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Operations Research

2,413 missions · 1,159 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

Missions

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Graph TheoryLinear OptimizationProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Linear Programming and Community Detection 6: The LP Relaxation Fails w.h.p. in the Very Dense and Dense SBM Above Explicit ThresholdsResearch Paper

Motivation

Community detection asks for a hidden partition of the nodes of a graph from its edges. Its simplest probabilistic benchmark is the two-community stochastic block model (SBM), in which the minimum bisection problem is the maximum a posteriori estimator. That problem is NP-hard, so convex relaxations are used in its place, and the question is when a relaxation still returns the hidden partition exactly. For semidefinite relaxations this question has sharp answers (Abbe, Bandeira, Hall 2016; Bandeira 2018). Del Pia, Khajavirad and Kunisky (arXiv:2006.03213v2) ask the same question for the most common linear programming relaxation of minimum bisection, the metric relaxation. They show that it recovers the planted bisection in very dense graphs when p−q>1/2p-q>1/2p−q>1/2 (their Theorem 6). This mission is their converse in the very dense and dense regimes, Theorem 7: above explicit thresholds the LP fails with high probability.

Setting

The node set is V={1,…,n}V=\{1,\dots,n\}V={1,…,n}, nnn even. A bisection is a partition V=V1⊔V2V=V_1\sqcup V_2V=V1​⊔V2​ with ∣V1∣=∣V2∣=n/2|V_1|=|V_2|=n/2∣V1​∣=∣V2​∣=n/2. The cut vector xˉ∈{0,1}(n2)\bar x\in\{0,1\}^{\binom n2}xˉ∈{0,1}(2n​) of V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​ has xˉij=1\bar x_{ij}=1xˉij​=1 exactly when iii and jjj lie on different sides. For a graph GGG with adjacency indicators aija_{ij}aij​, the metric relaxation is

(LP-P)min⁡x∑i<jaijxijs.t.xij≤xik+xjk,xij+xik+xjk≤2,∑i<jxij=n24,\text{(LP-P)}\qquad \min_x \sum_{i<j}a_{ij}x_{ij}\quad\text{s.t.}\quad x_{ij}\le x_{ik}+x_{jk},\quad x_{ij}+x_{ik}+x_{jk}\le2,\quad \sum_{i<j}x_{ij}=\frac{n^2}{4},(LP-P)xmin​i<j∑​aij​xij​s.t.xij​≤xik​+xjk​,xij​+xik​+xjk​≤2,i<j∑​xij​=4n2​,

over x∈R(n2)x\in\mathbb R^{\binom n2}x∈R(2n​), with the first family over distinct i,j,ki,j,ki,j,k with i<ji<ji<j and the second over i<j<ki<j<ki<j<k. The LP recovers the planted bisection if xˉ\bar xxˉ is its unique optimal solution.

In the SBM Gn,p,q\mathcal G_{n,p,q}Gn,p,q​ a bisection V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​ is first drawn uniformly at random; then each pair on the same side is an edge with probability ppp and each pair across with probability qqq, independently, with p>qp>qp>q. The Erdős–Rényi graph Gn,p\mathcal G_{n,p}Gn,p​ has every pair an edge with probability ppp. The dense scaling (20) is p=αn−ωp=\alpha n^{-\omega}p=αn−ω, q=βn−ωq=\beta n^{-\omega}q=βn−ω with α>β>0\alpha>\beta>0α>β>0, 0≤ω<10\le\omega<10≤ω<1; ω=0\omega=0ω=0 is the very dense regime. An event holds with high probability (w.h.p.) if its probability tends to 111 as n→∞n\to\inftyn→∞.

For a graph GGG, ρG(i,j)\rho_G(i,j)ρG​(i,j) is the shortest-path distance (+∞+\infty+∞ across components), ρmax⁡(G)=max⁡i,jρG(i,j)\rho_{\max}(G)=\max_{i,j}\rho_G(i,j)ρmax​(G)=maxi,j​ρG​(i,j) is the diameter, and ρavg(G)=2n2∑i<jρG(i,j)\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)=\frac2{n^2}\sum_{i<j}\rho_G(i,j)ρavg​(G)=n22​∑i<j​ρG​(i,j) is the average distance. EEE is the edge set of GGG, E0E_0E0​ the set of edges across the planted bisection.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7 (pp. 15–16)

Let p=αn−ωp=\alpha n^{-\omega}p=αn−ω, q=βn−ωq=\beta n^{-\omega}q=βn−ω with α>β>0\alpha>\beta>0α>β>0, ω∈[0,1)\omega\in[0,1)ω∈[0,1), and α,β<1\alpha,\beta<1α,β<1 if ω=0\omega=0ω=0. If one of

  1. ω=0\omega=0ω=0 and β>max⁡{3−α−(3−α)2−4α2, 2α−1}\beta>\max\big\{\tfrac{3-\alpha-\sqrt{(3-\alpha)^2-4\alpha}}2,\ 2\alpha-1\big\}β>max{23−α−(3−α)2−4α​​, 2α−1} (22),
  2. ω∈(0,1)\omega\in(0,1)ω∈(0,1), 11−ω∉N\tfrac1{1-\omega}\notin\mathbb N1−ω1​∈/N and β>α/(2⌈11−ω⌉−1)\beta>\alpha/(2\lceil\tfrac1{1-\omega}\rceil-1)β>α/(2⌈1−ω1​⌉−1) (23),
  3. ω=12\omega=\tfrac12ω=21​ and β>max⁡{1−2e−α22−e−α2,13+2e−α2}α\beta>\max\big\{\tfrac{1-2e^{-\alpha^2}}{2-e^{-\alpha^2}},\tfrac1{3+2e^{-\alpha^2}}\big\}\alphaβ>max{2−e−α21−2e−α2​,3+2e−α21​}α (24),
  4. ω∈(0,1)\omega\in(0,1)ω∈(0,1), 11−ω∈N∖{2}\tfrac1{1-\omega}\in\mathbb N\setminus\{2\}1−ω1​∈N∖{2} and β>α/(21−ω−1+2e−α1/(1−ω))\beta>\alpha/\big(\tfrac2{1-\omega}-1+2e^{-\alpha^{1/(1-\omega)}}\big)β>α/(1−ω2​−1+2e−α1/(1−ω)) (25)

holds, then

lim⁡n→∞P(V1,G)∼Gn,p,q[(LP-P) does not recover V1,V2]=1.\lim_{n\to\infty}\mathbb P_{(V_1,G)\sim\mathcal G_{n,p,q}}\big[\text{(LP-P) does not recover }V_1,V_2\big]=1.n→∞lim​P(V1​,G)∼Gn,p,q​​[(LP-P) does not recover V1​,V2​]=1.

Milestones

  1. (26), p. 16: for p,q=Ω(log⁡n/n)p,q=\Omega(\log n/n)p,q=Ω(logn/n) with lim⁡q/p∈(0,1]\lim q/p\in(0,1]limq/p∈(0,1], the ratio ∣E0∣/∣E∣|E_0|/|E|∣E0​∣/∣E∣ lies in (1±ϵ) q/(p+q)(1\pm\epsilon)\,q/(p+q)(1±ϵ)q/(p+q) w.h.p.
  2. Proposition 11, p. 28: a coupling of Gn,q\mathcal G_{n,q}Gn,q​, Gn,q,p\mathcal G_{n,q,p}Gn,q,p​ and Gn,p\mathcal G_{n,p}Gn,p​ in which the three graphs are nested.
  3. Proposition 12, p. 28: w.h.p. ρmax⁡(Gn,αn−ω)=1+⌊11−ω⌋\rho_{\max}(\mathcal G_{n,\alpha n^{-\omega}})=1+\lfloor\frac1{1-\omega}\rfloorρmax​(Gn,αn−ω​)=1+⌊1−ω1​⌋.
  4. Proposition 14, p. 29 (Shimizu): w.h.p. ρavg(Gn,αn−ω)∈((1−ϵ)μ,(1+ϵ)μ)\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(\mathcal G_{n,\alpha n^{-\omega}})\in((1-\epsilon)\mu,(1+\epsilon)\mu)ρavg​(Gn,αn−ω​)∈((1−ϵ)μ,(1+ϵ)μ), where μ=⌈11−ω⌉+1{11−ω∈N}e−α1/(1−ω)\mu=\lceil\frac1{1-\omega}\rceil+\mathbf 1\{\frac1{1-\omega}\in\mathbb N\}e^{-\alpha^{1/(1-\omega)}}μ=⌈1−ω1​⌉+1{1−ω1​∈N}e−α1/(1−ω).
  5. Propositions 16, 17, 18, pp. 29–30: the diameter of the very dense and dense SBM, and lower bounds on its average distance, in the three cases ω=0\omega=0ω=0, 11−ω∉N\frac1{1-\omega}\notin\mathbb N1−ω1​∈/N and 11−ω∈N\frac1{1-\omega}\in\mathbb N1−ω1​∈N.

Significance

Theorem 6 and Theorem 7 together bracket the success region of the metric relaxation in the very dense regime: recovery for p−q>1/2p-q>1/2p−q>1/2, failure above the curve (22). In the dense regime, Theorem 7 gives explicit linear thresholds β>c(ω,α) α\beta>c(\omega,\alpha)\,\alphaβ>c(ω,α)α above which the LP fails. The proof reduces failure to a deterministic distance criterion (Theorem 5, posed in mission 4 of this series) and turns asymptotic distance distributions of random graphs into statements about an LP.

The results are proved in the paper, partly by citing Bollobás's diameter theorems and Shimizu's average-distance theorem; none of them has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing the mission yields, besides Theorem 7, the diameter and average distance of dense Erdős–Rényi graphs (Propositions 12 and 14) and the monotone coupling between Erdős–Rényi graphs and the SBM (Proposition 11), each of which is usable beyond this paper. The coupling and (26) are also the inputs of the logarithmic-degree result (Theorem 8, mission 7).

Difficulty

The deterministic half is short: once ∣E0∣/∣E∣|E_0|/|E|∣E0​∣/∣E∣, ρmax⁡\rho_{\max}ρmax​ and ρavg\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}ρavg​ are pinned down, the case computations (28)–(29) reduce to inequalities between explicit expressions in α\alphaα, β\betaβ and ω\omegaω. The difficulty is the random-graph input. The diameter of Gn,p\mathcal G_{n,p}Gn,p​ for p=αn−ωp=\alpha n^{-\omega}p=αn−ω needs the second-moment analysis of the number of pairs at distance greater than ddd (Bollobás, Corollaries 10.11–10.12), and the average distance needs the finer limit law for path counts at the critical exponent 11−ω∈N\frac1{1-\omega}\in\mathbb N1−ω1​∈N, where the constant e−α1/(1−ω)e^{-\alpha^{1/(1-\omega)}}e−α1/(1−ω) appears. A first-moment argument gives only one side of each estimate. Concentration of ∣E∣|E|∣E∣ and ∣E0∣|E_0|∣E0​∣ (26) is a Hoeffding bound, but it must hold uniformly over the random planted bisection.

Formalization scope

Nodes are Fin n and graphs SimpleGraph (Fin n). A bisection is its side V1V_1V1​ with 2∣V1∣=n2|V_1|=n2∣V1​∣=n. The LP variable is a symmetric, zero-diagonal array Fin n → Fin n → ℝ, with no box constraints, so uniqueness is uniqueness over R(n2)\mathbb R^{\binom n2}R(2n​). Probabilities are finite sums over all graphs (and all bisections for the SBM). Edge probabilities are clamped into [0,1][0,1][0,1], which affects only finitely many nnn. SBM limits run over even n=2mn=2mn=2m. Distances are in ℕ∞ and ρavg\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}ρavg​ in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], so disconnected samples have infinite diameter and average distance; no real truncation is used.

Disclosed choices:

  • Theorem 7 adds α>β\alpha>\betaα>β, the SBM's standing assumption p>qp>qp>q (§4, p. 13), also assumed by Proposition 18 and (26).
  • (26) is posed for p=αs(n)p=\alpha s(n)p=αs(n), q=βs(n)q=\beta s(n)q=βs(n) with s(n)≥clog⁡n/ns(n)\ge c\log n/ns(n)≥clogn/n and αs(n)≤1\alpha s(n)\le1αs(n)≤1 eventually. Then q/p=β/αq/p=\beta/\alphaq/p=β/α, which avoids the printed "lim⁡p/q∈(0,1]\lim p/q\in(0,1]limp/q∈(0,1]", a slip for q/pq/pq/p.
  • Proposition 11 is posed as printed, with middle law Gn,q,p\mathcal G_{n,q,p}Gn,q,p​ (within qqq, across ppp).

Two encodings would make the statements trivial, and both are excluded. Unnormalized LP variables would make uniqueness false. Reading ρ\rhoρ in R\mathbb RR via toReal would make the upper bounds hold for disconnected graphs.

The deterministic distance criterion (Theorem 5) is posed in mission 4 and is not restated. Contributions are welcome on the coupling, Hoeffding-type concentration of edge counts, and the Erdős–Rényi distance asymptotics. These are reusable for any finite random-graph development.

Selected references

  • A. Del Pia, A. Khajavirad, D. Kunisky, Linear Programming and Community Detection, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023; arXiv:2006.03213v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.03213
  • E. Abbe, A. S. Bandeira, G. Hall, Exact recovery in the stochastic block model, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 62 (2016) 471–487. https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.3267
  • A. S. Bandeira, Random Laplacian matrices and convex relaxations, Found. Comput. Math. 18 (2018) 345–379. https://arxiv.org/abs/1504.03987
  • B. Bollobás, Random Graphs, 2nd ed., Cambridge Studies in Advanced Mathematics 73, Cambridge University Press, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511814068
  • N. Shimizu, The average distance of dense homogeneous random graphs, Mathematical Engineering Technical Report, Department of Mathematical Informatics, The University of Tokyo, November 2017 (Theorem 1; reference [38] of the paper). https://www.keisu.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/techrep/
14 thms1 active userReviewed
Graph TheoryLinear OptimizationProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Linear Programming and Community Detection 7: The LP Relaxation Fails w.h.p. in the Logarithmic-Degree SBMResearch Paper

Motivation

The stochastic block model (SBM) is the standard benchmark for community detection: a random graph whose vertices are split into hidden communities, with denser connections inside a community than across. For two equal communities, the best possible estimator of the hidden partition is the minimum bisection problem, which is NP-hard in the worst case. Its tractable relaxations are therefore compared by asking for which edge densities they still recover the hidden partition exactly.

For semidefinite programming the answer is complete in the logarithmic-degree regime: Abbe, Bandeira and Hall (arXiv:1405.3267) located the information-theoretic threshold α−β=2\sqrt\alpha-\sqrt\beta=\sqrt2α​−β​=2​, and the SDP relaxation was shown to reach it by Hajek, Wu and Xu (arXiv:1412.6156) and by Bandeira (arXiv:1504.03987). Linear programming relaxations are cheaper and widely used in combinatorial optimization, but their behaviour on the SBM was not known. Del Pia, Khajavirad and Kunisky (arXiv:2006.03213, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023) study the most common one, the metric relaxation. This mission formalizes their result for the logarithmic-degree regime (Theorem 8): there the LP relaxation fails to recover the hidden partition with high probability, at every choice of the parameters.

Setting

Let V={1,…,n}V=\{1,\dots,n\}V={1,…,n} with nnn even. A bisection is a partition V=V1⊔V2V=V_1\sqcup V_2V=V1​⊔V2​ with ∣V1∣=∣V2∣=n/2|V_1|=|V_2|=n/2∣V1​∣=∣V2​∣=n/2; its cost in a graph GGG is the number of edges between V1V_1V1​ and V2V_2V2​. Given a fixed planted bisection V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​, an optimization problem recovers it if its unique optimal solution corresponds to V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​.

The cut vector xˉ∈{0,1}(n2)\bar x\in\{0,1\}^{\binom n2}xˉ∈{0,1}(2n​) of V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​ has xˉij=1\bar x_{ij}=1xˉij​=1 exactly when i,ji,ji,j lie on different sides. With aij=1a_{ij}=1aij​=1 for edges and 000 otherwise, the metric relaxation is

(LP-P)min⁡x∑i<jaijxij  s.t.  xij≤xik+xjk,  xij+xik+xjk≤2,  ∑i<jxij=n24,\text{(LP-P)}\quad \min_x \sum_{i<j}a_{ij}x_{ij}\ \ \text{s.t.}\ \ x_{ij}\le x_{ik}+x_{jk},\ \ x_{ij}+x_{ik}+x_{jk}\le2,\ \ \sum_{i<j}x_{ij}=\frac{n^2}{4},(LP-P)xmin​i<j∑​aij​xij​  s.t.  xij​≤xik​+xjk​,  xij​+xik​+xjk​≤2,  i<j∑​xij​=4n2​,

the first family over distinct i,j,ki,j,ki,j,k and the second over i<j<ki<j<ki<j<k, with xji:=xijx_{ji}:=x_{ij}xji​:=xij​. Every bisection's cut vector is feasible.

The distance ρG(i,j)\rho_G(i,j)ρG​(i,j) is the length of a shortest iii–jjj path (+∞+\infty+∞ across components). The diameter is ρmax⁡(G)=max⁡i,jρG(i,j)\rho_{\max}(G)=\max_{i,j}\rho_G(i,j)ρmax​(G)=maxi,j​ρG​(i,j) and the average distance is ρavg(G)=2n2∑i<jρG(i,j)\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)=\frac{2}{n^2}\sum_{i<j}\rho_G(i,j)ρavg​(G)=n22​∑i<j​ρG​(i,j).

The Erdős–Rényi model Gn,p\mathcal G_{n,p}Gn,p​ draws each edge independently with probability ppp. The SBM Gn,p,q\mathcal G_{n,p,q}Gn,p,q​ chooses a bisection V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​ uniformly at random, then draws each pair inside a side with probability ppp and each pair across with probability qqq, independently, where p>qp>qp>q. The logarithmic-degree regime (21) is

p=αlog⁡nn,q=βlog⁡nn,α>β>0.p=\alpha\frac{\log n}{n},\qquad q=\beta\frac{\log n}{n},\qquad \alpha>\beta>0 .p=αnlogn​,q=βnlogn​,α>β>0.

An event AnA_nAn​ holds with high probability if P[An]→1\mathbb P[A_n]\to1P[An​]→1 as n→∞n\to\inftyn→∞.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8 (p. 18)

α>β>0 ⟹ lim⁡n→∞PGn,p,q[(LP-P) does not recover V1,V2]=1.\alpha>\beta>0\ \Longrightarrow\ \lim_{n\to\infty}\mathbb P_{\mathcal G_{n,p,q}}\big[\text{(LP-P) does not recover }V_1,V_2\big]=1 .α>β>0 ⟹ n→∞lim​PGn,p,q​​[(LP-P) does not recover V1​,V2​]=1.

Milestones

  1. The threshold of [2] (p. 14, strict cases): if α−β>2\sqrt\alpha-\sqrt\beta>\sqrt2α​−β​>2​, the minimum bisection problem recovers V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​ with high probability; if α−β<2\sqrt\alpha-\sqrt\beta<\sqrt2α​−β​<2​, it does not.
  2. Proposition 13 (p. 29): for α>1\alpha>1α>1 and G∼Gn,αlog⁡n/nG\sim\mathcal G_{n,\alpha\log n/n}G∼Gn,αlogn/n​, ρmax⁡(G)∈((1−ϵ)log⁡nlog⁡log⁡n,(1+ϵ)log⁡nlog⁡log⁡n)\rho_{\max}(G)\in\big((1-\epsilon)\frac{\log n}{\log\log n},(1+\epsilon)\frac{\log n}{\log\log n}\big)ρmax​(G)∈((1−ϵ)loglognlogn​,(1+ϵ)loglognlogn​) with high probability.
  3. Proposition 15 (p. 29, Theorem 1 of Chung–Lu): for α>1\alpha>1α>1, ρavg(G)∈((1−ϵ)log⁡nlog⁡pn,(1+ϵ)log⁡nlog⁡pn)\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)\in\big((1-\epsilon)\frac{\log n}{\log pn},(1+\epsilon)\frac{\log n}{\log pn}\big)ρavg​(G)∈((1−ϵ)logpnlogn​,(1+ϵ)logpnlogn​) with high probability.
  4. Proposition 19 (p. 30): for α>β>0\alpha>\beta>0α>β>0 with α+β2>1\frac{\alpha+\beta}{2}>12α+β​>1 and G∼Gn,p,qG\sim\mathcal G_{n,p,q}G∼Gn,p,q​,
(1−ϵ)log⁡nlog⁡log⁡n≤ρavg(G)≤ρmax⁡(G)≤(1+ϵ)log⁡nlog⁡log⁡n(1-\epsilon)\frac{\log n}{\log\log n}\le\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)\le\rho_{\max}(G)\le(1+\epsilon)\frac{\log n}{\log\log n}(1−ϵ)loglognlogn​≤ρavg​(G)≤ρmax​(G)≤(1+ϵ)loglognlogn​

with high probability.

Two results the proof of Theorem 8 uses are posed in sibling missions of this series and are not restated here: Theorem 5 (a distance-based non-recovery criterion for (LP-P), mission 4) and the coupling Proposition 11 together with the crossing-edge count (26) (mission 6).

Significance

The result. Theorem 8 separates linear from semidefinite programming on a natural statistical problem. In the logarithmic regime the SDP relaxation recovers the planted bisection whenever any method can, while the metric LP fails with high probability for all α>β>0\alpha>\beta>0α>β>0, including parameters far above the information-theoretic threshold. The paper's Theorem 6 shows that in the very dense regime (constant p,qp,qp,q) the LP does succeed when p−q>1/2p-q>1/2p−q>1/2; Theorem 8 shows that at logarithmic degree no such window exists.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper, modulo results cited from the random-graph literature. Nothing in this mission is machine-checked yet. Formalization adds a precise account of what the cited distance asymptotics assert; Proposition 19's upper bound is justified in the paper only by reference to "a standard result on the diameter of the SBM" obtained by adapting an argument of Abbe's survey, so a complete proof of it is new work. Propositions 13 and 15 are classical facts about Erdős–Rényi graphs that have no formal proof in any library known to the curators, and are reusable well beyond community detection.

Difficulty

The LP side of the argument is deterministic and finite. The difficulty is probabilistic. The distance results require tight control of breadth-first neighbourhood growth in sparse random graphs near the connectivity threshold, where the average degree is only logarithmic, with error terms small enough to pin the diameter to a (1±ϵ)(1\pm\epsilon)(1±ϵ) window. A first-moment estimate of path counts gives only one side of each bound. In the SBM the two edge probabilities make neighbourhood growth inhomogeneous, so the Erdős–Rényi results do not transfer verbatim. The threshold of [2] is a separate sharp large-deviation statement, at the level of individual vertices' in- and out-degrees.

Formalization scope

Vertices are Fin n (0-based); graphs are SimpleGraph (Fin n). A bisection is recorded by its side V1V_1V1​ with 2∣V1∣=n2|V_1|=n2∣V1​∣=n. The LP variable is a symmetric, zero-diagonal array x:V×V→Rx:V\times V\to\mathbb Rx:V×V→R, which is a point of R(n2)\mathbb R^{\binom n2}R(2n​); no box constraints are added. LP recovery means that the planted cut vector is the unique optimal solution; minimum-bisection recovery means that every bisection of cost at most the planted one is the planted unordered partition. Distances are in N∪{∞}\mathbb N\cup\{\infty\}N∪{∞} and the average distance in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], so a disconnected sample has infinite diameter. The random-graph laws are finite sums over all graphs; the SBM averages over all bisections. Edge probabilities are clamped into [0,1][0,1][0,1], which matters only for the finitely many nnn with αlog⁡n/n>1\alpha\log n/n>1αlogn/n>1. "With high probability" is a limit of probabilities equal to 111; for the SBM the limit runs along n=2mn=2mn=2m. Logarithms are natural.

Disclosed choices relative to the printed statements: Theorem 8 prints only α,β>0\alpha,\beta>0α,β>0, and α>β\alpha>\betaα>β is added as the SBM's standing assumption p>qp>qp>q (p. 13) and that of (21). The threshold of [2] is printed as an "if and only if"; only the two strict implications are posed, and the boundary α−β=2\sqrt\alpha-\sqrt\beta=\sqrt2α​−β​=2​ is left out.

The statements cannot be satisfied vacuously: the laws are genuine probability distributions for every nnn, the events compare extended-valued distances without truncation, and recovery requires uniqueness over all real feasible points of (LP-P). An encoding with an empty or degenerate feasible set, or with distances truncated to finite reals, would change the theorems and is excluded.

A complete development needs: Erdős–Rényi and SBM laws, breadth-first exploration bounds for sparse random graphs, the coupling of the SBM between two Erdős–Rényi graphs (mission 6), the LP non-recovery criterion (mission 4), and the information-theoretic threshold of [2]. Contributions on the random-graph distance asymptotics are reusable on their own and especially welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Del Pia, A. Khajavirad, D. Kunisky, Linear Programming and Community Detection, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.03213 (v2 is the cited version)
  • E. Abbe, A. S. Bandeira, G. Hall, Exact recovery in the stochastic block model, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 62:471–487, 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.3267
  • E. Abbe, Community detection and stochastic block models: recent developments, Journal of Machine Learning Research 18:1–86, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.10146
  • F. Chung, L. Lu, The diameter of sparse random graphs, Advances in Applied Mathematics 26(4):257–279, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1006/aama.2001.0720
  • F. Chung, L. Lu, The average distances in random graphs with given expected degrees, PNAS 99(25):15879–15882, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.252631999
  • B. Hajek, Y. Wu, J. Xu, Achieving exact cluster recovery threshold via semidefinite programming, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 62(5):2788–2797, 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6156
  • A. S. Bandeira, Random Laplacian matrices and convex relaxations, Foundations of Computational Mathematics 18(2):345–379, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1504.03987
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue 4: The k-SS Mechanism Is Ex-Post IC-IR and a (2 log k + 4)-Approximation to Welfare for Strong-SOS ValuationsResearch Paper

Motivation

In auctions with interdependent values, the value an agent assigns to an outcome depends not only on her own private information but on the information of the others: a bidder for drilling rights values a tract according to every bidder's geological survey, and a buyer of a used asset values it according to every inspector's report. Each agent observes only her own signal, while the mechanism designer knows how values depend on the full signal profile. Maximizing welfare truthfully is then much harder than with private values: the VCG mechanism no longer applies, and without structural assumptions on the valuations no ex-post truthful mechanism gives a good approximation of the optimal welfare (the source's Examples 1.2–1.3).

Eden, Feldman, Fiat, Goldner and Karlin (arXiv:1903.08384) identify submodularity over signals (SOS) as a condition under which constant or near-constant approximations become possible, including for combinatorial auctions, where agents value bundles of items. For single-dimensional signals that take kkk values, they give a (k+3)(k+3)(k+3)-approximation under SOS (Theorem 6.1) and, under the stronger condition strong-SOS, a (2log⁡2k+4)(2\log_2 k+4)(2log2​k+4)-approximation (Theorem 6.5). This mission formalizes the second result.

Timeline. Milgrom and Weber (1982) introduced the interdependent value model for auctions; Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) studied efficient auctions under the single-crossing condition. The computer science literature then gave approximation results for simple single-parameter settings (mostly single-item auctions or matroid constraints), again largely under single crossing or its variants, e.g. Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen (2016) and Eden, Feldman, Fiat and Goldner (2018), as surveyed in the source. The SOS paper (arXiv v2, 2019; journal version in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024) drops single crossing and gives, in its own words, the first welfare approximation guarantees for multi-dimensional combinatorial auctions with interdependent values.

Setting

There are nnn agents and mmm items. Agent iii holds a signal si∈{0,1,…,k−1}s_i\in\{0,1,\dots,k-1\}si​∈{0,1,…,k−1}, and s=(s1,…,sn)\mathbf s=(s_1,\dots,s_n)s=(s1​,…,sn​) is the signal profile. For every bundle T⊆[m]T\subseteq[m]T⊆[m], agent iii's value is viT(s)≥0v_{iT}(\mathbf s)\ge0viT​(s)≥0, with vi∅=0v_{i\emptyset}=0vi∅​=0; for nonempty TTT it is weakly increasing in every signal and strictly increasing in sis_isi​.

A function www of the profile is strong-SOS if for every coordinate jjj, every δ≥0\delta\ge0δ≥0 and profiles s′≤s\mathbf s'\le\mathbf ss′≤s coordinate-wise,

w(s−j,sj+δ)−w(s)  ≤  w(s−j′,sj′+δ)−w(s′).w(\mathbf s_{-j},s_j+\delta)-w(\mathbf s)\;\le\;w(\mathbf s'_{-j},s'_j+\delta)-w(\mathbf s').w(s−j​,sj​+δ)−w(s)≤w(s−j′​,sj′​+δ)−w(s′).

Raising one signal helps less the higher the profile, including the raised coordinate itself; in particular the effect of an agent's own signal is concave. SOS asks this only when the raised coordinate starts from the same value in both profiles.

An allocation T=(T1,…,Tn)T=(T_1,\dots,T_n)T=(T1​,…,Tn​) gives pairwise disjoint bundles. A deterministic mechanism maps reported signals to an allocation and payments; it is ex-post IC if, whatever the true signals and with the others truthful, no agent gains by misreporting, and ex-post IR if truthful utility is nonnegative. A randomized mechanism is universally ex-post IC-IR if every deterministic mechanism in its support is.

Let k=2qk=2^qk=2q. Random Bucket picks ℓ∈{1,…,log⁡2k}\ell\in\{1,\dots,\log_2 k\}ℓ∈{1,…,log2​k} uniformly, calls NBℓ={i:si≥2ℓ−1}N_{B_\ell}=\{i:s_i\ge2^{\ell-1}\}NBℓ​​={i:si​≥2ℓ−1} the high agents, and allocates to them a bundle assignment maximizing ∑i∈NBℓviSi(sN¬Bℓ,2ℓ−1NBℓ)\sum_{i\in N_{B_\ell}}v_{iS_i}(\mathbf s_{N_{\neg B_\ell}},\mathbf{2^{\ell-1}}_{N_{B_\ell}})∑i∈NBℓ​​​viSi​​(sN¬Bℓ​​​,2ℓ−1NBℓ​​​), the values with every high signal lowered to 2ℓ−12^{\ell-1}2ℓ−1; agent iii receiving Tˉi\bar T_iTˉi​ pays viTˉi(s−i,2ℓ−1−1)v_{i\bar T_i}(\mathbf s_{-i},2^{\ell-1}-1)viTˉi​​(s−i​,2ℓ−1−1). Random Sampling splits the agents uniformly at random into AAA and BBB, allocates to BBB a bundle assignment maximizing ∑i∈BviSi(sA,0B)\sum_{i\in B}v_{iS_i}(\mathbf s_A,\mathbf 0_B)∑i∈B​viSi​​(sA​,0B​), and charges nothing. k-SS runs Random Bucket with probability pRB=log⁡2klog⁡2k+2p_{RB}=\frac{\log_2 k}{\log_2 k+2}pRB​=log2​k+2log2​k​ and Random Sampling otherwise.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.5

For strong-SOS valuations, k-SS is universally ex-post IC-IR and, for every grid profile s\mathbf ss and every feasible allocation T∗T^*T∗,

∑iviTi∗(s)  ≤  (2log⁡2k+4)  E[welfare of k-SS at s].\sum_i v_{iT^*_i}(\mathbf s)\;\le\;(2\log_2 k+4)\;\mathbb E\big[\text{welfare of k-SS at }\mathbf s\big].i∑​viTi∗​​(s)≤(2log2​k+4)E[welfare of k-SS at s].

Milestones

  1. Strong-SOS implies SOS (p. 19).
  2. Display (9), corrected: with SELF=∑ℓ=1k−1∑i:si=ℓviTi(0−i,si)\mathsf{SELF}=\sum_{\ell=1}^{k-1}\sum_{i:s_i=\ell}v_{iT_i}(\mathbf 0_{-i},s_i)SELF=∑ℓ=1k−1​∑i:si​=ℓ​viTi​​(0−i​,si​),
SELF≤2∑ℓ=1log⁡2k∑i:2ℓ−1≤si<2ℓviTi(0−i,2iℓ−1).\mathsf{SELF}\le 2\sum_{\ell=1}^{\log_2 k}\sum_{i:2^{\ell-1}\le s_i<2^\ell}v_{iT_i}(\mathbf 0_{-i},2^{\ell-1}_i).SELF≤2ℓ=1∑log2​k​i:2ℓ−1≤si​<2ℓ∑​viTi​​(0−i​,2iℓ−1​).
  1. Lemma 6.4: Random Bucket is ex-post IC-IR and SELF≤2log⁡2k⋅E[welfare of Random Bucket]\mathsf{SELF}\le 2\log_2 k\cdot\mathbb E[\text{welfare of Random Bucket}]SELF≤2log2​k⋅E[welfare of Random Bucket].
  2. The combination: SELF+OTHER≤(2log⁡2k+4) E[welfare of k-SS]\mathsf{SELF}+\mathsf{OTHER}\le(2\log_2 k+4)\,\mathbb E[\text{welfare of k-SS}]SELF+OTHER≤(2log2​k+4)E[welfare of k-SS], where OTHER=∑iviTi(s−i,0i)\mathsf{OTHER}=\sum_i v_{iT_i}(\mathbf s_{-i},0_i)OTHER=∑i​viTi​​(s−i​,0i​).

Significance

The theorem shows that the price of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions with interdependent values grows only logarithmically in the number of signal values once values are concave in the agents' own signals, compared with the linear (k+3)(k+3)(k+3) of the SOS mechanism. It also exhibits a decomposition of optimal welfare into a part driven by the other agents' signals (OTHER) and a part driven by the agent's own signal (SELF), each covered by a different randomized mechanism; this template recurs in later work on interdependent values.

The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version exists. Formalizing it fixes the exact model behind a proof that is stated in a few lines and checks it against the paper's own appendix: the printed display (9) omits a factor 2 (it fails for one agent with v(s)=s1v(\mathbf s)=s_1v(s)=s1​, k=4k=4k=4, s1=3s_1=3s1​=3), and the mission states the corrected inequality, which is the d=1d=1d=1 case of the paper's display (12) and is what the ratio 2log⁡2k2\log_2 k2log2​k requires.

Difficulty

The obvious route compares the mechanism's allocation with the optimal one agent by agent, but the mechanisms allocate by proxy values computed from modified signal profiles, and the optimal allocation's value at the true profile is not directly comparable with any single proxy. Covering SELF requires bounding an agent's own-signal contribution within a bucket by its value at the bucket floor, which needs concavity in the own signal and is false under SOS alone. Covering OTHER requires the Key Lemma 3.1 on random zeroing of signals. Incentive compatibility needs the argmax to be read off the proxy profile alone; an argmax with tie-breaking on the full report fails it.

Formalization scope

Signals are natural numbers and every hypothesis (nonnegativity, monotonicity, SOS, strong-SOS, the selectors' optimality) is quantified over the grid {0,…,k−1}n\{0,\dots,k-1\}^n{0,…,k−1}n only. k=2qk=2^qk=2q with log⁡2k=q\log_2 k=qlog2​k=q is a disclosed reading: the buckets cover {1,…,k−1}\{1,\dots,k-1\}{1,…,k−1} only for powers of two. The empty bundle is worth 000, and the monotonicity clauses apply to nonempty bundles. The argmax of each mechanism is an arbitrary selector that sees only the bucket index (or BBB) and the proxy profile and returns a feasible maximizer; theorems quantify over all such selectors. Random Sampling zeroes all of BBB, the agent's own signal included (the paper's "vijv_{ij}vij​" is read as viTv_{iT}viT​). Expectations are finite uniform averages; at q=0q=0q=0 Lean's 0−1=00^{-1}=00−1=0 makes the Random Bucket term vanish, matching pRB=0p_{RB}=0pRB​=0.

The approximation is stated for every feasible allocation and with true values at the truthful profile, not with proxy values or a supremum; IC and IR are stated for each deterministic component, not for the mixture's expectation. Replacing the average over partitions by an existential, or the explicit payments by existence of payments, would not be this theorem.

The model layer (signal grid, combinatorial valuations, SOS, ex-post IC-IR, OTHER and SELF, Random Sampling) is shared with the companion missions and lives in InterdepSOS.KHL and InterdepSOS.RSV; strong-SOS, Random Bucket and k-SS are defined in InterdepSOS.KSS. Lemma 6.3 and the decomposition (7), which the proof uses, are posed in the companion mission on k-HL. Proofs of the milestones, and reusable lemmas on concavity in the own signal and on random zeroing, are welcome. The source is the arXiv v2 preprint; the journal version in Mathematics of Operations Research (2024) is not what the mission cites.

