Potential Games 4: An Efficient Solution Is the Shapley Value on the Subgames of v If and Only If the Participation Game Γ(ψ, c, v) Is a Potential GameResearch Paper
Motivation
The Shapley value (Shapley 1953) is the most widely used single-valued solution of cooperative games with transferable utility. It is usually justified axiomatically, from cooperative principles. A recurring question in game theory, sometimes called the Nash program, asks whether cooperative solution concepts can also be recovered from the strategic behaviour of players in a non-cooperative game.
Section 6 of Monderer and Shapley, Potential Games (Games and Economic Behavior 14, 1996), gives such a recovery through the notion of a potential game, the central object of that paper. With every solution , vector of outside options and TU game it associates a simple non-cooperative participation game, in which each player decides whether to join. The Shapley value is then characterised, among efficient solutions, as exactly the solution for which every such participation game is a potential game. The characterisation rests on the potential of a TU game introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989), whose marginal contributions are the Shapley value; Monderer and Shapley connect that cooperative potential to the strategic one of their paper.
Setting
Let be a finite set of players.
A game in strategic form has strategy sets and payoff functions on . Writing for the profile with player 's strategy replaced by , a function is an exact potential if
for every , every and all (condition (2.2) with unit weights). A game with an exact potential is a potential game.
For a coalition , is the space of TU games on : real functions on the subsets of with . A solution assigns to every a payoff vector . It is efficient if for every and every . For , is its restriction to the subsets of . The Shapley value of is
Given a solution , a vector and , the participation game has player set and strategy sets . Player either stays out (0) and receives , or participates (1). With the set of participants at the profile ,
For , is the profile in which exactly the members of participate.
In Lean these are IsPotential, IsPotentialGame, Solution, IsEfficient, shapleyOn, joiners (), profileOf () and participationPayoff, all in the namespace MondererShapley.Participation.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 6.1 (p. 137)
For every efficient solution , every and every ,
Milestones (proof of Theorem 6.1, p. 137)
- (6.1) For every and , with ,
- (6.2) is a potential game iff there is with for every and .
- (6.3) With , satisfies (6.2) iff for every and .
- The last step of the proof. For efficient and , a function on coalitions satisfying (6.3) exists iff for all and . The paper obtains this from Theorem A of Hart and Mas-Colell (1989); that theorem is not a result of this paper.
Further: Theorem 6.2 (p. 137)
An efficient is the Shapley value on all of iff is a potential game for every .
Significance
Theorem 6.1 is a local characterisation: for a single game it identifies the Shapley value of all subgames of through a property of one non-cooperative game, for any outside options . Theorem 6.2 turns it into a global axiomatisation of the Shapley value among efficient solutions, with "every participation game has a potential" in place of the usual symmetry, null-player and additivity axioms. It links the cooperative potential of Hart and Mas-Colell to the strategic potentials of Monderer and Shapley, and through the latter to the existence of pure equilibria and the convergence of improvement dynamics in the participation games.
Both theorems are proved in the paper, on the basis of Hart and Mas-Colell's Theorem A. To the curators' knowledge no machine-checked proof exists: neither the Hart–Mas-Colell potential nor its identification with the Shapley value of subgames is formalized on Prove2Me or in Mathlib. A complete development therefore formalizes the paper's reduction (milestones 1–3) and, as its substantial part, the Hart–Mas-Colell characterisation (milestone 4), which is reusable for any later work on cooperative potentials, consistency and the Shapley value.
Difficulty
Milestones 1–3 are bookkeeping on profiles in ; the obstacle is the identification of the potential of a game on with a function of coalitions, which is a translation between two indexings rather than an idea. The substance is milestone 4, which is Hart and Mas-Colell's Theorem A specialised to the subgames . The condition (6.3) speaks of marginal differences of an unknown function on coalitions, while the Shapley value is a closed weighted sum over subsets of whose weights depend on ; relating the two requires a genuine combinatorial identity over the subset lattice of every coalition, in both directions, and efficiency of on every subgame is used essentially. Unfolding the definitions does not suffice for either direction.
Formalization scope
- Players are a finite type
ιwith decidable equality; the strategy set isBool(false= 0,true= 1). isFunction.update ε i x. - A coalition is a
Finset ι; a TU game isw : Finset ι → ℝ, with "" encoded asw ∅ = 0and only the values on subsets of meant. A solution isψ : Finset ι → (Finset ι → ℝ) → ι → ℝ,ψ S wstanding for ; only the coordinates are read. This admits solutions that look at values ofwoutside , so the Lean statements cover every solution of the paper and more; " is the Shapley value on " is∀ S, ∀ i ∈ S, ψ S v i = shapleyOn S v i. - Efficiency is required for every coalition and every game, not only for , as in the paper.
- The Shapley value formula
shapleyOnis supplied: the paper uses the Shapley value without defining it. Its weights use , the size of the subgame's player set. - The page writes with in (6.2) and (6.3); this equals and is kept literally. The of (6.3) is stated as a function of coalitions, for the page's .
- The outside options are arbitrary reals; no sign or normalisation is assumed.
- Trivializations ruled out: is an arbitrary efficient solution, never replaced by the Shapley value itself;
v ∅ = 0is kept as the meaning of (without it, efficiency does not constrainψ S v); and the potential is an exact potential on all of , not only on profiles of a special form. - Welcome contributions: a general Hart–Mas-Colell potential for TU games, with its uniqueness and its identification with the Shapley value, stated so that it applies to subgames; proofs of milestones 1–3; Theorem 6.2 from Theorem 6.1.
- Not included: Theorem 6.3 (weighted Shapley values), for which the paper gives no proof and does not define the weighted value.
Selected references
- D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley, Potential Games, Games and Economic Behavior 14 (1996), 124–143. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0044
- S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell, Potential, Value, and Consistency, Econometrica 57 (1989), 589–614. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911054
- L. S. Shapley, A Value for n-Person Games, in Contributions to the Theory of Games II, Annals of Mathematics Studies 28, Princeton University Press (1953), 307–317. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400881970-018