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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

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🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Evolution of Shares in a Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrency: Under Coin Rewards R_t = ρN_{t−1}^γ, Limiting Investor Shares Concentrate at the Initial Share as N → ∞ if and only if γ < 1Research Paper

In a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) cryptocurrency, new coins are not mined with computing power: before each date the protocol picks one coin holder at random, with probability equal to the fraction of coins she holds, and pays her a reward of new coins. A common claim in the cryptocurrency press is that this makes the rich richer: larger holders are selected more…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Persuading Customers to Buy Early: The Value of Personalized Information Provisioning: The Personalized Buy/Wait/No Mechanism Is Optimal and Strictly Beats Public SignalingResearch Paper

A seller who sells over two periods, at a full price now and a discount later, loses revenue to strategic customers who wait for the discount. Waiting is costly to the customer only through availability risk: if inventory is scarce, the product may be gone by the second period. Inventory is usually known to the firm and not to its customers, so the firm can…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Initial Coin Offerings, Speculation, and Asset Tokenization: A Utility-Token ICO Fails When v ≤ 2c and Otherwise Has a Unique Equilibrium with Cap n* in (mc/v, m/2) and No Fund DiversionResearch Paper

A firm can sell utility tokens before it has produced the good those tokens will buy. The sale supplies cash for production, but the firm can keep some or all of that cash instead. Speculators anticipate both the later value of a token and this diversion incentive when deciding whether to buy. Gan, Tsoukalas and Netessine study the resulting financing and…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Signaling to the Crowd: Private Quality Information and Rewards-Based Crowdfunding: A Separating Equilibrium Always Exists, and the High Type Charges v_H and Signals by Raising Its Target to C*(α)Research Paper

Rewards-based crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter and Indiegogo let a creator pre-sell a product before it exists. Most backers cannot judge the product's quality from a campaign page, while some (experts, early adopters, people who have seen a prototype) can. A creator who knows her product is good therefore faces a classical signaling problem: how…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryAnalysisOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Managing Congestion in Matching Markets: The Unique Mean-Field Equilibrium Has Acceptance Probability min(p̂, p̄) and Explicit Welfare for Both SidesResearch Paper

Online matching platforms (labor platforms such as Upwork or TaskRabbit, dating sites, short-term rental platforms) make it cheap to contact potential partners, but not cheap to find one who is still available. A worker who has already accepted a job, or a listing that is already booked, keeps receiving applications and keeps being screened. Arnosti, Johari…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Is Personalized Pricing Profitable When Firms Can Differentiate? II: If Personalized Pricing Is Decided Before Positioning, Neither Firm Adopts It at Any Cost F ≥ 0Research Paper

Firms can use information about individual customers to quote different prices. That ability changes their price competition, but it can also change where they locate their products or services in a market. For a firm deciding whether to invest in personalized pricing (PP), the order of those decisions matters: a positioning choice made after the investment…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Addictive Platforms 1: Monopoly versus Duopoly — Competition Raises Addictiveness and Hurts the Consumer When Attention Is Scarce, and Lowers Addictiveness When It Is AbundantResearch Paper

Digital services are paid for with attention: an ad-financed platform earns more the longer its users stay. Policy reports on digital markets (Crémer, de Montjoye and Schweitzer, 2019; the U.K. Digital Competition Expert Panel, 2019; Scott Morton et al., 2019) worry that such firms degrade their services with features that capture attention at the user's…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Is Personalized Pricing Profitable When Firms Can Differentiate? I: With Costless Personalized Pricing Both Firms Adopt It and Locate at 1/4 and 3/4, Each Earning t/8Research Paper

Firms that collect data on individual consumers can price each one separately. This is personalized pricing (PP): targeted coupons, individualized offers, prices that depend on a customer's browsing or purchase history. Whether competing firms gain from this ability is a long-standing question in industrial organization. When firm positions are fixed, the…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Aggregating Distributed Energy Resources: Efficiency and Market Power II: Prosumer Participation Raises Welfare and Shrinks the Welfare Loss from Generators' Strategic BiddingResearch Paper

Households and small firms increasingly own distributed energy resources (DERs): rooftop solar, batteries, small generators. A household that owns a DER is a prosumer: it consumes electricity and can also sell its surplus. Whether prosumers should be allowed to sell into the wholesale market, directly or through an aggregator that pools many small units, is…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Aggregating Distributed Energy Resources: Efficiency and Market Power I: A Profit-Seeking Aggregator with Two-Part Pricing Attains the Benchmark Welfare, Dispatch and PricesResearch Paper

Distributed energy resources (DERs) — rooftop solar, home batteries, electric vehicles — turn electricity consumers into prosumers who can both buy and sell power. Their individual capacities are far too small to bid in a wholesale electricity market directly, so regulators have opened these markets to DER aggregators, intermediaries that pool many small…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization II: On Low-Moreishness, Near-Constant-Value Manifolds, Engagement Maximization Is Near-OptimalResearch Paper

Recommender systems on online platforms are usually trained to maximize engagement: time spent, items consumed, sessions returned. The implicit justification is revealed preference: a user who consumes more must value the content more. Behavioural economics questions that inference when a person's choices are driven by two conflicting processes, a…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Improving Access to Rare Disease Treatments: Subsidy, Pricing, and Payment Schemes I: With Manufacturer Pricing, Subsidize Only the Manufacturer; Outcome-Based Pay Raises the Price iff B < k − 1/8Research Paper

Treatments for rare diseases can require substantial research and development spending while reaching a small patient population. A public subsidy can cover part of the manufacturer's development cost, part of the patient's price, or both. Which recipient should receive the subsidy depends on how the manufacturer responds. A further design choice is whether…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization I: Engagement Beats Utility Only Through Higher Moreishness, or Higher Span with Lower ValueResearch Paper

