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Linear Optimization

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CombinatoricsDiscrete GeometryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

On Sub-determinants and the Diameter of Polyhedra: A Polynomial Diameter Bound in the Largest SubdeterminantResearch Paper

Motivation

The combinatorial diameter of a polyhedron is the largest distance, in its vertex-edge graph, between two vertices. It is a lower bound on the number of pivots any edge-following method such as the simplex method needs in the worst case, which is why the polynomial Hirsch conjecture — the diameter of P={x∈Rn:Ax≤b}P = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^n : Ax \le b\}P={x∈Rn:Ax≤b} is bounded by a polynomial in mmm and nnn — is a central open question of linear optimization and discrete geometry. The best general upper bound is quasi-polynomial, m1+log⁡nm^{1+\log n}m1+logn (Kalai–Kleitman 1992); the original Hirsch bound m−nm - nm−n is false for polytopes (Santos 2012).

A different line of work bounds the diameter by the arithmetic of the constraint matrix instead of its size. For an integer matrix AAA let Δ\DeltaΔ be the largest absolute value of a sub-determinant of AAA. Dyer and Frieze (1994) showed that for totally unimodular AAA (Δ=1\Delta = 1Δ=1) the diameter is polynomial, O(m16n3(log⁡mn)3)O(m^{16} n^3 (\log mn)^3)O(m16n3(logmn)3). Bonifas, Di Summa, Eisenbrand, Hähnle and Niemeier (SoCG 2012; Discrete Comput Geom 52, 2014) improved and generalized this to O(Δ2n4log⁡nΔ)O(\Delta^2 n^4 \log n\Delta)O(Δ2n4lognΔ) for all polyhedra and O(Δ2n3.5log⁡nΔ)O(\Delta^2 n^{3.5} \log n\Delta)O(Δ2n3.5lognΔ) for polytopes, bounds that do not depend on the number mmm of inequalities. This mission formalizes the polytope case.

Setting

Let A∈Zm×nA \in \mathbb{Z}^{m\times n}A∈Zm×n with rows a1,…,ama_1,\dots,a_ma1​,…,am​, let b∈Rmb \in \mathbb{R}^mb∈Rm, and let P={x∈Rn:Ax≤b}P = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^n : Ax \le b\}P={x∈Rn:Ax≤b}. A vertex of PPP is an extreme point; for a polyhedron this is a point of PPP at which nnn linearly independent inequalities are tight. Two vertices u≠vu \ne vu=v are adjacent if the segment [u,v][u,v][u,v] is an edge (a one-dimensional face) of PPP. This gives the polyhedral graph GP=(V,E)G_P = (V, E)GP​=(V,E), and the diameter of PPP is at most BBB if every two vertices are joined by a walk of at most BBB edges.

AAA has sub-determinants bounded by Δ\DeltaΔ if every k×kk\times kk×k submatrix, for every k≥1k \ge 1k≥1, has determinant in [−Δ,Δ][-\Delta, \Delta][−Δ,Δ]. In particular every entry is at most Δ\DeltaΔ in absolute value.

For a vertex vvv the normal cone CvC_vCv​ is the set of objectives ccc for which vvv maximizes cTxc^T xcTx over PPP. With BnB_nBn​ the closed unit ball, the volume of a set U⊆VU \subseteq VU⊆V of vertices is

vol(U)=vol(⋃v∈UCv∩Bn),\mathrm{vol}(U) = \mathrm{vol}\Big(\bigcup_{v\in U} C_v \cap B_n\Big),vol(U)=vol(v∈U⋃​Cv​∩Bn​),

and the neighbourhood N(I)\mathcal N(I)N(I) of I⊆VI \subseteq VI⊆V is the set of vertices outside III adjacent to a vertex of III. A spherical cone is S=C∩BnS = C \cap B_nS=C∩Bn​ with CCC closed under non-negative scaling; its dockable surface D(S)D(S)D(S) is the (n−1)(n-1)(n−1)-dimensional measure of the part of its boundary inside the open ball. A cone of revolution of angle 0<θ≤π/20<\theta\le\pi/20<θ≤π/2 is {x∈Bn:vTx≥cos⁡θ ∥v∥ ∥x∥}\{x \in B_n : v^T x \ge \cos\theta\,\|v\|\,\|x\|\}{x∈Bn​:vTx≥cosθ∥v∥∥x∥}. PPP is non-degenerate if every vertex has exactly nnn tight inequalities.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 105)

If A∈Zm×nA \in \mathbb{Z}^{m\times n}A∈Zm×n has all sub-determinants bounded by Δ\DeltaΔ and PPP is bounded, then

diam⁡(P)≤2⌊2π Δ2n5/2ln⁡ ⁣(2n n! nn/2 Δn)⌋+2  =  O(Δ2n3.5log⁡nΔ).\operatorname{diam}(P) \le 2\Big\lfloor \sqrt{2\pi}\,\Delta^2 n^{5/2}\ln\!\big(2^n\, n!\, n^{n/2}\,\Delta^n\big)\Big\rfloor + 2 \;=\; O(\Delta^2 n^{3.5}\log n\Delta).diam(P)≤2⌊2π​Δ2n5/2ln(2nn!nn/2Δn)⌋+2=O(Δ2n3.5lognΔ).

No non-degeneracy, full-dimensionality or rank condition is assumed, and the bound is uniform in mmm and bbb.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 3 (p. 108): for a vertex vvv of a non-degenerate polytope, D(Sv)≤Δ2n3 vol(Sv)D(S_v) \le \Delta^2 n^3\,\mathrm{vol}(S_v)D(Sv​)≤Δ2n3vol(Sv​), where Sv=Cv∩BnS_v = C_v \cap B_nSv​=Cv​∩Bn​.
  2. Lemma 4 (p. 109): among spherical cones of a given volume, a cone of revolution has minimum dockable surface.
  3. Lemma 5 (p. 110): for a cone of revolution, D(S)≥2n/π vol(S)D(S) \ge \sqrt{2n/\pi}\,\mathrm{vol}(S)D(S)≥2n/π​vol(S).
  4. Lemma 6 (p. 111): for every measurable spherical cone with vol(S)≤12vol(Bn)\mathrm{vol}(S) \le \frac12 \mathrm{vol}(B_n)vol(S)≤21​vol(Bn​), D(S)≥2n/π vol(S)D(S) \ge \sqrt{2n/\pi}\,\mathrm{vol}(S)D(S)≥2n/π​vol(S).
  5. Lemma 1 (p. 105): for a non-degenerate polytope and I⊆VI \subseteq VI⊆V with vol(I)≤12vol(Bn)\mathrm{vol}(I) \le \frac12\mathrm{vol}(B_n)vol(I)≤21​vol(Bn​),
vol(N(I))≥2π 1Δ2n2.5 vol(I).\mathrm{vol}(\mathcal N(I)) \ge \sqrt{\tfrac{2}{\pi}}\,\frac{1}{\Delta^2 n^{2.5}}\,\mathrm{vol}(I).vol(N(I))≥π2​​Δ2n2.51​vol(I).
  1. Eq. (1) (p. 105): if IjI_jIj​ is the set of vertices at graph distance at most jjj from a vertex vvv and vol(Ij)≤12vol(Bn)\mathrm{vol}(I_j) \le \frac12\mathrm{vol}(B_n)vol(Ij​)≤21​vol(Bn​), then j≤2π Δ2n2.5ln⁡(2n/vol(I0))j \le \sqrt{2\pi}\,\Delta^2 n^{2.5}\ln(2^n/\mathrm{vol}(I_0))j≤2π​Δ2n2.5ln(2n/vol(I0​)).

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 bounds the diameter of every integral polytope by a polynomial in the dimension and the largest sub-determinant, independently of the number of facets. For totally unimodular matrices, which cover network-flow, bipartite matching and transportation polytopes, it gives O(n3.5log⁡n)O(n^{3.5}\log n)O(n3.5logn), improving the Dyer–Frieze bound by a large polynomial factor. It shows that the obstruction to a polynomial Hirsch bound, if any, must come from matrices with large sub-determinants. The volume-expansion method — measuring breadth-first search by the volume of the normal fan it has covered — was later refined, for instance in the shadow-vertex analysis of Dadush–Hähnle, which improves the dependence on nnn.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved (2012/2014); no machine-checked proof is known. A formal development needs, on top of Mathlib, the normal fan of a polytope and its relation to the vertex-edge graph, a Hausdorff-measure calculus for cones (surface of a cone in terms of its base), Lévy's isoperimetric inequality on the sphere in a measure-theoretic form, and explicit Gamma-function estimates. Each of these is reusable well beyond this paper.

Difficulty

The combinatorial side is short; the geometry is not. Lemma 4 is the spherical isoperimetric inequality of Lévy, which Mathlib does not have in any form, and which the paper cites rather than proves; the relations between the volume of a spherical cone, the area of its base, its lateral surface and the length of the base's boundary (Eq. (3), "basic integration") are also absent. Lemma 3 depends on the structure of the normal cone of a vertex of a non-degenerate polytope (full-dimensional, simplicial, generated by rows of AAA), none of which is available for Mathlib's extreme points. Lemma 1 depends on the normal fan of a polytope: the normal cones have pairwise disjoint interiors, cover Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn, and share a facet exactly when their vertices are adjacent. The step from non-degenerate to arbitrary polytopes perturbs bbb and needs the diameter not to decrease, a statement about the vertex-edge graph under perturbation. A shortcut through a finite graph abstraction is not available: the constant depends on the geometry of the normal cones, not only on the graph.

Formalization scope

The polyhedron is Hirsch.Hpoly (rowVec A) b, with rowVec A i the iii-th row of A∈A \inA∈ Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℤ as a vector of EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n). Vertices are Set.extremePoints ℝ P, adjacency is Hirsch.Adj, "diameter at most BBB" is Hirsch.DiamLE P B, all from the published Hirsch_model. The normal cone is the published FirstOrderOpt.ConvexTheory.normalCone. Volumes are Lebesgue measure with values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; the dockable surface uses μHE[n-1], the Hausdorff measure normalized to agree with Lebesgue measure on hyperplanes, applied to frontier S ∩ Metric.ball 0 1. Δ\DeltaΔ is a natural number and the sub-determinant bound ranges over all sizes k≥1k \ge 1k≥1.

Explicit constants. The paper writes O(Δ2n3.5log⁡nΔ)O(\Delta^2 n^{3.5}\log n\Delta)O(Δ2n3.5lognΔ) in Theorem 2; the proof on pp. 105–106 yields 2⌊K⌋+22\lfloor K\rfloor + 22⌊K⌋+2 with K=2π Δ2n5/2ln⁡(2nn! nn/2Δn)K = \sqrt{2\pi}\,\Delta^2 n^{5/2}\ln(2^n n!\, n^{n/2}\Delta^n)K=2π​Δ2n5/2ln(2nn!nn/2Δn), from Eq. (1), the bound vol(I0)≥1/(n! nn/2Δn)\mathrm{vol}(I_0) \ge 1/(n!\,n^{n/2}\Delta^n)vol(I0​)≥1/(n!nn/2Δn) and the fact that the diameter is at most twice the number of breadth-first-search iterations needed to cover more than half of BnB_nBn​. This explicit bound is the goal. The ratios D/volD/\mathrm{vol}D/vol of Lemmas 3, 5, 6 are stated in multiplicative form.

Non-degeneracy is a hypothesis of Lemma 3, Lemma 1 and Eq. (1) only, as in the paper's §1.1, and never of Theorem 2. The neighbourhood N(I)\mathcal N(I)N(I) excludes III; including it would make Lemma 1 trivial, since its constant is below 111. Lemma 4 is stated against every competitor: for every measurable spherical cone SSS and every cone of revolution S∗S^*S∗ of the same volume, D(S∗)≤D(S)D(S^*) \le D(S)D(S∗)≤D(S); it does not assert existence of a cone of a prescribed volume. The goal is Theorem 2 about the polytope and its graph, not an abstract statement about set families with a volume-expansion property; integrality of AAA and the bound on minors of every size are both essential (scaling a real matrix down makes Δ\DeltaΔ arbitrarily small), and the raw Hausdorff measure μH[n-1] would put Lemmas 3 and 6 on incompatible scales.

Contributions are welcome at every level: the normal fan and its adjacency structure, cone surface formulas, the Gamma estimate Γ(x+12)/Γ(x)≥x−14\Gamma(x+\frac12)/\Gamma(x) \ge \sqrt{x-\frac14}Γ(x+21​)/Γ(x)≥x−41​​, and a formal Lévy inequality.

Selected references

  • N. Bonifas, M. Di Summa, F. Eisenbrand, N. Hähnle, M. Niemeier, On Sub-determinants and the Diameter of Polyhedra, Discrete Comput Geom 52 (2014) 102–115. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00454-014-9601-x
  • M. Dyer, A. Frieze, Random walks, totally unimodular matrices, and a randomised dual simplex algorithm, Math. Program. 64 (1994) 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01582563
  • G. Kalai, D. J. Kleitman, A quasi-polynomial bound for the diameter of graphs of polyhedra, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 26 (1992) 315–316. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0273-0979-1992-00285-9
  • F. Santos, A counterexample to the Hirsch conjecture, Annals of Math. 176 (2012) 383–412. https://doi.org/10.4007/annals.2012.176.1.7
  • T. Figiel, J. Lindenstrauss, V. Milman, The dimension of almost spherical sections of convex bodies, Acta Math. 139 (1977) 53–94 (Lévy's isoperimetric inequality, Theorem 2.1). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02392234
  • D. Dadush, N. Hähnle, On the shadow simplex method for curved polyhedra, Discrete Comput Geom 56 (2016). https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6705
11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Stochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Linear Programming 02: Finiteness and Smoothness of Expected Fixed RecourseTextbook

Motivation

A two-stage stochastic linear program chooses a first-stage decision before uncertain coefficients are known and then uses recourse variables to repair the decision after the data are observed. The resulting expected recourse cost is central to existence, stability, and numerical methods: if it can be infinite, an apparently feasible model may still have no meaningful expected objective; if it is differentiable with a continuous gradient, deterministic smooth optimization methods become available on the feasible first-stage domain. Chapter III of Peter Kall's Stochastic Linear Programming develops these properties for fixed recourse. This mission packages two complete results from that development: Theorem 12 on continuous differentiability and Theorem 15 on the exact finiteness criterion under complete recourse.

Theorem 12 is the goal. Theorem 15 is retained as a separate source theorem from the same expected-recourse setting, not as a lemma asserted to prove Theorem 12. Keeping both statements makes the distinction between the general feasible-domain regime and the stronger complete-recourse regime explicit.

Setting

Fix a deterministic matrix (W\in\mathbb R^{m\times p}). A random data point is a triple (d=(A,b,q)), where (A\in\mathbb R^{m\times n}), (b\in\mathbb R^m), and (q\in\mathbb R^p), with arbitrary joint probability law μ. For a first-stage vector (x\in\mathbb R^n), the pointwise recourse value is the extended-real linear-program value

Q(x,d)=inf⁡{q⊤y:Wy=b−Ax, y≥0}.Q(x,d)=\inf\{q^\top y:Wy=b-Ax,\ y\ge 0\}.Q(x,d)=inf{q⊤y:Wy=b−Ax, y≥0}.

The extended-real convention records an infeasible recourse problem as (+\infty) and an unbounded-below problem as (-\infty). The recourse domain is

K={x:Q(x,d)<+∞ for μ-almost every d}.K=\{x:Q(x,d)<+\infty\text{ for μ-almost every }d\}.K={x:Q(x,d)<+∞ for μ-almost every d}.

Thus (K) requires almost-sure feasibility but does not assume complete recourse and does not exclude a value of (-\infty). The signed extended expectation follows Kall's equation III.(8): it is the integral of the positive part minus the integral of the negative part. A separate real-valued expected-recourse adapter integrates (Q(x,d).\mathrm{toReal}); the target uses that adapter only after explicitly concluding almost-sure finiteness and integrability, so totalization at infinities does not hide a divergent cost.

The shared moment condition is exactly the disjunction from Theorem 10 and Corollary 11: all coordinates of (A,b,q) are square integrable; or (q) is almost surely constant while (A,b) are integrable; or (A,b) are almost surely constant while (q) is integrable; or all three random coefficient ranges are bounded. No independence or finite-support hypothesis is imposed.

Finally, (W) has complete recourse when every right-hand side (z\in\mathbb R^m) admits a nonnegative (y) satisfying (Wy=z). This is stronger than membership of one decision in (K), but it does not by itself prevent an unbounded-below recourse cost.

Formalization targets

Theorem 12: continuous gradient of expected fixed recourse

Assume one of the four moment alternatives, assume the signed expected recourse is strictly above (-\infty) at every (x\in K), and assume the joint law μ is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure on the full finite-dimensional coefficient space. Then the pointwise recourse value is finite almost everywhere and its real projection is integrable for each (x\in K). Moreover, there is a continuous field of linear functionals (g(x)) such that

g(x)=DQμ(x)within K,g(x)=D Q_\mu(x)\quad\text{within }K,g(x)=DQμ​(x)within K,

including boundary points of (K). In Lean this is stated by ContinuousOn g K together with HasFDerivWithinAt for the expected-recourse function at every point of (K). It is not weakened to differentiability only on the interior, and it does not add complete recourse.

Theorem 15: finiteness iff almost-sure dual feasibility

Under complete recourse and one of the same four moment alternatives, for an arbitrary fixed (x\in\mathbb R^n),

E[Q(x,d)]∈R⟺{z∈Rm:W⊤z≤q(d)}≠∅ almost surely.\mathbb E[Q(x,d)]\in\mathbb R \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad \{z\in\mathbb R^m:W^\top z\le q(d)\}\ne\varnothing \text{ almost surely}.E[Q(x,d)]∈R⟺{z∈Rm:W⊤z≤q(d)}=∅ almost surely.

The left side means that the signed extended expectation equals a real number, not merely that a totalized real integral returns a value. The right side requires feasibility of the dual inequalities almost surely; it does not require attainment or optimality. This full equivalence is the mission's supporting milestone.

Significance

Theorem 12 supplies a smooth expected objective on the entire source feasible domain under an absolutely continuous data law. That conclusion is stronger than convexity or local Lipschitz continuity: it provides a continuously varying derivative while retaining boundary points and the random dependence of all coefficient blocks. The explicit finiteness and integrability clauses make clear when the real expected objective faithfully represents the extended-real model.

Theorem 15 separates two different well-posedness questions. Complete recourse guarantees primal feasibility for every residual, while almost-sure feasibility of the dual inequalities is exactly what prevents the expected value from escaping the real line under the stated moment conditions. Omitting either direction would lose the source's characterization.

Both results are established in the 1976 book; the staged Lean theorem declarations contain proof placeholders. Completing them would give machine-checked versions of the source statements using reusable definitions for equality-constrained nonnegative linear-program values, pointwise recourse, expected recourse, complete recourse, the signed expectation, and the four moment regimes.

Difficulty

For differentiability, a pointwise optimal solution or dual vector need not vary continuously when the active basis changes. Absolute continuity removes coefficient configurations lying on relevant exceptional hyperplanes only after a measure-theoretic argument, and the conclusion must hold relative to a possibly closed feasible domain rather than only on an open set. One must also prove finiteness and integrability before using the real-valued expectation; simply differentiating the totalized toReal expression would not establish the source theorem.

For finiteness, complete recourse handles feasibility but not unbounded negative cost. The dual system is random through (q), and the equivalence concerns almost-sure existence of a dual-feasible vector together with a signed extended expectation. Assuming dual feasibility or integrability of the recourse value at the outset would make one direction circular.

Formalization scope

All coefficient spaces use finite Fin indices and real scalars. The law is an arbitrary probability measure on the joint product (A,b,q). The density premise for Theorem 12 is ambient absolute continuity with respect to the product Lebesgue volume; it is not a density on an unspecified lower-dimensional support. Consequently, some constant-coordinate moment branches may be incompatible with that density premise, matching the reviewed ambient interpretation rather than silently changing the measure space.

The feasible domain uses (Q(x,d)<+\infty) almost surely and includes its boundary. The signed expectation preserves positive and negative infinities. Theorem 12 assumes it is above (-\infty) on (K) and concludes the conditions needed for the separate real integral. Theorem 15 adds complete recourse but no density, independence, finite support, pre-assumed dual feasibility, or pre-assumed value integrability. Its decision (x) remains arbitrary.

The mission reuses the platform definitions of LPValue, PointwiseRecourse, ExpectedRecourse, and CompleteRecourse. The book-local Kall1976 namespace contains only the expression-essential data type, feasible domain, signed expectation, moment disjunction, and the two reviewed theorem statements. Contributions may add analytical, measure-theoretic, or linear-programming lemmas needed for proofs, but may not replace the signed expectation by a totalized real value, restrict Theorem 12 to the interior, or weaken Theorem 15 to one implication.

Selected references

  • Peter Kall, Stochastic Linear Programming, Springer, 1976, Chapter III: equations (4)-(5), printed p. 41 / PDF47; equation (8), printed p. 44 / PDF50; Theorem 10 and Corollary 11, printed pp. 46-48 / PDF52-54; Theorem 12, printed p. 48 / PDF54; complete recourse, printed p. 51 / PDF57; Theorem 15, printed p. 54 / PDF60. DOI.
7 thms2 active usersReviewed
Graph TheoryOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Linear Programming and Community Detection 6: The LP Relaxation Fails w.h.p. in the Very Dense and Dense SBM Above Explicit ThresholdsResearch Paper

Motivation

Community detection asks for a hidden partition of the nodes of a graph from its edges. Its simplest probabilistic benchmark is the two-community stochastic block model (SBM), in which the minimum bisection problem is the maximum a posteriori estimator. That problem is NP-hard, so convex relaxations are used in its place, and the question is when a relaxation still returns the hidden partition exactly. For semidefinite relaxations this question has sharp answers (Abbe, Bandeira, Hall 2016; Bandeira 2018). Del Pia, Khajavirad and Kunisky (arXiv:2006.03213v2) ask the same question for the most common linear programming relaxation of minimum bisection, the metric relaxation. They show that it recovers the planted bisection in very dense graphs when p−q>1/2p-q>1/2p−q>1/2 (their Theorem 6). This mission is their converse in the very dense and dense regimes, Theorem 7: above explicit thresholds the LP fails with high probability.

Setting

The node set is V={1,…,n}V=\{1,\dots,n\}V={1,…,n}, nnn even. A bisection is a partition V=V1⊔V2V=V_1\sqcup V_2V=V1​⊔V2​ with ∣V1∣=∣V2∣=n/2|V_1|=|V_2|=n/2∣V1​∣=∣V2​∣=n/2. The cut vector xˉ∈{0,1}(n2)\bar x\in\{0,1\}^{\binom n2}xˉ∈{0,1}(2n​) of V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​ has xˉij=1\bar x_{ij}=1xˉij​=1 exactly when iii and jjj lie on different sides. For a graph GGG with adjacency indicators aija_{ij}aij​, the metric relaxation is

(LP-P)min⁡x∑i<jaijxijs.t.xij≤xik+xjk,xij+xik+xjk≤2,∑i<jxij=n24,\text{(LP-P)}\qquad \min_x \sum_{i<j}a_{ij}x_{ij}\quad\text{s.t.}\quad x_{ij}\le x_{ik}+x_{jk},\quad x_{ij}+x_{ik}+x_{jk}\le2,\quad \sum_{i<j}x_{ij}=\frac{n^2}{4},(LP-P)xmin​i<j∑​aij​xij​s.t.xij​≤xik​+xjk​,xij​+xik​+xjk​≤2,i<j∑​xij​=4n2​,

over x∈R(n2)x\in\mathbb R^{\binom n2}x∈R(2n​), with the first family over distinct i,j,ki,j,ki,j,k with i<ji<ji<j and the second over i<j<ki<j<ki<j<k. The LP recovers the planted bisection if xˉ\bar xxˉ is its unique optimal solution.

In the SBM Gn,p,q\mathcal G_{n,p,q}Gn,p,q​ a bisection V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​ is first drawn uniformly at random; then each pair on the same side is an edge with probability ppp and each pair across with probability qqq, independently, with p>qp>qp>q. The Erdős–Rényi graph Gn,p\mathcal G_{n,p}Gn,p​ has every pair an edge with probability ppp. The dense scaling (20) is p=αn−ωp=\alpha n^{-\omega}p=αn−ω, q=βn−ωq=\beta n^{-\omega}q=βn−ω with α>β>0\alpha>\beta>0α>β>0, 0≤ω<10\le\omega<10≤ω<1; ω=0\omega=0ω=0 is the very dense regime. An event holds with high probability (w.h.p.) if its probability tends to 111 as n→∞n\to\inftyn→∞.

For a graph GGG, ρG(i,j)\rho_G(i,j)ρG​(i,j) is the shortest-path distance (+∞+\infty+∞ across components), ρmax⁡(G)=max⁡i,jρG(i,j)\rho_{\max}(G)=\max_{i,j}\rho_G(i,j)ρmax​(G)=maxi,j​ρG​(i,j) is the diameter, and ρavg(G)=2n2∑i<jρG(i,j)\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)=\frac2{n^2}\sum_{i<j}\rho_G(i,j)ρavg​(G)=n22​∑i<j​ρG​(i,j) is the average distance. EEE is the edge set of GGG, E0E_0E0​ the set of edges across the planted bisection.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7 (pp. 15–16)

Let p=αn−ωp=\alpha n^{-\omega}p=αn−ω, q=βn−ωq=\beta n^{-\omega}q=βn−ω with α>β>0\alpha>\beta>0α>β>0, ω∈[0,1)\omega\in[0,1)ω∈[0,1), and α,β<1\alpha,\beta<1α,β<1 if ω=0\omega=0ω=0. If one of

  1. ω=0\omega=0ω=0 and β>max⁡{3−α−(3−α)2−4α2, 2α−1}\beta>\max\big\{\tfrac{3-\alpha-\sqrt{(3-\alpha)^2-4\alpha}}2,\ 2\alpha-1\big\}β>max{23−α−(3−α)2−4α​​, 2α−1} (22),
  2. ω∈(0,1)\omega\in(0,1)ω∈(0,1), 11−ω∉N\tfrac1{1-\omega}\notin\mathbb N1−ω1​∈/N and β>α/(2⌈11−ω⌉−1)\beta>\alpha/(2\lceil\tfrac1{1-\omega}\rceil-1)β>α/(2⌈1−ω1​⌉−1) (23),
  3. ω=12\omega=\tfrac12ω=21​ and β>max⁡{1−2e−α22−e−α2,13+2e−α2}α\beta>\max\big\{\tfrac{1-2e^{-\alpha^2}}{2-e^{-\alpha^2}},\tfrac1{3+2e^{-\alpha^2}}\big\}\alphaβ>max{2−e−α21−2e−α2​,3+2e−α21​}α (24),
  4. ω∈(0,1)\omega\in(0,1)ω∈(0,1), 11−ω∈N∖{2}\tfrac1{1-\omega}\in\mathbb N\setminus\{2\}1−ω1​∈N∖{2} and β>α/(21−ω−1+2e−α1/(1−ω))\beta>\alpha/\big(\tfrac2{1-\omega}-1+2e^{-\alpha^{1/(1-\omega)}}\big)β>α/(1−ω2​−1+2e−α1/(1−ω)) (25)

holds, then

lim⁡n→∞P(V1,G)∼Gn,p,q[(LP-P) does not recover V1,V2]=1.\lim_{n\to\infty}\mathbb P_{(V_1,G)\sim\mathcal G_{n,p,q}}\big[\text{(LP-P) does not recover }V_1,V_2\big]=1.n→∞lim​P(V1​,G)∼Gn,p,q​​[(LP-P) does not recover V1​,V2​]=1.

Milestones

  1. (26), p. 16: for p,q=Ω(log⁡n/n)p,q=\Omega(\log n/n)p,q=Ω(logn/n) with lim⁡q/p∈(0,1]\lim q/p\in(0,1]limq/p∈(0,1], the ratio ∣E0∣/∣E∣|E_0|/|E|∣E0​∣/∣E∣ lies in (1±ϵ) q/(p+q)(1\pm\epsilon)\,q/(p+q)(1±ϵ)q/(p+q) w.h.p.
  2. Proposition 11, p. 28: a coupling of Gn,q\mathcal G_{n,q}Gn,q​, Gn,q,p\mathcal G_{n,q,p}Gn,q,p​ and Gn,p\mathcal G_{n,p}Gn,p​ in which the three graphs are nested.
  3. Proposition 12, p. 28: w.h.p. ρmax⁡(Gn,αn−ω)=1+⌊11−ω⌋\rho_{\max}(\mathcal G_{n,\alpha n^{-\omega}})=1+\lfloor\frac1{1-\omega}\rfloorρmax​(Gn,αn−ω​)=1+⌊1−ω1​⌋.
  4. Proposition 14, p. 29 (Shimizu): w.h.p. ρavg(Gn,αn−ω)∈((1−ϵ)μ,(1+ϵ)μ)\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(\mathcal G_{n,\alpha n^{-\omega}})\in((1-\epsilon)\mu,(1+\epsilon)\mu)ρavg​(Gn,αn−ω​)∈((1−ϵ)μ,(1+ϵ)μ), where μ=⌈11−ω⌉+1{11−ω∈N}e−α1/(1−ω)\mu=\lceil\frac1{1-\omega}\rceil+\mathbf 1\{\frac1{1-\omega}\in\mathbb N\}e^{-\alpha^{1/(1-\omega)}}μ=⌈1−ω1​⌉+1{1−ω1​∈N}e−α1/(1−ω).
  5. Propositions 16, 17, 18, pp. 29–30: the diameter of the very dense and dense SBM, and lower bounds on its average distance, in the three cases ω=0\omega=0ω=0, 11−ω∉N\frac1{1-\omega}\notin\mathbb N1−ω1​∈/N and 11−ω∈N\frac1{1-\omega}\in\mathbb N1−ω1​∈N.

Significance

Theorem 6 and Theorem 7 together bracket the success region of the metric relaxation in the very dense regime: recovery for p−q>1/2p-q>1/2p−q>1/2, failure above the curve (22). In the dense regime, Theorem 7 gives explicit linear thresholds β>c(ω,α) α\beta>c(\omega,\alpha)\,\alphaβ>c(ω,α)α above which the LP fails. The proof reduces failure to a deterministic distance criterion (Theorem 5, posed in mission 4 of this series) and turns asymptotic distance distributions of random graphs into statements about an LP.

The results are proved in the paper, partly by citing Bollobás's diameter theorems and Shimizu's average-distance theorem; none of them has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing the mission yields, besides Theorem 7, the diameter and average distance of dense Erdős–Rényi graphs (Propositions 12 and 14) and the monotone coupling between Erdős–Rényi graphs and the SBM (Proposition 11), each of which is usable beyond this paper. The coupling and (26) are also the inputs of the logarithmic-degree result (Theorem 8, mission 7).

Difficulty

The deterministic half is short: once ∣E0∣/∣E∣|E_0|/|E|∣E0​∣/∣E∣, ρmax⁡\rho_{\max}ρmax​ and ρavg\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}ρavg​ are pinned down, the case computations (28)–(29) reduce to inequalities between explicit expressions in α\alphaα, β\betaβ and ω\omegaω. The difficulty is the random-graph input. The diameter of Gn,p\mathcal G_{n,p}Gn,p​ for p=αn−ωp=\alpha n^{-\omega}p=αn−ω needs the second-moment analysis of the number of pairs at distance greater than ddd (Bollobás, Corollaries 10.11–10.12), and the average distance needs the finer limit law for path counts at the critical exponent 11−ω∈N\frac1{1-\omega}\in\mathbb N1−ω1​∈N, where the constant e−α1/(1−ω)e^{-\alpha^{1/(1-\omega)}}e−α1/(1−ω) appears. A first-moment argument gives only one side of each estimate. Concentration of ∣E∣|E|∣E∣ and ∣E0∣|E_0|∣E0​∣ (26) is a Hoeffding bound, but it must hold uniformly over the random planted bisection.

Formalization scope

Nodes are Fin n and graphs SimpleGraph (Fin n). A bisection is its side V1V_1V1​ with 2∣V1∣=n2|V_1|=n2∣V1​∣=n. The LP variable is a symmetric, zero-diagonal array Fin n → Fin n → ℝ, with no box constraints, so uniqueness is uniqueness over R(n2)\mathbb R^{\binom n2}R(2n​). Probabilities are finite sums over all graphs (and all bisections for the SBM). Edge probabilities are clamped into [0,1][0,1][0,1], which affects only finitely many nnn. SBM limits run over even n=2mn=2mn=2m. Distances are in ℕ∞ and ρavg\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}ρavg​ in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], so disconnected samples have infinite diameter and average distance; no real truncation is used.

Disclosed choices:

  • Theorem 7 adds α>β\alpha>\betaα>β, the SBM's standing assumption p>qp>qp>q (§4, p. 13), also assumed by Proposition 18 and (26).
  • (26) is posed for p=αs(n)p=\alpha s(n)p=αs(n), q=βs(n)q=\beta s(n)q=βs(n) with s(n)≥clog⁡n/ns(n)\ge c\log n/ns(n)≥clogn/n and αs(n)≤1\alpha s(n)\le1αs(n)≤1 eventually. Then q/p=β/αq/p=\beta/\alphaq/p=β/α, which avoids the printed "lim⁡p/q∈(0,1]\lim p/q\in(0,1]limp/q∈(0,1]", a slip for q/pq/pq/p.
  • Proposition 11 is posed as printed, with middle law Gn,q,p\mathcal G_{n,q,p}Gn,q,p​ (within qqq, across ppp).

Two encodings would make the statements trivial, and both are excluded. Unnormalized LP variables would make uniqueness false. Reading ρ\rhoρ in R\mathbb RR via toReal would make the upper bounds hold for disconnected graphs.

The deterministic distance criterion (Theorem 5) is posed in mission 4 and is not restated. Contributions are welcome on the coupling, Hoeffding-type concentration of edge counts, and the Erdős–Rényi distance asymptotics. These are reusable for any finite random-graph development.

Selected references

  • A. Del Pia, A. Khajavirad, D. Kunisky, Linear Programming and Community Detection, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023; arXiv:2006.03213v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.03213
  • E. Abbe, A. S. Bandeira, G. Hall, Exact recovery in the stochastic block model, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 62 (2016) 471–487. https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.3267
  • A. S. Bandeira, Random Laplacian matrices and convex relaxations, Found. Comput. Math. 18 (2018) 345–379. https://arxiv.org/abs/1504.03987
  • B. Bollobás, Random Graphs, 2nd ed., Cambridge Studies in Advanced Mathematics 73, Cambridge University Press, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511814068
  • N. Shimizu, The average distance of dense homogeneous random graphs, Mathematical Engineering Technical Report, Department of Mathematical Informatics, The University of Tokyo, November 2017 (Theorem 1; reference [38] of the paper). https://www.keisu.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/techrep/
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Linear Programming and Community Detection 7: The LP Relaxation Fails w.h.p. in the Logarithmic-Degree SBMResearch Paper

Motivation

The stochastic block model (SBM) is the standard benchmark for community detection: a random graph whose vertices are split into hidden communities, with denser connections inside a community than across. For two equal communities, the best possible estimator of the hidden partition is the minimum bisection problem, which is NP-hard in the worst case. Its tractable relaxations are therefore compared by asking for which edge densities they still recover the hidden partition exactly.

For semidefinite programming the answer is complete in the logarithmic-degree regime: Abbe, Bandeira and Hall (arXiv:1405.3267) located the information-theoretic threshold α−β=2\sqrt\alpha-\sqrt\beta=\sqrt2α​−β​=2​, and the SDP relaxation was shown to reach it by Hajek, Wu and Xu (arXiv:1412.6156) and by Bandeira (arXiv:1504.03987). Linear programming relaxations are cheaper and widely used in combinatorial optimization, but their behaviour on the SBM was not known. Del Pia, Khajavirad and Kunisky (arXiv:2006.03213, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023) study the most common one, the metric relaxation. This mission formalizes their result for the logarithmic-degree regime (Theorem 8): there the LP relaxation fails to recover the hidden partition with high probability, at every choice of the parameters.

Setting

Let V={1,…,n}V=\{1,\dots,n\}V={1,…,n} with nnn even. A bisection is a partition V=V1⊔V2V=V_1\sqcup V_2V=V1​⊔V2​ with ∣V1∣=∣V2∣=n/2|V_1|=|V_2|=n/2∣V1​∣=∣V2​∣=n/2; its cost in a graph GGG is the number of edges between V1V_1V1​ and V2V_2V2​. Given a fixed planted bisection V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​, an optimization problem recovers it if its unique optimal solution corresponds to V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​.

The cut vector xˉ∈{0,1}(n2)\bar x\in\{0,1\}^{\binom n2}xˉ∈{0,1}(2n​) of V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​ has xˉij=1\bar x_{ij}=1xˉij​=1 exactly when i,ji,ji,j lie on different sides. With aij=1a_{ij}=1aij​=1 for edges and 000 otherwise, the metric relaxation is

(LP-P)min⁡x∑i<jaijxij  s.t.  xij≤xik+xjk,  xij+xik+xjk≤2,  ∑i<jxij=n24,\text{(LP-P)}\quad \min_x \sum_{i<j}a_{ij}x_{ij}\ \ \text{s.t.}\ \ x_{ij}\le x_{ik}+x_{jk},\ \ x_{ij}+x_{ik}+x_{jk}\le2,\ \ \sum_{i<j}x_{ij}=\frac{n^2}{4},(LP-P)xmin​i<j∑​aij​xij​  s.t.  xij​≤xik​+xjk​,  xij​+xik​+xjk​≤2,  i<j∑​xij​=4n2​,

the first family over distinct i,j,ki,j,ki,j,k and the second over i<j<ki<j<ki<j<k, with xji:=xijx_{ji}:=x_{ij}xji​:=xij​. Every bisection's cut vector is feasible.

