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Operations ResearchOptimizationStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Asymptotic Optimality of Base-Stock Policies for Perishable Inventory Systems 3: Under FIFO Issuance the Heuristic Base-Stock Policy Is Asymptotically Optimal as the Unit Penalty Cost GrowsResearch Paper

Motivation

Perishable products, among them fresh food, blood platelets and pharmaceuticals, lose their value after a fixed number of periods. Their inventory control has been studied since the 1970s (Nahmias, Perishable inventory theory: a review, Operations Research 1982). The optimal policy of the standard lost-sales model depends on the whole age profile of the stock and is computationally intractable when the lifetime is long. Practitioners therefore use base-stock policies, which raise the total inventory to a fixed level every period. Before Bu, Gong & Chao (SSRN 3724966, accepted at Management Science, 2022), no guarantee was known on how far the best such policy, or any explicitly computable one, is from optimal.

This mission concerns the regime of a large unit penalty cost. Firms in retail and manufacturing often run at very high service levels (Huh et al. 2009; Wei et al. 2021), which in a cost-based model means that the unit lost-sales penalty ppp is much larger than the unit holding cost hhh. The question is whether a simple base-stock policy remains near-optimal as ppp grows.

Setting

A product has a fixed lifetime of m≥1m\ge1m≥1 periods. Demands D1,D2,…D_1,D_2,\dotsD1​,D2​,… are i.i.d. copies of a non-negative random variable DDD with 0<E[D]<∞0<\mathbb E[D]<\infty0<E[D]<∞ and distribution function F(x)=P(D≤x)F(x)=\mathbb P(D\le x)F(x)=P(D≤x). At the start of period ttt the state is xt=(xt,1,…,xt,m−1)x_t=(x_{t,1},\dots,x_{t,m-1})xt​=(xt,1​,…,xt,m−1​), where xt,ix_{t,i}xt,i​ is the stock whose remaining lifetime is at most iii periods, and xt,0:=0x_{t,0}:=0xt,0​:=0. The firm orders qt≥0q_t\ge0qt​≥0 and the total level becomes xt,m=xt,m−1+qtx_{t,m}=x_{t,m-1}+q_txt,m​=xt,m−1​+qt​ (zero lead time). Demand is served oldest first (FIFO issuance) and unmet demand is lost. The outdated quantity is ot=(xt,1−Dt)+o_t=(x_{t,1}-D_t)^+ot​=(xt,1​−Dt​)+, and the dynamics are

xt+1,i=(xt,i+1−Dt−ot)+,i=1,…,m−1,x_{t+1,i}=(x_{t,i+1}-D_t-o_t)^+,\qquad i=1,\dots,m-1,xt+1,i​=(xt,i+1​−Dt​−ot​)+,i=1,…,m−1,

starting from the empty state x1=0x_1=0x1​=0. The period cost is Ctπ=h(xt,mπ−Dt)++p(Dt−xt,mπ)++θotπC^\pi_t=h(x^\pi_{t,m}-D_t)^++p(D_t-x^\pi_{t,m})^++\theta o^\pi_tCtπ​=h(xt,mπ​−Dt​)++p(Dt​−xt,mπ​)++θotπ​, with h>0h>0h>0, p>0p>0p>0 and an additional outdating cost θ≥0\theta\ge0θ≥0. An admissible policy orders qt=φtπ(xt)q_t=\varphi^\pi_t(x_t)qt​=φtπ​(xt​) with each φtπ\varphi^\pi_tφtπ​ a non-negative measurable function of the state. Its long-run average cost is Cπ=lim sup⁡T→∞1T∑t=1TE[Ctπ]C^\pi=\limsup_{T\to\infty}\frac1T\sum_{t=1}^T\mathbb E[C^\pi_t]Cπ=limsupT→∞​T1​∑t=1T​E[Ctπ​], and OPT=inf⁡πCπ\mathrm{OPT}=\inf_\pi C^\piOPT=infπ​Cπ over all admissible policies.

The base-stock policy πS\pi_SπS​ orders (S−xt,m−1)+(S-x_{t,m-1})^+(S−xt,m−1​)+, and C(S)C(S)C(S) is its average cost. E[O∞(S)]\mathbb E[O_\infty(S)]E[O∞​(S)] is its long-run average outdated quantity. The heuristic level S~\widetilde SS is any minimizer over [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) of

C~(S)=hE[(S−D)+]+pE[(D−S)+]+θmE[(S−∑i=1mDi)+].\widetilde C(S)=h\mathbb E[(S-D)^+]+p\mathbb E[(D-S)^+]+\frac\theta m\mathbb E\Big[\Big(S-\sum_{i=1}^mD_i\Big)^+\Big].C(S)=hE[(S−D)+]+pE[(D−S)+]+mθ​E[(S−i=1∑m​Di​)+].

Two further objects appear: the upper support Dˉ=sup⁡{x:F(x)<1}∈[0,∞]\bar D=\sup\{x:F(x)<1\}\in[0,\infty]Dˉ=sup{x:F(x)<1}∈[0,∞] (demand is bounded when Dˉ<∞\bar D<\inftyDˉ<∞), and the floor level S‾=arg⁡min⁡S≥0{hE[(S−D)+]+pE[(D−S)+]+θS}\underline S=\arg\min_{S\ge0}\{h\mathbb E[(S-D)^+]+p\mathbb E[(D-S)^+]+\theta S\}S​=argminS≥0​{hE[(S−D)+]+pE[(D−S)+]+θS}. A subscript ppp marks dependence on the penalty: CpC_pCp​, OPTp\mathrm{OPT}_pOPTp​, S~p\widetilde S_pSp​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 13)

lim⁡p→∞(Cp(S~p)−OPTp)=0,\lim_{p\to\infty}\big(C_p(\widetilde S_p)-\mathrm{OPT}_p\big)=0,p→∞lim​(Cp​(Sp​)−OPTp​)=0,

with mmm, hhh, θ\thetaθ and the demand law fixed, for every selection p↦S~pp\mapsto\widetilde S_pp↦Sp​ of minimizers. No boundedness assumption on demand is made.

Milestones

  1. (25), p. 24, for every demand law: C(S~)−OPT≤θ(E[(D−S~/m)+]−E[(1m∑i=1mDi−S~/m)+])C(\widetilde S)-\mathrm{OPT}\le\theta\big(\mathbb E[(D-\widetilde S/m)^+]-\mathbb E[(\frac1m\sum_{i=1}^mD_i-\widetilde S/m)^+]\big)C(S)−OPT≤θ(E[(D−S/m)+]−E[(m1​∑i=1m​Di​−S/m)+]).
  2. Lemma 6, p. 22: if Dˉ<∞\bar D<\inftyDˉ<∞, some optimal policy has xt,m≥S‾x_{t,m}\ge\underline Sxt,m​≥S​ in every period on every demand path.
  3. (20), p. 22: such a policy outdates cumulatively at least as much as πS‾\pi_{\underline S}πS​​, pathwise.
  4. Proposition 3, p. 22: if Dˉ<∞\bar D<\inftyDˉ<∞, OPT≥hE[(S‾−D)+]+θE[O∞(S‾)]\mathrm{OPT}\ge h\mathbb E[(\underline S-D)^+]+\theta\mathbb E[O_\infty(\underline S)]OPT≥hE[(S​−D)+]+θE[O∞​(S​)].
  5. (EC.13), p. ec6: if Dˉ<∞\bar D<\inftyDˉ<∞, pE[(D−S~)+]≤p(Dˉ−S~)P(D>S~)≤(h+θ)(Dˉ−S~)p\mathbb E[(D-\widetilde S)^+]\le p(\bar D-\widetilde S)\mathbb P(D>\widetilde S)\le(h+\theta)(\bar D-\widetilde S)pE[(D−S)+]≤p(Dˉ−S)P(D>S)≤(h+θ)(Dˉ−S).
  6. (EC.15), p. ec6: E[O∞(S2)]≤E[O∞(S1)]+S2−S1\mathbb E[O_\infty(S_2)]\le\mathbb E[O_\infty(S_1)]+S_2-S_1E[O∞​(S2​)]≤E[O∞​(S1​)]+S2​−S1​ for 0≤S1≤S20\le S_1\le S_20≤S1​≤S2​.
  7. (26), p. 24: if Dˉ<∞\bar D<\inftyDˉ<∞, C(S~)−OPT≤(h+θ)(Dˉ−S‾)C(\widetilde S)-\mathrm{OPT}\le(h+\theta)(\bar D-\underline S)C(S)−OPT≤(h+θ)(Dˉ−S​).

Significance

Theorem 3 shows that the explicitly computable policy πS~\pi_{\widetilde S}πS​ is asymptotically optimal in the high-service regime. The optimal policy is a function of the whole age vector, whereas S~\widetilde SS is the minimizer of a one-dimensional convex function. Together with the companion results of the paper, in the lifetime mmm, the demand population and the outdating cost θ\thetaθ, this gives a uniform picture of when a single stock level suffices for a perishable product. Lemma 6 and Proposition 3 are of independent interest: a uniform floor on the optimal order-up-to level and a lower bound on the optimal average cost that does not require solving the dynamic program.