Selected references

  • A. Eden, M. Feldman, A. Fiat, K. Goldner, A. R. Karlin, Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue, arXiv:1903.08384v2, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.08384v2
  • P. Milgrom, R. Weber, A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, Econometrica 50(5), 1982. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911865
  • P. Dasgupta, E. Maskin, Efficient Auctions, Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(2), 2000. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355300554737
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CombinatoricsGraph TheoryLinear Optimization+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Linear Programming and Community Detection 5: The LP Relaxation Recovers the Planted Bisection w.h.p. in the Very Dense SBM When p − q > 1/2Research Paper

Motivation

The stochastic block model (SBM), introduced by Holland, Laskey and Leinhardt (1983), is the standard random model for networks with community structure, and the basic benchmark for community-detection algorithms (Abbe 2018). In its two-community form the nodes are split into two equal halves, edges inside a half appear with probability ppp, and edges across with probability q<pq<pq<p. The task of exact recovery is to identify the hidden halves from the graph alone.

The maximum a posteriori estimator for this model is the minimum bisection problem (find a balanced cut with the fewest crossing edges), which is NP-hard in general. Abbe, Bandeira and Hall (2016) determined when it recovers the planted bisection, and showed that a semidefinite relaxation is as good as the integer program. Del Pia, Khajavirad and Kunisky (arXiv:2006.03213, Mathematics of Operations Research 2023) ask the same question for the cheapest standard relaxation: the metric linear programming relaxation, defined by triangle inequalities. This mission is their positive result in the very dense regime.

Setting

Let V={1,…,n}V=\{1,\dots,n\}V={1,…,n} with nnn even. A bisection is a partition V=V1∪V2V=V_1\cup V_2V=V1​∪V2​ with ∣V1∣=∣V2∣=n/2|V_1|=|V_2|=n/2∣V1​∣=∣V2​∣=n/2. For a graph G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) let aij=1a_{ij}=1aij​=1 if (i,j)∈E(i,j)\in E(i,j)∈E and 000 otherwise. The metric relaxation (LP-P) is

min⁡x∈R(n2) ∑i<jaijxijs.t.xij≤xik+xjk,xij+xik+xjk≤2,∑i<jxij=n24,\min_{x\in\mathbb R^{\binom n2}}\ \sum_{i<j}a_{ij}x_{ij}\quad\text{s.t.}\quad x_{ij}\le x_{ik}+x_{jk},\quad x_{ij}+x_{ik}+x_{jk}\le 2,\quad \sum_{i<j}x_{ij}=\frac{n^2}{4},x∈R(2n​)min​ i<j∑​aij​xij​s.t.xij​≤xik​+xjk​,xij​+xik​+xjk​≤2,i<j∑​xij​=4n2​,

the first constraint for all distinct i,j,ki,j,ki,j,k with i<ji<ji<j, the second for all i<j<ki<j<ki<j<k, and xji:=xijx_{ji}:=x_{ij}xji​:=xij​. The cut vector xˉ\bar xxˉ of a bisection has xˉij=0\bar x_{ij}=0xˉij​=0 for i,ji,ji,j on the same side and xˉij=1\bar x_{ij}=1xˉij​=1 otherwise. (LP-P) recovers the planted bisection when xˉ\bar xxˉ is its unique optimal solution.

In the Erdős–Rényi model Gn,p\mathcal G_{n,p}Gn,p​ every pair of nodes is an edge independently with probability ppp. In the SBM Gn,p,q\mathcal G_{n,p,q}Gn,p,q​ a bisection V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​ is first chosen uniformly at random; then pairs inside V1V_1V1​ or inside V2V_2V2​ are edges with probability ppp, pairs between them with probability qqq, all independently. Gn,0,q\mathcal G_{n,0,q}Gn,0,q​ is the random bipartite graph across a random bisection. An event occurs with high probability (w.h.p.) if its probability tends to 111 as n→∞n\to\inftyn→∞. The graph is very dense when ppp and qqq are constants.

For a finite graph G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) and b∈Z≥0Vb\in\mathbb Z_{\ge0}^Vb∈Z≥0V​, a bbb-factor (or fff-factor) is a set F⊆EF\subseteq EF⊆E with exactly bvb_vbv​ edges of FFF at each node vvv; N(U,U′)N(U,U')N(U,U′) counts edges with one endpoint in UUU and one in U′U'U′; dmin⁡d_{\min}dmin​, dmax⁡d_{\max}dmax​ are the minimum and maximum degrees; and the node connectivity κ(G)\kappa(G)κ(G) is the minimum number of nodes whose deletion disconnects GGG (the number of nodes, for a complete graph).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6 (p. 15)

For constants 0<q<p<10<q<p<10<q<p<1,

p−q>12 ⟹ PG∼Gn,p,q[(LP-P) recovers the planted bisection]→n→∞1.p-q>\tfrac12\ \Longrightarrow\ \mathbb P_{G\sim\mathcal G_{n,p,q}}\big[\text{(LP-P) recovers the planted bisection}\big]\xrightarrow[n\to\infty]{}1 .p−q>21​ ⟹ PG∼Gn,p,q​​[(LP-P) recovers the planted bisection]n→∞​1.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 6 (p. 20): for G∼G2m,0,qG\sim\mathcal G_{2m,0,q}G∼G2m,0,q​ there is C>0C>0C>0 with dmax⁡≤qm+Cmlog⁡md_{\max}\le qm+C\sqrt{m\log m}dmax​≤qm+Cmlogm​ w.h.p.
  2. Proposition 5 (p. 20; Schrijver, Cor. 21.4a): a bipartite graph has a bbb-factor iff N(U,U)≥b(U)−12b(V)N(U,U)\ge b(U)-\frac12 b(V)N(U,U)≥b(U)−21​b(V) for every U⊆VU\subseteq VU⊆V.
  3. Proposition 3 (p. 14): there is Creg,2>0C_{\mathrm{reg},2}>0Creg,2​>0 such that for every q∈(0,1)q\in(0,1)q∈(0,1), w.h.p. G∼Gn,0,qG\sim\mathcal G_{n,0,q}G∼Gn,0,q​ is a subgraph of a regular bipartite graph with the same bipartition, of degree dreg=qn2+Creg,2n2log⁡n2d_{\mathrm{reg}}=\frac{qn}2+C_{\mathrm{reg},2}\sqrt{\frac n2\log\frac n2}dreg​=2qn​+Creg,2​2n​log2n​​ (rounded down).
  4. Proposition 8 (p. 24): for G∼Gn,pG\sim\mathcal G_{n,p}G∼Gn,p​ there is C>0C>0C>0 with dmin⁡≥pn−Cnlog⁡nd_{\min}\ge pn-C\sqrt{n\log n}dmin​≥pn−Cnlogn​ w.h.p.
  5. Proposition 9 (p. 24; Bollobás–Thomason): for G∼Gn,pG\sim\mathcal G_{n,p}G∼Gn,p​, κ(G)=dmin⁡\kappa(G)=d_{\min}κ(G)=dmin​ w.h.p.
  6. Proposition 7 (p. 24; Tutte's fff-factor theorem).
  7. Proposition 4 (p. 14): there is Creg,1>0C_{\mathrm{reg},1}>0Creg,1​>0 such that for every p∈(0,1)p\in(0,1)p∈(0,1), w.h.p. G∼Gn,pG\sim\mathcal G_{n,p}G∼Gn,p​ contains a spanning regular subgraph of degree dreg=pn−Creg,1nlog⁡nd_{\mathrm{reg}}=pn-C_{\mathrm{reg},1}\sqrt{n\log n}dreg​=pn−Creg,1​nlogn​ (rounded up to an even integer).

The deterministic recovery criterion that the goal also depends on, Theorem 4 of the paper (regular sandwiching with din−dout≥n/4d_{\mathrm{in}}-d_{\mathrm{out}}\ge n/4din​−dout​≥n/4), is the goal of mission 3 of this series and is not restated here.

Significance

The result. Theorem 6 is the only positive recovery guarantee for the metric LP in the random setting of the paper. Together with the failure results of Theorems 7 and 8 (missions 6 and 7), it locates the LP strictly between trivial and information-theoretically optimal: it recovers in a region of constant p,qp,qp,q, but not up to the threshold p>qp>qp>q that the minimum bisection problem and its SDP relaxation reach. Propositions 3 and 4, that dense random graphs sit inside, and contain, regular graphs of nearly their average degree, are of independent interest in random graph theory, as the authors note.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; none of it is machine-checked. The mission also requires three classical theorems that are not in Mathlib: the bbb-factor criterion for bipartite graphs, Tutte's fff-factor theorem (Mathlib has only the perfect-matching case f≡1f\equiv 1f≡1), and the Bollobás–Thomason theorem κ=dmin⁡\kappa=d_{\min}κ=dmin​ for random graphs, together with degree concentration for Gn,p\mathcal G_{n,p}Gn,p​ and the bipartite SBM. Each is reusable well beyond this paper.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for recovery is to exhibit a dual certificate for (LP-P), which needs regularity of the communities and of the cross edges; a random graph is not regular. The paper bridges the gap by sandwiching the random graph between regular graphs of nearly equal degree, and that step is where the difficulty lies: the existence of a regular sub- or supergraph is a global combinatorial property, characterized by factor theorems with exponentially many conditions, each of which must hold simultaneously with high probability. Degree concentration alone, the first idea, controls only the singleton conditions. Tutte's fff-factor theorem and the bipartite bbb-factor criterion are themselves substantial combinatorial theorems, and the connectivity statement of Bollobás and Thomason is a deep result on random graphs.

Formalization scope

Nodes are Fin n (0-based). A bisection is a Finset V1V_1V1​ with 2∣V1∣=n2|V_1|=n2∣V1​∣=n. Points of R(n2)\mathbb R^{\binom n2}R(2n​) are symmetric arrays with zero diagonal; (LP-P) has no box constraints 0≤x≤10\le x\le10≤x≤1 (they are implied by the constraints and adding them would change the LP). Recovery means: xˉ\bar xxˉ is optimal and every optimal solution equals xˉ\bar xxˉ.

The random-graph laws are finite: a probability is a weighted sum over all graphs on Fin n, with independent edge weights, and for the SBM an average over all bisections; the event may depend on the drawn bisection. Edge probabilities are clamped into [0,1][0,1][0,1], which is the identity on the parameters used here. "With high probability" is Tendsto … atTop (𝓝 1), along n=2mn=2mn=2m for the SBM. The standing assumption p>qp>qp>q is not built into the law, so that Gn,0,q\mathcal G_{n,0,q}Gn,0,q​ is the case p=0p=0p=0.

Disclosed readings: the printed dregd_{\mathrm{reg}}dreg​ of Propositions 3 and 4 is not an integer; Proposition 3 is posed with degree ⌊dreg⌋\lfloor d_{\mathrm{reg}}\rfloor⌊dreg​⌋ and Proposition 4 with 2⌈dreg/2⌉2\lceil d_{\mathrm{reg}}/2\rceil2⌈dreg​/2⌉, the least even integer ≥dreg\ge d_{\mathrm{reg}}≥dreg​ (the proof assumes dregd_{\mathrm{reg}}dreg​ even). κ(Kn)=n\kappa(K_n)=nκ(Kn​)=n as on p. 24. Quantifier order follows each page: in Propositions 3 and 4 the constant precedes the probability parameter, in Propositions 6 and 8 it follows it; no constant depends on nnn.

A statement in which "with high probability" is replaced by a positive probability or an eventual bound, in which the bisection is fixed rather than random, or in which the regular degree is compared with an irrational real (an empty event) is not this mission's target.

Infrastructure needed: the finite random-graph laws, Hoeffding-type concentration over them, the two factor theorems, and node connectivity. Proofs of any milestone, and of the classical results as general graph theory, are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Del Pia, A. Khajavirad, D. Kunisky, Linear Programming and Community Detection, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023; arXiv:2006.03213v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.03213
  • E. Abbe, A. S. Bandeira, G. Hall, Exact Recovery in the Stochastic Block Model, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 62(1), 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.3267
  • E. Abbe, Community Detection and Stochastic Block Models: Recent Developments, Journal of Machine Learning Research 18, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.10146
  • P. W. Holland, K. B. Laskey, S. Leinhardt, Stochastic Blockmodels: First Steps, Social Networks 5(2), 1983. https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733(83)90021-7
  • W. T. Tutte, The Factors of Graphs, Canadian Journal of Mathematics 4, 1952. https://doi.org/10.4153/CJM-1952-028-2
  • A. Schrijver, Combinatorial Optimization: Polyhedra and Efficiency, Springer, 2003 (Corollary 21.4a).
  • B. Bollobás, A. Thomason, Random Graphs of Small Order, in Random Graphs '83, North-Holland Mathematics Studies 118, 1985 (Theorem 1).
  • A. Frieze, M. Karoński, Introduction to Random Graphs, Cambridge University Press, 2016 (Chapter 3). https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316339831
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Graph TheoryLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Linear Programming and Community Detection 4: A Distance-Based Condition Under Which the Metric LP Relaxation Fails to Recover the Planted BisectionResearch Paper

Motivation

The minimum bisection problem asks, for a graph on an even number nnn of vertices, for a split of the vertices into two halves that cuts as few edges as possible. It is NP-hard, and it is the maximum a posteriori estimator for the two-community stochastic block model (SBM), the standard benchmark for community detection (Abbe, 2018). Convex relaxations are the usual way to make such estimators tractable while keeping guarantees. For the semidefinite relaxation, exact-recovery thresholds are known (Abbe, Bandeira, Hall, 2016; Hajek, Wu, Xu, 2016). Linear programming relaxations are cheaper and much used in combinatorial optimization, but their recovery properties were not understood.

Del Pia, Khajavirad and Kunisky (arXiv:2006.03213v2, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023) study the best-known LP relaxation of minimum bisection, the metric relaxation. They give a sufficient condition for it to recover a planted bisection (Theorem 4) and a necessary one (Theorem 5). This mission formalizes the necessary condition. Its consequence, developed in §4 of the paper, is that the metric relaxation fails with high probability in most SBM regimes, including those where the minimum bisection itself succeeds.

Setting

Let G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) be a simple graph on V={1,…,n}V=\{1,\dots,n\}V={1,…,n}, and write (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) for an edge with i<ji<ji<j; set aij=1a_{ij}=1aij​=1 if (i,j)∈E(i,j)\in E(i,j)∈E and aij=0a_{ij}=0aij​=0 otherwise. A bisection is a partition of VVV into two sets V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​ with ∣V1∣=∣V2∣=n/2|V_1|=|V_2|=n/2∣V1​∣=∣V2​∣=n/2. One fixed bisection, unknown to the solver, is the planted bisection; E0E_0E0​ is the set of edges with one end in V1V_1V1​ and the other in V2V_2V2​.

The cut vector xˉ∈{0,1}(n2)\bar x\in\{0,1\}^{\binom n2}xˉ∈{0,1}(2n​) of the planted bisection has xˉij=1\bar x_{ij}=1xˉij​=1 exactly when iii and jjj lie on different sides. The metric relaxation is the linear program, with xji:=xijx_{ji}:=x_{ij}xji​:=xij​,

min⁡x ∑1≤i<j≤naijxijs.t.xij≤xik+xjk (1),xij+xik+xjk≤2 (2),∑1≤i<j≤nxij=n24 (3),\min_x\ \sum_{1\le i<j\le n}a_{ij}x_{ij}\quad\text{s.t.}\quad x_{ij}\le x_{ik}+x_{jk}\ (1),\qquad x_{ij}+x_{ik}+x_{jk}\le 2\ (2),\qquad \sum_{1\le i<j\le n}x_{ij}=\frac{n^2}{4}\ (3),xmin​ 1≤i<j≤n∑​aij​xij​s.t.xij​≤xik​+xjk​ (1),xij​+xik​+xjk​≤2 (2),1≤i<j≤n∑​xij​=4n2​ (3),

where (1) ranges over distinct i,j,ki,j,ki,j,k with i<ji<ji<j and (2) over i<j<ki<j<ki<j<k. The LP recovers the planted bisection if xˉ\bar xxˉ is its unique optimal solution. The objective at xˉ\bar xxˉ is ∣E0∣|E_0|∣E0​∣.

The graph distance ρG(i,j)\rho_G(i,j)ρG​(i,j) is the length of a shortest iii–jjj path (+∞+\infty+∞ across components). The diameter and the average distance are

ρmax⁡(G)=max⁡i,j∈VρG(i,j),ρavg(G)=2n2∑1≤i<j≤nρG(i,j).\rho_{\max}(G)=\max_{i,j\in V}\rho_G(i,j),\qquad \rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)=\frac{2}{n^2}\sum_{1\le i<j\le n}\rho_G(i,j).ρmax​(G)=i,j∈Vmax​ρG​(i,j),ρavg​(G)=n22​1≤i<j≤n∑​ρG​(i,j).

The average is over all n2n^2n2 ordered pairs, the diagonal included. For n≥5n\ge5n≥5 define

c(G)=max⁡{0, 3ρmax⁡(G)−4ρavg(G)1−4/n}.(17)c(G)=\max\Big\{0,\ \frac{3\rho_{\max}(G)-4\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)}{1-4/n}\Big\}.\qquad(17)c(G)=max{0, 1−4/n3ρmax​(G)−4ρavg​(G)​}.(17)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5

For a connected graph GGG on n≥5n\ge5n≥5 nodes with a planted bisection,

1+c(G)2ρavg(G)+2c(G)(1−1n) ∣E∣<∣E0∣(18)⟹(LP-P) does not recover the planted bisection.\frac{1+c(G)}{2\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)+2c(G)(1-\frac1n)}\,|E|<|E_0|\quad(18)\qquad\Longrightarrow\qquad\text{(LP-P) does not recover the planted bisection.}2ρavg​(G)+2c(G)(1−n1​)1+c(G)​∣E∣<∣E0​∣(18)⟹(LP-P) does not recover the planted bisection.

Milestones

The proof of Theorem 5 works with the point x~∈R(n2)\tilde x\in\mathbb R^{\binom n2}x~∈R(2n​),

x~ij=ρG(i,j)+c(G)2ρavg(G)+2c(G)(1−1n).\tilde x_{ij}=\frac{\rho_G(i,j)+c(G)}{2\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)+2c(G)(1-\frac1n)}.x~ij​=2ρavg​(G)+2c(G)(1−n1​)ρG​(i,j)+c(G)​.

The mission poses three statements about it, for a connected GGG on n≥5n\ge5n≥5 nodes:

  1. display (19), p. 12: for i<j<ki<j<ki<j<k, x~ij+x~ik+x~jk≤32⋅ρmax⁡(G)+c(G)ρavg(G)+c(G)(1−1n)\displaystyle\tilde x_{ij}+\tilde x_{ik}+\tilde x_{jk}\le\frac32\cdot\frac{\rho_{\max}(G)+c(G)}{\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)+c(G)(1-\frac1n)}x~ij​+x~ik​+x~jk​≤23​⋅ρavg​(G)+c(G)(1−n1​)ρmax​(G)+c(G)​;
  2. p. 13: x~\tilde xx~ is feasible for (LP-P);
  3. p. 13: the objective of (LP-P) at x~\tilde xx~ equals 1+c(G)ρavg(G)+c(G)(1−1n)⋅∣E∣2\displaystyle\frac{1+c(G)}{\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)+c(G)(1-\frac1n)}\cdot\frac{|E|}{2}ρavg​(G)+c(G)(1−n1​)1+c(G)​⋅2∣E∣​.

Significance

The result. Theorem 5 is a deterministic certificate of failure, stated for any connected graph, not for a random model. It reduces the question "does the LP recover?" to comparing two numbers that depend only on the distance profile of GGG and on the fraction of edges cut by the planted bisection. When typical distances are close to the diameter, c(G)c(G)c(G) is small and (18) asks only that ∣E0∣/∣E∣|E_0|/|E|∣E0​∣/∣E∣ exceed roughly 1/(2ρavg(G))1/(2\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G))1/(2ρavg​(G)). In random graphs typical distances are close to the diameter. The paper's Theorems 7 and 8 combine Theorem 5 with known distance asymptotics of Erdős–Rényi graphs (Bollobás, Random Graphs, 2001; Chung, Lu, 2001). They show that the metric relaxation fails with high probability in the dense and logarithmic-degree SBM, in contrast with the semidefinite relaxation. Those theorems are separate missions of this series and use Theorem 5 as a black box.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version is known. The mission produces a formal metric relaxation of minimum bisection, with LP recovery defined as uniqueness of the optimum, and links it to graph distances through Mathlib's SimpleGraph.edist/ediam. The definitions are written to coincide with those of the other missions of this series, so that one model layer serves the sufficient condition (Theorem 4), the necessary condition (this mission), and the random-graph consequences.

Difficulty

Theorem 5 is not deep, but it is exact. The milestones fix the witness x~\tilde xx~; the work is in checking it. The obvious candidate, the graph metric ρG\rho_GρG​ itself rescaled to satisfy the equality (3), satisfies the triangle inequalities (1). It can violate the perimeter constraints (2) whenever some triangle of vertices is spread out compared with the average distance. The shift by c(G)c(G)c(G), which depends on ρmax⁡\rho_{\max}ρmax​ and on the factor 1−4/n1-4/n1−4/n, is tuned so that (2) holds with no slack in the worst case. A proof has to keep track of the normalization 2/n22/n^22/n2 (ordered pairs, diagonal included), the factor 1−1/n1-1/n1−1/n, and the sign of 3ρmax⁡−4ρavg3\rho_{\max}-4\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}3ρmax​−4ρavg​, and must use n≥5n\ge5n≥5 wherever it divides by 1−4/n1-4/n1−4/n. In Lean the further work is converting between sums over ordered pairs, unordered pairs and the edge set, and between extended-valued distances and their real values for a connected graph.

Formalization scope

  • Vertices and bisections. Vertices are Fin n (0-based). The planted bisection is a finset V1V_1V1​ with 2∣V1∣=n2|V_1|=n2∣V1​∣=n, and V2=V1cV_2=V_1^{c}V2​=V1c​. ∣E0∣|E_0|∣E0​∣ is the number of pairs i<ji<ji<j adjacent in GGG and on different sides.
  • LP variables. A point of R(n2)\mathbb R^{\binom n2}R(2n​) is an array x:Fin n→Fin n→Rx:\texttt{Fin } n\to\texttt{Fin } n\to\mathbb Rx:Fin n→Fin n→R. Feasibility includes symmetry and a zero diagonal, so the free diagonal and lower-triangle entries cannot break uniqueness of the optimum. No bounds 0≤x≤10\le x\le10≤x≤1 are added; they are not constraints of (LP-P).
  • Recovery. LPRecovers G V1 says that the cut vector of V1V_1V1​ is optimal and every optimal point equals it.
  • Distances. ρG\rho_GρG​ is SimpleGraph.edist (in N∪{∞}\mathbb N\cup\{\infty\}N∪{∞}), ρmax⁡\rho_{\max}ρmax​ is SimpleGraph.ediam, and ρavg\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}ρavg​ is the printed formula computed in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. c(G)c(G)c(G) and x~\tilde xx~ use their real values. All statements assume GGG connected, where these values are finite and ρavg(G)>0\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)>0ρavg​(G)>0.
  • Standing hypotheses. Every statement carries exactly the page's hypotheses: GGG connected and n≥5n\ge5n≥5, plus, for Theorem 5, the planted bisection. The bisection forces nnn even, so in effect n≥6n\ge6n≥6; n≥5n\ge5n≥5 is kept as printed. x~\tilde xx~ is indexed by i<ji<ji<j on the page and is extended symmetrically with zero diagonal.
  • Ruled out. A formalization that adds box constraints, drops the symmetric zero-diagonal normalization, averages over n(n−1)/2n(n-1)/2n(n−1)/2 pairs instead of the printed 2/n22/n^22/n2, or omits connectivity (where the real value of an infinite distance would be 000) states a different theorem. None of these is used here.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the three milestones and the goal. Reusable lemmas include the identity ∑i<jaijxij=∑(i,j)∈Exij\sum_{i<j}a_{ij}x_{ij}=\sum_{(i,j)\in E}x_{ij}∑i<j​aij​xij​=∑(i,j)∈E​xij​ for SimpleGraph.edgeFinset, the finiteness of ediam for connected graphs on Fin n, and the bound ρavg(G)≤(1−1n)ρmax⁡(G)\rho_{\mathrm{avg}}(G)\le(1-\frac1n)\rho_{\max}(G)ρavg​(G)≤(1−n1​)ρmax​(G).

Selected references

  • A. Del Pia, A. Khajavirad, D. Kunisky, Linear Programming and Community Detection, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023; arXiv:2006.03213v2 (2022). https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.03213
  • E. Abbe, Community Detection and Stochastic Block Models: Recent Developments, Journal of Machine Learning Research 18 (2018). https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.10146
  • E. Abbe, A. S. Bandeira, G. Hall, Exact Recovery in the Stochastic Block Model, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 62 (2016). https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.3267
  • B. Hajek, Y. Wu, J. Xu, Achieving Exact Cluster Recovery Threshold via Semidefinite Programming, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 62 (2016). https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6156
  • B. Bollobás, Random Graphs, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511814068
  • F. Chung, L. Lu, The Diameter of Sparse Random Graphs, Advances in Applied Mathematics 26 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1006/aama.2001.0720
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Graph TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Load Balancing Under Strict Compatibility Constraints 3: Inhomogeneous Random Graphs with Edge Probabilities Satisfying (3.5) Are Almost Surely Proportionally Sparse and SubcriticalResearch Paper

Motivation

Large-scale computing systems route incoming tasks to servers through dispatchers, one per task type. A task can only run on a server that holds the data or software it needs, so the set of admissible pairs forms a bipartite compatibility graph between task types and servers. Full flexibility (every server can serve every type) gives the best load balancing but requires each server to store everything. A central question is how sparse the compatibility graph can be while keeping the performance of the fully flexible system.

For the power-of-ddd policy JSQ(ddd) (an arriving task samples ddd compatible servers and joins the shortest of their queues), Rutten and Mukherjee (arXiv:2008.07562v2, Math. Oper. Res. 2023) identify two deterministic graph conditions, proportional sparsity and subcriticality, under which the occupancy process has the same mean-field limit and the same steady-state limit as in the fully flexible system (their Theorem 3.4). They then show that natural random designs satisfy both conditions almost surely. This mission covers the second random design: task types with inhomogeneous levels of flexibility, where each edge incident to task type www is present independently with its own probability pw(N)p_w(N)pw​(N) (Theorem 3.6 of the paper).

Earlier work on JSQ-type policies with constrained compatibility includes the stability analyses of Bramson (Ann. Appl. Probab. 2011) and of Cardinaels, Borst and van Leeuwaarden (Queueing Syst. 2019), to which subcriticality is equivalent for a fixed system (Remark 3 of the paper), and the mean-field analysis of the supermarket model on graphs by Budhiraja, Mukherjee and Wu (Ann. Appl. Probab. 2019), whose load condition is stronger than the condition (A.19) used here (Remark 11 of the paper).

Setting

For each N≥1N \ge 1N≥1 there are a set VNV_NVN​ of NNN servers and a set WNW_NWN​ of M(N)≥1M(N) \ge 1M(N)≥1 dispatchers. A compatibility graph is GN=(VN,WN,EN)G_N = (V_N, W_N, E_N)GN​=(VN​,WN​,EN​) with EN⊆VN×WNE_N \subseteq V_N \times W_NEN​⊆VN​×WN​, and the neighbourhood of www is Nw={v:(v,w)∈EN}N_w = \{v : (v, w) \in E_N\}Nw​={v:(v,w)∈EN​}.

Proportional sparsity (Definition 3.1). For every ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0,

sup⁡U⊆VN1M(N)∣{w∈WN:∣∣Nw∩U∣∣Nw∣−∣U∣N∣≥ε}∣→0.\sup_{U \subseteq V_N} \frac{1}{M(N)} \Bigl| \Bigl\{ w \in W_N : \Bigl| \frac{|N_w \cap U|}{|N_w|} - \frac{|U|}{N} \Bigr| \ge \varepsilon \Bigr\} \Bigr| \to 0 .U⊆VN​sup​M(N)1​​{w∈WN​:​∣Nw​∣∣Nw​∩U∣​−N∣U∣​​≥ε}​→0.

Every set UUU of servers is seen by all but a vanishing fraction of dispatchers in roughly its global proportion.

Subcriticality (Definition 3.3). For each NNN, www and nonempty U⊆VNU \subseteq V_NU⊆VN​ there is a probability distribution γwU\gamma^U_wγwU​ on UUU such that, with kw=min⁡(d,∣Nw∣)k_w = \min(d, |N_w|)kw​=min(d,∣Nw​∣),

lim sup⁡N→∞max⁡v∈VNNM(N)∑w∈WN(∣Nw∣kw)−1∑U⊆Nw, ∣U∣=kwγwU(v)≤1.\limsup_{N \to \infty} \max_{v \in V_N} \frac{N}{M(N)} \sum_{w \in W_N} \binom{|N_w|}{k_w}^{-1} \sum_{U \subseteq N_w,\ |U| = k_w} \gamma^U_w(v) \le 1 .N→∞limsup​v∈VN​max​M(N)N​w∈WN​∑​(kw​∣Nw​∣​)−1U⊆Nw​, ∣U∣=kw​∑​γwU​(v)≤1.

Some static routing of sampled sets loads no server asymptotically beyond its capacity.

The random graph. Given edge probabilities pw(N)∈(0,1]p_w(N) \in (0, 1]pw​(N)∈(0,1], the graph GNG_NGN​ contains each pair (v,w)(v, w)(v,w) independently with probability pw(N)p_w(N)pw​(N). Write pˉ(N)=min⁡wpw(N)\bar p(N) = \min_{w} p_w(N)pˉ​(N)=minw​pw​(N) and ∥p(N)−1∥2−2=(∑wpw(N)−2)−1\|p(N)^{-1}\|_2^{-2} = (\sum_w p_w(N)^{-2})^{-1}∥p(N)−1∥2−2​=(∑w​pw​(N)−2)−1. Only the law of each GNG_NGN​ is prescribed; the graphs for different NNN may be coupled arbitrarily, and "almost surely" refers to any such coupling.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.6 (graph part)

If, as N→∞N \to \inftyN→∞,

Nln⁡M(N)+ln⁡N pˉ(N)→∞,M(N) pˉ(N)→∞,ln⁡NM(N)2∑w∈WN1pw(N)2→0,(3.5)\frac{N}{\ln M(N) + \ln N}\, \bar p(N) \to \infty, \qquad M(N)\, \bar p(N) \to \infty, \qquad \frac{\ln N}{M(N)^2} \sum_{w \in W_N} \frac{1}{p_w(N)^2} \to 0, \qquad (3.5)lnM(N)+lnNN​pˉ​(N)→∞,M(N)pˉ​(N)→∞,M(N)2lnN​w∈WN​∑​pw​(N)21​→0,(3.5)

then almost surely {GN}\{G_N\}{GN​} is proportionally sparse and satisfies the subcriticality condition.

Milestones

  1. Lemma B.1. If pˉ(N)=ω(1/N)\bar p(N) = \omega(1/N)pˉ​(N)=ω(1/N) and pˉ(N)=ω(1/M(N))\bar p(N) = \omega(1/M(N))pˉ​(N)=ω(1/M(N)), then {GN}\{G_N\}{GN​} is proportionally sparse almost surely.
  2. The (A.19) reduction. For any graph sequence and d≥1d \ge 1d≥1,
lim sup⁡N→∞max⁡v∈VNNM(N)∑w∈WN1{(v,w)∈EN}∣Nw∣≤1(A.19)\limsup_{N \to \infty} \max_{v \in V_N} \frac{N}{M(N)} \sum_{w \in W_N} \frac{\mathbb 1\{(v, w) \in E_N\}}{|N_w|} \le 1 \qquad \text{(A.19)}N→∞limsup​v∈VN​max​M(N)N​w∈WN​∑​∣Nw​∣1{(v,w)∈EN​}​≤1(A.19)

implies subcriticality. 3. Lemma B.2. If pˉ(N)=ω((ln⁡M(N)+ln⁡N)/N)\bar p(N) = \omega((\ln M(N) + \ln N)/N)pˉ​(N)=ω((lnM(N)+lnN)/N) and ∥p(N)−1∥2−2=ω(ln⁡N/M(N)2)\|p(N)^{-1}\|_2^{-2} = \omega(\ln N / M(N)^2)∥p(N)−1∥2−2​=ω(lnN/M(N)2), then {GN}\{G_N\}{GN​} satisfies the subcriticality condition almost surely.

The goal is the conjunction of Lemmas B.1 and B.2 under (3.5).

Significance

Combined with Theorem 3.4 of the paper, the goal says that JSQ(ddd) on a random compatibility graph with dispatcher-dependent flexibility behaves, in the large-system limit and in steady state, like JSQ(ddd) on the complete bipartite graph. Condition (3.5) allows the least flexible task type to be compatible with only about ln⁡(M(N)N)\ln(M(N)N)ln(M(N)N) times a diverging factor of servers in expectation, far below NNN, and allows strongly heterogeneous flexibility levels as long as the spread measured by ∑wpw(N)−2\sum_w p_w(N)^{-2}∑w​pw​(N)−2 is controlled. Remark 8 of the paper notes that for M(N)=NM(N) = NM(N)=N and equal probabilities, p(N)=o(ln⁡N/N)p(N) = o(\ln N / N)p(N)=o(lnN/N) leaves a dispatcher isolated with probability tending to one, so the growth conditions are close to necessary.

The result is proved in the paper (Appendix B). As far as is known, none of it has been machine-checked. A formal proof requires a quantitative Chernoff bound for binomial tails, a bounded-differences (Azuma–Hoeffding) inequality for functions of independent Bernoulli variables, a union bound over all 2N2^N2N subsets of servers, and the first Borel–Cantelli lemma in a setting where only per-NNN marginal laws are fixed.

Difficulty

Proportional sparsity quantifies over every subset UUU of the NNN servers. A concentration estimate for one fixed UUU, or one fixed dispatcher, is not enough: whatever bound is used must survive a union over 2N2^N2N subsets, so a merely vanishing failure probability per dispatcher does not suffice.

Subcriticality is a maximum over all servers of a sum whose terms 1{(v,w)∈EN}/∣Nw∣\mathbb 1\{(v, w) \in E_N\}/|N_w|1{(v,w)∈EN​}/∣Nw​∣ are not independent: ∣Nw∣|N_w|∣Nw​∣ depends on the edge (v,w)(v, w)(v,w) itself, and a term is unbounded in the regime where ∣Nw∣|N_w|∣Nw​∣ is small. A direct concentration inequality for this sum therefore does not apply, and the logarithmic factors in (3.5) reflect the need to control all M(N)M(N)M(N) neighbourhood sizes and all NNN servers at once.

Independence across NNN is not available, so almost-sure statements cannot use the second Borel–Cantelli lemma or any law of large numbers along NNN; every bound must be summable in NNN.

Formalization scope

  • Servers are Fin N, dispatchers Fin (M N) with 0 < M N assumed, and a graph is a Finset (Fin N × Fin (M N)).
  • Edge probabilities are reals with 0<pw(N)≤10 < p_w(N) \le 10<pw​(N)≤1 (implicit in the paper). The random graph is a family of measurable maps XN:Ω→{0,1}VN×WNX_N : \Omega \to \{0,1\}^{V_N \times W_N}XN​:Ω→{0,1}VN​×WN​ on one probability space whose image law is the product of Bernoulli(pw(N))(p_w(N))(pw​(N)) laws. No assumption links different NNN.
  • Every "lim sup⁡≤1\limsup \le 1limsup≤1" is stated as "for every ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0, eventually, for every server, ≤1+ε\le 1 + \varepsilon≤1+ε"; the supremum over UUU in (3.1) as "for all ε,δ>0\varepsilon, \delta > 0ε,δ>0, eventually, for every UUU, at most δM(N)\delta M(N)δM(N) bad dispatchers". Both are exact equivalents.
  • Ratios use real division; ∣Nw∣=0|N_w| = 0∣Nw​∣=0 gives ratio 000, harmless for a limit condition. At N=1N = 1N=1 the logarithms in (3.5) and Lemma B.2 can make a denominator 000; this affects finitely many NNN.
  • Proportional sparsity does not include connectivity: these graphs are disconnected with positive probability for every NNN, so requiring connectivity would make the goal false.
  • Subcriticality is Definition 3.3 with two repairs: distributions are required only for nonempty UUU, and the normalisation is (∣Nw∣min⁡(d,∣Nw∣))\binom{|N_w|}{\min(d, |N_w|)}(min(d,∣Nw​∣)∣Nw​∣​) instead of the printed (∣Nw∣d)\binom{|N_w|}{d}(d∣Nw​∣​), which is 000 when ∣Nw∣<d|N_w| < d∣Nw​∣<d, an event of positive probability here. The two agree when ∣Nw∣≥d|N_w| \ge d∣Nw​∣≥d.
  • d≥2d \ge 2d≥2 as in the model. Under d=0d = 0d=0 the subcriticality predicate would be trivially true; the statements exclude it.
  • Only the graph part of Theorem 3.6 is posed; "Consequently, the conclusions of Theorem 3.4 hold" belongs to the mean-field mission of this series.

