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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

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🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Net-Metered Distributed Renewable Energy: A Peril for Utilities?: DRE Raises a Utility's Expected Profit if and only if Its Existing Resources Are Small and the Wholesale Price Is Sensitive EnoughResearch Paper

Electricity end-users increasingly generate their own power with rooftop solar panels and small wind turbines. This distributed renewable energy (DRE) is usually sold under net metering: a customer who produces less than it consumes buys the shortfall from its utility at the retail price, and a customer who produces more sells the surplus back to the…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Role of Participation in Innovation Contests: Multiple Rewards Are Optimal Exactly When Entry Is Costly, the Budget Is Large and a Failed Contest Is CostlyResearch Paper

An innovation contest asks people outside a firm to submit solutions and promises payments according to the rank of their submissions. The firm would like a strong best submission, but a potential solver must decide whether entering is worth a fixed cost before knowing who else will enter. Paying only the winner can encourage effort while leaving the…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Rationale for Imperfect Reporting Standards: With a Low Payoff Threshold and a High Prior, a Conservative Report Beats a Perfectly Informative OneResearch Paper

Financial reports help investors value a firm, but a firm can also learn and voluntarily disclose information outside the report. A regulator who makes mandatory reports more precise changes the firm's incentive to acquire that other information. Friedman, Hughes and Michaeli's 2020 preprint, Proposition 1, studies whether a reporting rule that is less…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Beneficial Effects of Ad Blockers: Both Platforms Allowing Ad Blockers Is an Equilibrium That Beats a World Without Ad Blockers for Low β and High γ/βResearch Paper

Ad blockers remove advertising from web pages, and with it the revenue that pays for free content. By the time of this paper a large share of desktop users ran one, and publishers had three responses at hand: tolerate ad blockers, block access to users who run one (an adblock wall), or move behind a paywall. The common view was that ad blockers can only…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Inundation on Platforms and Implications: Under Unknown Post Accuracy, Screening for the Largest Expected Variance Reduction Selects the Post Closest to the BeliefResearch Paper

Online platforms show a reader many short signals about the same question (posts, headlines, tweets), more than the reader can absorb. The reader screens the menu and consumes only a few items. Allon, Drakopoulos and Manshadi (Information Inundation on Platforms and Implications, SSRN 3385627; Operations Research, 2021, doi:10.1287/opre.2021.2119) ask what…

11 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
AnalysisOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Platform Tokenization: Financing, Governance, and Moral Hazard: For Small Capacity Cost the Blockchain-Based Business Model Strictly Dominates the Traditional OneResearch Paper

Digital platforms (marketplaces, payment networks, sharing services) need large up-front investments in capacity before any revenue arrives, and their founders typically finance them by selling equity to venture capitalists. Since 2017 an alternative has been available: issuing a platform-specific cryptocurrency (a utility token) in an initial coin offering…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Improving Access to Rare Disease Treatments: Subsidy, Pricing, and Payment Schemes II: Consortium Price, No Cure No Pay: Subsidize Only Patients When the Price Is High, Only the Manufacturer When LowResearch Paper

A rare disease affects few patients, so a drug for it has a small market and its research and development (R&D) cost is spread over few sales. Governments respond with two kinds of subsidy: cost subsidies that pay part of the manufacturer's R&D bill (orphan drug programmes), and price subsidies that pay part of what each patient is charged. At the same time…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Theory of Liquidity in Private Equity I: Without a Secondary Market, Two Capital-Share Thresholds Characterize Equilibrium, and Liquid LPs Earn Strictly More When Both Fund Types ExistResearch Paper

Private equity funds are organized as limited partnerships. Limited partners (LPs: pension funds, endowments, insurers) commit capital, and a general partner (GP) manages the fund and calls the committed capital over several years. A well-documented empirical regularity is that some LPs earn persistently higher returns than others, and that fund returns…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Precommitments in Two-Sided Market Competition 2: Commission Precommitment Beats No Commitment When γ ≥ β or γ ≪ β, and Loses to It When γ Is Just Below βResearch Paper

Many service platforms set a price paid by customers and a wage paid to the providers who serve them. A platform may instead announce how much of each transaction's price it will pass to providers, then choose prices after both platforms have announced their shares. These are different games: a price change in the second game changes both customer demand…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization III: Whether Utility Rises with Session Length Is Decided by Span Versus MoreishnessResearch Paper

Platforms that rank content by engagement (time spent, items consumed) implicitly assume revealed preference: a user who stays longer is a user who is better off. Kleinberg, Mullainathan and Raghavan (arXiv:2202.11776, Management Science 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.03683) model a user with inconsistent preferences, a forward-looking system 2 and an…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Frontiers in Operations: Battery as a Service: Flexible Electric Vehicle Battery Leasing: Win-Win-Win of Flexible Leasing for a Large High-Capacity Range and Battery Cost near a(1−ρ)/2Research Paper

Electric-vehicle makers such as NIO sell cars without the battery and lease the battery separately, a business model called Battery as a Service (BaaS). The leased battery can be swapped at a station in minutes, so a customer is not tied to one battery size: a driver who leases a small battery for the daily commute can rent a large one for a long holiday…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity IV: Under Moral Hazard Every Equity-Financeable Venture Is Token-Financeable and Every Token-Financeable One Is Debt-Financeable, Both StrictlyResearch Paper

Start-ups that build a platform or a digital service increasingly raise their set-up capital by pre-selling tokens: claims on the future output of the service, redeemable once it exists. Between 2017 and 2019 such token offerings raised billions of dollars, and corporate finance asked whether a token is anything more than a disguised equity or debt claim.…