The result is proved in the paper; it has not been formalized. A machine-checked development requires a perishable inventory model, long-run average costs over an infinite i.i.d. demand path, and, for Lemma 6, the existence of an average-optimal policy. The last step requires a vanishing-discount argument.

Difficulty

The unbounded-demand case rests on (25). The lower bounds it combines (Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 of the paper) are posed in mission 1 of this series and only cited here. The bounded-demand case is harder. One would like to compare πS~\pi_{\widetilde S}πS​ with an optimal policy directly, but a priori there is no optimal policy at all: OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is an infimum over a large class of state-feedback policies on a continuous state space. Lemma 6 asserts that the infimum is attained, and attained by a policy whose order-up-to level never drops below S‾\underline SS​. The paper obtains it from the discounted problem (Nandakumar & Morton 1993) and a vanishing-discount limit, verifying the conditions of Schäl (1993, Theorem 3.8) and in particular a uniform bound on relative discounted values (EC.34). Schäl's theorem is posed separately on Prove2Me as a statement (SchalAvg.AvgOpt.theorem_3_8, not proved), which is context and not part of this mission. Bounding the lost-sales term by a quantity independent of ppp, as (EC.13) does, needs the first-order condition at a minimizer of C~\widetilde CC, which is a non-smooth convex function.

Formalization scope

  • Time is zero-based: Lean period ttt is the paper's period t+1t+1t+1.
  • State: Fin (m - 1) → ℝ of cumulative levels, with xt,0:=0x_{t,0}:=0xt,0​:=0, so m=1m=1m=1 (empty state, everything left over outdates) is included, not excluded.
  • Parameters: a record (m,h,p,θ)(m,h,p,\theta)(m,h,p,θ) with the standing hypotheses m≥1m\ge1m≥1, h>0h>0h>0, p>0p>0p>0, θ≥0\theta\ge0θ≥0. In Theorem 3 only the field ppp varies.
  • Expectations and costs are lower Lebesgue integrals over the i.i.d. path law (CappedBaseStock.demandPathLaw), valued in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. Long-run averages are limsups of Cesàro averages.
  • Policies: the class Π\PiΠ of the paper: time-dependent, deterministic, measurable functions of the current state. OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is the infimum over all of Π\PiΠ, not over base-stock policies.
  • C(S)C(S)C(S) is the simulated long-run average cost of πS\pi_SπS​, not a formula. E[O∞(S)]\mathbb E[O_\infty(S)]E[O∞​(S)] is the long-run average outdating of πS\pi_SπS​ from the empty state.
  • S~\widetilde SS is any minimizer of C~\widetilde CC; all statements quantify over every minimizer. S‾\underline SS​ is the least minimizer of its function, the weaker choice for Lemma 6.
  • Gaps "A−OPT≤BA-\mathrm{OPT}\le BA−OPT≤B" are stated as A≤OPT+BA\le\mathrm{OPT}+BA≤OPT+B in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. The limit uses real values, which is faithful because Cp(S)≤hS+pE[D]+θS<∞C_p(S)\le hS+p\mathbb E[D]+\theta S<\inftyCp​(S)≤hS+pE[D]+θS<∞.
  • Lemma 6 requires an exactly optimal policy and a floor on every demand path.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out. OPT is not restricted to base-stock policies, C(S)C(S)C(S) is not defined by its formula (3), S~\widetilde SS is not replaced by a closed form, and mmm, θ\thetaθ, hhh and the demand law are kept general.

The FIFO lemmas the proof uses, namely Lemma 1, Lemma 2, Proposition 2 and the recursion (19), are posed in mission 1 of this series and are not restated. The development reuses the published demand layer CappedBaseStock_Model and the newsvendor functions LostSalesOrderUpTo.Asymptotic.Backorder. A general vanishing-discount theorem for Borel-state average-cost control would be reusable well beyond this mission; contributions toward it, and toward the convexity and first-order conditions of newsvendor-type costs, are welcome.

Selected references

  • X. Bu, X. Gong, X. Chao, Asymptotic Optimality of Base-Stock Policies for Perishable Inventory Systems, accepted manuscript, Management Science, 2022. SSRN 3724966, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3724966
  • S. Nahmias, Perishable inventory theory: a review, Operations Research 30(4), 1982. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.30.4.680
  • P. Nandakumar, T. E. Morton, Near myopic heuristics for the fixed-life perishability problem, Management Science 39(12), 1993. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.39.12.1490
  • M. Schäl, Average optimality in dynamic programming with general state space, Mathematics of Operations Research 18(1), 1993. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.18.1.163
  • W. T. Huh, G. Janakiraman, J. A. Muckstadt, P. Rusmevichientong, Asymptotic optimality of order-up-to policies in lost sales inventory systems, Management Science 55(3), 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0945
12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion 3: Information Design Pareto-Dominates Full Information Exactly When Low-Need Arrivals Exceed a ThresholdResearch Paper

Motivation

Public and nonprofit services such as food banks, shelters, free clinics and legal aid often run with too little capacity and serve two kinds of users: people with no alternative, and people who have a reasonable outside option. When the queue is long, a user who has an alternative but joins anyway imposes waiting costs on everyone behind them, including the users who cannot go elsewhere. Pricing is usually ruled out in such settings, which leaves the provider one lever: what it tells arriving users about congestion.

Anunrojwong, Iyer and Manshadi (arXiv:2005.07253v3; Management Science, 2023) study this lever as a Bayesian persuasion problem in a queue, building on the revenue-maximization model of Lingenbrink and Iyer (Operations Research 67(5):1397–1416, 2019). The natural benchmark is full information: announce the queue length and let users decide. This mission formalizes the paper's answer to when full information can be improved for both user types at once, and by how much.

Setting

A single server serves users first come, first served, with exponential service times of rate 111. High-need users (type H) arrive as a Poisson stream of rate λH≥0\lambda_H\ge0λH​≥0 and always join. Low-need users (type L) arrive at rate λL>0\lambda_L>0λL​>0 and either join or take an outside option worth 000. Write λ=λL+λH≤1\lambda=\lambda_L+\lambda_H\le1λ=λL​+λH​≤1. A type-iii user who joins with nnn users already present receives utility ui(n)u_i(n)ui​(n). The standing assumptions are ui(0)>0u_i(0)>0ui​(0)>0, ui(k)<0u_i(k)<0ui​(k)<0 for some kkk, each uiu_iui​ strictly decreasing, and the increments uL(n)−uL(n+1)u_L(n)-u_L(n+1)uL​(n)−uL​(n+1) non-increasing (Assumption 1).

By a revelation-principle argument (Lemma 1 of the paper, from Lingenbrink and Iyer), a recommendation mechanism that users obey is described by the queue's stationary distribution π=(πn)n≥0\pi=(\pi_n)_{n\ge0}π=(πn​)n≥0​. An admission policy is a distribution with λHπn≤πn+1≤λπn\lambda_H\pi_n\le\pi_{n+1}\le\lambda\pi_nλH​πn​≤πn+1​≤λπn​ for all nnn; their set is ΠAP\Pi_{AP}ΠAP​. A signaling mechanism is an admission policy that also satisfies the obedience constraints

J(π)=∑n≥0(πn+1−λHπn)uL(n)≥0,L(π)=∑n≥0(λπn−πn+1)uL(n)≤0,J(\pi)=\sum_{n\ge0}(\pi_{n+1}-\lambda_H\pi_n)u_L(n)\ge0,\qquad L(\pi)=\sum_{n\ge0}(\lambda\pi_n-\pi_{n+1})u_L(n)\le0,J(π)=n≥0∑​(πn+1​−λH​πn​)uL​(n)≥0,L(π)=n≥0∑​(λπn​−πn+1​)uL​(n)≤0,

called (JOIN) and (LEAVE); their set is ΠSM\Pi_{SM}ΠSM​. The welfare of the two types is WL(π)=J(π)W_L(\pi)=J(\pi)WL​(π)=J(π) and WH(π)=λH∑nπnuH(n)W_H(\pi)=\lambda_H\sum_n\pi_nu_H(n)WH​(π)=λH​∑n​πn​uH​(n). A policy π^\hat\piπ^ Pareto-dominates π\piπ if it is at least as good for both types and strictly better for one; π\piπ is Pareto-efficient within a class if no member of the class dominates it.

A threshold policy πx\pi_xπx​, x=m+a≥0x=m+a\ge0x=m+a≥0, admits L users when fewer than mmm users are present, admits them with probability aaa at mmm, and turns them away above mmm. Write WL(x)W_L(x)WL​(x), WH(x)W_H(x)WH​(x) and L(x)L(x)L(x) for its welfare and (LEAVE) value. The full-information threshold mfim_{fi}mfi​ is the smallest kkk with uL(k)<0u_L(k)<0uL​(k)<0, and the full-information mechanism is fi=πmfi\mathsf{fi}=\pi_{m_{fi}}fi=πmfi​​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3(1)–(2)

For λH∈(0,1)\lambda_H\in(0,1)λH​∈(0,1), with uL,uHu_L,u_HuL​,uH​ fixed, there is a threshold ΛˉL(λH)∈(0,1−λH]\bar\Lambda_L(\lambda_H)\in(0,1-\lambda_H]ΛˉL​(λH​)∈(0,1−λH​] such that some signaling mechanism Pareto-dominates fi\mathsf{fi}fi if and only if λL≥ΛˉL(λH)\lambda_L\ge\bar\Lambda_L(\lambda_H)λL​≥ΛˉL​(λH​), and

ΛˉL(λH) ≥ (1−λH) uL(mfi−1)uL(0)−∑k=1mfi−1λHk(uL(k−1)−uL(k)) > 0.\bar\Lambda_L(\lambda_H)\ \ge\ (1-\lambda_H)\,\frac{u_L(m_{fi}-1)}{u_L(0)-\sum_{k=1}^{m_{fi}-1}\lambda_H^k\big(u_L(k-1)-u_L(k)\big)}\ >\ 0 .ΛˉL​(λH​) ≥ (1−λH​)uL​(0)−∑k=1mfi​−1​λHk​(uL​(k−1)−uL​(k))uL​(mfi​−1)​ > 0.