The distance ρG(i,j)\rho_G(i,j)ρG​(i,j) is the length of a shortest iii–jjj path (+∞+\infty+∞ across components). The diameter is ρmax⁡(G)=max⁡i,jρG(i,j)\rho_{\max}(G)=\max_{i,j}\rho_G(i,j)ρmax​(G)=maxi,j​ρG​(i,j) and the average distance is ρavg(G)=2n2∑i<jρG(i,j)\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)=\frac{2}{n^2}\sum_{i<j}\rho_G(i,j)ρavg​(G)=n22​∑i<j​ρG​(i,j).

The Erdős–Rényi model Gn,p\mathcal G_{n,p}Gn,p​ draws each edge independently with probability ppp. The SBM Gn,p,q\mathcal G_{n,p,q}Gn,p,q​ chooses a bisection V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​ uniformly at random, then draws each pair inside a side with probability ppp and each pair across with probability qqq, independently, where p>qp>qp>q. The logarithmic-degree regime (21) is

p=αlog⁡nn,q=βlog⁡nn,α>β>0.p=\alpha\frac{\log n}{n},\qquad q=\beta\frac{\log n}{n},\qquad \alpha>\beta>0 .p=αnlogn​,q=βnlogn​,α>β>0.

An event AnA_nAn​ holds with high probability if P[An]→1\mathbb P[A_n]\to1P[An​]→1 as n→∞n\to\inftyn→∞.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8 (p. 18)

α>β>0 ⟹ lim⁡n→∞PGn,p,q[(LP-P) does not recover V1,V2]=1.\alpha>\beta>0\ \Longrightarrow\ \lim_{n\to\infty}\mathbb P_{\mathcal G_{n,p,q}}\big[\text{(LP-P) does not recover }V_1,V_2\big]=1 .α>β>0 ⟹ n→∞lim​PGn,p,q​​[(LP-P) does not recover V1​,V2​]=1.

Milestones

  1. The threshold of [2] (p. 14, strict cases): if α−β>2\sqrt\alpha-\sqrt\beta>\sqrt2α​−β​>2​, the minimum bisection problem recovers V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​ with high probability; if α−β<2\sqrt\alpha-\sqrt\beta<\sqrt2α​−β​<2​, it does not.
  2. Proposition 13 (p. 29): for α>1\alpha>1α>1 and G∼Gn,αlog⁡n/nG\sim\mathcal G_{n,\alpha\log n/n}G∼Gn,αlogn/n​, ρmax⁡(G)∈((1−ϵ)log⁡nlog⁡log⁡n,(1+ϵ)log⁡nlog⁡log⁡n)\rho_{\max}(G)\in\big((1-\epsilon)\frac{\log n}{\log\log n},(1+\epsilon)\frac{\log n}{\log\log n}\big)ρmax​(G)∈((1−ϵ)loglognlogn​,(1+ϵ)loglognlogn​) with high probability.
  3. Proposition 15 (p. 29, Theorem 1 of Chung–Lu): for α>1\alpha>1α>1, ρavg(G)∈((1−ϵ)log⁡nlog⁡pn,(1+ϵ)log⁡nlog⁡pn)\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)\in\big((1-\epsilon)\frac{\log n}{\log pn},(1+\epsilon)\frac{\log n}{\log pn}\big)ρavg​(G)∈((1−ϵ)logpnlogn​,(1+ϵ)logpnlogn​) with high probability.
  4. Proposition 19 (p. 30): for α>β>0\alpha>\beta>0α>β>0 with α+β2>1\frac{\alpha+\beta}{2}>12α+β​>1 and G∼Gn,p,qG\sim\mathcal G_{n,p,q}G∼Gn,p,q​,
(1−ϵ)log⁡nlog⁡log⁡n≤ρavg(G)≤ρmax⁡(G)≤(1+ϵ)log⁡nlog⁡log⁡n(1-\epsilon)\frac{\log n}{\log\log n}\le\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)\le\rho_{\max}(G)\le(1+\epsilon)\frac{\log n}{\log\log n}(1−ϵ)loglognlogn​≤ρavg​(G)≤ρmax​(G)≤(1+ϵ)loglognlogn​

with high probability.

Two results the proof of Theorem 8 uses are posed in sibling missions of this series and are not restated here: Theorem 5 (a distance-based non-recovery criterion for (LP-P), mission 4) and the coupling Proposition 11 together with the crossing-edge count (26) (mission 6).

Significance

The result. Theorem 8 separates linear from semidefinite programming on a natural statistical problem. In the logarithmic regime the SDP relaxation recovers the planted bisection whenever any method can, while the metric LP fails with high probability for all α>β>0\alpha>\beta>0α>β>0, including parameters far above the information-theoretic threshold. The paper's Theorem 6 shows that in the very dense regime (constant p,qp,qp,q) the LP does succeed when p−q>1/2p-q>1/2p−q>1/2; Theorem 8 shows that at logarithmic degree no such window exists.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper, modulo results cited from the random-graph literature. Nothing in this mission is machine-checked yet. Formalization adds a precise account of what the cited distance asymptotics assert; Proposition 19's upper bound is justified in the paper only by reference to "a standard result on the diameter of the SBM" obtained by adapting an argument of Abbe's survey, so a complete proof of it is new work. Propositions 13 and 15 are classical facts about Erdős–Rényi graphs that have no formal proof in any library known to the curators, and are reusable well beyond community detection.

Difficulty

The LP side of the argument is deterministic and finite. The difficulty is probabilistic. The distance results require tight control of breadth-first neighbourhood growth in sparse random graphs near the connectivity threshold, where the average degree is only logarithmic, with error terms small enough to pin the diameter to a (1±ϵ)(1\pm\epsilon)(1±ϵ) window. A first-moment estimate of path counts gives only one side of each bound. In the SBM the two edge probabilities make neighbourhood growth inhomogeneous, so the Erdős–Rényi results do not transfer verbatim. The threshold of [2] is a separate sharp large-deviation statement, at the level of individual vertices' in- and out-degrees.

Formalization scope

Vertices are Fin n (0-based); graphs are SimpleGraph (Fin n). A bisection is recorded by its side V1V_1V1​ with 2∣V1∣=n2|V_1|=n2∣V1​∣=n. The LP variable is a symmetric, zero-diagonal array x:V×V→Rx:V\times V\to\mathbb Rx:V×V→R, which is a point of R(n2)\mathbb R^{\binom n2}R(2n​); no box constraints are added. LP recovery means that the planted cut vector is the unique optimal solution; minimum-bisection recovery means that every bisection of cost at most the planted one is the planted unordered partition. Distances are in N∪{∞}\mathbb N\cup\{\infty\}N∪{∞} and the average distance in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], so a disconnected sample has infinite diameter. The random-graph laws are finite sums over all graphs; the SBM averages over all bisections. Edge probabilities are clamped into [0,1][0,1][0,1], which matters only for the finitely many nnn with αlog⁡n/n>1\alpha\log n/n>1αlogn/n>1. "With high probability" is a limit of probabilities equal to 111; for the SBM the limit runs along n=2mn=2mn=2m. Logarithms are natural.

Disclosed choices relative to the printed statements: Theorem 8 prints only α,β>0\alpha,\beta>0α,β>0, and α>β\alpha>\betaα>β is added as the SBM's standing assumption p>qp>qp>q (p. 13) and that of (21). The threshold of [2] is printed as an "if and only if"; only the two strict implications are posed, and the boundary α−β=2\sqrt\alpha-\sqrt\beta=\sqrt2α​−β​=2​ is left out.

The statements cannot be satisfied vacuously: the laws are genuine probability distributions for every nnn, the events compare extended-valued distances without truncation, and recovery requires uniqueness over all real feasible points of (LP-P). An encoding with an empty or degenerate feasible set, or with distances truncated to finite reals, would change the theorems and is excluded.

A complete development needs: Erdős–Rényi and SBM laws, breadth-first exploration bounds for sparse random graphs, the coupling of the SBM between two Erdős–Rényi graphs (mission 6), the LP non-recovery criterion (mission 4), and the information-theoretic threshold of [2]. Contributions on the random-graph distance asymptotics are reusable on their own and especially welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Del Pia, A. Khajavirad, D. Kunisky, Linear Programming and Community Detection, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.03213 (v2 is the cited version)
  • E. Abbe, A. S. Bandeira, G. Hall, Exact recovery in the stochastic block model, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 62:471–487, 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.3267
  • E. Abbe, Community detection and stochastic block models: recent developments, Journal of Machine Learning Research 18:1–86, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.10146
  • F. Chung, L. Lu, The diameter of sparse random graphs, Advances in Applied Mathematics 26(4):257–279, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1006/aama.2001.0720
  • F. Chung, L. Lu, The average distances in random graphs with given expected degrees, PNAS 99(25):15879–15882, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.252631999
  • B. Hajek, Y. Wu, J. Xu, Achieving exact cluster recovery threshold via semidefinite programming, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 62(5):2788–2797, 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6156
  • A. S. Bandeira, Random Laplacian matrices and convex relaxations, Foundations of Computational Mathematics 18(2):345–379, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1504.03987
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Linear Programming and Community Detection 5: The LP Relaxation Recovers the Planted Bisection w.h.p. in the Very Dense SBM When p − q > 1/2Research Paper

Motivation

The stochastic block model (SBM), introduced by Holland, Laskey and Leinhardt (1983), is the standard random model for networks with community structure, and the basic benchmark for community-detection algorithms (Abbe 2018). In its two-community form the nodes are split into two equal halves, edges inside a half appear with probability ppp, and edges across with probability q<pq<pq<p. The task of exact recovery is to identify the hidden halves from the graph alone.

The maximum a posteriori estimator for this model is the minimum bisection problem (find a balanced cut with the fewest crossing edges), which is NP-hard in general. Abbe, Bandeira and Hall (2016) determined when it recovers the planted bisection, and showed that a semidefinite relaxation is as good as the integer program. Del Pia, Khajavirad and Kunisky (arXiv:2006.03213, Mathematics of Operations Research 2023) ask the same question for the cheapest standard relaxation: the metric linear programming relaxation, defined by triangle inequalities. This mission is their positive result in the very dense regime.

Setting

Let V={1,…,n}V=\{1,\dots,n\}V={1,…,n} with nnn even. A bisection is a partition V=V1∪V2V=V_1\cup V_2V=V1​∪V2​ with ∣V1∣=∣V2∣=n/2|V_1|=|V_2|=n/2∣V1​∣=∣V2​∣=n/2. For a graph G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) let aij=1a_{ij}=1aij​=1 if (i,j)∈E(i,j)\in E(i,j)∈E and 000 otherwise. The metric relaxation (LP-P) is

min⁡x∈R(n2) ∑i<jaijxijs.t.xij≤xik+xjk,xij+xik+xjk≤2,∑i<jxij=n24,\min_{x\in\mathbb R^{\binom n2}}\ \sum_{i<j}a_{ij}x_{ij}\quad\text{s.t.}\quad x_{ij}\le x_{ik}+x_{jk},\quad x_{ij}+x_{ik}+x_{jk}\le 2,\quad \sum_{i<j}x_{ij}=\frac{n^2}{4},x∈R(2n​)min​ i<j∑​aij​xij​s.t.xij​≤xik​+xjk​,xij​+xik​+xjk​≤2,i<j∑​xij​=4n2​,

the first constraint for all distinct i,j,ki,j,ki,j,k with i<ji<ji<j, the second for all i<j<ki<j<ki<j<k, and xji:=xijx_{ji}:=x_{ij}xji​:=xij​. The cut vector xˉ\bar xxˉ of a bisection has xˉij=0\bar x_{ij}=0xˉij​=0 for i,ji,ji,j on the same side and xˉij=1\bar x_{ij}=1xˉij​=1 otherwise. (LP-P) recovers the planted bisection when xˉ\bar xxˉ is its unique optimal solution.

In the Erdős–Rényi model Gn,p\mathcal G_{n,p}Gn,p​ every pair of nodes is an edge independently with probability ppp. In the SBM Gn,p,q\mathcal G_{n,p,q}Gn,p,q​ a bisection V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​ is first chosen uniformly at random; then pairs inside V1V_1V1​ or inside V2V_2V2​ are edges with probability ppp, pairs between them with probability qqq, all independently. Gn,0,q\mathcal G_{n,0,q}Gn,0,q​ is the random bipartite graph across a random bisection. An event occurs with high probability (w.h.p.) if its probability tends to 111 as n→∞n\to\inftyn→∞. The graph is very dense when ppp and qqq are constants.

For a finite graph G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) and b∈Z≥0Vb\in\mathbb Z_{\ge0}^Vb∈Z≥0V​, a bbb-factor (or fff-factor) is a set F⊆EF\subseteq EF⊆E with exactly bvb_vbv​ edges of FFF at each node vvv; N(U,U′)N(U,U')N(U,U′) counts edges with one endpoint in UUU and one in U′U'U′; dmin⁡d_{\min}dmin​, dmax⁡d_{\max}dmax​ are the minimum and maximum degrees; and the node connectivity κ(G)\kappa(G)κ(G) is the minimum number of nodes whose deletion disconnects GGG (the number of nodes, for a complete graph).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6 (p. 15)

For constants 0<q<p<10<q<p<10<q<p<1,

p−q>12 ⟹ PG∼Gn,p,q[(LP-P) recovers the planted bisection]→n→∞1.p-q>\tfrac12\ \Longrightarrow\ \mathbb P_{G\sim\mathcal G_{n,p,q}}\big[\text{(LP-P) recovers the planted bisection}\big]\xrightarrow[n\to\infty]{}1 .p−q>21​ ⟹ PG∼Gn,p,q​​[(LP-P) recovers the planted bisection]n→∞​1.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 6 (p. 20): for G∼G2m,0,qG\sim\mathcal G_{2m,0,q}G∼G2m,0,q​ there is C>0C>0C>0 with dmax⁡≤qm+Cmlog⁡md_{\max}\le qm+C\sqrt{m\log m}dmax​≤qm+Cmlogm​ w.h.p.
  2. Proposition 5 (p. 20; Schrijver, Cor. 21.4a): a bipartite graph has a bbb-factor iff N(U,U)≥b(U)−12b(V)N(U,U)\ge b(U)-\frac12 b(V)N(U,U)≥b(U)−21​b(V) for every U⊆VU\subseteq VU⊆V.
  3. Proposition 3 (p. 14): there is Creg,2>0C_{\mathrm{reg},2}>0Creg,2​>0 such that for every q∈(0,1)q\in(0,1)q∈(0,1), w.h.p. G∼Gn,0,qG\sim\mathcal G_{n,0,q}G∼Gn,0,q​ is a subgraph of a regular bipartite graph with the same bipartition, of degree dreg=qn2+Creg,2n2log⁡n2d_{\mathrm{reg}}=\frac{qn}2+C_{\mathrm{reg},2}\sqrt{\frac n2\log\frac n2}dreg​=2qn​+Creg,2​2n​log2n​​ (rounded down).
  4. Proposition 8 (p. 24): for G∼Gn,pG\sim\mathcal G_{n,p}G∼Gn,p​ there is C>0C>0C>0 with dmin⁡≥pn−Cnlog⁡nd_{\min}\ge pn-C\sqrt{n\log n}dmin​≥pn−Cnlogn​ w.h.p.
  5. Proposition 9 (p. 24; Bollobás–Thomason): for G∼Gn,pG\sim\mathcal G_{n,p}G∼Gn,p​, κ(G)=dmin⁡\kappa(G)=d_{\min}κ(G)=dmin​ w.h.p.
  6. Proposition 7 (p. 24; Tutte's fff-factor theorem).
  7. Proposition 4 (p. 14): there is Creg,1>0C_{\mathrm{reg},1}>0Creg,1​>0 such that for every p∈(0,1)p\in(0,1)p∈(0,1), w.h.p. G∼Gn,pG\sim\mathcal G_{n,p}G∼Gn,p​ contains a spanning regular subgraph of degree dreg=pn−Creg,1nlog⁡nd_{\mathrm{reg}}=pn-C_{\mathrm{reg},1}\sqrt{n\log n}dreg​=pn−Creg,1​nlogn​ (rounded up to an even integer).

The deterministic recovery criterion that the goal also depends on, Theorem 4 of the paper (regular sandwiching with din−dout≥n/4d_{\mathrm{in}}-d_{\mathrm{out}}\ge n/4din​−dout​≥n/4), is the goal of mission 3 of this series and is not restated here.

Significance

The result. Theorem 6 is the only positive recovery guarantee for the metric LP in the random setting of the paper. Together with the failure results of Theorems 7 and 8 (missions 6 and 7), it locates the LP strictly between trivial and information-theoretically optimal: it recovers in a region of constant p,qp,qp,q, but not up to the threshold p>qp>qp>q that the minimum bisection problem and its SDP relaxation reach. Propositions 3 and 4, that dense random graphs sit inside, and contain, regular graphs of nearly their average degree, are of independent interest in random graph theory, as the authors note.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; none of it is machine-checked. The mission also requires three classical theorems that are not in Mathlib: the bbb-factor criterion for bipartite graphs, Tutte's fff-factor theorem (Mathlib has only the perfect-matching case f≡1f\equiv 1f≡1), and the Bollobás–Thomason theorem κ=dmin⁡\kappa=d_{\min}κ=dmin​ for random graphs, together with degree concentration for Gn,p\mathcal G_{n,p}Gn,p​ and the bipartite SBM. Each is reusable well beyond this paper.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for recovery is to exhibit a dual certificate for (LP-P), which needs regularity of the communities and of the cross edges; a random graph is not regular. The paper bridges the gap by sandwiching the random graph between regular graphs of nearly equal degree, and that step is where the difficulty lies: the existence of a regular sub- or supergraph is a global combinatorial property, characterized by factor theorems with exponentially many conditions, each of which must hold simultaneously with high probability. Degree concentration alone, the first idea, controls only the singleton conditions. Tutte's fff-factor theorem and the bipartite bbb-factor criterion are themselves substantial combinatorial theorems, and the connectivity statement of Bollobás and Thomason is a deep result on random graphs.

Formalization scope

Nodes are Fin n (0-based). A bisection is a Finset V1V_1V1​ with 2∣V1∣=n2|V_1|=n2∣V1​∣=n. Points of R(n2)\mathbb R^{\binom n2}R(2n​) are symmetric arrays with zero diagonal; (LP-P) has no box constraints 0≤x≤10\le x\le10≤x≤1 (they are implied by the constraints and adding them would change the LP). Recovery means: xˉ\bar xxˉ is optimal and every optimal solution equals xˉ\bar xxˉ.

The random-graph laws are finite: a probability is a weighted sum over all graphs on Fin n, with independent edge weights, and for the SBM an average over all bisections; the event may depend on the drawn bisection. Edge probabilities are clamped into [0,1][0,1][0,1], which is the identity on the parameters used here. "With high probability" is Tendsto … atTop (𝓝 1), along n=2mn=2mn=2m for the SBM. The standing assumption p>qp>qp>q is not built into the law, so that Gn,0,q\mathcal G_{n,0,q}Gn,0,q​ is the case p=0p=0p=0.

Disclosed readings: the printed dregd_{\mathrm{reg}}dreg​ of Propositions 3 and 4 is not an integer; Proposition 3 is posed with degree ⌊dreg⌋\lfloor d_{\mathrm{reg}}\rfloor⌊dreg​⌋ and Proposition 4 with 2⌈dreg/2⌉2\lceil d_{\mathrm{reg}}/2\rceil2⌈dreg​/2⌉, the least even integer ≥dreg\ge d_{\mathrm{reg}}≥dreg​ (the proof assumes dregd_{\mathrm{reg}}dreg​ even). κ(Kn)=n\kappa(K_n)=nκ(Kn​)=n as on p. 24. Quantifier order follows each page: in Propositions 3 and 4 the constant precedes the probability parameter, in Propositions 6 and 8 it follows it; no constant depends on nnn.

A statement in which "with high probability" is replaced by a positive probability or an eventual bound, in which the bisection is fixed rather than random, or in which the regular degree is compared with an irrational real (an empty event) is not this mission's target.

Infrastructure needed: the finite random-graph laws, Hoeffding-type concentration over them, the two factor theorems, and node connectivity. Proofs of any milestone, and of the classical results as general graph theory, are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Del Pia, A. Khajavirad, D. Kunisky, Linear Programming and Community Detection, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023; arXiv:2006.03213v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.03213
  • E. Abbe, A. S. Bandeira, G. Hall, Exact Recovery in the Stochastic Block Model, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 62(1), 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.3267
  • E. Abbe, Community Detection and Stochastic Block Models: Recent Developments, Journal of Machine Learning Research 18, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.10146
  • P. W. Holland, K. B. Laskey, S. Leinhardt, Stochastic Blockmodels: First Steps, Social Networks 5(2), 1983. https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733(83)90021-7
  • W. T. Tutte, The Factors of Graphs, Canadian Journal of Mathematics 4, 1952. https://doi.org/10.4153/CJM-1952-028-2
  • A. Schrijver, Combinatorial Optimization: Polyhedra and Efficiency, Springer, 2003 (Corollary 21.4a).
  • B. Bollobás, A. Thomason, Random Graphs of Small Order, in Random Graphs '83, North-Holland Mathematics Studies 118, 1985 (Theorem 1).
  • A. Frieze, M. Karoński, Introduction to Random Graphs, Cambridge University Press, 2016 (Chapter 3). https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316339831
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Graph TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Linear Programming and Community Detection 4: A Distance-Based Condition Under Which the Metric LP Relaxation Fails to Recover the Planted BisectionResearch Paper

Motivation

The minimum bisection problem asks, for a graph on an even number nnn of vertices, for a split of the vertices into two halves that cuts as few edges as possible. It is NP-hard, and it is the maximum a posteriori estimator for the two-community stochastic block model (SBM), the standard benchmark for community detection (Abbe, 2018). Convex relaxations are the usual way to make such estimators tractable while keeping guarantees. For the semidefinite relaxation, exact-recovery thresholds are known (Abbe, Bandeira, Hall, 2016; Hajek, Wu, Xu, 2016). Linear programming relaxations are cheaper and much used in combinatorial optimization, but their recovery properties were not understood.

Del Pia, Khajavirad and Kunisky (arXiv:2006.03213v2, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023) study the best-known LP relaxation of minimum bisection, the metric relaxation. They give a sufficient condition for it to recover a planted bisection (Theorem 4) and a necessary one (Theorem 5). This mission formalizes the necessary condition. Its consequence, developed in §4 of the paper, is that the metric relaxation fails with high probability in most SBM regimes, including those where the minimum bisection itself succeeds.

Setting

Let G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) be a simple graph on V={1,…,n}V=\{1,\dots,n\}V={1,…,n}, and write (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) for an edge with i<ji<ji<j; set aij=1a_{ij}=1aij​=1 if (i,j)∈E(i,j)\in E(i,j)∈E and aij=0a_{ij}=0aij​=0 otherwise. A bisection is a partition of VVV into two sets V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​ with ∣V1∣=∣V2∣=n/2|V_1|=|V_2|=n/2∣V1​∣=∣V2​∣=n/2. One fixed bisection, unknown to the solver, is the planted bisection; E0E_0E0​ is the set of edges with one end in V1V_1V1​ and the other in V2V_2V2​.

The cut vector xˉ∈{0,1}(n2)\bar x\in\{0,1\}^{\binom n2}xˉ∈{0,1}(2n​) of the planted bisection has xˉij=1\bar x_{ij}=1xˉij​=1 exactly when iii and jjj lie on different sides. The metric relaxation is the linear program, with xji:=xijx_{ji}:=x_{ij}xji​:=xij​,

min⁡x ∑1≤i<j≤naijxijs.t.xij≤xik+xjk (1),xij+xik+xjk≤2 (2),∑1≤i<j≤nxij=n24 (3),\min_x\ \sum_{1\le i<j\le n}a_{ij}x_{ij}\quad\text{s.t.}\quad x_{ij}\le x_{ik}+x_{jk}\ (1),\qquad x_{ij}+x_{ik}+x_{jk}\le 2\ (2),\qquad \sum_{1\le i<j\le n}x_{ij}=\frac{n^2}{4}\ (3),xmin​ 1≤i<j≤n∑​aij​xij​s.t.xij​≤xik​+xjk​ (1),xij​+xik​+xjk​≤2 (2),1≤i<j≤n∑​xij​=4n2​ (3),

where (1) ranges over distinct i,j,ki,j,ki,j,k with i<ji<ji<j and (2) over i<j<ki<j<ki<j<k. The LP recovers the planted bisection if xˉ\bar xxˉ is its unique optimal solution. The objective at xˉ\bar xxˉ is ∣E0∣|E_0|∣E0​∣.

The graph distance ρG(i,j)\rho_G(i,j)ρG​(i,j) is the length of a shortest iii–jjj path (+∞+\infty+∞ across components). The diameter and the average distance are

ρmax⁡(G)=max⁡i,j∈VρG(i,j),ρavg(G)=2n2∑1≤i<j≤nρG(i,j).\rho_{\max}(G)=\max_{i,j\in V}\rho_G(i,j),\qquad \rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)=\frac{2}{n^2}\sum_{1\le i<j\le n}\rho_G(i,j).ρmax​(G)=i,j∈Vmax​ρG​(i,j),ρavg​(G)=n22​1≤i<j≤n∑​ρG​(i,j).

The average is over all n2n^2n2 ordered pairs, the diagonal included. For n≥5n\ge5n≥5 define

c(G)=max⁡{0, 3ρmax⁡(G)−4ρavg(G)1−4/n}.(17)c(G)=\max\Big\{0,\ \frac{3\rho_{\max}(G)-4\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)}{1-4/n}\Big\}.\qquad(17)c(G)=max{0, 1−4/n3ρmax​(G)−4ρavg​(G)​}.(17)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5

For a connected graph GGG on n≥5n\ge5n≥5 nodes with a planted bisection,

1+c(G)2ρavg(G)+2c(G)(1−1n) ∣E∣<∣E0∣(18)⟹(LP-P) does not recover the planted bisection.\frac{1+c(G)}{2\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)+2c(G)(1-\frac1n)}\,|E|<|E_0|\quad(18)\qquad\Longrightarrow\qquad\text{(LP-P) does not recover the planted bisection.}2ρavg​(G)+2c(G)(1−n1​)1+c(G)​∣E∣<∣E0​∣(18)⟹(LP-P) does not recover the planted bisection.

Milestones

The proof of Theorem 5 works with the point x~∈R(n2)\tilde x\in\mathbb R^{\binom n2}x~∈R(2n​),

x~ij=ρG(i,j)+c(G)2ρavg(G)+2c(G)(1−1n).\tilde x_{ij}=\frac{\rho_G(i,j)+c(G)}{2\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)+2c(G)(1-\frac1n)}.x~ij​=2ρavg​(G)+2c(G)(1−n1​)ρG​(i,j)+c(G)​.

The mission poses three statements about it, for a connected GGG on n≥5n\ge5n≥5 nodes:

  1. display (19), p. 12: for i<j<ki<j<ki<j<k, x~ij+x~ik+x~jk≤32⋅ρmax⁡(G)+c(G)ρavg(G)+c(G)(1−1n)\displaystyle\tilde x_{ij}+\tilde x_{ik}+\tilde x_{jk}\le\frac32\cdot\frac{\rho_{\max}(G)+c(G)}{\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)+c(G)(1-\frac1n)}x~ij​+x~ik​+x~jk​≤23​⋅ρavg​(G)+c(G)(1−n1​)ρmax​(G)+c(G)​;
  2. p. 13: x~\tilde xx~ is feasible for (LP-P);
  3. p. 13: the objective of (LP-P) at x~\tilde xx~ equals 1+c(G)ρavg(G)+c(G)(1−1n)⋅∣E∣2\displaystyle\frac{1+c(G)}{\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)+c(G)(1-\frac1n)}\cdot\frac{|E|}{2}ρavg​(G)+c(G)(1−n1​)1+c(G)​⋅2∣E∣​.

Significance

The result. Theorem 5 is a deterministic certificate of failure, stated for any connected graph, not for a random model. It reduces the question "does the LP recover?" to comparing two numbers that depend only on the distance profile of GGG and on the fraction of edges cut by the planted bisection. When typical distances are close to the diameter, c(G)c(G)c(G) is small and (18) asks only that ∣E0∣/∣E∣|E_0|/|E|∣E0​∣/∣E∣ exceed roughly 1/(2ρavg(G))1/(2\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G))1/(2ρavg​(G)). In random graphs typical distances are close to the diameter. The paper's Theorems 7 and 8 combine Theorem 5 with known distance asymptotics of Erdős–Rényi graphs (Bollobás, Random Graphs, 2001; Chung, Lu, 2001). They show that the metric relaxation fails with high probability in the dense and logarithmic-degree SBM, in contrast with the semidefinite relaxation. Those theorems are separate missions of this series and use Theorem 5 as a black box.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version is known. The mission produces a formal metric relaxation of minimum bisection, with LP recovery defined as uniqueness of the optimum, and links it to graph distances through Mathlib's SimpleGraph.edist/ediam. The definitions are written to coincide with those of the other missions of this series, so that one model layer serves the sufficient condition (Theorem 4), the necessary condition (this mission), and the random-graph consequences.

Difficulty

Theorem 5 is not deep, but it is exact. The milestones fix the witness x~\tilde xx~; the work is in checking it. The obvious candidate, the graph metric ρG\rho_GρG​ itself rescaled to satisfy the equality (3), satisfies the triangle inequalities (1). It can violate the perimeter constraints (2) whenever some triangle of vertices is spread out compared with the average distance. The shift by c(G)c(G)c(G), which depends on ρmax⁡\rho_{\max}ρmax​ and on the factor 1−4/n1-4/n1−4/n, is tuned so that (2) holds with no slack in the worst case. A proof has to keep track of the normalization 2/n22/n^22/n2 (ordered pairs, diagonal included), the factor 1−1/n1-1/n1−1/n, and the sign of 3ρmax⁡−4ρavg3\rho_{\max}-4\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}3ρmax​−4ρavg​, and must use n≥5n\ge5n≥5 wherever it divides by 1−4/n1-4/n1−4/n. In Lean the further work is converting between sums over ordered pairs, unordered pairs and the edge set, and between extended-valued distances and their real values for a connected graph.

Formalization scope

  • Vertices and bisections. Vertices are Fin n (0-based). The planted bisection is a finset V1V_1V1​ with 2∣V1∣=n2|V_1|=n2∣V1​∣=n, and V2=V1cV_2=V_1^{c}V2​=V1c​. ∣E0∣|E_0|∣E0​∣ is the number of pairs i<ji<ji<j adjacent in GGG and on different sides.
  • LP variables. A point of R(n2)\mathbb R^{\binom n2}R(2n​) is an array x:Fin n→Fin n→Rx:\texttt{Fin } n\to\texttt{Fin } n\to\mathbb Rx:Fin n→Fin n→R. Feasibility includes symmetry and a zero diagonal, so the free diagonal and lower-triangle entries cannot break uniqueness of the optimum. No bounds 0≤x≤10\le x\le10≤x≤1 are added; they are not constraints of (LP-P).
  • Recovery. LPRecovers G V1 says that the cut vector of V1V_1V1​ is optimal and every optimal point equals it.
  • Distances. ρG\rho_GρG​ is SimpleGraph.edist (in N∪{∞}\mathbb N\cup\{\infty\}N∪{∞}), ρmax⁡\rho_{\max}ρmax​ is SimpleGraph.ediam, and ρavg\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}ρavg​ is the printed formula computed in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. c(G)c(G)c(G) and x~\tilde xx~ use their real values. All statements assume GGG connected, where these values are finite and ρavg(G)>0\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)>0ρavg​(G)>0.
  • Standing hypotheses. Every statement carries exactly the page's hypotheses: GGG connected and n≥5n\ge5n≥5, plus, for Theorem 5, the planted bisection. The bisection forces nnn even, so in effect n≥6n\ge6n≥6; n≥5n\ge5n≥5 is kept as printed. x~\tilde xx~ is indexed by i<ji<ji<j on the page and is extended symmetrically with zero diagonal.
  • Ruled out. A formalization that adds box constraints, drops the symmetric zero-diagonal normalization, averages over n(n−1)/2n(n-1)/2n(n−1)/2 pairs instead of the printed 2/n22/n^22/n2, or omits connectivity (where the real value of an infinite distance would be 000) states a different theorem. None of these is used here.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the three milestones and the goal. Reusable lemmas include the identity ∑i<jaijxij=∑(i,j)∈Exij\sum_{i<j}a_{ij}x_{ij}=\sum_{(i,j)\in E}x_{ij}∑i<j​aij​xij​=∑(i,j)∈E​xij​ for SimpleGraph.edgeFinset, the finiteness of ediam for connected graphs on Fin n, and the bound ρavg(G)≤(1−1n)ρmax⁡(G)\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)\le(1-\frac1n)\rho_{\max}(G)ρavg​(G)≤(1−n1​)ρmax​(G).

Selected references

  • A. Del Pia, A. Khajavirad, D. Kunisky, Linear Programming and Community Detection, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023; arXiv:2006.03213v2 (2022). https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.03213
  • E. Abbe, Community Detection and Stochastic Block Models: Recent Developments, Journal of Machine Learning Research 18 (2018). https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.10146
  • E. Abbe, A. S. Bandeira, G. Hall, Exact Recovery in the Stochastic Block Model, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 62 (2016). https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.3267
  • B. Hajek, Y. Wu, J. Xu, Achieving Exact Cluster Recovery Threshold via Semidefinite Programming, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 62 (2016). https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6156
  • B. Bollobás, Random Graphs, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511814068
  • F. Chung, L. Lu, The Diameter of Sparse Random Graphs, Advances in Applied Mathematics 26 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1006/aama.2001.0720
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantum Algorithms for Zero-Sum Games 2: The Value of a Zero-Sum Game, Known to Error ε/(6R(r+1)), Decides Whether an LP Has OPT < α or OPT ≥ α − εResearch Paper

Linear programs as zero-sum games

Linear programming and two-player zero-sum matrix games are two faces of one theory. Von Neumann's minimax theorem is a statement of LP duality, and conversely, since Dantzig's 1951 note, every linear program can be rewritten as a zero-sum game. The equivalence matters in practice whenever an algorithm is much better at one of the two problems. Game solvers based on multiplicative weights and sampling, such as the randomized algorithm of Grigoriadis and Khachiyan (GK95), approximate the value of an n×mn\times mn×m game in time sublinear in the size of the matrix. Carmon, Duchi, Sidford and Tian (arXiv:1903.02675) and van Apeldoorn and Gilyén (arXiv:1904.03180) use such game solvers, classical or quantum, as linear-programming solvers. For that to work, the reduction from a linear program to a game must be explicit, with the exact error budget that the game solver has to meet.

This mission formalizes that reduction as it is stated in §4 of van Apeldoorn and Gilyén (2019), Lemma 12 (p. 14). The paper uses it to turn its quantum zero-sum game solvers into quantum LP solvers with cubic dependence on R(r+1)/εR(r+1)/\varepsilonR(r+1)/ε (Theorem 13, p. 15).

Setting

The linear program. Let A∈Rn×mA \in \mathbb R^{n\times m}A∈Rn×m, b∈Rmb \in \mathbb R^mb∈Rm and c∈Rnc \in \mathbb R^nc∈Rn. The primal LP (4) and its dual (5) are

max⁡y∈Rm { bTy:Ay≤c, y≥0 },min⁡x∈Rn { cTx:ATx≥b, x≥0 }.\max_{y \in \mathbb R^m}\ \{\, b^{\mathsf T}y : Ay \le c,\ y \ge 0 \,\}, \qquad \min_{x \in \mathbb R^n}\ \{\, c^{\mathsf T}x : A^{\mathsf T}x \ge b,\ x \ge 0 \,\}.y∈Rmmax​ {bTy:Ay≤c, y≥0},x∈Rnmin​ {cTx:ATx≥b, x≥0}.

The paper's standing assumptions (p. 12) are:

  • every entry of AAA, bbb and ccc lies in [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1];
  • a constant R>0R > 0R>0 is known such that adding ∑jyj≤R\sum_j y_j \le R∑j​yj​≤R to the primal does not change its optimal value, and ∣ci∣≤R|c_i| \le R∣ci​∣≤R for every iii;
  • a constant rrr is known such that adding ∑ixi≤r\sum_i x_i \le r∑i​xi​≤r to the dual does not change its optimal value. The two optimal values coincide, and OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT denotes the common value.

The game. In a zero-sum game with payoff matrix MMM, the column player picks a mixed strategy yyy in the standard simplex Δ={y≥0:∑kyk=1}\Delta = \{y \ge 0 : \sum_k y_k = 1\}Δ={y≥0:∑k​yk​=1}, and the row player picks the row with the largest payoff. The value of the game (LP (1), p. 2) is

λ∗(M)=min⁡y∈Δ max⁡i (My)i.\lambda^*(M) = \min_{y \in \Delta}\ \max_i\ (My)_i .λ∗(M)=y∈Δmin​ imax​ (My)i​.