A complete development needs binomial Chernoff bounds, a bounded-differences inequality and Borel–Cantelli for summable bounds; these are reusable for other random-graph statements. Proofs of the deterministic (A.19) reduction and of either lemma are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • M. Rutten, D. Mukherjee, Load Balancing Under Strict Compatibility Constraints, arXiv:2008.07562v2, 2020; Math. Oper. Res. 48 (2023). https://arxiv.org/abs/2008.07562
  • M. Bramson, Stability of join the shortest queue networks, Ann. Appl. Probab. 21(4):1568–1625, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1214/10-AAP726
  • A. Budhiraja, D. Mukherjee, R. Wu, Supermarket model on graphs, Ann. Appl. Probab. 29(3):1740–1777, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.07607
  • E. Cardinaels, S. C. Borst, J. S. H. van Leeuwaarden, Job assignment in large-scale service systems with affinity relations, Queueing Syst. 93(3–4):227–268, 2019.
  • S. Janson, T. Łuczak, A. Ruciński, Random Graphs, Wiley, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118032718
7 thms1 active userReviewed
AnalysisOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Lightning Network Economics: Channels III: The Minimal Cost of a Symmetric Bidirectional Channel Is 3(2Bλ/r)^{1/3} − B/6 + O(r^{1/3}) as r → 0Research Paper

Motivation

Payment channels let two parties make repeated transfers while using an on-chain transaction only when a channel needs resetting. They require funds to be committed in advance. The economic choice is therefore between the transaction fees saved by using a channel and the opportunity cost of funds tied up in it. Guasoni, Huberman, and Shikhelman give a stochastic cost model in which this tradeoff can be compared for one-way and two-way payment streams (Guasoni et al., 2023, §§1 and 3). Their small-discount-rate result makes the difference between the two arrangements quantitative: the optimal one-way cost grows like r−1/2r^{-1/2}r−1/2, while the optimal symmetric two-way cost grows like r−1/3r^{-1/3}r−1/3.

The paper was published online in Management Science on November 6, 2023. This mission concerns Theorem 3(i)–(ii) in that published version, especially the cost expansion (8). The paper proves these asymptotic claims; the task here is to state them precisely in Lean and develop machine-checked proofs of the stated cost laws.

Setting

Two nodes exchange unit payments. Payments from node 1 to node 2 arrive at rate λ1\lambda_1λ1​, and payments in the reverse direction arrive at rate λ2\lambda_2λ2​. Each payment stream is a Poisson process, and the streams are independent. The continuously compounded discount rate r>0r>0r>0 measures the opportunity cost of committed capital. A channel reset costs B>0B>0B>0, while an on-chain payment costs CCC. Node 1 commits l1l_1l1​ and node 2 commits l2l_2l2​. The channel balance moves by one unit at each payment; at a boundary, a reset replenishes it (Guasoni et al., 2023, §§1.1, 3.1 and 5).

The paper's closed-form bidirectional cost cl1,l2(λ1,λ2)c^{l_1,l_2}(\lambda_1,\lambda_2)cl1​,l2​(λ1​,λ2​) is given in equations (3)–(4). It uses two characteristic roots α−\alpha_-α−​ and α+\alpha_+α+​, determined by the payment rates and rrr. This mission uses the formula at equal rates λ1=λ2=λ>0\lambda_1=\lambda_2=\lambda>0λ1​=λ2​=λ>0. A separate unidirectional cost c0,m(0,λ)c^{0,m}(0,\lambda)c0,m(0,λ) from equation (1) describes a stream in only one direction. Its optimizing size is denoted mmm below. The exact channel model has integer balance states; the paper optimizes the closed forms over positive real channel sizes in its asymptotic analysis.

Write copt(0,λ)c^{\mathrm{opt}}(0,\lambda)copt(0,λ) for the infimum of the unidirectional cost over m>0m>0m>0, and copt(λ,λ)c^{\mathrm{opt}}(\lambda,\lambda)copt(λ,λ) for the infimum of the symmetric bidirectional cost over l1,l2>0l_1,l_2>0l1​,l2​>0. These are functions of rrr and BBB as well as of λ\lambdaλ; the compact paper notation suppresses those arguments. The term O(ra)O(r^a)O(ra) has its usual uniform meaning as r↓0r\downarrow0r↓0 with BBB and λ\lambdaλ fixed: its absolute value is at most a constant times rar^ara for all sufficiently small positive rrr.

Formalization targets

Unidirectional benchmark

Theorem 3(i), equation (7), states

copt(0,λ)=2(Bλr)1/2−B2+O(r1/2).c^{\mathrm{opt}}(0,\lambda) =2\left(\frac{B\lambda}{r}\right)^{1/2}-\frac B2+O(r^{1/2}).copt(0,λ)=2(rBλ​)1/2−2B​+O(r1/2).

The same part states that an optimal size is (Bλ/r)1/2+O(r1/2)(B\lambda/r)^{1/2}+O(r^{1/2})(Bλ/r)1/2+O(r1/2). The mission records that size claim using the explicit optimizer displayed after equation (2) (Guasoni et al., 2023, pp. 6–7).

Symmetric bidirectional goal

The mission's goal is the cost clause of Theorem 3(ii), equation (8):

copt(λ,λ)=3(2Bλr)1/3−B6+O(r1/3).c^{\mathrm{opt}}(\lambda,\lambda) =3\left(\frac{2B\lambda}{r}\right)^{1/3}-\frac B6+O(r^{1/3}).copt(λ,λ)=3(r2Bλ​)1/3−6B​+O(r1/3).

This includes the constant correction −B/6-B/6−B/6 and a two-sided error estimate of order r1/3r^{1/3}r1/3. The theorem also states that optimal commitments are equal and each has size (2Bλ/r)1/3+O(r1/3)(2B\lambda/r)^{1/3}+O(r^{1/3})(2Bλ/r)1/3+O(r1/3). That separate size clause is outside this proposal; the goal does not assert the existence or location of a minimizing pair (Guasoni et al., 2023, p. 7).

Significance

The different exponents distinguish the two designs even when both can make frequent off-chain payments. At small rrr, the model's optimal symmetric bidirectional cost grows more slowly than its optimal unidirectional cost. The formulas also retain the next constant term, allowing a comparison beyond the leading growth rates. The paper relates this difference to the amount of capital that must be committed by the participants (Guasoni et al., 2023, p. 7).

A formal proof would connect the exact channel-cost formulas, a two-variable infimum, the diagonal specialization, bounds on the hyperbolic cosecant, and real asymptotics in one reusable development. The supporting statements are useful separately: the root expansion concerns a quadratic characteristic equation, and the diagonal reduction concerns a symmetric optimization problem. The paper supplies proofs of the mathematical results; the remaining work is their faithful machine-checked formalization.

Difficulty

The cost depends on rrr and on sizes that grow without bound as rrr approaches zero. An expansion valid for each fixed size does not by itself justify substituting a size that varies with rrr. The target asks for a uniform remainder at the infimum, including its constant term. The cost must be controlled from both sides over every admissible positive size; evaluating one promising size supplies only one side of that comparison. The paper's proof of Theorem 3 uses formal small-rrr expansions of the cost and first-order conditions, and the stated error rate calls for care when these are applied to moving optimizers (Guasoni et al., 2023, pp. 11–12).

Formalization scope

The Lean definitions reproduce equations (1), (3), and (4). The one-way and two-way costs are separate functions, matching the paper's separate treatment of the unidirectional boundary case. Real powers are used for the real-size optimization; the balance lattice in the exact stochastic model uses integer sizes. Both optimal costs are infima over strictly positive real sizes. The symmetric infimum is not defined by choosing a particular size or by assuming that the minimum is attained. All rates in the asymptotic theorems satisfy λ>0\lambda>0λ>0, the reset cost satisfies B>0B>0B>0, and the filter sends rrr to zero through positive values. Consequently a Big-O constant may depend on BBB and λ\lambdaλ but cannot depend on rrr.

The on-chain costs Cλ/rC\lambda/rCλ/r for one stream and 2Cλ/r2C\lambda/r2Cλ/r for two equal streams supply the paper's economic comparison, although CCC does not occur in this mission's cost goal. The diagonal milestone omits that on-chain term because it is constant in the channel sizes; it states a midpoint cost inequality so no minimizer is assumed. The proof's root expansion is recorded for both α+\alpha_+α+​ and α−\alpha_-α−​. The paper's assertion that the symmetric minimizing sizes equal (2Bλ/r)1/3+O(r1/3)(2B\lambda/r)^{1/3}+O(r^{1/3})(2Bλ/r)1/3+O(r1/3) is explicitly omitted. The development does not fix a numerical value of rrr, permit an rrr-dependent Big-O constant, drop the −B/6-B/6−B/6 term, or replace the infimum by cost at a chosen size.

The mission needs real-power identities, properties of sinh⁡\sinhsinh and cosh⁡\coshcosh, nonempty bounded-below cost sets, infimum estimates, and Mathlib's Asymptotics.IsBigO on the positive-side neighborhood of zero. Results about real asymptotics and symmetric minimization can be reused beyond this channel model. Contributions proving the cost milestones, the root expansion, the diagonal inequality, and the goal are all within scope.

Selected references

  • Guasoni, P., Huberman, G., and Shikhelman, Y., Lightning Network Economics: Channels, Management Science, Articles in Advance, November 6, 2023, pp. 1–14. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.01664.
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Graph TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Load Balancing Under Strict Compatibility Constraints 2: Random Graphs with Server Degree c(N) → ∞ and Nc(N)/(M(N) ln N) → ∞ Are Almost Surely Proportionally Sparse and SubcriticalResearch Paper

Motivation

In large data centres, an incoming task often cannot run on every server: its data, software or licences sit on only some of the machines. Such strict compatibility constraints are modelled by a bipartite graph between task types (dispatchers) and servers. For the fully flexible system, in which every task can go to every server, the JSQ(ddd) policy (sample ddd servers at random and join the shortest queue) is described in the large-system limit by the mean-field ODE of Vvedenskaya, Dobrushin and Karpelevich (1996) and Mitzenmacher (1996). Rutten and Mukherjee (arXiv:2008.07562, Math. Oper. Res. 2023) identify two graph conditions, proportional sparsity and subcriticality, under which JSQ(ddd) on a sparse compatibility graph has the same mean-field limit and the same steady state as the fully flexible system (their Theorem 3.4).

The two conditions are useful in system design only if there are natural graph families that satisfy them. A storage designer controls the server degree: the number of task types a server can process is roughly proportional to the data it must store. Theorem 3.5 of the paper answers this design question for random graphs. If every server stores data for c(N)c(N)c(N) task types chosen uniformly at random, then c(N)→∞c(N)\to\inftyc(N)→∞ together with a mild density condition suffices, even when c(N)c(N)c(N) is negligible compared with the number M(N)M(N)M(N) of task types. This mission formalizes Theorem 3.5's graph-theoretic content and the chain of lemmas in Appendix A that proves it.

Setting

A system with NNN servers VN={1,…,N}V_N=\{1,\dots,N\}VN​={1,…,N} and M(N)M(N)M(N) dispatchers WN={1,…,M(N)}W_N=\{1,\dots,M(N)\}WN​={1,…,M(N)} has a compatibility graph GN=(VN,WN,EN)G_N=(V_N,W_N,E_N)GN​=(VN​,WN​,EN​) with EN⊆VN×WNE_N\subseteq V_N\times W_NEN​⊆VN​×WN​. The neighbourhood of a dispatcher www is Nw={v:(v,w)∈EN}\mathcal N_w=\{v:(v,w)\in E_N\}Nw​={v:(v,w)∈EN​}; that of a server vvv is Nv={w:(v,w)∈EN}\mathcal N_v=\{w:(v,w)\in E_N\}Nv​={w:(v,w)∈EN​}.

Proportional sparsity (Definition 3.1): for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0,

sup⁡U⊆VN∣{w∈WN:∣∣Nw∩U∣∣Nw∣−∣U∣N∣≥ε}∣/M(N)→0.\sup_{U\subseteq V_N}\Big|\Big\{w\in W_N:\Big|\tfrac{|\mathcal N_w\cap U|}{|\mathcal N_w|}-\tfrac{|U|}{N}\Big|\ge\varepsilon\Big\}\Big|\Big/M(N)\to0 .U⊆VN​sup​​{w∈WN​:​∣Nw​∣∣Nw​∩U∣​−N∣U∣​​≥ε}​/M(N)→0.

In words, for every set UUU of servers, all but a vanishing fraction of the dispatchers see UUU in roughly the proportion ∣U∣/N|U|/N∣U∣/N.

Subcriticality (Definition 3.3) with sample size d≥2d\ge2d≥2: there are probability distributions γwU\gamma^U_wγwU​ on the sets U⊆VNU\subseteq V_NU⊆VN​ such that

lim sup⁡N→∞max⁡v∈VNNM(N)∑w∈WN(∣Nw∣kw)−1∑U⊆Nw, ∣U∣=kwγwU(v)≤1,kw=min⁡(d,∣Nw∣).\limsup_{N\to\infty}\max_{v\in V_N}\frac{N}{M(N)}\sum_{w\in W_N}\binom{|\mathcal N_w|}{k_w}^{-1}\sum_{U\subseteq\mathcal N_w,\ |U|=k_w}\gamma^U_w(v)\le1,\qquad k_w=\min(d,|\mathcal N_w|).N→∞limsup​v∈VN​max​M(N)N​w∈WN​∑​(kw​∣Nw​∣​)−1U⊆Nw​, ∣U∣=kw​∑​γwU​(v)≤1,kw​=min(d,∣Nw​∣).

Think of a static policy that routes a task arriving at www to a server in a sampled set UUU according to γwU\gamma^U_wγwU​. The condition says that no server receives more than its fair share of load. Its uniform-weight special case is condition (A.19):

lim sup⁡N→∞max⁡v∈VNNM(N)∑w∈WN1{(v,w)∈EN}∣Nw∣≤1.\limsup_{N\to\infty}\max_{v\in V_N}\frac{N}{M(N)}\sum_{w\in W_N}\frac{\mathbb 1\{(v,w)\in E_N\}}{|\mathcal N_w|}\le1 .N→∞limsup​v∈VN​max​M(N)N​w∈WN​∑​∣Nw​∣1{(v,w)∈EN​}​≤1.

The random graph. Let 1≤c(N)≤M(N)1\le c(N)\le M(N)1≤c(N)≤M(N). For each NNN, each server independently chooses its neighbourhood Nv\mathcal N_vNv​ uniformly among the c(N)c(N)c(N)-subsets of WNW_NWN​, so every server has degree exactly c(N)c(N)c(N). All graphs live on one probability space, but only the law of each GNG_NGN​ is prescribed; the joint law across different NNN is arbitrary.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.5 (graph part)

If c(N)→∞c(N)\to\inftyc(N)→∞ and Nc(N)/(M(N)ln⁡N)→∞Nc(N)/(M(N)\ln N)\to\inftyNc(N)/(M(N)lnN)→∞, then almost surely

{GN}N≥1 is proportionally sparseand{GN}N≥1 satisfies the subcriticality condition.\{G_N\}_{N\ge1}\ \text{is proportionally sparse}\quad\text{and}\quad\{G_N\}_{N\ge1}\ \text{satisfies the subcriticality condition.}{GN​}N≥1​ is proportionally sparseand{GN​}N≥1​ satisfies the subcriticality condition.

Milestones, in the order of the proof in Appendix A

  1. Lemma A.1. If XN∼Bin(N,p(N))X_N\sim\mathrm{Bin}(N,p(N))XN​∼Bin(N,p(N)) and p(N)→0p(N)\to0p(N)→0, then for each δ∈(0,1/2)\delta\in(0,1/2)δ∈(0,1/2) there are N0≥1N_0\ge1N0​≥1 and a>0a>0a>0 with P(XN≥δN)≤(a p(N)δ)N\mathbb P(X_N\ge\delta N)\le(a\,p(N)^\delta)^NP(XN​≥δN)≤(ap(N)δ)N for N≥N0N\ge N_0N≥N0​.
  2. Lemma A.2. Let BN(X)B_N(X)BN​(X) be the set of servers whose number of neighbours in XXX deviates from c(N)∣X∣/M(N)c(N)|X|/M(N)c(N)∣X∣/M(N) by at least εc(N)∣X∣/M(N)\varepsilon c(N)|X|/M(N)εc(N)∣X∣/M(N). If c(N)→∞c(N)\to\inftyc(N)→∞ and Nc(N)/M(N)→∞Nc(N)/M(N)\to\inftyNc(N)/M(N)→∞, then for 0<ε≤3/20<\varepsilon\le3/20<ε≤3/2, 0<δ<1/20<\delta<1/20<δ<1/2 and η>0\eta>0η>0, almost surely eventually ∣BN(X)∣≤δN|B_N(X)|\le\delta N∣BN​(X)∣≤δN for all XXX with ∣X∣≥ηM(N)|X|\ge\eta M(N)∣X∣≥ηM(N).
  3. Lemma A.3. Under the same growth conditions, almost surely eventually at most δM(N)\delta M(N)δM(N) dispatchers have ∣Nw∣≤(1−ε)Nc(N)/M(N)|\mathcal N_w|\le(1-\varepsilon)Nc(N)/M(N)∣Nw​∣≤(1−ε)Nc(N)/M(N).
  4. Proposition A.4. Under the same growth conditions, {GN}\{G_N\}{GN​} is proportionally sparse almost surely.
  5. (A.19) reduction (p. 34). For any graph sequence, (A.19) implies subcriticality.
  6. Lemma A.5. If Nc(N)/(M(N)ln⁡N)→∞Nc(N)/(M(N)\ln N)\to\inftyNc(N)/(M(N)lnN)→∞, then {GN}\{G_N\}{GN​} satisfies (A.19) almost surely.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3.5 shows that the performance of the fully flexible JSQ(ddd) system, in the mean-field limit and in steady state, can be achieved with a server degree c(N)c(N)c(N) that grows arbitrarily slowly. The only requirement is that each dispatcher's mean degree Nc(N)/M(N)Nc(N)/M(N)Nc(N)/M(N) grow faster than ln⁡N\ln NlnN. Each server then needs to store data for only c(N)c(N)c(N) task types, a vanishing fraction of the M(N)M(N)M(N) types. The ln⁡N\ln NlnN threshold matches the scale below which some dispatchers have too few neighbours to share the load evenly.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper, and no part of it has been machine-checked. The mission produces reusable statements about random bipartite graphs with fixed left degree: hypergeometric concentration over all large dispatcher sets, the degree lower tail, and a Borel–Cantelli argument without independence across NNN. It also produces a deterministic reduction from subcriticality to (A.19). That reduction is shared with Theorem 3.6 of the same paper (inhomogeneous random graphs). The printed proof of Lemma A.5 has a gap: (A.23) bounds the probability that some dispatcher has low degree by N1−a2/2N^{1-a^2/2}N1−a2/2, but the union over M(N)M(N)M(N) dispatchers gives M(N)N−a2/2M(N)N^{-a^2/2}M(N)N−a2/2. This is not summable when M(N)M(N)M(N) grows faster than every polynomial, which the hypotheses allow. A complete formal proof must close this gap or show that low-degree dispatchers contribute too little to matter.

Difficulty

Every statement is almost sure along the whole sequence, but the graphs for different NNN may be coupled arbitrarily, so no strong law over NNN is available. Each a.s. claim needs a failure probability that is summable in NNN, followed by the first Borel–Cantelli lemma. Proportional sparsity quantifies over all 2N2^N2N server sets UUU, and Lemma A.2 over all 2M(N)2^{M(N)}2M(N) dispatcher sets XXX. The obvious argument would concentrate each ∣Nw∩U∣|\mathcal N_w\cap U|∣Nw​∩U∣ separately and take a union bound. It fails because ∣Nw∣|\mathcal N_w|∣Nw​∣ is only of order Nc(N)/M(N)Nc(N)/M(N)Nc(N)/M(N), which may be far smaller than NNN and M(N)M(N)M(N), so per-dispatcher tails cannot absorb an eNe^{N}eN or eM(N)e^{M(N)}eM(N) union. Uniform control over all large sets XXX (Lemma A.2) is therefore the crux. For subcriticality, the difficulty is that the maximum over vvv runs over NNN servers while the minimum degree runs over M(N)M(N)M(N) dispatchers.

Formalization scope

  • Servers are Fin N, dispatchers Fin (M N); a graph is a Finset (Fin N × Fin (M N)), and a random graph is a measurable random adjacency matrix Fin N → Fin (M N) → Bool (the space {0,1}N×M(N)\{0,1\}^{N\times M(N)}{0,1}N×M(N) of p. 13).
  • The law of each random matrix is prescribed pointwise: every matrix with all row sums equal to c(N)c(N)c(N) has probability (M(N)c(N))−N\binom{M(N)}{c(N)}^{-N}(c(N)M(N)​)−N. This is the uniform, independent-over-servers choice. No independence across NNN is assumed. A formalization that assumes independent graphs for different NNN proves a weaker theorem.
  • Hypotheses 1≤c(N)≤M(N)1\le c(N)\le M(N)1≤c(N)≤M(N) for every NNN, d≥2d\ge2d≥2, and the growth conditions as real limits (Tendsto … atTop atTop). ln⁡N\ln NlnN is Real.log, so the ratio is 000 at N=1N=1N=1, which does not affect a limit.
  • Proportional sparsity is the limit condition (3.1) as "for every ε,δ>0\varepsilon,\delta>0ε,δ>0, eventually, for every UUU, at most δM(N)\delta M(N)δM(N) bad dispatchers". The connectivity in Definition 3.1 is not included, because the random graphs are disconnected for small NNN. A dispatcher with ∣Nw∣=0|\mathcal N_w|=0∣Nw​∣=0 gives the ratio 0/0=00/0=00/0=0 in Lean.
  • Subcriticality constrains γwU\gamma^U_wγwU​ only for nonempty UUU and normalises by (∣Nw∣min⁡(d,∣Nw∣))\binom{|\mathcal N_w|}{\min(d,|\mathcal N_w|)}(min(d,∣Nw​∣)∣Nw​∣​). The paper's (∣Nw∣d)\binom{|\mathcal N_w|}{d}(d∣Nw​∣​) is 1/01/01/0 when ∣Nw∣<d|\mathcal N_w|<d∣Nw​∣<d, and the empty UUU admits no distribution. With the literal definition the goal would be false. Both "lim sup⁡≤1\limsup\le1limsup≤1" conditions are written as "for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, eventually at most 1+ε1+\varepsilon1+ε".
  • Not formalized: the sentence "Consequently, the conclusions of Theorem 3.4 hold", which composes this mission's goal with the mean-field mission of this series.
  • Infrastructure that is welcome and reusable: hypergeometric and binomial Chernoff bounds in a form usable with Finset.powersetCard, and Borel–Cantelli for eventually-uniform statements over families of finite sets.

Selected references

  • D. Rutten and D. Mukherjee, Load Balancing Under Strict Compatibility Constraints, Math. Oper. Res., 2023; arXiv:2008.07562v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/2008.07562
  • A. Budhiraja, D. Mukherjee and R. Wu, Supermarket model on graphs, Ann. Appl. Probab. 29(3):1740–1777, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1214/18-AAP1437
  • M. Bramson, Stability of join the shortest queue networks, Ann. Appl. Probab. 21(4):1568–1625, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1214/10-AAP726
  • S. Janson, T. Łuczak and A. Ruciński, Random Graphs, Wiley, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118032718
  • N. D. Vvedenskaya, R. L. Dobrushin and F. I. Karpelevich, Queueing system with selection of the shortest of two queues: an asymptotic approach, Probl. Inf. Transm. 32(1):15–27, 1996.
  • M. Mitzenmacher, The power of two choices in randomized load balancing, IEEE Trans. Parallel Distrib. Syst. 12(10):1094–1104, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1109/71.963420
10 thms1 active userReviewed
EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Management in Crowdfunding 2: Optimal Pledge Level and Campaign Duration When Each Backer Type Shares One Valuation and Herding Is WeakResearch Paper

Motivation

On reward-based crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter, a project creator fixes two numbers before launch: the pledge level ppp, the amount a backer commits, and the campaign duration TTT. Both are set once and cannot be revised. A higher pledge earns more per backer but turns away backers whose valuation falls short, and a longer campaign reaches more backers but makes them wait longer for a project they value less the further away its delivery is. Zhang, Savin and Veeraraghavan (Revenue Management in Crowdfunding, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2022; manuscript SSRN 3065267) model this trade-off with two kinds of backers. Independent backers decide on their own valuation. Herding backers arrive in proportion to the pledges already collected, so early success attracts more pledges. The paper asks when the creator should exploit herding and when it should ignore it.

This mission formalizes the paper's answer in the simplest setting it treats: every independent backer values the project at the same viv_ivi​, and every herding backer at the same vhv_hvh​.

Setting

A campaign has a population I^>0\hat I>0I^>0 of independent backers, who arrive at rate k>0k>0k>0 times the number still to come. Every backer discounts the project's value at rate r>0r>0r>0: a backer arriving at time ttt with valuation vvv pledges if and only if ve−r(T−t)≥pv e^{-r(T-t)}\ge pve−r(T−t)≥p. Herding backers arrive at time ttt at rate Λhqp\Lambda_h q pΛh​qp times the number of pledges so far, where Λh≥0\Lambda_h\ge0Λh​≥0 is an arrival rate and q≥0q\ge0q≥0 a propensity to pledge, and they pledge under the same discounted-value rule. Valuations lie in [0,vˉ][0,\bar v][0,vˉ] and enter only through the survival functions Fˉi=1−Fi\bar F_i=1-F_iFˉi​=1−Fi​ and Fˉh=1−Fh\bar F_h=1-F_hFˉh​=1−Fh​ of the two valuation laws.

The paper solves the pledging dynamics in closed form (its Propositions 1 and 2). The numbers of pledging independent and herding backers at time ttt are

nip(t,p,T)=kI^∫0te−kxFˉi(per(T−x)) dx,n^p_i(t,p,T)=k\hat I\int_0^t e^{-kx}\bar F_i\big(pe^{r(T-x)}\big)\,dx,nip​(t,p,T)=kI^∫0t​e−kxFˉi​(per(T−x))dx, nhp(t,p,T)=Λhqp kI^∫0teΛhqp∫τtFˉh(per(T−u))du Fˉh(per(T−τ))∫0τe−kxFˉi(per(T−x))dx dτ.n^p_h(t,p,T)=\Lambda_hqp\,k\hat I\int_0^t e^{\Lambda_hqp\int_\tau^t\bar F_h(pe^{r(T-u)})du}\,\bar F_h\big(pe^{r(T-\tau)}\big)\int_0^\tau e^{-kx}\bar F_i\big(pe^{r(T-x)}\big)dx\,d\tau .nhp​(t,p,T)=Λh​qpkI^∫0t​eΛh​qp∫τt​Fˉh​(per(T−u))duFˉh​(per(T−τ))∫0τ​e−kxFˉi​(per(T−x))dxdτ.

The total number of pledges is n(p,T)=nip(T,p,T)+nhp(T,p,T)n(p,T)=n^p_i(T,p,T)+n^p_h(T,p,T)n(p,T)=nip​(T,p,T)+nhp​(T,p,T), and the creator's problem (18) is

max⁡ π(p,T)=p n(p,T)over0<p≤vˉ,  0≤T≤1rln⁡(vˉ/p).\max\ \pi(p,T)=p\,n(p,T)\quad\text{over}\quad 0<p\le\bar v,\ \ 0\le T\le\tfrac1r\ln(\bar v/p).max π(p,T)=pn(p,T)over0<p≤vˉ,  0≤T≤r1​ln(vˉ/p).

With identical valuations, Fˉi(y)=1\bar F_i(y)=1Fˉi​(y)=1 for y<viy<v_iy<vi​ and 000 for y≥viy\ge v_iy≥vi​, and likewise Fˉh\bar F_hFˉh​ with vhv_hvh​, where 0<vi,vh≤vˉ0<v_i,v_h\le\bar v0<vi​,vh​≤vˉ. Proposition 6 adds the constraint T≤1rln⁡(vi/p)T\le\frac1r\ln(v_i/p)T≤r1​ln(vi​/p), under which every independent backer pledges from the start.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 6(ii)

Let Λh,q>0\Lambda_h,q>0Λh​,q>0, vi>vhv_i>v_hvi​>vh​, and set δ=Λhqvh/r\delta=\Lambda_hqv_h/rδ=Λh​qvh​/r, a=k/(Λhq)a=k/(\Lambda_hq)a=k/(Λh​q), b=Λhq/rb=\Lambda_hq/rb=Λh​q/r and

X=ebvh/e14a(krvhe−2+0.5 bvh2e−3+2a+vh)+1a(kr(vh+a)+a).X=e^{bv_h/e}\frac1{4a}\Big(\frac kr v_he^{-2}+0.5\,bv_h^2e^{-3}+2a+v_h\Big)+\frac1a\Big(\frac kr(v_h+a)+a\Big).X=ebvh​/e4a1​(rk​vh​e−2+0.5bvh2​e−3+2a+vh​)+a1​(rk​(vh​+a)+a).

If δ<1\delta<1δ<1 and vi/vh>(X/(1−δ))r/kv_i/v_h>(X/(1-\delta))^{r/k}vi​/vh​>(X/(1−δ))r/k, then on Proposition 6's feasible set the unique maximizer of π\piπ is

p∗=vi(rk+r)r/k,T∗=1rln⁡vip∗.p^*=v_i\Big(\frac r{k+r}\Big)^{r/k},\qquad T^*=\frac1r\ln\frac{v_i}{p^*}.p∗=vi​(k+rr​)r/k,T∗=r1​lnp∗vi​​.

Milestones

  1. Corollary 1. If 0<p≤min⁡(vie−rT,vh)0<p\le\min(v_ie^{-rT},v_h)0<p≤min(vi​e−rT,vh​), then for t∈[0,T]t\in[0,T]t∈[0,T], nip(t,p,T)=I^(1−e−kt)n^p_i(t,p,T)=\hat I(1-e^{-kt})nip​(t,p,T)=I^(1−e−kt) and nhpn^p_hnhp​ equals the explicit formula (15).
  2. Proposition 3(b). If Λhqvh/r<1\Lambda_hqv_h/r<1Λh​qvh​/r<1 and k/r>2k/r>2k/r>2, then for every sufficiently long fixed duration TTT, the unique optimal pledge level on (18)'s range is p∗(T)=vie−rTp^*(T)=v_ie^{-rT}p∗(T)=vi​e−rT.
  3. Proposition 6(i). If vi≤vhv_i\le v_hvi​≤vh​, an optimal campaign exists on Proposition 6's feasible set, and every optimum has p∗≥vi/ep^*\ge v_i/ep∗≥vi​/e and T∗≤1/rT^*\le 1/rT∗≤1/r.

Significance

Proposition 6 separates two regimes. When herding backers value the project at least as much as independent ones, the optimal campaign is short, T∗≤1/rT^*\le1/rT∗≤1/r, and its pledge is at least vi/ev_i/evi​/e. When herding is weak (δ<1\delta<1δ<1) and independent backers value the project enough more than herding ones, the creator's best response is to price herding backers out entirely and run the campaign that would be optimal if no herding backer existed. The threshold (33) quantifies "enough more". Together with Proposition 3(b), which fixes the duration and finds that the optimal pledge sits exactly at the highest level that keeps every independent backer in from the start, these results give a creator explicit rules rather than a numerical optimization.

The paper states that the proofs of Propositions 3 to 7 are in an online Technical Appendix, which is not part of the manuscript this mission cites; the manuscript's own Appendix proves only Propositions 1 and 2 and Corollaries 1 and 2. None of the results has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing Proposition 6(ii) would supply a verified proof of a result whose published proof is not in the source held here, and would check the threshold (33), whose grouping of terms is read off the typeset page.

Difficulty

The objective π\piπ is defined through nested integrals of step functions, so it is not differentiable everywhere: the jumps of Fˉi\bar F_iFˉi​ and Fˉh\bar F_hFˉh​ put kinks in π\piπ where p=vie−rTp=v_ie^{-rT}p=vi​e−rT and where p=vhe−rTp=v_he^{-rT}p=vh​e−rT or p=vhp=v_hp=vh​, at which a backer type starts or stops pledging during the campaign. Setting a gradient to zero does not identify the optimum. The obvious argument for the goal, that herding backers do not pledge at p∗>vhp^*>v_hp∗>vh​ and so the no-herding optimum is optimal, compares only campaigns that exclude herding backers; it says nothing about the campaigns with a lower pledge level that do attract them. Those campaigns gain a herding term growing exponentially in Λhqp\Lambda_hqpΛh​qp times the time during which herding backers pledge, and the comparison must hold uniformly over the whole feasible region, which is what the threshold (33) is for. Uniqueness, not only optimality, must also be shown.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace CrowdfundRM.Identical. Parameters form a structure Campaign with fields Ihat, k, r, Lh (for Λh\Lambda_hΛh​), q, vbar, Fbi, Fbh. The standing assumptions, implicit in the paper, are I^,k,r,vˉ>0\hat I,k,r,\bar v>0I^,k,r,vˉ>0, Λh,q≥0\Lambda_h,q\ge0Λh​,q≥0, and that each survival function is nonincreasing, takes values in [0,1][0,1][0,1], equals 111 below 000 and 000 from vˉ\bar vvˉ on. Identical valuations set Fˉi\bar F_iFˉi​, Fˉh\bar F_hFˉh​ to the step functions above with 0<vi,vh≤vˉ0<v_i,v_h\le\bar v0<vi​,vh​≤vˉ.

Conventions: real numbers throughout; the pledge counts are the closed forms (5) and (11); the feasible set of (18) adds p>0p>0p>0, which ln⁡(vˉ/p)\ln(\bar v/p)ln(vˉ/p) requires; "the optimal" is the unique maximizer over the stated feasible set, and Proposition 6(i), which does not claim uniqueness, asserts that a maximizer exists and bounds every maximizer; "sufficiently long" in Proposition 3(b) is an unspecified threshold T0>0T_0>0T0​>0; Λh,q>0\Lambda_h,q>0Λh​,q>0 is added in Proposition 6(ii) because aaa and bbb divide by Λhq\Lambda_hqΛh​q. The paper's T∗=1rln⁡(vi/pˉ)T^*=\frac1r\ln(v_i/\bar p)T∗=r1​ln(vi​/pˉ​) has an undefined pˉ\bar ppˉ​ and is read as p∗p^*p∗. In (33) the factors ebvh/ee^{bv_h/e}ebvh​/e and 1/(4a)1/(4a)1/(4a) multiply only the first bracket.

The following formalizations would trivialize the targets and are ruled out: defining n(p,T)n(p,T)n(p,T) by the explicit formulas (14)–(15) or by the paper's single formula (17) instead of (5) and (11); stating optimality through sSup or a first-order condition; stating Proposition 6(i) for maximizers without asserting that one exists; and stating Proposition 3(b) with a chosen threshold or with Proposition 6's narrower feasible set. The pledging differential equations themselves and their solution (Propositions 1–2) are formalized in the companion mission on triangular valuations; this mission works from their closed forms.

Infrastructure needed: interval integrals of monotone step functions, the exponential, logarithm and real power from Mathlib. Explicit evaluation of the nested integrals under step laws (Corollary 1) is reusable for any proof in this model. Contributions are welcome on each milestone and on lemmas such as continuity of π\piπ on the feasible set and the closed form of π\piπ in each region of (p,T)(p,T)(p,T).

Selected references

  • J. Zhang, S. Savin, S. Veeraraghavan, Revenue Management in Crowdfunding, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.1147. Cited from the authors' manuscript of May 26, 2021, SSRN 3065267: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3065267
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CombinatoricsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Secretary Problems with Biased Evaluations Using Partial Ordinal Information II: No Algorithm Beats Competitive Ratio ω on Posets of Width ωResearch Paper

Motivation

In hiring, admissions and procurement, candidates are often judged by scores that are known to be biased: two candidates from different groups, schools or evaluation pipelines cannot be compared by their observed scores, while two candidates from the same pipeline can. Salem and Gupta (SSRN 3444283, published in Management Science, 2023) model this situation as a poset secretary problem. The decision maker sees only a partial order between candidates, namely the comparisons that are trustworthy, and must still make irrevocable online selections.

The classical secretary problem and its kkk-selection variant (Kleinberg, 2005) assume a total order. With only partial comparisons, the natural question is how much the missing comparisons cost. Salem and Gupta answer it in terms of the width of the poset. This mission formalizes their lower bound: no algorithm can do better than a factor of the width.

Setting

A finite set C\mathcal CC of NNN candidates carries a partial order ⪯\preceq⪯. Each candidate aaa has a true score w(a)w(a)w(a). The scores are nonnegative and pairwise distinct, and they are consistent with the order: a≺ba\prec ba≺b implies w(a)<w(b)w(a)<w(b)w(a)<w(b). The pair I=(P,w)\mathcal I=(\mathcal P,w)I=(P,w) is an instance. Candidates arrive in uniformly random order. An algorithm knows NNN and a capacity kkk, observes the comparisons of P\mathcal PP among the candidates that have arrived, and selects at most kkk candidates, irrevocably. It never observes the scores.