If moreover λ<1\lambda<1λ<1, uL(mfi−1)≤WL(fi)u_L(m_{fi}-1)\le W_L(\mathsf{fi})uL​(mfi​−1)≤WL​(fi), uH(mfi)≤WH(fi)u_H(m_{fi})\le W_H(\mathsf{fi})uH​(mfi​)≤WH​(fi), L(mfi−1)≤0L(m_{fi}-1)\le0L(mfi​−1)≤0 and WH(fi)>0W_H(\mathsf{fi})>0WH​(fi)>0, then a signaling mechanism sm\mathsf{sm}sm exists with

WL(sm)≥βL,smWL(fi),WH(sm)≥βH,smWH(fi),W_L(\mathsf{sm})\ge\beta_{L,sm}W_L(\mathsf{fi}),\qquad W_H(\mathsf{sm})\ge\beta_{H,sm}W_H(\mathsf{fi}),WL​(sm)≥βL,sm​WL​(fi),WH​(sm)≥βH,sm​WH​(fi),

where βL,sm=1+λH(1−λ)λLλmfi−11−λH−λLλmfi−1>1\beta_{L,sm}=1+\frac{\lambda_H(1-\lambda)\lambda_L\lambda^{m_{fi}-1}}{1-\lambda_H-\lambda_L\lambda^{m_{fi}-1}}>1βL,sm​=1+1−λH​−λL​λmfi​−1λH​(1−λ)λL​λmfi​−1​>1 and βH,sm=1+(1−λH)(1−λ)λLλmfi−11−λH−λLλmfi−1>1\beta_{H,sm}=1+\frac{(1-\lambda_H)(1-\lambda)\lambda_L\lambda^{m_{fi}-1}}{1-\lambda_H-\lambda_L\lambda^{m_{fi}-1}}>1βH,sm​=1+1−λH​−λL​λmfi​−1(1−λH​)(1−λ)λL​λmfi​−1​>1.

Milestones

  • Lemma 3: the geometric sandwich λHk−qπq≤πk≤λk−qπq\lambda_H^{k-q}\pi_q\le\pi_k\le\lambda^{k-q}\pi_qλHk−q​πq​≤πk​≤λk−qπq​ on ΠAP\Pi_{AP}ΠAP​.
  • Theorems 1 and 2: Pareto-efficient signaling mechanisms and admission policies have a threshold structure with threshold at most mfim_{fi}mfi​.
  • Lemma 2: maximizers of θWL+(1−θ)WH\theta W_L+(1-\theta)W_HθWL​+(1−θ)WH​ exist.
  • Theorem 3: when (LEAVE) is slack, efficiency within ΠSM\Pi_{SM}ΠSM​ and within ΠAP\Pi_{AP}ΠAP​ coincide.
  • Lemma 5(1)–(2): WH(x)W_H(x)WH​(x) is strictly decreasing, and WL(x)W_L(x)WL​(x) is unimodal and monotone between consecutive integers.
  • fi∈ΠSM\mathsf{fi}\in\Pi_{SM}fi∈ΠSM​ with L(fi)<0L(\mathsf{fi})<0L(fi)<0.
  • Theorem 4: exactly one of "fi\mathsf{fi}fi is Pareto-efficient among admission policies" and "a signaling mechanism dominates fi\mathsf{fi}fi" holds, the first if and only if WL(mfi)>WL(mfi−1)W_L(m_{fi})>W_L(m_{fi}-1)WL​(mfi​)>WL​(mfi​−1).
  • From the proof of Proposition 3: the equivalence of that condition with f(λL,λH)<0f(\lambda_L,\lambda_H)<0f(λL​,λH​)<0, an identity for WL(m−1)W_L(m-1)WL​(m−1) and an inequality for WH(m−1)W_H(m-1)WH​(m−1), for 1≤m≤mfi1\le m\le m_{fi}1≤m≤mfi​.

Significance

The proposition gives a clean regime split. Full information is already Pareto-efficient when low-need demand is light. Once λL\lambda_LλL​ crosses an explicit level, revealing everything leaves welfare on the table for both types, so a provider who cares about either group has a reason to hide some queue information. The lower bound on ΛˉL\bar\Lambda_LΛˉL​ is explicit in the primitives, and the factors βL,sm,βH,sm\beta_{L,sm},\beta_{H,sm}βL,sm​,βH,sm​ give a guaranteed improvement, not only an existence statement. Theorem 4, the milestone behind part 1, reduces the comparison to two adjacent thresholds.

The paper proves these results on paper. To our knowledge none of them has a machine-checked proof. A formal development checks the "little algebra" steps that the paper compresses (the equivalence with f<0f<0f<0, the welfare identities of p. 41–42). It also produces a reusable layer for persuasion in birth–death queues: obedient mechanisms as distributions, threshold policies, and Pareto efficiency within a class. The companion missions of this series (threshold structure, the homogeneous case, first-best) are stated over the same layer.

Difficulty

The threshold ΛˉL\bar\Lambda_LΛˉL​ comes from analysing the sign of f(⋅,λH)f(\cdot,\lambda_H)f(⋅,λH​) on (0,1−λH](0,1-\lambda_H](0,1−λH​]. Translating "fi is not dominated" into that sign condition is where the work lies. The obvious attempt, comparing fi\mathsf{fi}fi only with nearby threshold policies, settles one direction: if WL(mfi−1)≥WL(mfi)W_L(m_{fi}-1)\ge W_L(m_{fi})WL​(mfi​−1)≥WL​(mfi​), the threshold mfi−1m_{fi}-1mfi​−1 dominates. The converse needs every competitor in ΠAP\Pi_{AP}ΠAP​, not just threshold policies. That requires the structure theorem for efficient admission policies, the existence of maximizers, and unimodality of WLW_LWL​, followed by a transfer from ΠAP\Pi_{AP}ΠAP​ to ΠSM\Pi_{SM}ΠSM​ that only works because (LEAVE) is slack at fi\mathsf{fi}fi. The welfare series are infinite, and the threshold family is parametrised by a real xxx whose fractional part enters nonlinearly, so the comparisons are not finite-dimensional linear algebra.

Formalization scope

Everything is stated over a structure Model with real fields λL,λH\lambda_L,\lambda_HλL​,λH​ and utilities uL,uH:N→Ru_L,u_H:\mathbb N\to\mathbb RuL​,uH​:N→R, with a predicate Standing holding the standing assumptions (lim⁡kui(k)<0\lim_ku_i(k)<0limk​ui​(k)<0 is encoded as ∃k, ui(k)<0\exists k,\ u_i(k)<0∃k, ui​(k)<0). Queue lengths are natural numbers, and the two types are separate fields. Membership in ΠAP\Pi_{AP}ΠAP​ includes summability of πnuL(n)\pi_nu_L(n)πn​uL​(n) and πnuH(n)\pi_nu_H(n)πn​uH​(n): the paper treats all welfare as finite, and an unrestricted tsum would assign 000 to divergent welfare. WLW_LWL​ is the right-hand form of (2), with no division by λLπn\lambda_L\pi_nλL​πn​. A finite threshold requires π∈ΠAP\pi\in\Pi_{AP}π∈ΠAP​, πm>0\pi_m>0πm​>0 and a joining fraction in [0,1][0,1][0,1], as in Definition 2. Threshold policies are defined from their unnormalised weights, fi\mathsf{fi}fi is πmfi\pi_{m_{fi}}πmfi​​ as a distribution, and Pareto efficiency is Definition 1 within an explicit class. "Exactly one" is exclusive or.

Added hypotheses, each disclosed in the item that carries it:

  1. Convergence of ∑nλHnuH(n)\sum_n\lambda_H^nu_H(n)∑n​λHn​uH​(n). This is the finite-welfare convention, equivalent to ΠAP≠∅\Pi_{AP}\ne\emptysetΠAP​=∅ when λH>0\lambda_H>0λH​>0.
  2. Lemma 2's hypothesis (λ<1\lambda<1λ<1, or uL,uH→−∞u_L,u_H\to-\inftyuL​,uH​→−∞) wherever existence of maximizers is used.
  3. uL(mfi−1)≠0u_L(m_{fi}-1)\ne0uL​(mfi​−1)=0 in Proposition 3. Without it the claimed ΛˉL>0\bar\Lambda_L>0ΛˉL​>0 is false.
  4. λH>0\lambda_H>0λH​>0 in Lemma 5(1) and Theorem 4, as required by §4.2's heterogeneous setting. For λH=0\lambda_H=0λH​=0, WH≡0W_H\equiv0WH​≡0, and Theorem 4's strict adjacent-threshold comparison can fail at a tie.