The reduction. Fix a threshold α\alphaα. With eee the all-ones vector of length mmm, the game matrix (6) acts on the variables (y,z,h)(y, z, h)(y,z,h) (the original variables, one slack variable and one homogenizing variable):

A′′′=(eT1−1−eT−11−bT0α/RA0−c/R).A''' = \begin{pmatrix} e^{\mathsf T} & 1 & -1 \\ -e^{\mathsf T} & -1 & 1 \\ -b^{\mathsf T} & 0 & \alpha/R \\ A & 0 & -c/R \end{pmatrix}.A′′′=​eT−eT−bTA​1−100​−11α/R−c/R​​.

Write λ∗=λ∗(A′′′)\lambda^* = \lambda^*(A''')λ∗=λ∗(A′′′) for its value, and set the error level ε′′′=ε/(6R(r+1))\varepsilon''' = \varepsilon/(6R(r+1))ε′′′=ε/(6R(r+1)).

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 12

For every ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0, every threshold α\alphaα with ∣α∣≤R|\alpha| \le R∣α∣≤R, and every estimate λ~\tilde\lambdaλ~ with ∣λ~−λ∗∣≤ε′′′|\tilde\lambda - \lambda^*| \le \varepsilon'''∣λ~−λ∗∣≤ε′′′,

λ~>ε′′′  ⟹  OPT<α,λ~≤ε′′′  ⟹  OPT≥α−ε.\tilde\lambda > \varepsilon''' \implies \mathrm{OPT} < \alpha, \qquad \tilde\lambda \le \varepsilon''' \implies \mathrm{OPT} \ge \alpha - \varepsilon .λ~>ε′′′⟹OPT<α,λ~≤ε′′′⟹OPT≥α−ε.

This is the paper's "finding the optimal value λ∗\lambda^*λ∗ of the game (6) up to additive error ε′′′\varepsilon'''ε′′′ suffices to correctly conclude either OPT<α\mathrm{OPT} < \alphaOPT<α or OPT≥α−ε\mathrm{OPT} \ge \alpha - \varepsilonOPT≥α−ε", with the decision rule its proof uses.

The two cases (milestones)

The goal splits into the two exact implications of the proof:

λ∗>0  ⟹  OPT<α,λ∗≤2ε′′′  ⟹  OPT≥α−ε.\lambda^* > 0 \implies \mathrm{OPT} < \alpha, \qquad\qquad \lambda^* \le 2\varepsilon''' \implies \mathrm{OPT} \ge \alpha - \varepsilon .λ∗>0⟹OPT<α,λ∗≤2ε′′′⟹OPT≥α−ε.

The milestones follow the printed proof, all on p. 14:

  • the explicit strategy y^\hat yy^​ built from a primal point with objective at least α\alphaα;
  • the first case;
  • the existence of a strategy that attains the value;
  • the bound ∣h−1/2∣≤ε′′′|h - 1/2| \le \varepsilon'''∣h−1/2∣≤ε′′′;
  • the approximate feasibility and optimality bounds (7)–(8);
  • weak duality with relaxed constraints;
  • the second case.

Significance

The result. Lemma 12 is the bridge that makes any approximate zero-sum game solver an approximate LP solver. It turns the question "is OPT≥α\mathrm{OPT} \ge \alphaOPT≥α?" into a single approximate value computation, and binary search over α∈[−R,R]\alpha \in [-R, R]α∈[−R,R] (p. 12) then locates OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT to additive error ε\varepsilonε. The constant 6R(r+1)6R(r+1)6R(r+1) is the price of the reduction. It fixes how accurately the game must be solved, and therefore the (R(r+1)/ε)3(R(r+1)/\varepsilon)^3(R(r+1)/ε)3 and (R(r+1)/ε)3.5(R(r+1)/\varepsilon)^{3.5}(R(r+1)/ε)3.5 factors of Theorem 13. The same reduction appears, in other forms, in classical sublinear LP solvers.

Formalizing it. The lemma is proved in the paper; this mission produces a machine-checked version with every constant explicit. That is not a formality here. As printed, the second row of (6) is (−eT,1,1)(-e^{\mathsf T}, 1, 1)(−eT,1,1), and with that row the lemma is false: for n=m=1n = m = 1n=m=1, A=1A = 1A=1, c=1c = 1c=1, b=−1b = -1b=−1, R=1R = 1R=1, r=0r = 0r=0 and α=0\alpha = 0α=0, one has OPT=0≥α\mathrm{OPT} = 0 \ge \alphaOPT=0≥α but λ∗>0\lambda^* > 0λ∗>0. The derivation on p. 13 gives (−eT,−1,1)(-e^{\mathsf T}, -1, 1)(−eT,−1,1), which the mission uses. Step (7) of the proof is written for α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0 and needs ∣α∣≤R|\alpha| \le R∣α∣≤R in general. The mission states the lemma with both repairs, so that later LP-solver formalizations can cite an exact statement. To our knowledge no machine-checked version of this reduction exists.

Difficulty

Each step is elementary, and the difficulty is bookkeeping. The game value is an infimum over the simplex, and the second case needs a strategy that actually attains it, or an approximation argument with slack. The homogenizing variable hhh is pinned only approximately: an approximately optimal strategy satisfies h≈1/2h \approx 1/2h≈1/2 only up to ε′′′\varepsilon'''ε′′′. That error is multiplied by α/R\alpha/Rα/R and ci/Rc_i/Rci​/R, whose signs are arbitrary, so the inequalities that look natural for nonnegative data fail for negative α\alphaα or cic_ici​. The relaxed constraints then pass through weak duality, where the dual bound rrr enters, and the errors have to add up to exactly ε\varepsilonε. A reading with α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0 would cover only half of the binary search.

Formalization scope

  • Data. AAA is Matrix (Fin n) (Fin m) ℝ, bbb is Fin m → ℝ and ccc is Fin n → ℝ: constraints are indexed by Fin n and variables by Fin m, as in (4). The paper's index letters in §4 vary.

  • Standing assumptions. A structure LPStanding A b c R r OPT collects them:

    • entries of AAA, bbb, ccc in [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1];
    • R>0R > 0R>0 and ∣ci∣≤R|c_i| \le R∣ci​∣≤R;
    • OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT bounds every primal feasible objective and is attained by a primal feasible yyy with ∑jyj≤R\sum_j y_j \le R∑j​yj​≤R;
    • OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is attained by a dual feasible xxx with ∑ixi≤r\sum_i x_i \le r∑i​xi​≤r.

    The last item is the paper's assumption of strong duality, in the form its proof uses. It is a hypothesis, not a theorem to derive.

  • The game. The matrix (6) has rows Fin 2 ⊕ (Unit ⊕ Fin n) and columns Fin m ⊕ Fin 2 (with zzz = inr 0 and hhh = inr 1), and its second row is the corrected (−eT,−1,1)(-e^{\mathsf T}, -1, 1)(−eT,−1,1).

  • The value. The value is sInf of the image of stdSimplex under y↦max⁡i(My)iy \mapsto \max_i (My)_iy↦maxi​(My)i​. It is not an infimum over a membership proposition, which in Lean would return min⁡(0,λ∗)\min(0, \lambda^*)min(0,λ∗) and make the first case vacuous. LP (1)'s side constraint λ∈[−1,1]\lambda \in [-1, 1]λ∈[−1,1] is omitted because it is inactive for entries in [−1,1][-1, 1][−1,1].

  • Constants. ε′′′=ε/(6R(r+1))\varepsilon''' = \varepsilon/(6R(r+1))ε′′′=ε/(6R(r+1)) exactly, with ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0.

  • Added hypothesis. ∣α∣≤R|\alpha| \le R∣α∣≤R is the one hypothesis not written in the lemma. §4 supplies it through the binary search range, and through the requirement that (6) be a game with entries in [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1].

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out. LPStanding is satisfiable, the second row forces ∑jyj+z=h\sum_j y_j + z = h∑j​yj​+z=h, the value is not junk on a positive game, and the goal is stated for every estimate within ε′′′\varepsilon'''ε′′′ rather than only at λ∗=0\lambda^* = 0λ∗=0. A sanity file checks the first three on small instances.

Infrastructure. Everything is built from Mathlib's stdSimplex, Matrix.mulVec and dotProduct. The attainment of the value of a finite matrix game (milestone exists_strategy_le) and weak duality with relaxed constraints are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, and so are alternative proofs of the second case that avoid attainment by a slack argument.

Selected references

  • J. van Apeldoorn and A. Gilyén, Quantum algorithms for zero-sum games, arXiv:1904.03180v1, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.03180
  • M. D. Grigoriadis and L. G. Khachiyan, A sublinear-time randomized approximation algorithm for matrix games, Operations Research Letters 18(2):53–58, 1995. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6377(95)00032-0
  • Y. Carmon, J. C. Duchi, A. Sidford and K. Tian, A rank-1 sketch for matrix multiplicative weights, arXiv:1903.02675, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.02675
  • G. B. Dantzig, A proof of the equivalence of the programming problem and the game problem, in T. C. Koopmans (ed.), Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, Wiley, 1951, pp. 330–335.
  • I. Adler, The equivalence of linear programs and zero-sum games, International Journal of Game Theory 42(1):165–177, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0328-8
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Graph TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Linear Programming and Community Detection 3: The Metric LP Relaxation Recovers the Planted Bisection When d_in − d_out ≥ n/4 Under Regular SandwichingResearch Paper

Motivation

The minimum bisection problem asks, for a graph G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) on an even number nnn of vertices, for a split of VVV into two halves of size n/2n/2n/2 that cuts as few edges as possible. It is NP-hard, and it is also the maximum a posteriori estimator for the two-community stochastic block model, the standard random model of networks with community structure. A tractable surrogate is a convex relaxation. Semidefinite relaxations of minimum bisection are known to recover a planted community structure under near-optimal conditions; Del Pia, Khajavirad and Kunisky (arXiv:2006.03213, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023) ask the same question for the cheaper and more classical linear programming relaxation, the metric relaxation obtained by outer-approximating the cut polytope by triangle inequalities.

This mission covers the deterministic, sufficient side of their analysis (§3.1 of the paper): explicit conditions on a graph with a planted bisection under which the LP relaxation returns exactly that bisection. These conditions are the input to the paper's probabilistic recovery theorem for the very dense block model (Theorem 6).

Setting

Let V={1,…,n}V=\{1,\dots,n\}V={1,…,n}. A bisection is a partition V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​ of VVV with ∣V1∣=∣V2∣=n/2|V_1|=|V_2|=n/2∣V1​∣=∣V2​∣=n/2. A fixed but unknown bisection is the planted bisection. Write G1=G[V1]G_1=G[V_1]G1​=G[V1​] and G2=G[V2]G_2=G[V_2]G2​=G[V2​] for the subgraphs induced on the two sides, and G0G_0G0​ for the bipartite graph of the edges with one end on each side. Two degree parameters describe the instance: dind_{\mathrm{in}}din​, a degree inside the communities, and doutd_{\mathrm{out}}dout​, a degree across them. A graph is ddd-regular if every vertex has exactly ddd neighbours.

The cut vector xˉ∈{0,1}(n2)\bar x\in\{0,1\}^{\binom n2}xˉ∈{0,1}(2n​) of the planted bisection has xˉij=0\bar x_{ij}=0xˉij​=0 for i,ji,ji,j on the same side and xˉij=1\bar x_{ij}=1xˉij​=1 otherwise. With aij=1a_{ij}=1aij​=1 if (i,j)∈E(i,j)\in E(i,j)∈E and 000 otherwise, and the convention xji=xijx_{ji}=x_{ij}xji​=xij​, the metric relaxation is

(LP-P)min⁡x∑1≤i<j≤naijxijs.t.xij≤xik+xjkdistinct i,j,k, i<j,(1)xij+xik+xjk≤21≤i<j<k≤n,(2)∑i<jxij=n2/4.(3)\text{(LP-P)}\qquad \min_x \sum_{1\le i<j\le n} a_{ij}x_{ij}\quad\text{s.t.}\quad \begin{aligned} &x_{ij}\le x_{ik}+x_{jk} && \text{distinct } i,j,k,\ i<j, &(1)\\ &x_{ij}+x_{ik}+x_{jk}\le 2 && 1\le i<j<k\le n, &(2)\\ &\textstyle\sum_{i<j}x_{ij}=n^2/4. && &(3) \end{aligned}(LP-P)xmin​1≤i<j≤n∑​aij​xij​s.t.​xij​≤xik​+xjk​xij​+xik​+xjk​≤2∑i<j​xij​=n2/4.​​distinct i,j,k, i<j,1≤i<j<k≤n,​(1)(2)(3)​

The LP recovers the planted bisection if xˉ\bar xxˉ is an optimal solution and the only one.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (p. 12)

Assume G1G_1G1​ and G2G_2G2​ contain dind_{\mathrm{in}}din​-regular subgraphs on the same node sets, and G0G_0G0​ is a subgraph of a doutd_{\mathrm{out}}dout​-regular bipartite graph with the same bipartition. Then

din−dout ≥ n4⟹(LP-P) recovers the planted bisection.d_{\mathrm{in}}-d_{\mathrm{out}}\ \ge\ \frac n4\quad\Longrightarrow\quad \text{(LP-P) recovers the planted bisection.}din​−dout​ ≥ 4n​⟹(LP-P) recovers the planted bisection.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 1 (p. 7). If G1,G2G_1,G_2G1​,G2​ are dind_{\mathrm{in}}din​-regular with din∈{1,…,n/2−1}d_{\mathrm{in}}\in\{1,\dots,n/2-1\}din​∈{1,…,n/2−1}, G0G_0G0​ is doutd_{\mathrm{out}}dout​-regular with dout∈{0,…,n/2}d_{\mathrm{out}}\in\{0,\dots,n/2\}dout​∈{0,…,n/2}, n≥4n\ge4n≥4, and din−dout≥n/4−1d_{\mathrm{in}}-d_{\mathrm{out}}\ge n/4-1din​−dout​≥n/4−1, then xˉ\bar xxˉ is optimal for (LP-P).
  2. Theorem 3 (pp. 9–10), Mangasarian's criterion: for an LP min⁡{c⊤x:Ax=b, Cx≥d}\min\{c^\top x: Ax=b,\ Cx\ge d\}min{c⊤x:Ax=b, Cx≥d} with primal optimum xˉ\bar xxˉ and dual optimum (uˉ,vˉ)(\bar u,\bar v)(uˉ,vˉ), xˉ\bar xxˉ is the unique optimum if and only if Ax=0Ax=0Ax=0, CKx=0C_Kx=0CK​x=0, CLx≥0C_Lx\ge0CL​x≥0 has no nonzero solution, where KKK and LLL are the active constraints with positive and zero multiplier.
  3. Proposition 2 (p. 10). For regular G1,G2,G0G_1,G_2,G_0G1​,G2​,G0​ as above, din−dout≥n/4d_{\mathrm{in}}-d_{\mathrm{out}}\ge n/4din​−dout​≥n/4 implies recovery.
  4. Lemma 2 (p. 11). Recovery survives deleting crossing edges.
  5. Lemma 3 (p. 11). Recovery survives adding edges inside V1V_1V1​ or V2V_2V2​.

Significance

Theorem 4 is a deterministic certificate: any graph that can be sandwiched between a regular within-community graph and a regular across-community graph with a degree gap of n/4n/4n/4 is solved exactly by a polynomial-size LP. For regular instances the threshold is tight: for 8∣n8\mid n8∣n and any din−dout≤n/4−1d_{\mathrm{in}}-d_{\mathrm{out}}\le n/4-1din​−dout​≤n/4−1 in range, the paper's Theorem 2 constructs regular graphs on which even the exact minimum bisection fails to recover the planted bisection. The sandwich form is what makes the result usable for random graphs: the paper's Theorem 6 shows that in the very dense block model with constant edge probabilities p>qp>qp>q and p−q>1/2p-q>1/2p−q>1/2 the sandwich hypotheses hold with high probability, so the LP recovers the communities.

None of these statements has, to our knowledge, a machine-checked proof. A complete development gives a verified dual certificate for the metric polytope, a verified version of Mangasarian's uniqueness criterion for linear programs in the general form Ax=bAx=bAx=b, Cx≥dCx\ge dCx≥d (useful well beyond this paper), and the monotonicity lemmas that transfer LP recovery between graphs.

Difficulty

Optimality of xˉ\bar xxˉ (Proposition 1) needs an explicit dual solution of (LP-P), with one multiplier per triangle inequality, and the bookkeeping that verifies the dual equality constraint for every pair i<ji<ji<j in six cases. Optimality alone is not recovery: the obvious argument, exhibiting a dual solution, says nothing about other optima, and the LP has many fractional feasible points. Uniqueness requires a strictly complementary structure and a separate argument that the linear system attached to the active constraints has only the zero solution; on the page this step uses Dirac's theorem on Hamiltonian cycles inside each community. Finally, the passage from regular to sandwiched graphs is not a perturbation statement: adding or deleting edges changes the objective, and the lemmas rely on the bounds 0≤xij≤10\le x_{ij}\le 10≤xij​≤1, which are implied by the triangle inequalities rather than imposed.

Formalization scope

Vertices are Fin n (0-based), a graph is a SimpleGraph (Fin n), and a bisection is a finset V1 with 2 * V1.card = n; the other side is its complement. A point of R(n2)\mathbb R^{\binom n2}R(2n​) is an array x : Fin n → Fin n → ℝ that is symmetric with zero diagonal, and these two conditions are part of LP feasibility. Recovery is optimality of the cut vector together with equality of every optimal solution to it. Regularity of G1G_1G1​ and G2G_2G2​ with one common degree is "every vertex has exactly dind_{\mathrm{in}}din​ neighbours on its own side"; regularity of G0G_0G0​ is "every vertex has exactly doutd_{\mathrm{out}}dout​ neighbours on the other side". Degree conditions are compared in R\mathbb RR.

Committed readings:

  • Theorem 4 is posed for arbitrary integers din,doutd_{\mathrm{in}},d_{\mathrm{out}}din​,dout​ satisfying the sandwich hypotheses. The page names them the minimum and maximum degrees, but the paper's Theorem 6 applies Theorem 4 with other integers; the literal reading is a special case.
  • The two dind_{\mathrm{in}}din​-regular subgraphs of G1G_1G1​ and G2G_2G2​ are encoded as a single graph with no crossing edges.
  • Proposition 1 carries the standing assumptions of §3.1.1 (n≥4n\ge4n≥4 and the degree ranges). Proposition 2 and Theorem 4 carry no range hypotheses: they are implied by the remaining hypotheses for n≥4n\ge4n≥4, the hypotheses are unsatisfiable at n=2n=2n=2, and the conclusion is trivial at n=0n=0n=0.
  • Lemma 2's strict inclusion E(G~0)⊂E(G0)E(\tilde G_0)\subset E(G_0)E(G~0​)⊂E(G0​) is posed as ⊆\subseteq⊆, since equality is trivial.
  • Theorem 3 renames the cost vector ppp to ccc and the number of variables nnn to NNN.

Two encodings would trivialize the mission and are ruled out: an array xxx without symmetry and zero diagonal (its unconstrained entries make uniqueness false), and an LP with added box constraints 0≤x≤10\le x\le10≤x≤1 (a different polytope). Dirac's theorem, used inside the proof of Proposition 2, is posed separately on the platform (AppliedComb.Graphs.dirac) and is not restated here. Contributions welcome: the dual certificate of Proposition 1, a general-purpose proof of Theorem 3 from LP duality, and the two monotonicity lemmas.

Selected references

  • A. Del Pia, A. Khajavirad, D. Kunisky, Linear Programming and Community Detection, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023; arXiv:2006.03213v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.03213
  • O. L. Mangasarian, Uniqueness of solution in linear programming, Linear Algebra and its Applications 25 (1979), 151–162. https://doi.org/10.1016/0024-3795(79)90014-4
  • G. A. Dirac, Some theorems on abstract graphs, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society s3-2 (1952), 69–81. https://doi.org/10.1112/plms/s3-2.1.69
  • M. M. Deza, M. Laurent, Geometry of Cuts and Metrics, Springer, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04295-9
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Algorithmic Game TheoryGraph TheoryMechanism Design+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms 1: Some Stationary Equilibrium of Directed Search Attains a Quarter of the First-Best WelfareResearch Paper

Motivation

Two-sided platforms for dating, freelancing and housing do more than list participants: they decide whom each participant is shown. When search is costly and agents leave the market over time, the platform's choice of assortments (which types of agents meet which, and how often) determines who matches, and agents respond strategically by deciding which matches to accept. A platform that ignores those responses can design meetings that agents then decline.

Immorlica, Lucier, Manshadi and Wei (arXiv:2102.09017, Management Science 2023) model this as directed search in a stationary flow economy and ask how much welfare a platform can secure when it controls only meetings, while agents retain the decision to accept. Computing the optimal assortments is NP-hard to approximate within 24/23 (their Theorem 4.2), so the relevant question is whether a constant fraction of the best conceivable welfare is reachable at all. Their Theorem 4.1 answers it with the factor 4, measured against the platform's first best, a benchmark in which the platform also dictates acceptance.

The mission formalizes the existence part of Theorem 4.1 and the chain of results in §4 of the paper that leads to it.

Setting

There are finitely many types on two sides, a set M\mathcal MM and a set W\mathcal WW; write Θ=M∪W\Theta=\mathcal M\cup\mathcal WΘ=M∪W and let θ′\theta'θ′ denote a generic type on the side opposite to θ\thetaθ. Agents of type θ\thetaθ enter at rate αθ>0\alpha_\theta>0αθ​>0 and each agent leaves unmatched at rate δ>0\delta>0δ>0. When an agent of type mmm meets one of type www, both observe one symmetric utility uuu drawn from a law FmwF_{mw}Fmw​ on R\mathbb RR with no atoms and finite mean; they match, and leave with utility uuu each, if both accept.

The platform picks an assortment λθ(θ′)≥0\lambda_\theta(\theta')\ge0λθ​(θ′)≥0 for each type: type θ\thetaθ meets type θ′\theta'θ′ at rate λθ(θ′)\lambda_\theta(\theta')λθ​(θ′). Agents use thresholds τθ\tau_\thetaτθ​ and accept exactly when u≥τθu\ge\tau_\thetau≥τθ​, so a pair matches when u≥max⁡(τm,τw)u\ge\max(\tau_m,\tau_w)u≥max(τm​,τw​). With population masses ηθ\eta_\thetaηθ​ and matching rates ξθ\xi_\thetaξθ​, the assortments induce a stationary equilibrium when, for every type,

αθ=(δ+ξθ)ηθ,ηmλm(w)=ηwλw(m),∑θ′λθ(θ′)≤1,\alpha_\theta=(\delta+\xi_\theta)\eta_\theta,\qquad \eta_m\lambda_m(w)=\eta_w\lambda_w(m),\qquad \sum_{\theta'}\lambda_\theta(\theta')\le1,αθ​=(δ+ξθ​)ηθ​,ηm​λm​(w)=ηw​λw​(m),θ′∑​λθ​(θ′)≤1, ξθ=∑θ′λθ(θ′)∫max⁡(τθ,τθ′)∞dFθθ′,τθ=∑θ′λθ(θ′)∫max⁡(τθ,τθ′)∞u dFθθ′δ+ξθ.\xi_\theta=\sum_{\theta'}\lambda_\theta(\theta')\int_{\max(\tau_\theta,\tau_{\theta'})}^\infty dF_{\theta\theta'},\qquad \tau_\theta=\frac{\sum_{\theta'}\lambda_\theta(\theta')\int_{\max(\tau_\theta,\tau_{\theta'})}^\infty u\,dF_{\theta\theta'}}{\delta+\xi_\theta}.ξθ​=θ′∑​λθ​(θ′)∫max(τθ​,τθ′​)∞​dFθθ′​,τθ​=δ+ξθ​∑θ′​λθ​(θ′)∫max(τθ​,τθ′​)∞​udFθθ′​​.

These are constraints (6a)–(6f) of the paper; the last one, (6e), says each threshold equals the type's expected utility, which is the agents' best response. The welfare is the flow of realized utility,

SW=∑m∑w(ηmλm(w)+ηwλw(m))∫max⁡(τm,τw)∞u dFmw.\mathrm{SW}=\sum_{m}\sum_{w}\big(\eta_m\lambda_m(w)+\eta_w\lambda_w(m)\big)\int_{\max(\tau_m,\tau_w)}^\infty u\,dF_{mw}.SW=m∑​w∑​(ηm​λm​(w)+ηw​λw​(m))∫max(τm​,τw​)∞​udFmw​.

The first-best relaxation (§4.1) drops (6e) and replaces max⁡(τm,τw)\max(\tau_m,\tau_w)max(τm​,τw​) by a free pairwise threshold τmw\tau_{mw}τmw​: the platform chooses both the meetings and which matches happen. Its welfare FB\mathrm{FB}FB is the same expression with τmw\tau_{mw}τmw​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.1

For every market satisfying the standing assumptions there are assortments, thresholds, rates and masses satisfying (6a)–(6f) such that, for every first-best feasible candidate QQQ,

FB(Q)≤4 SW.\mathrm{FB}(Q)\le 4\,\mathrm{SW}.FB(Q)≤4SW.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 4.4. The first best equals the linear program max⁡ 2∑m,wρmwβmw\max\,2\sum_{m,w}\rho_{mw}\beta_{mw}max2∑m,w​ρmw​βmw​ subject to β≥0\beta\ge0β≥0, ∑wβmw≤αm\sum_w\beta_{mw}\le\alpha_m∑w​βmw​≤αm​, ∑mβmw≤αw\sum_m\beta_{mw}\le\alpha_w∑m​βmw​≤αw​, where ρmw=max⁡τ≥0∫τ∞u dFmw/(δ+∫τ∞dFmw)\rho_{mw}=\max_{\tau\ge0}\int_\tau^\infty u\,dF_{mw}/(\delta+\int_\tau^\infty dF_{mw})ρmw​=maxτ≥0​∫τ∞​udFmw​/(δ+∫τ∞​dFmw​).
  2. Lemma 4.5. The maximizer of A(τ)=∫τ∞u dF/(δ+∫τ∞dF)A(\tau)=\int_\tau^\infty u\,dF/(\delta+\int_\tau^\infty dF)A(τ)=∫τ∞​udF/(δ+∫τ∞​dF) over τ≥0\tau\ge0τ≥0 is a fixed point of AAA, and AAA increases before it and decreases after it.
  3. Lemma 4.6. The LP has an optimal solution whose support is a forest on Θ\ThetaΘ.
  4. Lemma 4.7. An edge-weighted forest keeps half its weight on a union of vertex-disjoint stars.
  5. Lemma 4.9. In a star-shaped market (one side has a single type) the LP is a fractional knapsack with a greedy optimum.
  6. §4.2.2 remark, Lemmas 4.10–4.12. The idealized thresholds τ^wi\hat\tau_{w_i}τ^wi​​ exist, coincide with or lie below ρmwi\rho_{mw_i}ρmwi​​, and bound the equilibrium thresholds from above and the pair thresholds max⁡(τm,τwi)\max(\tau_m,\tau_{w_i})max(τm​,τwi​​) from below.
  7. Proposition 4.8. In a star-shaped market some induced stationary equilibrium satisfies FB(Q)≤2 SW\mathrm{FB}(Q)\le2\,\mathrm{SW}FB(Q)≤2SW for every first-best feasible QQQ.

Significance

Theorem 4.1 is a price-of-anarchy statement for platform design: restricting the platform to meetings, and letting agents choose acceptance selfishly, costs at most a factor 4 against a platform that dictates everything. Since every equilibrium candidate is also a first-best candidate with the same welfare, it gives a 4-approximation to the optimal directed search as well. The construction behind it has a structure that is itself informative: the equilibrium consists of disjoint submarkets in each of which one side has a single type.

The results are proved in the paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof in Lean or another proof assistant on record. Formalizing them yields a checked model of stationary search markets with threshold play, a checked reduction of the first best to a generalized assignment LP, and two graph lemmas (forest support of LP optima, the star-forest halving) that recur in rounding arguments for generalized assignment and budgeted allocation.

Difficulty

The first best is easy to reach once Proposition 4.4 linearizes it; the obstacle is incentives. Turning a first-best solution into an equilibrium by keeping its meeting rates fails, because agents raise or lower their thresholds relative to the pairwise thresholds the platform would choose, and constraint (6e) couples every type's threshold to all thresholds on the opposite side through max⁡(τm,τw)\max(\tau_m,\tau_w)max(τm​,τw​). The paper therefore has to control equilibrium thresholds without computing them, which it does only in star-shaped markets, and it needs a case analysis there (Case 1 and Subcases 2(a), 2(b) of Proposition 4.8) in which the meetings of the first best are sometimes discarded. Each of the reductions loses a factor: 2 in the passage from a forest to stars and 2 inside each star.

Formalization scope

The sides are separate finite types M and W with one law F m w per pair, serving both sides. The standing assumptions are δ>0\delta>0δ>0; αθ>0\alpha_\theta>0αθ​>0 for every type; each FmwF_{mw}Fmw​ a probability measure with no atoms (NullSingletonClass, the paper's "continuous distribution"); and an integrable identity under each FmwF_{mw}Fmw​. The positivity of αθ\alpha_\thetaαθ​ and the integrability are added: the paper uses both implicitly. Tails are taken over [a,∞)[a,\infty)[a,∞). LP feasibility includes β≥0\beta\ge0β≥0, which the paper leaves implicit; Lemma 4.6 also assumes nonnegative capacities. ρmw\rho_{mw}ρmw​ is the supremum of AAA over [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), never defined as a fixed point.

"Approximation of the first-best optimum" is stated against every first-best feasible candidate, so no supremum appears. An induced stationary equilibrium always includes the best-response constraint (6e); a formalization that drops it, or that lets the equilibrium use pairwise thresholds, makes the goal compare the first best with itself and is ruled out. With an empty side both welfares vanish and the goal holds, as in the paper.

The "polynomial-time" part of Theorem 4.1 is not posed: the paper's computational model (oracle access to the laws, footnote 15) is not specified precisely enough to formalize. The source is the arXiv v2 preprint (18 Aug 2021); the Management Science version may number results differently. Proofs of any milestone, auxiliary lemmas about tail integrals of atomless laws, and LP vertex arguments are all welcome.

Selected references

  • N. Immorlica, B. Lucier, V. Manshadi, A. Wei, Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms, Management Science, 2023; preprint arXiv:2102.09017v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.09017
  • J. K. Lenstra, D. B. Shmoys, É. Tardos, Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines, Mathematical Programming 46, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01585745
  • D. Chakrabarty, G. Goel, On the approximability of budgeted allocations and improved lower bounds for submodular welfare maximization and GAP, SIAM Journal on Computing 39(6), 2010. https://doi.org/10.1137/080735503
  • S. Banerjee, S. Gollapudi, K. Kollias, K. Munagala, Segmenting two-sided markets, WWW 2017. https://doi.org/10.1145/3038912.3052578
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Operations ResearchProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Selection and Ordering Policies for Hiring Pipelines via Linear Programming 3: In Simultaneous Offering With Values at Least τ, a Truncated-LP Value-Ordered Policy Earns ≥ α^τ_k Times the LP BoundResearch Paper

Motivation

A firm that fills a fixed number of positions from a pool of applicants faces uncertainty at every stage: applicants differ in value, and an offer may be declined. When offers must go out at once, as in a recruiting season with a common deadline, the firm decides a single offer set and lives with however many candidates accept. Sending too few offers leaves positions empty; sending too many hires beyond capacity at a cost. This trade-off is the same as overbooking in revenue management (airline seats, hotel rooms), with the difference that candidates are heterogeneous in both value and acceptance probability.

Epstein and Ma (arXiv:2210.04059v3, Operations Research 2024) study three hiring-pipeline models through linear programming relaxations. This mission formalizes their lower bound for the third model, Simultaneous Offering (§3.3 and §6 of the paper). The question it answers is practical: how much is lost if the firm restricts itself to value-ordered policies, which send offers to the mmm most valuable candidates for some mmm, instead of searching over all 2n2^n2n offer sets? Value-ordered policies are natural, because a firm rarely wants to withhold offers from its best candidates, and the optimal one is computable by a short dynamic program. The paper shows (Example 1, p. 25) that they can be arbitrarily bad in general, and that they are provably good when every candidate's value is bounded below.

Setting

An instance I=(k,n,p,v)I=(k,n,p,v)I=(k,n,p,v) has kkk positions and nnn candidates, 1≤k≤n1\le k\le n1≤k≤n. Candidate iii accepts an offer independently with probability pi∈[0,1]p_i\in[0,1]pi​∈[0,1] and then contributes value vi≥0v_i\ge0vi​≥0. Candidates are labelled so that v1≥v2≥⋯≥vnv_1\ge v_2\ge\dots\ge v_nv1​≥v2​≥⋯≥vn​. The firm chooses an offer set S⊆[n]S\subseteq[n]S⊆[n]; with A⊆SA\subseteq SA⊆S the random set of acceptances, the reward is

∑i∈Avi−[ ∣A∣−k ]+,\sum_{i\in A}v_i-\big[\,|A|-k\,\big]^+,i∈A∑​vi​−[∣A∣−k]+,

the cost per candidate hired beyond capacity being normalised to 111. OPTsim(I)\mathrm{OPT}_{\mathrm{sim}}(I)OPTsim​(I) is the best expected reward over offer sets. For τ>0\tau>0τ>0 the instance is τ\tauτ-bounded, I∈IsimτI\in\mathcal I^\tau_{\mathrm{sim}}I∈Isimτ​, if vi≥τv_i\ge\tauvi​≥τ for all iii; the interesting range is τ∈(0,1)\tau\in(0,1)τ∈(0,1), since for τ≥1\tau\ge1τ≥1 offering to everyone is optimal.

The benchmark is the LP relaxation

LPsim(I)=max⁡y,z ∑ivipiyi+zs.t.z≤k−∑ipiyi,  z≤0,  0≤yi≤1,\mathrm{LP}_{\mathrm{sim}}(I)=\max_{y,z}\ \sum_{i}v_ip_iy_i+z\quad\text{s.t.}\quad z\le k-\sum_ip_iy_i,\ \ z\le0,\ \ 0\le y_i\le1,LPsim​(I)=y,zmax​ i∑​vi​pi​yi​+zs.t.z≤k−i∑​pi​yi​,  z≤0,  0≤yi​≤1,

which charges the overage cost on the expected number of hires. Write Vhigh={i:vi>1}V_{\mathrm{high}}=\{i:v_i>1\}Vhigh​={i:vi​>1} and Phigh=∑i∈VhighpiP_{\mathrm{high}}=\sum_{i\in V_{\mathrm{high}}}p_iPhigh​=∑i∈Vhigh​​pi​.

The algorithm ALGsims\mathrm{ALG}^s_{\mathrm{sim}}ALGsims​, for s∈[0,1]s\in[0,1]s∈[0,1], takes an optimal LP solution yyy, scales its total mass ∑iyipi\sum_iy_ip_i∑i​yi​pi​ by sss to κ\kappaκ, and fills mass κ\kappaκ from the most valuable candidate down: yi′=1y'_i=1yi′​=1 while the prefix mass ∑l≤ipl\sum_{l\le i}p_l∑l≤i​pl​ stays at most κ\kappaκ, one fractional entry, then zeros. Offers are then sent independently with probabilities yi′y'_iyi′​, so the algorithm randomises between two value-ordered policies. Its expected reward is RALGsims(I)R_{\mathrm{ALG}^s_{\mathrm{sim}}}(I)RALGsims​​(I).

The guarantee involves the truncated Poisson mean E[min⁡{Pois(λ),k}]=∑j≥0min⁡{j,k}e−λλj/j!\mathbb E[\min\{\mathrm{Pois}(\lambda),k\}]=\sum_{j\ge0}\min\{j,k\}e^{-\lambda}\lambda^j/j!E[min{Pois(λ),k}]=∑j≥0​min{j,k}e−λλj/j! and

αkτ=sup⁡0≤s≤1(s−sτ+E[min⁡{Pois(sk),k}]τk).\alpha^\tau_k=\sup_{0\le s\le1}\Big(s-\frac{s}{\tau}+\frac{\mathbb E[\min\{\mathrm{Pois}(sk),k\}]}{\tau k}\Big).αkτ​=0≤s≤1sup​(s−τs​+τkE[min{Pois(sk),k}]​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 30)

For τ∈(0,1)\tau\in(0,1)τ∈(0,1), every I∈IsimτI\in\mathcal I^\tau_{\mathrm{sim}}I∈Isimτ​, every optimal solution of LPsim(I)\mathrm{LP}_{\mathrm{sim}}(I)LPsim​(I) and a maximiser s∗∈[0,1]s^*\in[0,1]s∗∈[0,1] of the objective defining αkτ\alpha^\tau_kαkτ​,

RALGsims∗(I) ≥ αkτ LPsim(I).R_{\mathrm{ALG}^{s^*}_{\mathrm{sim}}}(I)\ \ge\ \alpha^\tau_k\,\mathrm{LP}_{\mathrm{sim}}(I).RALGsims∗​​(I) ≥ αkτ​LPsim​(I).