Online platforms rank content by what they can measure: clicks, watch time, session length. The implicit justification is revealed preference: if users stay longer, they must like what they see. Kleinberg, Mullainathan and Raghavan (arXiv:2202.11776v3, Management Science 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.03683) question this justification with a model of a user…

4 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Output-Oriented Agricultural Subsidy Design II: The Combined Subsidy Needs the Least Budget, and the Selective Subsidy Needs Less Than Either Single SubsidyResearch Paper

Governments sometimes pay crop producers to increase supply. A payment for each unit planted and a payment for each unit harvested create different incentives when farmers have different yields. An agency choosing among those formats needs to know how much it must spend to attain the same total output. Fan, Feng, Li, Shanthikumar, and Wu study that question…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Precommitments in Two-Sided Market Competition 1: Committing to a Matching Capacity, Then Competing in Price and Wage, Yields the Quantity-Competition OutcomeResearch Paper

A service platform makes decisions on two sides of a market. It charges consumers a price and pays independent providers a wage, then earns a margin only when it can match a consumer with a provider. Capacity is another decision available to the platform: it can limit how many matches it will carry, for example by limiting the active provider pool. Hu and…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Infinite-Dimensional Fisher Markets and Tractable Fair Division 3: The Quasilinear Eisenberg–Gale Programs Attain Their Optima and Characterize Quasilinear EquilibriaResearch Paper

A Fisher market allocates a common supply of items among buyers with separate budgets. When the items form a continuum, such as positions in a measurable interval, a buyer's valuation and the market price are functions rather than finite lists. This is a useful model for divisible resources and for settings in which an allocation can be described as a…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality Signaling Through Crowdfunding Pricing II: With Price Commitment and a Small Quality Gap, the Unique Refined Separating Equilibrium Lowers the Funding Price and Raises the Regular PriceResearch Paper

In reward-based crowdfunding, a seller asks customers to pay before the product's quality is known to them. A high-quality seller can try to communicate private quality through the prices he posts. That signal is costly because a price that deters imitation may also reduce the seller's own expected revenue. Bolandifar, Chen, Kouvelis and Zhou study this…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryDynamical Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Network Externalities and Market Dominance: Under In/Out Demand the Impulse Selects the Introspective Equilibrium by Its Position Relative to the Middle EquilibriumResearch Paper

Markets with network externalities can support several levels of adoption at the same price. A consumer's willingness to buy may rise when many other consumers buy, while the ordinary price effect still works in the opposite direction. A price and an aggregate demand curve can therefore identify several self-consistent quantities without identifying which…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity II: A Token Pre-Sale with Revenue Share t/(t+c) Induces Monopoly Output, Has a Unique Break-Even Size, and Leaves the Entrepreneur the NPVResearch Paper

Entrepreneurs sometimes sell claims on a product before it exists. A token can represent a claim on a future unit, and its eventual market price can depend on how much the entrepreneur produces. That link creates a production incentive absent from a simple sale of equity. Malinova and Park study whether the token allocation can fund a venture while…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Output-Oriented Agricultural Subsidy Design I: Under a Combined Subsidy, More Dispersed Farmer Productivity Gives More Dispersed Outputs and ProfitsResearch Paper

Agricultural subsidies can raise total crop supply while changing which farmers produce it. A payment tied to planted input gives a larger reward per unit of harvested output to a farmer who needs more input for that output. A payment tied to harvested output gives the same reward per unit of output to every farmer. These differences matter when a…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality Signaling Through Crowdfunding Pricing I: Without Price Commitment, a Low Enough Funding Price Is the Unique Separating Equilibrium That Survives the Intuitive CriterionResearch Paper

In reward based crowdfunding, customers must decide whether to back a product before its quality is known to them. The entrepreneur knows that quality and chooses a funding price. A high quality entrepreneur may therefore use price to convey information, but the same price is available to a low quality entrepreneur. The choice also changes the chance that…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization V: The Seller Earns More Under A-Learning, Buyers Earn More Under O-Learning, and Small Fixed Costs Reverse Both When Selling Is CheapResearch Paper

A firm can learn a customer's preference before choosing a customized product, or it can let the customer choose a requested design. The two approaches assign the design decision to different parties. That matters when design changes both the value of a sale and a cost the seller must incur before the price is negotiated. Guo's study of customer voice in…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Courier Dispatch in On-Demand Delivery II: In a Crowded Market with Endogenous Demand, Batch Delivery Earns More Exactly Below One Threshold in Wait Cost and in Service RadiusResearch Paper

A delivery vendor controls both how a courier serves orders and what customers pay. Serving one order per trip avoids waiting for a second order, but serving two together can save travel time when demand is high. If the vendor can change its price, it also changes the rate at which customers join the system. The preferred dispatch rule therefore depends on…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization I: Under A-Learning, Truthful Cheap-Talk Communication Is an Equilibrium If and Only If θH/θL ≥ ΔResearch Paper

Sellers often ask customers what they want before designing a product or service. The answer can affect both the quality delivered and the price paid. Because a customer can send a costless, unverifiable message, the seller cannot assume that a stated preference is true. Guo's customization model asks when the customer's own incentives make truthful…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithms for Competitive Division of Chores 2: Indivisible Chores Always Admit a Pareto Optimal Allocation That Is Both Weighted-EF^1_1 and Weighted-Prop1Research Paper

Many allocation problems distribute chores: tasks, shifts, teaching duties or cleaning rotas that every recipient would rather avoid. Agents often have unequal obligations, for example a full-time and a part-time worker, and a fair division should respect these entitlements. When the tasks can be split (time shares, probabilities), the competitive rule of…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
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