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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

Missions

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🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Management in Crowdfunding 2: Optimal Pledge Level and Campaign Duration When Each Backer Type Shares One Valuation and Herding Is WeakResearch Paper

On reward-based crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter, a project creator fixes two numbers before launch: the pledge level ppp, the amount a backer commits, and the campaign duration TTT. Both are set once and cannot be revised. A higher pledge earns more per backer but turns away backers whose valuation falls short, and a longer campaign reaches more…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Sharing Sequentially Triggered Losses: Automated Conflict Resolution Through Smart Contracts 2: For Equal Losses the Midpoint Fixed-Fraction Rule Is Equidistant from All Ideal AllocationsResearch Paper

When a contract breach propagates along a supply chain, one failure triggers the next: a supplier delivers late, the manufacturer misses its own delivery, the distributor misses its, and so on. Each link suffers a loss caused by its predecessor, and the question is who should be liable for what. Gudmundsson, Hougaard and Ko (Management Science 70(3), 2024)…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 3: Sensitivities of Equilibrium Hash Rates to Mining Capacity and Reward, and Shares Shift to Smaller MinersResearch Paper

Bitcoin and other proof-of-work cryptocurrencies rely on miners, who spend computing power ("hash rate") to win the right to append a block and collect a reward. The security argument for such systems assumes that no single miner, or small coalition, controls a large share of the total hash rate. Whether the economics of mining push the system towards or…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithms for Competitive Division of Chores 1: At Most min{(2m−1)^{n(n−1)/2}, (2n−1)^{m(m−1)/2}} Competitive Utility Profiles and Pareto-Frontier Faces Meeting the Negative OrthantResearch Paper

Many allocation problems divide work, not goods: shifts among employees, teaching loads among faculty, cleaning duties among housemates, maintenance tasks among the owners of a shared resource. For divisible goods the standard fair and efficient solution is the competitive rule (competitive equilibrium from budgets): give every agent a budget, find prices…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Marketplace Leakage 4: The Marketplace Prefers Not to Impose a Price-Parity Clause If and Only If q < 1/2 and μ > (v − c)/2Research Paper

Online marketplaces (Amazon, Booking.com, Airbnb, Upwork) charge sellers a fee on every transaction they intermediate. Once a buyer has found a seller on the marketplace, both have an incentive to complete the sale off the platform and split the fee they save. This is leakage (also called disintermediation or showrooming), and it limits the fees a…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Sharing Sequentially Triggered Losses: Automated Conflict Resolution Through Smart Contracts 1: Additive, Zero-Truncating, Merging-Proof, Population-Monotonic Rules Are the Fixed-Fraction RulesResearch Paper

Contract breaches in supply chains rarely stay isolated. A supplier that delivers late forces its customer to breach its own downstream contract, which in turn harms the next firm, and so on. Each firm in such a chain both suffers a loss and causes one, and a court, an arbitrator or a self-executing smart contract has to decide who pays for what.…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Marketplace Leakage 2: Optimal Investment in Transaction Benefits Decreases in Its Cost and Is First Constant, Then Decreasing, Then Increasing in Switching CostsResearch Paper

Online marketplaces for services (home repair, tutoring, beauty appointments, freelancing) earn a fee on each transaction they intermediate. After a buyer has found a seller on the marketplace, both sides can often complete the transaction, or the next one, off the platform and avoid the fee. This leakage (also called disintermediation) is a central…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

A Strongly Polynomial Algorithm for Linear Exchange Markets I: Over Revealed Edges, the Prices of an F-Equilibrium Support a Market EquilibriumResearch Paper

The linear exchange market (the linear Arrow–Debreu model) is the basic model of general equilibrium with linear utilities: each agent brings goods to the market, sells them at the going prices, and spends the proceeds on the goods that give the most utility per unit of money. Computing its equilibrium is a classical problem in algorithmic game theory and…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Partial Vertical Ownership, Capacity Investment, and Information Exchange in a Supply Chain II: Truthful Cheap Talk Is an Equilibrium Iff the Ownership Share β Is at Least β̳Research Paper