The offline optimum is

OPT(w,k)=max⁡{∑a∈Sw(a)  :  S⊆C, ∣S∣≤k}.\mathrm{OPT}(w,k)=\max\Big\{\textstyle\sum_{a\in S}w(a)\;:\;S\subseteq\mathcal C,\ |S|\le k\Big\}.OPT(w,k)=max{∑a∈S​w(a):S⊆C, ∣S∣≤k}.

An algorithm is α\alphaα-competitive if E[w(Alg(I))]≥OPT(I)/α\mathbb E[w(\mathsf{Alg}(\mathcal I))]\ge\mathrm{OPT}(\mathcal I)/\alphaE[w(Alg(I))]≥OPT(I)/α on every instance (Definition 3.4).

The width ω\omegaω of P\mathcal PP is the largest number of pairwise incomparable candidates (an antichain).

Because an algorithm sees only the poset and the arrival order, on a fixed poset its randomness (arrival order and internal coins) induces a probability distribution μ\muμ on the selected set, supported on sets of at most kkk elements, and μ\muμ does not depend on the scores. Such a μ\muμ is called a selection rule with capacity kkk. Its expected score is Eμ[w(Alg)]=∑Sμ(S)∑a∈Sw(a)\mathbb E_\mu[w(\mathrm{Alg})]=\sum_S\mu(S)\sum_{a\in S}w(a)Eμ​[w(Alg)]=∑S​μ(S)∑a∈S​w(a). The selection probability of aaa is p(a)=∑S∋aμ(S)p(a)=\sum_{S\ni a}\mu(S)p(a)=∑S∋a​μ(S).

The instance of the lower bound is Chains(ω,k)\mathrm{Chains}(\omega,k)Chains(ω,k): ω\omegaω disjoint chains of kkk elements each, with elements in different chains incomparable (Figure 8 of the paper, with n=ωkn=\omega kn=ωk).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5.1 (p. 14, proof in Appendix F, p. 42)

For every k≥1k\ge1k≥1 and ω≥1\omega\ge1ω≥1 there is a poset P\mathcal PP of width ω\omegaω such that for every selection rule μ\muμ with capacity kkk and every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 there is a consistent scoring www with OPT(w,k)>0\mathrm{OPT}(w,k)>0OPT(w,k)>0 and

Eμ[w(Alg)]≤(1+ε) OPT(w,k)ω.\mathbb E_\mu[w(\mathrm{Alg})]\le\frac{(1+\varepsilon)\,\mathrm{OPT}(w,k)}{\omega}.Eμ​[w(Alg)]≤ω(1+ε)OPT(w,k)​.

Equivalently, for every algorithm, sup⁡IOPT(I)/E[w(Alg(I))]≥ω\sup_{\mathcal I}\mathrm{OPT}(\mathcal I)/\mathbb E[w(\mathsf{Alg}(\mathcal I))]\ge\omegasupI​OPT(I)/E[w(Alg(I))]≥ω, the supremum taken over the scorings of P\mathcal PP.

Milestones (Appendix F, p. 42)

  1. The width of Chains(ω,k)\mathrm{Chains}(\omega,k)Chains(ω,k) is ω\omegaω for k≥1k\ge1k≥1.
  2. For every selection rule with capacity kkk on Chains(ω,k)\mathrm{Chains}(\omega,k)Chains(ω,k), some chain iii has ∑jpji≤k/ω\sum_j p^i_j\le k/\omega∑j​pji​≤k/ω.
  3. If www is a consistent perturbation of the scoring that gives M/kM/kM/k to each element of one chain i0i_0i0​ and 000 elsewhere, with perturbations below M/2kM/2kM/2k in absolute value, nonnegative off i0i_0i0​, and summing to 000 on i0i_0i0​, then OPT(w,k)=M\mathrm{OPT}(w,k)=MOPT(w,k)=M.
  4. Given such a chain i0i_0i0​, M>0M>0M>0 and ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, there is a consistent scoring with OPT=M\mathrm{OPT}=MOPT=M and Eμ[w(Alg)]≤(1+ε)OPT/ω\mathbb E_\mu[w(\mathrm{Alg})]\le(1+\varepsilon)\mathrm{OPT}/\omegaEμ​[w(Alg)]≤(1+ε)OPT/ω.

Significance

The result shows that the width of the poset is a genuine barrier: whatever the algorithm, an adversary choosing scores after seeing how the algorithm spreads its selections can force a ratio arbitrarily close to ω\omegaω. The paper's ProxyLabel algorithm has competitive ratio at most e(ω+1)/(1−1/k)k−1≤e2(ω+1)e(\omega+1)/(1-1/k)^{k-1}\le e^2(\omega+1)e(ω+1)/(1−1/k)k−1≤e2(ω+1) when the width is known (Corollary 5.1, p. 15). Together the two results show that the best achievable competitive ratio in the poset secretary problem is of order ω\omegaω, which the paper calls order-optimal. The lower bound also covers the group-bias model of the paper: ω\omegaω groups whose members are compared only within their group form exactly the instance used here.

On the formal side, the result is proved in the paper but has no machine-checked proof. The mission produces a formal model of score-independent randomized selection on a finite poset, a formal offline optimum with kkk selections, and the width of a disjoint union of chains. These can be reused for other lower bounds in online selection.

Difficulty

The argument is short, and the work lies in getting the quantifiers and the encoding right. The printed statement places "there is an instance" before "for any algorithm". Read literally this is false for ω≥2\omega\ge2ω≥2: on a fixed instance, the algorithm that always selects the kkk highest-scoring elements achieves ratio 111. The proof establishes the other order: the poset is fixed, then the algorithm, then the scoring. A formalization must keep the scoring chosen after the algorithm while preventing the algorithm from depending on the scores.

The printed chain of inequalities also needs care. Its middle step drops the term ∑jpjωεjω\sum_j p^\omega_j\varepsilon^\omega_j∑j​pjω​εjω​, which the stated constraints on the perturbation do not make nonpositive. The bound therefore holds for perturbations chosen small enough, not for every perturbation satisfying the printed constraints. The existence of distinct, order-consistent scores meeting all the constraints at once has to be shown, and so does the identification of the optimum with the heavy chain.

Formalization scope

Elements form a finite type with a partial order. A consistent scoring is a function to R\mathbb RR that is nonnegative, injective and strictly monotone (a<b⇒w(a)<w(b)a<b\Rightarrow w(a)<w(b)a<b⇒w(a)<w(b)). These are the standing assumptions of the model (§3.1, p. 7), not additions. OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is a finite maximum over subsets of at most kkk elements. Width is the published definition AppliedComb.Posets.width, the size of a largest antichain, not a minimum number of chains, so the width milestone is a real claim. Algorithms are represented by selection rules: nonnegative weights on subsets summing to 111 and vanishing on subsets of more than kkk elements. This class contains the selected-set law of every online algorithm, so a lower bound for it is a lower bound for online algorithms. Expectations and probabilities are finite sums. Competitiveness is stated as E≤(1+ε)OPT/ω\mathbb E\le(1+\varepsilon)\mathrm{OPT}/\omegaE≤(1+ε)OPT/ω together with OPT>0\mathrm{OPT}>0OPT>0, with no division by an expectation that may vanish. The hypotheses k≥1k\ge1k≥1 and ω≥1\omega\ge1ω≥1 are standing: with ω=0\omega=0ω=0 the poset is empty, and with k=0k=0k=0 every ratio is 0/00/00/0. The instance is the sigma type Σ (i:Fin ω),Fin k\Sigma\,(i:\mathrm{Fin}\,\omega),\mathrm{Fin}\,kΣ(i:Finω),Fink with Mathlib's disjoint order.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out explicitly. A selection rule must have total mass 111, so the zero rule does not make the expected score vanish. It must respect the capacity, so the rule selecting everything is excluded. The scoring is quantified after the selection rule, never before it and never as an input to it. OPT>0\mathrm{OPT}>0OPT>0 is part of the conclusion.

The development needs finite sums over subsets, the order on sigma types, and antichains. Contributions are welcome on any milestone. The width of a disjoint union of chains and the pigeonhole bound on selection probabilities are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • J. Salem and S. Gupta, Secretary Problems with Biased Evaluations Using Partial Ordinal Information, Management Science, 2023. Preprint: SSRN 3444283 (version of 2022-04-17), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3444283. Published version: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4926
  • R. Kleinberg, A multiple-choice secretary algorithm with applications to online auctions, Proceedings of SODA, 2005. https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1070432.1070519
  • R. P. Dilworth, A decomposition theorem for partially ordered sets, Annals of Mathematics 51(1), 1950. https://doi.org/10.2307/1969503
8 thms1 active userReviewed
Graph TheoryLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Linear Programming and Community Detection 3: The Metric LP Relaxation Recovers the Planted Bisection When d_in − d_out ≥ n/4 Under Regular SandwichingResearch Paper

Motivation

The minimum bisection problem asks, for a graph G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) on an even number nnn of vertices, for a split of VVV into two halves of size n/2n/2n/2 that cuts as few edges as possible. It is NP-hard, and it is also the maximum a posteriori estimator for the two-community stochastic block model, the standard random model of networks with community structure. A tractable surrogate is a convex relaxation. Semidefinite relaxations of minimum bisection are known to recover a planted community structure under near-optimal conditions; Del Pia, Khajavirad and Kunisky (arXiv:2006.03213, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023) ask the same question for the cheaper and more classical linear programming relaxation, the metric relaxation obtained by outer-approximating the cut polytope by triangle inequalities.

This mission covers the deterministic, sufficient side of their analysis (§3.1 of the paper): explicit conditions on a graph with a planted bisection under which the LP relaxation returns exactly that bisection. These conditions are the input to the paper's probabilistic recovery theorem for the very dense block model (Theorem 6).

Setting

Let V={1,…,n}V=\{1,\dots,n\}V={1,…,n}. A bisection is a partition V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​ of VVV with ∣V1∣=∣V2∣=n/2|V_1|=|V_2|=n/2∣V1​∣=∣V2​∣=n/2. A fixed but unknown bisection is the planted bisection. Write G1=G[V1]G_1=G[V_1]G1​=G[V1​] and G2=G[V2]G_2=G[V_2]G2​=G[V2​] for the subgraphs induced on the two sides, and G0G_0G0​ for the bipartite graph of the edges with one end on each side. Two degree parameters describe the instance: dind_{\mathrm{in}}din​, a degree inside the communities, and doutd_{\mathrm{out}}dout​, a degree across them. A graph is ddd-regular if every vertex has exactly ddd neighbours.

The cut vector xˉ∈{0,1}(n2)\bar x\in\{0,1\}^{\binom n2}xˉ∈{0,1}(2n​) of the planted bisection has xˉij=0\bar x_{ij}=0xˉij​=0 for i,ji,ji,j on the same side and xˉij=1\bar x_{ij}=1xˉij​=1 otherwise. With aij=1a_{ij}=1aij​=1 if (i,j)∈E(i,j)\in E(i,j)∈E and 000 otherwise, and the convention xji=xijx_{ji}=x_{ij}xji​=xij​, the metric relaxation is

(LP-P)min⁡x∑1≤i<j≤naijxijs.t.xij≤xik+xjkdistinct i,j,k, i<j,(1)xij+xik+xjk≤21≤i<j<k≤n,(2)∑i<jxij=n2/4.(3)\text{(LP-P)}\qquad \min_x \sum_{1\le i<j\le n} a_{ij}x_{ij}\quad\text{s.t.}\quad \begin{aligned} &x_{ij}\le x_{ik}+x_{jk} && \text{distinct } i,j,k,\ i<j, &(1)\\ &x_{ij}+x_{ik}+x_{jk}\le 2 && 1\le i<j<k\le n, &(2)\\ &\textstyle\sum_{i<j}x_{ij}=n^2/4. && &(3) \end{aligned}(LP-P)xmin​1≤i<j≤n∑​aij​xij​s.t.​xij​≤xik​+xjk​xij​+xik​+xjk​≤2∑i<j​xij​=n2/4.​​distinct i,j,k, i<j,1≤i<j<k≤n,​(1)(2)(3)​

The LP recovers the planted bisection if xˉ\bar xxˉ is an optimal solution and the only one.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (p. 12)

Assume G1G_1G1​ and G2G_2G2​ contain dind_{\mathrm{in}}din​-regular subgraphs on the same node sets, and G0G_0G0​ is a subgraph of a doutd_{\mathrm{out}}dout​-regular bipartite graph with the same bipartition. Then

din−dout ≥ n4⟹(LP-P) recovers the planted bisection.d_{\mathrm{in}}-d_{\mathrm{out}}\ \ge\ \frac n4\quad\Longrightarrow\quad \text{(LP-P) recovers the planted bisection.}din​−dout​ ≥ 4n​⟹(LP-P) recovers the planted bisection.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 1 (p. 7). If G1,G2G_1,G_2G1​,G2​ are dind_{\mathrm{in}}din​-regular with din∈{1,…,n/2−1}d_{\mathrm{in}}\in\{1,\dots,n/2-1\}din​∈{1,…,n/2−1}, G0G_0G0​ is doutd_{\mathrm{out}}dout​-regular with dout∈{0,…,n/2}d_{\mathrm{out}}\in\{0,\dots,n/2\}dout​∈{0,…,n/2}, n≥4n\ge4n≥4, and din−dout≥n/4−1d_{\mathrm{in}}-d_{\mathrm{out}}\ge n/4-1din​−dout​≥n/4−1, then xˉ\bar xxˉ is optimal for (LP-P).
  2. Theorem 3 (pp. 9–10), Mangasarian's criterion: for an LP min⁡{c⊤x:Ax=b, Cx≥d}\min\{c^\top x: Ax=b,\ Cx\ge d\}min{c⊤x:Ax=b, Cx≥d} with primal optimum xˉ\bar xxˉ and dual optimum (uˉ,vˉ)(\bar u,\bar v)(uˉ,vˉ), xˉ\bar xxˉ is the unique optimum if and only if Ax=0Ax=0Ax=0, CKx=0C_Kx=0CK​x=0, CLx≥0C_Lx\ge0CL​x≥0 has no nonzero solution, where KKK and LLL are the active constraints with positive and zero multiplier.
  3. Proposition 2 (p. 10). For regular G1,G2,G0G_1,G_2,G_0G1​,G2​,G0​ as above, din−dout≥n/4d_{\mathrm{in}}-d_{\mathrm{out}}\ge n/4din​−dout​≥n/4 implies recovery.
  4. Lemma 2 (p. 11). Recovery survives deleting crossing edges.
  5. Lemma 3 (p. 11). Recovery survives adding edges inside V1V_1V1​ or V2V_2V2​.

Significance

Theorem 4 is a deterministic certificate: any graph that can be sandwiched between a regular within-community graph and a regular across-community graph with a degree gap of n/4n/4n/4 is solved exactly by a polynomial-size LP. For regular instances the threshold is tight: for 8∣n8\mid n8∣n and any din−dout≤n/4−1d_{\mathrm{in}}-d_{\mathrm{out}}\le n/4-1din​−dout​≤n/4−1 in range, the paper's Theorem 2 constructs regular graphs on which even the exact minimum bisection fails to recover the planted bisection. The sandwich form is what makes the result usable for random graphs: the paper's Theorem 6 shows that in the very dense block model with constant edge probabilities p>qp>qp>q and p−q>1/2p-q>1/2p−q>1/2 the sandwich hypotheses hold with high probability, so the LP recovers the communities.

None of these statements has, to our knowledge, a machine-checked proof. A complete development gives a verified dual certificate for the metric polytope, a verified version of Mangasarian's uniqueness criterion for linear programs in the general form Ax=bAx=bAx=b, Cx≥dCx\ge dCx≥d (useful well beyond this paper), and the monotonicity lemmas that transfer LP recovery between graphs.

Difficulty

Optimality of xˉ\bar xxˉ (Proposition 1) needs an explicit dual solution of (LP-P), with one multiplier per triangle inequality, and the bookkeeping that verifies the dual equality constraint for every pair i<ji<ji<j in six cases. Optimality alone is not recovery: the obvious argument, exhibiting a dual solution, says nothing about other optima, and the LP has many fractional feasible points. Uniqueness requires a strictly complementary structure and a separate argument that the linear system attached to the active constraints has only the zero solution; on the page this step uses Dirac's theorem on Hamiltonian cycles inside each community. Finally, the passage from regular to sandwiched graphs is not a perturbation statement: adding or deleting edges changes the objective, and the lemmas rely on the bounds 0≤xij≤10\le x_{ij}\le 10≤xij​≤1, which are implied by the triangle inequalities rather than imposed.

Formalization scope

Vertices are Fin n (0-based), a graph is a SimpleGraph (Fin n), and a bisection is a finset V1 with 2 * V1.card = n; the other side is its complement. A point of R(n2)\mathbb R^{\binom n2}R(2n​) is an array x : Fin n → Fin n → ℝ that is symmetric with zero diagonal, and these two conditions are part of LP feasibility. Recovery is optimality of the cut vector together with equality of every optimal solution to it. Regularity of G1G_1G1​ and G2G_2G2​ with one common degree is "every vertex has exactly dind_{\mathrm{in}}din​ neighbours on its own side"; regularity of G0G_0G0​ is "every vertex has exactly doutd_{\mathrm{out}}dout​ neighbours on the other side". Degree conditions are compared in R\mathbb RR.

Committed readings:

  • Theorem 4 is posed for arbitrary integers din,doutd_{\mathrm{in}},d_{\mathrm{out}}din​,dout​ satisfying the sandwich hypotheses. The page names them the minimum and maximum degrees, but the paper's Theorem 6 applies Theorem 4 with other integers; the literal reading is a special case.
  • The two dind_{\mathrm{in}}din​-regular subgraphs of G1G_1G1​ and G2G_2G2​ are encoded as a single graph with no crossing edges.
  • Proposition 1 carries the standing assumptions of §3.1.1 (n≥4n\ge4n≥4 and the degree ranges). Proposition 2 and Theorem 4 carry no range hypotheses: they are implied by the remaining hypotheses for n≥4n\ge4n≥4, the hypotheses are unsatisfiable at n=2n=2n=2, and the conclusion is trivial at n=0n=0n=0.
  • Lemma 2's strict inclusion E(G~0)⊂E(G0)E(\tilde G_0)\subset E(G_0)E(G~0​)⊂E(G0​) is posed as ⊆\subseteq⊆, since equality is trivial.
  • Theorem 3 renames the cost vector ppp to ccc and the number of variables nnn to NNN.

Two encodings would trivialize the mission and are ruled out: an array xxx without symmetry and zero diagonal (its unconstrained entries make uniqueness false), and an LP with added box constraints 0≤x≤10\le x\le10≤x≤1 (a different polytope). Dirac's theorem, used inside the proof of Proposition 2, is posed separately on the platform (AppliedComb.Graphs.dirac) and is not restated here. Contributions welcome: the dual certificate of Proposition 1, a general-purpose proof of Theorem 3 from LP duality, and the two monotonicity lemmas.

Selected references

  • A. Del Pia, A. Khajavirad, D. Kunisky, Linear Programming and Community Detection, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023; arXiv:2006.03213v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.03213
  • O. L. Mangasarian, Uniqueness of solution in linear programming, Linear Algebra and its Applications 25 (1979), 151–162. https://doi.org/10.1016/0024-3795(79)90014-4
  • G. A. Dirac, Some theorems on abstract graphs, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society s3-2 (1952), 69–81. https://doi.org/10.1112/plms/s3-2.1.69
  • M. M. Deza, M. Laurent, Geometry of Cuts and Metrics, Springer, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04295-9
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimizationStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Managing Outpatient Service with Strategic Walk-ins II: The Triage Model Costs Less When C_L/C_O ≤ α̲ and the Strategic Model Costs Less When C_L/C_O ≥ ᾱResearch Paper

Motivation

Many outpatient clinics offer two ways in: an appointment booked online, and walk-in hours on the day. Some patients have no choice (acute cases arrive as walk-ins), but many can pick either channel, and they pick the one that costs them less: a long appointment delay pushes them into the walk-in room, a crowded walk-in room pushes them to book or to give up. A clinic deciding how to split its daily capacity between the two channels therefore faces a game, not a forecasting problem.

Liu, van Jaarsveld, Wang and Xiao (SSRN 3558209; Management Science 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4676) model this game and compare three operational levers: the capacity split, how much delay information the booking system reveals, and triage, that is, reserving walk-in hours for acute patients only (as some practices do, e.g. Centre Pediatrics 2021). This mission formalizes the triage comparison, Proposition 6 of the paper: closing walk-in hours to patients who could book pays off exactly when lost demand is cheap relative to overtime.

Setting

Patients. Exogenous walk-ins arrive at rate λE\lambda_EλE​ and are always served on the day, possibly in overtime. Strategic patients arrive as a Poisson process of rate λ>0\lambda>0λ>0. A served patient gains R>0R>0R>0.

Capacity. The clinic has total capacity μ>0\mu>0μ>0 per day, split into appointment hours μS\mu_SμS​ and walk-in hours μW=μ−μS\mu_W=\mu-\mu_SμW​=μ−μS​, with μS∈[0,μ)\mu_S\in[0,\mu)μS​∈[0,μ).

The appointment queue. Appointments form a single-server queue with deterministic service time 1/μS1/\mu_S1/μS​. In the observable setting a patient sees the queue: with kkk patients waiting, the delay is (k+u~)/μS(k+\tilde u)/\mu_S(k+u~)/μS​, u~\tilde uu~ uniform on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. A patient schedules when this delay is at most a threshold δ\deltaδ, and scheduling at delay ddd is worth uS2(d)=R−CDdu^2_S(d)=R-C_D duS2​(d)=R−CD​d. The fraction of strategic patients who do not schedule is the blocking probability π(δ,μS)\pi(\delta,\mu_S)π(δ,μS​) of this M/D/1/K−1+p queue, where K=⌈δμS⌉K=\lceil\delta\mu_S\rceilK=⌈δμS​⌉ and p=δμS+1−Kp=\delta\mu_S+1-Kp=δμS​+1−K. With ρ=λ/μS\rho=\lambda/\mu_Sρ=λ/μS​ it has the closed form π(δ,μS)=1−1/(q0+ρ)\pi(\delta,\mu_S)=1-1/(q_0+\rho)π(δ,μS​)=1−1/(q0​+ρ), where q0q_0q0​ is built from the Poisson weights αj=ρje−ρ/j!\alpha_j=\rho^je^{-\rho}/j!αj​=ρje−ρ/j! by the Brun–Garcia recursion (Online Appendix C, (26)–(27), Corollary C.1). With no appointment hours, π(δ,0)=1\pi(\delta,0)=1π(δ,0)=1.

Walking in and balking. A patient who does not schedule walks in with probability proportional to pWp_WpW​ or balks with probability proportional to pBp_BpB​. Walking in is worth uW2(pW)=R−CW w((λE+pWλ)/μW)u^2_W(p_W)=R-C_W\,w\big((\lambda_E+p_W\lambda)/\mu_W\big)uW2​(pW​)=R−CW​w((λE​+pW​λ)/μW​), with www convex, strictly increasing and w(0)=0w(0)=0w(0)=0; balking is worth 000. An observable equilibrium (δ,pW,pB)(\delta,p_W,p_B)(δ,pW​,pB​) is a solution of conditions (6)–(10): the threshold δ\deltaδ makes scheduling at least as good as the walk-in/balk mixture up to δ\deltaδ and worse beyond it, pW+pB=π(δ,μS)p_W+p_B=\pi(\delta,\mu_S)pW​+pB​=π(δ,μS​), and patients walk in (balk) only if walking in is worth at least (at most) zero.

Costs. The provider pays CLC_LCL​ per balking patient and CO o(⋅)C_O\,o(\cdot)CO​o(⋅) for overtime, with ooo convex and strictly increasing. In the strategic model patients choose freely, and the cost at allocation μS\mu_SμS​ and equilibrium (δ,pW,pB)(\delta,p_W,p_B)(δ,pW​,pB​) is

Zs=CL pBλ+CO o(pWλ+λEμW).(Ob.P)Z^s=C_L\,p_B\lambda+C_O\,o\Big(\frac{p_W\lambda+\lambda_E}{\mu_W}\Big). \qquad\text{(Ob.P)}Zs=CL​pB​λ+CO​o(μW​pW​λ+λE​​).(Ob.P)

In the triage model strategic patients may only schedule or balk, so they behave with threshold R/CDR/C_DR/CD​ and

Zt=CL π(R/CD,μS) λ+CO o(λEμW).(T.Ob.P)Z^t=C_L\,\pi(R/C_D,\mu_S)\,\lambda+C_O\,o\Big(\frac{\lambda_E}{\mu_W}\Big). \qquad\text{(T.Ob.P)}Zt=CL​π(R/CD​,μS​)λ+CO​o(μW​λE​​).(T.Ob.P)

Let μ‾W\underline\mu_Wμ​W​ solve R−CW w(λE/μ‾W)=0R-C_W\,w(\lambda_E/\underline\mu_W)=0R−CW​w(λE​/μ​W​)=0 (15): below these walk-in hours the exogenous walk-ins alone make walking in worthless.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 6

Suppose μ>μ‾W\mu>\underline\mu_Wμ>μ​W​ and set

α‾=o′(λE/μ)μ,α‾=o′(λE/μ‾W)μ‾Wmax⁡{λEλ π(R/CD,μ−μ‾W),1}.\underline\alpha=\frac{o'(\lambda_E/\mu)}{\mu},\qquad \overline\alpha=\frac{o'(\lambda_E/\underline\mu_W)}{\underline\mu_W}\max\Big\{\frac{\lambda_E}{\lambda\,\pi(R/C_D,\mu-\underline\mu_W)},1\Big\}.α​=μo′(λE​/μ)​,α=μ​W​o′(λE​/μ​W​)​max{λπ(R/CD​,μ−μ​W​)λE​​,1}.

Then

CLCO≤α‾ ⟹ inf⁡Zt≤inf⁡Zs,CLCO≥α‾ ⟹ inf⁡Zs≤inf⁡Zt,\frac{C_L}{C_O}\le\underline\alpha\ \Longrightarrow\ \inf Z^t\le\inf Z^s,\qquad \frac{C_L}{C_O}\ge\overline\alpha\ \Longrightarrow\ \inf Z^s\le\inf Z^t,CO​CL​​≤α​ ⟹ infZt≤infZs,CO​CL​​≥α ⟹ infZs≤infZt,

where the infima are over allocations μS∈[0,μ)\mu_S\in[0,\mu)μS​∈[0,μ) and, on the strategic side, over the equilibria at each allocation. The Lean statement says this without infima: every strategic configuration is matched by a triage allocation that costs no more, and every triage allocation is matched by a strategic allocation at which an equilibrium exists and every equilibrium costs no more.

Milestones

  1. Proposition C.2 (μS\mu_SμS​-part): μS↦π(δ,μS)\mu_S\mapsto\pi(\delta,\mu_S)μS​↦π(δ,μS​) is continuous and strictly decreasing on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞).
  2. Proposition 1 (observable setting): an observable equilibrium exists at every allocation.
  3. Proposition 2 (1): if μW≤μ‾W\mu_W\le\underline\mu_WμW​≤μ​W​, every equilibrium is schedule-and-balk, pW=0p_W=0pW​=0, δ=R/CD\delta=R/C_Dδ=R/CD​, pB=π(R/CD,μS)p_B=\pi(R/C_D,\mu_S)pB​=π(R/CD​,μS​).
  4. From the proof of part 1: λ (1−π(δ,μS))≤λ (1−π(R/CD,μS))\lambda\,(1-\pi(\delta,\mu_S))\le\lambda\,(1-\pi(R/C_D,\mu_S))λ(1−π(δ,μS​))≤λ(1−π(R/CD​,μS​)) at every equilibrium.
  5. From the proof of part 2: if nobody balks, (λpW+λE)/μW≤λE/μ‾W(\lambda p_W+\lambda_E)/\mu_W\le\lambda_E/\underline\mu_W(λpW​+λE​)/μW​≤λE​/μ​W​.
  6. From the proof of part 2: if patients mix between walking in and balking, (λpW+λE)/μW=λE/μ‾W(\lambda p_W+\lambda_E)/\mu_W=\lambda_E/\underline\mu_W(λpW​+λE​)/μW​=λE​/μ​W​.

Significance

Proposition 6 turns a qualitative trade-off into two explicit thresholds on the ratio of the lost-demand cost to the overtime cost. Free choice reduces balking but lets strategic patients crowd the walk-in hours; triage removes that crowding at the price of more balking. The thresholds α‾\underline\alphaα​ and α‾\overline\alphaα depend only on the overtime function, the capacity and the blocking probability, so a clinic can evaluate them from its own data. The paper also shows (Remark 4, Appendix D.8) that the same insight holds in the unobservable setting, with capacity playing an additional role; that variant is not part of this mission.

The result is proved in the paper (Online Appendix E.3, pp. 35–37) and has no machine-checked proof. The formalization adds three things. It fixes the equilibrium concept precisely, including the mixture weights and the endpoint conventions. It states the comparison of optimal costs without presupposing that the optima are attained; the paper's proof begins "denote the optimal capacity allocations" without proving existence. And it ties the blocking probability to the paper's closed form, so the monotonicity in μS\mu_SμS​ that the proof invokes becomes a statement about an explicit function rather than about a queue described in words.

Difficulty

The comparison itself is a chain of convexity inequalities at a single allocation. The hard part is the blocking probability. The paper proves that π(δ,μS)\pi(\delta,\mu_S)π(δ,μS​) decreases in μS\mu_SμS​ by a sample-path argument on the queue, but a formal development has only the closed form, in which K=⌈δμS⌉K=\lceil\delta\mu_S\rceilK=⌈δμS​⌉ jumps at every μS\mu_SμS​ where δμS\delta\mu_SδμS​ is an integer, ppp jumps from 111 to 000 there, and ρ=λ/μS\rho=\lambda/\mu_Sρ=λ/μS​ moves continuously. Monotonicity and continuity must be shown across these seams, through alternating sums whose terms cancel heavily. The obvious route, differentiating the closed form for fixed KKK, does not give the sign without a further structural argument on the coefficients aja_jaj​.

Existence of an equilibrium (milestone 2) is an intermediate-value argument in δ\deltaδ, which in turn needs continuity of π\piπ in δ\deltaδ and positivity of π\piπ.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace OutpatientWalkIn.Triage. The definition Queue contains the closed-form blocking probability blockProb lam δ μS; the definition Setting contains the model, the standing assumptions, the utilities, the equilibrium IsObsEq, the costs obsCost and triageCost, and the thresholds alphaLow, alphaHigh.

Conventions:

  • Standing assumptions, hypotheses of every theorem: λ>0\lambda>0λ>0, λE≥0\lambda_E\ge0λE​≥0, R,CD,CW>0R,C_D,C_W>0R,CD​,CW​>0, CL,CO≥0C_L,C_O\ge0CL​,CO​≥0, μ>0\mu>0μ>0; www convex and strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with w(0)=0w(0)=0w(0)=0 (Assumption 1); ooo convex and strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) (Assumption 2).
  • Allocations range over μS∈[0,μ)\mu_S\in[0,\mu)μS​∈[0,μ) on both sides, so that μW>0\mu_W>0μW​>0; the paper's μS=μ\mu_S=\muμS​=μ leaves the exogenous walk-ins with no walk-in hours.
  • π(δ,0)=1\pi(\delta,0)=1π(δ,0)=1; the observable setting is defined directly (the paper's CG=0C_G=0CG​=0).
  • The equilibrium carries the guard pW+pB>0p_W+p_B>0pW​+pB​>0, which by (8) is π(δ,μS)>0\pi(\delta,\mu_S)>0π(δ,μS​)>0 and excludes no equilibrium of the paper.
  • Added hypotheses of the goal: CO>0C_O>0CO​>0, λE>0\lambda_E>0λE​>0, μ‾W>0\underline\mu_W>0μ​W​>0 given by (15), and differentiability of ooo at λE/μ\lambda_E/\muλE​/μ and λE/μ‾W\lambda_E/\underline\mu_WλE​/μ​W​ (where o′o'o′ is evaluated). Without them Lean's CL/0=0C_L/0=0CL​/0=0 and the zero derivative of a non-differentiable function would make α‾=0\underline\alpha=0α​=0 and turn part 1 into a different claim.
  • "Costs less" is "costs no more" (p. 26).

A formalization that compares the two models at one fixed allocation only, that lets the prover choose a cheap equilibrium when several might exist, or that replaces π\piπ by an arbitrary decreasing function, is not the paper's theorem; the statements here rule these out.

Contributions welcome: properties of the closed-form π\piπ (positivity, π≤1\pi\le1π≤1, monotonicity and continuity in both arguments), the existence of equilibria, and the convexity estimates of the final comparison. The queue file is reusable for any M/D/1/K model with partial joining.

Selected references

  • N. Liu, W. van Jaarsveld, S. Wang, G. Xiao, Managing Outpatient Service with Strategic Walk-ins, SSRN 3558209 (version of 2022-07-05); Management Science, 2023. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3558209, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4676
  • O. Brun, J.-M. Garcia, Analytical solution of finite capacity M/D/1 queues, Journal of Applied Probability 37(4), 2000 (the source of the aja_jaj​ recursion, cited in the paper's Online Appendix C).
  • P. Naor, The regulation of queue size by levying tolls, Econometrica 37(1), 1969. https://doi.org/10.2307/1909200
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CombinatoricsGraph Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Linear Programming and Community Detection 2: The Minimum Bisection Recovery Condition d_in − d_out > n/4 − 1 Is TightResearch Paper

Why minimum bisection recovery matters

The minimum bisection problem partitions an even-sized graph into two equally large groups while cutting as few edges as possible. In community detection, a graph may have been generated around an unknown, balanced pair of groups. The statistical question is whether an optimizer can identify that planted partition from the edges. Before studying random graph models or relaxations, it is useful to know which properties of a single observed graph suffice for recovery and whether those properties can be weakened.

Del Pia, Khajavirad and Kunisky express a deterministic sufficient condition through two vertex-degree parameters. Their Theorem 1 says that minimum bisection recovers the planted partition when the smallest within-community degree exceeds the largest cross-community degree by more than n/4−1n/4-1n/4−1. Theorem 2 supplies graphs at or below that boundary where recovery fails. Thus the degree difference has a sharp worst-case boundary within the theorem's stated size and degree ranges. This mission formalizes that second, tightness result.

Graphs, bisections, and degrees

Let G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) be a simple undirected graph with nnn vertices. A bisection is a partition V1,V2V_1,V_2V1​,V2​ of VVV with ∣V1∣=∣V2∣=n/2|V_1|=|V_2|=n/2∣V1​∣=∣V2​∣=n/2. Its cut cost is the number of edges with one endpoint in each side. The planted bisection is a designated partition regarded as the answer the optimizer should recover. Since exchanging V1V_1V1​ and V2V_2V2​ leaves the partition unchanged, uniqueness is always understood up to this exchange.

For each vertex vvv, count its neighbors on its own side of the planted bisection and its neighbors on the opposite side. Write din(v)d_{\mathrm{in}}(v)din​(v) and dout(v)d_{\mathrm{out}}(v)dout​(v) for these counts. The two parameters of the planted graph are

din=min⁡v∈Vdin(v),dout=max⁡v∈Vdout(v).d_{\mathrm{in}}=\min_{v\in V}d_{\mathrm{in}}(v),\qquad d_{\mathrm{out}}=\max_{v\in V}d_{\mathrm{out}}(v).din​=v∈Vmin​din​(v),dout​=v∈Vmax​dout​(v).

Minimum bisection recovers the planted partition if every bisection with cost at most that of the planted one is the planted partition, up to swapping its sides. This formulation requires both optimality and uniqueness. If the planted bisection costs more than a competitor, recovery fails; it also fails when a distinct bisection ties it. These definitions follow §2 of the pinned preprint.

Formalization targets

Existence of regular graph pieces

Lemma 1 supplies two finite-graph existence statements. For positive even ttt, a simple ddd-regular bipartite graph exists on ttt vertices with t/2t/2t/2 vertices per side whenever 0≤d≤t/20\le d\le t/20≤d≤t/2. For the same ttt, a simple ddd-regular graph exists whenever 0≤d≤t−10\le d\le t-10≤d≤t−1. The bipartite part includes the edgeless graph at d=0d=0d=0 and the complete bipartite graph at d=t/2d=t/2d=t/2. The second part includes the edgeless and complete graphs at its own endpoints.

Tightness of the recovery threshold

The mission's goal is Theorem 2. For every positive multiple of eight nnn and every pair of nonnegative integers satisfying

din≤n2−1,dout≤n2,din−dout≤n4−1,d_{\mathrm{in}}\le \frac n2-1,\qquad d_{\mathrm{out}}\le \frac n2,\qquad d_{\mathrm{in}}-d_{\mathrm{out}}\le \frac n4-1,din​≤2n​−1,dout​≤2n​,din​−dout​≤4n​−1,

there exist a graph GGG on nnn vertices and a planted bisection with those exact parameters for which minimum bisection does not recover the planted partition. The inequalities delimit the claimed family; the goal does not assert failure for every graph with those degrees. The word “exact” matters because a construction with merely smaller within-side degrees or larger cross-side degrees would not establish tightness for the requested parameter pair.