Milestones

  • Lemma 10 (p. 27): LPsim(I)≥OPTsim(I)\mathrm{LP}_{\mathrm{sim}}(I)\ge\mathrm{OPT}_{\mathrm{sim}}(I)LPsim​(I)≥OPTsim​(I).
  • Lemma 11 (p. 27): some optimal LP solution is a filled prefix y=(1,…,1,yj,0,…,0)y=(1,\dots,1,y_j,0,\dots,0)y=(1,…,1,yj​,0,…,0) with yj>0y_j>0yj​>0.
  • Lemma 12 (p. 28): the total mass of such a solution is PhighP_{\mathrm{high}}Phigh​ if Phigh>kP_{\mathrm{high}}>kPhigh​>k and min⁡{k,Ptotal}\min\{k,P_{\mathrm{total}}\}min{k,Ptotal​} otherwise (posed under the disclosed hypothesis vi>0v_i>0vi​>0, vi≠1v_i\ne1vi​=1, pi>0p_i>0pi​>0).
  • Monotonicity (App. D.5, p. ec16): E[min⁡{Pois(x),k}]/x\mathbb E[\min\{\mathrm{Pois}(x),k\}]/xE[min{Pois(x),k}]/x is decreasing in xxx.
  • Proposition EC.2 (p. ec3): E[min⁡{Pois(k),k}]=k(1−e−kkk/k!)\mathbb E[\min\{\mathrm{Pois}(k),k\}]=k(1-e^{-k}k^k/k!)E[min{Pois(k),k}]=k(1−e−kkk/k!).
  • Lemma 13 (p. 29): if Phigh≤kP_{\mathrm{high}}\le kPhigh​≤k, then RALGsims(I)≥(s−s/τ+E[min⁡{Pois(sk),k}]/(τk))LPsim(I)R_{\mathrm{ALG}^s_{\mathrm{sim}}}(I)\ge\big(s-s/\tau+\mathbb E[\min\{\mathrm{Pois}(sk),k\}]/(\tau k)\big)\mathrm{LP}_{\mathrm{sim}}(I)RALGsims​​(I)≥(s−s/τ+E[min{Pois(sk),k}]/(τk))LPsim​(I) for every s∈[0,1]s\in[0,1]s∈[0,1].
  • The ALG1\mathrm{ALG}^1ALG1 bound (p. 30): on every τ\tauτ-bounded instance, RALGsim1(I)≥(1−e−kkk/(k!τ)) LPsim(I)R_{\mathrm{ALG}^1_{\mathrm{sim}}}(I)\ge(1-e^{-k}k^k/(k!\tau))\,\mathrm{LP}_{\mathrm{sim}}(I)RALGsim1​​(I)≥(1−e−kkk/(k!τ))LPsim​(I).
  • Lemma 14 (p. 29): if Phigh>kP_{\mathrm{high}}>kPhigh​>k, deflating the acceptance probabilities to an instance with Phigh=kP_{\mathrm{high}}=kPhigh​=k does not increase the ratio RALGsims∗/LPsimR_{\mathrm{ALG}^{s^*}_{\mathrm{sim}}}/\mathrm{LP}_{\mathrm{sim}}RALGsims∗​​/LPsim​ (posed under the disclosed hypothesis vi≠1v_i\ne1vi​=1).

Significance

Theorem 3 makes value-ordered policies an αkτ\alpha^\tau_kαkτ​-approximation on τ\tauτ-bounded instances, through Lemma 10. The factor tends to 111 as k→∞k\to\inftyk→∞ for fixed τ\tauτ: at s=1s=1s=1 it is at least 1−e−kkk/(k!τ)=1−O(1/k)1-e^{-k}k^k/(k!\tau)=1-O(1/\sqrt k)1−e−kkk/(k!τ)=1−O(1/k​) (Corollary 4). The paper's Theorem 4, the subject of the companion mission in this series, shows that no value-ordered policy beats the same expression with the supremum over s≥0s\ge0s≥0, so the analysis is tight wherever the two suprema coincide. The interpretation of τ\tauτ is how soft the capacity is: the bound degrades exactly as the overage cost dominates candidate values.

The result is proved in the paper; nothing in this mission is open mathematics. To our knowledge none of it has been machine-checked. A complete development would give the platform an overbooking-type stochastic selection model with an exact expected reward, an LP benchmark, and the truncated-Poisson constant that recurs in prophet-inequality and online-matching analyses (the kkk-uniform correlation gap of Yan 2011). Proposition EC.2 and the monotonicity of E[min⁡{Pois(x),k}]/x\mathbb E[\min\{\mathrm{Pois}(x),k\}]/xE[min{Pois(x),k}]/x are reusable on their own.

Difficulty

The obvious argument compares the algorithm's random number of hires with the LP's expected number and loses everything to the overage term: the LP pays [E∣A∣−k]+[\mathbb E|A|-k]^+[E∣A∣−k]+, the algorithm pays E[∣A∣−k]+\mathbb E[|A|-k]^+E[∣A∣−k]+, and Jensen's inequality points the wrong way. The gap must be controlled by a sum of independent Bernoulli variables against a Poisson variable of the same mean, uniformly over how the mass is spread across candidates. A second difficulty is the regime Phigh>kP_{\mathrm{high}}>kPhigh​>k, where the LP optimum deliberately exceeds capacity; a direct bound there does not reduce to the first case, and the paper's reduction (Lemma 14) changes the instance rather than the algorithm. Tie cases vi=1v_i=1vi​=1 make the LP optimum non-unique, which the formal statements must handle explicitly.

Formalization scope

Candidates are Fin n (0-based), all quantities are real. The sorted labelling v1≥⋯≥vnv_1\ge\dots\ge v_nv1​≥⋯≥vn​ is part of instance validity (Antitone I.v), as the paper assumes after relabelling; ties may be ordered arbitrarily. Every expectation is an explicit finite sum over the 2n2^n2n hire sets with independent probabilities yi′piy'_ip_iyi′​pi​; there is no measure theory. The truncated Poisson mean is the series of the Poisson pmf. LPsim(I)\mathrm{LP}_{\mathrm{sim}}(I)LPsim​(I) is the supremum of the objective over the feasible set, which is the LP value; αkτ\alpha^\tau_kαkτ​ is the supremum over [0,1][0,1][0,1]. s∗s^*s∗ is any maximiser of the αkτ\alpha^\tau_kαkτ​ objective over [0,1][0,1][0,1]; one exists by continuity. A candidate with pi=0p_i=0pi​=0 receives yi′=0y'_i=0yi′​=0, which changes no reward.

The algorithm's reward is the exact expected reward of the run with independent offers, never the bound produced in the paper's proof, and the comparison is with the LP value at an optimal solution, not with the objective at an arbitrary feasible point; αkτ\alpha^\tau_kαkτ​ is the supremum of the specific Poisson expression, not a free constant.

Two statements carry disclosed hypotheses, because the printed versions fail at ties: Lemma 12 assumes vi>0v_i>0vi​>0, vi≠1v_i\ne1vi​=1, pi>0p_i>0pi​>0, and Lemma 14 assumes vi≠1v_i\ne1vi​=1. Counterexamples are in the items' Formalization Notes. Theorem 3 and Lemma 13 need neither and hold for every optimal LP solution.

A complete development needs Poisson series manipulations (the closed form, concavity of λ↦E[min⁡{Pois(λ),k}]\lambda\mapsto\mathbb E[\min\{\mathrm{Pois}(\lambda),k\}]λ↦E[min{Pois(λ),k}]), a Bernoulli-to-Poisson comparison for Emin⁡{∑iDi,k}\mathbb E\min\{\sum_iD_i,k\}Emin{∑i​Di​,k}, and fractional-knapsack structure for the LP. Contributions of alternative proofs of any milestone, and of the Poisson facts as standalone results, are welcome.

Selected references

  • B. Epstein, W. Ma, Selection and Ordering Policies for Hiring Pipelines via Linear Programming, arXiv:2210.04059v3 (2023); Operations Research (2024). https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.04059
  • Q. Yan, Mechanism Design via Correlation Gap, Proceedings of SODA 2011, 710–719. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973082.56
  • M. T. Goodrich, R. Tamassia, Algorithm Design: Foundations, Analysis, and Internet Examples, Wiley, 2001, Chapter 5 (fractional knapsack).
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Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantum Algorithms for Zero-Sum Games 1: With Step ε/4, Grigoriadis–Khachiyan Sampling Play Yields ε-Optimal Strategies After ⌈16 ln(nm/δ)/ε²⌉ Iterations with Probability ≥ 1 − δResearch Paper

Motivation

Two-player zero-sum matrix games are the simplest model of strict competition, and computing their value is equivalent to linear programming. Many algorithms in optimization and learning (boosting, online learning with experts, approximate LP and SDP solvers) are, at their core, procedures that approximately solve such a game. For large games the cost of reading the whole payoff matrix dominates, so algorithms that look at only a small part of it are of direct interest.

Grigoriadis and Khachiyan (Operations Research Letters 18(2), 1995) gave a randomized algorithm that finds a pair of ε\varepsilonε-optimal strategies for an n×mn\times mn×m game with entries in [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1] after O(log⁡(n+m)/ε2)O(\log(n+m)/\varepsilon^2)O(log(n+m)/ε2) iterations, each of which touches only one row and one column of the matrix. They also showed that every deterministic algorithm must read Ω(nm)\Omega(nm)Ω(nm) entries. Van Apeldoorn and Gilyén (arXiv:1904.03180v1, 2019) re-prove the correctness of this algorithm directly for non-symmetric games (Lemma 1, p. 3) and then speed up its sampling step on a quantum computer. Lemma 1 is the classical guarantee that their quantum algorithms (Theorems 9 and 11) inherit.

Setting

A matrix game is a matrix A∈Rn×mA\in\mathbb R^{n\times m}A∈Rn×m with entries Aij∈[−1,1]A_{ij}\in[-1,1]Aij​∈[−1,1], n,m≥1n,m\ge1n,m≥1. Alice chooses a row i∈[n]i\in[n]i∈[n] and receives AijA_{ij}Aij​; Bob chooses a column j∈[m]j\in[m]j∈[m] and receives −Aij-A_{ij}−Aij​. Mixed strategies are probability vectors x∈Δnx\in\Delta^nx∈Δn and y∈Δmy\in\Delta^my∈Δm. The value of the game is

v∗=min⁡y∈Δm max⁡i∈[n] (Ay)i.v^*=\min_{y\in\Delta^m}\ \max_{i\in[n]}\ (Ay)_i .v∗=y∈Δmmin​ i∈[n]max​ (Ay)i​.

Bob's strategy y∈Δmy\in\Delta^my∈Δm is ε\varepsilonε-optimal if (Ay)i≤v∗+ε(Ay)_i\le v^*+\varepsilon(Ay)i​≤v∗+ε for every iii, and Alice's x∈Δnx\in\Delta^nx∈Δn is ε\varepsilonε-optimal if (ATx)j≥v∗−ε(A^{\mathsf T}x)_j\ge v^*-\varepsilon(ATx)j​≥v∗−ε for every jjj.

The Gibbs distribution of a vector vvv is G(v)k=evk/∑levlG(v)_k=e^{v_k}/\sum_l e^{v_l}G(v)k​=evk​/∑l​evl​ (Definition 5, p. 7).

Algorithm 1 (p. 3) keeps cumulative vectors x∈Rnx\in\mathbb R^nx∈Rn and y∈Rmy\in\mathbb R^my∈Rm, both starting at 000. In iteration τ=1,2,…\tau=1,2,\dotsτ=1,2,… it uses a step η(τ)>0\eta(\tau)>0η(τ)>0, samples independently

a∼G(−ATx)∈Δm,b∼G(Ay)∈Δn,a\sim G(-A^{\mathsf T}x)\in\Delta^m,\qquad b\sim G(Ay)\in\Delta^n,a∼G(−ATx)∈Δm,b∼G(Ay)∈Δn,

and updates y←y+η(τ)eay\leftarrow y+\eta(\tau)e_ay←y+η(τ)ea​ and x←x+η(τ)ebx\leftarrow x+\eta(\tau)e_bx←x+η(τ)eb​. Each player thus plays a smoothed best response to the other's empirical play, which connects the method to fictitious play. After ttt iterations the candidate strategies are the normalized vectors xt/∥xt∥1x_t/\|x_t\|_1xt​/∥xt​∥1​ and yt/∥yt∥1y_t/\|y_t\|_1yt​/∥yt​∥1​. In the fixed accuracy-goal version the step is η(τ)=ε/4\eta(\tau)=\varepsilon/4η(τ)=ε/4.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 1, fixed accuracy-goal version (p. 3)

For δ∈(0,1/3)\delta\in(0,1/3)δ∈(0,1/3) and ε∈(0,1)\varepsilon\in(0,1)ε∈(0,1), Algorithm 1 run with η=ε/4\eta=\varepsilon/4η=ε/4 satisfies, for every t≥Tt\ge Tt≥T,

Pr⁡[ xt∥xt∥1 and yt∥yt∥1 are ε-optimal ] ≥ 1−δ,T=⌈16ln⁡(nm/δ)ε2⌉.\Pr\Big[\ \tfrac{x_t}{\|x_t\|_1}\text{ and }\tfrac{y_t}{\|y_t\|_1}\text{ are }\varepsilon\text{-optimal}\ \Big]\ \ge\ 1-\delta,\qquad T=\Big\lceil\frac{16\ln(nm/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}\Big\rceil .Pr[ ∥xt​∥1​xt​​ and ∥yt​∥1​yt​​ are ε-optimal ] ≥ 1−δ,T=⌈ε216ln(nm/δ)​⌉.

Milestones (the proof on pp. 4–5, in order)

  1. If x∈Δnx\in\Delta^nx∈Δn, y∈Δmy\in\Delta^my∈Δm and (Ay)i−(ATx)j≤ε(Ay)_i-(A^{\mathsf T}x)_j\le\varepsilon(Ay)i​−(ATx)j​≤ε for all i,ji,ji,j, then both are ε\varepsilonε-optimal.
  2. The potential Φ=(∑je−(ATx)j)(∑ie(Ay)i)\Phi=(\sum_j e^{-(A^{\mathsf T}x)_j})(\sum_i e^{(Ay)_i})Φ=(∑j​e−(ATx)j​)(∑i​e(Ay)i​) changes by the factor (∑jpje−ηAbj)(∑iqieηAia)(\sum_j p_je^{-\eta A_{bj}})(\sum_i q_ie^{\eta A_{ia}})(∑j​pj​e−ηAbj​)(∑i​qi​eηAia​) in one update.
  3. ex≤1+x+34x2e^x\le1+x+\tfrac34x^2ex≤1+x+43​x2 on [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1].
  4. One iteration: E[Φ(t+1)]≤Φ(t)(1+3η2)\mathbb E[\Phi(t+1)]\le\Phi(t)(1+3\eta^2)E[Φ(t+1)]≤Φ(t)(1+3η2).
  5. After ttt iterations: E[Φ(t)]≤nm e3∑τ≤tη(τ)2\mathbb E[\Phi(t)]\le nm\,e^{3\sum_{\tau\le t}\eta(\tau)^2}E[Φ(t)]≤nme3∑τ≤t​η(τ)2.
  6. Display (3): with probability ≥1−δ′\ge1-\delta'≥1−δ′ every gap is at most (ln⁡(nm/δ′)+3∑τη(τ)2)/∑τη(τ)\big(\ln(nm/\delta')+3\sum_\tau\eta(\tau)^2\big)/\sum_\tau\eta(\tau)(ln(nm/δ′)+3∑τ​η(τ)2)/∑τ​η(τ).
  7. With η=ε/4\eta=\varepsilon/4η=ε/4 that bound equals 34ε+4ln⁡(nm/δ)/(tε)\tfrac34\varepsilon+4\ln(nm/\delta)/(t\varepsilon)43​ε+4ln(nm/δ)/(tε), which is at most ε\varepsilonε once t≥16ln⁡(nm/δ)/ε2t\ge16\ln(nm/\delta)/\varepsilon^2t≥16ln(nm/δ)/ε2.
  8. Lemma 1, first sentence (anytime version): with η(τ)=1/(2τ)\eta(\tau)=1/(2\sqrt\tau)η(τ)=1/(2τ​), with probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ every iterate is ε′(t)\varepsilon'(t)ε′(t)-optimal with ε′(t)=2t(3ln⁡t+ln⁡(nm)+ln⁡(1/δ)+2)\varepsilon'(t)=\frac{2}{\sqrt t}\big(3\ln t+\ln(nm)+\ln(1/\delta)+2\big)ε′(t)=t​2​(3lnt+ln(nm)+ln(1/δ)+2).

The goal is the fixed-step statement because it is the form invoked by the paper's later results and it carries the paper's explicit constant 161616. The anytime statement is stronger in one respect (a single event for all ttt) and is posed as a further target.

Significance

Lemma 1 says that the sampled dynamics converge to an ε\varepsilonε-equilibrium in O(log⁡(nm/δ)/ε2)O(\log(nm/\delta)/\varepsilon^2)O(log(nm/δ)/ε2) rounds, each of which reads one row and one column of AAA. That gives sublinear-time approximation of the game value, and it is the classical skeleton of the paper's quantum algorithms: Theorems 9 and 11 run exactly this iteration, replacing the classical Gibbs sampler by a quantum one. Through the reduction of §4 (Lemma 12), the same iteration also yields the paper's LP solvers.

The result is proved in the paper and in [GK95]. As far as is known it has no machine-checked proof. Formalizing it fixes a precise probability law for a sequential randomized algorithm whose sampling distribution depends on the whole history, and it records exactly where each constant (3/43/43/4, 333, 161616) comes from. The milestones (a potential identity, a one-step expectation bound, Markov's inequality on a finite path space) are pieces of the multiplicative-weights analysis that recur throughout online learning.

Difficulty

Each step is elementary, but the statement concerns a randomized process, not a deterministic one. The iterates are random, and the distribution of each draw depends on all previous draws. The obvious approach of bounding the potential pathwise fails: on unfavourable paths Φ\PhiΦ can grow like e2ηte^{2\eta t}e2ηt, so a high-probability statement is unavoidable. Making that rigorous needs the conditional expectation of the next potential given the past, iterated over the path law, followed by Markov's inequality and a union of nmnmnm pointwise consequences. The bookkeeping also needs care: the step index, the fact that ∥xt∥1=∑τ≤tη(τ)\|x_t\|_1=\sum_{\tau\le t}\eta(\tau)∥xt​∥1​=∑τ≤t​η(τ), and the requirement ∣η(Aia−Abj)∣≤1|\eta(A_{ia}-A_{bj})|\le1∣η(Aia​−Abj​)∣≤1 under which the quadratic bound on exe^xex applies.

Formalization scope

  • Game and value. A : Matrix (Fin n) (Fin m) ℝ with |A i j| ≤ 1 and 0 < n, 0 < m. The value is the infimum of y↦max⁡i(Ay)iy\mapsto\max_i(Ay)_iy↦maxi​(Ay)i​ over the image of stdSimplex ℝ (Fin m). It is not written as ⨅ y ∈ stdSimplex …, which over ℝ evaluates to min⁡(0,v∗)\min(0,v^*)min(0,v∗), and ε-optimality is measured against this value. LP (1)'s constraint λ∈[−1,1]\lambda\in[-1,1]λ∈[−1,1] is inactive and not encoded.
  • The algorithm. A run of ttt iterations is a sample path ω:{0,…,t−1}→[m]×[n]\omega:\{0,\dots,t-1\}\to[m]\times[n]ω:{0,…,t−1}→[m]×[n], with entry τ\tauτ holding the draws (a,b)(a,b)(a,b) of iteration τ+1\tau+1τ+1. Its probability is the product over iterations of G(−ATx)a G(Ay)bG(-A^{\mathsf T}x)_a\,G(Ay)_bG(−ATx)a​G(Ay)b​, computed from the iterates before that iteration. Probabilities and expectations are finite sums over paths. The printed loop reads x(t)x^{(t)}x(t) at t=1t=1t=1 but initializes only x(0)x^{(0)}x(0). The reading adopted is that update τ≥1\tau\ge1τ≥1 uses step η(τ)\eta(\tau)η(τ) and the iterates after τ−1\tau-1τ−1 updates, so ∥xt∥1=∑τ=1tη(τ)\|x_t\|_1=\sum_{\tau=1}^t\eta(\tau)∥xt​∥1​=∑τ=1t​η(τ), as display (3) uses. Normalization divides by the coordinate sum, which equals the ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ norm for these nonnegative vectors.
  • Conventions. "After TTT iterations" is stated for every t≥Tt\ge Tt≥T, each separately. Hypotheses on step sizes are imposed only for τ≥1\tau\ge1τ≥1. The anytime milestone corrects the printed "with probability at least δ\deltaδ" to 1−δ1-\delta1−δ, as the proof concludes, and states the event for all 1≤t≤t01\le t\le t_01≤t≤t0​ for every horizon t0t_0t0​. The paper invokes strong duality in milestone 1, but the implication needs only min⁡j(ATx)j≤v∗≤max⁡i(Ay)i\min_j(A^{\mathsf T}x)_j\le v^*\le\max_i(Ay)_iminj​(ATx)j​≤v∗≤maxi​(Ay)i​, so no duality hypothesis is added.
  • Excluded trivializations. A path weight that is not a probability law (unnormalized, or ignoring the history), ε-optimality against a junk value, normalization of the zero vector at t=0t=0t=0, and stating the gap bound alone as the goal are all excluded: the law sums to one, the value is the true minimum, T≥1T\ge1T≥1, and the goal concludes ε-optimality.
  • Infrastructure. Everything is stated with Mathlib's stdSimplex, Matrix.mulVec, Real.exp/Real.log and finite sums. The finite path-law calculus (a tower property over the last draw, Markov's inequality for a finite weighted sum) is reusable for other sequential sampling algorithms. Contributions of proofs of any milestone are welcome. A PMF-based restatement proved equivalent to the finite-sum law would also be useful.

Selected references

  • J. van Apeldoorn and A. Gilyén, Quantum algorithms for zero-sum games, arXiv preprint, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.03180v1
  • M. D. Grigoriadis and L. G. Khachiyan, A sublinear-time randomized approximation algorithm for matrix games, Operations Research Letters 18(2), 53–58, 1995 (reference [GK95] of the paper above).
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Stochastic Max-Weight Bipartite Matching: Beyond Prophet Inequalities: Rounding LP-Match Online Earns 0.51 of the Optimal Online AlgorithmResearch Paper

Motivation

Ride hailing, online advertising and kidney exchange share a decision problem: resources that are present from the start must be matched, irrevocably and one at a time, to requests that arrive at random. When the arrival probabilities are known in advance, the natural benchmark for an online algorithm is not the offline optimum (the "prophet", who sees every arrival in advance) but the optimal online algorithm: the best expected profit any algorithm can earn when it must decide without seeing the future. That benchmark is well defined and computable in exponential time, so the question becomes one of approximation algorithms: how much of it can a polynomial-time algorithm guarantee?

Papadimitriou, Pollner, Saberi and Wajc (arXiv:2102.10261, Math. Oper. Res. 2024) answer both halves of that question for online Bayesian bipartite matching. They show that approximating the optimal online algorithm within some constant α<1\alpha<1α<1 is PSPACE-hard (Theorem 1.1, not part of this mission), and they give a polynomial-time algorithm that earns a 0.510.510.51 fraction of it (Theorem 1.2). The number matters because 1/21/21/2 is the best possible ratio against the prophet, already for a single bin, so 0.510.510.51 shows that comparing with the online optimum genuinely permits better guarantees.

Timeline:

  • 1978: Krengel and Sucheston's prophet inequality: for a single item, no online algorithm earns more than 1/21/21/2 of the offline optimum in the worst case, and 1/21/21/2 is achievable.
  • 2015–2020: 1/21/21/2-competitive algorithms against the offline optimum for unit-demand combinatorial auctions (Feldman, Gravin and Lucier, SODA 2015) and for online stochastic max-weight matching with vertex arrivals (Ezra, Feldman, Gravin and Tang, EC 2020).
  • 2017: Torrico and Toriello's LP relaxations for online bipartite matching (arXiv:1709.01557), which imply that LP-Match bounds the optimal online algorithm (Lemma 4.1 here).
  • 2021: this paper, 0.510.510.51 of the online optimum by rounding LP-Match online.
  • 2021: Saberi and Wajc's online edge-colouring algorithm (ICALP 2021), whose ideas improve the ratio of Theorem 1.2 to 0.5260.5260.526 (as reported on p. 4 of the paper).

Setting

A RideHail instance III has a finite set of bins (taxis) iii and balls (passengers) t=1,…,nt=1,\dots,nt=1,…,n, revealed in this fixed order. Ball ttt arrives with probability pt∈[0,1]p_t\in[0,1]pt​∈[0,1], independently of every other ball. If it arrives it may be matched, irrevocably and before ball t+1t+1t+1 is revealed, to an unmatched bin iii, earning wi,t≥0w_{i,t}\ge 0wi,t​≥0. A deterministic online policy chooses the bin for ball ttt as a function of the arrivals of balls 1,…,t1,\dots,t1,…,t only. Its expected profit is the average, over the 2n2^n2n arrival patterns, of the total weight of the matching it builds, and OPTon(I)\mathrm{OPT}_{on}(I)OPTon​(I) is the largest expected profit over all such policies.

LP-Match is the linear program in variables xi,tx_{i,t}xi,t​, read as "the probability that the algorithm matches ttt to iii":

max⁡∑i,twi,txi,t  s.t.  ∑txi,t≤1,  ∑ixi,t≤pt,  xi,t≤pt(1−∑t′<txi,t′),  xi,t≥0.\max \sum_{i,t} w_{i,t}x_{i,t}\ \ \text{s.t.}\ \ \sum_t x_{i,t}\le 1,\ \ \sum_i x_{i,t}\le p_t,\ \ x_{i,t}\le p_t\Big(1-\sum_{t'<t}x_{i,t'}\Big),\ \ x_{i,t}\ge 0.maxi,t∑​wi,t​xi,t​  s.t.  t∑​xi,t​≤1,  i∑​xi,t​≤pt​,  xi,t​≤pt​(1−t′<t∑​xi,t′​),  xi,t​≥0.

Its optimal value is LP-Match(I)\mathrm{LP\text{-}Match}(I)LP-Match(I). The third family of constraints, (11), holds for online algorithms only.

Algorithm 1 (Rounding LP-Match Online), with c=0.01c=0.01c=0.01, takes an optimal solution xxx of LP-Match, adds a weight-zero dummy bin for each ball so that ∑ixi,t=pt\sum_i x_{i,t}=p_t∑i​xi,t​=pt​, and then processes the balls in order. When ball ttt arrives it picks a bin iii with probability xi,t/ptx_{i,t}/p_txi,t​/pt​. If iii is vacant, (i,t)(i,t)(i,t) is matched with probability

qi,t=min⁡(1, 1/2+c1−∑t′<txi,t′(1/2+c)).q_{i,t}=\min\Big(1,\ \frac{1/2+c}{1-\sum_{t'<t}x_{i,t'}(1/2+c)}\Big).qi,t​=min(1, 1−∑t′<t​xi,t′​(1/2+c)1/2+c​).

If ttt is still unmatched, it picks again from the same distribution, and is matched to the new pick when that bin is vacant and ∑t′<txi,t′>1/2−c1/2+c\sum_{t'<t}x_{i,t'}>\frac{1/2-c}{1/2+c}∑t′<t​xi,t′​>1/2+c1/2−c​. Edges added by the first pick form M1M_1M1​, those added by the second pick form M2M_2M2​, and M=M1⊔M2M=M_1\sqcup M_2M=M1​⊔M2​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1.2

For every instance III and every optimal solution xxx of LP-Match,

E[∑(i,t)∈Mwi,t] ≥ 0.51⋅OPTon(I),\mathbb E\Big[\sum_{(i,t)\in M}w_{i,t}\Big]\ \ge\ 0.51\cdot \mathrm{OPT}_{on}(I),E[(i,t)∈M∑​wi,t​] ≥ 0.51⋅OPTon​(I),

where MMM is the output of Algorithm 1 run on xxx.

The path

The milestones follow the paper's proof. LP-Match is a relaxation of the online problem (Lemma 4.1). Algorithm 1 matches every edge with probability at least xi,t(1/2+c)x_{i,t}(1/2+c)xi,t​(1/2+c) (Theorem 4.2), which rests on two bounds:

  • the first-pick analysis, Lemma 4.4 with the vacancy bounds of Corollary 4.5;
  • the second-pick bound, Theorem 4.6. It uses Equation (20), Lemma 4.7, the covariance bound of Lemma 4.8 and the conditioning bound of Lemma 4.11.

Lemma 4.8 comes from the negative association of early-occupancy indicators: Lemma 4.9 and Corollary 4.10, resting on Definition 2.5 and Propositions 2.6–2.8.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1.2 is the first polynomial-time algorithm for online stochastic matching with a ratio above 1/21/21/2 against the optimal online algorithm. It separates the online benchmark from the prophet benchmark in an algorithmic sense, and its main technical step, bounding positive correlation between bins' matched statuses through negative association, has been reused for online edge colouring.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper and is not machine-checked anywhere. The mission produces:

  • a formal model of online Bayesian matching, with the optimal online policy as a benchmark;
  • a formal LP relaxation and its validity for online policies;
  • a formal statement of a randomized online rounding scheme and its per-edge guarantee.

The negative-association layer (Definition 2.5, Propositions 2.6–2.8) is general probability, absent from Mathlib, and reusable well beyond this mission.

Difficulty

The obvious argument fails at the second pick. Once ball ttt has been rejected by its first pick, the events "bin iii is vacant" and "the first pick was rejected" are dependent, for two reasons:

  1. The second pick may re-draw the very bin that just rejected.
  2. Bins' occupancy statuses may be positively correlated, so a rejection by one bin makes the others likely occupied too.

Either effect alone can make the second pick useless. The first is controlled by Constraint (11) (Lemma 4.7). The second needs a quantitative bound on the covariance of vacancy indicators (Lemma 4.8), proved by splitting occupancy into early and late parts and showing that the early parts are negatively associated, through a coupling of the algorithm's randomness with independent pick and coin variables. Lemma 4.1 is also not routine to formalize: it requires turning an arbitrary history-dependent online policy into a feasible LP solution, using the independence of arrivals from past decisions.

Formalization scope

Conventions committed to in Lean (namespace OnlineMaxWeightMatch.Approx):

  • Bins form a finite type ι; balls are Fin n in arrival order (paper ball ttt is index t−1t-1t−1). Weights and probabilities are real numbers with w≥0w\ge 0w≥0 and 0≤pt≤10\le p_t\le 10≤pt​≤1; missing edges have weight 000.
  • OPTon(I)\mathrm{OPT}_{on}(I)OPTon​(I) is the supremum over deterministic non-anticipating policies: the choice for ball ttt is a function of the arrival indicators of balls s≤ts\le ts≤t. Randomized online algorithms are mixtures of these and add nothing. Policies never see later arrivals; comparing against the prophet would make the goal false.
  • LP-Match(I)\mathrm{LP\text{-}Match}(I)LP-Match(I) is the supremum of the objective over the feasible set (9)–(12), which is nonempty and compact.
  • Algorithm 1's randomness is a finite product space: for each ball, an arrival bit, a first pick, one acceptance coin per bin and a second pick, all independent. MMM, M1M_1M1​, M2M_2M2​ are computed from an outcome by recursion over the balls.
  • Picks are Option-valued: "no bin" carries the leftover mass 1−∑ixi,t/pt1-\sum_i x_{i,t}/p_t1−∑i​xi,t​/pt​. When pt=0p_t=0pt​=0, xi,t/ptx_{i,t}/p_txi,t​/pt​ is 000 in Lean and the ball never arrives.
  • Dummy bins are genuine bins of type ι ⊕ Fin n with weight 000. A dummy first pick is accepted with probability 1/2+c1/2+c1/2+c and consumes the ball's turn, as in the paper. A dummy is never matched as a second pick.
  • ccc is the fixed constant 1/1001/1001/100, not a parameter.
  • The milestones are stated for any LP-Match-feasible xxx with ∑ixi,t=pt\sum_i x_{i,t}=p_t∑i​xi,t​=pt​ (the paper's standing assumption); the goal does the augmentation and assumes optimality only.
  • Conditional probabilities use ProbabilityTheory.cond, which is 000 on null events. Equation (20) and Lemma 4.7 therefore carry positivity hypotheses (xj,t>0x_{j,t}>0xj,t​>0, pt>0p_t>0pt​>0) that make the conditioning event non-null.
  • Negative association uses bounded, measurable, non-decreasing test functions; covariances are ProbabilityTheory.covariance.

"Polynomial time" is not formalized. Because "some online algorithm earns 0.51⋅OPTon0.51\cdot\mathrm{OPT}_{on}0.51⋅OPTon​" is trivially true of the optimal online algorithm itself, the goal names Algorithm 1 run on an arbitrary optimal LP-Match solution. That solution exists, so the goal is not vacuous. Replacing OPTon\mathrm{OPT}_{on}OPTon​ by an offline benchmark, dropping Constraint (11), restricting to non-adaptive policies, or treating the dummy pick as "pick nothing" would each change the theorem.

Infrastructure a complete development needs: negative association with its closure properties, finite product probability spaces, conditioning on events, covariance of indicators, and linear-programming feasibility arguments for online policies. Contributions to any milestone are welcome; the probability layer (Propositions 2.6–2.8) is independent of the rest.

Selected references

  • C. Papadimitriou, T. Pollner, A. Saberi, D. Wajc, Online Stochastic Max-Weight Bipartite Matching: Beyond Prophet Inequalities, arXiv:2102.10261v3 (2021); Mathematics of Operations Research (2024). https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.10261
  • K. Joag-Dev, F. Proschan, Negative Association of Random Variables, with Applications, Annals of Statistics 11(1):286–295, 1983. https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1176346079
  • D. Dubhashi, D. Ranjan, Balls and Bins: A Study in Negative Dependence, BRICS Report Series 3(25), 1996; Random Structures & Algorithms 13(2), 1998. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1098-2418(199809)13:2<99::AID-RSA1>3.0.CO;2-M
  • A. Torrico, A. Toriello, Dynamic Relaxations for Online Bipartite Matching, arXiv:1709.01557, 2017. https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.01557
  • T. Ezra, M. Feldman, N. Gravin, Z. G. Tang, Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: Prophet Inequality for Vertex and Edge Arrival Models, EC 2020. https://doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399513
  • A. Saberi, D. Wajc, The Greedy Algorithm Is Not Optimal for On-Line Edge Coloring, ICALP 2021. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2021.109
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Linear algebraTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

A Strongly Polynomial Algorithm for Linear Exchange Markets II: A Z₊-Matrix Polyhedron P_M Lies Between an M2VPI Polyhedron and Its Scaling by B²Research Paper

Motivation

In a linear exchange market every agent owns one divisible good and has linear utilities over all goods; an equilibrium is a price vector at which every agent can spend its budget on goods that maximize utility per unit of money, and all goods are sold. Computing such an equilibrium in strongly polynomial time, with a number of arithmetic operations bounded by a polynomial in the number of agents alone, was an open question until Garg and Végh (arXiv:1809.06266; Operations Research, 2023). Their algorithm alternates two kinds of phases. One identifies "revealed" edges that appear in every equilibrium (the subject of mission I of this series). The other computes good starting prices for the current set of revealed edges by solving a linear program whose constraint matrix has a special sign structure.

No strongly polynomial algorithm is known for that linear program. Systems in which every inequality has at most one positive and at most one negative coefficient, by contrast, are strongly polynomially solvable (Megiddo, 1983; Hochbaum and Naor, 1994). The paper bridges the gap with Theorem 6.4: a polyhedron given by a Z+Z_+Z+​-matrix is sandwiched between a monotone two-variable-per-inequality polyhedron and its scaling by an explicit factor B2B^2B2. This mission formalizes that theorem and the lemmas of §7 that prove it. It is a statement about matrices and polyhedra only; no market notions enter.

Setting

Matrices are rational. For integers k,t≥0k, t \ge 0k,t≥0 a matrix M∈Qk×tM \in \mathbb{Q}^{k\times t}M∈Qk×t is a Z+Z_+Z+​-matrix, written M∈Z+(k,t)M \in \mathcal{Z}_+(k,t)M∈Z+​(k,t), if every off-diagonal entry is nonpositive and every column sum is nonnegative:

Mij≤0(i≠j),∑i=1kMij≥0(j∈[t]).M_{ij} \le 0 \quad (i \ne j), \qquad \sum_{i=1}^k M_{ij} \ge 0 \quad (j \in [t]).Mij​≤0(i=j),i=1∑k​Mij​≥0(j∈[t]).

For a non-square matrix the diagonal entries are the MiiM_{ii}Mii​ with 1≤i≤min⁡{k,t}1 \le i \le \min\{k,t\}1≤i≤min{k,t}. Square Z+Z_+Z+​-matrices are exactly the transposes of weighted Laplacians of directed graphs, or such transposes with one row and column deleted.

M2(m,t)\mathcal{M}_2(m,t)M2​(m,t) is the set of m×tm\times tm×t rational matrices with at most one positive and at most one negative entry in every row. A system Mˉx≤bˉ\bar M x \le \bar bMˉx≤bˉ with Mˉ∈M2(m,t)\bar M \in \mathcal{M}_2(m,t)Mˉ∈M2​(m,t) is a monotone two-variable-per-inequality system (M2VPI).