A supplier who must build capacity before a selling season would like to know how large demand will be, and the retailer downstream often knows better. Under a simple wholesale-price contract, however, the retailer gains from overstating demand: more capacity means more sales for her, and the cost of idle capacity falls on the supplier. Since the retailer's…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Partial Vertical Ownership, Capacity Investment, and Information Exchange in a Supply Chain I: Under Complete Information the Retailer Finances the Entire Capacity Iff β ≥ β̲, and β̲ < 1Research Paper

Firms in a supply chain often hold equity in one another. A retailer may own a minority stake in a supplier without controlling it: the stake is passive, but it changes what the retailer cares about, because part of the supplier's profit now accrues to her. Avinadav and Shamir (Management Science, 2023) study how such partial vertical ownership (PVO) affects…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamical SystemsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimum Earnings Regulation and the Stability of Marketplaces II: Without Subsidies a Utilization Shock u₀ Can Be Absorbed Exactly When u₀ ≥ M/J(C(M))Research Paper

In 2018 New York City's Taxi and Limousine Commission adopted a minimum earnings rule for ride-hailing drivers: each platform must pay drivers, per hour spent with a passenger, at least a target hourly earnings level divided by the platform's measured driver utilization in the previous period. The rule ties next period's wage floor to this period's idle…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamical SystemsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimum Earnings Regulation and the Stability of Marketplaces III: A Minimum Earnings Marketplace Is Dynamically Stable Exactly When It Is Statically StableResearch Paper

In 2018 New York City's Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) imposed a minimum pay formula on the largest ride-hailing platforms, following a proposal by Parrott and Reich (2018): the pay per minute and per mile driven is divided by the platform's utilization rate, the fraction of drivers' working time spent carrying passengers. Seattle adopted a similar…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Operational Risk Management: Optimal Inspection Policy II: The Optimal Hybrid Inspection Policy Strictly Beats the Random Policy and Weakly Beats the Periodic PolicyResearch Paper

Banks and other financial firms lose money through operational errors: mistyped trades, missed reconciliations, compliance lapses. Regulators require the firm to hold capital against these losses, and internal audit teams spend most of their effort deciding when to inspect. Two inspection schedules are common in practice: a periodic schedule (inspect every…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Marketplace Leakage 1: With Uniform Switching Costs the Equilibrium Fee Is min{μ, v − c}, Leakage Is Positive but Partial, and the Marketplace's Profit Increases in μResearch Paper

Online marketplaces such as Airbnb, Amazon, eBay, Preply or Upwork earn most of their revenue from transaction fees: a seller who sells through the marketplace pays a fee on every sale. Many of these sellers also run their own sales channel, and a buyer who discovers a seller on the marketplace can often complete the purchase directly with that seller,…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
AnalysisControl TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Punish Underperformance with Suspension: Optimal Dynamic Contracts in the Presence of Switching Cost IV: Low Switching Cost, Control-Band Value Functions Meet the Optimality ConditionsResearch Paper

Many service relationships are dynamic contracts in which the principal cannot observe the agent's effort, only its noisy consequences. Cao, Sun and Tian (Management Science, 2024) study such a relationship when the principal can suspend the agent and must pay a fixed switching cost to restart work. Suspension is a punishment that does not end the…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Digital Privacy II: Against the Social Optimum, a Business Never Under-Collects While Over-Protecting Data, and a Purely Usage-Driven One Under-Collects and Under-ProtectsResearch Paper

Digital businesses (search engines, social networks, marketplaces) record what their users do and decide how well to protect what they record. Both choices affect users: stored data can improve the service, and it can also be accessed by adversaries such as hackers, fraudsters or data brokers, whose activity harms users. Regulation of data collection and…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisControl TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Punish Underperformance with Suspension: Optimal Dynamic Contracts in the Presence of Switching Cost III: Condition 2, Medium Switching Cost, Always-Work Value Functions Meet the Optimality ConditionsResearch Paper