The page's range λL∈[ΛˉL,1)\lambda_L\in[\bar\Lambda_L,1)λL​∈[ΛˉL​,1) is intersected with λ≤1\lambda\le1λ≤1. In part 2, "sm\mathsf{sm}sm" is read existentially.

Ruled out as trivializing: choosing ΛˉL\bar\Lambda_LΛˉL​ after λL\lambda_LλL​ (the goal quantifies it once, with λH,uL,uH\lambda_H,u_L,u_HλH​,uL​,uH​ fixed); defining fi\mathsf{fi}fi through its welfare; replacing Pareto efficiency by maximization of a weighted welfare; replacing exclusive or by inclusive or; and any constant that differs from the page's βL,sm\beta_{L,sm}βL,sm​, βH,sm\beta_{H,sm}βH,sm​ or lower bound symbol for symbol.

A complete development needs geometric and arithmetico-geometric series, rearrangement of infinite sums over N\mathbb NN, and convexity arguments in the space of summable sequences. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are lemmas about threshold policies that the other missions of the series can reuse.

Selected references

  • J. Anunrojwong, K. Iyer, V. Manshadi, Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion, Management Science, 2023; read as arXiv:2005.07253v3 (2022). https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.07253
  • D. Lingenbrink, K. Iyer, Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues, Operations Research 67(5):1397–1416, 2019.
  • E. Kamenica, M. Gentzkow, Bayesian Persuasion, American Economic Review 101(6), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2590
  • D. Gross, J. F. Shortle, J. M. Thompson, C. M. Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, 5th ed., Wiley, 2018.
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Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On-Demand Delivery from Stores: Dynamic Dispatching and Routing with Random Demand I: The Approximation APT Bounds the Expected Cost-to-Go from Below and Above and Is Exact in the Last PeriodResearch Paper

Motivation

Retailers and restaurants increasingly deliver orders from their own stores within an hour or less. Orders arrive throughout the day, a fixed pool of drivers is based at the store, and in each dispatch wave the operator must decide how many drivers to send out now and along which routes. Sending many drivers now gives short delivery times for the current orders but leaves few drivers for orders that arrive while those drivers are still on the road. Liu and Luo (arXiv:2107.13058, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2023) model this trade-off as a finite-horizon stochastic dynamic program and propose a rollout policy built on a tractable approximation of its cost-to-go. Their Theorem 1 justifies the approximation: with suitable parameters it lies below the true expected cost-to-go, with other parameters it lies between that cost and the cost of any feasible simple policy, and in the last period it is exact. This mission formalizes that theorem.

Setting

A store (the depot 000) serves a finite set I\mathcal II of customer locations over NNN periods with strictly increasing decision epochs t1<⋯<tNt_1 < \dots < t_Nt1​<⋯<tN​. A fleet of Kˉ\bar KKˉ drivers carries at most QQQ items per trip; travel times τ(i,j)≥0\tau(i,j) \ge 0τ(i,j)≥0, an on-site service time s≥0s \ge 0s≥0 and a delivery target Lmax⁡L_{\max}Lmax​ are given. At epoch tnt_ntn​ the operator observes the demand of period nnn: the set In⊆I\mathcal I^n \subseteq \mathcal IIn⊆I of locations with an order and the quantities qinq^n_iqin​, drawn from a finitely supported law Qn\mathbb Q^nQn, independently across periods.

The driver status ζn=(ζ1n,…,ζNn)\zeta^n = (\zeta^n_1,\dots,\zeta^n_N)ζn=(ζ1n​,…,ζNn​) records how many drivers are still en route in each period n′n'n′ because of earlier dispatches, so Kˉ−ζnn\bar K - \zeta^n_nKˉ−ζnn​ drivers are available at tnt_ntn​. A decision YnY^nYn is a set of depot-to-depot routes 0→i1→⋯→im→00 \to i_1 \to \dots \to i_m \to 00→i1​→⋯→im​→0, one per dispatched driver. It is feasible if it uses at most Kˉ−ζnn\bar K - \zeta^n_nKˉ−ζnn​ drivers, serves every current order exactly once, loads at most QQQ items per route, and delivers every order within Lmax⁡L_{\max}Lmax​. The delivery times are ui1=τ(0,i1)u_{i_1} = \tau(0,i_1)ui1​​=τ(0,i1​) and uik+1=uik+s+τ(ik,ik+1)u_{i_{k+1}} = u_{i_k} + s + \tau(i_k,i_{k+1})uik+1​​=uik​​+s+τ(ik​,ik+1​); the cost of YnY^nYn is ∑i∈Inui(Yn)\sum_{i \in \mathcal I^n} u_i(Y^n)∑i∈In​ui​(Yn). A driver whose route lasts longer than tn′−tnt_{n'} - t_ntn′​−tn​ is counted as en route in period n′n'n′; this is the transition (9) from ζn\zeta^nζn to ζn+1\zeta^{n+1}ζn+1.

The cost-to-go Hn(In,qn,ζn)\mathcal H_n(\mathcal I^n, q^n, \zeta^n)Hn​(In,qn,ζn) is the minimum over feasible YnY^nYn of the period's cost plus EQn+1[Hn+1]\mathbb E_{\mathbb Q^{n+1}}[\mathcal H_{n+1}]EQn+1​[Hn+1​] at the resulting status, with HN\mathcal H_NHN​ the period cost alone ((7)–(8)). The single-period cost Hs(K,In,qn)\mathcal H^s(K, \mathcal I^n, q^n)Hs(K,In,qn) is the minimum cost of serving the demand with at most KKK drivers.

The approximation APTn(ζn)\mathbf{APT}^n(\zeta^n)APTn(ζn) (10) replaces the future by single-period problems coupled only through driver counts:

VAPTn(ζn)=min⁡Kn′∈N∑n′=nNEQn′[Hs(Kn′,In′,qn′)]  s.t.  ∑m=nn′ωmn′(Km)≤Kˉ−ζn′n,  n′=n,…,N,V^n_{APT}(\zeta^n) = \min_{K^{n'} \in \mathbb N} \sum_{n'=n}^{N} \mathbb E_{\mathbb Q^{n'}}\big[\mathcal H^s(K^{n'}, \mathcal I^{n'}, q^{n'})\big] \ \ \text{s.t.}\ \ \sum_{m=n}^{n'} \omega^{n'}_m(K^m) \le \bar K - \zeta^n_{n'},\ \ n' = n,\dots,N,VAPTn​(ζn)=Kn′∈Nmin​n′=n∑N​EQn′​[Hs(Kn′,In′,qn′)]  s.t.  m=n∑n′​ωmn′​(Km)≤Kˉ−ζn′n​,  n′=n,…,N,

where ωn′n′(K)=K\omega^{n'}_{n'}(K) = Kωn′n′​(K)=K and the nonnegative parameters ωmn′(Km)\omega^{n'}_m(K^m)ωmn′​(Km), m<n′m < n'm<n′, estimate how many of the KmK^mKm drivers dispatched in period mmm are still en route in period n′n'n′. A static myopic policy dispatches a state-independent number Kn′,smK^{n',sm}Kn′,sm of drivers in each period and routes them to minimize the single-period cost; it is feasible from (n,ζn)(n,\zeta^n)(n,ζn) if it never asks for more drivers than are available and its single-period problems are always feasible.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 13)

For 1≤n≤N1 \le n \le N1≤n≤N and a status with ζn′n≤Kˉ\zeta^n_{n'} \le \bar Kζn′n​≤Kˉ:

∃ ω: VAPTn(ζn;ω)≤EQn[Hn],∀ πsm feasible ∃ ω: EQn[Hn]≤VAPTn(ζn;ω)≤Jn(πsm),\exists\,\omega:\ V^n_{APT}(\zeta^n;\omega) \le \mathbb E_{\mathbb Q^n}[\mathcal H_n], \qquad \forall\,\pi^{sm}\ \text{feasible}\ \exists\,\omega:\ \mathbb E_{\mathbb Q^n}[\mathcal H_n] \le V^n_{APT}(\zeta^n;\omega) \le J_n(\pi^{sm}),∃ω: VAPTn​(ζn;ω)≤EQn​[Hn​],∀πsm feasible ∃ω: EQn​[Hn​]≤VAPTn​(ζn;ω)≤Jn​(πsm),

and VAPTN(ζ;ω)=EQN[HN(⋅,ζ)]V^N_{APT}(\zeta;\omega) = \mathbb E_{\mathbb Q^N}[\mathcal H_N(\cdot,\zeta)]VAPTN​(ζ;ω)=EQN​[HN​(⋅,ζ)] for every ω\omegaω.

