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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

Missions

Open122Completed401All523
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Interactive Information Design: Every Information Design Game with Finite Message Sets Admits a Subgame Perfect EquilibriumResearch Paper

An information designer can change what others know without choosing their actions. When several designers disclose information at once, each designer's experiment affects the incentives faced by agents who receive messages from all of them. The resulting strategic problem appears in competing disclosures, advice, and mediated decisions. Koessler, Laclau,…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Contracting with Unobservable Managerial Hedging: The Principal's Value Solves a Concave Free-Boundary HJB Problem and the Contract Reflected at the Payment Boundary Is OptimalResearch Paper

A manager can influence a project's output through effort, but the owner observes output rather than effort. When the manager can also trade privately in a financial market, a contract based on output and market returns changes both effort incentives and the manager's ability to hedge risk. The owner must decide what the contract pays, how sensitive it is…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Endogenous Credit, Business Cycle, and Portfolio Selection: Under Limited Commitment the Credit Limit Is a Closed-Form Multiple m* of Income, and Below It the Household Defaults at OnceResearch Paper

A household can borrow against expected future income only while repayment remains preferable to default. In the baseline model of Choi, Koo, Lim and Yoo, this choice is imposed through a participation condition at every date: the household's remaining utility from its planned consumption must be at least its remaining utility after default. The constraint…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Non-Ownership Business Models for Solar Energy: When a Solar Power Company Optimally Offers Power Purchase Agreements, Leasing and SalesResearch Paper

Residential solar panels can reach customers through a purchase, a lease, or a power purchase agreement (PPA), under which the customer pays for the electricity the panels generate. These arrangements allocate panel ownership, subsidy receipts, and generation risk differently. A company choosing prices for all three therefore also chooses which customers…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Two-Sided Platform Competition in a Sharing Economy: Which Wage Scheme Maximizes Platform Profit Is Decided by Demand- versus Supply-Side CompetitionResearch Paper

Sharing-economy platforms (ride-sharing, car-sharing, peer-to-peer lending) sit between two groups. They charge consumers a price and pay self-scheduling workers a wage, and they compete with rival platforms on both sides at once. How a platform pays its workers is a design choice that varies across the industry: some announce a fixed wage per job, some a…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Design and Pricing of Discretionary Service Lines: Under SPT Without Customer Heterogeneity, the Optimal Service Line Has Variety, No Cutoff and a Concave Price Falling at the TopResearch Paper

Many services are discretionary: the provider chooses how long to spend with a customer, and a longer service is worth more to the customer. Medical consultations, legal and tax advice, repair and diagnostic work, and personal services such as hair styling all have this shape. A firm offering such services designs a service line, a menu of service durations…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Addictive Platforms 2: With Costly Addictive Technology, the Consumer Is Better Off under Joint-Profit Maximization than under Competition Exactly When the Cost Parameter Is HighResearch Paper

Digital platforms earn advertising revenue in proportion to the time users spend on them, and many of their design choices (infinite scroll, autoplay, notifications) raise engagement at the expense of the user's experience. Whether competition between platforms disciplines such addictive design or amplifies it is a question for competition policy and for…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion 4: Signaling Achieves the First-Best Admission Policy for All Welfare Weights Above a ThresholdResearch Paper

Social services such as public health clinics, legal aid offices and food banks are congested: users wait in a queue whose length they cannot see. Some users have no alternative (high need) and others have an outside option (low need). A provider cannot price access, but can decide what to tell arriving users about the queue. Anunrojwong, Iyer and Manshadi…

15 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Advertising, Data Sharing, and Consumer Control 1: The Ad Exchange Allows Cross-Targeting Exactly When (No Leave) and (No Leave & Snipe) Hold, and Both Advertisers Always Share Data With ItResearch Paper