What the result establishes

Together with the paper's Theorem 1, the goal locates the worst-case threshold for recovery by minimum bisection: a strictly larger degree difference guarantees recovery, while every admissible parameter pair at or below the boundary occurs in a counterexample. This separates a guarantee about all graphs with given degree extrema from a claim about a particular graph. It also gives a deterministic baseline for comparing the behavior of the paper's linear programming relaxation and stochastic block model, whose recovery guarantees concern different optimization procedures and graph distributions.

The theorem is proved in the cited paper; the task here is to state its graph model, parameter extrema, and recovery conclusion in Lean with the same quantifiers and boundary cases, then obtain a machine-checked proof. The regular-graph existence lemma is independently reusable for other finite graph constructions. The definition layer can also support later exact-recovery statements for the same paper after the series' graph conventions are consolidated.

The obstacle to a direct argument

A strict threshold being sufficient does not itself show that it is necessary. At equality, an inequality used in a recovery guarantee no longer forces a unique optimum, but that leaves open whether a graph with the prescribed degree extrema actually has a competing bisection. Every requested pair (din,dout)(d_{\mathrm{in}},d_{\mathrm{out}})(din​,dout​) must be realized by a genuine simple graph, including the degree endpoints, and the competing partition must be balanced and distinct even after sides are exchanged. The proof therefore needs graph existence and degree bookkeeping as well as a comparison of cut costs. The page states one numbered supporting lemma, Lemma 1; its two clauses are the mission's milestone.

Formalization scope

Vertices are represented by Fin n, indexed from zero rather than the paper's 1,…,n1,\ldots,n1,…,n. A side of a bisection is a Finset; its complement represents the other side. Graphs are Mathlib SimpleGraph values, and cut cost counts each undirected crossing edge once by ordering its endpoints. The within and across degrees are filtered neighbor counts. Their minimum and maximum range over all vertices, matching the paper. An empty vertex type receives a conventional zero degree extremum, while Theorem 2 requires n>0n>0n>0.

The bounds involving n/2−1n/2-1n/2−1 and n/4−1n/4-1n/4−1 are compared in the reals, so natural-number subtraction cannot truncate a negative difference. The hypothesis 8∣n8\mid n8∣n makes n/4n/4n/4 an integer in the theorem's actual domain. Lemma 1 uses positive even ttt, with Mathlib's regular-degree predicate and a bisection set witnessing equal bipartition sizes. Its bound t−1t-1t−1 is safe in natural numbers because t>0t>0t>0.

The formal goal requires a witness graph whose minimum within-side degree equals the requested dind_{\mathrm{in}}din​ and whose maximum across-side degree equals the requested doutd_{\mathrm{out}}dout​. It also requires an actual planted bisection and failure of uniqueness up to complement. Replacing either equality with a loose degree bound, or allowing a non-bisection witness, would make the claim easier and lose the paper's result. Contributions toward finite regular graph constructions, exact degree calculations, and cut-cost comparisons are within scope.

Selected references

  • A. Del Pia, A. Khajavirad and D. Kunisky, Linear Programming and Community Detection, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023; pinned source: arXiv:2006.03213v2, §2, pp. 3–6, especially Lemma 1 and Theorem 2 on p. 5.
3 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Accelerability vs. Scalability: R&D Investment Under Financial Constraints and Competition II: Unconstrained R&D Race: Best Responses Rise on Accelerable Projects and a Symmetric Equilibrium ExistsResearch Paper

Why investment races matter

Two firms developing competing innovations face a decision that a single firm does not: a rival's discovery can end the value of continuing the project. If the first discovery wins the payoff, each firm chooses how much to spend per period while knowing that greater spending may change both its payoff on success and its speed of discovery. The investment decision therefore depends on what the rival chooses. Danmo Lin's model separates these two channels and asks when competition itself raises a firm's chosen R&D intensity Lin (2022).

This mission concerns the paper's race of two financially unconstrained firms. The result is a comparative statics claim about a firm's best response to its rival, together with existence of a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium. The paper proves the result in Appendix A.6. The problem here is to give machine-checked statements and ultimately a proof for the same stochastic race, including its strategy ranges and first-arrival payoffs.

The two-firm race

Firm i∈{1,2}i\in\{1,2\}i∈{1,2} chooses a fixed investment intensity RiR_iRi​, the amount it pays per unit time while the race continues. Its technology has parameters (Ai,βi,ηi,γi)(A_i,\beta_i,\eta_i,\gamma_i)(Ai​,βi​,ηi​,γi​). If it discovers first, its mean project payoff is ui(Ri)=AiRiβiu_i(R_i)=A_iR_i^{\beta_i}ui​(Ri​)=Ai​Riβi​​. Its discovery time τi\tau_iτi​ is exponentially distributed with rate λi(Ri)=ηiRiγi\lambda_i(R_i)=\eta_iR_i^{\gamma_i}λi​(Ri​)=ηi​Riγi​​. The discovery times are independent, represented by the product law E(λ1,λ2)\mathcal E(\lambda_1,\lambda_2)E(λ1​,λ2​), and the earlier discovery wins. Both firms stop paying at min⁡{τ1,τ2}\min\{\tau_1,\tau_2\}min{τ1​,τ2​}. The loser receives no discovery payoff. Future cash flows are discounted at rate r>0r>0r>0 Lin (2022), §3.1.

The technology conditions are Ai,ηi>0A_i,\eta_i>0Ai​,ηi​>0, 0≤βi,γi<10\le\beta_i,\gamma_i<10≤βi​,γi​<1, and βi+γi<1\beta_i+\gamma_i<1βi​+γi​<1. A project is scalable when its discovery payoff increases with investment, corresponding here to βi>0\beta_i>0βi​>0. It is accelerable when investment increases its discovery rate, corresponding to γi>0\gamma_i>0γi​>0. The model permits the two firms' parameters to differ. The lower intensity is 111; the upper intensity is Rˉi=(Aiηi)1/(1−βi−γi)\bar R_i=(A_i\eta_i)^{1/(1-\beta_i-\gamma_i)}Rˉi​=(Ai​ηi​)1/(1−βi​−γi​). The standing condition Aiηi>1A_i\eta_i>1Ai​ηi​>1 makes [1,Rˉi][1,\bar R_i][1,Rˉi​] a nondegenerate range in which investment takes place Lin (2022), (2), (7).

Write Pi(R1,R2)P_i(R_1,R_2)Pi​(R1​,R2​) for Firm iii's expected discounted payoff from the first-arrival race. Its best-response set BRi(R−i)BR_i(R_{-i})BRi​(R−i​) contains every maximizer of PiP_iPi​ over its own fixed interval [1,Rˉi][1,\bar R_i][1,Rˉi​], holding the rival's intensity fixed. A pure Nash equilibrium is a pair (R1,R2)(R_1,R_2)(R1​,R2​) in which each intensity belongs to that firm's best-response set. This set-valued definition keeps the claim meaningful when there is more than one maximizer.

Formalization targets

The first milestone identifies each expected payoff with the closed form in Lemma 2:

Pi(R1,R2)=Vi(R1,R2)=ui(Ri)λi(Ri)−Rir+λ1(R1)+λ2(R2).P_i(R_1,R_2)=V_i(R_1,R_2) =\frac{u_i(R_i)\lambda_i(R_i)-R_i}{r+\lambda_1(R_1)+\lambda_2(R_2)}.Pi​(R1​,R2​)=Vi​(R1​,R2​)=r+λ1​(R1​)+λ2​(R2​)ui​(Ri​)λi​(Ri​)−Ri​​.

The second milestone is the Appendix A.6 cross-partial identity. For Firm 1, the expression V1 ∂R1R22V1−(∂R1V1)(∂R2V1)V_1\,\partial^2_{R_1R_2}V_1-(\partial_{R_1}V_1)(\partial_{R_2}V_1)V1​∂R1​R2​2​V1​−(∂R1​​V1​)(∂R2​​V1​) equals λ2′(u1λ1−R1)2λ1′/(r+λ1+λ2)4\lambda'_2(u_1\lambda_1-R_1)^2\lambda'_1/(r+\lambda_1+\lambda_2)^4λ2′​(u1​λ1​−R1​)2λ1′​/(r+λ1​+λ2​)4. It is strictly positive when both discovery rates rise with intensity and Firm 1's project surplus is nonzero Lin (2022), (A.27)–(A.28).

The goal is Proposition 3. When both projects are accelerable, higher rival investment orders the best-response sets upward, with strict movement for an old response above 111. When neither project is accelerable, the best-response sets are constant in the rival's intensity. For identical firms, the theorem asserts a symmetric pure Nash equilibrium:

∃R∈[1,Rˉ]R∈BR1(R)∩BR2(R).\exists R\in[1,\bar R]\quad R\in BR_1(R)\cap BR_2(R).∃R∈[1,Rˉ]R∈BR1​(R)∩BR2​(R).

Best-response sets are required to be nonempty for every positive rival intensity. The ordering statements therefore make substantive claims about actual choices Lin (2022), Proposition 3.

What the result establishes

The result distinguishes a change in the timing of innovation from a change in its eventual payoff. In an accelerable project, a rival who spends more discovers faster, and the firm's optimal investment response moves upward. If investment cannot affect discovery speed, a rival's intensity does not alter the firm's best-response set in this model. The equilibrium clause says the symmetric game has at least one profile at which neither firm gains by changing its own intensity. These are statements about competition's effect on project spending, rather than only about the numerical value of a firm Lin (2022), §3.1.

The mathematical result is proved in the paper; the mission seeks a Lean formalization of that known result. The expectation-to-value identity requires a reusable treatment of independent exponential discovery times and discounted spending stopped at the first arrival. The best-response statement then supplies a precise set-valued comparative statics target. A verified development of these ingredients could be reused for other innovation races and first-arrival games. This mission does not claim that such a machine-checked proof already exists.

Mathematical difficulty

The payoff is an expectation over two random times, with the prize awarded only to the earlier discovery and spending stopped at their minimum. The closed form must agree with that stochastic expression for each positive pair of intensities. The comparison of best responses involves all maximizers, including possible ties and boundary choices. A derivative of one selected optimizer is not a well-defined substitute when the optimizer is set-valued; moreover, strict response cannot be demanded at the lower endpoint. Equilibrium existence must hold for the same best-response correspondence that defines the competitive race. These points make a direct translation of the paper's derivative notation insufficient Lin (2022), Appendix A.5–A.6.

Formalization scope

Lean uses real intensities, real technology parameters, Real.rpow for the power functions, and ProbabilityTheory.expMeasure for each discovery time. Their product measure encodes independence. Firm 1's discovery time is the first coordinate throughout, including Firm 2's payoff. The two firms have separate technology records. A best response maximizes the expectation from (8) over the own interval [1,Rˉi][1,\bar R_i][1,Rˉi​]; that interval never depends on the rival's action. The named closed form V1V_1V1​ is separate from the expectation and appears in the Appendix A.6 milestone. The random payoff on discovery is represented by its mean ui(Ri)u_i(R_i)ui​(Ri​), as the paper's calculation uses only that mean. The other cash-flow component of the underlying firm value is independent of the R&D choice and is omitted from the race payoff.

The hypotheses Aiηi>1A_i\eta_i>1Ai​ηi​>1, r>0r>0r>0, and positive intensities are explicit. The comparison allows any positive rival intensity, while each firm's own maximization uses (7). The paper's derivative claims about Ri∗R_i^*Ri∗​ are posed as orderings of complete best-response sets; strictness is asserted for an old response above 111. Both firms must be accelerable for the increasing-response clause, and the symmetric equilibrium clause applies to identical technologies. The strict inequality in (A.28) includes the necessary nonzero-surplus condition, since its square vanishes at the upper endpoint. These choices and the printed endpoint issue are recorded in the mission's moderation notes.

The target excludes empty best-response sets, rival-dependent feasible ranges, payoffs defined by the closed form (9), an equilibrium asserted without mutual best-response membership, and comparisons that discard the strict interior part. A complete development will need integration and exponential-distribution facts, continuity and maximizer existence on compact intervals, ordered best-response sets, and a fixed-point argument for the symmetric correspondence. The first-arrival probability and integration results can be reused beyond this paper; contributions to those interfaces and to the two stated milestones are welcome.

Selected references

  • Danmo Lin, Accelerability vs. Scalability: R&D Investment Under Financial Constraints and Competition, Management Science, Articles in Advance, 2022. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4503.
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Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms 1: Some Stationary Equilibrium of Directed Search Attains a Quarter of the First-Best WelfareResearch Paper

Motivation

Two-sided platforms for dating, freelancing and housing do more than list participants: they decide whom each participant is shown. When search is costly and agents leave the market over time, the platform's choice of assortments (which types of agents meet which, and how often) determines who matches, and agents respond strategically by deciding which matches to accept. A platform that ignores those responses can design meetings that agents then decline.

Immorlica, Lucier, Manshadi and Wei (arXiv:2102.09017, Management Science 2023) model this as directed search in a stationary flow economy and ask how much welfare a platform can secure when it controls only meetings, while agents retain the decision to accept. Computing the optimal assortments is NP-hard to approximate within 24/23 (their Theorem 4.2), so the relevant question is whether a constant fraction of the best conceivable welfare is reachable at all. Their Theorem 4.1 answers it with the factor 4, measured against the platform's first best, a benchmark in which the platform also dictates acceptance.

The mission formalizes the existence part of Theorem 4.1 and the chain of results in §4 of the paper that leads to it.

Setting

There are finitely many types on two sides, a set M\mathcal MM and a set W\mathcal WW; write Θ=M∪W\Theta=\mathcal M\cup\mathcal WΘ=M∪W and let θ′\theta'θ′ denote a generic type on the side opposite to θ\thetaθ. Agents of type θ\thetaθ enter at rate αθ>0\alpha_\theta>0αθ​>0 and each agent leaves unmatched at rate δ>0\delta>0δ>0. When an agent of type mmm meets one of type www, both observe one symmetric utility uuu drawn from a law FmwF_{mw}Fmw​ on R\mathbb RR with no atoms and finite mean; they match, and leave with utility uuu each, if both accept.

The platform picks an assortment λθ(θ′)≥0\lambda_\theta(\theta')\ge0λθ​(θ′)≥0 for each type: type θ\thetaθ meets type θ′\theta'θ′ at rate λθ(θ′)\lambda_\theta(\theta')λθ​(θ′). Agents use thresholds τθ\tau_\thetaτθ​ and accept exactly when u≥τθu\ge\tau_\thetau≥τθ​, so a pair matches when u≥max⁡(τm,τw)u\ge\max(\tau_m,\tau_w)u≥max(τm​,τw​). With population masses ηθ\eta_\thetaηθ​ and matching rates ξθ\xi_\thetaξθ​, the assortments induce a stationary equilibrium when, for every type,

αθ=(δ+ξθ)ηθ,ηmλm(w)=ηwλw(m),∑θ′λθ(θ′)≤1,\alpha_\theta=(\delta+\xi_\theta)\eta_\theta,\qquad \eta_m\lambda_m(w)=\eta_w\lambda_w(m),\qquad \sum_{\theta'}\lambda_\theta(\theta')\le1,αθ​=(δ+ξθ​)ηθ​,ηm​λm​(w)=ηw​λw​(m),θ′∑​λθ​(θ′)≤1, ξθ=∑θ′λθ(θ′)∫max⁡(τθ,τθ′)∞dFθθ′,τθ=∑θ′λθ(θ′)∫max⁡(τθ,τθ′)∞u dFθθ′δ+ξθ.\xi_\theta=\sum_{\theta'}\lambda_\theta(\theta')\int_{\max(\tau_\theta,\tau_{\theta'})}^\infty dF_{\theta\theta'},\qquad \tau_\theta=\frac{\sum_{\theta'}\lambda_\theta(\theta')\int_{\max(\tau_\theta,\tau_{\theta'})}^\infty u\,dF_{\theta\theta'}}{\delta+\xi_\theta}.ξθ​=θ′∑​λθ​(θ′)∫max(τθ​,τθ′​)∞​dFθθ′​,τθ​=δ+ξθ​∑θ′​λθ​(θ′)∫max(τθ​,τθ′​)∞​udFθθ′​​.

These are constraints (6a)–(6f) of the paper; the last one, (6e), says each threshold equals the type's expected utility, which is the agents' best response. The welfare is the flow of realized utility,

SW=∑m∑w(ηmλm(w)+ηwλw(m))∫max⁡(τm,τw)∞u dFmw.\mathrm{SW}=\sum_{m}\sum_{w}\big(\eta_m\lambda_m(w)+\eta_w\lambda_w(m)\big)\int_{\max(\tau_m,\tau_w)}^\infty u\,dF_{mw}.SW=m∑​w∑​(ηm​λm​(w)+ηw​λw​(m))∫max(τm​,τw​)∞​udFmw​.

The first-best relaxation (§4.1) drops (6e) and replaces max⁡(τm,τw)\max(\tau_m,\tau_w)max(τm​,τw​) by a free pairwise threshold τmw\tau_{mw}τmw​: the platform chooses both the meetings and which matches happen. Its welfare FB\mathrm{FB}FB is the same expression with τmw\tau_{mw}τmw​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.1

For every market satisfying the standing assumptions there are assortments, thresholds, rates and masses satisfying (6a)–(6f) such that, for every first-best feasible candidate QQQ,

FB(Q)≤4 SW.\mathrm{FB}(Q)\le 4\,\mathrm{SW}.FB(Q)≤4SW.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 4.4. The first best equals the linear program max⁡ 2∑m,wρmwβmw\max\,2\sum_{m,w}\rho_{mw}\beta_{mw}max2∑m,w​ρmw​βmw​ subject to β≥0\beta\ge0β≥0, ∑wβmw≤αm\sum_w\beta_{mw}\le\alpha_m∑w​βmw​≤αm​, ∑mβmw≤αw\sum_m\beta_{mw}\le\alpha_w∑m​βmw​≤αw​, where ρmw=max⁡τ≥0∫τ∞u dFmw/(δ+∫τ∞dFmw)\rho_{mw}=\max_{\tau\ge0}\int_\tau^\infty u\,dF_{mw}/(\delta+\int_\tau^\infty dF_{mw})ρmw​=maxτ≥0​∫τ∞​udFmw​/(δ+∫τ∞​dFmw​).
  2. Lemma 4.5. The maximizer of A(τ)=∫τ∞u dF/(δ+∫τ∞dF)A(\tau)=\int_\tau^\infty u\,dF/(\delta+\int_\tau^\infty dF)A(τ)=∫τ∞​udF/(δ+∫τ∞​dF) over τ≥0\tau\ge0τ≥0 is a fixed point of AAA, and AAA increases before it and decreases after it.
  3. Lemma 4.6. The LP has an optimal solution whose support is a forest on Θ\ThetaΘ.
  4. Lemma 4.7. An edge-weighted forest keeps half its weight on a union of vertex-disjoint stars.
  5. Lemma 4.9. In a star-shaped market (one side has a single type) the LP is a fractional knapsack with a greedy optimum.
  6. §4.2.2 remark, Lemmas 4.10–4.12. The idealized thresholds τ^wi\hat\tau_{w_i}τ^wi​​ exist, coincide with or lie below ρmwi\rho_{mw_i}ρmwi​​, and bound the equilibrium thresholds from above and the pair thresholds max⁡(τm,τwi)\max(\tau_m,\tau_{w_i})max(τm​,τwi​​) from below.
  7. Proposition 4.8. In a star-shaped market some induced stationary equilibrium satisfies FB(Q)≤2 SW\mathrm{FB}(Q)\le2\,\mathrm{SW}FB(Q)≤2SW for every first-best feasible QQQ.

Significance

Theorem 4.1 is a price-of-anarchy statement for platform design: restricting the platform to meetings, and letting agents choose acceptance selfishly, costs at most a factor 4 against a platform that dictates everything. Since every equilibrium candidate is also a first-best candidate with the same welfare, it gives a 4-approximation to the optimal directed search as well. The construction behind it has a structure that is itself informative: the equilibrium consists of disjoint submarkets in each of which one side has a single type.

The results are proved in the paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof in Lean or another proof assistant on record. Formalizing them yields a checked model of stationary search markets with threshold play, a checked reduction of the first best to a generalized assignment LP, and two graph lemmas (forest support of LP optima, the star-forest halving) that recur in rounding arguments for generalized assignment and budgeted allocation.

Difficulty

The first best is easy to reach once Proposition 4.4 linearizes it; the obstacle is incentives. Turning a first-best solution into an equilibrium by keeping its meeting rates fails, because agents raise or lower their thresholds relative to the pairwise thresholds the platform would choose, and constraint (6e) couples every type's threshold to all thresholds on the opposite side through max⁡(τm,τw)\max(\tau_m,\tau_w)max(τm​,τw​). The paper therefore has to control equilibrium thresholds without computing them, which it does only in star-shaped markets, and it needs a case analysis there (Case 1 and Subcases 2(a), 2(b) of Proposition 4.8) in which the meetings of the first best are sometimes discarded. Each of the reductions loses a factor: 2 in the passage from a forest to stars and 2 inside each star.

Formalization scope

The sides are separate finite types M and W with one law F m w per pair, serving both sides. The standing assumptions are δ>0\delta>0δ>0; αθ>0\alpha_\theta>0αθ​>0 for every type; each FmwF_{mw}Fmw​ a probability measure with no atoms (NullSingletonClass, the paper's "continuous distribution"); and an integrable identity under each FmwF_{mw}Fmw​. The positivity of αθ\alpha_\thetaαθ​ and the integrability are added: the paper uses both implicitly. Tails are taken over [a,∞)[a,\infty)[a,∞). LP feasibility includes β≥0\beta\ge0β≥0, which the paper leaves implicit; Lemma 4.6 also assumes nonnegative capacities. ρmw\rho_{mw}ρmw​ is the supremum of AAA over [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), never defined as a fixed point.

"Approximation of the first-best optimum" is stated against every first-best feasible candidate, so no supremum appears. An induced stationary equilibrium always includes the best-response constraint (6e); a formalization that drops it, or that lets the equilibrium use pairwise thresholds, makes the goal compare the first best with itself and is ruled out. With an empty side both welfares vanish and the goal holds, as in the paper.

The "polynomial-time" part of Theorem 4.1 is not posed: the paper's computational model (oracle access to the laws, footnote 15) is not specified precisely enough to formalize. The source is the arXiv v2 preprint (18 Aug 2021); the Management Science version may number results differently. Proofs of any milestone, auxiliary lemmas about tail integrals of atomless laws, and LP vertex arguments are all welcome.

Selected references

  • N. Immorlica, B. Lucier, V. Manshadi, A. Wei, Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms, Management Science, 2023; preprint arXiv:2102.09017v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.09017
  • J. K. Lenstra, D. B. Shmoys, É. Tardos, Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines, Mathematical Programming 46, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01585745
  • D. Chakrabarty, G. Goel, On the approximability of budgeted allocations and improved lower bounds for submodular welfare maximization and GAP, SIAM Journal on Computing 39(6), 2010. https://doi.org/10.1137/080735503
  • S. Banerjee, S. Gollapudi, K. Kollias, K. Munagala, Segmenting two-sided markets, WWW 2017. https://doi.org/10.1145/3038912.3052578
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Lightning Network Economics: Channels II: A Payment Channel Beats On-Chain Settlement Only If the On-Chain Fee Exceeds an Explicit ThresholdResearch Paper

Motivation

Every Bitcoin transaction recorded on the blockchain pays a fee, and the blockchain processes only a few transactions per second. The Lightning Network is a layer-two protocol that moves repeated payments off chain: two parties lock funds in a payment channel, exchange payments by updating the channel's balance, and touch the blockchain only to open, close or reset the channel. Whether a channel is worth opening is an economic question. Locked funds forgo interest, and a channel whose balance is exhausted must be reset on chain at a cost.

Guasoni, Huberman and Shikhelman (Management Science, 2023) model this trade-off with Poisson payment streams and continuous discounting, and obtain closed-form channel costs (their Theorem 1). Their Theorem 2 turns those costs into necessary conditions: a channel can be cheaper than settling every payment on chain only if the on-chain fee exceeds an explicit threshold depending on the reset cost, the payment rate and the interest rate. This mission formalizes Theorem 2, its two proofs, and the on-chain benchmark (Lemma 1) against which every channel is measured.

Setting

Node 1 pays node 2 one unit at the jumps of a Poisson process with rate λ1\lambda_1λ1​, and node 2 pays node 1 at the jumps of an independent Poisson process with rate λ2\lambda_2λ2​. The discount rate r>0r>0r>0 is the opportunity cost of capital per unit of time, BBB is the cost of resetting a channel, and CCC is the cost of one on-chain transaction. Node iii commits the amount lil_ili​ to the channel.

On-chain settlement. If every payment of a stream with rate λ\lambdaλ is settled on chain, the expected discounted cost is E[∑n≥1e−rτnC]=Cλ/r\mathbb E\big[\sum_{n\ge1}e^{-r\tau_n}C\big]=C\lambda/rE[∑n≥1​e−rτn​C]=Cλ/r, where τn\tau_nτn​ is the nnn-th arrival time (Lemma 1). Two streams of rate λ\lambdaλ cost 2Cλ/r2C\lambda/r2Cλ/r.

Unidirectional channel. If only one node pays, at rate λ\lambdaλ, a channel of size mmm costs (Theorem 1(i), equation (1))

uniCost(m)=m+B((r+λλ)m−1)−1.\mathrm{uniCost}(m)=m+B\Big(\big(\tfrac{r+\lambda}{\lambda}\big)^{m}-1\Big)^{-1}.uniCost(m)=m+B((λr+λ​)m−1)−1.

Bidirectional channel. With

α±=λ1+λ2+r±(λ2−λ1)2+r2+2r(λ2+λ1)2λ2\alpha_\pm=\frac{\lambda_1+\lambda_2+r\pm\sqrt{(\lambda_2-\lambda_1)^2+r^2+2r(\lambda_2+\lambda_1)}}{2\lambda_2}α±​=2λ2​λ1​+λ2​+r±(λ2​−λ1​)2+r2+2r(λ2​+λ1​)​​

(equation (4)), a channel with sizes l1,l2l_1,l_2l1​,l2​ costs biCost(l1,l2)\mathrm{biCost}(l_1,l_2)biCost(l1​,l2​), the expression (3) in α±l1\alpha_\pm^{l_1}α±l1​​, α±l2\alpha_\pm^{l_2}α±l2​​ and α±l1+l2\alpha_\pm^{l_1+l_2}α±l1​+l2​​. In the symmetric case λ1=λ2=λ\lambda_1=\lambda_2=\lambdaλ1​=λ2​=λ it simplifies, with α=α+\alpha=\alpha_+α=α+​, to

l1+l2+B(αl1+αl2)(αl1−1)(αl2−1).l_1+l_2+\frac{B(\alpha^{l_1}+\alpha^{l_2})}{(\alpha^{l_1}-1)(\alpha^{l_2}-1)}.l1​+l2​+(αl1​−1)(αl2​−1)B(αl1​+αl2​)​.

A channel costs less than on-chain transactions if, for some size, its cost is strictly below the on-chain cost of the streams it carries.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2

For B,r,λ>0B,r,\lambda>0B,r,λ>0 and any fee CCC:

  1. if uniCost(m)<λC/r\mathrm{uniCost}(m)<\lambda C/runiCost(m)<λC/r for some m>0m>0m>0, then
C>log⁡(1+Blog⁡(1+rλ));(5)C>\log\Big(1+B\log\big(1+\tfrac r\lambda\big)\Big);\tag{5}C>log(1+Blog(1+λr​));(5)
  1. if biCost(l1,l2)<2Cλ/r\mathrm{biCost}(l_1,l_2)<2C\lambda/rbiCost(l1​,l2​)<2Cλ/r for some l1,l2>0l_1,l_2>0l1​,l2​>0 with λ1=λ2=λ\lambda_1=\lambda_2=\lambdaλ1​=λ2​=λ, then
C>3(Bκ44)1/3−B12κ2,κ=log⁡r+2λ+r(4λ+r)2λ.(6)C>3\Big(\frac{B\kappa^4}{4}\Big)^{1/3}-\frac B{12}\kappa^2,\qquad \kappa=\log\frac{r+2\lambda+\sqrt{r(4\lambda+r)}}{2\lambda}.\tag{6}C>3(4Bκ4​)1/3−12B​κ2,κ=log2λr+2λ+r(4λ+r)​​.(6)

Milestones

  • Lemma 1: the on-chain cost Cλ/rC\lambda/rCλ/r.
  • Part (i) chain: the change of variable κ=log⁡(1+r/λ)\kappa=\log(1+r/\lambda)κ=log(1+r/λ) that turns the excess cost into F(m)=C/(1−eκ)+B/(eκm−1)+mF(m)=C/(1-e^\kappa)+B/(e^{\kappa m}-1)+mF(m)=C/(1−eκ)+B/(eκm−1)+m; the unique minimizer m^=cosh⁡−1(Bκ/2+1)/κ\hat m=\cosh^{-1}(B\kappa/2+1)/\kappam^=cosh−1(Bκ/2+1)/κ and the minimum value; inequality (16); the sufficient condition (17)–(20) for on-chain settlement to be strictly cheaper; Theorem 2(i).
  • Part (ii) chain: the symmetric cost and λ/r=α/(α−1)2\lambda/r=\alpha/(\alpha-1)^2λ/r=α/(α−1)2; the reduction (21) to equal sizes; the hyperbolic form and the bounds 1/x2−1/3<csch⁡2x<1/x21/x^2-1/3<\operatorname{csch}^2x<1/x^21/x2−1/3<csch2x<1/x2 of (22); the minimization (24) of the lower bound (23); Theorem 2(ii).
  • Expansions: the right-hand sides of (5) and (6) equal Br/λ+o(r)Br/\lambda+o(r)Br/λ+o(r) and 3(Br2/(4λ2))1/3−Br/(12λ)+o(r)3(Br^2/(4\lambda^2))^{1/3}-Br/(12\lambda)+o(r)3(Br2/(4λ2))1/3−Br/(12λ)+o(r) as r→0+r\to0^+r→0+.

Significance

Theorem 2 gives the qualitative conclusion of the paper in quantitative form: channels pay off only when on-chain fees are high, reset costs low, payment rates high, or interest rates low. Read as a contrapositive, it says that below the thresholds, settling on chain is at least as cheap for every channel size, so no optimization over sizes is needed to rule a channel out. The expansions show the two thresholds scale differently in the interest rate, linearly for a unidirectional channel and as r2/3r^{2/3}r2/3 for a symmetric bidirectional one. The paper's subsequent asymptotic results (Theorem 3) rely on the same reductions.

The theorem is proved in the paper; nothing here is open. To our knowledge none of it is formalized. A formalization adds a machine-checked verification of a proof that contains several informal steps: a minimizer of a two-variable function is assumed to exist, two inequalities are stated non-strictly where strict ones are needed, and one sentence states an "if and only if" with ≤\le≤ where <<< is meant. Lemma 1 also requires the discounted sum over a Poisson process to be integrable, which the paper's renewal argument takes for granted.

Difficulty

The bidirectional cost (3) is a ratio of differences of real powers of two algebraic numbers, and its minimum over two sizes has no closed form, so the threshold cannot be read off an explicit optimum. The paper replaces the optimum by reductions whose rigorous versions are the substance of the work: the passage from (3) to the symmetric form, the reduction of a two-variable minimization to the diagonal (asserted in the paper through a Hessian computation and the existence of a minimizer, neither of which is carried out), and a lower bound on csch⁡2\operatorname{csch}^2csch2 that holds on all of (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) and is not in Mathlib. The obvious approach of bounding the cost at its minimizer fails for the same reason it fails on paper: no minimizer is given. For part (i), the minimizer involves cosh⁡−1\cosh^{-1}cosh−1, and the minimal value still depends on CCC through two terms, so a condition on CCC alone does not follow by rearrangement. Lemma 1 requires an exchange of expectation and infinite sum over a Poisson process, which the paper's renewal argument assumes.

Formalization scope

  • Costs as closed forms for real sizes. uniCost and biCost are the paper's expressions (1) and (3) with real sizes and real powers (Real.rpow). Theorem 2's proofs minimize over real sizes, and the hypotheses quantify over real sizes, so the statements imply their versions for natural sizes. The probabilistic derivation of (1) and (3) from the balance random walk is the subject of the sibling mission Channels I.
  • Explicit on-chain costs. The comparisons are with λC/r\lambda C/rλC/r and 2Cλ/r2C\lambda/r2Cλ/r, written out; there is no opaque on-chain cost function.
  • Strict and existential. "Costs less" is strict and asserted for some size; the conclusions on CCC are strict. No sign is imposed on CCC; B,r,λ>0B,r,\lambda>0B,r,λ>0.
  • Lemma 1 uses the published definition QueueingFundamentals.Foundations.IsExpInterarrivals of i.i.d. exponential interarrival times; the conclusion asserts integrability as well as the value Cλ/rC\lambda/rCλ/r.
  • Corrections recorded in the statements. (17)–(20) is stated with the strict conclusion F>0F>0F>0 that (17) gives, for all m>0m>0m>0; (21) is stated in midpoint form, H(m,m)≤H(l1,l2)H(m,m)\le H(l_1,l_2)H(m,m)≤H(l1​,l2​) for m=(l1+l2)/2m=(l_1+l_2)/2m=(l1​+l2​)/2, which requires no minimizer.
  • Two different κ\kappaκ. In part (i) κ=log⁡(1+r/λ)\kappa=\log(1+r/\lambda)κ=log(1+r/λ); in part (ii) κ=log⁡α+\kappa=\log\alpha_+κ=logα+​. They are never identified.
  • Asymptotics are little-o along r→0+r\to0^+r→0+ (𝓝[>] 0) with BBB and λ\lambdaλ fixed.

Ruled out as trivializing: fixing BBB, rrr or λ\lambdaλ; restricting to natural sizes without saying so; an existentially chosen κ\kappaκ; weakening either strict inequality; or an on-chain cost under which the comparison is vacuous.

Needed infrastructure: real-power calculus and convexity on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), cosh⁡−1\cosh^{-1}cosh−1 and sinh⁡\sinhsinh bounds, little-o expansions of log⁡\loglog and cosh⁡−1\cosh^{-1}cosh−1 near their base points, and the Laplace transform of Gamma laws for Lemma 1. The csch inequality (22) and Lemma 1 are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • P. Guasoni, G. Huberman, C. Shikhelman, Lightning Network Economics: Channels, Management Science, Articles in Advance, published online Nov. 6, 2023, pp. 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01664
  • J. Poon, T. Dryja, The Bitcoin Lightning Network: Scalable Off-Chain Instant Payments, technical report, 2016. https://lightning.network/lightning-network-paper.pdf
  • G. Huberman, J. D. Leshno, C. Moallemi, Monopoly without a Monopolist: An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment System, Review of Economic Studies 88(6), 2021. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab014
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Linear OptimizationProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Selection and Ordering Policies for Hiring Pipelines via Linear Programming 3: In Simultaneous Offering With Values at Least τ, a Truncated-LP Value-Ordered Policy Earns ≥ α^τ_k Times the LP BoundResearch Paper

Motivation

A firm that fills a fixed number of positions from a pool of applicants faces uncertainty at every stage: applicants differ in value, and an offer may be declined. When offers must go out at once, as in a recruiting season with a common deadline, the firm decides a single offer set and lives with however many candidates accept. Sending too few offers leaves positions empty; sending too many hires beyond capacity at a cost. This trade-off is the same as overbooking in revenue management (airline seats, hotel rooms), with the difference that candidates are heterogeneous in both value and acceptance probability.

Epstein and Ma (arXiv:2210.04059v3, Operations Research 2024) study three hiring-pipeline models through linear programming relaxations. This mission formalizes their lower bound for the third model, Simultaneous Offering (§3.3 and §6 of the paper). The question it answers is practical: how much is lost if the firm restricts itself to value-ordered policies, which send offers to the mmm most valuable candidates for some mmm, instead of searching over all 2n2^n2n offer sets? Value-ordered policies are natural, because a firm rarely wants to withhold offers from its best candidates, and the optimal one is computable by a short dynamic program. The paper shows (Example 1, p. 25) that they can be arbitrarily bad in general, and that they are provably good when every candidate's value is bounded below.