Milestones (Appendix D, pp. 34–35, and Lemma 1, p. 12)

  1. With ωmn′≡0\omega^{n'}_m \equiv 0ωmn′​≡0 for m<n′m < n'm<n′: VAPTn=∑n′E[Hs(Kˉ−ζn′n)]≤E[Hn]V^n_{APT} = \sum_{n'} \mathbb E[\mathcal H^s(\bar K - \zeta^n_{n'})] \le \mathbb E[\mathcal H_n]VAPTn​=∑n′​E[Hs(Kˉ−ζn′n​)]≤E[Hn​].
  2. For n<Nn < Nn<N and a feasible static myopic policy: E[Hn]≤Jn(πsm)\mathbb E[\mathcal H_n] \le J_n(\pi^{sm})E[Hn​]≤Jn​(πsm), and some ω\omegaω gives VAPTn=Jn(πsm)V^n_{APT} = J_n(\pi^{sm})VAPTn​=Jn​(πsm).
  3. At n=Nn = Nn=N: E[HN]=min⁡KN≤Kˉ−ζNNE[Hs(KN,⋅)]\mathbb E[\mathcal H_N] = \min_{K^N \le \bar K - \zeta^N_N} \mathbb E[\mathcal H^s(K^N,\cdot)]E[HN​]=minKN≤Kˉ−ζNN​​E[Hs(KN,⋅)].
  4. Lemma 1: Hn\mathcal H_nHn​ and, for nonnegative ω\omegaω, VAPTnV^n_{APT}VAPTn​ are nondecreasing in ζn\zeta^nζn.

Significance

The rollout policy AJRP of the paper solves, at each epoch, the current routing problem together with APTn+1\mathbf{APT}^{n+1}APTn+1 as a stand-in for the future. Theorem 1 is what connects that stand-in to the dynamic program: it shows that the en route parameters move the approximation between a valid lower bound and the cost of an implementable policy, and its exactness part yields the paper's Corollary 1 (AJRP is optimal for N=2N = 2N=2). Lemma 1 shows the approximation keeps the monotonicity of the true value in the driver status.

The paper's proofs are in its Online Appendix (Appendix D). They are short but informal, and the formal statement here differs from the printed one in three pinned-down respects: the single-period cost is read with at most KKK drivers, as the proofs use it; the upper bound is capped by the policy's cost, since otherwise it is vacuous; and the parameter choice printed for the upper bound has to be corrected in the last period. No part of the result has a machine-checked proof. A formal proof makes these readings definitive, and it produces a reusable Lean model of multi-period dispatching with routes, en route drivers and a Bellman recursion over a random demand.

Difficulty

Every part is a backward induction on the remaining periods, but the inductions run over a state that grows: the status ζn+1\zeta^{n+1}ζn+1 depends on the durations of the routes chosen in period nnn, and the infimum in (7) is over finite lists of routes, not over a finite action set. The lower bound needs that a larger status can only raise the cost; the upper bound needs that a policy which is feasible on its reachable states stays feasible after every realized demand. Exchanging the expectation with the minimum over the driver count in the last period is not a general fact and holds only because the single-period cost is nonincreasing in the number of available drivers. The obvious choice of parameters for the upper bound, the one printed in the proof, does not bound the last period's count and fails.

Formalization scope

Locations are a type with the depot as none; periods are 1-based natural numbers and every statement carries 1≤n≤N1 \le n \le N1≤n≤N. Costs and values lie in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; every minimum is an infimum, equal to +∞+\infty+∞ on an empty feasible set; expectations are sums against the probability mass function of Qn\mathbb Q^nQn. A decision is a list of nonempty routes covering the current orders exactly once. The parameters ω\omegaω are nonnegative reals by their type, with the diagonal ωn′n′(K)=K\omega^{n'}_{n'}(K) = Kωn′n′​(K)=K written into (10). The available drivers in the dynamic program are Kˉ−ζnn\bar K - \zeta^n_nKˉ−ζnn​ in N\mathbb NN; in APT the right-hand side is the real Kˉ−ζn′n\bar K - \zeta^n_{n'}Kˉ−ζn′n​.

Standing assumptions, shared by every statement: N≥1N \ge 1N≥1; strictly increasing epochs; finitely supported, period-independent demand laws; qin=0q^n_i = 0qin​=0 off In\mathcal I^nIn. Added hypothesis: ζn′n≤Kˉ\zeta^n_{n'} \le \bar Kζn′n​≤Kˉ for n≤n′≤Nn \le n' \le Nn≤n′≤N (the en route drivers belong to the fleet). Disclosed readings: travel times do not depend on the period; delivery times follow the recursion of Appendix C with equality, starting from the depot leg; a policy's expected cost is defined recursively along its decisions.

Ruled out: defining HN\mathcal H_NHN​ or Hs\mathcal H^sHs through the APT objective (exactness would become definitional); decision sets that may leave orders unserved (every cost would vanish); an upper bound without the cap by the policy's cost; negative parameters ω\omegaω.

The development needs the model and its recursion (provided as one definition file), monotonicity of Hs\mathcal H^sHs in KKK, and induction principles for the well-founded recursions. Proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome; Lemma 1 is not used by the paper's proof of Theorem 1 but is a natural first step.

Selected references

  • S. Liu, Z. Luo, On-Demand Delivery from Stores: Dynamic Dispatching and Routing with Random Demand, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2023; preprint arXiv:2107.13058v3, 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.13058
  • W. B. Powell, Approximate Dynamic Programming: Solving the Curses of Dimensionality, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118029176
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control, Vol. I, 4th ed., Athena Scientific, 2017 (rollout policies, Ch. 6).
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Operations ResearchOptimizationStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Asymptotic Optimality of Base-Stock Policies for Perishable Inventory Systems 1: Under FIFO Issuance the Heuristic Base-Stock Policy's Optimality Gap Decays Exponentially in the Product LifetimeResearch Paper

Perishable inventory and the base-stock question

Blood platelets, fresh produce, dairy and many pharmaceuticals have a fixed shelf life: a unit that has not been used within mmm periods of its arrival must be discarded. Managing such stock is a classical problem of inventory theory, going back to Nahmias (1975), and it remains of practical interest for hospital blood banks and grocery retail. The difficulty is structural. The state of the system is the whole age profile of the stock, a vector of dimension m−1m-1m−1, and the optimal policy depends on all of it. Dynamic programming over this state is intractable even for moderate lifetimes, so practice relies on simple heuristics, above all base-stock policies, which raise the total stock to a fixed level SSS every period.

For decades the performance of base-stock policies in this system was understood only numerically. Chazan and Gal (1977) and Cooper (2001) bounded the long-run outdating of a base-stock policy; Nandakumar and Morton (1993) built a base-stock policy from bounds on the optimal order-up-to level and showed numerically that it performs close to optimal. Bu, Gong and Chao (SSRN 3724966, accepted by Management Science, 2022) give the first theoretical guarantees, comparing a simple base-stock policy with the optimal policy in several asymptotic regimes. This mission formalizes the first of them: the optimality gap decays exponentially in the lifetime mmm.

Setting

Time is discrete, t=1,2,…t=1,2,\dotst=1,2,…. Demands D1,D2,…D_1,D_2,\dotsD1​,D2​,… are i.i.d. copies of a nonnegative random variable DDD with 0<E[D]<∞0<\mathbb E[D]<\infty0<E[D]<∞ and distribution function F(x)=P(D≤x)F(x)=\mathbb P(D\le x)F(x)=P(D≤x); F−1(x)=inf⁡{y:F(y)≥x}F^{-1}(x)=\inf\{y:F(y)\ge x\}F−1(x)=inf{y:F(y)≥x}.

At the start of period ttt the state is xt=(xt,1,…,xt,m−1)\mathbf x_t=(x_{t,1},\dots,x_{t,m-1})xt​=(xt,1​,…,xt,m−1​), where xt,ix_{t,i}xt,i​ is the stock whose remaining lifetime is at most iii periods. The firm orders qt≥0q_t\ge0qt​≥0, which arrives immediately and raises the total level to xt,m=xt,m−1+qtx_{t,m}=x_{t,m-1}+q_txt,m​=xt,m−1​+qt​ (with xt,0=0x_{t,0}=0xt,0​=0). Demand is served oldest-first (FIFO issuance) and unmet demand is lost. Stock reaching the end of its life is outdated:

ot=(xt,1−Dt)+,xt+1,i=(xt,i+1−Dt−ot)+,i=1,…,m−1.o_t=(x_{t,1}-D_t)^+,\qquad x_{t+1,i}=(x_{t,i+1}-D_t-o_t)^+,\quad i=1,\dots,m-1.ot​=(xt,1​−Dt​)+,xt+1,i​=(xt,i+1​−Dt​−ot​)+,i=1,…,m−1.

The system starts empty. Each period costs

Ctπ=h(xt,mπ−Dt)++p(Dt−xt,mπ)++θotπ,C^\pi_t=h(x^\pi_{t,m}-D_t)^++p(D_t-x^\pi_{t,m})^++\theta o^\pi_t,Ctπ​=h(xt,mπ​−Dt​)++p(Dt​−xt,mπ​)++θotπ​,

with holding cost h>0h>0h>0, lost-sales penalty p>0p>0p>0 and additional outdating cost θ≥0\theta\ge0θ≥0. A policy is admissible if each order is a nonnegative measurable function of the current state; Π\PiΠ is the set of admissible policies. The long-run average cost is Cπ=lim sup⁡T→∞1T∑t=1TE[Ctπ]C^\pi=\limsup_{T\to\infty}\frac1T\sum_{t=1}^T\mathbb E[C^\pi_t]Cπ=limsupT→∞​T1​∑t=1T​E[Ctπ​], and OPT=inf⁡π∈ΠCπ\mathrm{OPT}=\inf_{\pi\in\Pi}C^\piOPT=infπ∈Π​Cπ.