For M∈Z+(k,t)M \in \mathcal{Z}_+(k,t)M∈Z+​(k,t) and b∈Qkb \in \mathbb{Q}^kb∈Qk with b>0b > 0b>0, the polyhedron of interest is

PM={x∈Rt:Mx≤b, x≥0}.P_M = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^t : Mx \le b,\ x \ge 0\}.PM​={x∈Rt:Mx≤b, x≥0}.

Write ℓ\ellℓ for the number of nonzero entries of MMM, αP={αx:x∈P}\alpha P = \{\alpha x : x \in P\}αP={αx:x∈P} for α>0\alpha > 0α>0, and

B=∑j=1kbjmin⁡i∈[k]bi.B = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^k b_j}{\min_{i\in[k]} b_i}.B=mini∈[k]​bi​∑j=1k​bj​​.

In §7 the right-hand side is called γ\gammaγ instead of bbb, and λi=∑j≠iγj\lambda_i = \sum_{j\ne i}\gamma_jλi​=∑j=i​γj​.

The proof works with a square M∈Z+(t,t)M \in \mathcal{Z}_+(t,t)M∈Z+​(t,t) with positive diagonal. Its digraph ([t],H)([t],H)([t],H) has an arc ijijij whenever Mij<0M_{ij} < 0Mij​<0. DiD_iDi​ is the set of vertices reachable from iii (including iii), and M(i)M^{(i)}M(i) is the submatrix of the rows MjM_jMj​, j∈Dij \in D_ij∈Di​. The vertices split into T1T_1T1​ (at most one outgoing arc), T2T_2T2​ (at least two arcs and rk⁡M(i)=∣Di∣\operatorname{rk} M^{(i)} = |D_i|rkM(i)=∣Di​∣) and T3T_3T3​ (at least two arcs and rk⁡M(i)<∣Di∣\operatorname{rk} M^{(i)} < |D_i|rkM(i)<∣Di​∣).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.4 (p. 15)

For M∈Z+(k,t)M \in \mathcal{Z}_+(k,t)M∈Z+​(k,t) with k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 and ℓ\ellℓ nonzero entries, and b∈Qkb \in \mathbb{Q}^kb∈Qk with b>0b > 0b>0, there are ℓ′≤ℓ\ell' \le \ellℓ′≤ℓ, Mˉ∈M2(ℓ′,t)\bar M \in \mathcal{M}_2(\ell',t)Mˉ∈M2​(ℓ′,t) and bˉ∈Qℓ′\bar b \in \mathbb{Q}^{\ell'}bˉ∈Qℓ′ with

PM⊆{x∈Rt:Mˉx≤bˉ, x≥0}⊆B2PM.P_M \subseteq \{x \in \mathbb{R}^t : \bar Mx \le \bar b,\ x \ge 0\} \subseteq B^2 P_M.PM​⊆{x∈Rt:Mˉx≤bˉ, x≥0}⊆B2PM​.

Milestones (§7, pp. 16–23)

  • Lemma 7.1: for M∈Z+(t,t)M \in \mathcal{Z}_+(t,t)M∈Z+​(t,t) and pˉ≥0\bar p \ge 0pˉ​≥0 with Mpˉ≤γM\bar p \le \gammaMpˉ​≤γ,  Mpˉ≥−λ≥−(B−1)γ\ M\bar p \ge -\lambda \ge -(B-1)\gamma Mpˉ​≥−λ≥−(B−1)γ.
  • Lemma 7.2: the Gaussian elimination of the proof, run on T∈Z+(ℓ,t)T \in \mathcal{Z}_+(\ell,t)T∈Z+​(ℓ,t), returns T′=YTT' = YTT′=YT with Y≥0Y \ge 0Y≥0, T′T'T′ upper triangular with diagonal entries in {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1} and nonpositive off-diagonal entries, and Tkk′=1T'_{kk} = 1Tkk′​=1 whenever some Tik<0T_{ik} < 0Tik​<0 with i>ki > ki>k.
  • Claim 7.3(iii): for i∈T3i \in T_3i∈T3​, MiM_iMi​ is a linear combination of {Mh:h∈Di∖{i}}\{M_h : h \in D_i \setminus\{i\}\}{Mh​:h∈Di​∖{i}}.
  • Lemma 7.4(i): for i∈T2∪T3i \in T_2\cup T_3i∈T2​∪T3​ there is a unique q(i)∈R+tq^{(i)} \in \mathbb{R}^t_+q(i)∈R+t​ with Mℓq(i)=0M_\ell q^{(i)} = 0Mℓ​q(i)=0 (ℓ∈Di∖{i}\ell \in D_i\setminus\{i\}ℓ∈Di​∖{i}), qi(i)=1q^{(i)}_i = 1qi(i)​=1 and qℓ(i)=0q^{(i)}_\ell = 0qℓ(i)​=0 off DiD_iDi​.
  • Lemma 7.4(iv) and (iii): points r(i)∈PMr^{(i)} \in P_Mr(i)∈PM​ tight on Di∖{i}D_i\setminus\{i\}Di​∖{i} (for i∈T3i \in T_3i∈T3​) and on DiD_iDi​ with ri(i)=κ(i)r^{(i)}_i = \kappa(i)ri(i)​=κ(i) (for i∈T2i \in T_2i∈T2​).
  • Claim 7.5: κ(i) Miq(i)≤Bγi\kappa(i)\,M_i q^{(i)} \le B\gamma_iκ(i)Mi​q(i)≤Bγi​ for i∈T2i \in T_2i∈T2​.
  • The reduced case (§7, p. 16): Theorem 6.4 for square MMM with positive diagonal.

Significance

Theorem 6.4 turns an LP over a Z+Z_+Z+​ constraint matrix, for which no strongly polynomial algorithm is known, into an M2VPI system that is strongly polynomially solvable, at the price of a factor B2B^2B2. In the exchange-market algorithm B≤nB \le nB≤n, so the starting prices of each phase come within a factor n2n^2n2 of optimal (the proof of Theorem 3.7, p. 15). That bound is what lets the potential argument advance in a polynomial number of phases. The construction is not specific to markets: any LP of the form max⁡∑ixi\max \sum_i x_imax∑i​xi​ over PMP_MPM​ with MMM a Z+Z_+Z+​-matrix, which includes LPs over transposed weighted Laplacians of directed graphs, inherits the same approximation.

The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge none of it has been machine-checked. A formalization produces a checked proof of the sandwich. It also produces reusable facts about Gaussian elimination on Z+Z_+Z+​-matrices (Lemma 7.2), which hold for any matrix whose off-diagonal entries are nonpositive and whose column sums are nonnegative.

Difficulty

The obvious approach, deleting all but two variables from each inequality of PMP_MPM​, fails: the dropped negative terms make the resulting system either too weak or invalid. The paper instead derives one new constraint per arc ijijij of HHH, as a nonnegative combination of the inequalities Mpˉ≥−λM\bar p \ge -\lambdaMpˉ​≥−λ. Finding it requires an ordering of DiD_iDi​ in which every vertex but iii has an in-neighbour placed after it, and an elimination on the permuted submatrix whose penultimate row has exactly two nonzero entries. The reverse containment {Mˉpˉ≤bˉ}⊆B2PM\{\bar M\bar p \le \bar b\} \subseteq B^2P_M{Mˉpˉ​≤bˉ}⊆B2PM​ is the hard direction. It splits by whether the rows on DiD_iDi​ are linearly independent (T2T_2T2​) or not (T3T_3T3​), and the T2T_2T2​ case needs the extra constraint pˉi≤κ(i)\bar p_i \le \kappa(i)pˉ​i​≤κ(i) and the comparison of entries of the elimination multipliers Y(ij)Y^{(ij)}Y(ij) in Claim 7.5. Every step relies on a sign invariant of the elimination that Lemma 7.2 proves by induction.

Formalization scope

Indices are 0-based (Fin k, Fin t); the paper's [n]={1,…,n}[n] = \{1,\dots,n\}[n]={1,…,n}. Matrices MMM, Mˉ\bar MMˉ and right-hand sides bbb, bˉ\bar bbˉ, γ\gammaγ are rational (ℚ), as on p. 15, and act on real vectors x∈Rtx \in \mathbb{R}^tx∈Rt through the cast. A diagonal entry of a rectangular matrix is one whose two indices agree as natural numbers. B2PMB^2P_MB2PM​ is the image {B2x:x∈PM}\{B^2x : x \in P_M\}{B2x:x∈PM​}. BBB is defined for k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 only, and every statement using it assumes k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 (resp. t≥1t \ge 1t≥1).

Not formalized: the running time O(ℓ(min⁡{k,t})3)O(\ell(\min\{k,t\})^3)O(ℓ(min{k,t})3) and the polynomial bound on the encoding size of Mˉ\bar MMˉ, bˉ\bar bbˉ in Theorem 6.4. The goal is the existence statement that the construction (13) witnesses. The standing assumptions of §7 (γ>0\gamma > 0γ>0; positive diagonal after the reduction) appear as hypotheses of the milestones that live in that setting.

Lemma 7.2 is stated about the specific elimination of the proof (p. 17), defined explicitly; an existential "there is Y≥0Y \ge 0Y≥0" form would be nearly trivial, since Y=0Y = 0Y=0 satisfies all but one clause. In the goal, Mˉ\bar MMˉ must have at most one positive and at most one negative entry per row, and ℓ′≤ℓ\ell' \le \ellℓ′≤ℓ. Dropping either requirement makes the goal weaker than the paper's theorem.

κ(i)\kappa(i)κ(i), defined in (12) through the elimination for an arbitrarily chosen arc, is restated intrinsically as the iii-th entry of (MDi,Di)−1γDi(M_{D_i,D_i})^{-1}\gamma_{D_i}(MDi​,Di​​)−1γDi​​, a number the paper shows equal (proof of Lemma 7.4(iii)). It is used only for i∈T2i \in T_2i∈T2​, where that block is invertible. Claim 7.3(i)–(ii) and Lemma 7.4(ii), which concern the elimination output for a particular arc, are not milestones.

A complete development needs the elimination and its invariants, reachability in a finite digraph, ranks of row submatrices, and the construction (13). The elimination lemmas are reusable for any Z+Z_+Z+​-matrix. Contributions are welcome on any milestone, on the reduction from rectangular MMM to the square positive-diagonal case, and on the two containments of the reduced case.

Selected references

  • J. Garg and L. A. Végh, A strongly polynomial algorithm for linear exchange markets, arXiv:1809.06266v3, 2022; Operations Research, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.06266
  • N. Megiddo, Towards a genuinely polynomial algorithm for linear programming, SIAM Journal on Computing 12(2), 1983. https://doi.org/10.1137/0212022
  • D. S. Hochbaum and J. Naor, Simple and fast algorithms for linear and integer programs with two variables per inequality, SIAM Journal on Computing 23(6), 1994. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539793251876
  • R. W. Cottle and A. F. Veinott, Jr., Polyhedral sets having a least element, Mathematical Programming 3, 1972. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01584975
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Operations ResearchProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Selection and Ordering Policies for Hiring Pipelines via Linear Programming 2: An LP-Rounding Policy That Sends Offers in Parallel Lists Earns at Least (1 − 1/e) Times the LP BoundResearch Paper

Motivation

Firms that hire for several roles at once face a timing problem. An offer occupies a candidate until they answer, a candidate can hold only one offer, and the hiring season has a fixed number of decision rounds. Sending offers one at a time is slow; sending them all at once risks over-hiring. Epstein and Ma (arXiv:2210.04059v3, Operations Research 2024) study three stylised models of this pipeline: interviewing with a cap on interviews (ProbeTop-kkk), offering in parallel rounds, and offering all at once. This mission formalizes their result for the second model, the Parallel Offering problem.

The question belongs to the literature on stochastic probing and LP-based approximation of adaptive policies. The Sequential Offering model of Purohit, Gollapudi and Raghavan (2019) sends one offer per round for identical positions. Parallel Offering lets each unfilled position send one offer per round, with heterogeneous positions, and asks how much a simple, non-adaptive policy loses against the best adaptive one.

Setting

A firm fills kkk positions from nnn candidates within TTT rounds. Candidate i∈[n]i\in[n]i∈[n] accepts an offer for position j∈[k]j\in[k]j∈[k] with probability pijp_{ij}pij​ and then adds the value vijv_{ij}vij​. An instance is I=(k,T,n,p,v)I=(k,T,n,p,v)I=(k,T,n,p,v) with

1≤k≤T≤n,p∈[0,1]n×k,v∈R+n×k.1\le k\le T\le n,\qquad p\in[0,1]^{n\times k},\qquad v\in\mathbb R_+^{n\times k}.1≤k≤T≤n,p∈[0,1]n×k,v∈R+n×k​.

In each round the firm may send one offer for every unfilled position, and each candidate receives at most one offer in total. Before the rounds start, each candidate iii has decided the set Ai⊆[k]A_i\subseteq[k]Ai​⊆[k] of positions they would accept, with P(j∈Ai)=pij\mathbb P(j\in A_i)=p_{ij}P(j∈Ai​)=pij​. These decisions may be correlated across the positions of one candidate and are independent across candidates.

The linear program LPpar(I)\mathrm{LP}_{\mathrm{par}}(I)LPpar​(I) has a variable yijy_{ij}yij​ for the probability that candidate iii is offered position jjj:

max⁡ ∑j=1k∑i=1nvijyijpijs.t.∑iyij≤T,∑iyijpij≤1  (∀j),∑jyij≤1  (∀i),0≤yij≤1.\max\ \sum_{j=1}^k\sum_{i=1}^n v_{ij}y_{ij}p_{ij}\quad\text{s.t.}\quad \sum_i y_{ij}\le T,\quad \sum_i y_{ij}p_{ij}\le 1\ \ (\forall j),\qquad \sum_j y_{ij}\le 1\ \ (\forall i),\qquad 0\le y_{ij}\le 1.max j=1∑k​i=1∑n​vij​yij​pij​s.t.i∑​yij​≤T,i∑​yij​pij​≤1  (∀j),j∑​yij​≤1  (∀i),0≤yij​≤1.

The paper shows (Lemma 6) that its value bounds the expected reward of every policy.

The dependent rounding of Gandhi, Khuller, Parthasarathy and Srinivasan (2006) takes a bipartite graph with edge weights xe∈[0,1]x_e\in[0,1]xe​∈[0,1] and outputs random indicators Xe∈{0,1}X_e\in\{0,1\}Xe​∈{0,1} with (P1) EXe=xe\mathbb E X_e=x_eEXe​=xe​; (P2) every vertex degree ∑e∋uXe\sum_{e\ni u}X_e∑e∋u​Xe​ is the floor or the ceiling of its fractional degree, with probability 1; (P3) for every vertex uuu, every set SSS of edges at uuu and every c∈{0,1}c\in\{0,1\}c∈{0,1}, P(⋂e∈S{Xe=c})≤∏e∈SP(Xe=c)\mathbb P(\bigcap_{e\in S}\{X_e=c\})\le\prod_{e\in S}\mathbb P(X_e=c)P(⋂e∈S​{Xe​=c})≤∏e∈S​P(Xe​=c).

The algorithm ALGpar\mathrm{ALG}_{\mathrm{par}}ALGpar​ solves LPpar(I)\mathrm{LP}_{\mathrm{par}}(I)LPpar​(I) to optimality, rounds the optimal yyy on the complete bipartite graph candidates ×\times× positions, and puts candidate iii on the list of position jjj iff Yij=1Y_{ij}=1Yij​=1. Every list is then run in parallel, in decreasing order of vijv_{ij}vij​: position jjj offers to the next candidate on its list each round until someone accepts, the list ends or the TTT rounds are over. RALGpar(I)R_{\mathrm{ALG}_{\mathrm{par}}}(I)RALGpar​​(I) is its expected total value.

For the analysis, Dj={i:Yij=1, j∈Ai}D_j=\{i: Y_{ij}=1,\ j\in A_i\}Dj​={i:Yij​=1, j∈Ai​} is the set of candidates on list jjj who would accept, vj∗(S)=max⁡i∈Svijv^*_j(S)=\max_{i\in S}v_{ij}vj∗​(S)=maxi∈S​vij​ (zero on the empty set), D~j\tilde D_jD~j​ is the same set built from independent Bernoulli(yijy_{ij}yij​) variables instead of YijY_{ij}Yij​, and Lj∗=∑ivijyijpijL^*_j=\sum_i v_{ij}y_{ij}p_{ij}Lj∗​=∑i​vij​yij​pij​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2

RALGpar(I) ≥ (1−1e) LPpar(I)for every I∈Ipar.R_{\mathrm{ALG}_{\mathrm{par}}}(I)\ \ge\ \Big(1-\frac1e\Big)\,\mathrm{LP}_{\mathrm{par}}(I)\qquad\text{for every } I\in\mathcal I_{\mathrm{par}}.RALGpar​​(I) ≥ (1−e1​)LPpar​(I)for every I∈Ipar​.

The constant is tight (App. C.5 of the paper), so the goal states the paper's result in its final form.

Milestones

  1. Properties (a) and (b) (§5.2): with probability 1 every list has at most TTT candidates and every candidate is on at most one list.
  2. Lj=E vj∗(D)L_j=\mathbb E\,v^*_j(D)Lj​=Evj∗​(D) (§5.3): the expected value hired for position jjj is the expected best value among the accepting list members.
  3. Lemma 7: E vj∗(D)≥E vj∗(D~)\mathbb E\,v^*_j(D)\ge\mathbb E\,v^*_j(\tilde D)Evj∗​(D)≥Evj∗​(D~) for every position jjj.
  4. Lemma 8: E vj∗(D~)≥(1−1/e)Lj∗\mathbb E\,v^*_j(\tilde D)\ge(1-1/e)L^*_jEvj∗​(D~)≥(1−1/e)Lj∗​ for every position jjj.
  5. Lemma 9 (companion, §5.4): if all positions are identical, LPpar(I)=LPseq(I′)\mathrm{LP}_{\mathrm{par}}(I)=\mathrm{LP}_{\mathrm{seq}}(I')LPpar​(I)=LPseq​(I′), where I′I'I′ is the Sequential Offering instance with the same candidates and a budget of kTkTkT offers.

Significance

Theorem 2 shows that a non-adaptive policy, fixed before any offer is answered, earns at least 1−1/e≈0.6321-1/e\approx0.6321−1/e≈0.632 of the LP bound, hence of the best adaptive policy, for heterogeneous positions and with acceptance decisions correlated across positions. Through Lemma 9 it also bounds the cost of batching: TTT parallel rounds lose at most a factor 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e against kTkTkT sequential offers (Corollary 3 of the paper).

The results are proved in the paper; none of them is formalized. The mission adds to the platform a reusable statement of the GKPS rounding properties on bipartite graphs, an explicit finite model of a parallel offering process computed from its run, and a (1−1/e)(1-1/e)(1−1/e) LP-rounding guarantee that a solver must connect end to end: the algorithm's reward, the per-position reduction, the comparison with independent rounding, and the bound for independent rounding.

Difficulty

The obvious first step, replacing the dependent rounding by independent rounding with the same marginals, is not free: the rounding couples the candidates of a list, and an expected maximum is not linear in the indicators. Only the negative correlation of the rounding at a single position rescues it, and the paper notes (App. C.3) that (P1) and (P3) alone do not suffice once several identical positions are pooled, so the argument is genuinely per position. The written proof of Lemma 7 (p. ec10) has a sign error and a wrong indicator; the statement is correct. Independent rounding then still has to be compared with the LP: the LP only controls each list in expectation, through ∑iyijpij≤1\sum_i y_{ij}p_{ij}\le1∑i​yij​pij​≤1, while the algorithm collects at most one value per list.

Formalization scope

Candidates are Fin n, positions Fin k, all quantities real. All randomness is finite: an expectation is an explicit sum over the rounded edge set Y⊆[n]×[k]Y\subseteq[n]\times[k]Y⊆[n]×[k], weighted by a distribution μ\muμ, and over acceptance profiles (Ai)i(A_i)_i(Ai​)i​, weighted by ∏iacci(Ai)\prod_i\mathrm{acc}_i(A_i)∏i​acci​(Ai​), where acci\mathrm{acc}_iacci​ is any law on subsets of [k][k][k] with marginals pijp_{ij}pij​. The rounding is independent of the acceptance decisions.

The rounding scheme is represented by its properties: the goal holds for every distribution μ\muμ with (P1)–(P3) for the weights yyy, which includes the scheme of Gandhi et al. The LP solution is any optimal one. The order of list jjj is a permutation of the candidates that is decreasing in vijv_{ij}vij​, ties in any order. RALGparR_{\mathrm{ALG}_{\mathrm{par}}}RALGpar​​ is computed from the run: candidate iii is hired for jjj iff iii is on list jjj, would accept jjj, nobody earlier on list jjj would accept jjj, and fewer than TTT candidates precede iii on the list. It is not defined by the formula E vj∗(D)\mathbb E\,v^*_j(D)Evj∗​(D), which is a milestone, and the goal is compared with the objective at an optimal LP solution, never at an arbitrary feasible point. The degree condition (P2) is kept in the rounding predicate, not replaced by the list properties it implies.

A complete development needs finite sums over product distributions, expected maxima of random subsets of sorted values, and elementary estimates involving e−1e^{-1}e−1; no measure theory is required. The GKPS definition is generic in the two vertex sets and reusable for other dependent-rounding results. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as is a proof of Lemma 7 for general negatively correlated roundings.

Selected references

  • B. Epstein, W. Ma, Selection and Ordering Policies for Hiring Pipelines via Linear Programming, Operations Research, 2024; preprint arXiv:2210.04059v3, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.04059
  • R. Gandhi, S. Khuller, S. Parthasarathy, A. Srinivasan, Dependent rounding and its applications to approximation algorithms, Journal of the ACM 53(3), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1145/1147954.1147956
  • M. Purohit, S. Gollapudi, M. Raghavan, Hiring under uncertainty, ICML 2019. https://proceedings.mlr.press/v97/purohit19a.html
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Operations ResearchProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Selection and Ordering Policies for Hiring Pipelines via Linear Programming 1: A Non-Adaptive, Committed LP-Rounding Policy for ProbeTop-k Earns at Least (1 − e^{−k}k^k/k!) Times the LP BoundResearch Paper

Motivation

Hiring is a pipeline: a firm with kkk openings and a large pool of applicants cannot interview everyone, so it must decide whom to interview, in what order, and whether to hire on the spot. The ProbeTop-k problem models this. Each applicant has a random value with a known distribution, an interview reveals the value, at most TTT interviews may be conducted, and at most kkk applicants are hired. The firm maximises the expected total value of its hires.

The same structure appears in stochastic probing, sequential testing and assortment problems, and its benchmark, the best adaptive, non-committed policy (one that may choose the next interview after seeing earlier values and may hire only at the end), is hard to compute. Practical policies are non-adaptive (fix the interview order in advance) and committed (hire or reject right after each interview). Epstein and Ma (arXiv:2210.04059v3, Operations Research 2024) ask how much is lost by restricting to such policies, and answer with an LP-rounding algorithm whose guarantee improves with kkk.

Setting

An instance I=(k,T,n,F)I = (k, T, n, F)I=(k,T,n,F) has 1≤k≤T≤n1 \le k \le T \le n1≤k≤T≤n. Applicant i∈[n]i \in [n]i∈[n] has value ViV_iVi​ supported on finitely many non-negative values r1,…,rJr_1, \dots, r_Jr1​,…,rJ​, with qij=Pr⁡(Vi=rj)q_{ij} = \Pr(V_i = r_j)qij​=Pr(Vi​=rj​); values are independent across applicants.

The linear relaxation LPptk(I)\mathrm{LP}_{ptk}(I)LPptk​(I) has variables yiy_iyi​ (probability of interviewing iii) and xijx_{ij}xij​ (probability of hiring iii when Vi=rjV_i = r_jVi​=rj​):

LPptk(I)=max⁡∑i=1n∑j=1Jrjxijs.t.xij≤yiqij,  ∑iyi≤T,  ∑i,jxij≤k,  xij≥0,  0≤yi≤1.\mathrm{LP}_{ptk}(I) = \max \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^J r_j x_{ij} \quad \text{s.t.}\quad x_{ij} \le y_i q_{ij},\ \ \sum_i y_i \le T,\ \ \sum_{i,j} x_{ij} \le k,\ \ x_{ij} \ge 0,\ \ 0 \le y_i \le 1 .LPptk​(I)=maxi=1∑n​j=1∑J​rj​xij​s.t.xij​≤yi​qij​,  i∑​yi​≤T,  i,j∑​xij​≤k,  xij​≥0,  0≤yi​≤1.

From a solution (x,y)(x, y)(x,y) define

pi=∑jxijyi,vi=∑jrjxij∑jxij,p_i = \frac{\sum_j x_{ij}}{y_i}, \qquad v_i = \frac{\sum_j r_j x_{ij}}{\sum_j x_{ij}},pi​=yi​∑j​xij​​,vi​=∑j​xij​∑j​rj​xij​​,

each 000 when its denominator is 000.

The algorithm ALGptk solves the LP and takes a basic optimal solution (x,y)(x, y)(x,y). It then draws the interview set SSS by the dependent rounding DR: applicants with yi=1y_i = 1yi​=1 are always in SSS; a single fractional yay_aya​ puts aaa in SSS with probability yay_aya​; two fractional ya+yb=1y_a + y_b = 1ya​+yb​=1 put exactly one of them in SSS, aaa with probability yay_aya​. ALGptk interviews SSS in decreasing order of viv_ivi​, and on observing Vi=rjV_i = r_jVi​=rj​ hires iii with probability xij/(yiqij)x_{ij}/(y_i q_{ij})xij​/(yi​qij​) if a position is still open. Its expected reward is RALGptk(I)R_{ALG_{ptk}}(I)RALGptk​​(I).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

RALGptk(I)  ≥  (1−e−kkkk!) LPptk(I)for every valid instance I with k positions.R_{ALG_{ptk}}(I) \;\ge\; \Big(1 - \frac{e^{-k}k^k}{k!}\Big)\, \mathrm{LP}_{ptk}(I) \qquad \text{for every valid instance } I \text{ with } k \text{ positions.}RALGptk​​(I)≥(1−k!e−kkk​)LPptk​(I)for every valid instance I with k positions.

The factor is 1−1/e1 - 1/e1−1/e at k=1k = 1k=1 and tends to 111 as k→∞k \to \inftyk→∞.

Milestones

The paper's own steps, in attack order:

  1. Lemma 2 (p. 16): a basic feasible solution has at most two fractional yiy_iyi​, and two fractional ones sum to 111.
  2. (P1), (P2) (p. 17): DR has marginals E(Yi)=yi\mathbb{E}(Y_i) = y_iE(Yi​)=yi​ and never exceeds TTT interviews.
  3. E(Pi)=pi\mathbb{E}(P_i) = p_iE(Pi​)=pi​ (p. 18): the hiring coin has mean pip_ipi​.
  4. Lemma 3 (p. 18): RALGptk(I)=∑ivi E(1{Ni−1<k}Zi)R_{ALG_{ptk}}(I) = \sum_i v_i\, \mathbb{E}(\mathbf 1\{N_{i-1} < k\} Z_i)RALGptk​​(I)=∑i​vi​E(1{Ni−1​<k}Zi​), where Zi=YiPiZ_i = Y_i P_iZi​=Yi​Pi​, the PiP_iPi​ are independent Bernoulli(pip_ipi​) indicators, and Ni−1N_{i-1}Ni−1​ counts the earlier applicants with Zℓ=1Z_\ell = 1Zℓ​=1.
  5. Lemma 4 (p. 18): with two fractional components, this quantity under DR is at least its value under independent rounding of yyy.
  6. LP identity (p. ec8): ∑i,jrjxij=∑iyivipi\sum_{i,j} r_j x_{ij} = \sum_i y_i v_i p_i∑i,j​rj​xij​=∑i​yi​vi​pi​.
  7. Proposition EC.1 (Yan 2011; p. ec2): the weighted rank function of a kkk-uniform matroid has correlation gap at most (1−e−kkk/k!)−1(1 - e^{-k}k^k/k!)^{-1}(1−e−kkk/k!)−1.
  8. Independent version (p. ec8): with independent rounding, the reward is at least (1−e−kkk/k!) LPptk(I)(1 - e^{-k}k^k/k!)\,\mathrm{LP}_{ptk}(I)(1−e−kkk/k!)LPptk​(I).

A companion milestone, Lemma 5 (p. 21), states that for weighted Bernoulli instances the LP has an optimal solution with xi=yiqix_i = y_i q_ixi​=yi​qi​. It does not feed Theorem 1.

Significance

Theorem 1, combined with the fact that LPptk\mathrm{LP}_{ptk}LPptk​ bounds every adaptive, non-committed policy (Lemma 1 of the paper), shows that a policy that is both non-adaptive and committed earns at least a fraction 1−e−kkk/k!1 - e^{-k}k^k/k!1−e−kkk/k! of the optimal adaptive, non-committed reward; the lost fraction e−kkk/k!e^{-k}k^k/k!e−kkk/k! vanishes as kkk grows. The factor is tight for this LP (App. B.6). The theorem also underlies a PTAS for ProbeTop-k (Corollary 1) and, through Lemma 5, the same guarantee for the Sequential Offering problem of Purohit et al. (Corollary 2).

The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge nothing in it is machine-checked. A formalization would add to the platform:

  • an LP relaxation with basic feasible solutions as extreme points of a polytope;
  • an explicit model of a randomised, committed selection algorithm as a finite expectation;
  • the correlation gap of kkk-uniform weighted rank functions, a tool that recurs across prophet inequalities, posted pricing and stochastic probing.

Proposition EC.1 is a cited result (Yan 2011), not proved in the paper. Formalizing it is part of the work.

Difficulty

The obvious argument compares the algorithm with the LP term by term, Pr⁡(i hired)≥c yipi\Pr(i \text{ hired}) \ge c\, y_i p_iPr(i hired)≥cyi​pi​ for each iii. This fails because hiring is capped at kkk: applicants late in the order are hired only if few earlier ones were. The guarantee must be obtained in aggregate, which is what the correlation gap does.

Two steps carry the weight:

  • Proposition EC.1 is a genuine extremal inequality over all distributions on subsets with given marginals.
  • Lemma 4 must show that the negative correlation DR introduces between the two fractional applicants never hurts a committed, order-dependent selection. It is a case analysis over sample paths that uses the decreasing order of viv_ivi​.

Lemma 3 is a conditional-expectation identity, but in a fully explicit model it requires marginalising out the values and coins of all other applicants.

Formalization scope

Lean namespace HiringLP.ProbeTopK.

Representation.

  • Applicants are Fin n and support points Fin J. All quantities are real.
  • Instances are valid when 1≤k≤T≤n1 \le k \le T \le n1≤k≤T≤n, rj≥0r_j \ge 0rj​≥0, qij≥0q_{ij} \ge 0qij​≥0 and ∑jqij=1\sum_j q_{ij} = 1∑j​qij​=1.
  • Basic feasible solutions are Set.extremePoints ℝ of the feasible set in (x,y)(x, y)(x,y)-space. An optimal solution is feasible and objective-maximal among feasible points, and LPptk(I)\mathrm{LP}_{ptk}(I)LPptk​(I) is the objective at it.

Conventions.

  • pip_ipi​, viv_ivi​ and the hiring probability xij/(yiqij)x_{ij}/(y_i q_{ij})xij​/(yi​qij​) are 000 when their denominators vanish (the paper's footnote 2).
  • The interview order is a permutation required to be non-increasing in viv_ivi​, with ties in any order.
  • DR is an explicit formula for the probability of each interview set.

The expected reward. RALGptk(I)R_{ALG_{ptk}}(I)RALGptk​​(I) is a finite sum over the interview set, the value vector (independent, law qqq) and the vector of hiring coins (independent given the values). Applicant iii is hired exactly when it is interviewed, its coin succeeds, and fewer than kkk earlier interviewed applicants had successful coins. The reward collects the realised values rVir_{V_i}rVi​​.

Ruled out.

  • Defining the reward as ∑ivi E(1{Ni−1<k}Zi)\sum_i v_i\, \mathbb{E}(\mathbf 1\{N_{i-1} < k\} Z_i)∑i​vi​E(1{Ni−1​<k}Zi​). That is Lemma 3, which would make the goal a statement about its own proof.
  • Comparing with the objective at an arbitrary feasible point instead of an optimal one.

Infrastructure and contributions. The weighted rank function, independent rounding and marginals are separate, reusable definitions. Contributions are welcome on each milestone, especially Proposition EC.1. So is general infrastructure: extreme points of polytopes as basic solutions, and finite product distributions.

Selected references

  • B. Epstein, W. Ma, Selection and Ordering Policies for Hiring Pipelines via Linear Programming, Operations Research, 2024; preprint arXiv:2210.04059v3, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.04059
  • Q. Yan, Mechanism design via correlation gap, Proceedings of the 22nd ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 710–719, 2011. Proceedings volume: https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973082
  • S. Agrawal, Y. Ding, A. Saberi, Y. Ye, Correlation robust stochastic optimization, Proceedings of the 21st ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 1087–1096, 2010. Proceedings volume: https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973075
  • R. Gandhi, S. Khuller, S. Parthasarathy, A. Srinivasan, Dependent rounding and its applications to approximation algorithms, Journal of the ACM 53(3):324–360, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1145/1147954.1147956
  • M. Purohit, S. Gollapudi, M. Raghavan, Hiring under uncertainty, Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Machine Learning (PMLR 97), 5181–5189, 2019. https://proceedings.mlr.press/v97/purohit19a.html
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CombinatoricsGraph TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Matching: Characterizing and Achieving Constant Regret II: In (SPP)-Acyclic Networks the Static Planning Solution Is Given by Surplus Vectors in {−1, 0, 1}ⁿResearch Paper

Motivation

Centralized markets such as kidney exchanges, ride-sharing platforms and online labor markets match agents who arrive over time. Kerimov, Ashlagi and Gurvich (SSRN 3824407; Management Science, 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.01215) study such a market with nnn agent types and ddd feasible multi-way matches. Their main result is that, when a fluid linear program called the static-planning problem (SPP) has a unique non-degenerate solution, a periodic resolving policy keeps the regret against the hindsight optimum bounded by a constant of order 1/ϵ1/\epsilon1/ϵ at all times, where the general position gap ϵ\epsilonϵ is the smallest positive basic variable of (SPP).

The constant 1/ϵ1/\epsilon1/ϵ is only informative if one can say what ϵ\epsilonϵ is. Section 5 of the paper does this for a class of networks it calls (SPP)-acyclic: there the optimal solution of (SPP) is an explicit signed sum of arrival rates, so ϵ\epsilonϵ is an imbalance between sums of arrival probabilities. This mission formalizes that structural result and the lemmas it rests on. It needs no probability: only the combinatorics of the network and linear programming.

Setting

A matching network has agent types A={1,…,n}\mathcal A = \{1,\dots,n\}A={1,…,n} and matches M={1,…,d}\mathcal M = \{1,\dots,d\}M={1,…,d}. Match mmm uses one agent of each type in a set A(m)\mathcal A(m)A(m) with ∣A(m)∣≥2|\mathcal A(m)| \ge 2∣A(m)∣≥2, every type belongs to some match, and the matching matrix M∈{0,1}n×dM \in \{0,1\}^{n\times d}M∈{0,1}n×d has Mim=1M_{im} = 1Mim​=1 iff i∈A(m)i \in \mathcal A(m)i∈A(m). Arrival probabilities λ\lambdaλ satisfy λi>0\lambda_i > 0λi​>0, ∑iλi=1\sum_i \lambda_i = 1∑i​λi​=1, and match values satisfy rm>0r_m > 0rm​>0.

The matching network graph G\mathcal GG is the bipartite graph whose vertices are the types and the matches, with an edge between type iii and match mmm iff i∈A(m)i \in \mathcal A(m)i∈A(m).

For a right-hand side b∈Rnb \in \mathbb R^nb∈Rn, the static-planning problem is

max⁡ r⋅zs.t.Mz+s=b,z∈R≥0d, s∈R≥0n,\max\ r\cdot z\quad\text{s.t.}\quad Mz + s = b,\quad z \in \mathbb R^d_{\ge 0},\ s \in \mathbb R^n_{\ge 0},max r⋅zs.t.Mz+s=b,z∈R≥0d​, s∈R≥0n​,

and (SPP) is the case b=λb = \lambdab=λ. For a solution (z∗,s∗)(z^*, s^*)(z∗,s∗) write M+={m:zm∗>0}\mathcal M_+ = \{m : z^*_m > 0\}M+​={m:zm∗​>0} (active matches), M0=M∖M+\mathcal M_0 = \mathcal M \setminus \mathcal M_+M0​=M∖M+​ (redundant matches), Q+={j:sj∗>0}\mathcal Q_+ = \{j : s^*_j > 0\}Q+​={j:sj∗​>0} and Q0=A∖Q+\mathcal Q_0 = \mathcal A \setminus \mathcal Q_+Q0​=A∖Q+​.

The network satisfies the general position condition (GP) if (SPP) has a unique optimal solution (z∗,s∗)(z^*, s^*)(z∗,s∗) and it is non-degenerate: ∣M+∣+∣Q+∣=n|\mathcal M_+| + |\mathcal Q_+| = n∣M+​∣+∣Q+​∣=n. The optimal basis matrix B\mathcal BB is formed by the columns of MMM indexed by M+\mathcal M_+M+​ and the unit vectors eje_jej​, j∈Q+j \in \mathcal Q_+j∈Q+​.

