a target hourly earnings level divided by the platform's measured driver utilization in the previous period. The rule ties next period's wage floor to this period's idle…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamical SystemsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimum Earnings Regulation and the Stability of Marketplaces III: A Minimum Earnings Marketplace Is Dynamically Stable Exactly When It Is Statically StableResearch Paper

In 2018 New York City's Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) imposed a minimum pay formula on the largest ride-hailing platforms, following a proposal by Parrott and Reich (2018): the pay per minute and per mile driven is divided by the platform's utilization rate, the fraction of drivers' working time spent carrying passengers. Seattle adopted a similar…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Operational Risk Management: Optimal Inspection Policy II: The Optimal Hybrid Inspection Policy Strictly Beats the Random Policy and Weakly Beats the Periodic PolicyResearch Paper

Banks and other financial firms lose money through operational errors: mistyped trades, missed reconciliations, compliance lapses. Regulators require the firm to hold capital against these losses, and internal audit teams spend most of their effort deciding when to inspect. Two inspection schedules are common in practice: a periodic schedule (inspect every…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Marketplace Leakage 1: With Uniform Switching Costs the Equilibrium Fee Is min{μ, v − c}, Leakage Is Positive but Partial, and the Marketplace's Profit Increases in μResearch Paper

Online marketplaces such as Airbnb, Amazon, eBay, Preply or Upwork earn most of their revenue from transaction fees: a seller who sells through the marketplace pays a fee on every sale. Many of these sellers also run their own sales channel, and a buyer who discovers a seller on the marketplace can often complete the purchase directly with that seller,…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Digital Privacy II: Against the Social Optimum, a Business Never Under-Collects While Over-Protecting Data, and a Purely Usage-Driven One Under-Collects and Under-ProtectsResearch Paper

Digital businesses (search engines, social networks, marketplaces) record what their users do and decide how well to protect what they record. Both choices affect users: stored data can improve the service, and it can also be accessed by adversaries such as hackers, fraudsters or data brokers, whose activity harms users. Regulation of data collection and…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisControl TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Punish Underperformance with Suspension: Optimal Dynamic Contracts in the Presence of Switching Cost III: Condition 2, Medium Switching Cost, Always-Work Value Functions Meet the Optimality ConditionsResearch Paper

Many service relationships pay an agent per unit of output whose arrival is random: a salesperson closing deals, a call-centre worker resolving tickets, a contractor delivering jobs. When effort is unobservable, the classical tool for keeping an agent motivated is the threat of termination after poor performance. In practice firms often use a milder…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Improving Dispute Resolution in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Review Blackmail I: Under Centralized Dispute Resolution the Equilibrium Ransom Is Not Monotonically Decreasing in Efficiency γδResearch Paper

Online marketplaces depend on consumer reviews, and a single negative review can move a seller's future sales. Review blackmail exploits this: a consumer buys a product, posts a negative review, and offers to remove it in exchange for a payment. Platforms such as Amazon, eBay, Taobao and TripAdvisor respond with dispute resolution mechanisms that let…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
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