The base-stock policy πS\pi_SπS​ orders (S−xt,m−1)+(S-x_{t,m-1})^+(S−xt,m−1​)+; its cost is C(S)C(S)C(S). The heuristic level S~\widetilde SS is a minimizer over [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) of

C~(S)=h E[(S−D)+]+p E[(D−S)+]+θm E[(S−∑i=1mDi)+],\widetilde C(S)=h\,\mathbb E[(S-D)^+]+p\,\mathbb E[(D-S)^+]+\frac\theta m\,\mathbb E\Big[\Big(S-\sum_{i=1}^mD_i\Big)^+\Big],C(S)=hE[(S−D)+]+pE[(D−S)+]+mθ​E[(S−i=1∑m​Di​)+],

and SNP=F−1(p/(p+h))S^{NP}=F^{-1}(p/(p+h))SNP=F−1(p/(p+h)) is the newsvendor level.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 11)

For every λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 and m≥1m\ge1m≥1,

Cm(S~m)−OPTm≤(m−1)θλme eλSNP(E[e−λD])m.C_m(\widetilde S_m)-\mathrm{OPT}_m\le\frac{(m-1)\theta}{\lambda me}\,e^{\lambda S^{NP}}\big(\mathbb E[e^{-\lambda D}]\big)^m .Cm​(Sm​)−OPTm​≤λme(m−1)θ​eλSNP(E[e−λD])m.

The bound holds for every minimizer S~m\widetilde S_mSm​ and every demand law with positive finite mean. Since E[e−λD]<1\mathbb E[e^{-\lambda D}]<1E[e−λD]<1, the gap decays exponentially in mmm.

Milestones

  1. (19), the FIFO outdating recursion ot+m−1π=(xt,mπ−∑i=tt+m−1Di−∑j=tt+m−2ojπ)+o^\pi_{t+m-1}=\big(x^\pi_{t,m}-\sum_{i=t}^{t+m-1}D_i-\sum_{j=t}^{t+m-2}o^\pi_j\big)^+ot+m−1π​=(xt,mπ​−∑i=tt+m−1​Di​−∑j=tt+m−2​ojπ​)+, for every admissible policy and every demand path.
  2. Lemma 1: C(S)=h E[(S−D)+]+p E[(D−S)+]+θ E[O∞(S)]C(S)=h\,\mathbb E[(S-D)^+]+p\,\mathbb E[(D-S)^+]+\theta\,\mathbb E[O_\infty(S)]C(S)=hE[(S−D)+]+pE[(D−S)+]+θE[O∞​(S)], with the long-run average outdating E[O∞(S)]\mathbb E[O_\infty(S)]E[O∞​(S)] the same from every initial state.
  3. Lemma 2: 1mE[(S−∑i≤mDi)+]≤E[O∞(S)]≤min⁡{E[(S/m−D)+],E[(S−∑i≤mDi)+]}\frac1m\mathbb E[(S-\sum_{i\le m}D_i)^+]\le\mathbb E[O_\infty(S)]\le\min\{\mathbb E[(S/m-D)^+],\mathbb E[(S-\sum_{i\le m}D_i)^+]\}m1​E[(S−∑i≤m​Di​)+]≤E[O∞​(S)]≤min{E[(S/m−D)+],E[(S−∑i≤m​Di​)+]}.
  4. (5): F−1(pp+h+θ)≤S~≤F−1(pp+h)F^{-1}(\frac p{p+h+\theta})\le\widetilde S\le F^{-1}(\frac p{p+h})F−1(p+h+θp​)≤S≤F−1(p+hp​).
  5. (15): ∑i=tt+m−1oiπ≥(xt,mπ−∑i=tt+m−1Di)+\sum_{i=t}^{t+m-1}o^\pi_i\ge(x^\pi_{t,m}-\sum_{i=t}^{t+m-1}D_i)^+∑i=tt+m−1​oiπ​≥(xt,mπ​−∑i=tt+m−1​Di​)+.
  6. Proposition 2: OPT≥C~(S~)\mathrm{OPT}\ge\widetilde C(\widetilde S)OPT≥C(S).
  7. (21): C(S~)−OPT≤(m−1)θm E[(S~−∑i≤mDi)+]C(\widetilde S)-\mathrm{OPT}\le\frac{(m-1)\theta}m\,\mathbb E[(\widetilde S-\sum_{i\le m}D_i)^+]C(S)−OPT≤m(m−1)θ​E[(S−∑i≤m​Di​)+].

Significance

Theorem 1 says that a single explicit base-stock level, computable from the demand law by a one-dimensional convex search, is nearly optimal once the lifetime is moderately long, with an explicit, distribution-dependent rate. It explains why the non-perishable newsvendor intuition carries over to long-lived products, and it is the first of seven guarantees in the paper. Its ingredients are reused throughout: Lemmas 1 and 2, Proposition 2 and the gap bound (21) are posed in this mission and used, without restatement, by missions 2 to 4 of this series (demand population size, penalty cost, outdating cost).

The result is proved on paper; nothing about perishable inventory has been machine-checked. A formal development would provide a reusable model of FIFO perishable dynamics with long-run average costs, sample-path inequalities for outdating, and the first verified optimality-gap bound for an inventory heuristic in a high-dimensional state space.

Difficulty

Most of the argument is sample-path bookkeeping plus Jensen's inequality, but two steps are not routine. Lemma 1 asserts that the long-run average outdating of πS\pi_SπS​ exists and does not depend on the initial state. The natural route through a stationary distribution fails: when P(D<S/m)=1\mathbb P(D<S/m)=1P(D<S/m)=1 the chain can be periodic and has no steady state, so the identity must hold for Cesàro averages directly; in the aperiodic case the paper uses a minorization condition (Meyn and Tweedie, Theorem 16.0.2). Proposition 2 compares every admissible policy with the heuristic cost, which needs the independence of the order-up-to level xt,mπx^\pi_{t,m}xt,mπ​ from current and future demands, and a conditional Jensen step for nonlinear expectations of a policy-dependent quantity.

Formalization scope

The Lean development fixes the following conventions.

  • Time is zero-based: Lean period ttt is the paper's period t+1t+1t+1.
  • The state is Fin (m - 1) → ℝ holding the cumulative levels, with xt,0=0x_{t,0}=0xt,0​=0, so m=1m=1m=1 (empty state, all leftover stock outdates) is included; m≥1m\ge1m≥1, h>0h>0h>0, p>0p>0p>0, θ≥0\theta\ge0θ≥0 are fields of the parameter record.
  • Base-stock levels range over [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) (ℝ≥0).
  • The trajectory is a recursion on the demand path, so the state of period ttt depends only on D1,…,Dt−1D_1,\dots,D_{t-1}D1​,…,Dt−1​.
  • Costs and averages take values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; expectations are lower Lebesgue integrals over the i.i.d. path law; averages run over T+1T+1T+1 periods, which has the same limsup.
  • Π\PiΠ is the paper's class: time-dependent measurable state-feedback orders.
  • E[O∞(S)]\mathbb E[O_\infty(S)]E[O∞​(S)] is the long-run average expected outdating of πS\pi_SπS​ from the empty state.
  • "S~\widetilde SS is a minimizer" is a predicate, and the goal, (21) and Proposition 2 quantify over every minimizer; the upper half of (5) is stated for the least minimizer.
  • Gaps are written C(S~)≤OPT+BC(\widetilde S)\le\mathrm{OPT}+BC(S)≤OPT+B, equivalent to the paper's form since OPT≤C(0)<∞\mathrm{OPT}\le C(0)<\inftyOPT≤C(0)<∞.
  • (15) and Proposition 2 are stated for FIFO only, although the paper states them for any issuance policy.
  • The demand law and the newsvendor functions are the published definitions CappedBaseStock_Model and LostSalesOrderUpTo.Asymptotic.Backorder.

Trivializing readings are excluded: C(S)C(S)C(S) is the simulated cost of πS\pi_SπS​, not a formula; OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT ranges over all admissible policies, not only base-stock ones; S~\widetilde SS is the argmin predicate, not a closed form; mmm, θ\thetaθ and the demand law are general; and no gap is stated with truncated subtraction. Contributions of any of the milestones, of general facts about Cesàro limits of Markov chains, or of the convexity of C~\widetilde CC, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Bu, X. Gong, X. Chao, Asymptotic Optimality of Base-Stock Policies for Perishable Inventory Systems, Management Science, 2022 (accepted manuscript, SSRN 3724966). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3724966
  • D. Chazan, S. Gal, A Markovian model for a perishable product inventory, Management Science 23(5), 1977. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.23.5.512
  • W. L. Cooper, Pathwise properties and performance bounds for a perishable inventory system, Operations Research 49(3), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.49.3.455.11221
  • S. Nahmias, Optimal ordering policies for perishable inventory—II, Operations Research 23(4), 1975. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.23.4.735
  • P. Nandakumar, T. E. Morton, Near myopic heuristics for the fixed-life perishability problem, Management Science 39(12), 1993. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.39.12.1490
  • S. P. Meyn, R. L. Tweedie, Markov Chains and Stochastic Stability, Springer, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-3267-7
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Operations ResearchStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Subset Selection with Shrinkage: Sparse Linear Modeling When the SNR Is Low II: Four Gaussian Noise Events Behind the Error Bounds Hold with High ProbabilityResearch Paper

Motivation

Best subset selection fits a linear model using at most kkk of ppp candidate predictors. When the noise level is high relative to the signal, it overfits. Mazumder, Radchenko and Dedieu (arXiv:1708.03288v4; Operations Research, 2023) add a shrinkage penalty λ∥β∥q\lambda\|\beta\|_qλ∥β∥q​, q∈{1,2}q\in\{1,2\}q∈{1,2}, to the best-subsets problem and prove oracle inequalities for the resulting estimators. Their main error bounds (Theorems 2–5) are proved in the same way: a deterministic argument shows the bound holds whenever the noise vector lies in one of four explicit sets, and a separate probabilistic result shows that each set has probability close to one. This mission formalizes that probabilistic result, Theorem 1 of the paper (p. 13, proof in Supplement B.1, pp. 38–39).