The (SPP)-residual graph is G\mathcal GG with the redundant matches removed, and the network is (SPP)-acyclic if it satisfies GP and its (SPP)-residual graph has no cycle.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1 (p. 25)

Assume GP and (SPP)-acyclicity. Then there are vectors yl∈{−1,0,1}ny^l \in \{-1,0,1\}^nyl∈{−1,0,1}n, l∈M+∪Q+l \in \mathcal M_+ \cup \mathcal Q_+l∈M+​∪Q+​, with

zm∗=ymλ>0 (m∈M+),sj∗=yjλ>0 (j∈Q+),z^*_m = y^m\lambda > 0\ (m \in \mathcal M_+),\qquad s^*_j = y^j\lambda > 0\ (j \in \mathcal Q_+),zm∗​=ymλ>0 (m∈M+​),sj∗​=yjλ>0 (j∈Q+​),

and every right-hand side λ~>0\tilde\lambda > 0λ~>0 with ylλ~>0y^l\tilde\lambda > 0ylλ~>0 for all lll has, as its unique optimal solution, zm=ymλ~z_m = y^m\tilde\lambdazm​=ymλ~ on M+\mathcal M_+M+​, sj=yjλ~s_j = y^j\tilde\lambdasj​=yjλ~ on Q+\mathcal Q_+Q+​, and zero elsewhere.

Milestones

  1. (4), p. 20. Under GP, B\mathcal BB is invertible and (zM+∗,sQ+∗)=B−1λ>0(z^*_{\mathcal M_+}, s^*_{\mathcal Q_+}) = \mathcal B^{-1}\lambda > 0(zM+​∗​,sQ+​∗​)=B−1λ>0.
  2. §4.2, p. 20. Under GP the same basis remains optimal for every λ~>0\tilde\lambda > 0λ~>0 with ∥λ~−λ∥∞≤ζ0\|\tilde\lambda - \lambda\|_\infty \le \zeta_0∥λ~−λ∥∞​≤ζ0​, for some ζ0>0\zeta_0 > 0ζ0​>0.
  3. Lemma C.1, p. 44. A connected acyclic matching network graph has at least n−d+1n - d + 1n−d+1 leaves; under GP with M0=∅\mathcal M_0 = \emptysetM0​=∅ and a connected acyclic residual graph, ∣Q+∣=n−d|\mathcal Q_+| = n - d∣Q+​∣=n−d and some over-demanded queue takes part in exactly one match.

A further theorem item, Lemma 5.1 (p. 24), states that under GP a network with only two-way matches, in which every cycle contains an even number of matches, is (SPP)-acyclic.

Significance

Theorem 5.1 turns the regret constant of the paper's main theorem into a quantity one can read off the data: every positive basic variable, and therefore ϵ\epsilonϵ, is ∑iyiλi\sum_i y_i\lambda_i∑i​yi​λi​ with coefficients in {−1,0,1}\{-1,0,1\}{−1,0,1}. Its second sentence describes the whole region of right-hand sides on which the same basis stays optimal, an open polyhedral cone cut out by the inequalities ylλ~>0y^l\tilde\lambda > 0ylλ~>0, which is how the paper relates GP to the arrival rates in §5.1.

On the formal side, the mission builds a reusable model of the matching network, its bipartite incidence graph and the static-planning linear program with a variable right-hand side. Prove2Me does not yet contain the structural theory of optimal bases of such programs. Theorem 5.1 and its milestones are proved in the paper (Appendix C and §4.2); none of them is machine-checked yet.

Difficulty

The representation z∗=B−1λz^* = \mathcal B^{-1}\lambdaz∗=B−1λ holds for every network in general position, so the content of the theorem lies in two places.

  • The entries of B−1\mathcal B^{-1}B−1. Inverses of 0/10/10/1 matrices have arbitrary rational entries in general: the triangle network (three types, matches {1,2},{2,3},{1,3}\{1,2\},\{2,3\},\{1,3\}{1,2},{2,3},{1,3}) has an optimal basis whose inverse has entries ±12\pm\tfrac12±21​. The claim needs the acyclic structure of the residual graph in an essential way.
  • The second sentence. Exhibiting numbers yly^lyl with ylλ=zl∗y^l\lambda = z^*_lylλ=zl∗​ is trivial and says nothing. The statement requires the same vectors to produce the unique optimal solution for a whole open set of right-hand sides, which forces them to be the rows of B−1\mathcal B^{-1}B−1. This step therefore also involves the optimality conditions of (SPP) and the uniqueness part of GP.

Formalization scope

Types are Fin n, matches Fin d, both 0-based. The topology is the structure MatchingNetwork with the fields ∣A(m)∣≥2|\mathcal A(m)| \ge 2∣A(m)∣≥2 and "every type is in a match"; λ\lambdaλ and rrr are separate vectors with the standing predicates λi>0\lambda_i > 0λi​>0, ∑iλi=1\sum_i\lambda_i = 1∑i​λi​=1 and rm>0r_m > 0rm​>0, which are hypotheses of every theorem. The optimal solution (z∗,s∗)(z^*, s^*)(z∗,s∗) is an argument together with the GP hypothesis, never a default or a choice. The graph is a SimpleGraph on Fin n ⊕ Fin d; the residual graph keeps redundant matches as isolated vertices, which affects neither acyclicity nor the degrees of type vertices. The column index type of B\mathcal BB is M+⊔Q+\mathcal M_+ \sqcup \mathcal Q_+M+​⊔Q+​, and the inverse is a two-sided inverse over these index types, not Matrix.inv, which is 000 on singular matrices.

Conventions the statements commit to:

  • in Theorem 5.1, "induces the optimal solution" is read as the unique optimal solution, and λ~\tilde\lambdaλ~ is any positive vector, not necessarily summing to one;
  • "for all sufficiently small ζ0\zeta_0ζ0​" in milestone 2 is the existence of one ζ0>0\zeta_0 > 0ζ0​>0;
  • Lemma C.1's count of n−d+1n - d + 1n−d+1 leaves is stated without natural-number subtraction;
  • Lemma C.1's second half carries the standing reduction of Appendix C (M0=∅\mathcal M_0 = \emptysetM0​=∅, one connected component) as hypotheses;
  • "every cycle contains an even number of matches" in Lemma 5.1 is stated as "every cycle of the bipartite graph has length divisible by 4".

The paper's own text says "all entries of YYY are either −1-1−1, 000, or −1-1−1" (p. 25); this is read as −1-1−1, 000 or 111, as in the theorem's statement.

A formalization that keeps only the first sentence of Theorem 5.1, or that lets the vectors yly^lyl be unrelated to the basis, is trivially satisfiable and is not the theorem.

Needed infrastructure: optimality conditions for linear programs in equality form (reduced costs, uniqueness of a non-degenerate optimum), Mathlib's acyclic graphs and trees (SimpleGraph.IsAcyclic, IsTree.card_edgeFinset), and degree counting on bipartite graphs. The paper proves Theorem 5.1 in Appendix C by an explicit construction along paths of the residual graph; any correct argument is welcome. Lemmas on the inverse of a basis matrix whose bipartite row–column graph is a forest would be reusable well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • S. Kerimov, I. Ashlagi, I. Gurvich, Dynamic Matching: Characterizing and Achieving Constant Regret, SSRN 3824407 (version of September 14, 2022); Management Science (2023). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3824407, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.01215
  • D. Bertsimas, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Introduction to Linear Optimization, Athena Scientific, 1997, §5.1 (sensitivity analysis of an optimal basis).
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Markov ChainOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Matching: Characterizing and Achieving Constant Regret I: Under General Position the Exhaustive Resolving Policy Has Regret at Most Γ/ϵ at All TimesResearch Paper

Motivation

Centralized matching markets (kidney exchange, ride hailing, freight and labor platforms) repeatedly decide which waiting participants to match now and which to hold for a better opportunity later. Matching early collects value sooner; waiting lets the platform see more arrivals and avoid matches that later turn out to be wasteful. A natural yardstick is the best set of matches that could have been made with hindsight from all arrivals up to a given time, and the question is how far an online policy, which cannot see the future, must fall behind that yardstick.

Kerimov, Ashlagi and Gurvich (SSRN 3824407, September 2022; Management Science 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.01215) answer this for multi-way matching networks with patient agents. They identify a single parameter of the fluid relaxation, the general position gap ϵ\epsilonϵ, and show that the regret against the hindsight benchmark can be kept at order ϵ−1\epsilon^{-1}ϵ−1 at all times, and that no policy does better in order on non-trivial networks. This mission formalizes the upper bound. The paper places itself next to constant-regret results for online packing (Bumpensanti and Wang 2020; Vera and Banerjee 2021), where resolving a linear program at each arrival achieves bounded regret.

Setting

There are nnn agent types and ddd matches. Match mmm is a set A(m)\mathcal A(m)A(m) of at least two types, every type belongs to some match, and the matching matrix M∈{0,1}n×dM\in\{0,1\}^{n\times d}M∈{0,1}n×d has Mim=1M_{im}=1Mim​=1 iff i∈A(m)i\in\mathcal A(m)i∈A(m). Performing match mmm uses one agent of each type in A(m)\mathcal A(m)A(m) and earns rm>0r_m>0rm​>0. Time is discrete; at each time t=1,2,…t=1,2,\dotst=1,2,… one agent arrives, of type iii with probability λi>0\lambda_i>0λi​>0, ∑iλi=1\sum_i\lambda_i=1∑i​λi​=1, independently over time. AitA^t_iAit​ counts the type-iii arrivals by time ttt.

A matching policy records DmtD^t_mDmt​, the number of times match mmm has been performed by time ttt. It is admissible when it is non-anticipative and only matches agents present: MDt≤AtMD^t\le A^tMDt≤At. The pre-match queue is Qt=At−MDt−1Q^t=A^t-MD^{t-1}Qt=At−MDt−1, the value collected is RD,t=E[r⋅Dt]\mathcal R^{D,t}=\mathbb E[r\cdot D^t]RD,t=E[r⋅Dt], and the hindsight benchmark is

R∗,t=E[max⁡{r⋅y:My≤At, y∈Z≥0d}].\mathcal R^{*,t}=\mathbb E\big[\max\{r\cdot y: My\le A^t,\ y\in\mathbb Z^d_{\ge0}\}\big].R∗,t=E[max{r⋅y:My≤At, y∈Z≥0d​}].

The static-planning problem is the linear program

(SPP)max⁡ r⋅zs.t.Mz+s=λ, z≥0, s≥0.\text{(SPP)}\qquad \max\ r\cdot z\quad\text{s.t.}\quad Mz+s=\lambda,\ z\ge0,\ s\ge0.(SPP)max r⋅zs.t.Mz+s=λ, z≥0, s≥0.

For an optimal (z∗,s∗)(z^*,s^*)(z∗,s∗) let M+={m:zm∗>0}\mathcal M_+=\{m:z^*_m>0\}M+​={m:zm∗​>0} (active matches), M0\mathcal M_0M0​ the rest (redundant matches), Q+={j:sj∗>0}\mathcal Q_+=\{j:s^*_j>0\}Q+​={j:sj∗​>0} (under-demanded types) and Q0\mathcal Q_0Q0​ the rest (over-demanded types). The network satisfies general position (GP) if (SPP) has a unique optimal solution and it is non-degenerate, ∣M+∣+∣Q+∣=n|\mathcal M_+|+|\mathcal Q_+|=n∣M+​∣+∣Q+​∣=n. The general position gap is the smallest positive basic value,

ϵ=min⁡m∈M+zm∗ ∧ min⁡j∈Q+sj∗.\epsilon=\min_{m\in\mathcal M_+}z^*_m\ \wedge\ \min_{j\in\mathcal Q_+}s^*_j .ϵ=m∈M+​min​zm∗​ ∧ j∈Q+​min​sj∗​.

The exhaustive resolving policy with inter-action delay τ\tauτ acts only at the epochs tk=kτt_k=k\tautk​=kτ. There it performs an optimal solution of the integer program max⁡{r⋅z:Mz≤Qtk, z∈Z≥0d}\max\{r\cdot z: Mz\le Q^{t_k},\ z\in\mathbb Z^d_{\ge0}\}max{r⋅z:Mz≤Qtk​, z∈Z≥0d​} with the redundant matches removed, and then discards the leftover agents of the under-demanded types.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1 (Upper bound), p. 14

There are constants κ,Γ>0\kappa,\Gamma>0κ,Γ>0 depending only on n,d,M,rn,d,M,rn,d,M,r such that, under GP, the exhaustive resolving policy with τ=⌈κϵ−1⌉\tau=\lceil\kappa\epsilon^{-1}\rceilτ=⌈κϵ−1⌉ (any tie-breaking) is admissible and

R∗,t−RD,t≤Γ ϵ−1for all t≥1.\mathcal R^{*,t}-\mathcal R^{D,t}\le\Gamma\,\epsilon^{-1}\qquad\text{for all }t\ge1 .R∗,t−RD,t≤Γϵ−1for all t≥1.

The constants are not fixed, so the goal survives any improvement of them.

Milestones

  1. §2, p. 8: R∗,t=max⁡DRD,t\mathcal R^{*,t}=\max_{D}\mathcal R^{D,t}R∗,t=maxD​RD,t, attained by the ultimate batching policy.
  2. §4.2, (4), p. 20: under GP the optimal basis B\mathcal BB is invertible, (zM+∗,sQ+∗)=B−1λ(z^*_{\mathcal M_+},s^*_{\mathcal Q_+})=\mathcal B^{-1}\lambda(zM+​∗​,sQ+​∗​)=B−1λ, and the entries of B−1\mathcal B^{-1}B−1 are bounded by a constant of the topology.
  3. §4.2, p. 20: θ=∑m∈M+rmym\theta=\sum_{m\in\mathcal M_+}r_my^mθ=∑m∈M+​​rm​ym is the optimal dual of (SPP), θ≥0\theta\ge0θ≥0, and θi>0\theta_i>0θi​>0 on Q0\mathcal Q_0Q0​.
  4. Lemma 4.1, p. 19 (optimality test): a policy without redundant matches whose over-demanded queues have mean O(ϵ−1)O(\epsilon^{-1})O(ϵ−1) has regret O(ϵ−1)O(\epsilon^{-1})O(ϵ−1).
  5. Lemma 4.2, p. 21: a Foster–Lyapunov drift condition bounds stationary means (Glynn and Zeevi 2008).
  6. (11), p. 23: Eπ[h∗(Q0)]=O(ϵ−1)\mathbb E_\pi[h^*(Q^0)]=O(\epsilon^{-1})Eπ​[h∗(Q0)]=O(ϵ−1) for the stationary law of the epoch chain.
  7. App. D, p. 49: E0[h∗(Qtk)]=O(ϵ−1)\mathbb E_{\mathbf 0}[h^*(Q^{t_k})]=O(\epsilon^{-1})E0​[h∗(Qtk​)]=O(ϵ−1) for all k≥1k\ge1k≥1.

Here h∗(u)h^*(u)h∗(u) is the θ\thetaθ-weighted leftover in Q0\mathcal Q_0Q0​ after an optimal integer matching of uuu (display (7)).

Significance

The upper bound says that, under GP, hindsight-optimal performance up to an additive constant is achievable at every time simultaneously, not just at a known horizon. Long-run average optimality and near-optimality under discounting follow (Remark 2.1). The bound also quantifies the cost of acting often: the delay τ\tauτ and the regret both scale with ϵ−1\epsilon^{-1}ϵ−1, so networks close to degeneracy force batching. Combined with the paper's lower bound, ϵ−1\epsilon^{-1}ϵ−1 is the right order on non-trivial networks.

The result has a printed proof (§4, Appendices B and D) but no machine-checked one. Several intermediate statements of the printed proof do not hold as stated and are not posed here. The goal and the stated displays (11) and App. D are posed as the paper states them, so a formal proof requires a correct argument for the uniform-in-λ\lambdaλ bound on the over-demanded queues. Lemma 4.1, the basis and duality facts and Lemma 4.2 are self-contained and checkable on their own.

Difficulty

The obvious approach compares the policy's realized matches with the fluid optimum t z∗t\,z^*tz∗ and controls the deviation with concentration bounds. That gives errors of order t\sqrt tt​, not a constant. The constant comes from showing that the over-demanded queues stay of order ϵ−1\epsilon^{-1}ϵ−1 uniformly in time and in λ\lambdaλ. Between epochs these queues behave like a multidimensional reflected random walk whose drift toward zero is only of order ϵτ\epsilon\tauϵτ, while its fluctuations over an epoch are of order τ\sqrt\tauτ​. The delay τ≍ϵ−1\tau\asymp\epsilon^{-1}τ≍ϵ−1 balances the two, but the queue state enters through the integer program (3), whose solution changes discontinuously with the queues, and the quantities that measure the drift are signed combinations of arrival counts, to which the usual one-sided concentration bounds for nonnegative sums do not apply. On top of this every constant must be independent of λ\lambdaλ.

Formalization scope

  • Types are Fin n and matches Fin d (0-based); the topology with its two standing assumptions (∣A(m)∣≥2|\mathcal A(m)|\ge2∣A(m)∣≥2, every type in a match) is a structure, and λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 with ∑λi=1\sum\lambda_i=1∑λi​=1 and r>0r>0r>0 are hypotheses.
  • Time is N\mathbb NN; "for all t>0t>0t>0" is t≥1t\ge1t≥1. The arrival at time s+1s+1s+1 is the sss-th entry of a path ω:N→\omega:\mathbb N\toω:N→ Fin n. Expectations at horizon ttt are finite sums over the first ttt arrivals weighted by ∏λωs\prod\lambda_{\omega_s}∏λωs​​, so no expectation is a default value.
  • Admissible policies are non-anticipative cumulative counts with MDt≤AtMD^t\le A^tMDt≤At and no rejections. The resolving policy's removal of under-demanded leftovers acts on its own virtual queue, which agrees with the actual queue on Q0\mathcal Q_0Q0​; its matches are feasible without removals, so it is admissible.
  • (3) is solved with the redundant matches set to zero, and statements quantify over every tie-breaking selection. A selection exists (a sanity file exhibits one), so these statements are not vacuous.
  • GP is a hypothesis on an explicit pair (z∗,s∗)(z^*,s^*)(z∗,s∗); ϵ\epsilonϵ is the minimum of the positive basic values. The basis inverse is never a matrix-inverse function: statements assert the existence of a two-sided inverse.
  • h∗h^*h∗ is defined in the form min⁡{∑Q0θisi:Mz+s=u, zM0=0}\min\{\sum_{\mathcal Q_0}\theta_is_i: Mz+s=u,\ z_{\mathcal M_0}=0\}min{∑Q0​​θi​si​:Mz+s=u, zM0​​=0}, equivalent to (7) under the paper's reduction M0=∅\mathcal M_0=\emptysetM0​=∅; θ\thetaθ is any solution of the complementary-slackness system, which is unique under GP.
  • Every O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) is an explicit constant, quantified after the topology and rrr and before λ\lambdaλ. Placing it after λ\lambdaλ would turn the theorem into a per-instance boundedness statement and is ruled out.
  • A trivializing formalization (some unspecified policy, a τ\tauτ independent of ϵ\epsilonϵ, or GP replaced by an unsatisfiable condition) is ruled out: the policy is constructed, τ=⌈κ/ϵ⌉\tau=\lceil\kappa/\epsilon\rceilτ=⌈κ/ϵ⌉, and a sanity file proves GP for the Figure 1 network with ϵ=1/5\epsilon=1/5ϵ=1/5.
  • Not posed: the lower bound of Theorem 3.1, Proposition 4.1 (8)–(9), Lemmas B.1–B.2, Proposition B.1 and displays (21)–(22), which do not hold as printed; Theorem 5.2 and §6.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the LP facts (milestones 2–3) and Lemma 4.1, a Mathlib-ready proof of Lemma 4.2, and any correct argument for the epoch bounds.

Selected references

  • S. Kerimov, I. Ashlagi, I. Gurvich, Dynamic Matching: Characterizing and Achieving Constant Regret, SSRN 3824407 (version of Sep 14, 2022); Management Science, 2023. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3824407, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.01215
  • P. W. Glynn, A. Zeevi, Bounding stationary expectations of Markov processes, in Markov Processes and Related Topics, IMS Collections 4, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1214/074921708000000381
  • P. Bumpensanti, H. Wang, A re-solving heuristic with uniformly bounded loss for network revenue management, Management Science 66, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3365
  • D. Bertsimas, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Introduction to Linear Optimization, Athena Scientific, 1997.
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Secretaries with Advice 1: Under Non-Filtering and History-Irrelevance, an Optimal Stopping Policy Is MemorylessResearch Paper

Motivation

In the classical secretary problem, nnn candidates arrive one at a time in random order; at each arrival the decision maker sees only how the current candidate compares with the earlier ones, and must irrevocably hire or pass. The goal is to hire the best candidate, and the optimal rule (wait for about n/en/en/e arrivals, then take the first candidate better than all before) succeeds with probability about 1/e1/e1/e.

In many applications the decision maker also receives advice about each candidate: a noisy score, a prediction from a machine-learned classifier, or samples from the same distribution. Dütting, Lattanzi, Paes Leme and Vassilvitskii (arXiv:2011.06726, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024) propose a single model covering these cases: each secretary carries a signal, ranks and signals have an arbitrary known joint distribution, and the question is which policies are optimal. Their first structural result says that, under two natural conditions on the distribution, the optimal policy can ignore almost all of the history: it needs only the current signal and whether the current secretary is the best so far. Such memoryless policies are simpler, store less, and are relevant where data retention is restricted.

Timeline. Dynkin (1963) gave the 1/e1/e1/e rule for the advice-free problem. Gilbert and Mosteller (1966) studied the full-information version, where the advice is the candidate's value drawn from a known distribution. Buchbinder, Jain and Singh (2014) wrote secretary problems as linear programs. Dütting et al. (arXiv 2020) extended this LP to general advice and proved Theorem 8, the result of this mission.

Setting

There are nnn secretaries, arriving in the order 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n, and a finite signal space S\mathcal SS. An outcome consists of ranks r1,…,rn∈[n]r_1,\dots,r_n\in[n]r1​,…,rn​∈[n] (ties allowed) and signals s1,…,sn∈Ss_1,\dots,s_n\in\mathcal Ss1​,…,sn​∈S. A signaling structure is a known probability distribution P\mathbb PP over outcomes such that, almost surely, some secretary has the top rank ri=nr_i=nri​=n.

At round iii the algorithm sees the information (⪯1..i,s1,…,si)(\preceq_{1..i},s_1,\dots,s_i)(⪯1..i​,s1​,…,si​): the relative order of the first iii arrivals and their signals, not the ranks themselves. A policy qqq assigns to every round iii and every information value a stopping probability in [0,1][0,1][0,1]. The policy stops at iii with probability qi∏j<i(1−qj)q_i\prod_{j<i}(1-q_j)qi​∏j<i​(1−qj​), and its winning probability is the probability that it stops at some iii with ri=nr_i=nri​=n.

The best-so-far event is Ti={ri≥rj ∀j<i}T_i=\{r_i\ge r_j\ \forall j<i\}Ti​={ri​≥rj​ ∀j<i}. A policy is memoryless if its stopping probability at round iii depends only on iii, on whether TiT_iTi​ holds, and on sis_isi​.

Two properties of P\mathbb PP are assumed. Non-Filtering (NF): for j<ij<ij<i, the conditional law of (⪯1..j,s1,…,sj)(\preceq_{1..j},s_1,\dots,s_j)(⪯1..j​,s1​,…,sj​) given (Tj,sj)(T_j,s_j)(Tj​,sj​) is unchanged by additionally conditioning on (Ti,si)(T_i,s_i)(Ti​,si​). History-Irrelevance (HI): conditioned on (Ti,si)(T_i,s_i)(Ti​,si​), the information at round iii is independent of the event ri=nr_i=nri​=n.

For i∈[n]i\in[n]i∈[n], s,s′∈Ss,s'\in\mathcal Ss,s′∈S and j<ij<ij<i let a(i,s)=P[ri=n, si=s]a(i,s)=\mathbb P[r_i=n,\,s_i=s]a(i,s)=P[ri​=n,si​=s] and c(i,s,j,s′)=P[Tj, sj=s′∣Ti, si=s]c(i,s,j,s')=\mathbb P[T_j,\,s_j=s'\mid T_i,\,s_i=s]c(i,s,j,s′)=P[Tj​,sj​=s′∣Ti​,si​=s]. The LP of §3 has variables z(i,s)≥0z(i,s)\ge0z(i,s)≥0, constraint

z(i,s)≤1−∑j<i∑s′∈Sz(j,s′) c(i,s,j,s′),(4)z(i,s)\le 1-\sum_{j<i}\sum_{s'\in\mathcal S}z(j,s')\,c(i,s,j,s'),\tag{4}z(i,s)≤1−j<i∑​s′∈S∑​z(j,s′)c(i,s,j,s′),(4)

and objective Obj=∑i∑sz(i,s) a(i,s)\mathsf{Obj}=\sum_i\sum_s z(i,s)\,a(i,s)Obj=∑i​∑s​z(i,s)a(i,s) (5).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8

If P\mathbb PP satisfies NF and HI, then there is a memoryless policy mmm with

P[m wins] ≥ P[q wins]for every policy q.\mathbb P[m\text{ wins}]\ \ge\ \mathbb P[q\text{ wins}]\qquad\text{for every policy } q.P[m wins] ≥ P[q wins]for every policy q.

Milestones

  1. Best-so-far reduction (§2, p. 6): every policy is dominated by one that stops only on best-so-far rounds.
  2. Equation (2) (p. 8): under HI, P[ri=n∣≺1..i,s1,…,si]=P[ri=n∣Ti,si]\mathbb P[r_i=n\mid\prec_{1..i},s_1,\dots,s_i]=\mathbb P[r_i=n\mid T_i,s_i]P[ri​=n∣≺1..i​,s1​,…,si​]=P[ri​=n∣Ti​,si​].
  3. Equation (3) (p. 9): under HI, P[X∣si,ri=n]=P[X∣Ti,si]\mathbb P[X\mid s_i,r_i=n]=\mathbb P[X\mid T_i,s_i]P[X∣si​,ri​=n]=P[X∣Ti​,si​] for every event XXX of the round-iii information.
  4. Proposition 9 (p. 10): under NF and HI, every policy yields z≥0z\ge0z≥0 satisfying (4) whose objective (5) is its winning probability.
  5. Reconstruction claim (proof of Proposition 10, p. 11): for feasible zzz, the policy (6) satisfies P[i is picked∣Ti,si=s]=z(i,s)\mathbb P[i\text{ is picked}\mid T_i,s_i=s]=z(i,s)P[i is picked∣Ti​,si​=s]=z(i,s).
  6. Proposition 10 (p. 10): under NF and HI, every feasible zzz is realized by a memoryless policy with winning probability Obj\mathsf{Obj}Obj.

Significance

Theorem 8 reduces the search for an optimal policy from functions of the entire history, whose number grows exponentially in nnn, to n⋅2⋅∣S∣n\cdot 2\cdot|\mathcal S|n⋅2⋅∣S∣ numbers, and with Propositions 9 and 10 it turns the problem into a linear program of polynomial size. The later sections of the paper build on it: threshold policies (§4), secretaries with samples (§5) and binary-classifier advice (§6) are all analysed through this LP. The examples satisfying NF and HI include the classical problem, the full-information problem, samples, and noisy classifier advice.

The paper gives a complete proof. As far as is known, none of it has been machine-checked, and Prove2Me has no formal model of secretary problems with advice. A formal development makes precise the parts the paper's argument leaves informal: the handling of conditioning on null events, of randomized policies, and of the existence of an optimum.

Difficulty

The obvious argument replaces a general policy by its conditional stopping probability given (Ti,si)(T_i,s_i)(Ti​,si​). This fails directly: the probability of reaching round iii depends on the whole history, so averaging the decision at round iii changes the distribution of the earlier stopping events, and the winning probability with it. The paper therefore goes through the LP. The variables z(i,s)z(i,s)z(i,s) summarize a policy, NF is what makes constraint (4) depend only on the distribution and not on the policy, and HI is what makes the objective linear in zzz. The reverse direction, Proposition 10, rebuilds a policy from zzz through an induction over rounds in which the survival probability must be tracked exactly.

Formalization scope

  • Finite outcome space. Secretaries and ranks are Fin n, 0-based: Lean secretary iii is the paper's i+1i+1i+1, and Lean rank n−1n-1n−1 is the paper's top rank nnn. The signal space SSS is a finite type, so every probability is a finite sum. Continuous signals (the paper's Example 2, S=R\mathcal S=\mathbb RS=R) and the non-NF Example 11 are out of scope. Ties are allowed, as in §2.
  • Information and policies. The information at round iii is the comparison table ra≤rbr_a\le r_bra​≤rb​ for a,b≤ia,b\le ia,b≤i together with the signals s0,…,sis_0,\dots,s_is0​,…,si​. A policy is a function of this information only and never sees the outcome. Policies are randomized, with values in [0,1][0,1][0,1]; the competitors in Theorem 8 range over all of them.
  • Conditioning. NF, HI, (2), (3) and the reconstruction claim are written cross-multiplied, so a null conditioning event imposes nothing. c(i,s,j,s′)c(i,s,j,s')c(i,s,j,s′) is a quotient that Lean sets to 000 when P[Ti,si=s]=0\mathbb P[T_i,s_i=s]=0P[Ti​,si​=s]=0; there a(i,s)=0a(i,s)=0a(i,s)=0, so the objective is unaffected.
  • Optimality is stated as existence of a valid memoryless policy that beats every valid policy, not as a supremum. The paper presupposes that an optimum exists; with SSS finite it does.
  • Departures from the page. Proposition 10 additionally asserts that the realizing policy is memoryless; this is the proof of Theorem 8's own observation about the policy (6). Proposition 9 is stated for every policy, as printed.
  • Not trivial. A Memoryless predicate that allowed dependence on the whole information, or a winning probability without the survival product, would make the goal empty. Neither is used here: a memoryless policy is a function of (i,1Ti,si)(i,\mathbf 1_{T_i},s_i)(i,1Ti​​,si​) only, and the winning probability includes ∏j<i(1−qj)\prod_{j<i}(1-q_j)∏j<i​(1−qj​).
  • Welcome contributions. Lemmas on the finite probability calculus (prob, expectOn, cross-multiplied conditioning) and the identity ∏j<i(1−qj)=1−∑j<iqj∏k<j(1−qk)\prod_{j<i}(1-q_j)=1-\sum_{j<i}q_j\prod_{k<j}(1-q_k)∏j<i​(1−qj​)=1−∑j<i​qj​∏k<j​(1−qk​) are reusable well beyond this mission. Proving the milestones in the order listed follows the paper's proof. The running time of the LP and the paper's plots are out of scope.

Selected references

  • P. Dütting, S. Lattanzi, R. Paes Leme, S. Vassilvitskii, Secretaries with Advice, arXiv:2011.06726v1, 2020; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.06726
  • E. B. Dynkin, The optimum choice of the instant for stopping a Markov process, Soviet Mathematics Doklady 4, 1963.
  • J. P. Gilbert, F. Mosteller, Recognizing the maximum of a sequence, Journal of the American Statistical Association 61, 1966. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1966.10502008
  • N. Buchbinder, K. Jain, M. Singh, Secretary problems via linear programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 39(1), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2013.0604
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Secretaries with Advice 4: With Advice from a Binary Classifier, a Threshold Policy Is OptimalResearch Paper

Why binary advice matters

The classical secretary problem asks a decision maker to choose the best of nnn candidates arriving in random order. A decision must be made when each candidate arrives, before later candidates are seen. In the classical model the decision maker sees only comparisons with earlier candidates. In hiring and selection, a prediction system may also classify an arriving candidate as promising or unpromising. The question is then whether the entire history of comparisons and predictions must be retained to make an optimal decision. Dütting, Lattanzi, Paes Leme, and Vassilvitskii study this question for several advice models in Secretaries with Advice. This mission concerns their binary-classifier model and the structural conclusion of Theorem 19: two signal-dependent time thresholds suffice.

The no-information secretary problem is a special case in which the signal says YYY and NNN with equal probability regardless of candidate quality. A separate classical cutoff-rule problem on Prove2Me addresses a deterministic rule for that special case; the present target covers informative and uninformative classifiers and compares with randomized policies that may use all observed history. The result is known mathematically in the cited paper. The task here is to give its probability model and the structural theorem precise, checkable statements in Lean.

Setting

There are n≥1n\geq1n≥1 candidates. Their ranks are a uniformly random permutation of {1,…,n}\{1,\ldots,n\}{1,…,n}, with rank nnn uniquely best. At round iii, the decision maker learns how candidate iii compares with all earlier candidates and receives a binary signal si∈{Y,N}s_i\in\{Y,N\}si​∈{Y,N}. The classifier has recall ppp: the best candidate receives YYY with probability ppp. It has specificity p′p'p′: every other candidate receives NNN with probability p′p'p′. Both parameters lie in [1/2,1][1/2,1][1/2,1]. Conditional on the ranks, signals across candidates are independent, as used by the paper's calculation of the signal-history distribution in Example 5 and Section 2.2. The decision maker never observes absolute ranks.

A policy assigns a stopping probability between zero and one to every possible information state at every round. Its information consists of all relative comparisons among candidates seen so far and all signals seen so far. Once it stops, it cannot act again. It wins if it stops at the unique candidate of rank nnn. The winning probability therefore includes the probability of continuing through all earlier rounds. A candidate is best so far when its rank is at least that of every previously seen candidate.

A threshold policy chooses two rounds tY,tN∈{1,…,n}t_Y,t_N\in\{1,\ldots,n\}tY​,tN​∈{1,…,n}. It accepts the first best-so-far candidate arriving at or after tYt_YtY​ if the current signal is YYY, or at or after tNt_NtN​ if it is NNN. A policy can finish without selecting anyone; that outcome loses. Thresholds govern when a signal becomes acceptable, while the best-so-far condition still depends on the observed comparisons.

Formalization targets

The goal is Theorem 19. For every positive nnn and every p,p′∈[1/2,1]p,p'\in[1/2,1]p,p′∈[1/2,1], there are thresholds tY,tNt_Y,t_NtY​,tN​ such that, for every valid randomized history-dependent policy qqq,

\Pr(\text{win under }q) \leq \Pr(\text{win under threshold}$t_Y,t_N$).

The thresholds are chosen once for the model, before the competing policy qqq. Their order is not constrained by this theorem. The later asymptotic result, Theorem 20, studies the positions and relative order of thresholds and belongs to a separate mission.

The supporting targets follow the paper's route to this conclusion. Section 2.2 computes the chance that the current candidate is globally best after an observed information state. Section 6 identifies the binary model's factor-revealing linear program. Appendix C asserts that its backward-defined dual vector is monotone in time and optimal among dual-feasible vectors. Proposition 12 converts those dual properties into an optimal threshold policy. Each statement concerns the same (n,p,p′)(n,p,p')(n,p,p′) model fixed above.

What the result supplies

The theorem reduces an optimization over policies that can use every past comparison and signal to a search over two time thresholds. It says that remembering the earlier signals and relative-order pattern cannot increase the achievable chance of selecting the best candidate once the two thresholds are chosen. This is a structural result about policy form; it does not give the numerical values of the best thresholds or their large-nnn performance. The paper treats those questions separately in Theorem 20.

A formal development would also give reusable finite objects: a joint rank-and-signal probability model, the information available to an online policy, an exact winning-probability expression, and the primal and dual programs for binary advice. The target theorems in this proposal are open Lean statements with sorry; compilation checks their types, not their proofs. The paper supplies mathematical arguments, while the machine-checked proofs remain work for solvers. The local published uniform-average definition for rank permutations is relevant prior art, but this model uses its own weighted outcome sum because it also averages over the dependent signal law.

Where the difficulty lies

The available history is much larger than a pair of thresholds: it includes all earlier classifier outputs and the complete relative order observed so far. A direct comparison of a given policy with a threshold policy must account for the chance that the policy would already have stopped at an earlier round. Simply comparing the current stopping probabilities does not preserve the winning probability. The paper organizes those reach probabilities through a finite linear program and examines a dual vector defined backward from the last round. The remaining difficulty is to connect the properties of that vector to a policy with the claimed stopping behavior, including parameter values where some constraints are tight at equality.

Formalization scope

Lean uses Fin n for rounds and ranks. Its index zero is the paper's round one; formulas containing (1/i) use a natural round number in {1,…,n}\{1,\ldots,n\}{1,…,n}. Bool.true represents YYY. Every rank order is a permutation, so there are no ties. Each outcome weight is (1/n!) times the product of the conditional signal likelihoods. All expectations and event masses are finite sums, and conditional-probability claims are stated by cross-multiplying event masses, including at information states of zero probability. The LP is indexed only by positive rounds, so its divisions by iii and nnn have the intended values.