19 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity III: The Break-Even Token Pre-Sale Strictly Increases in the Set-Up Cost and the Marginal Cost and Strictly Decreases in Expected DemandResearch Paper

Firms can raise money before production by selling claims on future output. In the model of Malinova and Park, these claims are tokens: a buyer prepays for a quantity of the good, and the final contract also gives token holders a share of tokens issued after demand becomes known. The firm must choose how many tokens to pre-sell. A larger pre-sale brings in…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Personalized Pricing and Distribution Strategies I: With Positively Correlated Valuations and a Uniform Manufacturer Price, Dual Distribution Is Optimal Under Either Retailer Pricing PolicyResearch Paper

A manufacturer that already sells directly to consumers may also supply an independent retailer. Adding the retailer can reach consumers who prefer its service, but the two channels then compete for some of the same buyers. A wholesale price affects both the retailer's ability to serve consumers and its retail pricing. The manufacturer's choice of…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization III: Under O-Learning, No Separating Equilibrium Exists When θH/θL < ΛResearch Paper

When customers request a customized product, their requests can reveal information about what they value. A seller can use that information when setting a price, while a customer can choose a request with the resulting price in mind. The question is whether customers with different preferences can make different requests in equilibrium. Liang Guo's The…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Social Media and News: Content Bundling and News Quality I: Unilateral Content Bundling Lowers Publisher Profit and Raises News Quality and Consumer Surplus iff c < c†Research Paper

News publishers depend on direct visits for advertising revenue, while social platforms can show publishers' content inside their own feeds. That arrangement can move reading time from the publisher's site to the platform without changing how much news a consumer reads. It can therefore change the publisher's return from improving content quality. De…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion 2: With Only Low-Need Users, Full Information Is Within a Factor of the Optimal Signaling MechanismResearch Paper

Social services such as public housing, food banks and free clinics are congested: the users who arrive wait in a queue they cannot see, and some of them could do almost as well elsewhere. A provider who sees the queue can decide what to tell arriving users about it. Telling low-need users that the queue is long sends them to their outside option and…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion 1: Every Pareto-Efficient Signaling Mechanism Has a Threshold Structure at or Below the Full-Information ThresholdResearch Paper

Many social services are rationed by waiting rather than by price: public health clinics, food banks, shelters, legal aid. Users who need the service most often have no outside option, while users with less need could be served elsewhere but join the queue anyway and lengthen everyone's wait. The provider usually cannot force anyone to leave, and charging…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Right to Repair: Pricing, Welfare, and Environmental Implications: The Manufacturer's Optimal New-Product and Repair Prices and the Resulting No-, Partial- or Full-Repair Equilibrium (Table 1)Research Paper

Repair access changes more than the cost of fixing a broken product. It also changes how many used products reach a resale market, what those products sell for, and whether a manufacturer prefers to sell another new unit or earn a repair margin. Jin, Yang, and Zhu study these connected pricing decisions in a two-period durable-goods model in Right to…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Conceptual Flaws of Decentralized Automated Market Making: Constant Product Pricing Admits Profitable Front-Running and Multi-Venue ArbitrageResearch Paper

Decentralized exchanges on public blockchains do not match buyers with sellers through an order book. Most of them trade against a liquidity pool: a smart contract that holds reserves of two tokens and quotes a price by a fixed formula. The most widely used formula is the constant product rule of Uniswap (Adams, Zinsmeister and Robinson, 2020), under which…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Risk Mitigation in a Decentralized Supply Chain: Pricing Postponement or Payment Postponement? III: When Payment Postponement Helps or Hurts the Retailer, the Supplier and the ConsumersResearch Paper

A retailer can pay a supplier when it places an order or after the supplier delivers it. When production yield is uncertain, the choice changes who bears the cost of missing units. It can also change the supplier's production decision and, through the amount available for sale, the surplus received by consumers. Geng, Guo, Xiao and Yang study these effects…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Risk Mitigation in a Decentralized Supply Chain: Pricing Postponement or Payment Postponement? II: Under Reliable Yield the Postponements Are Complements Only at Intermediate CostResearch Paper

A retailer that buys from a supplier with unreliable production has two contractual levers against supply risk, and both postpone a decision until after the yield is known. Payment postponement means paying only for the units actually delivered (pay-by-delivery) instead of the units ordered (pay-by-order). This moves the yield risk upstream. Pricing…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Information TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Human and Machine: The Impact of Machine Input on Decision-Making Under Cognitive Limitations II: Machine Input Never Lowers the Decision-Maker's Accuracy or Expected ValueResearch Paper

Machine-learning systems are increasingly placed beside human experts — physicians reading scans, loan officers screening applications, judges assessing risk — rather than replacing them. The machine processes the structured data it can see; the human also has access to information the algorithm cannot observe, but her attention is limited. Whether such a…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Risk Mitigation in a Decentralized Supply Chain: Pricing Postponement or Payment Postponement? I: As Cost Rises the Retailer Prefers Payment, Then Pricing, Then Both, Then Pricing PostponementResearch Paper

When a supplier's production is subject to random yield, only part of a planned production run turns into usable output. A retailer sourcing from such a supplier bears the resulting shortage risk unless the contract or the selling strategy moves it elsewhere. Random yield is a classical topic in production planning (Yano and Lee, 1995), and postponing a…

15 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Information TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Human and Machine: The Impact of Machine Input on Decision-Making Under Cognitive Limitations I: The Rationally Inattentive Decision-Maker's Optimal Choice Probability in Closed FormResearch Paper

A person using a machine's advice may decide more accurately, but attention is costly. Before asking what a machine changes, the baseline decision has to be understood: how often would the person choose the action associated with a good state without machine input? Boyacı, Canyakmaz, and de Véricourt study this question in a model of a decision maker who…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
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