Setting

An instance I=(k,n,p,v)I=(k,n,p,v)I=(k,n,p,v) has kkk positions and nnn candidates, 1≤k≤n1\le k\le n1≤k≤n. Candidate iii accepts an offer independently with probability pi∈[0,1]p_i\in[0,1]pi​∈[0,1] and then contributes value vi≥0v_i\ge0vi​≥0. Candidates are labelled so that v1≥v2≥⋯≥vnv_1\ge v_2\ge\dots\ge v_nv1​≥v2​≥⋯≥vn​. The firm chooses an offer set S⊆[n]S\subseteq[n]S⊆[n]; with A⊆SA\subseteq SA⊆S the random set of acceptances, the reward is

∑i∈Avi−[ ∣A∣−k ]+,\sum_{i\in A}v_i-\big[\,|A|-k\,\big]^+,i∈A∑​vi​−[∣A∣−k]+,

the cost per candidate hired beyond capacity being normalised to 111. OPTsim(I)\mathrm{OPT}_{\mathrm{sim}}(I)OPTsim​(I) is the best expected reward over offer sets. For τ>0\tau>0τ>0 the instance is τ\tauτ-bounded, I∈IsimτI\in\mathcal I^\tau_{\mathrm{sim}}I∈Isimτ​, if vi≥τv_i\ge\tauvi​≥τ for all iii; the interesting range is τ∈(0,1)\tau\in(0,1)τ∈(0,1), since for τ≥1\tau\ge1τ≥1 offering to everyone is optimal.

The benchmark is the LP relaxation

LPsim(I)=max⁡y,z ∑ivipiyi+zs.t.z≤k−∑ipiyi,  z≤0,  0≤yi≤1,\mathrm{LP}_{\mathrm{sim}}(I)=\max_{y,z}\ \sum_{i}v_ip_iy_i+z\quad\text{s.t.}\quad z\le k-\sum_ip_iy_i,\ \ z\le0,\ \ 0\le y_i\le1,LPsim​(I)=y,zmax​ i∑​vi​pi​yi​+zs.t.z≤k−i∑​pi​yi​,  z≤0,  0≤yi​≤1,

which charges the overage cost on the expected number of hires. Write Vhigh={i:vi>1}V_{\mathrm{high}}=\{i:v_i>1\}Vhigh​={i:vi​>1} and Phigh=∑i∈VhighpiP_{\mathrm{high}}=\sum_{i\in V_{\mathrm{high}}}p_iPhigh​=∑i∈Vhigh​​pi​.

The algorithm ALGsims\mathrm{ALG}^s_{\mathrm{sim}}ALGsims​, for s∈[0,1]s\in[0,1]s∈[0,1], takes an optimal LP solution yyy, scales its total mass ∑iyipi\sum_iy_ip_i∑i​yi​pi​ by sss to κ\kappaκ, and fills mass κ\kappaκ from the most valuable candidate down: yi′=1y'_i=1yi′​=1 while the prefix mass ∑l≤ipl\sum_{l\le i}p_l∑l≤i​pl​ stays at most κ\kappaκ, one fractional entry, then zeros. Offers are then sent independently with probabilities yi′y'_iyi′​, so the algorithm randomises between two value-ordered policies. Its expected reward is RALGsims(I)R_{\mathrm{ALG}^s_{\mathrm{sim}}}(I)RALGsims​​(I).

The guarantee involves the truncated Poisson mean E[min⁡{Pois(λ),k}]=∑j≥0min⁡{j,k}e−λλj/j!\mathbb E[\min\{\mathrm{Pois}(\lambda),k\}]=\sum_{j\ge0}\min\{j,k\}e^{-\lambda}\lambda^j/j!E[min{Pois(λ),k}]=∑j≥0​min{j,k}e−λλj/j! and

αkτ=sup⁡0≤s≤1(s−sτ+E[min⁡{Pois(sk),k}]τk).\alpha^\tau_k=\sup_{0\le s\le1}\Big(s-\frac{s}{\tau}+\frac{\mathbb E[\min\{\mathrm{Pois}(sk),k\}]}{\tau k}\Big).αkτ​=0≤s≤1sup​(s−τs​+τkE[min{Pois(sk),k}]​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 30)

For τ∈(0,1)\tau\in(0,1)τ∈(0,1), every I∈IsimτI\in\mathcal I^\tau_{\mathrm{sim}}I∈Isimτ​, every optimal solution of LPsim(I)\mathrm{LP}_{\mathrm{sim}}(I)LPsim​(I) and a maximiser s∗∈[0,1]s^*\in[0,1]s∗∈[0,1] of the objective defining αkτ\alpha^\tau_kαkτ​,

RALGsims∗(I) ≥ αkτ LPsim(I).R_{\mathrm{ALG}^{s^*}_{\mathrm{sim}}}(I)\ \ge\ \alpha^\tau_k\,\mathrm{LP}_{\mathrm{sim}}(I).RALGsims∗​​(I) ≥ αkτ​LPsim​(I).

Milestones

  • Lemma 10 (p. 27): LPsim(I)≥OPTsim(I)\mathrm{LP}_{\mathrm{sim}}(I)\ge\mathrm{OPT}_{\mathrm{sim}}(I)LPsim​(I)≥OPTsim​(I).
  • Lemma 11 (p. 27): some optimal LP solution is a filled prefix y=(1,…,1,yj,0,…,0)y=(1,\dots,1,y_j,0,\dots,0)y=(1,…,1,yj​,0,…,0) with yj>0y_j>0yj​>0.
  • Lemma 12 (p. 28): the total mass of such a solution is PhighP_{\mathrm{high}}Phigh​ if Phigh>kP_{\mathrm{high}}>kPhigh​>k and min⁡{k,Ptotal}\min\{k,P_{\mathrm{total}}\}min{k,Ptotal​} otherwise (posed under the disclosed hypothesis vi>0v_i>0vi​>0, vi≠1v_i\ne1vi​=1, pi>0p_i>0pi​>0).
  • Monotonicity (App. D.5, p. ec16): E[min⁡{Pois(x),k}]/x\mathbb E[\min\{\mathrm{Pois}(x),k\}]/xE[min{Pois(x),k}]/x is decreasing in xxx.
  • Proposition EC.2 (p. ec3): E[min⁡{Pois(k),k}]=k(1−e−kkk/k!)\mathbb E[\min\{\mathrm{Pois}(k),k\}]=k(1-e^{-k}k^k/k!)E[min{Pois(k),k}]=k(1−e−kkk/k!).
  • Lemma 13 (p. 29): if Phigh≤kP_{\mathrm{high}}\le kPhigh​≤k, then RALGsims(I)≥(s−s/τ+E[min⁡{Pois(sk),k}]/(τk))LPsim(I)R_{\mathrm{ALG}^s_{\mathrm{sim}}}(I)\ge\big(s-s/\tau+\mathbb E[\min\{\mathrm{Pois}(sk),k\}]/(\tau k)\big)\mathrm{LP}_{\mathrm{sim}}(I)RALGsims​​(I)≥(s−s/τ+E[min{Pois(sk),k}]/(τk))LPsim​(I) for every s∈[0,1]s\in[0,1]s∈[0,1].
  • The ALG1\mathrm{ALG}^1ALG1 bound (p. 30): on every τ\tauτ-bounded instance, RALGsim1(I)≥(1−e−kkk/(k!τ)) LPsim(I)R_{\mathrm{ALG}^1_{\mathrm{sim}}}(I)\ge(1-e^{-k}k^k/(k!\tau))\,\mathrm{LP}_{\mathrm{sim}}(I)RALGsim1​​(I)≥(1−e−kkk/(k!τ))LPsim​(I).
  • Lemma 14 (p. 29): if Phigh>kP_{\mathrm{high}}>kPhigh​>k, deflating the acceptance probabilities to an instance with Phigh=kP_{\mathrm{high}}=kPhigh​=k does not increase the ratio RALGsims∗/LPsimR_{\mathrm{ALG}^{s^*}_{\mathrm{sim}}}/\mathrm{LP}_{\mathrm{sim}}RALGsims∗​​/LPsim​ (posed under the disclosed hypothesis vi≠1v_i\ne1vi​=1).

Significance

Theorem 3 makes value-ordered policies an αkτ\alpha^\tau_kαkτ​-approximation on τ\tauτ-bounded instances, through Lemma 10. The factor tends to 111 as k→∞k\to\inftyk→∞ for fixed τ\tauτ: at s=1s=1s=1 it is at least 1−e−kkk/(k!τ)=1−O(1/k)1-e^{-k}k^k/(k!\tau)=1-O(1/\sqrt k)1−e−kkk/(k!τ)=1−O(1/k​) (Corollary 4). The paper's Theorem 4, the subject of the companion mission in this series, shows that no value-ordered policy beats the same expression with the supremum over s≥0s\ge0s≥0, so the analysis is tight wherever the two suprema coincide. The interpretation of τ\tauτ is how soft the capacity is: the bound degrades exactly as the overage cost dominates candidate values.

The result is proved in the paper; nothing in this mission is open mathematics. To our knowledge none of it has been machine-checked. A complete development would give the platform an overbooking-type stochastic selection model with an exact expected reward, an LP benchmark, and the truncated-Poisson constant that recurs in prophet-inequality and online-matching analyses (the kkk-uniform correlation gap of Yan 2011). Proposition EC.2 and the monotonicity of E[min⁡{Pois(x),k}]/x\mathbb E[\min\{\mathrm{Pois}(x),k\}]/xE[min{Pois(x),k}]/x are reusable on their own.

Difficulty

The obvious argument compares the algorithm's random number of hires with the LP's expected number and loses everything to the overage term: the LP pays [E∣A∣−k]+[\mathbb E|A|-k]^+[E∣A∣−k]+, the algorithm pays E[∣A∣−k]+\mathbb E[|A|-k]^+E[∣A∣−k]+, and Jensen's inequality points the wrong way. The gap must be controlled by a sum of independent Bernoulli variables against a Poisson variable of the same mean, uniformly over how the mass is spread across candidates. A second difficulty is the regime Phigh>kP_{\mathrm{high}}>kPhigh​>k, where the LP optimum deliberately exceeds capacity; a direct bound there does not reduce to the first case, and the paper's reduction (Lemma 14) changes the instance rather than the algorithm. Tie cases vi=1v_i=1vi​=1 make the LP optimum non-unique, which the formal statements must handle explicitly.

Formalization scope

Candidates are Fin n (0-based), all quantities are real. The sorted labelling v1≥⋯≥vnv_1\ge\dots\ge v_nv1​≥⋯≥vn​ is part of instance validity (Antitone I.v), as the paper assumes after relabelling; ties may be ordered arbitrarily. Every expectation is an explicit finite sum over the 2n2^n2n hire sets with independent probabilities yi′piy'_ip_iyi′​pi​; there is no measure theory. The truncated Poisson mean is the series of the Poisson pmf. LPsim(I)\mathrm{LP}_{\mathrm{sim}}(I)LPsim​(I) is the supremum of the objective over the feasible set, which is the LP value; αkτ\alpha^\tau_kαkτ​ is the supremum over [0,1][0,1][0,1]. s∗s^*s∗ is any maximiser of the αkτ\alpha^\tau_kαkτ​ objective over [0,1][0,1][0,1]; one exists by continuity. A candidate with pi=0p_i=0pi​=0 receives yi′=0y'_i=0yi′​=0, which changes no reward.

The algorithm's reward is the exact expected reward of the run with independent offers, never the bound produced in the paper's proof, and the comparison is with the LP value at an optimal solution, not with the objective at an arbitrary feasible point; αkτ\alpha^\tau_kαkτ​ is the supremum of the specific Poisson expression, not a free constant.

Two statements carry disclosed hypotheses, because the printed versions fail at ties: Lemma 12 assumes vi>0v_i>0vi​>0, vi≠1v_i\ne1vi​=1, pi>0p_i>0pi​>0, and Lemma 14 assumes vi≠1v_i\ne1vi​=1. Counterexamples are in the items' Formalization Notes. Theorem 3 and Lemma 13 need neither and hold for every optimal LP solution.

A complete development needs Poisson series manipulations (the closed form, concavity of λ↦E[min⁡{Pois(λ),k}]\lambda\mapsto\mathbb E[\min\{\mathrm{Pois}(\lambda),k\}]λ↦E[min{Pois(λ),k}]), a Bernoulli-to-Poisson comparison for Emin⁡{∑iDi,k}\mathbb E\min\{\sum_iD_i,k\}Emin{∑i​Di​,k}, and fractional-knapsack structure for the LP. Contributions of alternative proofs of any milestone, and of the Poisson facts as standalone results, are welcome.

Selected references

  • B. Epstein, W. Ma, Selection and Ordering Policies for Hiring Pipelines via Linear Programming, arXiv:2210.04059v3 (2023); Operations Research (2024). https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.04059
  • Q. Yan, Mechanism Design via Correlation Gap, Proceedings of SODA 2011, 710–719. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973082.56
  • M. T. Goodrich, R. Tamassia, Algorithm Design: Foundations, Analysis, and Internet Examples, Wiley, 2001, Chapter 5 (fractional knapsack).
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue 2: Random-Sampling VCG Is Ex-Post IC-IR and a 4-Approximation to Welfare for Separable SOS ValuationsResearch Paper

Motivation

In many auctions a bidder's value for what is sold depends on information held by other bidders: the value of an oil-drilling lease depends on every bidder's geological survey, the value of a piece of art on what other experts know about its provenance. This is the interdependent values model of Milgrom and Weber (1982). With interdependent values the standard private-value tools fail: the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism is no longer incentive compatible, exact efficiency in ex-post equilibrium requires a single-crossing condition, and with multidimensional signals maximizing welfare is generically impossible even in Bayes–Nash equilibrium (Jehiel and Moldovanu 2001). Without some structural condition on how values respond to others' information, even a single-item auction can force every truthful randomized mechanism to lose a factor of order nnn (Example 1.3, after Eden et al. 2018), when values treat the signals as complements.

Eden, Feldman, Fiat, Goldner and Karlin (arXiv:1903.08384, Mathematics of Operations Research 2024) identify such a condition, submodularity over signals (SOS), and show that under SOS simple randomized mechanisms recover a constant fraction of the optimal welfare in rich settings. This mission formalizes their result for combinatorial auctions with multidimensional signals and separable SOS valuations, where the mechanism is a random-sampling variant of VCG with explicit payments.

Timeline of the line of work:

  • Milgrom and Weber (1982): the interdependent values model.
  • Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001): with multidimensional signals, welfare maximization is generically impossible even in Bayes–Nash equilibrium.
  • Chawla, Fu and Karlin (2014): revenue approximation in interdependent value settings under single crossing.
  • Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen (2016): characterization of ex-post IC for single-parameter settings by monotone allocation rules.
  • Eden, Feldman, Fiat and Goldner (2018): welfare approximation for single-item auctions under a relaxed c-single crossing condition; an SOS notion also appears there.
  • Eden, Feldman, Fiat, Goldner and Karlin (2019, arXiv v2): welfare approximation under SOS, without single crossing, for downward-closed single-parameter settings and combinatorial auctions; the subject of this mission.

Setting

There are nnn agents and mmm items; a bundle is a set T⊆[m]T \subseteq [m]T⊆[m]. Each agent iii privately holds a signal siT≥0s_{iT} \ge 0siT​≥0 for every bundle TTT, and sT=(s1T,…,snT)s_T = (s_{1T}, \dots, s_{nT})sT​=(s1T​,…,snT​) collects all agents' signals for TTT. Agent iii's value for bundle TTT is viT(sT)≥0v_{iT}(s_T) \ge 0viT​(sT​)≥0, a known function of sTs_TsT​, weakly increasing in every signal and strictly increasing in siTs_{iT}siT​; the empty bundle is worth 000.

A function www of the signal vector is SOS when raising a single coordinate helps at least as much at a coordinatewise lower profile of the other coordinates: for every coordinate jjj, x,δ≥0x, \delta \ge 0x,δ≥0 and profiles s′≤ss' \le ss′≤s off jjj,

w(s−j,x+δ)−w(s−j,x)≤w(s−j′,x+δ)−w(s−j′,x).w(s_{-j}, x + \delta) - w(s_{-j}, x) \le w(s'_{-j}, x + \delta) - w(s'_{-j}, x).w(s−j​,x+δ)−w(s−j​,x)≤w(s−j′​,x+δ)−w(s−j′​,x).

The valuations are separable SOS when

viT(sT)=g−iT(s−iT)+hiT(siT),v_{iT}(s_T) = g_{-iT}(s_{-iT}) + h_{iT}(s_{iT}),viT​(sT​)=g−iT​(s−iT​)+hiT​(siT​),

with g−iTg_{-iT}g−iT​ (depending only on the other agents' signals for TTT) and hiTh_{iT}hiT​ weakly increasing and g−iTg_{-iT}g−iT​ SOS.

An allocation gives agent iii the bundle TiT_iTi​, with the bundles pairwise disjoint. A deterministic mechanism maps reported signals to an allocation and payments. It is ex-post incentive compatible (IC) if, whatever the true signals, no agent gains by misreporting when the others report truthfully, where the agent's utility is her value at the true signals for the bundle she receives minus her payment; it is ex-post individually rational (IR) if the truthful utility is nonnegative. A randomized mechanism is universally ex-post IC-IR when every deterministic mechanism in its support is.

Random-Sampling VCG (RS-VCG) partitions the agents uniformly at random into AAA and BBB. For j∈Bj \in Bj∈B it sets the proxy weight

wjT:=vjT(s~jT,s~AT,0B−jT),w_{jT} := v_{jT}(\tilde s_{jT}, \tilde s_{AT}, 0_{B - jT}),wjT​:=vjT​(s~jT​,s~AT​,0B−jT​),

the value with the bundle-TTT signals of the other members of BBB replaced by 000. It allocates to BBB a feasible allocation {Ti}i∈B\{T_i\}_{i\in B}{Ti​}i∈B​ maximising ∑i∈BwiTi\sum_{i \in B} w_{iT_i}∑i∈B​wiTi​​, and a winner i∈Bi \in Bi∈B pays

pi(s~)=g−iTi(s~−iTi)−g−iTi(s~ATi,0B−iTi)−∑j∈B∖{i}wjTj+w−i,p_i(\tilde s) = g_{-iT_i}(\tilde s_{-iT_i}) - g_{-iT_i}(\tilde s_{AT_i}, 0_{B-iT_i}) - \sum_{j \in B\setminus\{i\}} w_{jT_j} + w_{-i},pi​(s~)=g−iTi​​(s~−iTi​​)−g−iTi​​(s~ATi​​,0B−iTi​​)−j∈B∖{i}∑​wjTj​​+w−i​,

where w−iw_{-i}w−i​ is the maximum proxy welfare of an allocation to B∖{i}B \setminus \{i\}B∖{i}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1 (p. 17)

For separable SOS valuations, RS-VCG is ex-post IC and IR for every partition, and for every true profile sss and every feasible allocation (Si∗)(S^*_i)(Si∗​),

∑iviSi∗(sSi∗)≤4 EB[∑iviTi(B)(sTi(B))].\sum_i v_{iS^*_i}(s_{S^*_i}) \le 4\, \mathbb{E}_B\Bigl[\sum_i v_{iT_i(B)}(s_{T_i(B)})\Bigr].i∑​viSi∗​​(sSi∗​​)≤4EB​[i∑​viTi​(B)​(sTi​(B)​)].

Milestones

  1. Observation 2.2 (p. 12): a separable SOS valuation is SOS.
  2. Display (5) (p. 17): EB[wiT⋅1i∈B]≥viT(sT)2⋅12\mathbb{E}_B[w_{iT}\cdot\mathbf 1_{i\in B}] \ge \frac{v_{iT}(s_T)}{2}\cdot\frac12EB​[wiT​⋅1i∈B​]≥2viT​(sT​)​⋅21​ for every agent iii and bundle TTT.
  3. Payment sign (p. 17): the payments pi(s~)p_i(\tilde s)pi​(s~) are nonnegative.
  4. IC display (p. 18): for every partition, truthful reporting maximises each agent's utility.
  5. IR display (p. 18): for every partition, the truthful utility is nonnegative.

Significance

The theorem shows that VCG-style reasoning survives interdependence when the dependence on other agents' information enters additively and submodularly: separability makes the payment absorb the effect of the others' signals, so that each agent of BBB faces the proxy welfare as its objective. It gives a constant-factor welfare guarantee in ex-post equilibrium for combinatorial auctions with multidimensional interdependent signals, a setting in which exact efficiency is generically out of reach. The construction is the template for the paper's single-dimensional results in §6.

The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. Formalizing it produces a reusable Lean model of interdependent-value combinatorial auctions (multidimensional signals, ex-post IC/IR, universal truthfulness of random mixtures) and of the SOS condition, and a checked account of the VCG accounting identity in this setting.

Difficulty

The approximation part rests on the Key Lemma 3.1: a uniformly random half of the other agents' signals set to zero keeps, in expectation, half of an SOS value. The obvious argument — monotonicity alone — gives no constant: with values depending on many signals, zeroing half of them can destroy almost all of the value, and the SOS condition is exactly what rules this out. The incentive part is where the obvious transfer of VCG fails: the proxy weight wiTw_{iT}wiT​ of agent iii is not its value, and the true value viTv_{iT}viT​ depends on signals that the proxy zeroes. Without separability, the payment of a VCG-style rule would itself depend on the agent's report (the paper's remark at the start of §5), and alignment of the agent's utility with the proxy objective breaks. Ties in the argmax and agents receiving the empty bundle must be handled for every tie-breaking rule.

Formalization scope

Agents are Fin n and items Fin m, with n,mn, mn,m arbitrary; bundles are Finset (Fin m). Signals are NNReal, one per (agent, bundle), and viTv_{iT}viT​ is a function of the bundle-TTT signal vector. The empty bundle is worth 000; monotonicity, strict own-signal monotonicity and the separable decomposition are assumed for nonempty bundles. The function g−iTg_{-iT}g−iT​ is written on the whole vector with the hypothesis that it ignores coordinate iii. The decomposition (g,h)(g, h)(g,h) is data of the mechanism, since the payments use ggg.

The allocation is produced by an arbitrary selector returning a feasible maximiser of the proxy welfare for every partition and report; all statements hold for every such selector. w−iw_{-i}w−i​ is a maximum over the finite set of feasible allocations to B∖{i}B \setminus \{i\}B∖{i}. Agents of AAA, and agents of BBB that receive the empty bundle, pay 000 (the paper defines payments for winners only). The expectation over the partition is the uniform average 2−n∑B⊆[n]2^{-n}\sum_{B \subseteq [n]}2−n∑B⊆[n]​, never an existential or universal over BBB; the approximation is stated for every feasible comparator allocation, with welfare at true values under truthful reports, never for proxy welfare or through a supremum. IC and IR are stated for each partition with the paper's explicit payments, not with existentially chosen payments.

A complete development needs finite averages over subsets, the Key Lemma 3.1 for SOS functions (posed in the companion mission on RS-V and not restated here), and finite argmax reasoning; the SOS layer and the combinatorial mechanism model are reusable for the other missions of this series. Proofs of the milestones, and of the d-SOS variant mentioned after the proof (a 2(d+1)2(d+1)2(d+1)-approximation, not posed here), are welcome.

The source is the arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.08384v2 (2 June 2019); all page and display numbers refer to it, not to the journal version in Mathematics of Operations Research (2024).

Selected references

  • A. Eden, M. Feldman, A. Fiat, K. Goldner, A. R. Karlin, Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue, arXiv:1903.08384v2, 2019; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.08384
  • P. R. Milgrom, R. J. Weber, A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, Econometrica 50(5), 1982. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911865
  • P. Jehiel, B. Moldovanu, Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations, Econometrica 69(5), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00241
  • S. Chawla, H. Fu, A. R. Karlin, Approximate Revenue Maximization in Interdependent Value Settings, EC 2014. https://doi.org/10.1145/2600057.2602858
  • A. Eden, M. Feldman, A. Fiat, K. Goldner, Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing, EC 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.03865
  • T. Roughgarden, I. Talgam-Cohen, Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values, ACM TEAC 4(3), 2016. https://doi.org/10.1145/2897185
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 4: The Threshold Equilibrium Investment in New Mining Hardware, with Entry Decreasing in the Fixed CostResearch Paper

Motivation

Proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin pay a block reward to the miner that first solves a computational puzzle. The chance of winning is proportional to a miner's share of the total computing power (hash rate), so mining is a contest in which every miner pays for hash rate and the reward is split in proportion to it. Over time mining moved from general-purpose hardware to specialized chips, and this raised the question of whether access to better hardware concentrates mining in a few hands, which would weaken the decentralization the protocol relies on for security. Arnosti and Weinberg (arXiv:1811.08572) showed that cost asymmetries alone already concentrate mining in a proportional-share contest.

Capponi, Ólafsson and Alsabah (arXiv:2106.09783v1, 2021; published in Management Science, 2023) model this as a two-stage game. Miners first decide how much to invest in the newest hardware, which lowers their cost per unit of hash rate. They then compete in the mining stage. Their Proposition 5.1 describes the equilibrium of the investment stage: which miners invest, how much, and how the number of active miners depends on the fixed cost of entering. This mission formalizes that result, corrected where the printed statement is false.

Setting

There are N≥2N\ge2N≥2 miners. Miner iii starts with a cost-per-hash c~i\tilde c_ic~i​, sorted so that c~1≤⋯≤c~N\tilde c_1\le\dots\le\tilde c_Nc~1​≤⋯≤c~N​. The newest hardware has cost-per-hash c~0\tilde c_0c~0​, with 0<c~0<c~i0<\tilde c_0<\tilde c_i0<c~0​<c~i​ for every iii. In the first stage miner iii replaces a fraction βi∈[0,1]\beta_i\in[0,1]βi​∈[0,1] of its hardware, which leaves it with cost-per-hash

ci(βi)=c~i−βi(c~i−c~0)+η(c~i−c~0)2βi2,c_i(\beta_i)=\tilde c_i-\beta_i(\tilde c_i-\tilde c_0)+\frac{\eta(\tilde c_i-\tilde c_0)}{2}\beta_i^2,ci​(βi​)=c~i​−βi​(c~i​−c~0​)+2η(c~i​−c~0​)​βi2​,

where η≥0\eta\ge0η≥0 measures adjustment costs ((3.1)–(3.2)). Write βˉ=min⁡{1/η,1}\bar\beta=\min\{1/\eta,1\}βˉ​=min{1/η,1}, read as 111 when η=0\eta=0η=0.

In the second stage, the mining stage, miner iii chooses a hash rate hi≥0h_i\ge0hi​≥0. With H=∑jhjH=\sum_jh_jH=∑j​hj​, its payoff is

πi=hiHR−cihi−γ2hi2−K 1{i∉A(0), βi>0}(H>0),πi=0(H=0),\pi_i=\frac{h_i}{H}R-c_ih_i-\frac{\gamma}{2}h_i^2-K\,\mathbf 1\{i\notin A(0),\ \beta_i>0\}\quad(H>0),\qquad \pi_i=0\quad(H=0),πi​=Hhi​​R−ci​hi​−2γ​hi2​−K1{i∈/A(0), βi​>0}(H>0),πi​=0(H=0),

with reward R>0R>0R>0, capacity parameter γ≥0\gamma\ge0γ≥0 and fixed entry cost K>0K>0K>0 ((3.4)). An equilibrium hash rate profile h∗(β)h^*(\beta)h∗(β) is a profile from which no miner gains by changing its own hash rate (Definition 3.2(i)). Proposition 4.1 of the paper shows that it exists and is unique, and posing that result is the subject of mission 1 of this series. The active set is A(β)={i:hi∗(β)>0}A(\beta)=\{i:h^*_i(\beta)>0\}A(β)={i:hi∗​(β)>0}, and A(0)A(0)A(0) is the set of miners active without investment. The entry cost KKK is paid by a miner outside A(0)A(0)A(0) that invests.

An equilibrium investment β∗∈[0,1]N\beta^*\in[0,1]^Nβ∗∈[0,1]N is a profile from which no miner can raise its payoff by changing βi\beta_iβi​, the mining stage being replayed at the new profile (Definition 3.2(ii)). The threshold profile β(n)\beta^{(n)}β(n) invests βˉ\bar\betaβˉ​ in miners 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n and 000 in the others; this is the form (5.1).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5.1, corrected

Assume KKK is generic: no potential entrant's gross mining profit at β(i)\beta^{(i)}β(i) equals KKK. Then:

  1. there is exactly one n∈{2,…,N}n\in\{2,\dots,N\}n∈{2,…,N} for which β(n)\beta^{(n)}β(n) is an equilibrium investment, and at it exactly nnn miners are active and A(0)⊆A(β(n))A(0)\subseteq A(\beta^{(n)})A(0)⊆A(β(n));
  2. every equilibrium investment β∗\beta^*β∗ satisfies A(0)⊆A(β∗)A(0)\subseteq A(\beta^*)A(0)⊆A(β∗) and βi∗=βˉ\beta^*_i=\bar\betaβi∗​=βˉ​ for every i∈A(0)i\in A(0)i∈A(0);
  3. nnn is nonincreasing in KKK:
K≤K′ ⟹ n(K′)≤n(K).K\le K'\ \Longrightarrow\ n(K')\le n(K).K≤K′ ⟹ n(K′)≤n(K).

Milestones

  • Proposition B.1: at a fixed set of nnn active miners, ∂πi∗/∂ci<0\partial\pi^*_i/\partial c_i<0∂πi∗​/∂ci​<0 and ∂πi∗/∂cj>0\partial\pi^*_i/\partial c_j>0∂πi∗​/∂cj​>0.
  • (5.2): the cost reduction ci(0)−ci(βˉ)c_i(0)-c_i(\bar\beta)ci​(0)−ci​(βˉ​) equals (c~i−c~0)/(2η)(\tilde c_i-\tilde c_0)/(2\eta)(c~i​−c~0​)/(2η) for η>1\eta>1η>1 and (1−η/2)(c~i−c~0)(1-\eta/2)(\tilde c_i-\tilde c_0)(1−η/2)(c~i​−c~0​) for η≤1\eta\le1η≤1, and βˉ\bar\betaβˉ​ uniquely minimizes cic_ici​ on [0,1][0,1][0,1].
  • Best responses (p. 44): at every equilibrium investment, active miners invest βˉ\bar\betaβˉ​ and inactive ones invest 000.
  • Order preservation (p. 45): for η>0\eta>0η>0, investing βˉ\bar\betaβˉ​ preserves the strict order of costs.
  • Participation at ∣A(0)∣|A(0)|∣A(0)∣ (p. 45): after miners 1,…,∣A(0)∣1,\dots,|A(0)|1,…,∣A(0)∣ invest, the participation inequality of Proposition 4.4 holds for miner ∣A(0)∣|A(0)|∣A(0)∣.

Significance

The result says three things about the effect of hardware upgrades on decentralization. Incumbents never drop out: every miner active before investment invests the cost-minimizing amount and stays active. Entry is ordered: in the threshold equilibrium the miners that enter are the most efficient ones. A higher fixed cost of entry admits weakly fewer miners. The paper's later propositions (5.2–5.5), which describe how hash rates and shares move after investment, start from this equilibrium.

Formalizing it adds two things. First, a machine-checked statement of what is actually true. The printed uniqueness is false, and the corrected statement separates what holds for every equilibrium from what holds within the threshold family. Second, a formal two-stage game in which the second stage is replayed at every deviation of the first, through an explicit equilibrium selection. None of the results of the paper has been formalized before; the platform has no contest or rent-seeking game.

Difficulty

The printed proof argues that an active miner's profit decreases in its own cost "irrespective of the cost parameters of other miners", citing Proposition B.1. Proposition B.1 is a derivative at a fixed set of active miners. Investment can change that set, so the proof needs a global monotonicity of the equilibrium profit across changes of the active set, in the own cost and in the presence of rivals. That step is not in the paper.

The obvious uniqueness argument also fails. Take two potential entrants with nearly equal initial costs and room in the market for only one of them. Either one can enter while the other stays out, and both profiles are equilibria. The numbers are c~=(1.074,1.419,2.914,2.923)\tilde c=(1.074,1.419,2.914,2.923)c~=(1.074,1.419,2.914,2.923), c~0=0.31\tilde c_0=0.31c~0​=0.31, η=0.5\eta=0.5η=0.5, γ=0.5\gamma=0.5γ=0.5, R=1R=1R=1 and any K∈(0.0168,0.0308)K\in(0.0168,0.0308)K∈(0.0168,0.0308): both (1,1,1,0)(1,1,1,0)(1,1,1,0) and (1,1,0,1)(1,1,0,1)(1,1,0,1) are equilibrium investments. So no proof can rest on "a miner never invests while a cheaper one does not", which the paper asserts on p. 45.

Formalization scope

Miners are Fin N and 0-based: Lean miner i is the paper's miner i+1i+1i+1. Hash rates, costs and parameters are real numbers. The mining stage is defined for an arbitrary cost vector, not assumed sorted, because investment can reorder costs. The equilibrium property "=sup⁡=\sup=sup" is written as "no deviation is profitable", over hi≥0h_i\ge0hi​≥0 and over βi∈[0,1]\beta_i\in[0,1]βi​∈[0,1]. The mining equilibrium enters as a selection h∗h^*h∗ with the hypothesis that h∗(β)h^*(\beta)h∗(β) is an equilibrium hash rate profile for every β∈[0,1]N\beta\in[0,1]^Nβ∈[0,1]N. Proposition 4.1 makes it unique; it is not defined by a closed form. The fixed cost enters only the investment stage, inside the H>0H>0H>0 branch of (3.4). Derivatives are HasDerivAt statements along one coordinate. "Decreasing" is weak, as in the paper's footnote 12.

The goal is the corrected Proposition 5.1. The printed uniqueness among all investment profiles is not posed, and neither is the p. 45 claim that a miner cannot invest while a cheaper miner does not. Both are false by the instance above. Three hypotheses are added to the paper's: c~0>0\tilde c_0>0c~0​>0; c~0<c~i\tilde c_0<\tilde c_ic~0​<c~i​ for every iii (the paper allows equality, under which cic_ici​ is constant and every βi\beta_iβi​ is a best response); and the genericity of KKK, which excludes finitely many values. Without the selection hypothesis the goal would be about an arbitrary function. Without the existence in part 1 the "every equilibrium" clause could be vacuous. Both are in the statement, so neither trivialization is available.

A complete development needs the mining-stage results of mission 1 of this series: existence and uniqueness of the mining equilibrium (Proposition 4.1) and the participation condition (Proposition 4.4). Since one draft cannot import another, this mission redefines the mining stage in its own namespace PoWMining.Investment. The new work is a global comparative-statics argument for the mining equilibrium across changes of the active set. It is reusable for any proportional-share contest with convex costs. Contributions are welcome on the milestones in any order, on that global monotonicity, and on the existence half of part 1.

Selected references

  • A. Capponi, S. Ólafsson, H. Alsabah, Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization?, arXiv preprint arXiv:2106.09783v1, 2021 (Proposition 5.1 p. 21, proofs pp. 43–46). https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.09783v1
  • N. Arnosti, S. M. Weinberg, Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly, Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.08572
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 3: Sensitivities of Equilibrium Hash Rates to Mining Capacity and Reward, and Shares Shift to Smaller MinersResearch Paper

Motivation

Bitcoin and other proof-of-work cryptocurrencies rely on miners, who spend computing power ("hash rate") to win the right to append a block and collect a reward. The security argument for such systems assumes that no single miner, or small coalition, controls a large share of the total hash rate. Whether the economics of mining push the system towards or away from that decentralized state is therefore a basic question for anyone designing or regulating these protocols.

A. Capponi, S. Ólafsson and H. Alsabah, in Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? (arXiv:2106.09783v1, 2021), model mining as a contest in which miners differ in their cost per hash and face a common capacity constraint. Their §4.3 asks how equilibrium hash rates respond to the model's parameters. This mission formalizes the answer for two of them: the capacity parameter γ\gammaγ, which measures how quickly a miner's operating cost grows with its scale, and the mining reward RRR. The finding is that increasing either parameter shifts hash rate share from large miners to small ones. This is the third mission of a four-part series on the paper; the first poses the existence and structure of the mining equilibrium, the second its sensitivity to mining costs.

Setting

There are n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 active miners, indexed i=1,…,ni = 1, \dots, ni=1,…,n, with costs per hash 0<c1≤c2≤⋯≤cn0 < c_1 \le c_2 \le \dots \le c_n0<c1​≤c2​≤⋯≤cn​ (sorted, without loss of generality), a reward R>0R > 0R>0 and a capacity parameter γ>0\gamma > 0γ>0. Miner iii choosing hash rate hih_ihi​ earns (hi/H)R−cihi−(γ/2)hi2(h_i/H)R - c_ih_i - (\gamma/2)h_i^2(hi​/H)R−ci​hi​−(γ/2)hi2​, where H=∑jhjH = \sum_j h_jH=∑j​hj​ is the aggregate hash rate (the paper's (3.4)). The cumulative cost is c(n)=c1+⋯+cnc^{(n)} = c_1 + \dots + c_nc(n)=c1​+⋯+cn​.