The universal competitor in Theorem 19 is a randomized policy whose input contains only observed comparisons and signals. Its winning probability has an explicit product of continuation probabilities over earlier rounds. This restriction and product prevent the result from becoming trivial by allowing the policy to see the future, identify the global best rank, or stop more than once. The parameter interval and n≥1n\geq1n≥1 are explicit hypotheses. The printed conditional-probability fractions in Section 2.2 omit a factor of the current round iii; the formal milestone uses the corrected value and records the discrepancy. The classifier's ppp is recall as defined in Example 5, despite a later use of the word “precision” in Section 6.

The scope includes the finite probability model, its LP coefficients, the greedy dual vector, and the optimality bridge. Solvers can contribute proofs of the event identities, dual feasibility and optimality, and the threshold conclusion. Running-time claims for an LP algorithm, plots, and Theorem 20's asymptotic limit are outside this mission.

Selected references

  • Paul Dütting, Silvio Lattanzi, Renato Paes Leme, and Sergei Vassilvitskii, Secretaries with Advice, arXiv preprint arXiv:2011.06726v1, 2020; later published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024. Pinned preprint.
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Secretaries with Advice 2: With k Samples, a Threshold Policy Is Optimal for Selecting the Best of n SecretariesResearch Paper

Motivation

In the classical secretary problem, nnn candidates with distinct qualities arrive in uniformly random order; after each arrival one sees only how the current candidate compares with those already seen, and must irrevocably accept or reject. The goal is to accept the best candidate. Dynkin's rule (skip roughly n/en/en/e candidates, then accept the first one better than all before it) succeeds with probability about 1/e1/e1/e, and nothing does better.

A natural question in online decision-making with data is how much prior samples help. Kaplan, Naori and Raz (SODA 2020) introduced a model in which an adversary writes down n+kn+kn+k numbers, a uniformly random kkk of them are revealed in advance as samples, and the remaining nnn arrive online in random order. Correa et al. (SODA 2021) studied the probability of selecting the maximum in a related independent-sampling model. Dütting, Lattanzi, Paes Leme and Vassilvitskii (arXiv:2011.06726, Mathematics of Operations Research 2024) place this model inside a general framework of secretaries with advice, where each arrival carries a signal, and prove that with kkk samples the optimal policy has a simple threshold form.

Timeline:

  • 1963: Dynkin, optimal rule for the classical problem (the case k=0k=0k=0).
  • 1966: Gilbert and Mosteller (JASA), full-information variants and threshold rules depending on the observed value.
  • 2014: Buchbinder, Jain and Singh (Math. Oper. Res.), a linear program whose value is the optimal success probability of secretary problems.
  • 2020: Kaplan, Naori and Raz, the sample model used here; Dütting et al., Theorem 16: threshold policies are optimal for every nnn and kkk.

Setting

Fix integers n≥1n\ge1n≥1 and k≥0k\ge0k≥0. Only the relative order of the n+kn+kn+k numbers matters, so an outcome is a uniformly random permutation σ\sigmaσ of k+nk+nk+n positions, read as position ↦\mapsto↦ value rank. The first kkk positions are the samples; position k+ik+ik+i holds the secretary of round iii.

  • The signal si∈S={0,1,…,k}s_i\in\mathcal S=\{0,1,\dots,k\}si​∈S={0,1,…,k} is the number of samples worse than secretary iii.
  • The best-so-far event TiT_iTi​ says that secretary iii beats every earlier secretary.
  • The event ri=nr_i=nri​=n says that secretary iii is the best of the nnn secretaries (samples do not count).
  • The information at round iii is the relative order of the samples and secretaries 1,…,i1,\dots,i1,…,i.
  • A policy qqq gives, in each round, a stopping probability qi(x)∈[0,1]q_i(x)\in[0,1]qi​(x)∈[0,1] that is a function of the information xxx only. Its winning probability is
win(q)=E[∑i=1n1[ri=n] qi(xi)∏j<i(1−qj(xj))].\mathrm{win}(q)=\mathbb E\Big[\sum_{i=1}^n \mathbf 1[r_i=n]\,q_i(x_i)\prod_{j<i}\big(1-q_j(x_j)\big)\Big].win(q)=E[i=1∑n​1[ri​=n]qi​(xi​)j<i∏​(1−qj​(xj​))].
  • A threshold policy is given by t:S→[n]t:\mathcal S\to[n]t:S→[n]: stop at τ=min⁡{i:Ti and i≥t(si)}\tau=\min\{i: T_i \text{ and } i\ge t(s_i)\}τ=min{i:Ti​ and i≥t(si​)}.

The proof passes through a linear program with variables z(i,s)z(i,s)z(i,s) and coefficients

a(i,s)=1k+1∏t=1n−1s+tk+t+1,c(i,s,j,s′)=1s+1∏t=1j−1s′+ts+t+1  (s′≤s),a(i,s)=\frac{1}{k+1}\prod_{t=1}^{n-1}\frac{s+t}{k+t+1},\qquad c(i,s,j,s')=\frac{1}{s+1}\prod_{t=1}^{j-1}\frac{s'+t}{s+t+1}\ \ (s'\le s),a(i,s)=k+11​t=1∏n−1​k+t+1s+t​,c(i,s,j,s′)=s+11​t=1∏j−1​s+t+1s′+t​  (s′≤s),

its dual with variables u(i,s)u(i,s)u(i,s), and the greedy dual solution (8), computed backwards from u(n,s)=a(n,s)u(n,s)=a(n,s)u(n,s)=a(n,s).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 16

∀n≥1, ∀k,∃ t:{0,…,k}→[n],∀q valid,win(q)≤win(τt).\forall n\ge1,\ \forall k,\quad \exists\, t:\{0,\dots,k\}\to[n],\quad \forall q\ \text{valid},\quad \mathrm{win}(q)\le \mathrm{win}(\tau_t).∀n≥1, ∀k,∃t:{0,…,k}→[n],∀q valid,win(q)≤win(τt​).

The goal asserts only the shape of the optimal policy, not the thresholds' values or the optimal winning probability. The milestones follow the paper's proof:

  1. The samples model satisfies Non-Filtering and History-Irrelevance (Definitions 6–7), and the LP coefficients aaa and ccc have the closed forms above (§5).
  2. Policies and LP solutions correspond (Propositions 9 and 10 for this model, together with the remark that only best-so-far stops matter).
  3. Lemma 15, a discrete integration identity for rising products.
  4. Claims (i) and (ii) of the proof of Theorem 16 about the perturbation Δ\DeltaΔ and its cumulative effect RiR_iRi​.
  5. The greedy dual solution is optimal and non-decreasing in iii.
  6. Proposition 12 for the samples LP: these two facts give a primal optimum of threshold shape.

Significance

The result. Theorem 16 reduces an optimal stopping problem over all history-dependent randomized policies, whose information is a full relative order of up to n+kn+kn+k items, to choosing k+1k+1k+1 integers. The greedy dual recursion computes them in polynomial time, which makes the optimal success probability computable for every nnn and kkk and underlies the numerical curves of the paper. For k=0k=0k=0 the theorem recovers the optimality of Dynkin-type cutoff rules.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper (main text plus Appendix A), but no machine-checked version exists. A formalization produces a verified LP characterization of a secretary problem with signals, a reusable discrete-integration lemma, and a checked instance of the general principle "greedy dual optimal and monotone implies threshold optimal". The classical special case is posed separately on the platform as the open item ClassicalSecretary.exists_optimal_cutoffRule (deterministic rank-only rules, k=0k=0k=0). This mission does not restate it.

Difficulty

The obvious approach is backward induction over information states: compute the value of continuing and compare it with the probability that the current secretary is best. The difficulty is that the information is a relative order of the samples and all secretaries seen so far, and showing that the stop region is an upper set in iii for each signal requires controlling continuation values across exponentially many states. The paper avoids this through a linear program. The hard steps are the exact probability computations behind aaa and ccc (and behind Non-Filtering and History-Irrelevance) and the optimality of the greedy dual. The perturbation argument for that optimality needs the closed form of Δ\DeltaΔ and a telescoping sum (Lemma 15). Monotonicity of the greedy solution does not follow from monotonicity of the coefficients alone, because the recursion subtracts a sum over later rounds.

Formalization scope

  • Outcomes are permutations Equiv.Perm (Fin (k + n)), read as position ↦ value rank, with the uniform distribution. Probabilities are finite counts divided by (k+n)!(k+n)!(k+n)!, never integrals. The adversary's numbers are taken distinct.
  • Rounds are 0-based in Lean (Fin n): Lean round iii is the paper's round i+1i+1i+1. The LP and its objects use 1-based natural indices i∈[1,n]i\in[1,n]i∈[1,n] and signals s∈{0,…,k}s\in\{0,\dots,k\}s∈{0,…,k}, as printed.
  • Information at round iii is the full table of comparisons among the first k+i+1k+i+1k+i+1 positions. Policies are typed on it, not on the outcome. A policy that could read the outcome could stop at the maximum and would trivialize the goal.
  • Policies are randomized (values in [0,1][0,1][0,1]) and history-dependent. Competitors are not restricted to deterministic or memoryless rules; the threshold function satisfies 1≤t(s)≤n1\le t(s)\le n1≤t(s)≤n.
  • Winning probability includes the survival product ∏j<i(1−qj)\prod_{j<i}(1-q_j)∏j<i​(1−qj​), so stopping happens at most once.
  • Conditional probabilities (Non-Filtering, History-Irrelevance, ccc) are stated cross-multiplied, so no quotient by a null probability occurs.
  • Disclosed additions: n≥1n\ge1n≥1 in Theorem 16 and Proposition 12; i∗≥2i^*\ge2i∗≥2 and δ≥0\delta\ge0δ≥0 in claim (ii); in Proposition 9, the policy stops only on best-so-far rounds, which the separate reduction item shows is without loss. Proposition 10 carries a second part: a threshold-shaped LP solution is achieved by the threshold policy itself.
  • Out of scope: the polynomial-time algorithm remark (p. 17), Figure 2, Corollary 18, and the explicit dual solution of Theorem 17, which is a separate mission of this series.
  • The definitions needed are elementary: permutations, finite sums and products, well-founded recursion for the greedy solution and for Δ\DeltaΔ. Lemma 15 and the LP-level claims are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone are welcome. The LP-level milestones (Lemma 15, claims (i)–(ii), greedy optimality and monotonicity) do not depend on the probabilistic model.

Selected references

  • P. Dütting, S. Lattanzi, R. Paes Leme, S. Vassilvitskii, Secretaries with Advice, arXiv:2011.06726v1, 2020; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.06726
  • H. Kaplan, D. Naori, D. Raz, Competitive Analysis with a Sample and the Secretary Problem, SODA 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.05350
  • J. Correa, A. Cristi, L. Feuilloley, T. Oosterwijk, A. Tsigonias-Dimitriadis, The Secretary Problem with Independent Sampling, SODA 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.07869
  • N. Buchbinder, K. Jain, M. Singh, Secretary Problems via Linear Programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 39(1):190–206, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2013.0604
  • J. P. Gilbert, F. Mosteller, Recognizing the Maximum of a Sequence, Journal of the American Statistical Association 61:35–73, 1966. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1966.10502008
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Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach II: In Binary Persuasion with a Convex Non-Adoption Region the Convex Program Reduces to a Linear Program over Ω ∪ K₀₁Research Paper

Motivation

In Bayesian persuasion a sender who observes the state of the world commits to a signaling scheme, a receiver updates her belief by Bayes' rule and acts, and the sender chooses the scheme that maximizes her own expected payoff (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011). The classical theory assumes the receiver maximizes expected utility, so her payoff is linear in her belief. Many applications violate this: a customer who joins a queue only if the mean of her waiting time plus a multiple of its standard deviation is below a threshold, a commuter who values route reliability, a buyer who dislikes uncertainty about a product. Anunrojwong, Iyer and Lingenbrink (arXiv:2208.03758v3) call such receivers risk-conscious: the receiver's utility ρ(μ,a)\rho(\mu,a)ρ(μ,a) of action aaa at belief μ\muμ is an arbitrary function of μ\muμ.

The paper's first result reduces the sender's problem, an optimization over distributions of posteriors, to a finite-dimensional convex program (program (7)). This mission concerns its second main result: in the practically important binary persuasion setting (two actions, the sender always weakly prefers action 111), when the region of beliefs at which the receiver rejects action 111 is convex, program (7) collapses further to a linear program whose feasible region is the convex hull of finitely many explicit beliefs.

Setting

Let Ω\OmegaΩ be a finite set of states and Δ(Ω)⊆RΩ\Delta(\Omega)\subseteq\mathbb R^{\Omega}Δ(Ω)⊆RΩ the simplex of beliefs, with the Euclidean topology. For ω∈Ω\omega\in\Omegaω∈Ω, eωe_\omegaeω​ is the point-mass belief at ω\omegaω; states are identified with their point masses. The prior is μ∗∈Δ(Ω)\mu^*\in\Delta(\Omega)μ∗∈Δ(Ω). The receiver has actions A={0,1}A=\{0,1\}A={0,1} and utility ρ(μ,a)\rho(\mu,a)ρ(μ,a). The optimality regions are

Pa={μ∈Δ(Ω): a∈arg⁡max⁡a′∈Aρ(μ,a′)},P_a=\{\mu\in\Delta(\Omega):\ a\in\arg\max_{a'\in A}\rho(\mu,a')\},Pa​={μ∈Δ(Ω): a∈arga′∈Amax​ρ(μ,a′)},

and the differential utility is ρ^(μ)=ρ(μ,1)−ρ(μ,0)\hat\rho(\mu)=\rho(\mu,1)-\rho(\mu,0)ρ^​(μ)=ρ(μ,1)−ρ(μ,0), so P1={ρ^≥0}P_1=\{\hat\rho\ge 0\}P1​={ρ^​≥0} and P0={ρ^≤0}P_0=\{\hat\rho\le 0\}P0​={ρ^​≤0} inside Δ(Ω)\Delta(\Omega)Δ(Ω). The sender's utility is v(ω,a)v(\omega,a)v(ω,a) with v(ω,1)≥v(ω,0)v(\omega,1)\ge v(\omega,0)v(ω,1)≥v(ω,0) for every ω\omegaω.

Two assumptions are used.

  • Assumption 1 (standing throughout the paper): P0P_0P0​ and P1P_1P1​ are closed.
  • Assumption 2: the non-adoption region P1c={μ∈Δ(Ω):ρ^(μ)<0}P_1^c=\{\mu\in\Delta(\Omega):\hat\rho(\mu)<0\}P1c​={μ∈Δ(Ω):ρ^​(μ)<0} is convex.

From these data the paper builds finitely many beliefs. K1={ω:eω∈P1}K_1=\{\omega: e_\omega\in P_1\}K1​={ω:eω​∈P1​} and K0={ω:eω∈P0}K_0=\{\omega:e_\omega\in P_0\}K0​={ω:eω​∈P0​} are the states where action 111, respectively 000, is optimal under full information, and L0=K0∖K1L_0=K_0\setminus K_1L0​=K0​∖K1​ the states where action 000 is uniquely optimal. For ω0∈L0\omega_0\in L_0ω0​∈L0​ and ω1∈K1\omega_1\in K_1ω1​∈K1​,

γ(ω0,ω1)=sup⁡{g∈[0,1]: geω0+(1−g)eω1∈P1},χ(ω0,ω1)=γ(ω0,ω1)eω0+(1−γ(ω0,ω1))eω1,\gamma(\omega_0,\omega_1)=\sup\{g\in[0,1]:\ g e_{\omega_0}+(1-g)e_{\omega_1}\in P_1\},\qquad \chi(\omega_0,\omega_1)=\gamma(\omega_0,\omega_1)e_{\omega_0}+(1-\gamma(\omega_0,\omega_1))e_{\omega_1},γ(ω0​,ω1​)=sup{g∈[0,1]: geω0​​+(1−g)eω1​​∈P1​},χ(ω0​,ω1​)=γ(ω0​,ω1​)eω0​​+(1−γ(ω0​,ω1​))eω1​​,

the mixture of ω0\omega_0ω0​ and ω1\omega_1ω1​ with the most weight on ω0\omega_0ω0​ at which action 111 is still optimal, and K01={χ(ω0,ω1):ω0∈L0, ω1∈K1}K_{01}=\{\chi(\omega_0,\omega_1):\omega_0\in L_0,\ \omega_1\in K_1\}K01​={χ(ω0​,ω1​):ω0​∈L0​, ω1​∈K1​}.

A candidate solution is a pair t=(t0,t1)t=(t_0,t_1)t=(t0​,t1​) of vectors in RΩ\mathbb R^{\Omega}RΩ, with ta(ω)t_a(\omega)ta​(ω) the joint probability of state ω\omegaω and action aaa. The sender's objective is ∑ωv(ω,1)t1(ω)+v(ω,0)t0(ω)\sum_\omega v(\omega,1)t_1(\omega)+v(\omega,0)t_0(\omega)∑ω​v(ω,1)t1​(ω)+v(ω,0)t0​(ω). Program (7) maximizes it subject to t0+t1=μ∗t_0+t_1=\mu^*t0​+t1​=μ∗ and ta∈Conv⁡(Pa∪{0})t_a\in\operatorname{Conv}(P_a\cup\{0\})ta​∈Conv(Pa​∪{0}); program (10) subject to t0+t1=μ∗t_0+t_1=\mu^*t0​+t1​=μ∗, t1∈Conv⁡(K1∪K01∪{0})t_1\in\operatorname{Conv}(K_1\cup K_{01}\cup\{0\})t1​∈Conv(K1​∪K01​∪{0}) and t0∈Conv⁡(L0∪{0})t_0\in\operatorname{Conv}(L_0\cup\{0\})t0​∈Conv(L0​∪{0}).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

Under Assumptions 1 and 2, with v(ω,1)≥v(ω,0)v(\omega,1)\ge v(\omega,0)v(ω,1)≥v(ω,0) for all ω\omegaω:

(i)  t feasible for (10)⇒t feasible for (7);(ii)  t feasible for (7)⇒∃ t′ feasible for (10),  obj(t)≤obj(t′).\text{(i)}\ \ t \text{ feasible for (10)} \Rightarrow t \text{ feasible for (7)};\qquad \text{(ii)}\ \ t \text{ feasible for (7)} \Rightarrow \exists\, t' \text{ feasible for (10)},\ \ \text{obj}(t)\le\text{obj}(t').(i)  t feasible for (10)⇒t feasible for (7);(ii)  t feasible for (7)⇒∃t′ feasible for (10),  obj(t)≤obj(t′).

Together these say that (7) and (10) have the same optimal value and every optimal solution of (10) is optimal for (7): (7) "can be optimized by solving" (10).

Milestones

  1. χ(ω0,ω1)∈P0∩P1\chi(\omega_0,\omega_1)\in P_0\cap P_1χ(ω0​,ω1​)∈P0​∩P1​ for ω0∈L0\omega_0\in L_0ω0​∈L0​, ω1∈K1\omega_1\in K_1ω1​∈K1​ (Section 5.1, under Assumption 1).
  2. Lemma 6: Δ(Ω)=Conv⁡(L0∪K01)∪Conv⁡(K1∪K01)\Delta(\Omega)=\operatorname{Conv}(L_0\cup K_{01})\cup\operatorname{Conv}(K_1\cup K_{01})Δ(Ω)=Conv(L0​∪K01​)∪Conv(K1​∪K01​), with no assumption on ρ\rhoρ.
  3. Lemma 7: under Assumption 2, Conv⁡(P1)=Conv⁡(K1∪K01)\operatorname{Conv}(P_1)=\operatorname{Conv}(K_1\cup K_{01})Conv(P1​)=Conv(K1​∪K01​).

Further results on the same objects

  • Lemma 3: if ρ^\hat\rhoρ^​ is quasiconvex on Δ(Ω)\Delta(\Omega)Δ(Ω), Assumption 2 holds.
  • Proposition 3: if v(ω,1)−v(ω,0)=vˉ>0v(\omega,1)-v(\omega,0)=\bar v>0v(ω,1)−v(ω,0)=vˉ>0 for all ω\omegaω and a strict total order ≺\prec≺ satisfies the monotonicity Assumption 3, every optimal solution of (10) has a threshold ω0∈L0\omega_0\in L_0ω0​∈L0​ with t1(ω)=μ∗(ω)t_1(\omega)=\mu^*(\omega)t1​(ω)=μ∗(ω) for ω≺ω0\omega\prec\omega_0ω≺ω0​ and t1(ω)=0t_1(\omega)=0t1​(ω)=0 for ω0≺ω\omega_0\prec\omegaω0​≺ω.
  • With strict preference v(ω,1)>v(ω,0)v(\omega,1)>v(\omega,0)v(ω,1)>v(ω,0) for all ω\omegaω, every optimal solution of (7) is feasible for (10).

Significance

Theorem 3 replaces an optimization over a convex set described only implicitly through ρ\rhoρ by a linear program over an explicit polytope. It identifies a canonical signal set: irrespective of the prior, an optimal scheme only needs to induce beliefs in Ω∪K01\Omega\cup K_{01}Ω∪K01​, that is, either reveal the state or leave the receiver uncertain between one state of L0L_0L0​ and one of K1K_1K1​. Lemma 7 gives a simple full-persuasion test, μ∗∈Conv⁡(K1∪K01)\mu^*\in\operatorname{Conv}(K_1\cup K_{01})μ∗∈Conv(K1​∪K01​), and Proposition 3 a threshold structure of the induced actions that the paper uses in its queueing application. For expected-utility receivers the corresponding statements reduce to classical facts about concavification; the content here is that they survive non-linear utilities under a single convexity condition.

On the formal side, the results are proved in the paper and nothing about them is machine-checked. A complete development would give a verified reduction of a family of non-linear persuasion problems to linear programs, and a reusable library of convex-hull facts on the simplex (decompositions of the simplex into hulls of point masses and segment points). The formalization also corrects the paper at one point: the proof of Theorem 3 asserts that every optimal solution of (7) is feasible for (10), which fails when the sender is indifferent between actions in some state; the goal is stated in the form the proof establishes.

Difficulty

The inclusion of (10)'s feasible region in (7)'s is immediate once K01⊆P1K_{01}\subseteq P_1K01​⊆P1​. The content lies in the converse: P1P_1P1​ is an arbitrary closed set whose complement in the simplex is convex, and one must show that every point of P1P_1P1​ is a convex combination of point masses in K1K_1K1​ and the boundary points χ(ω0,ω1)\chi(\omega_0,\omega_1)χ(ω0​,ω1​) on the edges of the simplex. The natural first idea, to argue with extreme points of Conv⁡(P1)\operatorname{Conv}(P_1)Conv(P1​), does not work directly: P1P_1P1​ need not be convex, its convex hull need not be closed a priori, and the extreme points of P1P_1P1​ are not in general on edges of the simplex. Assumption 2 constrains only the complement of P1P_1P1​, so it has to be transported to a statement about P1P_1P1​ itself. A second difficulty is that t0t_0t0​ in a solution of (7) may put weight on states in K0∩K1K_0\cap K_1K0​∩K1​ or on interior beliefs, and it must be moved to t1t_1t1​ without lowering the objective.

Formalization scope

  • Beliefs are functions Ω → ℝ with [Fintype Ω] [DecidableEq Ω]; Δ(Ω)\Delta(\Omega)Δ(Ω) is Mathlib's stdSimplex ℝ Ω; eωe_\omegaeω​ is Pi.single ω 1; actions are Fin 2; Conv⁡\operatorname{Conv}Conv is convexHull ℝ; 000 is the zero vector.
  • The receiver's utility is ρ : (Ω → ℝ) → Fin 2 → ℝ, and PaP_aPa​ is defined from it by Eq. (1), intersected with the simplex; values of ρ off the simplex are irrelevant. Assumption 1 is IsClosed (P ρ a) for both actions.
  • K0,K1,L0K_0,K_1,L_0K0​,K1​,L0​ are sets of states; they enter convex hulls through their images under eee. γ\gammaγ is a real sSup, used only for ω0∈L0\omega_0\in L_0ω0​∈L0​, ω1∈K1\omega_1\in K_1ω1​∈K1​, where the set contains 000 and is bounded by 111.
  • Programs (7) and (10) are feasibility predicates on t : Fin 2 → Ω → ℝ with a common objective. Theorem 3 is stated as (i) and (ii) above, never through a supremum of objective values. A formalization in which (10) only needs to have some feasible point, or in which the supremum of an empty or unbounded set of values is compared, would be trivial or meaningless and is not the target.
  • Proposition 3 takes the order of Assumption 3 as a relation given with the data, and assumes L0≠∅L_0\neq\emptysetL0​=∅, which the paper uses implicitly.
  • Needed infrastructure: convex hulls of finite sets of point masses in the simplex, Carathéodory-type finite decompositions (available in Mathlib), and the decomposition of a convex combination along a segment. Proofs of the milestones, alternative proofs of Lemma 7 (for example by a separation argument), and proofs of the further results are all welcome.

Selected references

  • Anunrojwong, J., Iyer, K., Lingenbrink, D., Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach, arXiv:2208.03758v3, 2023 (journal version: Operations Research, 2024). https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.03758v3
  • Kamenica, E., Gentzkow, M., Bayesian Persuasion, American Economic Review 101(6), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2590
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Ride-Hailing Networks with Strategic Drivers: The Impact of Platform Control Capabilities on Performance: Centralized Control Has a Unique Driver Equilibrium and the Two-Step Solution Is OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

Ride-hailing platforms such as Uber and Lyft match riders with self-scheduling drivers who decide for themselves whether to work. Two features make capacity planning on such a platform different from classical fleet management. Demand is spatially imbalanced: more trips start in some locations than end there, so cars accumulate where they are not needed unless they drive back empty. And capacity is endogenous: the number of participating drivers depends on what drivers expect to earn, which in turn depends on how the platform uses them.

Afèche, Liu and Maglaras (MSOM 2023) study how much a platform gains from two operational controls under these conditions: admission control (rejecting some ride requests, depending on destination) and centralized repositioning (directing idle drivers to move empty between locations). The benchmark of their comparison is the regime in which the platform has both controls, called centralized control (regime CCC). This mission formalizes the paper's characterization of that benchmark: how a fixed number of drivers should be allocated, what each driver then earns, and why the resulting driver equilibrium is the platform's optimum.

Setting

There are two locations and four routes lklklk, l,k∈{1,2}l,k\in\{1,2\}l,k∈{1,2}. Route lklklk has potential demand rate Λlk\Lambda_{lk}Λlk​ and travel time tlk>0t_{lk}>0tlk​>0. The price is ppp per unit of travel time; the platform keeps a share γ∈(0,1)\gamma\in(0,1)γ∈(0,1) and drivers keep γˉp\bar\gamma pγˉ​p, with γˉ=1−γ\bar\gamma=1-\gammaγˉ​=1−γ, while paying a driving cost rate ccc, with γˉp−c>0\bar\gamma p-c>0γˉ​p−c>0. Demand is imbalanced: 0<Λ12<Λ210<\Lambda_{12}<\Lambda_{21}0<Λ12​<Λ21​ (Assumption 1). Repositioning is profitable: c t12<t21(γˉp−c)c\,t_{12}<t_{21}(\bar\gamma p-c)ct12​<t21​(γˉ​p−c) and c t21<t12(γˉp−c)c\,t_{21}<t_{12}(\bar\gamma p-c)ct21​<t12​(γˉ​p−c) (Assumption 2).

A pool of NNN potential drivers has opportunity cost rates drawn from a continuous distribution with CDF FFF, strictly increasing on [0,cˉo][0,\bar c_o][0,cˉo​] with cˉo≥p−c\bar c_o\ge p-ccˉo​≥p−c, F(0)=0F(0)=0F(0)=0 and F(cˉo)=1F(\bar c_o)=1F(cˉo​)=1 (Assumption 3). If drivers expect a profit rate π\piπ, then n=NF(π)n=NF(\pi)n=NF(π) of them participate.

In steady state the platform splits a driver capacity nnn into service capacity slk≤Slk:=Λlktlks_{lk}\le S_{lk}:=\Lambda_{lk}t_{lk}slk​≤Slk​:=Λlk​tlk​ on each route, repositioning capacity r12,r21r_{12},r_{21}r12​,r21​ (empty driving) and queueing capacity q1,q2q_1,q_2q1​,q2​ (idle drivers). With totals sˉ\bar ssˉ, rˉ\bar rrˉ, qˉ\bar qqˉ​ and Sˉ=∑lkSlk\bar S=\sum_{lk}S_{lk}Sˉ=∑lk​Slk​, the set CC(n)\mathcal C_C(n)CC​(n) of feasible allocations is

s12+r12t12=s21+r21t21,sˉ+rˉ+qˉ=n,0≤s≤S, r≥0, q≥0.\frac{s_{12}+r_{12}}{t_{12}}=\frac{s_{21}+r_{21}}{t_{21}},\qquad \bar s+\bar r+\bar q=n,\qquad 0\le s\le S,\ r\ge0,\ q\ge0 .t12​s12​+r12​​=t21​s21​+r21​​,sˉ+rˉ+qˉ​=n,0≤s≤S, r≥0, q≥0.

The first equation balances the flows of cars between the locations. The platform earns Π(s)=γpsˉ\Pi(s)=\gamma p\bar sΠ(s)=γpsˉ; each driver earns

π(s,r,n)=(γˉp−c)sˉ−crˉn.\pi(s,r,n)=\frac{(\bar\gamma p-c)\bar s-c\bar r}{n}.π(s,r,n)=n(γˉ​p−c)sˉ−crˉ​.

The platform's problem (13) maximizes Π(s)\Pi(s)Π(s) over (s,r,q,n)(s,r,q,n)(s,r,q,n) with (s,r,q)∈CC(n)(s,r,q)\in\mathcal C_C(n)(s,r,q)∈CC​(n) and the participation equation n=NF(π(s,r,n))n=NF(\pi(s,r,n))n=NF(π(s,r,n)); its value is ΠC∗\Pi^*_CΠC∗​.

The paper solves (13) in two steps. Step 1 fixes nnn, computes the maximal revenue ΠC(n)\Pi_C(n)ΠC​(n) over CC(n)\mathcal C_C(n)CC​(n), and among the revenue-maximizing allocations selects one that maximizes π\piπ, giving the per-driver profit πC(n)\pi_C(n)πC​(n). Step 2 solves nC=NF(πC(nC))n_C=NF(\pi_C(n_C))nC​=NF(πC​(nC​)). The constants

n1C:=Sˉ−(Λ21−Λ12)t21,n2C:=Sˉ+(Λ21−Λ12)t12n^C_1:=\bar S-(\Lambda_{21}-\Lambda_{12})t_{21},\qquad n^C_2:=\bar S+(\Lambda_{21}-\Lambda_{12})t_{12}n1C​:=Sˉ−(Λ21​−Λ12​)t21​,n2C​:=Sˉ+(Λ21​−Λ12​)t12​

split capacities into scarce, moderate and ample zones.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 1

πC continuous and nonincreasing on (0,∞), strictly decreasing on (n1C,∞);∃! nC>0: nC=NF(πC(nC));\pi_C \text{ continuous and nonincreasing on }(0,\infty),\ \text{strictly decreasing on }(n^C_1,\infty);\qquad \exists!\,n_C>0:\ n_C=NF(\pi_C(n_C));πC​ continuous and nonincreasing on (0,∞), strictly decreasing on (n1C​,∞);∃!nC​>0: nC​=NF(πC​(nC​)); πC(n)=max⁡(s,r,q)∈CC(n)π(s,r,n)(0<n≤N);ΠC∗=ΠC(nC), attained by the two-step tuple at nC.\pi_C(n)=\max_{(s,r,q)\in\mathcal C_C(n)}\pi(s,r,n)\quad(0<n\le N);\qquad \Pi^*_C=\Pi_C(n_C),\ \text{attained by the two-step tuple at } n_C .πC​(n)=(s,r,q)∈CC​(n)max​π(s,r,n)(0<n≤N);ΠC∗​=ΠC​(nC​), attained by the two-step tuple at nC​.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 1(1)–(3): the selected optimal allocation in each zone — sˉ=n\bar s=nsˉ=n, r=q=0r=q=0r=q=0 for n≤n1Cn\le n^C_1n≤n1C​; sˉ+r12=n\bar s+r_{12}=nsˉ+r12​=n with r12=t12t12+t21(n−n1C)r_{12}=\frac{t_{12}}{t_{12}+t_{21}}(n-n^C_1)r12​=t12​+t21​t12​​(n−n1C​), r21=0r_{21}=0r21​=0, q=0q=0q=0 for n1C<n≤n2Cn^C_1<n\le n^C_2n1C​<n≤n2C​; sˉ=Sˉ\bar s=\bar Ssˉ=Sˉ, r12=n2C−Sˉr_{12}=n^C_2-\bar Sr12​=n2C​−Sˉ, r21=0r_{21}=0r21​=0, qˉ=n−n2C\bar q=n-n^C_2qˉ​=n−n2C​ for n>n2Cn>n^C_2n>n2C​.
  2. Display (18): the closed form of πC(n)\pi_C(n)πC​(n) in the three zones.
  3. Lemma 1 at X=CX=CX=C: if πC\pi_CπC​ is driver-optimal (16) and nonincreasing, the two-step solution solves (13).

Significance

The corollary is what makes centralized control a usable benchmark. It says the platform's joint problem, which couples a linear program with a fixed-point equation in nnn, decomposes: the platform can optimize a fixed capacity and then let drivers settle, with no loss. Under the other regimes of the paper this alignment of platform and driver incentives can fail, and the paper's comparisons of regimes (value of admission control, value of repositioning) are measured against the regime-CCC optimum characterized here. Proposition 1 also makes explicit that a centralized platform keeps drivers idle only when all demand is served.

The paper's proofs are in its e-companion, which is not part of the source this mission cites; no machine-checked version of these results exists. The mission produces a checked parametric solution of a small linear program, a checked closed form of the per-driver profit, and a checked equilibrium-and-optimality argument, with every standing assumption made explicit.

Difficulty

Proposition 1 is a parametric linear program in eight variables, but stating its solution is not enough: each zone needs an upper bound on sˉ\bar ssˉ valid on all of CC(n)\mathcal C_C(n)CC​(n), and a second optimization (per-driver profit) over the set of revenue maximizers, which is not a singleton. Driver-optimality (16) is a separate claim about a different objective over the full set CC(n)\mathcal C_C(n)CC​(n); it holds only because Assumption 2 makes the capacity used for excess cross-location demand still profitable for drivers. Finally, Lemma 1 compares tuples of (13) at different capacities, which requires monotonicity of ΠC\Pi_CΠC​ and πC\pi_CπC​ in nnn and the participation equation at both capacities. The natural reading of "nC∗=nCn^*_C=n_CnC∗​=nC​" as uniqueness of the optimal capacity is false when nC>n2Cn_C>n^C_2nC​>n2C​, since wasteful repositioning can keep revenue γpSˉ\gamma p\bar SγpSˉ at a smaller capacity; the targets assert attainment instead.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace RideHailing.Central, in one definition file. Routes are named fields (Λ11 … Λ22, t11 … t22), not indexed. FFF is ProbabilityTheory.cdf μ of a measure μ on R\mathbb RR. The standing hypothesis Model.Standing bundles 0<γ<10<\gamma<10<γ<1, γˉp−c>0\bar\gamma p-c>0γˉ​p−c>0, Assumptions 1–3 as printed, and the paper's implicit conventions, made explicit: tlk>0t_{lk}>0tlk​>0, Λ11,Λ22≥0\Lambda_{11},\Lambda_{22}\ge0Λ11​,Λ22​≥0, p>0p>0p>0, N>0N>0N>0, c>0c>0c>0, μ\muμ a probability measure with continuous CDF.

ΠC(n)\Pi_C(n)ΠC​(n) and πC(n)\pi_C(n)πC​(n) are defined as suprema over the allocation problem; every target states attainment with IsGreatest or with membership in the selected set, so no conclusion rests on a supremum convention. Capacities in (13) and (16) are strictly positive, because (12d) divides by nnn.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: πC\pi_CπC​ is defined through the two-step selection, never by its closed form (18); "max" is never an unattained supremum; feasibility for (13) includes the participation equation and n>0n>0n>0; and nCn_CnC​ is characterized by ∃!\exists!∃! and then quantified over, never chosen.

Regimes MMM and AAA of the paper, which need objects defined only in the e-companion, are out of scope, as are the reformulation of §2.4 and Remark 2. Proofs of any milestone, and lemmas on monotonicity of ΠC\Pi_CΠC​ or attainment of linear programs over CC(n)\mathcal C_C(n)CC​(n), are welcome.

Selected references

  • P. Afèche, Z. Liu, C. Maglaras, Ride-Hailing Networks with Strategic Drivers: The Impact of Platform Control Capabilities on Performance, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Articles in Advance, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.1221
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Reducing Marketplace Interference Bias Via Shadow Prices 3: The Scaled Expected Matching Value Converges to the Fluid LP Value Φ(λ, π)Research Paper

Why a fluid limit for matching markets

Two-sided platforms (ride hailing, delivery, freelancing, logistics) collect demand and supply requests over a matching cycle and then clear them with an optimization problem. When such a platform runs an experiment, treated and control units compete for the same supply, so the outcome of one unit depends on the treatment of others. Interference bias of this kind is the subject of Bright, Delarue and Lobel, Reducing Marketplace Interference Bias Via Shadow Prices (arXiv:2205.02274v4; Management Science, 2025). Their analysis of estimators, including the shadow-price estimator built from linear-programming duals, is carried out in a deterministic fluid limit. Theorem 1 of the paper justifies that step: as the market becomes dense, the expected matching value per unit of density converges to the optimal value of a deterministic linear program with the arrival rates as inputs.