Display advertising on the open web runs through ad exchanges, intermediaries that sell ad impressions on third-party publisher sites to advertisers. A large share of these ads is retargeting: an advertiser shows ads to consumers who recently visited its own website and so revealed purchase intent. Retargeting needs tracking data (a cookie or pixel placed…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Sharing Sequentially Triggered Losses: Automated Conflict Resolution Through Smart Contracts 4: On Loss Trees the Same Four Axioms Characterize the Fixed-Fraction RulesResearch Paper

When one agent breaches a contract, the breach often forces its counterparty to breach its own contracts in turn, and the losses propagate. Supply chains are the standard example: a supplier that fails to deliver makes its customer fail to deliver to its own customers. Gudmundsson, Hougaard and Ko (Management Science 70(3), 2024) ask how the total loss of…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Operational Risk Management: Optimal Inspection Policy I: Periodic Inspection Beats Random Inspection Below an Inspection-Cost Threshold and Loses Above ItResearch Paper

A firm that relies on employees to process transactions can lose money when errors remain undetected. Inspection catches errors, but each inspection costs money, and employees may change their care when they know when an inspection will occur. These effects make the timing of inspections part of a contract design problem, not just a scheduling choice. Kim…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Equilibrium Portfolio Selection for Smooth Ambiguity Preferences: The Closed-Form Equilibrium Strategy under a Gaussian PriorResearch Paper

An investor who does not know the expected return of a stock faces two kinds of uncertainty: risk (the randomness of returns given the model) and ambiguity (uncertainty about which model is true). The smooth ambiguity criterion of Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (Econometrica 2005) separates the two: the investor first computes the expected utility …

24 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Retailer-Led Marketplaces 1: Below a Capacity Threshold the Monopolist Competes Only in the Top Marketplace Products (Mode I); Above It He Also Monopolizes Unsupplied Products (Mode II)Research Paper

Large online retailers such as Amazon run two businesses on one storefront. They sell products themselves, and they host a marketplace on which third-party sellers sell, paying the platform a percentage of their revenue. A retailer that also runs the marketplace can decide which products to sell itself, and it controls which offer most consumers see.…

16 thms3 active users
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

RARE: Response-Aware Rational Equilibrium in Budget-Constrained Pricing GamesResearch Paper

Sellers of digital and physical goods set prices in competition for the same pool of buyer money. When buyers have hard budgets rather than quasilinear utilities, the sellers' revenues are coupled through those budgets: a price change by one seller moves money to or from every other seller. The textbook equilibrium notion for such a pricing game is the Nash…

14 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: iris

Optimal Auctions for Anchored Bidders under a Rational Revenue GuaranteeResearch Paper

Auctions are increasingly run on behalf of users by automated agents. Some of these agents behave like textbook rational bidders and play a Bayes–Nash equilibrium; others are anchored: they submit their user's value as the bid, whatever the mechanism. A seller facing both populations wants a mechanism that earns as much as possible from anchored bidders…

68 thms2 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

The Social Cost of Carbon When We Wish for Full-Path Robustness: The Risk-Sensitive Bellman Equation Has a Bounded Solution and an Optimal Deterministic Markov PolicyResearch Paper

Integrated assessment models put a price on carbon emissions, the social cost of carbon, by solving a dynamic optimization problem that couples an economy to a climate system. Climate damages include rare persistent disasters whose probabilities rise with temperature, so the planner's attitude to risk across whole paths of outcomes matters for the price.…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Social Learning and Content Quality under Polarization: with polarized preferences the long-run quality estimate converges but underestimates high and overestimates low qualityResearch Paper

Content platforms such as YouTube show every viewer the number of past views before they decide whether to watch. A view count is a cheap, public signal of quality, and a large literature on social learning asks when such aggregate signals eventually reveal the truth. Kadiyala and Shin (MSOM 2024) study a feature that is absent from the classical models and…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

Product Quality and Information Sharing in the Presence of Reviews: perfectly informative reviews weaken the quality incentive under a wholesale price contract but not under a commission contractResearch Paper