In the paper's Proposition 4.1, the equilibrium aggregate hash rate is the positive root of γH2+c(n)H−(n−1)R=0\gamma H^2 + c^{(n)}H - (n-1)R = 0γH2+c(n)H−(n−1)R=0, and the equilibrium hash rates are given in closed form. The paper's appendix (B.3) writes them as functions of the active miners' data:

g=g(c1,…,cn,γ,R)=(c(n))2+4(n−1)Rγ−c(n)2γ,fi=fi(c1,…,cn,γ,R)=g R−cigR+γg2,g = g(c_1,\dots,c_n,\gamma,R) = \frac{\sqrt{(c^{(n)})^2 + 4(n-1)R\gamma} - c^{(n)}}{2\gamma},\qquad f_i = f_i(c_1,\dots,c_n,\gamma,R) = g\,\frac{R - c_i g}{R + \gamma g^2},g=g(c1​,…,cn​,γ,R)=2γ(c(n))2+4(n−1)Rγ​−c(n)​,fi​=fi​(c1​,…,cn​,γ,R)=gR+γg2R−ci​g​,

with H∗=gH^* = gH∗=g and hi∗=fih^*_i = f_ihi∗​=fi​. Miner iii is active exactly when R−cig>0R - c_i g > 0R−ci​g>0. The hash rate share of miner iii is hi∗/H∗h^*_i/H^*hi∗​/H∗.

The paper's sensitivities are derivatives of these maps at a state where small parameter changes leave the set of active miners unchanged (pp. 15–16). For x∈{γ,R}x \in \{\gamma, R\}x∈{γ,R}, (B.4) splits the derivative of hi∗h^*_ihi∗​ into a direct part, Δi,1(x)=∂fi/∂x\Delta^{(x)}_{i,1} = \partial f_i/\partial xΔi,1(x)​=∂fi​/∂x with ggg held fixed, and an indirect part through the aggregate, Δi,2(x)=(∂fi/∂g)(∂g/∂x)\Delta^{(x)}_{i,2} = (\partial f_i/\partial g)(\partial g/\partial x)Δi,2(x)​=(∂fi​/∂g)(∂g/∂x).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4.8 (p. 20)

For every active miner iii,

∂hi∗∂γ=Δi,1(γ)+Δi,2(γ),Δi,1(γ)<0,Δi,2(γ)>0  ⟺  hi∗H∗<12,\frac{\partial h^*_i}{\partial\gamma} = \Delta^{(\gamma)}_{i,1}+\Delta^{(\gamma)}_{i,2},\quad \Delta^{(\gamma)}_{i,1}<0,\quad \Delta^{(\gamma)}_{i,2}>0 \iff \frac{h^*_i}{H^*}<\frac12,∂γ∂hi∗​​=Δi,1(γ)​+Δi,2(γ)​,Δi,1(γ)​<0,Δi,2(γ)​>0⟺H∗hi∗​​<21​, ∂hi∗∂R=Δi,1(R)+Δi,2(R)>0,Δi,1(R)>0,Δi,2(R)<0  ⟺  hi∗H∗<12,\frac{\partial h^*_i}{\partial R} = \Delta^{(R)}_{i,1}+\Delta^{(R)}_{i,2} > 0,\quad \Delta^{(R)}_{i,1}>0,\quad \Delta^{(R)}_{i,2}<0 \iff \frac{h^*_i}{H^*}<\frac12,∂R∂hi∗​​=Δi,1(R)​+Δi,2(R)​>0,Δi,1(R)​>0,Δi,2(R)​<0⟺H∗hi∗​​<21​,

and the derivatives of hi∗/H∗h^*_i/H^*hi∗​/H∗ with respect to γ\gammaγ and to RRR are increasing in iii, for 1≤i≤n1 \le i \le n1≤i≤n.

Milestones (the steps of the appendix proof)

  1. (B.2), p. 39: ∂H∗/∂γ=−(H∗)2/(c(n)+2γH∗)<0\partial H^*/\partial\gamma = -(H^*)^2/(c^{(n)}+2\gamma H^*) < 0∂H∗/∂γ=−(H∗)2/(c(n)+2γH∗)<0 and ∂H∗/∂R=(n−1)/(c(n)+2γH∗)>0\partial H^*/\partial R = (n-1)/(c^{(n)}+2\gamma H^*) > 0∂H∗/∂R=(n−1)/(c(n)+2γH∗)>0.
  2. p. 40: ∂fi/∂γ=−g3(R−cig)/(R+γg2)2<0\partial f_i/\partial\gamma = -g^3(R-c_ig)/(R+\gamma g^2)^2 < 0∂fi​/∂γ=−g3(R−ci​g)/(R+γg2)2<0 and ∂fi/∂R=g2(ci+γg)/(R+γg2)2>0\partial f_i/\partial R = g^2(c_i+\gamma g)/(R+\gamma g^2)^2 > 0∂fi​/∂R=g2(ci​+γg)/(R+γg2)2>0.
  3. (B.4), pp. 40–41: closed forms of ∂hi∗/∂γ\partial h^*_i/\partial\gamma∂hi∗​/∂γ and ∂hi∗/∂R\partial h^*_i/\partial R∂hi∗​/∂R.
  4. (B.6), pp. 42–43: closed forms of the share derivatives, and the p. 43 rewrites in which iii enters only through fif_ifi​ and ci+γfic_i + \gamma f_ici​+γfi​.

Significance

The result. Proposition 4.8 says that a tighter capacity constraint and a larger reward both favour small miners. The direct effect of a larger γ\gammaγ lowers every miner's hash rate. The indirect effect raises the hash rate of every miner with less than half of the total, because the aggregate falls and the marginal gain of hashing rises. For the reward, every miner's hash rate rises, but the share derivatives are increasing in the miner's index, i.e. in its cost: costlier, smaller miners gain share. Table 1 of the paper (p. 16) lists the signs; this proposition supplies the γ\gammaγ and RRR columns. The paper uses it to argue that rising block rewards or tighter hardware constraints work against concentration (§4.3.3), in contrast to cost reductions from new hardware (§5).

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper by explicit differentiation (Appendix B). No machine-checked version exists. The mission produces checked closed forms of every derivative in (B.2), (B.4) and (B.6) for the γ\gammaγ and RRR directions, the sign analysis, and the monotonicity in iii. The proof text on p. 43 says "decreasing in iii" where the proposition says "increasing"; a formal proof settles which is right (the displayed expressions give increasing, which is what is posed).

Difficulty

Each derivative is an exercise; the difficulty lies in keeping the algebra correct over several layers. The aggregate ggg is the root of a quadratic, so its derivatives involve the square root, and every simplification of (B.4) and (B.6) uses the root identity γg2+c(n)g=(n−1)R\gamma g^2 + c^{(n)}g = (n-1)Rγg2+c(n)g=(n−1)R, i.e. (c(n))2+4(n−1)Rγ=c(n)+2γg\sqrt{(c^{(n)})^2+4(n-1)R\gamma} = c^{(n)} + 2\gamma g(c(n))2+4(n−1)Rγ​=c(n)+2γg, and the first-order identity ci+γfi=(R/g)(1−fi/g)c_i + \gamma f_i = (R/g)(1 - f_i/g)ci​+γfi​=(R/g)(1−fi​/g). The sign of the indirect parts is not visible from the raw derivative: it requires rewriting ∂fi/∂g\partial f_i/\partial g∂fi​/∂g so that the threshold fi/g=1/2f_i/g = 1/2fi​/g=1/2 appears. The positivity of ∂hi∗/∂R\partial h^*_i/\partial R∂hi∗​/∂R needs a separate bound, since its indirect part can be negative. The monotonicity in iii is the most delicate part: it is not true term by term in (B.6) as first displayed, and only becomes visible after the p. 43 rewrite, which separates the dependence on fif_ifi​ (decreasing in iii) from that on ci+γfic_i + \gamma f_ici​+γfi​ (increasing in iii), with coefficients whose signs again come from the root identity. Without the sorting of the costs, the monotonicity claim is false.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace PoWMining.CapacityStatics. Miners are Fin n, 0-based: Lean miner i is the paper's miner i+1i+1i+1, so "increasing in iii" is Monotone on Fin n, and "increasing" is weak, as in the paper's footnote 12. The definition ClosedForms provides cumCost (c(n)c^{(n)}c(n)), gH ((4.1)/(B.3), with both branches of (4.1)), fH (fif_ifi​ with the aggregate as a free argument), hstar, share, and the standing assumptions Standing: n≥2n\ge2n≥2, R>0R>0R>0, γ>0\gamma>0γ>0, ck>0c_k>0ck​>0, costs sorted, and R−ckg>0R - c_kg > 0R−ck​g>0 for every kkk (all nnn miners active). The condition γ>0\gamma > 0γ>0 is the paper's: (B.3) defines ggg only for γ>0\gamma>0γ>0. The definition Sensitivities defines the four Δ\DeltaΔ's as derivatives (Lean deriv) of the (B.3) maps, never by their closed forms; derivative claims in theorems are stated with HasDerivAt, so a junk value of deriv at a non-differentiable point cannot make a statement true.

The mission takes the active miners' costs as its data, which is the paper's own meaning of a sensitivity at a fixed active set. That fif_ifi​ and ggg are the equilibrium of the mining game is Proposition 4.1, posed in mission 1 of this series; the cost derivatives, (B.5) and ∂fi/∂g\partial f_i/\partial g∂fi​/∂g are posed in mission 2. This mission uses those identities but does not pose them.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: the Δ\DeltaΔ's are derivatives, not formulas whose signs can be read off; the standing assumptions are satisfiable (two miners with c=(1,1)c = (1,1)c=(1,1), γ=1\gamma = 1γ=1, R=3R = 3R=3 give g=1g = 1g=1, hi∗=1/2h^*_i = 1/2hi∗​=1/2); and the monotonicity is stated for derivatives asserted to exist.

Needed infrastructure: one-variable calculus in Mathlib (HasDerivAt for square roots, quotients and compositions) and finite sums. A reusable lemma library for ggg (the root identity, positivity, c(n)+2γg>0c^{(n)}+2\gamma g > 0c(n)+2γg>0) serves all three of missions 1–3 and is welcome, as are proofs of the milestones in any order.

Selected references

  • A. Capponi, S. Ólafsson, H. Alsabah, Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization?, arXiv preprint, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.09783v1
  • G. Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, Western Economic Journal 5(3), 224–232, 1967 (the rent-seeking model the paper builds on). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1967.tb01923.x
  • S. Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, 2008. https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
8 thms1 active userReviewed
AnalysisOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Sample-Driven Optimal Stopping: From the Secretary Problem to the i.i.d. Prophet Inequality III: The Explicit Lower Bound on the Competitive Ratio Is at Least α* Times pResearch Paper

Motivation

Optimal stopping with partial information sits between two classical problems. In the secretary problem a decision maker sees values in random order, knows nothing about how they are generated, and must stop on the best one; the optimal guarantee is 1/e1/e1/e. In the i.i.d. prophet inequality the values are independent draws from a known distribution, and the best guarantee, relative to the expected maximum, is the constant α∗≈0.745\alpha^*\approx 0.745α∗≈0.745: Hill and Kertz (1982) and Kertz (1986) showed that no stopping rule does better on every distribution, and Correa, Foncea, Hoeksma, Oosterwijk and Vredeveld (2017, doi:10.1145/3033274.3085137) gave a rule that achieves it. Practical settings, such as pricing from historical data, lie in between: the distribution is unknown, but samples of it are available.

Correa, Cristi, Epstein and Soto (arXiv:2011.06516v2) interpolate between the two problems with the ppp-sample-driven optimal stopping problem: each of NNN adversarial values is independently revealed in advance (a sample) with probability ppp, and the remaining values arrive online in random order. At p=0p=0p=0 this is the secretary problem; as p→1p\to1p→1 it approaches the i.i.d. prophet inequality. They show that the optimal competitive ratio α(p)\alpha(p)α(p) of the limit problem is the value of an infinite-dimensional linear program, and they construct an explicit threshold rule whose guarantee α~(p)\tilde\alpha(p)α~(p) is the root of a scalar equation.

Prior work on learning a distribution from samples obtained guarantees α∗−O(ε)\alpha^*-O(\varepsilon)α∗−O(ε) with O(n2/ε)O(n^2/\varepsilon)O(n2/ε) samples (Correa, Dütting, Fischer, Schewior, 2019) and with O(n/ε6)O(n/\varepsilon^6)O(n/ε6) samples (Rubinstein, Wang, Weinberg, 2020). Theorem 9 of the paper, the goal of this mission, gives such a guarantee with O(n/ε)O(n/\varepsilon)O(n/ε) samples.

Setting

Fix p∈(0,1)p\in(0,1)p∈(0,1). The guarantee of the explicit threshold rule is the number α~(p)∈(0,1)\tilde\alpha(p)\in(0,1)α~(p)∈(0,1) solving

ln⁡p+α~(1−p)2p=∑i=1∞ln⁡(1−α~+α~[(i+1)pi−ipi+1])i(i+1).(19)\ln p+\frac{\tilde\alpha(1-p)^2}{p}=\sum_{i=1}^{\infty}\frac{\ln\bigl(1-\tilde\alpha+\tilde\alpha[(i+1)p^i-ip^{i+1}]\bigr)}{i(i+1)}.\tag{19}lnp+pα~(1−p)2​=i=1∑∞​i(i+1)ln(1−α~+α~[(i+1)pi−ipi+1])​.(19)

Lemma 7 of the paper shows that (19) has exactly one root in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1). The i.i.d. prophet constant α∗∈(0,1)\alpha^*\in(0,1)α∗∈(0,1) is the solution of

∫01dyy(1−ln⁡y)+1/α∗−1=1.\int_0^1\frac{dy}{y(1-\ln y)+1/\alpha^*-1}=1 .∫01​y(1−lny)+1/α∗−1dy​=1.

The proof of Theorem 9 (Appendix B.9) works with three auxiliary functions of ppp, each depending on α∗\alpha^*α∗ as a parameter:

a(p)=∑i≥1ln⁡(1p−α∗(1−pi(1+i(1−p))))i(i+1)+α∗(2p−p2),b(p)=1p2∑i≥11i(i+1)(1p−α∗(1−pi(1+i(1−p)))),a(p)=\sum_{i\ge1}\frac{\ln\bigl(\tfrac1p-\alpha^*(1-p^i(1+i(1-p)))\bigr)}{i(i+1)}+\alpha^*(2p-p^2),\qquad b(p)=\frac1{p^2}\sum_{i\ge1}\frac{1}{i(i+1)\bigl(\tfrac1p-\alpha^*(1-p^i(1+i(1-p)))\bigr)},a(p)=i≥1∑​i(i+1)ln(p1​−α∗(1−pi(1+i(1−p))))​+α∗(2p−p2),b(p)=p21​i≥1∑​i(i+1)(p1​−α∗(1−pi(1+i(1−p))))1​, c(p)=∑i≥1pi−1−pi1pα∗−1+pi(1+i(1−p)).c(p)=\sum_{i\ge1}\frac{p^{i-1}-p^i}{\tfrac1{p\alpha^*}-1+p^i(1+i(1-p))}.c(p)=i≥1∑​pα∗1​−1+pi(1+i(1−p))pi−1−pi​.

Appendix B.7 also names the two sides of (19): f(p,α)=ln⁡p+α(1−p)2/pf(p,\alpha)=\ln p+\alpha(1-p)^2/pf(p,α)=lnp+α(1−p)2/p and g(p,α)=∑i≥1ln⁡(1+α(pi(1+i(1−p))−1))/(i(i+1))g(p,\alpha)=\sum_{i\ge1}\ln(1+\alpha(p^i(1+i(1-p))-1))/(i(i+1))g(p,α)=∑i≥1​ln(1+α(pi(1+i(1−p))−1))/(i(i+1)). In Lean, IsAlphaTilde p a and IsAlphaStar s are shared predicates in SampleDrivenOS.Limit; aB9 s p, bB9 s p, cB9 s p, fB7 p α, and gB7 p α are in SampleDrivenOS.Linear.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 9 (p. 17)

for every p∈(0,1):α~(p) ≥ α∗p.\text{for every }p\in(0,1):\qquad \tilde\alpha(p)\ \ge\ \alpha^*p .for every p∈(0,1):α~(p) ≥ α∗p.

It is stated for every root α~\tilde\alphaα~ of (19) and every solution α∗\alpha^*α∗ of the integral equation; neither existence nor uniqueness is assumed.

Milestones (Appendix B.7 and B.9, in the order the proof uses them)

  1. B.7: f(p,⋅)f(p,\cdot)f(p,⋅) is strictly increasing on [0,1][0,1][0,1] and g(p,⋅)g(p,\cdot)g(p,⋅) non-increasing on [0,1)[0,1)[0,1).
  2. B.9: if (19) holds with "≤\le≤" at α∗p\alpha^*pα∗p in place of α~\tilde\alphaα~ (after the substitution α~=f(p)p\tilde\alpha=f(p)pα~=f(p)p), then α~(p)≥α∗p\tilde\alpha(p)\ge\alpha^*pα~(p)≥α∗p.
  3. B.9: that inequality is equivalent to α∗≤a(p)\alpha^*\le a(p)α∗≤a(p).
  4. B.9: aaa is differentiable on (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) with a′(p)=2α∗(1−p)−b(p)+c(p)a'(p)=2\alpha^*(1-p)-b(p)+c(p)a′(p)=2α∗(1−p)−b(p)+c(p), also in term-by-term form.
  5. B.9: b(p)≥1/pb(p)\ge 1/pb(p)≥1/p.
  6. B.9: c(p)≤1p∫01dy1/(pα∗)−1+y(1−pln⁡y)−α∗(1−p)c(p)\le\frac1p\int_0^1\frac{dy}{1/(p\alpha^*)-1+y(1-p\ln y)}-\alpha^*(1-p)c(p)≤p1​∫01​1/(pα∗)−1+y(1−plny)dy​−α∗(1−p).
  7. B.9: using the defining equation of α∗\alpha^*α∗,
1p∫01dy1pα∗−1+y(1−pln⁡y)≤1p−1−pp(1pα∗−1e)ln⁡1pα∗+pe1pα∗+pe−1.\frac1p\int_0^1\frac{dy}{\tfrac1{p\alpha^*}-1+y(1-p\ln y)}\le\frac1p-\frac{1-p}{p}\Bigl(\frac1{p\alpha^*}-\frac1e\Bigr)\ln\frac{\tfrac1{p\alpha^*}+\tfrac pe}{\tfrac1{p\alpha^*}+\tfrac pe-1}.p1​∫01​pα∗1​−1+y(1−plny)dy​≤p1​−p1−p​(pα∗1​−e1​)lnpα∗1​+ep​−1pα∗1​+ep​​.
  1. B.9: for all s∈[0.74,0.75]s\in[0.74,0.75]s∈[0.74,0.75] and p∈(0,1)p\in(0,1)p∈(0,1), (1ps−1e)ln⁡1/(ps)+p/e1/(ps)+p/e−1≥0.8\bigl(\frac1{ps}-\frac1e\bigr)\ln\frac{1/(ps)+p/e}{1/(ps)+p/e-1}\ge0.8(ps1​−e1​)ln1/(ps)+p/e−11/(ps)+p/e​≥0.8.
  2. B.9: if α∗∈[0.74,0.75]\alpha^*\in[0.74,0.75]α∗∈[0.74,0.75], then c(p)≤1p−α∗(1−p)(1+1p)c(p)\le\frac1p-\alpha^*(1-p)(1+\frac1p)c(p)≤p1​−α∗(1−p)(1+p1​).
  3. B.9: under the same hypothesis, ddpa(p)≤0\frac{d}{dp}a(p)\le0dpd​a(p)≤0 on (0,1)(0,1)(0,1).

Significance

The explicit rule's guarantee α~(p)\tilde\alpha(p)α~(p) is a lower bound on the optimal ratio α(p)\alpha(p)α(p), and Theorem 8 (a separate mission of this series) shows α~(p)→α∗\tilde\alpha(p)\to\alpha^*α~(p)→α∗ as p→1p\to1p→1. Theorem 9 makes that convergence quantitative and uniform: the guarantee is at least linear in ppp, so with p=1−εp=1-\varepsilonp=1−ε, an online set of size n=εNn=\varepsilon Nn=εN and O(n/ε)O(n/\varepsilon)O(n/ε) samples the rule earns α∗−O(ε)\alpha^*-O(\varepsilon)α∗−O(ε) of the expected maximum. This improves the sample complexity of the earlier learning-based results by a polynomial factor, in a model more general than theirs.

The theorem is proved in the paper; it has no machine-checked proof. The proof is elementary real analysis on explicit series and integrals, and one of its steps is a numerical check that the paper does not carry out in print. A formalization turns that numerical claim into a certified inequality and checks a chain of estimates in which one inequality sign is misprinted (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The statement is about two implicitly defined numbers. α~(p)\tilde\alpha(p)α~(p) has no closed form, and α∗\alpha^*α∗ is defined by an integral equation. Evaluating both numerically at finitely many ppp proves nothing for the remaining ppp, and the inequality is tight at p=1p=1p=1 (α~(1)=α∗\tilde\alpha(1)=\alpha^*α~(1)=α∗), so no uniform slack is available near p=1p=1p=1.

Concavity of α~\tilde\alphaα~ would give the result immediately, and the paper reports it numerically, but the authors were unable to prove it; the argument must avoid it. The remaining work handles infinite series whose terms depend on ppp through both pip^ipi and i(1−p)i(1-p)i(1−p): differentiating such a series term by term requires uniform control of the derivative series, comparing it with an integral needs a monotonicity argument, and one step needs a bound valid on an entire two-parameter region rather than at a point.

Formalization scope

  • Numbers, not processes. No probability, program or algorithm appears in Lean. Everything is a real-valued function on R\mathbb RR.
  • Predicates, not choice. α~(p)\tilde\alpha(p)α~(p) and α∗\alpha^*α∗ enter as IsAlphaTilde p a (with 0<a<10<a<10<a<1) and IsAlphaStar s (with 0<s<10<s<10<s<1). Statements quantify over every solution. Both exist, so the goal is not vacuous: existence of α~\tilde\alphaα~ is Lemma 7 (posed in the second mission of this series), and existence and uniqueness of α∗=1/β∗\alpha^*=1/\beta^*α∗=1/β∗ are posed as CorreaThreshold.Adaptive.beta_star_existsUnique (512ff915-7ec1-4d24-87b3-bc8adfee6bad).
  • Series. Every series is a Lean tsum over i : ℕ with the paper's index i≥1i\ge1i≥1 shifted to i + 1. For parameters in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) all series are summable, so tsum is the true sum; summability is part of what solvers prove, never a hypothesis. Differentiability of aaa is likewise a conclusion (HasDerivAt), never assumed.
  • Total functions. Real.log 0 = 0 makes the integrands' values at y=0y=0y=0 equal their limits, so the interval integrals are the true integrals. Every division (1/p1/p1/p, 1/(ps)1/(ps)1/(ps)) is at a positive argument under the stated ranges, and every logarithm's argument is positive.
  • α∗≈0.745\alpha^*\approx0.745α∗≈0.745. The paper uses this approximation through the interval α∗∈[0.74,0.75]\alpha^*\in[0.74,0.75]α∗∈[0.74,0.75] of its numerical check. Milestones 9 and 10 carry that interval as a hypothesis; the goal does not. The lower bound α∗>0.745\alpha^*>0.745α∗>0.745 is posed as CorreaThreshold.Adaptive.inv_beta_star_gt (ce70487c-b155-4e47-9ce8-8348dc1b1645). The upper bound α∗≤0.75\alpha^*\le0.75α∗≤0.75 (numerically α∗≈0.74544\alpha^*\approx0.74544α∗≈0.74544) is posed nowhere and is welcome as a lemma.
  • A printed slip. The paper prints the conclusion of milestone 9 as "c(p)≥…c(p)\ge\dotsc(p)≥…". The surrounding argument requires and announces "≤\le≤", and the formal statement uses ≤\le≤.
  • Ruled-out trivializations. Fixing ppp, replacing α∗\alpha^*α∗ by the numeral 0.7450.7450.745 (a weaker statement, since 0.745<α∗0.745<\alpha^*0.745<α∗), stating aaa's monotonicity through deriv (which is 000 at non-differentiable points), or replacing α~\tilde\alphaα~ by a chosen value all change the theorem. None is used.
  • Reusable infrastructure. Welcome contributions include term-by-term differentiation of tsums under a dominating series, Riemann-sum comparisons for monotone integrands, a Chebyshev-type integral inequality for two decreasing functions, and certified interval arithmetic for a two-variable inequality such as milestone 8.

Selected references

  • J. Correa, A. Cristi, B. Epstein, J. A. Soto, Sample-Driven Optimal Stopping: From the Secretary Problem to the i.i.d. Prophet Inequality, arXiv:2011.06516v2, 2021 (journal version: Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024). https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.06516v2
  • J. Correa, P. Foncea, R. Hoeksma, T. Oosterwijk, T. Vredeveld, Posted Price Mechanisms for a Random Stream of Customers, ACM EC 2017; Mathematics of Operations Research 46(4), 2021. https://doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3085137
  • T. P. Hill, R. P. Kertz, Comparisons of stop rule and supremum expectations of i.i.d. random variables, Annals of Probability 10(2), 1982 (reference [26] of the paper). https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176993767
  • R. P. Kertz, Stop rule and supremum expectations of i.i.d. random variables: a complete comparison by conjugate duality, Journal of Multivariate Analysis 19, 1986 (reference [28] of the paper).
  • J. Correa, P. Dütting, F. Fischer, K. Schewior, Prophet Inequalities for I.I.D. Random Variables from an Unknown Distribution, ACM EC 2019. https://doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329627
  • A. Rubinstein, J. Z. Wang, S. M. Weinberg, Optimal Single-Choice Prophet Inequalities from Samples, ITCS 2020. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2020.60
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue 1: Random Sampling Vickrey Is Ex-Post IC-IR and a 2(d+1)-Approximation to Welfare for d-SOS ValuationsResearch Paper

Motivation

In an auction with interdependent values, a bidder's value can depend on information held by other bidders. An estimate of a shared resource's usefulness, for example, may improve when another participant reports a stronger signal. The auctioneer must decide whom to serve using reported signals, while each participant has an incentive to report a signal that improves her allocation or payment. This combination makes a welfare guarantee and truthful reporting harder to obtain together than in a setting where each bidder's value depends only on her own information. Eden, Feldman, Fiat, Goldner, and Karlin study this problem under a diminishing-returns condition on signals and give mechanisms for several allocation settings in their arXiv preprint, §§1–4.

This mission concerns their single-parameter, downward-closed setting. Each agent either receives service or does not; the feasible groups of served agents are specified in advance. The result gives a direct welfare guarantee for a randomized allocation rule whose deterministic components can each be paired with truthful payments. It is one of four separate missions drawn from the same preprint. The source here is arXiv:1903.08384v2, dated June 2019; theorem labels and pages in this mission refer to that preprint, not to the 2024 Mathematics of Operations Research version.

Setting

There are nnn agents. Agent iii has a signal si∈R+=[0,∞)s_i\in\mathbb R_+=[0,\infty)si​∈R+​=[0,∞), and a complete profile is s=(s1,…,sn)s=(s_1,\ldots,s_n)s=(s1​,…,sn​). If served, agent iii receives value vi(s)≥0v_i(s)\ge0vi​(s)≥0. The value is weakly increasing in each coordinate and strictly increasing in agent iii's own signal. A family I\mathcal II of subsets of agents is downward closed when every subset of a feasible set is feasible. The welfare of a feasible served set SSS at the true profile is ∑i∈Svi(s)\sum_{i\in S}v_i(s)∑i∈S​vi​(s). These conventions come from Definitions 2.1–2.2 and §4 of the source.

A function vvv is ddd-submodular over signals, or ddd-SOS, when increasing coordinate jjj by the same nonnegative increment yields at most ddd times as much extra value at a larger profile of the other coordinates as at a smaller one. For d=1d=1d=1 this is called SOS. This condition compares marginal gains from one signal while holding that signal's starting value fixed. It is the condition in Definition 2.13 of the preprint, p. 11.

The Random Sampling Vickrey mechanism, RS-V, chooses a uniformly random partition of agents into AAA and BBB. For each i∈Bi\in Bi∈B, it computes the proxy weight wi=vi(sA,si,0B∖{i})w_i=v_i(s_A,s_i,0_{B\setminus\{i\}})wi​=vi​(sA​,si​,0B∖{i}​) from the reported profile: it keeps the signals in AAA and agent iii's own signal, and sets the other signals in BBB to zero. It then serves a feasible subset S⊆BS\subseteq BS⊆B maximizing ∑i∈Swi\sum_{i\in S}w_i∑i∈S​wi​. Its true welfare is the sum of vi(s)v_i(s)vi​(s) for the served agents, evaluated at the true profile. The mechanism is specified in §4, p. 14 of the preprint.

For a deterministic allocation and payment rule, ex-post incentive compatibility means that, when all other agents report truthfully, no agent can gain by changing her own report. Ex-post individual rationality means that truthful participation gives nonnegative utility. Utility uses the true value of the allocation and the payment determined by reports. A randomized mechanism is universally ex-post IC-IR when every deterministic mechanism in its support has these properties, as in Definitions 2.3–2.8 of the preprint, pp. 9–10.

Formalization targets

Main theorem

For every downward-closed I\mathcal II, every ddd-SOS valuation family meeting the setting above, and every feasible maximizing selector used to break RS-V ties, each partition component admits ex-post IC-IR payments, and for every S∈IS\in\mathcal IS∈I and signal profile sss,

∑i∈Svi(s) ≤ 2(d+1) EB ⁣[∑i∈xB(s)vi(s)].\sum_{i\in S}v_i(s)\ \le\ 2(d+1)\,\mathbb E_B\!\left[\sum_{i\in x_B(s)}v_i(s)\right].i∈S∑​vi​(s) ≤ 2(d+1)EB​​i∈xB​(s)∑​vi​(s)​.

Here xB(s)x_B(s)xB​(s) is the set served by RS-V with candidate set BBB. At d=1d=1d=1, the factor is 444. This is Theorem 4.1, p. 14 of the preprint. The universal payment claim reads the theorem alongside its proof and the paper's definition of universal ex-post IC-IR.

Supporting results

The milestones follow the paper's stated results: Proposition 2.1 characterizes which deterministic allocation rules admit ex-post IC-IR payments; the opening of §4 states monotonicity of RS-V's allocation; Lemma 2.3 extends the ddd-SOS marginal bound to a set of signal coordinates; Lemma 3.1 bounds value after randomly zeroing the other agents' signals; and display (4) specializes that expectation to one RS-V proxy weight. Each has its own source quote and page in the milestone list.

Significance

The theorem says that a mechanism that only sees reported signals can remain truthful component by component while obtaining welfare within a factor determined by the SOS parameter. The guarantee compares against every feasible allocation at the true profile, so it applies to the optimal welfare without requiring a separately chosen optimum in the statement. The same preprint uses the random-zeroing estimate beyond this single-parameter mechanism, including in its combinatorial-auction sections Eden et al., §§3–6.

The theorem and supporting results are proved on paper. This mission asks for machine-checked proofs of their stated formalizations. A complete development will also provide reusable definitions for signal profiles, SOS valuations, ex-post incentives, finite random-partition averages, and allocation selectors. No machine-checked proof is claimed by this proposal.

Difficulty

The agent's value depends on reports from other agents, so maximizing reported welfare directly does not by itself give an ex-post incentive guarantee. RS-V instead allocates using proxy values, which raises a second issue: high proxy welfare need not equal high true welfare for a particular partition. The central mathematical task is to control the loss caused by zeroing signals in a uniform random partition. The incentive claim also needs to hold for every maximizing tie choice, rather than for a specially chosen selector. These are the obstacles behind the source's separate monotonicity and random-zeroing statements Eden et al., §§3–4.

Formalization scope

Agents are Fin n, with arbitrary finite nnn; signals are nonnegative real numbers, including zero, and valuations and payments are real valued. A served set is a Finset, and feasibility is a downward-closed set of such sets. The selector is a function of the reported profile and the partition, constrained to return a feasible maximizer among subsets of BBB. Every such selector is covered. Payments for a partition are functions of reports alone. The random choice of BBB is the finite uniform average over all 2n2^n2n subsets, while Lemma 3.1 averages over all 2n−12^{n-1}2n−1 subsets of the other agents when an agent iii exists. Welfare uses true values, not proxy weights.

The printed Definition 2.1 says the value of agent jjj is strictly increasing in sis_isi​; the formalization reads this as agent jjj's own signal. The symbol R+\mathbb R_+R+​ includes zero because the mechanism sets signals to zero. The printed Lemma 3.1 omits a range for ddd; its standalone statement adds d≥0d\ge0d≥0, since it is false for negative ddd near zero. Theorem 4.1 needs no separate bound on ddd, because its strict own-signal monotonicity and ddd-SOS hypothesis already imply d≥1d\ge1d≥1 for a nonempty agent set. The formalization excludes vacuous selectors by requiring the returned set to be feasible and to maximize the specified proxy objective. These choices and their source locations are recorded in the moderation notes.

Contributions may establish the SOS lemmas, the monotone-allocation and payment characterization, and the final finite-average welfare bound. The basic definitions and finite averaging infrastructure can be reused in the later missions of this preprint once the separately drafted models are consolidated.

Selected references

  • Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, and Anna R. Karlin, Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue, arXiv:1903.08384v2, 2019. Preprint.
7 thms1 active userReviewed
CombinatoricsMechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Scaling Blockchains: Can Committee-Based Consensus Help? II: With a Single Voter, Voting for the k Candidates Most Likely to Be Honest Is OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

Many proof-of-stake blockchains do not let every token holder take part in consensus. Instead, token holders elect a small committee of block producers, and the committee runs a Byzantine agreement protocol. EOS, for instance, elects 21 producers by an up-to-30-vote approval ballot (paper, p. 9, citing EOS voting guide 2018). Byzantine agreement protocols are safe only if a supermajority of the committee is honest, typically more than two thirds. Whether the electorate can reliably seat such a supermajority depends on how voters vote and on how much they know about the candidates.

Benhaim, Falk and Tsoukalas (arXiv:2110.08673, Management Science 2023) model this election as approval voting under limited information. Each voter sees a noisy private signal of every candidate's type and turns it into a posterior probability that the candidate is honest. This mission formalizes the paper's single-voter result, Proposition 2: a voter who decides the committee alone should approve exactly the kkk candidates most likely to be honest. The same statement covers voters who pool their signals (Proposition 4), because once the shared posteriors are computed the pooled electorate acts as one voter. A companion mission (I of this series) formalizes the paper's main result for many voters, exponential convergence of the success probability.

Setting

There are mmm candidates c1,…,cmc_1,\dots,c_mc1​,…,cm​ and a committee size k≤mk \le mk≤m. A voter approves a set C\mathcal CC of candidates (the ballot). The score of a candidate is the number of voters approving it (Definition 1); with a single voter it is 111 on C\mathcal CC and 000 elsewhere. The kkk highest-scoring candidates are elected. When fewer than kkk candidates have non-zero score the committee is filled adversarially, and ties at the lowest elected score are broken adversarially (Definition 3). The committees the rule can produce are therefore the admissible committees: sets TTT with ∣T∣=k|T| = k∣T∣=k and score(b)≤score(a)\mathrm{score}(b) \le \mathrm{score}(a)score(b)≤score(a) for every a∈Ta \in Ta∈T and b∉Tb \notin Tb∈/T.

Each candidate is honest or malicious. Write Hon\mathrm{Hon}Hon for the set of honest candidates. For a tolerance p∈[0,1]p \in [0,1]p∈[0,1], the committee is honest, T=H\mathbb T = HT=H, if it has at least ⌈(1−p)k⌉\lceil (1-p)k \rceil⌈(1−p)k⌉ honest members. Since the adversary chooses after the types are realised, T=H\mathbb T = HT=H means that every admissible committee TTT satisfies ∣T∩Hon∣≥⌈(1−p)k⌉|T \cap \mathrm{Hon}| \ge \lceil (1-p)k\rceil∣T∩Hon∣≥⌈(1−p)k⌉.

The voter's information is summarised by the posterior probabilities sj=Pr⁡[cj=H∣sj∗]∈[0,1]s_j = \Pr[c_j = H \mid s^*_j] \in [0,1]sj​=Pr[cj​=H∣sj∗​]∈[0,1] ((3)). Given the signals, the types are independent, so a set Hon\mathrm{Hon}Hon has probability ∏j∈Honsj∏j∉Hon(1−sj)\prod_{j \in \mathrm{Hon}} s_j \prod_{j \notin \mathrm{Hon}} (1-s_j)∏j∈Hon​sj​∏j∈/Hon​(1−sj​). The success probability of a ballot C\mathcal CC is Pr⁡[T=H∣s]\Pr[\mathbb T = H \mid s]Pr[T=H∣s], the total weight of the sets Hon\mathrm{Hon}Hon for which T=H\mathbb T = HT=H holds under the scores of C\mathcal CC ((6) with n=1n = 1n=1).

The number of honest members of a fixed set SSS is then a Poisson binomial random variable XSX_SXS​ with parameters (sj)j∈S(s_j)_{j\in S}(sj​)j∈S​, the law of a sum of independent Bernoulli variables (Definition 7):

Pr⁡[XS=ℓ]=∑A⊆S, ∣A∣=ℓ ∏i∈Asi∏j∈S∖A(1−sj).\Pr[X_S = \ell] = \sum_{A \subseteq S,\ |A| = \ell}\ \prod_{i\in A} s_i \prod_{j \in S\setminus A}(1-s_j).Pr[XS​=ℓ]=A⊆S, ∣A∣=ℓ∑​ i∈A∏​si​j∈S∖A∏​(1−sj​).

