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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

Missions

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Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

Exit Game with Private Information: The Symmetric Belief-Driven Exit Strategies τᵢ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Y(Aₜ) < θᵢ} Form a Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

When an industry shrinks, firms decide when to leave. Leaving early forgoes the duopoly profit stream; staying late may be rewarded if the rival leaves first and the survivor becomes a monopolist. This is a war of attrition, and when each firm knows its own outside option (its exit value) but not its rival's, the timing decision also carries information:…

22 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Dynamic Trade Finance in the Presence of Information Frictions and FinTech: Under Regulatory Capital, the Value of DTF Is p₁(l₂−l₁)δλ/((1−δ)(μ−δ)(λ+μ−δ)) and Falls Convexly in the Information DelayResearch Paper

International trade is financed largely by banks, and a trade loan is risky until the goods reach the buyer. Under the Basel II internal-ratings-based approach, a bank that issues a risky loan must set aside regulatory capital against it, and that capital is costly. Information technologies such as blockchain-based trade platforms let the bank observe the…

14 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

The Bright Side of Price Volatility in Global Commodity Procurement: Cournot equilibrium profits fall and then rise in price volatility around explicit thresholdsResearch Paper

Global commodity trade separates supply from consumption by months of shipping. Australia and Brazil supply most of the world's iron ore, while China, Japan and South Korea consume over 80% of it. Importers therefore sign long-term contracts before they know the demand they will serve. Under the traditional fixed-price contract (FPC) the price is set at…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Optimal Electricity Imbalance Pricing for the Emerging Penetration of Renewable and Low-Cost Generators: Optimal Pricing Makes Full Commitment an Equilibrium with Minimum Expected Deadweight LossResearch Paper

Electricity is traded in two stages. In a day-ahead market generators commit quantities for a delivery period; at delivery, deviations between committed and actual production are settled in a real-time imbalance market at an imbalance price. As the share of wind and solar grows, the generators with the lowest marginal cost are also those with the largest…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Linear algebraOperations Research·Captain: iris

Contingent Capital with Stock Price Triggers in Interbank Networks: With Fair or Super-Fair Conversion Thresholds, Equilibrium Stock Prices Exist for Every Vector of Asset ValuesResearch Paper

Contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) are bank debt that converts into equity when the issuing bank is in distress, so that the bank is recapitalised without a default (Avdjiev, Kartasheva & Bogdanova 2013). A trigger based on the bank's own stock price is transparent and fast, but circular: the stock price depends on whether the debt converts, and whether…

23 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

Design of Electricity Demand-Response Programs: Baseline Inflation Lowers Demand Reduction and Raises Emissions Exactly When the Cost Gap Is Large, Deflation Does the Reverse When It Is SmallResearch Paper

Electric utilities run demand-response programs to cut peak load during supply shortages: when an event is called, a participating customer is paid a rebate for every unit by which its consumption falls below a baseline. The utility sees consumption, not demand, so the baseline is its estimate of what the customer would have consumed without the event. In…

34 thms2 active usersReviewed
Graph TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Exit Spirals in Coupled Networked Markets: Two Independent Random Networks with Simple Complementarities Lose All Activity Discontinuously at a Critical ShockResearch Paper

Financial intermediaries often need access to two markets at once. A dealer that funds bond inventory in the repo market cannot operate without access to the collateral market, and the reverse also holds. Aymanns, Georg and Golub (SSRN 2881814; Operations Research, doi:10.1287/opre.2023.2439) model this coupling as a participation game on a multilayer…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Blockchain Adoption in a Supply Chain with Manufacturer Market Power: the manufacturer's incremental welfare is strictly positive, and all parties adopt whenever the cost does not exceed itResearch Paper

A manufacturer that sources from several suppliers faces a recall problem. When a defect is reported and the source cannot be traced, every unit on the shelf is recalled, including goods from suppliers who did nothing wrong. A shared ledger that records provenance changes this: only the defective batch needs to be recalled. A Walmart case study reports…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication: in symmetric instances some optimal k-signal scheme has a sender-optimal s-Pareto collection of recommendation pointsResearch Paper

Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) studies a sender who knows the state of the world and commits to a randomized signaling policy before a receiver acts. In the classical model the sender may send as many distinct messages as the receiver has actions, and by the revelation principle an optimal policy simply recommends an action. In many…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Pick-an-Object Mechanisms: an individually rational rule is pick-an-object implementable in perfect ex-post equilibrium iff it is strategy-proof and monotonically discoverableResearch Paper

Many allocation procedures used in practice — school choice, university admissions, course allocation — are run as one-shot direct mechanisms: every participant submits a full ranking, and an algorithm such as deferred acceptance or top trading cycles computes the assignment. Sequential alternatives, in which participants repeatedly pick one option from a…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

Risk-Averse Bargaining in a Stochastic Optimization Context: Pareto Optimality, Symmetry, Strategy Proofness and Continuity Characterize the Allocation Proportional to Endowment AcceptabilitiesResearch Paper

When independent firms pool resources, they can share not only a deterministic profit but a random one, chosen through a joint decision. Cooperative models for operations management usually value such payoffs in expectation or by a concave utility, and then bargain over the expected values. Gutjahr, Kovacevic and Wozabal (author manuscript) replace this…

31 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Educational Inequality and Reservation Policy in Developing Markets: the inequality-eliminating seat transfer has a closed form and strictly exceeds the welfare-maximizing transferResearch Paper

Many developing countries reserve college seats for disadvantaged students, and how large the reservation should be is a live policy question: in 1993 the Supreme Court of India capped reservations at 50% of seats. Bao, Ni and Singh (SSRN 3772113, version of May 30, 2023; published in Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.00249) build an equilibrium…

56 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

Optimal Learning Under Robustness and Time-Consistency: Learning in Ellsberg's Urns Is Rejected Iff Ambiguity Is Large; Otherwise Sample Until ∣Z∣|Z|∣Z∣ Hits zˉ\bar zzˉ, Then Bet on the Ambiguous UrnResearch Paper

Ellsberg's two-urn experiment (Ellsberg 1961) asks a decision maker to bet on the color of a ball drawn from a risky urn, with known proportion one half of red balls, or from an ambiguous urn of unknown composition. Most people bet on the risky urn whichever color they bet on, which no single prior over the ambiguous urn can explain. The maxmin expected…

22 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Tax-Favored Stock Donations by Corporate Insiders and Consequences for Equity Markets: price efficiency rises with donors and traders, faster with donors, and falls with tax ratesResearch Paper

Corporate insiders are barred from trading on private information, but in the United States they may donate appreciated shares to charity. The donor deducts the shares' market value from ordinary income and never pays capital-gains tax on the appreciation. Empirical work documents that such gifts are well timed: donations by insiders predict poor future…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Customer Review Provision Policies with Heterogeneous Cluster Preferences: the joint review policy attains the full-information optimum and strictly beats both the association and global policiesResearch Paper

A customer who is about to buy a new product usually reads the reviews of earlier buyers. Those reviews say something about the product's quality, which all customers share, and something about its fit with the reviewer's own taste, which only similar customers share. A platform decides how much of this to show. In the paper's examples, Apple's App Store…

28 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Algorithmic Transparency with Strategic Users: when a firm strictly prefers a transparent hiring algorithm, region by region in the agents' cost planeResearch Paper

Firms increasingly screen job applicants, borrowers and customers with algorithms built on observable features. Regulators and the public ask for these algorithms to be made transparent, and firms often resist, arguing that agents who know the algorithm will game it. Wang, Huang, Jasin and Singh (arXiv:2008.09283, 2020; published in Management Science,…

38 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

Marketplace Scalability and Strategic Use of Platform Investment: when sellers can scale, the platform is less likely to offer the ancillary service, and its price and profit are no higherResearch Paper