The same kind of statement, the expected value of a random linear program converging to the value of the program at the mean data, is also used in network revenue management and in stochastic matching, where fluid linear programs serve as benchmarks.

Setting

Network. There are ndn_dnd​ demand types and nsn_sns​ supply types. A directed network has one demand node uidu^d_iuid​ per demand type (a sink), one supply node ujsu^s_jujs​ per supply type (a source) and a finite set U∗\mathcal U_*U∗​ of intermediate nodes. Every arc (u,w)(u,w)(u,w) carries a value vu,w∈Rv_{u,w}\in\mathbb Rvu,w​∈R and a capacity ku,w≥0k_{u,w}\ge 0ku,w​≥0.

Matching program. For a density τ\tauτ, demand vector ddd and supply vector sss, Φτ(d,s)\Phi_\tau(d,s)Φτ​(d,s) is the maximum of ∑(u,w)vu,wxu,w\sum_{(u,w)} v_{u,w}x_{u,w}∑(u,w)​vu,w​xu,w​ over flows xxx with inflow at most did_idi​ at uidu^d_iuid​, outflow at most sjs_jsj​ at ujsu^s_jujs​, flow balance at every intermediate node and 0≤xu,w≤τku,w0\le x_{u,w}\le\tau k_{u,w}0≤xu,w​≤τku,w​ (display (2), p. 7). Write Φ:=Φ1\Phi:=\Phi_1Φ:=Φ1​. Without intermediate nodes this is a capacitated bipartite transportation problem.

Random counts. Demand units of type iii arrive at rate λi≥0\lambda_i\ge 0λi​≥0 and supply units of type jjj at rate πj≥0\pi_j\ge 0πj​≥0. At density τ\tauτ the numbers of units collected in one cycle are independent Poisson counts

Diτ,λ∼Poisson(λiτ),Sjτ∼Poisson(πjτ).D^{\tau,\lambda}_i\sim\mathrm{Poisson}(\lambda_i\tau),\qquad S^\tau_j\sim\mathrm{Poisson}(\pi_j\tau).Diτ,λ​∼Poisson(λi​τ),Sjτ​∼Poisson(πj​τ).

Treatment effect. If a treatment changes the demand rates from λ\lambdaλ to λ+β\lambda+\betaλ+β (with λ+β≥0\lambda+\beta\ge 0λ+β≥0), the global treatment effect at density τ\tauτ is Δτ=1τE[Φτ(Dτ,λ+β,Sτ)−Φτ(Dτ,λ,Sτ)]\Delta^\tau=\frac1\tau\mathbb E[\Phi_\tau(D^{\tau,\lambda+\beta},S^\tau)-\Phi_\tau(D^{\tau,\lambda},S^\tau)]Δτ=τ1​E[Φτ​(Dτ,λ+β,Sτ)−Φτ​(Dτ,λ,Sτ)] (Definition 1, p. 8).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1, display (7), p. 12

lim⁡τ→∞E[1τ Φτ(Dτ,λ,Sτ)]=Φ(λ,π),\lim_{\tau\to\infty}\mathbb E\Big[\frac1\tau\,\Phi_\tau\big(D^{\tau,\lambda},S^\tau\big)\Big]=\Phi(\lambda,\pi),τ→∞lim​E[τ1​Φτ​(Dτ,λ,Sτ)]=Φ(λ,π),

for every network, every λ≥0\lambda\ge 0λ≥0 and every π≥0\pi\ge 0π≥0, along integer densities τ\tauτ. No rate of convergence and no constant is fixed.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1 (p. 37), scaling. For integer d,s≥0d,s\ge 0d,s≥0 and τ>0\tau>0τ>0, 1τΦτ(d,s)=Φ(1τd,1τs)\frac1\tau\Phi_\tau(d,s)=\Phi(\frac1\tau d,\frac1\tau s)τ1​Φτ​(d,s)=Φ(τ1​d,τ1​s), and xxx is optimal on the right if and only if τx\tau xτx is optimal on the left.
  2. Poisson tail bound (proof of Lemma 2, p. 38). For V∼Poisson(λ0)V\sim\mathrm{Poisson}(\lambda_0)V∼Poisson(λ0​), P(V≥t)≤e−t\mathbb P(V\ge t)\le e^{-t}P(V≥t)≤e−t for every t≥7λ0t\ge 7\lambda_0t≥7λ0​ (Janson, Łuczak and Ruciński 2000, Corollary 2.4).
  3. Lemma 2 (p. 38). If Xn∼Poisson(λn)X_n\sim\mathrm{Poisson}(\lambda n)Xn​∼Poisson(λn) for n≥1n\ge 1n≥1, then Z=sup⁡n≥1Xn/nZ=\sup_{n\ge1}X_n/nZ=supn≥1​Xn​/n has finite mean, whatever the joint law of the XnX_nXn​.

Companion: Corollary 1, display (8), p. 13

lim⁡τ→∞Δτ=Φ(λ+β,π)−Φ(λ,π).\lim_{\tau\to\infty}\Delta^\tau=\Phi(\lambda+\beta,\pi)-\Phi(\lambda,\pi).τ→∞lim​Δτ=Φ(λ+β,π)−Φ(λ,π).

Significance

Theorem 1 is the bridge between the paper's stochastic model and its deterministic analysis. Corollary 1 follows from it and identifies the estimand Δ=Φ(λ+β,π)−Φ(λ,π)\Delta=\Phi(\lambda+\beta,\pi)-\Phi(\lambda,\pi)Δ=Φ(λ+β,π)−Φ(λ,π). Every fluid-limit result of the paper is stated about this deterministic quantity: that the RCT estimator overestimates the treatment effect (Theorem 2), and that in a symmetric experiment the shadow-price estimator is no more biased than the RCT estimator (Theorem 4). Without Theorem 1 those results describe a linear program, not the experiment.

The result is proved in the paper (Appendix C.1, pp. 37–39). As far as a search of the Prove2Me catalogue shows, it has not been formalized: the catalogue has fluid limits of queueing networks and several Poisson concentration bounds, but no law of large numbers for the value of a random network-flow program. A formal development would provide a reusable definition of the capacitated network-flow program with supply and demand bounds, its scaling identity, and an integrability tool for suprema of scaled Poisson counts. The two other missions of this series, on the shadow-price estimator in the fluid limit and in finite samples, use the same network program.

Difficulty

The obvious argument is: 1τDτ→λ\frac1\tau D^\tau\to\lambdaτ1​Dτ→λ and 1τSτ→π\frac1\tau S^\tau\to\piτ1​Sτ→π, Φ\PhiΦ is continuous, so the expectations converge. Each step needs care.

  • The counts at different densities are defined only through their laws. A pathwise limit needs a coupling of the counts across τ\tauτ, which is not part of the statement.
  • Continuity of Φ\PhiΦ in its right-hand side, including at data where some λi\lambda_iλi​ or πj\pi_jπj​ is zero, is a statement about the value function of a parametric linear program. Mathlib has no theory of LP value functions.
  • Passing the limit inside the expectation needs a dominating function. The paper builds one from the supremum of scaled Poisson counts (Lemma 2), whose integrability rests on the Poisson tail bound. That bound is not in Mathlib either.

Formalization scope

Representation.

  • Demand types are Fin nd and supply types Fin ns; Lean index iii is the paper's type i+1i+1i+1.
  • A network is a structure with arc type E and intermediate-node type I. Each arc's tail is a supply or intermediate node and its head is a demand or intermediate node, which builds in the source/sink structure. Values are real and capacities nonnegative.
  • Φτ(d,s)\Phi_\tau(d,s)Φτ​(d,s) is the supremum of the objective over the feasible set of (2). For nonnegative data this set contains 000 and lies in the box [0,τk][0,\tau k][0,τk], so the supremum is a maximum.

Probability.

  • The count law at density τ\tauτ is the product of independent Poisson laws on Nnd×Nns\mathbb N^{n_d}\times\mathbb N^{n_s}Nnd​×Nns​. Independence across types and between demand and supply is the paper's reading of a Poisson process per type; it is used by the proofs but not written out.
  • Expectations are Bochner integrals. The integrand of the goal is bounded by ∑∣vu,w∣ku,w\sum|v_{u,w}|k_{u,w}∑∣vu,w​∣ku,w​, and every function on the countable count space is measurable, so the expectation is genuine and not the junk value 000.
  • The limit is taken along integer τ→∞\tau\to\inftyτ→∞, as on p. 12.
  • In Lemma 2, max⁡n≥1\max_{n\ge1}maxn≥1​ is read as a supremum in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], and "finite mean" as a finite lower Lebesgue integral.

Ruled out. A trivializing formalization is excluded: the expectation is taken against the Poisson laws with means λiτ\lambda_i\tauλi​τ and πjτ\pi_j\tauπj​τ, with the factor 1/τ1/\tau1/τ inside the expectation, not against point masses at the rates or in the rescaled form E[Φ(1τDτ,1τSτ)]\mathbb E[\Phi(\frac1\tau D^\tau,\frac1\tau S^\tau)]E[Φ(τ1​Dτ,τ1​Sτ)]. No hypothesis beyond λ,π≥0\lambda,\pi\ge 0λ,π≥0 is imposed.

Not stated.

  • The second sentence of Theorem 1, the almost-sure convergence of optimal primal and dual solutions. It assumes unique optima only inside its proof and needs a coupling across τ\tauτ that the paper does not construct.
  • Lemma 1's "z∗=τx∗z^*=\tau x^*z∗=τx∗" presupposes unique optima. It is stated as the equivalence "xxx is optimal for Φ(1τd,1τs)\Phi(\frac1\tau d,\frac1\tau s)Φ(τ1​d,τ1​s) if and only if τx\tau xτx is optimal for Φτ(d,s)\Phi_\tau(d,s)Φτ​(d,s)".

The statements follow arXiv:2205.02274v4. Its printed slips are corrected as disclosed in each item's Formalization Note.

Infrastructure needed.

  • Monotonicity and continuity of the value of a capacitated linear program in its right-hand side.
  • The Poisson Chernoff bound.
  • Convergence in probability of scaled Poisson counts.

The network-program definition and the Poisson tail bound are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions toward any of these are welcome.

Selected references

  • I. Bright, A. Delarue, I. Lobel, Reducing Marketplace Interference Bias Via Shadow Prices, arXiv preprint, v4, 2024; Management Science, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.02274v4
  • S. Janson, T. Łuczak, A. Ruciński, Random Graphs, Wiley, 2000, Corollary 2.4. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118032718
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Reducing Marketplace Interference Bias Via Shadow Prices 2: In Expectation the Shadow-Price Estimator Equals the Derivative of the Finite-Sample Partial-Treatment Value FunctionResearch Paper

Motivation

Two-sided platforms (ride hailing, delivery, freight, cloud capacity) test product changes with user-split experiments: each arriving demand unit is assigned to treatment with probability ρ\rhoρ and to control otherwise. Treated and control units then compete for the same supply, so the outcome of one group depends on the size of the other. This interference biases the standard estimator that compares the value earned by the two groups and rescales by ρ\rhoρ and 1−ρ1-\rho1−ρ (Blake and Coey, 2014; Johari, Li, Liskovich and Weintraub, 2022).

Bright, Delarue and Lobel (arXiv:2205.02274v4, 2024; Management Science 2025) model each matching cycle as a linear program and propose a shadow-price estimator that weights the observed demand counts by the marginal values of demand in the experiment's matching problem. This mission formalizes their finite-sample result, Theorem 6: at every market size, the shadow-price estimator is unbiased for the slope of the expected value function at the experiment state. The fluid-limit comparison with the standard estimator (Theorem 4) and the fluid limit of the matching value (Theorem 1) are the subjects of the other two missions of this series.

Setting

A matching network has one sink node uidu^d_iuid​ for each of ndn_dnd​ demand types, one source node ujsu^s_jujs​ for each of nsn_sns​ supply types, a finite set of intermediate nodes, and arcs that leave a supply or intermediate node and enter a demand or intermediate node. Arc (u,w)(u,w)(u,w) has a value vu,w∈Rv_{u,w}\in\mathbb Rvu,w​∈R and a capacity ku,w≥0k_{u,w}\ge0ku,w​≥0. For a density τ>0\tau>0τ>0, demand ddd and supply sss, the matching value Φτ(d,s)\Phi_\tau(d,s)Φτ​(d,s) is the optimal value of the linear program (2): maximize ∑vu,wxu,w\sum v_{u,w}x_{u,w}∑vu,w​xu,w​ subject to inflow at uidu^d_iuid​ at most did_idi​, outflow at ujsu^s_jujs​ at most sjs_jsj​, flow balance at intermediate nodes, and 0≤xu,w≤τku,w0\le x_{u,w}\le\tau k_{u,w}0≤xu,w​≤τku,w​. Write Φ=Φ1\Phi=\Phi_1Φ=Φ1​ and eie_iei​ for the iii-th unit vector.

Rates are a control demand rate λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0, a treatment effect β\betaβ with λ+β≥0\lambda+\beta\ge0λ+β≥0, and a supply rate π≥0\pi\ge0π≥0. In the partial-treatment market with treated fraction η∈[0,1]\eta\in[0,1]η∈[0,1], the demand counts Diτ,λ+ηβ∼Poisson((λi+ηβi)τ)D^{\tau,\lambda+\eta\beta}_i\sim\mathrm{Poisson}((\lambda_i+\eta\beta_i)\tau)Diτ,λ+ηβ​∼Poisson((λi​+ηβi​)τ) and supply counts Sjτ,π∼Poisson(πjτ)S^{\tau,\pi}_j\sim\mathrm{Poisson}(\pi_j\tau)Sjτ,π​∼Poisson(πj​τ) are independent. The finite-sample partial-treatment value function is

Ψτ(η)=E[1τ Φτ(Dτ,λ+ηβ,Sτ,π)],\Psi_\tau(\eta)=\mathbb E\Big[\tfrac1\tau\,\Phi_\tau\big(D^{\tau,\lambda+\eta\beta},S^{\tau,\pi}\big)\Big],Ψτ​(η)=E[τ1​Φτ​(Dτ,λ+ηβ,Sτ,π)],

and the global treatment effect is Δτ=Ψτ(1)−Ψτ(0)\Delta^\tau=\Psi_\tau(1)-\Psi_\tau(0)Δτ=Ψτ​(1)−Ψτ​(0).

In the experiment with treatment fraction ρ∈(0,1)\rho\in(0,1)ρ∈(0,1), the platform observes independent control counts Diτ,control∼Poisson((1−ρ)λiτ)D^{\tau,\mathrm{control}}_i\sim\mathrm{Poisson}((1-\rho)\lambda_i\tau)Diτ,control​∼Poisson((1−ρ)λi​τ), treatment counts Diτ,treatment∼Poisson(ρ(λi+βi)τ)D^{\tau,\mathrm{treatment}}_i\sim\mathrm{Poisson}(\rho(\lambda_i+\beta_i)\tau)Diτ,treatment​∼Poisson(ρ(λi​+βi​)τ) and supply counts, and solves the matching problem at Dτ,experiment=Dτ,control+Dτ,treatmentD^{\tau,\mathrm{experiment}}=D^{\tau,\mathrm{control}}+D^{\tau,\mathrm{treatment}}Dτ,experiment=Dτ,control+Dτ,treatment. The negative-demand subgradient is ai−=Φτ(d,s)−Φτ(d−ei,s)a^-_i=\Phi_\tau(d,s)-\Phi_\tau(d-e_i,s)ai−​=Φτ​(d,s)−Φτ​(d−ei​,s) and the positive one ai+=Φτ(d+ei,s)−Φτ(d,s)a^+_i=\Phi_\tau(d+e_i,s)-\Phi_\tau(d,s)ai+​=Φτ​(d+ei​,s)−Φτ​(d,s). The shadow-price estimator is

Δ^SPτ=1τ Aτ,experiment,−⋅(1ρDτ,treatment−11−ρDτ,control),\hat\Delta^\tau_{SP}=\frac1\tau\,A^{\tau,\mathrm{experiment},-}\cdot\Big(\frac1\rho D^{\tau,\mathrm{treatment}}-\frac1{1-\rho}D^{\tau,\mathrm{control}}\Big),Δ^SPτ​=τ1​Aτ,experiment,−⋅(ρ1​Dτ,treatment−1−ρ1​Dτ,control),

with Aτ,experiment,−A^{\tau,\mathrm{experiment},-}Aτ,experiment,− the vector a−a^-a− at (Dτ,experiment,Sτ)(D^{\tau,\mathrm{experiment}},S^\tau)(Dτ,experiment,Sτ).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6 (p. 24)

For every network, all rates as above, every ρ∈(0,1)\rho\in(0,1)ρ∈(0,1) and every τ>0\tau>0τ>0, Ψτ\Psi_\tauΨτ​ is differentiable at ρ\rhoρ and

E[Δ^SPτ]=Ψτ′(ρ).\mathbb E\big[\hat\Delta^\tau_{SP}\big]=\Psi_\tau'(\rho).E[Δ^SPτ​]=Ψτ′​(ρ).

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1 (p. 37): 1τΦτ(d,s)=Φ(1τd,1τs)\frac1\tau\Phi_\tau(d,s)=\Phi(\frac1\tau d,\frac1\tau s)τ1​Φτ​(d,s)=Φ(τ1​d,τ1​s) for integer d,sd,sd,s, and optimal flows correspond by the factor τ\tauτ.
  2. Theorem 7 (p. 24): with integer d,sd,sd,s and integer scaled capacities, Φτ(d±ε,s)\Phi_\tau(d\pm\varepsilon,s)Φτ​(d±ε,s) is linear in ε≥0\varepsilon\ge0ε≥0 on ∑iεi≤1\sum_i\varepsilon_i\le1∑i​εi​≤1, with slopes a+a^+a+ and a−a^-a−.
  3. Lemma 3 (p. 51): for D∼Poisson(λ)D\sim\mathrm{Poisson}(\lambda)D∼Poisson(λ) and ggg of linear growth, ∂∂λE[g(x,D)]=E[g(x,D+1)−g(x,D)]\frac{\partial}{\partial\lambda}\mathbb E[g(x,D)]=\mathbb E[g(x,D+1)-g(x,D)]∂λ∂​E[g(x,D)]=E[g(x,D+1)−g(x,D)].
  4. Lemma 4 (p. 52): ∂∂λiE[Φ(D,S)]=E[Ai+]\frac{\partial}{\partial\lambda_i}\mathbb E[\Phi(D,S)]=\mathbb E[A^+_i]∂λi​∂​E[Φ(D,S)]=E[Ai+​] for Poisson demand and supply.
  5. (32) (p. 54): given the total demand, the expected treatment and control counts of type iii are the total times ρ(λi+βi)/(λi+ρβi)\rho(\lambda_i+\beta_i)/(\lambda_i+\rho\beta_i)ρ(λi​+βi​)/(λi​+ρβi​) and (1−ρ)λi/(λi+ρβi)(1-\rho)\lambda_i/(\lambda_i+\rho\beta_i)(1−ρ)λi​/(λi​+ρβi​).
  6. Lemma 5 (p. 53): E[Df(D)]=λ E[f(D+1)]\mathbb E[Df(D)]=\lambda\,\mathbb E[f(D+1)]E[Df(D)]=λE[f(D+1)] for D∼Poisson(λ)D\sim\mathrm{Poisson}(\lambda)D∼Poisson(λ).

Companion: Corollary 2 (p. 24)

If ∣Ψτ′′∣≤M|\Psi_\tau''|\le M∣Ψτ′′​∣≤M on [0,1][0,1][0,1], then ∣E[Δ^SPτ]−Δτ∣≤M/2|\mathbb E[\hat\Delta^\tau_{SP}]-\Delta^\tau|\le M/2∣E[Δ^SPτ​]−Δτ∣≤M/2.

Significance

Theorem 6 says the shadow-price estimator measures, in expectation, the derivative of the value function at the experiment state, for every finite market and for every network, with no uniqueness assumption on optimal dual solutions. It is what licenses the estimator outside the fluid limit, where the matching problem is frequently degenerate. Corollary 2 turns it into an explicit bias bound in terms of the curvature of Ψτ\Psi_\tauΨτ​, and the same identity integrated over a uniformly random ρ\rhoρ gives an unbiased estimator of Δτ\Delta^\tauΔτ (Theorem 8 of the paper, not part of this mission).

The paper proves Theorem 6 in Appendix C.4.4; none of the statements has been machine-checked. The formalization adds a precise account of the junk cases a proof on paper passes over (infeasible programs at zero demand, the choice of subgradient), a Lean development of Poisson derivative identities that does not exist in Mathlib, and a network-flow LP layer shared with the two sibling missions. Theorem 7 is a discrete-concavity statement about network-flow values that is of independent interest.

Difficulty

The two sides of (14) are expectations under different laws: the right-hand side differentiates an expectation over the total demand in its Poisson means, while the left-hand side is an expectation over the separately observed treatment and control counts of a quantity that depends on both. Differentiating needs control of an infinite Poisson series uniformly in the mean, and differentiability in η\etaη is a joint statement about all ndn_dnd​ means at once. Computing the left-hand side with the law of the total demand alone loses exactly the information the estimator uses. The finite-sample matching problem is often degenerate, so its optimal duals are not unique; the paper notes that the particular selection a=a−a=a^-a=a− is what makes Theorem 6 hold (p. 25), so no argument that treats the duals as interchangeable can work. Theorem 7 is a discrete-concavity statement about network-flow values that needs integrality of the data, and is the hardest combinatorial statement of the mission.

Formalization scope

Demand types are Fin nd and supply types Fin ns (Lean index iii is the paper's type i+1i+1i+1). A network is a structure with arcs carrying their endpoints by type, values and nonnegative capacities. Φτ(d,s)\Phi_\tau(d,s)Φτ​(d,s) is the supremum of the objective over the feasible set; for nonnegative arguments the set contains x=0x=0x=0 and lies in the box [0,τk][0,\tau k][0,τk], so it is a maximum. Poisson vectors are products (Measure.pi) of Mathlib's poissonMeasure, and the experiment law is the product of the control, treatment and supply laws; independence across all counts is the paper's standing reading of one Poisson process per type. Derivatives are HasDerivAt, so every differentiability claim is part of a conclusion. Statements follow arXiv:2205.02274v4; its printed slips are corrected as disclosed in each item: (16) carries di≥1d_i\ge1di​≥1 wherever εi>0\varepsilon_i>0εi​>0, Lemma 1's uniqueness presupposition becomes a correspondence of optimal sets, Lemma 4 is stated for arbitrary capacities so that it covers Φτ\Phi_\tauΦτ​, and (32) drops the redundant conditioning on supply.

Standing hypotheses are λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0, λ+β≥0\lambda+\beta\ge0λ+β≥0, π≥0\pi\ge0π≥0, 0<ρ<10<\rho<10<ρ<1, τ>0\tau>0τ>0; Assumptions 1–3 of the paper are not hypotheses of Theorem 6, because its proof uses none of them, and no integrality of capacities is assumed outside Theorem 7. The estimator is (18) applied to Φτ\Phi_\tauΦτ​ and its expectation is taken under the separate laws of control and treatment counts; it is not defined as a derivative, and its expectation is not computed from the law of the total demand. At zero demand, the infeasible value of Φτ(d−ei,s)\Phi_\tau(d-e_i,s)Φτ​(d−ei​,s) is multiplied by a vanishing count, so it never affects the estimator.

Useful infrastructure beyond this mission: derivatives of Poisson expectations in the mean, the binomial conditional law of a Poisson split, and value-function facts for capacitated network-flow LPs. Contributions to any milestone are welcome; Lemmas 3 and 5 and (32) are pure probability and independent of the LP layer.

Selected references

  • I. Bright, A. Delarue, I. Lobel, Reducing Marketplace Interference Bias Via Shadow Prices, arXiv:2205.02274v4, 2024; Management Science, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.02274v4
  • T. Blake, D. Coey, Why Marketplace Experimentation Is Harder than it Seems: The Role of Test-Control Interference, ACM EC, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602837
  • R. Johari, H. Li, I. Liskovich, G. Y. Weintraub, Experimental Design in Two-Sided Platforms: An Analysis of Bias, Management Science 68(10), 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4247
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Operations ResearchStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Reducing Marketplace Interference Bias Via Shadow Prices 1: In a Symmetric Experiment the Shadow-Price Estimator Is No More Biased Than the RCT Estimator in the Fluid LimitResearch Paper

Motivation

Online marketplaces (ride hailing, delivery, freelancing, retail supply chains) test changes to their product with randomized controlled trials: a fraction ρ\rhoρ of the arriving customers is treated, the rest is kept as control, and the difference in outcomes is scaled up to estimate what would happen if everybody were treated. In a market with limited supply this estimate is biased. Treated and control customers compete for the same drivers or the same inventory, so the outcome of one group depends on the size of the other. This effect is called marketplace interference, and it makes the standard estimator overstate the effect of a treatment.

Bright, Delarue and Lobel (arXiv:2205.02274v4) model the platform's matching decision as a linear program and propose to estimate the treatment effect from the shadow prices of that program, which measure the marginal value of one more unit of demand of each type. This mission formalizes their fluid-limit comparison between the standard RCT estimator and the shadow-price estimator: in a symmetric experiment, the shadow-price estimator is never more biased.

Setting

A matching network is a finite directed graph with one demand node uidu^d_iuid​ for each demand type i∈[nd]i\in[n_d]i∈[nd​] (only incoming arcs), one supply node ujsu^s_jujs​ for each supply type j∈[ns]j\in[n_s]j∈[ns​] (only outgoing arcs), and intermediate nodes. Each arc (u,w)(u,w)(u,w) has a value vu,w∈Rv_{u,w}\in\mathbb Rvu,w​∈R per unit of flow and a capacity ku,w≥0k_{u,w}\ge0ku,w​≥0. Given a demand vector ddd and a supply vector sss, the platform solves the LP (2)

Φ(d,s)=max⁡∑(u,w)vu,wxu,w\Phi(d,s)=\max\sum_{(u,w)}v_{u,w}x_{u,w}Φ(d,s)=max(u,w)∑​vu,w​xu,w​

over arc flows xxx with 0≤x≤k0\le x\le k0≤x≤k, flow into each uidu^d_iuid​ at most did_idi​, flow out of each ujsu^s_jujs​ at most sjs_jsj​, and flow balance at each intermediate node. Its dual (5) has a nonnegative price aia_iai​ for each demand constraint, a price bjb_jbj​ for each supply constraint, a price ξu,w\xi_{u,w}ξu,w​ for each capacity and a free potential at each intermediate node. The price aia_iai​ is the shadow price of demand type iii.

Demand arrives at rate λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0 under global control and at rate λ+β≥0\lambda+\beta\ge0λ+β≥0 under global treatment; supply arrives at rate π≥0\pi\ge0π≥0. An experiment treats a fraction ρ∈(0,1)\rho\in(0,1)ρ∈(0,1) of demand, so the platform observes the market at the intermediate rate λ+ρβ\lambda+\rho\betaλ+ρβ. The partial-treatment value function is Ψ(η)=Φ(λ+ηβ,π)\Psi(\eta)=\Phi(\lambda+\eta\beta,\pi)Ψ(η)=Φ(λ+ηβ,π) for η∈[0,1]\eta\in[0,1]η∈[0,1], and the global treatment effect in the fluid limit is

Δ=Ψ(1)−Ψ(0)=Φ(λ+β,π)−Φ(λ,π).\Delta=\Psi(1)-\Psi(0)=\Phi(\lambda+\beta,\pi)-\Phi(\lambda,\pi).Δ=Ψ(1)−Ψ(0)=Φ(λ+β,π)−Φ(λ,π).

Two estimators are computed from the experiment state alone. The RCT estimator is Δ^RCT=vˉ∗⋅β\hat\Delta_{\mathrm{RCT}}=\bar v^*\cdot\betaΔ^RCT​=vˉ∗⋅β, where vˉi∗\bar v^*_ivˉi∗​ is the average value per unit of type-iii demand in the optimal flow of Φ(λ+ρβ,π)\Phi(\lambda+\rho\beta,\pi)Φ(λ+ρβ,π), computed along the supply-to-demand paths that carry it ((9)–(10)). The shadow-price estimator is Δ^SP=aρ⋅β\hat\Delta_{\mathrm{SP}}=a^\rho\cdot\betaΔ^SP​=aρ⋅β, where aρa^\rhoaρ is the demand part of the optimal dual solution of Φ(λ+ρβ,π)\Phi(\lambda+\rho\beta,\pi)Φ(λ+ρβ,π) ((11)). Two assumptions stand throughout: the optimal primal and dual solutions of Φ(λ+ρβ,π)\Phi(\lambda+\rho\beta,\pi)Φ(λ+ρβ,π) are unique (Assumption 2), and β\betaβ is sign-consistent, β≥0\beta\ge0β≥0 or β≤0\beta\le0β≤0 componentwise (Assumption 3).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (p. 21)

In a symmetric experiment, ρ=12\rho=\tfrac12ρ=21​,

∣Δ^SP−Δ∣ ≤ ∣Δ^RCT−Δ∣.\bigl|\hat\Delta_{\mathrm{SP}}-\Delta\bigr|\ \le\ \bigl|\hat\Delta_{\mathrm{RCT}}-\Delta\bigr|.​Δ^SP​−Δ​ ≤ ​Δ^RCT​−Δ​.

The statement fixes no constant other than the symmetric design. It holds for every network, every admissible rate vector and every path decomposition of the optimal flow.

Milestones

  • Proposition 1 (p. 13): Ψ\PsiΨ is concave and piecewise linear with finitely many pieces on [0,1][0,1][0,1].
  • Theorem 2 (p. 14): if β≥0\beta\ge0β≥0, then vˉ∗⋅(λ+β)≥Ψ(1)\bar v^*\cdot(\lambda+\beta)\ge\Psi(1)vˉ∗⋅(λ+β)≥Ψ(1) and vˉ∗⋅λ≤Ψ(0)\bar v^*\cdot\lambda\le\Psi(0)vˉ∗⋅λ≤Ψ(0), with the reverse inequalities if β≤0\beta\le0β≤0. Consequently ∣Δ^RCT∣≥∣Δ∣|\hat\Delta_{\mathrm{RCT}}|\ge|\Delta|∣Δ^RCT​∣≥∣Δ∣.
  • Proposition 6 (p. 21): Ψ′(η)=aη⋅β\Psi'(\eta)=a^\eta\cdot\betaΨ′(η)=aη⋅β off finitely many points, and Δ=∫01aη⋅β dη\Delta=\int_0^1a^\eta\cdot\beta\,d\etaΔ=∫01​aη⋅βdη.

Companion results

  • Theorem 9 (p. 27): for ρ<12\rho<\tfrac12ρ<21​ and β≤0\beta\le0β≤0, the estimator Δ^SP+=(1−2ρ)Δ^RCT+2ρΔ^SP\hat\Delta_{\mathrm{SP+}}=(1-2\rho)\hat\Delta_{\mathrm{RCT}}+2\rho\hat\Delta_{\mathrm{SP}}Δ^SP+​=(1−2ρ)Δ^RCT​+2ρΔ^SP​ is no more biased than Δ^RCT\hat\Delta_{\mathrm{RCT}}Δ^RCT​.
  • Theorem 10 (p. 27): for any ρ\rhoρ, if (vˉ∗−a0)⋅β≥(a0−a1)⋅β(\bar v^*-a^0)\cdot\beta\ge(a^0-a^1)\cdot\beta(vˉ∗−a0)⋅β≥(a0−a1)⋅β, then BiasSP≤BiasRCT\mathrm{Bias}_{\mathrm{SP}}\le\mathrm{Bias}_{\mathrm{RCT}}BiasSP​≤BiasRCT​; if (a0−a1)⋅β=0(a^0-a^1)\cdot\beta=0(a0−a1)⋅β=0, then BiasSP=0\mathrm{Bias}_{\mathrm{SP}}=0BiasSP​=0.

Significance

Theorem 4 says that a platform running a 50/50 experiment never does worse by replacing the average value vˉ∗\bar v^*vˉ∗ with the marginal value aρa^\rhoaρ. The comparison does not depend on the network, on the capacities, or on how strongly treatment and control interfere. Theorem 2 shows that the standard estimator is biased in a known direction, and Theorem 4 shows that a different use of the same experiment data reduces that bias. The SP estimator needs only the dual solution of an LP the platform already solves.

All results of this mission are proved in the paper (Appendix C), and none has a machine-checked proof. The milestones are statements about parametric linear programs: concavity and piecewise linearity of the optimal value in the right-hand side, and the identification of its derivative with the optimal dual. These hold well beyond this paper and are absent from the platform.

Difficulty

Two steps resist the naive argument. The bound vˉ∗⋅λ≤Ψ(0)\bar v^*\cdot\lambda\le\Psi(0)vˉ∗⋅λ≤Ψ(0) needs a feasible flow for the control market built from the experiment's optimal flow. Scaling the arc flow does not give one, because types share arcs. The flow has to be scaled path by path and type by type, which is why vˉ∗\bar v^*vˉ∗ is defined through paths. The identification Ψ′(η)=aη⋅β\Psi'(\eta)=a^\eta\cdot\betaΨ′(η)=aη⋅β needs LP sensitivity analysis in a parametric right-hand side: strong duality at every η\etaη, and the fact that dual optima are supergradients of Ψ\PsiΨ. Because Ψ\PsiΨ has kinks, the identification holds only off finitely many points. Finally, a pointwise comparison of aρa^\rhoaρ with vˉ∗\bar v^*vˉ∗ does not give Theorem 4. The proof compares integrals of aη⋅βa^\eta\cdot\betaaη⋅β over [0,ρ][0,\rho][0,ρ] and [ρ,1][\rho,1][ρ,1], and the symmetric design is what balances the two sides.

Formalization scope

Everything is defined in MarketInterference.FluidBias. The network is a structure with arcs E and intermediate nodes I, both finite. An arc's tail is a supply node or an intermediate node, and its head is a demand node or an intermediate node, so the sink and source convention holds by construction. Demand types are Fin nd, and Lean index iii is the paper's type i+1i+1i+1. Φ\PhiΦ is the supremum of the objective over the feasible set. For d,s≥0d,s\ge0d,s≥0 that set contains 000 and lies in the box [0,k][0,k][0,k], so the supremum is a maximum. The dual (5) is encoded arc by arc, and the four printed constraint families (5b)–(5e) are its four tail/head cases. Optimality of a primal or dual solution is stated explicitly. Strong duality is not assumed.

The estimators are the right-hand sides of (9)–(11). They are computed from an optimal primal flow, one of its path decompositions, and an optimal dual solution of the experiment LP. Neither is defined from Ψ\PsiΨ or from its derivative. A formalization that defined Δ^SP\hat\Delta_{\mathrm{SP}}Δ^SP​ as Ψ′(ρ)\Psi'(\rho)Ψ′(ρ), or Δ^RCT\hat\Delta_{\mathrm{RCT}}Δ^RCT​ through Ψ\PsiΨ, would trivialize the goal and is ruled out. With intermediate nodes, the decomposition of the optimal flow into paths, which (10) treats as given, is not unique. The theorems therefore hold for every decomposition. Paths are lists of distinct arcs. In (10), a type with λi+ρβi=0\lambda_i+\rho\beta_i=0λi​+ρβi​=0 has βi=0\beta_i=0βi​=0, and Lean's x/0=0x/0=0x/0=0 makes its term vanish. Assumption 2 is stated as uniqueness of the whole optimal primal flow and of the whole dual solution (a,b,m,ξ)(a,b,m,\xi)(a,b,m,ξ), as printed. Assumption 3 is a disjunction of the two sign conditions. Assumption 1 (random tie-breaking) concerns only the finite random market and is not added. The limits in Corollary 1 and Propositions 2 and 5 are not needed here: Δ\DeltaΔ, Δ^RCT\hat\Delta_{\mathrm{RCT}}Δ^RCT​ and Δ^SP\hat\Delta_{\mathrm{SP}}Δ^SP​ are defined directly in the fluid model. Proposition 6's derivative is stated with HasDerivAt off a finite set, and its dual selection η↦aη\eta\mapsto a^\etaη↦aη is arbitrary. The statements follow arXiv:2205.02274v4. Its printed slips are corrected as disclosed: the ill-defined y∗y^*y∗ of (10) is read as any path decomposition, and "uisu^s_iuis​" on p. 9 is read as uidu^d_iuid​.

A complete development needs LP strong duality and complementary slackness for this network LP, parametric-LP results (concavity and piecewise linearity of the optimal value along a ray, and dual optima as supergradients), path decompositions of flows, and the fundamental theorem of calculus for piecewise linear functions. The parametric-LP layer can be reused for any LP-based value function. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are general lemmas on network LPs.

Selected references

  • I. Bright, A. Delarue, I. Lobel, Reducing Marketplace Interference Bias Via Shadow Prices, arXiv:2205.02274v4, 2024; Management Science, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.02274
  • D. Bertsimas, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Introduction to Linear Optimization, Athena Scientific, 1997, Chapter 5 (sensitivity analysis; Theorem 5.1).
  • R. Johari, H. Li, I. Liskovich, G. Y. Weintraub, Experimental Design in Two-Sided Platforms: An Analysis of Bias, Management Science, 2022 (cited by the paper as [Johari et al. 2022]). https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.11142
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