X≤stYX \le_{\mathrm{st}} YX≤st​Y (the usual stochastic order, Definition 9) means FY(x)≤FX(x)F_Y(x) \le F_X(x)FY​(x)≤FX​(x) for all xxx.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (p. 20)

For every m≥km \ge km≥k, every p∈[0,1]p\in[0,1]p∈[0,1], every posterior vector s∈[0,1]ms\in[0,1]^ms∈[0,1]m, every set C⋆\mathcal C^\starC⋆ of kkk candidates with sb≤sas_b \le s_asb​≤sa​ for all a∈C⋆a\in\mathcal C^\stara∈C⋆, b∉C⋆b\notin\mathcal C^\starb∈/C⋆, and every ballot C\mathcal CC,

Pr⁡[T=H∣s]C  ≤  Pr⁡[T=H∣s]C⋆.\Pr[\mathbb T = H \mid s]_{\mathcal C} \;\le\; \Pr[\mathbb T = H \mid s]_{\mathcal C^\star}.Pr[T=H∣s]C​≤Pr[T=H∣s]C⋆​.

This is the cardinal strategy with z=kz = kz=k (Definition 6) being globally optimal. The statement is made pointwise in sss and for every top-kkk set, whatever the tie-breaking among equal posteriors.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 4 (p. 49). Permuting the parameters does not change a Poisson binomial law: Pr⁡[X=ℓ]=Pr⁡[X′=ℓ]\Pr[X = \ell] = \Pr[X' = \ell]Pr[X=ℓ]=Pr[X′=ℓ] for all ℓ\ellℓ.
  2. Lemma 5 (p. 49). If pi≤pi′p_i \le p'_ipi​≤pi′​ for every iii, then X≤stX′X \le_{\mathrm{st}} X'X≤st​X′.
  3. Lemma 1 (p. 19). If p1≥⋯≥pmp_1 \ge \dots \ge p_mp1​≥⋯≥pm​ lie in [0,1][0,1][0,1] and xxx is a positive integer, then over all kkk-element index sets PPP, Pr⁡[XP>x]\Pr[X_P > x]Pr[XP​>x] is maximised by P={1,…,k}P = \{1,\dots,k\}P={1,…,k}.

The paper's Lemma 6 (p. 52), that ≤st\le_{\mathrm{st}}≤st​ is preserved under independent sums, is already proved on the platform as StochasticOrders.Usual.usual_order_convolution (theorem a8208567-b950-4dc8-a0da-eb915fea422c), stated for the measure-theoretic order StochasticOrders_Usual_UsualOrder (definition 62d803de-7bc8-4f9d-a0f1-7f956fc2888f). It is not posed again. Its carrier is a probability space rather than the finite sums used here.

Significance

Proposition 2 is the paper's benchmark for strategic voting. With full information pooled in one decision maker, the best achievable ballot is the top kkk by posterior. The paper's Proposition 3 shows that the threshold strategies common in practice are not optimal against this benchmark, and Proposition 4 transfers the result to electorates that share signals. Lemma 1 is the underlying fact: among committees of fixed size, the one built from the largest honesty probabilities has the stochastically largest number of honest members. The fact applies to any Poisson binomial selection problem, for example choosing kkk independent components to maximise the probability that enough of them work.

The results are proved in the paper (Appendix B.2, p. 45, and Appendices C–D, pp. 49–52, where Lemma 6 is proved on p. 52). None of them has been machine-checked. The formalization produces a reusable finite Poisson binomial layer (probability mass function, cdf, tail, permutation invariance, monotonicity in the parameters) and the first approval-voting committee model on the platform.

Difficulty

The informal argument (p. 20) is that a single voter "can unilaterally decide the committee", so the best choice is the top kkk. That shortcut does not survive the adversarial rule. A ballot with fewer than kkk approvals lets the adversary fill the committee, and a ballot with more than kkk lets the adversary pick among the approved. The comparison is therefore between the worst admissible committee of an arbitrary ballot and the unique admissible committee of C⋆\mathcal C^\starC⋆.

The paper's proof also states success as Pr⁡[X>(1−p)k]\Pr[X > (1-p)k]Pr[X>(1−p)k] and applies Lemma 1 at the possibly non-integer threshold x=(1−p)kx = (1-p)kx=(1−p)k. Definition 3 asks for X≥⌈(1−p)k⌉X \ge \lceil (1-p)k\rceilX≥⌈(1−p)k⌉, so the relevant threshold is ⌈(1−p)k⌉−1\lceil(1-p)k\rceil - 1⌈(1−p)k⌉−1, which can be 000 or negative, outside Lemma 1's hypothesis x>0x > 0x>0. Lemma 1 itself needs a comparison of Poisson binomial tails for parameter vectors that differ in every coordinate, not just in one.

Formalization scope

Candidates are Fin m and are 0-based (the paper's cjc_jcj​ is index j−1j-1j−1). Probabilities are finite sums of product weights over Finset (Fin m); there is no measure theory. The Poisson binomial law is defined by the counting formula (84), which is exactly the product-measure probability of each outcome of independent Bernoulli trials. The threshold is Int.ceil ((1 - p) * k) compared with the integer cast of a cardinality. Stochastic order is expressed through cdfs at natural thresholds, which is equivalent to all real thresholds for laws supported on {0,…,n}\{0,\dots,n\}{0,…,n}.

Standing assumptions the page leaves implicit are explicit hypotheses: k≤mk \le mk≤m (p. 9), 0≤p≤10 \le p \le 10≤p≤1 (ppp is a tolerated fraction), and parameters in [0,1][0,1][0,1] wherever probabilities are used. Lemma 4 is stated without the range hypothesis, which makes it more general than the printed lemma.

Three printed readings are corrected and disclosed in the items. Lemma 4's "σ(pi)\sigma(p_i)σ(pi​)" means pσ(i)p_{\sigma(i)}pσ(i)​. Lemma 1's "argmax ={p1,…,pk}=\{p_1,\dots,p_k\}={p1​,…,pk​}" is formalized as "{1,…,k}\{1,\dots,k\}{1,…,k} attains the maximum", since ties make the argmax a family of sets. The success threshold is Definition 3's ⌈(1−p)k⌉\lceil(1-p)k\rceil⌈(1−p)k⌉, not the proof's ">(1−p)k> (1-p)k>(1−p)k".

The ballot in Proposition 2 is unrestricted in size, which covers every cap t≥kt \ge kt≥k of Definition 2. Optimality is stated pointwise in the posteriors, which implies optimality in expectation over any signal law. The Gaussian signal model (2)–(4) is not formalized.

The adversary is universal: the success event quantifies over every admissible committee. A formalization that let the election pick the best admissible committee, or that ignored admissibility and compared arbitrary kkk-sets, would make the goal trivial or independent of the ballot, and is ruled out. Proofs of all four theorems and any general Poisson binomial facts (normalisation, tail–cdf identities) are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Benhaim, B. H. Falk, G. Tsoukalas, Scaling Blockchains: Can Committee-Based Consensus Help?, Management Science, 2023; preprint arXiv:2110.08673v2, 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.08673 — DOI https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03177
  • M. Shaked, J. G. Shanthikumar, Stochastic Orders, Springer, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-34675-5
  • Aurora EOS, EOS voting guide, 2018 (cited by the paper as EOS A (2018)). https://medium.com/@auroraeos/eos-voting-guide-3bf4e0be251b
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Algorithmic Game TheoryAnalysisMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility 4: Randomized Perturbed Delayed Mechanisms Gain Ω(ε^(α/(2α−1))) Revenue Under Local α-Power EnvelopesResearch Paper

Motivation

Classical mechanism design assumes that agents optimize exactly: a buyer facing a menu of lotteries picks the one that maximizes expected utility, and an incentive compatible (IC) mechanism makes truth-telling optimal. Buyers that are only approximately rational, or that face small costs of computing or reporting, need only be made to prefer the truth up to a slack ε\varepsilonε. Approximate incentive compatibility (ε\varepsilonε-IC) is the corresponding relaxation of the IC constraints. It is also used in computer science as a robustness notion and in learning settings where a mechanism is only approximately optimal for the buyer.

Balseiro, Besbes and Castro (arXiv:2103.03403) ask how much revenue a seller of one item can gain from such a relaxation. For a single buyer, Myerson's theory gives the IC optimum as a posted price. With ε\varepsilonε-IC the feasible set grows, and the paper determines the order of the additional revenue as ε↓0\varepsilon\downarrow 0ε↓0.

Timeline. The rounding argument attributed to Noam Nisan, first used by Balcan, Blum, Hartline and Mansour (FOCS 2005), turns an ε\varepsilonε-IC mechanism into an IC one with a small revenue loss; for a single buyer it bounds the gain by O(ε)O(\sqrt\varepsilon)O(ε​) for every distribution (Proposition 1 of the paper). Balseiro, Besbes and Castro (2021; v2 2022; Operations Research 2024) prove an O~(εα/(2α−1))\tilde O(\varepsilon^{\alpha/(2\alpha-1)})O~(εα/(2α−1)) upper bound (Theorem 1) under a curvature condition on the revenue curve, show that deterministic mechanisms gain only Θ(ε)\Theta(\varepsilon)Θ(ε) (Theorem 2), and give a matching Ω(εα/(2α−1))\Omega(\varepsilon^{\alpha/(2\alpha-1)})Ω(εα/(2α−1)) lower bound by an explicit randomized construction (Theorem 3). This mission formalizes the lower bound.

Setting

A seller sells one item to one buyer. The buyer's value vvv has a cumulative distribution function FFF with density fff supported on S=[0,vˉ]S=[0,\bar v]S=[0,vˉ], vˉ>0\bar v>0vˉ>0. Assumption 1 requires fff to have bounded variation on SSS. Write Fˉ=1−F\bar F=1-FFˉ=1−F, the revenue curve R(v)=v Fˉ(v)R(v)=v\,\bar F(v)R(v)=vFˉ(v) (the revenue of a posted price vvv), and R˙(v)=Fˉ(v)−vf(v)\dot R(v)=\bar F(v)-v f(v)R˙(v)=Fˉ(v)−vf(v).

A direct mechanism m=(x,t)m=(x,t)m=(x,t) gives a buyer who reports vvv the item with probability x(v)∈[0,1]x(v)\in[0,1]x(v)∈[0,1] and charges t(v)t(v)t(v). It is individually rational (IR) if v x(v)−t(v)≥0v\,x(v)-t(v)\ge 0vx(v)−t(v)≥0 for all v∈Sv\in Sv∈S, and ε\varepsilonε-incentive compatible (ICε_\varepsilonε​) if

v x(v)−t(v) ≥ v x(v′)−t(v′)−ε∀v,v′∈S.v\,x(v)-t(v)\ \ge\ v\,x(v')-t(v')-\varepsilon\qquad\forall v,v'\in S.vx(v)−t(v) ≥ vx(v′)−t(v′)−ε∀v,v′∈S.

M(ε)\mathcal M(\varepsilon)M(ε) is the set of IR and ICε_\varepsilonε​ mechanisms, Π(m)=∫0vˉt(v)f(v) dv\Pi(m)=\int_0^{\bar v}t(v)f(v)\,dvΠ(m)=∫0vˉ​t(v)f(v)dv the expected revenue, and Π⋆(M(ε))=sup⁡m∈M(ε)Π(m)\Pi^\star(\mathcal M(\varepsilon))=\sup_{m\in\mathcal M(\varepsilon)}\Pi(m)Π⋆(M(ε))=supm∈M(ε)​Π(m). A best reporting mapping v⋆v^\starv⋆ for mmm picks, for each value vvv, a report in arg⁡max⁡w∈S{v x(w)−t(w)}\arg\max_{w\in S}\{v\,x(w)-t(w)\}argmaxw∈S​{vx(w)−t(w)}.

Local α\alphaα-power envelopes (Definition 1): RRR has a unique maximizer p⋆p^\starp⋆ on SSS, interior, and there are α>1\alpha>1α>1, κL,κU>0\kappa_L,\kappa_U>0κL​,κU​>0 and ℓ>0\ell>0ℓ>0 with (p⋆−ℓ,p⋆+ℓ)⊂(0,vˉ)(p^\star-\ell,p^\star+\ell)\subset(0,\bar v)(p⋆−ℓ,p⋆+ℓ)⊂(0,vˉ) and

κLα∣v−p⋆∣α≤(p⋆−v) R˙(v)≤κUα∣v−p⋆∣αon (p⋆−ℓ,p⋆+ℓ).\kappa_L\alpha|v-p^\star|^\alpha\le(p^\star-v)\,\dot R(v)\le\kappa_U\alpha|v-p^\star|^\alpha\quad\text{on }(p^\star-\ell,p^\star+\ell).κL​α∣v−p⋆∣α≤(p⋆−v)R˙(v)≤κU​α∣v−p⋆∣αon (p⋆−ℓ,p⋆+ℓ).

The parameter α\alphaα measures how flat RRR is at its peak; α=2\alpha=2α=2 is the generic smooth case.

Perturbed delayed mechanisms (§5.1). For μ,δ>0\mu,\delta>0μ,δ>0 the buyer is steered to report v⋆(v ∣ μ,δ)v^\star(v\,|\,\mu,\delta)v⋆(v∣μ,δ), equal to 000 below p⋆−δp^\star-\deltap⋆−δ, to v−μv-\muv−μ on [p⋆−δ,p⋆+δ+μ][p^\star-\delta,p^\star+\delta+\mu][p⋆−δ,p⋆+δ+μ], and to p⋆+δp^\star+\deltap⋆+δ above. With www its generalized inverse, the allocation xpdx_{pd}xpd​ solves on [0,p⋆+δ][0,p^\star+\delta][0,p⋆+δ] the ordinary and delay differential equations

x˙(v)=x(v)w(v)−v  (v≤p⋆−δ),x(0)=εp⋆−δ,x˙(v)=x(v)−x(v⋆(v))w(v)−v  (p⋆−δ≤v≤p⋆+δ),\dot x(v)=\frac{x(v)}{w(v)-v}\ \ (v\le p^\star-\delta),\qquad x(0)=\frac{\varepsilon}{p^\star-\delta},\qquad \dot x(v)=\frac{x(v)-x(v^\star(v))}{w(v)-v}\ \ (p^\star-\delta\le v\le p^\star+\delta),x˙(v)=w(v)−vx(v)​  (v≤p⋆−δ),x(0)=p⋆−δε​,x˙(v)=w(v)−vx(v)−x(v⋆(v))​  (p⋆−δ≤v≤p⋆+δ),

is 111 above p⋆+δp^\star+\deltap⋆+δ, and the payment tpdt_{pd}tpd​ is given explicitly in terms of xpdx_{pd}xpd​ and v⋆v^\starv⋆.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 27)

Under Assumption 1 and local α\alphaα-power envelopes there are C>0C>0C>0 and ε0>0\varepsilon_0>0ε0​>0 such that for all ε∈(0,ε0]\varepsilon\in(0,\varepsilon_0]ε∈(0,ε0​] some m∈M(ε)m\in\mathcal M(\varepsilon)m∈M(ε) satisfies

Π(m) ≥ Π⋆(M(0))+C εα/(2α−1).\Pi(m)\ \ge\ \Pi^\star(\mathcal M(0))+C\,\varepsilon^{\alpha/(2\alpha-1)} .Π(m) ≥ Π⋆(M(0))+Cεα/(2α−1).

The constants may depend on the distribution, but not on ε\varepsilonε.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 5 (p. 59): solutions of (ODE)-(DDE) are non-decreasing on [0,p⋆+δ][0,p^\star+\delta][0,p⋆+δ].
  2. Proposition 3 (p. 31): if xpd(v)→1x_{pd}(v)\to 1xpd​(v)→1 as v↑p⋆+δv\uparrow p^\star+\deltav↑p⋆+δ, then v⋆(⋅ ∣ μ,δ)v^\star(\cdot\,|\,\mu,\delta)v⋆(⋅∣μ,δ) is a best reporting mapping for mpdm_{pd}mpd​.
  3. Proposition 4 (p. 33): the system has a unique solution on [0,p⋆+δ][0,p^\star+\delta][0,p⋆+δ], which is positive, non-decreasing and given in closed form (eq. (25)).
  4. Lemma 6 (p. 60): with Γ(t)=∑j=0⌊t⌋+1(−1)je−jj!(t+1−j)j\Gamma(t)=\sum_{j=0}^{\lfloor t\rfloor+1}\frac{(-1)^je^{-j}}{j!}(t+1-j)^jΓ(t)=∑j=0⌊t⌋+1​j!(−1)je−j​(t+1−j)j,
2(t+1)e−1e−t<Γ(t)≤2(t+2)e−(t+1)(t≥0).2(t+1)e^{-1}e^{-t}<\Gamma(t)\le2(t+2)e^{-(t+1)}\qquad(t\ge0).2(t+1)e−1e−t<Γ(t)≤2(t+2)e−(t+1)(t≥0).
  1. Proposition 5 (p. 34): for μ>εe\mu>\varepsilon eμ>εe some δ∈[μ2/(4ε)−μ, μ2/(4ε)]\delta\in[\mu^2/(4\varepsilon)-\mu,\ \mu^2/(4\varepsilon)]δ∈[μ2/(4ε)−μ, μ2/(4ε)] makes xpdx_{pd}xpd​ reach 111 at p⋆+δp^\star+\deltap⋆+δ, and then mpd∈M(ε)m_{pd}\in\mathcal M(\varepsilon)mpd​∈M(ε).
  2. Proposition 6 (p. 35): the revenue identity
Π(mpd)=∫0p⋆+δxpd(v)(vf(v)−Fˉ(v+μ)w˙(v))dv+R(p⋆+δ)+∫p⋆+δp⋆+δ+μFˉ(v) dv.\Pi(m_{pd})=\int_0^{p^\star+\delta}x_{pd}(v)\big(vf(v)-\bar F(v+\mu)\dot w(v)\big)dv+R(p^\star+\delta)+\int_{p^\star+\delta}^{p^\star+\delta+\mu}\bar F(v)\,dv .Π(mpd​)=∫0p⋆+δ​xpd​(v)(vf(v)−Fˉ(v+μ)w˙(v))dv+R(p⋆+δ)+∫p⋆+δp⋆+δ+μ​Fˉ(v)dv.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3 shows that the O~(εα/(2α−1))\tilde O(\varepsilon^{\alpha/(2\alpha-1)})O~(εα/(2α−1)) upper bound of Theorem 1 is tight up to the logarithm. Since α/(2α−1)<1\alpha/(2\alpha-1)<1α/(2α−1)<1 for α>1\alpha>1α>1, the revenue gain from approximate incentive compatibility is supralinear in ε\varepsilonε: a seller who exploits ε\varepsilonε-optimizing buyers gains strictly more than the order-ε\varepsilonε gain available to deterministic mechanisms (Theorem 2). Randomization is therefore what makes the relaxation valuable, and the curvature α\alphaα of the revenue curve at the optimal price determines the exponent, which ranges from 111 (as α↓1\alpha\downarrow1α↓1) to 1/21/21/2 (as α→∞\alpha\to\inftyα→∞), the latter matching Nisan's universal bound.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper's online appendix; none of it is formalized. A formal development would supply a machine-checked revenue lower bound for an explicit class of ε\varepsilonε-IC mechanisms, a formal treatment of a linear delay differential equation with a piecewise history (method of steps, closed-form solution), and the two-sided bound on Γ\GammaΓ, which the paper derives from the renewal function of uniform interarrival times.

Difficulty

The obvious approach, perturbing the optimal posted price or a hard/soft floor mechanism, gains only order ε\varepsilonε (Theorem 2). To gain more, the mechanism must make the buyer misreport downward in a coordinated way, and the allocation that sustains a prescribed misreporting strategy is the solution of a delay differential equation. Three steps are delicate: showing that this solution exists, is unique and is monotone (the delay term couples x(v)x(v)x(v) to x(v−μ)x(v-\mu)x(v−μ)); choosing the delay δ\deltaδ so that the allocation reaches exactly 111 at p⋆+δp^\star+\deltap⋆+δ, which requires the sharp two-sided bound on Γ\GammaΓ and an intermediate value argument; and verifying global ε\varepsilonε-IC, since a best-response argument must rule out every deviation, not only local ones. The final bound balances the gain Fˉ(p⋆+δ+μ) μ\bar F(p^\star+\delta+\mu)\,\muFˉ(p⋆+δ+μ)μ against losses of order κU(δ+μ)α\kappa_U(\delta+\mu)^\alphaκU​(δ+μ)α, with μ\muμ of order εα/(2α−1)\varepsilon^{\alpha/(2\alpha-1)}εα/(2α−1).

Formalization scope

Values are reals, every function is a total function R→R\mathbb R\to\mathbb RR→R whose values matter only on S=[0,vˉ]S=[0,\bar v]S=[0,vˉ], and the density is integrable on SSS with total mass 111. Mechanisms are required to be measurable, which the expectation Ev[t(v)]\mathbb E_v[t(v)]Ev​[t(v)] presumes. Π⋆\Pi^\starΠ⋆ is a supremum (sSup); the goal is stated with an explicit witness m∈M(ε)m\in\mathcal M(\varepsilon)m∈M(ε), which is equivalent because the revenue image is nonempty and bounded above by vˉ\bar vvˉ. R˙\dot RR˙ is defined as Fˉ−vf\bar F-vfFˉ−vf, not as a derivative. The Ω\OmegaΩ constants are quantified after the distribution and before ε\varepsilonε.

The derivatives in (ODE)-(DDE) are one-sided at the endpoints of their closed intervals. At p⋆−δp^\star-\deltap⋆−δ the two right-hand sides differ, so a two-sided derivative would make the system unsolvable and every statement about its solutions vacuous; this encoding rules out that trivialization. The goal does not mention perturbed delayed mechanisms: any witness is acceptable.

Disclosed additions relative to the page: μ≤p⋆−δ\mu\le p^\star-\deltaμ≤p⋆−δ in the §5.1 statements (presumed by the paper's definition of www); Propositions 3–6 and Lemma 5 are stated for any price p⋆p^\starp⋆ with 0<δ<p⋆0<\delta<p^\star0<δ<p⋆ and p⋆+δ+μ<vˉp^\star+\delta+\mu<\bar vp⋆+δ+μ<vˉ, since their proofs never use optimality of p⋆p^\starp⋆; in Proposition 6 the integrand ψ⋅f\psi\cdot fψ⋅f is written in product form because ψ\psiψ divides by fff.

A complete development needs: absolutely continuous distribution functions and integration by parts on intervals; existence and uniqueness for linear ODEs and for a delay equation by the method of steps; Irwin–Hall distributions or a direct analytic bound for Lemma 6; and the intermediate value theorem. The delay-equation and Γ\GammaΓ results are reusable outside mechanism design. Contributions to any milestone, and alternative proofs of Lemma 6, are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. R. Balseiro, O. Besbes, F. Castro, Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility, arXiv:2103.03403v2, 2022; Operations Research, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.03403
  • M.-F. Balcan, A. Blum, J. D. Hartline, Y. Mansour, Mechanism Design via Machine Learning, FOCS 2005, 605–614. https://doi.org/10.1109/SFCS.2005.50
  • R. B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 58–73, 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • P. Milgrom, I. Segal, Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets, Econometrica 70(2), 583–601, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00296
  • R. D. Driver, Ordinary and Delay Differential Equations, Springer, 1977 (reprint 2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-9467-9
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Climate Impact Investing 1: With an Average-Emissions Interaction Effect the Unique Equilibrium Emission Schedule Is ψ* − ε/(2n+ε)·(ψ* + 2n²ψ̄*/(2n+(n+1)ε)), Below the Schedule Without InteractionResearch Paper

Motivation

Green investors hold a growing share of financial wealth, and the stated purpose of much of this capital is to change how companies behave, not only to avoid exposure to climate risk. Whether exclusionary or impact-oriented portfolios actually move corporate emissions is an equilibrium question: investors' preferences shift the cost of capital, and companies choose emissions knowing this. De Angelis, Tankov and Zerbib, Climate Impact Investing (SSRN 3562534; Management Science 2022, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4472), build a continuous-time model in which regular and green investors trade the shares of nnn companies, green investors penalize climate externalities, and each company chooses an emission schedule to maximize its expected market value.

This mission formalizes the companies' side of that model: the reduction of each company's problem to a date-by-date payoff (Proposition 2), the explicit emission rate it yields when externalities depend on a company's own emissions (Corollary 3), and the equilibrium among companies when externalities also depend on the economy's average emissions (Proposition 4, §3.4 "Interaction effects"). The last result is the one the paper uses to argue that internalizing aggregate emissions pushes every company to emit less.

Setting

There are n≥1n\ge1n≥1 companies, a final date T>0T>0T>0 and a rate of time preference ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0. A schedule ψ\psiψ assigns to each date s∈[0,T]s\in[0,T]s∈[0,T] the vector ψs∈R+n\psi_s\in\mathbb R^n_+ψs​∈R+n​ of emission rates. Company iii has a marginal abatement cost csi≥0c^i_s\ge0csi​≥0. Green investors hold a wealth share α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1)α∈(0,1). The climate externalities θsi(ψs)\theta^i_s(\psi_s)θsi​(ψs​) (as internalized by green investors) and θsc,i(ψs)\theta^{c,i}_s(\psi_s)θsc,i​(ψs​) (as internalized by the companies) are functions of the whole emission profile.

Company iii's profit function is its discounted expected equilibrium price,

Ji(ψ)=∫0Te−ρt(di+∫0Tcsi(ψsi−ψbi) ds+∫0tθsc,i(ψs) ds+α∫tTθsi(ψs) ds−γ∗∫tT[Σs1]i ds)dt,\mathcal J^i(\psi)=\int_0^T e^{-\rho t}\Big(d^i+\int_0^T c^i_s(\psi^i_s-\psi^i_b)\,ds+\int_0^t\theta^{c,i}_s(\psi_s)\,ds+\alpha\int_t^T\theta^i_s(\psi_s)\,ds-\gamma^*\int_t^T[\Sigma_s\mathbf 1]_i\,ds\Big)dt,Ji(ψ)=∫0T​e−ρt(di+∫0T​csi​(ψsi​−ψbi​)ds+∫0t​θsc,i​(ψs​)ds+α∫tT​θsi​(ψs​)ds−γ∗∫tT​[Σs​1]i​ds)dt,

with ddd the expected terminal dividends, ψb\psi_bψb​ the baseline emissions, γ∗\gamma^*γ∗ an aggregate risk-aversion constant and Σs\Sigma_sΣs​ the dividend covariance. An optimal emission schedule (9) is a Nash equilibrium: no company raises Ji\mathcal J^iJi by changing its own schedule.

With the time factors

βtc=e−ρt−e−ρT1−e−ρT,βt=1−e−ρt1−e−ρT,\beta^c_t=\frac{e^{-\rho t}-e^{-\rho T}}{1-e^{-\rho T}},\qquad\beta_t=\frac{1-e^{-\rho t}}{1-e^{-\rho T}},βtc​=1−e−ρTe−ρt−e−ρT​,βt​=1−e−ρT1−e−ρt​,

the date-ttt payoff (12) of company iii is Fi(x)=βtcθtc,i(x)+αβtθti(x)+ctixiF_i(x)=\beta^c_t\theta^{c,i}_t(x)+\alpha\beta_t\theta^i_t(x)+c^i_tx^iFi​(x)=βtc​θtc,i​(x)+αβt​θti​(x)+cti​xi for a profile x∈Rnx\in\mathbb R^nx∈Rn.

Without interaction, θti(x)=κ0,t−κt2(xi)2\theta^i_t(x)=\kappa_{0,t}-\frac{\kappa_t}{2}(x^i)^2θti​(x)=κ0,t​−2κt​​(xi)2 and similarly for θc,i\theta^{c,i}θc,i with κc\kappa^cκc, where κt,κtc>0\kappa_t,\kappa^c_t>0κt​,κtc​>0 are sensitivities; the resulting rate is

ψt∗,i=ctiβtcκtc+αβtκt.(13)\psi^{*,i}_t=\frac{c^i_t}{\beta^c_t\kappa^c_t+\alpha\beta_t\kappa_t}.\tag{13}ψt∗,i​=βtc​κtc​+αβt​κt​cti​​.(13)

With an interaction effect of elasticity ε≥0\varepsilon\ge0ε≥0, the externalities become

θti(ψ)=κ0,t−κt2[(ψti)2+εψtiψˉt],ψˉt=1n∑j=1nψtj,\theta^i_t(\psi)=\kappa_{0,t}-\frac{\kappa_t}{2}\big[(\psi^i_t)^2+\varepsilon\psi^i_t\bar\psi_t\big],\qquad\bar\psi_t=\frac1n\sum_{j=1}^n\psi^j_t,θti​(ψ)=κ0,t​−2κt​​[(ψti​)2+εψti​ψˉ​t​],ψˉ​t​=n1​j=1∑n​ψtj​,

and similarly for θc,i\theta^{c,i}θc,i. The stage game at date ttt has players i=1,…,ni=1,\dots,ni=1,…,n, strategies xix^ixi and payoffs FiF_iFi​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4(i)

For every t∈[0,T]t\in[0,T]t∈[0,T], the stage game with interaction effect has exactly one Nash equilibrium, namely

ψt∗,ε,i=ψt∗,i−ε2n+ε(ψt∗,i+2n22n+(n+1)εψˉt∗),(15)\psi^{*,\varepsilon,i}_t=\psi^{*,i}_t-\frac{\varepsilon}{2n+\varepsilon}\Big(\psi^{*,i}_t+\frac{2n^2}{2n+(n+1)\varepsilon}\bar\psi^*_t\Big),\tag{15}ψt∗,ε,i​=ψt∗,i​−2n+εε​(ψt∗,i​+2n+(n+1)ε2n2​ψˉ​t∗​),(15)

and it lies weakly below the schedule without interaction: ψt∗,ε,i≤ψt∗,i\psi^{*,\varepsilon,i}_t\le\psi^{*,i}_tψt∗,ε,i​≤ψt∗,i​ for all iii.

Milestones

  1. (39): an integration by parts that rewrites the reduced objective as ∫0T\int_0^T∫0T​ of a weighted date-ttt payoff, and the equivalence between maximizing Ji\mathcal J^iJi and the reduced objective.
  2. Proposition 2: a schedule that maximizes (12) at every date is optimal for Ji\mathcal J^iJi against every admissible unilateral deviation.
  3. Corollary 3: (13) is the unique maximizer of the date-ttt payoff with own-emission externalities over x≥0x\ge0x≥0.
  4. (40): a profile is a stage equilibrium if and only if xi=ψt∗,i−ε2n(∑jxj+xi)x^i=\psi^{*,i}_t-\frac{\varepsilon}{2n}\big(\sum_jx^j+x^i\big)xi=ψt∗,i​−2nε​(∑j​xj+xi) for all iii.
  5. Sum identity: summing (40) gives ∑ixi=2n2n+(n+1)ε∑iψt∗,i\sum_ix^i=\frac{2n}{2n+(n+1)\varepsilon}\sum_i\psi^{*,i}_t∑i​xi=2n+(n+1)ε2n​∑i​ψt∗,i​.

Companions

  • Proposition 4(ii): as n→∞n\to\inftyn→∞ with ψt∗,i,ψˉt∗\psi^{*,i}_t,\bar\psi^*_tψt∗,i​,ψˉ​t∗​ fixed, (15) tends to ψt∗,i−εε+2ψˉt∗\psi^{*,i}_t-\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon+2}\bar\psi^*_tψt∗,i​−ε+2ε​ψˉ​t∗​ (16).
  • Corollary 3 at schedule level: (13) is optimal for Ji\mathcal J^iJi.
  • Proposition 4 at schedule level: a nonnegative, admissible (15) satisfies the Nash condition (9) for the profit functions.

Significance

The result quantifies how a shared concern for aggregate emissions changes individual behaviour. Each company's emission falls by an amount proportional to its own no-interaction rate and to the economy's average, and in a large market the reduction is εε+2\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon+2}ε+2ε​ times the average emission. With ε=1\varepsilon=1ε=1, equal weight on own and average emissions, a company cuts its emissions by one third of the average (p. 30). The comparison with (13) is the paper's argument that interaction effects reinforce the impact of green investing.

Formalizing it makes the modelling layer precise: what "optimal schedule" means once the stochastic layer is evaluated, under which integrability conditions the integration by parts holds, and on which domain the equilibrium lives. The results are proved on the page with short arguments; none of them is machine-checked anywhere. The time-factor module is shared with the companion mission on climate uncertainty.

Difficulty

The algebra of (15) is short; the care lies elsewhere. First, the average ψˉt\bar\psi_tψˉ​t​ contains company iii's own emission, so the derivative of θti\theta^i_tθti​ in ψti\psi^i_tψti​ includes the term εψti/n\varepsilon\psi^i_t/nεψti​/n. Treating ψˉt\bar\psi_tψˉ​t​ as fixed, the mean-field reading, gives a different equilibrium, ψt∗,i−ε2ψˉt\psi^{*,i}_t-\frac{\varepsilon}{2}\bar\psi_tψt∗,i​−2ε​ψˉ​t​, which is not (15). Second, the page's proof imposes first-order conditions, which characterize equilibria of the game on Rn\mathbb R^nRn, while the model's schedules are nonnegative and (15) can be negative (for instance when cti=0c^i_t=0cti​=0 and ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0). Third, Proposition 2 is an exchange of the order of integration on {0≤s≤t≤T}\{0\le s\le t\le T\}{0≤s≤t≤T} that must be justified from integrability alone, without continuity of the schedule.

Formalization scope

The paper's model is stochastic: Brownian cash-flow news, subjective measures obtained by Girsanov's theorem, and CARA investors. None of this is formalized, and Propositions 1 and 5 are out of scope as equilibrium statements. The formal statements start from the companies' objective in the evaluated form of p. 64, the expected equilibrium price under the companies' measure.

Conventions committed to in Lean:

  • Companies are indexed by Fin n with n>0n>0n>0; profiles are Fin n → ℝ; Σs1\Sigma_s\mathbf 1Σs​1 is Matrix.mulVec (Sig s) 1, and only its iii-th coordinate is used.
  • Time factors, the quadratic externality and (13) live in the shared module TimeFactors. ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0 and T>0T>0T>0 are standing hypotheses; κt,κtc>0\kappa_t,\kappa^c_t>0κt​,κtc​>0 on [0,T][0,T][0,T] (Corollary 3's standing assumption, inherited by Proposition 4 through (13)) and cti≥0c^i_t\ge0cti​≥0 (implicit on the page) are disclosed. Positivity of κ0,t,κ0,tc\kappa_{0,t},\kappa^c_{0,t}κ0,t​,κ0,tc​ is not used and is dropped.
  • A schedule is admissible for company iii if it is Borel measurable and nonnegative on [0,T][0,T][0,T] and ciψic^i\psi^iciψi, θi(ψ)\theta^i(\psi)θi(ψ), θc,i(ψ)\theta^{c,i}(\psi)θc,i(ψ) are integrable there; cic^ici and [Σ1]i[\Sigma\mathbf 1]_i[Σ1]i​ are assumed integrable. Measurability is required by footnote 7; Lean encodes it through the schedule's zero extension outside [0,T][0,T][0,T]. Integrability is not on the page; without it the integrals would silently default to 000.
  • The page writes ddd in Ji\mathcal J^iJi for the coordinate did^idi.
  • The goal's stage game is played on Rn\mathbb R^nRn; this is a disclosed correction of the page's domain R+n\mathbb R^n_+R+n​, which its own first-order proof does not respect. The schedule-level companion restores R+\mathbb R_+R+​ under the proviso that (15) is nonnegative.
  • "Lower" is the weak inequality: at ε=0\varepsilon=0ε=0 or c≡0c\equiv0c≡0 the two schedules coincide.
  • Proposition 4(ii)'s "≃\simeq≃ for n≫εn\gg\varepsilonn≫ε" is pinned down as a limit n→∞n\to\inftyn→∞ with the no-interaction quantities held fixed.

A statement that assumes (40) or defines equilibrium as the solution of the first-order system would be trivial; the goal quantifies over all profiles and uses the Nash predicate, and no milestone assumes the conclusion of another.

The development needs interval integrals and Fubini on a triangle (both available in Mathlib's measure theory), and elementary algebra over Fin n sums. The profit-function layer and the stage-game predicates are reusable for other emission games built on the same model. Proofs of any item are welcome, as are proofs of the necessity direction of Proposition 2.

Selected references

  • T. De Angelis, P. Tankov, O. D. Zerbib, Climate Impact Investing, SSRN 3562534, version of 25 June 2021. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3562534
  • T. De Angelis, P. Tankov, O. D. Zerbib, Climate Impact Investing, Management Science, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4472
  • W. Nordhaus, Estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon: Concepts and Results from the DICE-2013R Model and Alternative Approaches, Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 1(1/2), 2014. https://doi.org/10.1086/676035
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