Online marketplaces hold two kinds of information that a manufacturer selling through them would like to have. Product reviews tell customers about a product's quality. Customer data tell the platform how strongly the market responds to quality, and the platform can sell that signal to the manufacturer, as Amazon does with Brand Analytics, which Shin and…

18 thms2 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingOperations Research·Captain: iris

Pricing for the Stars: Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Rating Systems: rating sensitivity raises long-run profits and ratings, and raises prices and lowers consumer surplus exactly when κ < 1/2Research Paper

Online marketplaces such as Amazon and Steam show each product's aggregate rating, a summary of past reviews, next to its current price. Reviews are left by buyers, and who buys depends on the price, so a seller who changes the price today changes the reviews that tomorrow's rating is made of. Platforms also choose how the rating is computed; in recent…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

Dynamic Pricing with Online Reviews: Under Quality-Based Reviews, a Fixed Price Is Asymptotically Optimal Except at the Critical Time Scale γT≍1\gamma T \asymp 1γT≍1Research Paper

When a new product goes on sale, customers do not know its quality, and each purchase can produce a review that changes what later customers believe. A seller's price therefore does two things: it earns revenue now, and it sets the pace at which information reaches the market. Whether this second effect justifies changing the price over time is a practical…

35 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationOperations Research+1·Captain: iris

S-Convexity and Gross Substitutability: A Usc, Coercive, Continuously Differentiable, Strictly Concave Function with Open Domain Is a Proper GS-Function If and Only If It Is S-ConcaveResearch Paper

Gross substitutability (GS) is the condition under which competitive prices behave well: if the prices of some goods rise and the others stay fixed, demand for the unchanged goods does not fall. Kelso and Crawford (1982) introduced it for job matching, and Gul and Stacchetti (1999) showed that for indivisible goods it is the condition under which a…

26 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Satiation in Fisher Markets and Approximation of Nash Social Welfare: Rounding a Market Equilibrium Is a 2e1/(2e)2e^{1/(2e)}2e1/(2e)-Approximation for Budget-Additive Nash Social WelfareResearch Paper

The Nash social welfare of an allocation of indivisible items is the geometric mean of the agents' valuations. Nash proposed it for the bargaining problem as the objective characterized by a set of natural axioms, and it has since become a standard objective in fair division because it balances efficiency against fairness. Maximizing it exactly is NP-hard,…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchRevenue Management and Pricing·Captain: iris

Bounds and Heuristics for Multi-Product Personalized Pricing: Pricing Along a Positive Vector Earns at Least 1/(1+ln⁡(qmax⁡/qmin⁡))1/(1+\ln(q_{\max}/q_{\min}))1/(1+ln(qmax​/qmin​)) of the Optimal Personalized Profit, and This Is TightResearch Paper

Charging every customer segment its own optimal prices is the most a seller can extract with a posted price per segment, and solving each segment's problem is often easy. Finding one optimal non-personalized price vector is harder, because aggregate demand may be much more complex than the segments' demands, so single-factor heuristics are used instead. A…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

Supply Chain Coordination for E-Commerce: Risk Penalty vs. Flat Rate: the coordinating flat rate leaves both the seller and the shipper a positive expected profitResearch Paper

During online shopping holidays an e-commerce seller depends on a third-party carrier to deliver every unit it sells. Peak demand is far above normal and hard to forecast, and carriers have responded with surcharges for sellers whose shipping volume exceeds the capacity they reserved (the paper cites UPS's 2017 plan, p. 9). Song and Zhao (SSRN 3129499;…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

The Implications of Strategic Inventory for Short-Term vs. Long-Term Supply Contracts in Nonexclusive Reselling Environments: suppliers prefer long-term contracts above a holding-cost thresholdResearch Paper

A retailer that buys from a supplier over several periods can buy more than it sells today and carry the surplus forward. Anand, Anupindi and Bassok (Management Science 54(10), 2008) showed that this strategic inventory disciplines a supplier who cannot commit to future wholesale prices: tomorrow's price must compete with the retailer's own stock. In their…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
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