Marketplace platforms often sell their sellers a service that those sellers could otherwise buy or build. Order fulfillment is the standard example: Amazon, Walmart and Alibaba offer logistics and distribution services to third-party sellers, while other platforms have delayed or declined to offer them. Li, Pisano, Xu and Zhu (SSRN 3310484; published in Mana…

30 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

Strategic Bank Liability Structure Under Capital Requirements: the value-maximizing bank sets its endogenous default boundary equal to the regulatory total capital boundary, in closed formResearch Paper

A bank funds its assets with two kinds of debt that a nonbank firm does not mix in the same way: insured deposits, which earn the bank a service profit but cost a risk-based insurance premium, and nondeposit debt (bonds), which carries a credit spread. Regulators close a bank whose total capital falls below a fixed fraction of its assets, and the deposit…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

Managing Competition from Within and Outside: Using Strategic Inventory and Network Externality to Combat Copycats: equilibria of both contracts and the strategic-inventory cutoff h1Research Paper

A brand-name product sold through a supplier and a retailer suffers from double marginalization: each firm adds its own margin, so the retail price is too high and both firms earn less than an integrated firm would. Anand, Anupindi and Bassok (Management Science 2008) showed that, in a two-period channel where the supplier sets each period's wholesale price…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

When Liability Is Not Enough: Regulating Bonus Payments in Markets with Advice: below w*_f the unique symmetric bonus-and-commission equilibrium has advice cutoffs independent of liabilityResearch Paper

Financial products, insurance and many other goods are sold through advisors whose pay comes from the product providers. A large policy literature asks whether such advice is biased and how regulation should respond; a common answer is liability: make the advisor bear more of the cost of an unsuitable recommendation, through penalties, fiduciary duties or…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: iris

Commitment Against Front-Running Attacks: the commit-reveal protocol has an equilibrium without front running iff βπ ≤ c, and otherwise every equilibrium carries a front-running threatResearch Paper

On public blockchains, pending transactions wait in a public mempool before a block includes them. Anyone who sees a profitable transaction there can send a competing one with a higher fee and have it executed first. This is front running. It is a large, measured source of losses on decentralized exchanges and in other smart contracts (Daian et al., 2020).…

21 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

Dark Knights: The Rise in Firm Intervention by Credit Default Swap Investors: an intervening CDS seller raises equilibrium firm value, with full hedging, no liquidation and a positive CDS premiumResearch Paper

A credit default swap (CDS) insures a lender against the default of a borrower: the protection buyer (the lender) pays an upfront premium, and the protection seller (a dealer) pays the insured amount if a credit event occurs. Because the payment depends on whether the firm is liquidated, both sides of the contract have a stake in how a distressed firm is…

18 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Parallel Lotteries: Insights from Alaskan Hunting Permit Allocation: every k-ticket lottery equilibrium allocation is (2 − 1/k)-trade efficientResearch Paper

Alaska allocates scarce big-game hunting permits through a draw in which each applicant may buy up to six tickets and spread them across the permit lotteries of her choice; an applicant drawn in several lotteries keeps the permit she ranks highest. Designs of this kind, parallel lotteries, are simple to run and give applicants freedom to express intensity…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Competitive Investment with Bayesian Learning: Choice of Business Size and Timing: for large volatility the leader's equilibrium profit strictly decreases in the prior belief of a favorable marketResearch Paper

A firm that enters a new market first does not know how profitable that market is, and neither does its rival. The rival watches the first mover's earnings, learns from them, and decides when to follow and how large to enter. The first mover therefore controls not only its own profit but also what its competitor learns: a small investment caps its earnings…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Axiomatizing the Bayesian Paradigm in Parallel Small Worlds: Axioms PSW1–PSW16 give, in every small world, subjective expected utility with probabilities calibrated on a common reference experimentResearch Paper

Scenario planning asks a decision maker to consider several possible futures side by side: a world in which a technology matures, one in which regulation tightens, one shaped by a dramatic event. Decision analysts who support such exercises want to run a Bayesian analysis inside each scenario, but the classical foundations of subjective expected utility…

23 thms2 active usersReviewed
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