Many service relationships pay an agent per unit of output whose arrival is random: a salesperson closing deals, a call-centre worker resolving tickets, a contractor delivering jobs. When effort is unobservable, the classical tool for keeping an agent motivated is the threat of termination after poor performance. In practice firms often use a milder…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Improving Dispute Resolution in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Review Blackmail I: Under Centralized Dispute Resolution the Equilibrium Ransom Is Not Monotonically Decreasing in Efficiency γδResearch Paper

Online marketplaces depend on consumer reviews, and a single negative review can move a seller's future sales. Review blackmail exploits this: a consumer buys a product, posts a negative review, and offers to remove it in exchange for a payment. Platforms such as Amazon, eBay, Taobao and TripAdvisor respond with dispute resolution mechanisms that let…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Improving Dispute Resolution in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Review Blackmail II: Under Semi-Decentralized Dispute Resolution with Penalty b the Equilibrium Ransom Has a Two-Regime Closed FormResearch Paper

Online marketplaces rely on consumer reviews, and a negative review lowers what future buyers believe about a product. Review blackmail exploits this: a consumer buys, posts a negative review, and offers to remove it for a ransom. Platforms counter with dispute-resolution mechanisms. Papanastasiou, Yang and Zhang (Management Science 69(10), 2023) compare…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Accelerability vs. Scalability: R&D Investment Under Financial Constraints and Competition III: Without Accelerability a Financially Constrained Monopoly Invests Less Than an Unconstrained OneResearch Paper

Young innovative firms often fund research out of internal cash flow rather than external capital. Whether such financial constraints make firms invest less in research and development (R&D) is a long-standing question in corporate finance and the economics of innovation. Myers (1977) showed that the possibility of default leads to under-investment in…

4 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption II: A Self-Financing Consumer Access Fee Sustains Full Blockchain Adoption for Large Horizontal DifferentiationResearch Paper

A permissioned blockchain is a shared ledger to which only approved participants may write. In supply chains it is proposed as a way to make product information (origin, quality, which supplier fulfilled an order) verifiable to buyers. Iyengar, Saleh, Sethuraman and Wang (SSRN 3602376; Management Science 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4532) ask who gains from…

10 thms2 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Platform Financing vs. Trade Credit for Lending to Third-Party Sellers II: At Low Uncertainty the Platform Gains by Lending Just Above the Risk-Free Rate at Low Cost and Just Below It at High CostResearch Paper

Online marketplaces such as Amazon, Alibaba and JD.com host millions of third-party sellers, many of them small firms without the working capital to pay their suppliers upfront. Two sources of credit compete for them. In trade credit the supplier ships the goods and is paid at the end of the season, bearing the risk that the seller cannot repay. In platform…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Consumer Privacy in Online Retail Supply Chains II: In a Supplier–Retailer Chain the GDPR Can Leave Consumers, Retailer and Supplier All Strictly Worse Off (Triple-Lose)Research Paper

Data-protection laws such as the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) shift control over personal data from firms to consumers: data may be collected and used only with the consumer's consent and only for the purposes she allows. The usual expectation is that such a rule helps consumers and costs firms. Xu, Wang and Zhang (Management…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Influencer Authenticity: To Grow or to Monetize 2: Under High Follower Turnover the Optimal Policy Is to Stay Authentic ForeverResearch Paper

Social-media influencers earn money by endorsing products to their followers. An endorsement of a product that does not fit the audience brings in money today but costs followers, and followers are also what spreads awareness of the influencer to new people. Nistor, Selove and Villas-Boas (Influencer Authenticity: To Grow or to Monetize, Management Science,…

5 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Retailer-Led Marketplaces 2: The Monopolist Always Charges a Strictly Positive Ad Valorem Marketplace FeeResearch Paper

Large online retailers such as Amazon sell their own products and, on the same storefront, host third-party sellers who pay a commission on their sales. The owner of such a retailer-led marketplace sets the commission, competes with the sellers it hosts, and can direct inattentive consumers to the offer of its choice. How these levers interact is a central…

4 thms2 active usersReviewed
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