The four events combine several tools of high-dimensional statistics. The event F\mathcal FF controls the noise through a sorted-ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ (SLOPE-type) norm; its probability bound is Theorem 4.1 of Bellec, Lecué and Tsybakov, Slope meets Lasso (Ann. Statist. 2018). The event Gs\mathcal G_sGs​ is a sparse version of a χ2\chi^2χ2 deviation bound, adapted from Lemma 8 of Raskutti, Wainwright and Yu (IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 2011). The event H\mathcal HH is the classical Gaussian maximal inequality behind Lasso and Dantzig-selector analyses.

Setting

Observations follow the model

y=f∗+ϵ(15)y = f^* + \epsilon \qquad (15)y=f∗+ϵ(15)

in Rn\mathbb R^nRn. The mean f∗f^*f∗ is deterministic and unknown. The noise ϵ\epsilonϵ has independent N(0,σ2)N(0,\sigma^2)N(0,σ2) coordinates, with σ>0\sigma>0σ>0. The design X∈Rn×pX\in\mathbb R^{n\times p}X∈Rn×p is deterministic, and its columns have unit Euclidean norm.

For u∈Rpu\in\mathbb R^pu∈Rp, ∥u∥\|u\|∥u∥ is the Euclidean norm, ∥u∥1\|u\|_1∥u∥1​ the ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ norm, ∥u∥∞\|u\|_\infty∥u∥∞​ the largest absolute coordinate, and ∥u∥0\|u\|_0∥u∥0​ the number of non-zero coordinates. For an integer s∈[p]={1,…,p}s\in[p]=\{1,\dots,p\}s∈[p]={1,…,p}, B0(s)={u∈Rp:∥u∥0≤s}B_0(s)=\{u\in\mathbb R^p:\|u\|_0\le s\}B0​(s)={u∈Rp:∥u∥0​≤s}. The non-increasing rearrangement u1♯≥⋯≥up♯u^\sharp_1\ge\dots\ge u^\sharp_pu1♯​≥⋯≥up♯​ lists ∣u1∣,…,∣up∣|u_1|,\dots,|u_p|∣u1​∣,…,∣up​∣ in non-increasing order. Logarithms are natural, and δ0∈(0,1]\delta_0\in(0,1]δ0​∈(0,1] is a confidence parameter.

The four events (p. 13) are sets of noise vectors:

Es={ϵ⊤Xu≤[4+2] σslog⁡(2ep/s) ∥u∥, ∀u∈B0(s)},\mathcal E_s=\bigl\{\epsilon^\top Xu\le[4+\sqrt2]\,\sigma\sqrt{s\log(2ep/s)}\,\|u\|,\ \forall u\in B_0(s)\bigr\},Es​={ϵ⊤Xu≤[4+2​]σslog(2ep/s)​∥u∥, ∀u∈B0​(s)}, F={ϵ⊤Xu≤[4+2] σmax⁡(∑j=1puj♯log⁡(2p/j), log⁡(1/δ0) ∥Xu∥), ∀u∈Rp},\mathcal F=\Bigl\{\epsilon^\top Xu\le[4+\sqrt2]\,\sigma\max\Bigl(\sum_{j=1}^p u^\sharp_j\sqrt{\log(2p/j)},\ \sqrt{\log(1/\delta_0)}\,\|Xu\|\Bigr),\ \forall u\in\mathbb R^p\Bigr\},F={ϵ⊤Xu≤[4+2​]σmax(j=1∑p​uj♯​log(2p/j)​, log(1/δ0​)​∥Xu∥), ∀u∈Rp}, Gs={ϵ⊤Xu≤σ5slog⁡(ep/s)+log⁡(1/δ0) ∥Xu∥, ∀u∈B0(s)},\mathcal G_s=\bigl\{\epsilon^\top Xu\le\sigma\sqrt{5s\log(ep/s)+\log(1/\delta_0)}\,\|Xu\|,\ \forall u\in B_0(s)\bigr\},Gs​={ϵ⊤Xu≤σ5slog(ep/s)+log(1/δ0​)​∥Xu∥, ∀u∈B0​(s)}, H={∥X⊤ϵ∥∞≤σ2log⁡(2p)+σ2log⁡(1/δ0)}.\mathcal H=\bigl\{\|X^\top\epsilon\|_\infty\le\sigma\sqrt{2\log(2p)}+\sigma\sqrt{2\log(1/\delta_0)}\bigr\}.H={∥X⊤ϵ∥∞​≤σ2log(2p)​+σ2log(1/δ0​)​}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (with the Gs\mathcal G_sGs​ part corrected)

For s∈[p]s\in[p]s∈[p] and δ0∈(0,1]\delta_0\in(0,1]δ0​∈(0,1]:

P(Es)≥1−s4ep,P(F)≥1−δ02,P(Gs′)≥1−δ0,P(H)≥1−δ0,\mathbb P(\mathcal E_s)\ge1-\frac{s}{4ep},\qquad\mathbb P(\mathcal F)\ge1-\frac{\delta_0}2,\qquad\mathbb P(\mathcal G'_s)\ge1-\delta_0,\qquad\mathbb P(\mathcal H)\ge1-\delta_0,P(Es​)≥1−4eps​,P(F)≥1−2δ0​​,P(Gs′​)≥1−δ0​,P(H)≥1−δ0​,

where Gs′\mathcal G'_sGs′​ is Gs\mathcal G_sGs​ with 3log⁡(1/δ0)3\log(1/\delta_0)3log(1/δ0​) in place of log⁡(1/δ0)\log(1/\delta_0)log(1/δ0​) under the root. Each event is also asserted to be measurable.

The printed claim P(Gs)≥1−δ0\mathbb P(\mathcal G_s)\ge1-\delta_0P(Gs​)≥1−δ0​ is false. Take n=p=s=1n=p=s=1n=p=s=1 and X=[1]X=[1]X=[1]. Then Gs={∣ϵ∣≤σ5+L}\mathcal G_s=\{|\epsilon|\le\sigma\sqrt{5+L}\}Gs​={∣ϵ∣≤σ5+L​} with L=log⁡(1/δ0)L=\log(1/\delta_0)L=log(1/δ0​), and P(Gsc)=2Φˉ(5+L)\mathbb P(\mathcal G_s^c)=2\bar\Phi(\sqrt{5+L})P(Gsc​)=2Φˉ(5+L​), which exceeds e−L=δ0e^{-L}=\delta_0e−L=δ0​ once L≥9L\ge9L≥9. The corrected constant 333 is what the argument the paper cites actually gives. Downstream, the paper uses P(Gs)\mathbb P(\mathcal G_s)P(Gs​) only inside inequalities that hold up to universal constants, so the correction does not affect its other results.

Milestones

The proof in B.1 is followed step by step:

  1. (27): ∥Xu∥≤∥u∥1≤s∥u∥\|Xu\|\le\|u\|_1\le\sqrt s\|u\|∥Xu∥≤∥u∥1​≤s​∥u∥ on B0(s)B_0(s)B0​(s), and at δ0=s/(2ep)\delta_0=s/(2ep)δ0​=s/(2ep), log⁡(1/δ0)∥Xu∥≤slog⁡(2ep/s)∥u∥\sqrt{\log(1/\delta_0)}\|Xu\|\le\sqrt{s\log(2ep/s)}\|u\|log(1/δ0​)​∥Xu∥≤slog(2ep/s)​∥u∥;
  2. log⁡(s!)≥slog⁡(s/e)\log(s!)\ge s\log(s/e)log(s!)≥slog(s/e), referenced from the platform as (s/e)s≤s!(s/e)^s\le s!(s/e)s≤s!;
  3. ∑j=1slog⁡(2p/j)=slog⁡(2p)−log⁡(s!)≤slog⁡(2ep/s)\sum_{j=1}^s\log(2p/j)=s\log(2p)-\log(s!)\le s\log(2ep/s)∑j=1s​log(2p/j)=slog(2p)−log(s!)≤slog(2ep/s);
  4. (28): ∑juj♯log⁡(2p/j)≤∥u∥∑j≤slog⁡(2p/j)≤slog⁡(2ep/s)∥u∥\sum_j u^\sharp_j\sqrt{\log(2p/j)}\le\|u\|\sqrt{\sum_{j\le s}\log(2p/j)}\le\sqrt{s\log(2ep/s)}\|u\|∑j​uj♯​log(2p/j)​≤∥u∥∑j≤s​log(2p/j)​≤slog(2ep/s)​∥u∥ on B0(s)B_0(s)B0​(s);
  5. F⊆Es\mathcal F\subseteq\mathcal E_sF⊆Es​ when δ0=s/(2ep)\delta_0=s/(2ep)δ0​=s/(2ep);
  6. P(F)≥1−δ0/2\mathbb P(\mathcal F)\ge1-\delta_0/2P(F)≥1−δ0​/2;
  7. P(H)≥1−δ0\mathbb P(\mathcal H)\ge1-\delta_0P(H)≥1−δ0​;
  8. P(Gs′)≥1−δ0\mathbb P(\mathcal G'_s)\ge1-\delta_0P(Gs′​)≥1−δ0​.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 is the only probabilistic input to the paper's statistical theory. Theorem 2 (ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​ shrinkage) is proved on E2k\mathcal E_{2k}E2k​, F\mathcal FF and G2k\mathcal G_{2k}G2k​. Theorem 3 (ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ shrinkage) uses H\mathcal HH as well. The lower bound for best subsets (Theorem 4) and the BIC-type choice of kkk (Theorem 5) also rely on Gs\mathcal G_sGs​. Every high-probability bound and every expected-error bound in §3 is obtained by combining a deterministic inequality with this theorem. The event F\mathcal FF is also of independent use: it gives the sorted-ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ control of Gaussian noise used in SLOPE and Lasso analyses.

Formalizing it. All four bounds are known results; the mission formalizes them. The deterministic reduction F⊆Es\mathcal F\subseteq\mathcal E_sF⊆Es​ is elementary. The three probability bounds need Gaussian machinery: a sorted-ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ deviation bound (the hardest part), a χ2\chi^2χ2 tail bound with a union over supports, and a Gaussian maximal inequality. None of these has a machine-checked proof in Mathlib for this setting. The formal statement of the Gs\mathcal G_sGs​ bound with its corrected constant is a contribution of its own, because the printed form is false.

Difficulty

The Es\mathcal E_sEs​ and H\mathcal HH parts are routine once the Gaussian tools exist. The Gs′\mathcal G'_sGs′​ part is a uniform statement over all (ps)\binom ps(sp​) supports at once, and the explicit constants 555 and 333 leave no room for a lossy tail bound: a generic sub-Gaussian estimate does not reach them.

The F\mathcal FF part is the hardest. It is uniform over all of Rp\mathbb R^pRp, not over a sparse set. A union bound over the coordinates of X⊤ϵX^\top\epsilonX⊤ϵ gives the flat weight log⁡p\sqrt{\log p}logp​ on every coordinate, not the decreasing weights log⁡(2p/j)\sqrt{\log(2p/j)}log(2p/j)​, and it does not produce the explicit constant 4+24+\sqrt24+2​. The bound of Bellec, Lecué and Tsybakov has to be formalized in full, under this paper's normalization (unit columns rather than columns of norm n\sqrt nn​).

Formalization scope

  • Model. Vectors are functions Fin n → ℝ, and XXX is Matrix (Fin n) (Fin p) ℝ with unit columns (∑iXij2=1\sum_i X_{ij}^2=1∑i​Xij2​=1). Mathlib's default norm on Fin m → ℝ is the sup norm, so the Euclidean, ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​, ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​ and ℓ0\ell_0ℓ0​ norms are explicit definitions. Indices are 0-based: j : Fin p stands for the paper's j+1j+1j+1.
  • Probability space. The probability space is Rn\mathbb R^nRn with the product law N(0,σ2)⊗nN(0,\sigma^2)^{\otimes n}N(0,σ2)⊗n of ϵ\epsilonϵ (the model (15)). Events are sets of noise vectors defined by the printed inequalities, quantified over all uuu in the stated range. Probabilities are taken as real numbers, and measurability of each event is part of each conclusion, not a hypothesis.
  • Sorted sum. ∑juj♯log⁡(2p/j)\sum_j u^\sharp_j\sqrt{\log(2p/j)}∑j​uj♯​log(2p/j)​ is encoded as the maximum over all permutations π\piπ of ∑j∣uπ(j)∣log⁡(2p/j)\sum_j|u_{\pi(j)}|\sqrt{\log(2p/j)}∑j​∣uπ(j)​∣log(2p/j)​. The weights are non-negative and non-increasing for j≤pj\le pj≤p, so by the rearrangement inequality this equals the paper's sum. Summing ∣uj∣|u_j|∣uj​∣ in index order would be a different, smaller quantity.
  • Constants. Every constant is the printed one (4+24+\sqrt24+2​, 2ep2ep2ep, 5slog⁡(ep/s)5s\log(ep/s)5slog(ep/s), 2log⁡(2p)\sqrt{2\log(2p)}2log(2p)​, s/(4ep)s/(4ep)s/(4ep), δ0/2\delta_0/2δ0​/2), except the disclosed 333 in Gs′\mathcal G'_sGs′​.
  • Hypotheses. The theorem assumes 1≤s≤p1\le s\le p1≤s≤p, 0<δ0≤10<\delta_0\le10<δ0​≤1, σ>0\sigma>0σ>0 and unit columns. The Es\mathcal E_sEs​ bound has no free δ0\delta_0δ0​: it is the F\mathcal FF bound at δ0=s/(2ep)\delta_0=s/(2ep)δ0​=s/(2ep).
  • Ruled-out trivializations. None of the following is a faithful formalization: replacing the max in F\mathcal FF by a sum, dropping "∀u∈B0(s)\forall u\in B_0(s)∀u∈B0​(s)", replacing u♯u^\sharpu♯ by ∣u∣|u|∣u∣ in index order, or taking the probability of a set not proved measurable.
  • Not formalized. The oracle inequalities (Theorems 2–5, the other missions of this series), Corollaries 1–6, Propositions 1–4 and the numerics.
  • Infrastructure needed and reusable. A complete development needs Gaussian rotation invariance, χ2\chi^2χ2 tails, Gaussian concentration for Lipschitz functions, and a sorted-ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ deviation bound. All of these are reusable well beyond this mission, and proofs of any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. Mazumder, P. Radchenko, A. Dedieu, Subset Selection with Shrinkage: Sparse Linear Modeling When the SNR Is Low, Operations Research, 2023; arXiv:1708.03288v4 (the version formalized). https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.03288
  • P. C. Bellec, G. Lecué, A. B. Tsybakov, Slope meets Lasso: improved oracle bounds and optimality, Annals of Statistics 46(6B), 2018. https://doi.org/10.1214/17-AOS1670
  • G. Raskutti, M. J. Wainwright, B. Yu, Minimax rates of estimation for high-dimensional linear regression over ℓq-balls, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 57(10), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1109/TIT.2011.2165799
  • B. Laurent, P. Massart, Adaptive estimation of a quadratic functional by model selection, Annals of Statistics 28(5), 2000. https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1015957395
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Differential GeometryMachine LearningOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Zeroth-Order Riemannian Derivative Estimation and Optimization 2: ZO-RSGD Has Average Expected Squared Riemannian Gradient Norm at Most 4L(f(x₀) − f(x*))/(N+1) + 2μ²L²(d+6)³ + 16(d+4)σ²/mResearch Paper

Motivation

Many optimization problems are posed over a manifold rather than a vector space: orthogonality constraints (the Stiefel manifold), unit-norm constraints (the sphere), fixed-rank matrices. In some of them the objective can only be evaluated, not differentiated. Black-box adversarial attacks on a neural network with a norm-constrained perturbation, hyperparameter tuning and simulation-based objectives are examples, and in all of them each function value is also noisy. Zeroth-order (derivative-free) methods replace the gradient by a random finite-difference estimate built from function values alone.

In Euclidean space the analysis of such methods is well developed. Nesterov and Spokoiny (2017) analysed Gaussian-smoothing estimators for deterministic objectives, and Ghadimi and Lan (2013) gave the first non-asymptotic stationarity rates for stochastic nonconvex objectives (the RSGF method). Li, Balasubramanian and Ma (arXiv:2003.11238, published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023) carried this programme to embedded submanifolds. They estimate the Riemannian gradient by projecting a Gaussian vector onto the tangent space and moving along a retraction, and they prove convergence rates for the resulting methods. This mission formalizes their rate for the stochastic method, ZO-RSGD (Theorem 3.2).

Setting

Let EEE be a finite-dimensional real inner product space (the paper's Rn\mathbb R^nRn), and let M⊆E\mathcal M \subseteq EM⊆E be a C1C^1C1 embedded submanifold of dimension ddd. The tangent space TxMT_x\mathcal MTx​M at x∈Mx \in \mathcal Mx∈M is the linear span of the tangent cone of M\mathcal MM at xxx. For a submanifold this is the set of velocities γ′(0)\gamma'(0)γ′(0) of curves in M\mathcal MM through xxx, and it is a subspace of dimension ddd. M\mathcal MM carries the metric induced by the inner product of EEE, and PxP_xPx​ denotes the orthogonal projection of EEE onto TxMT_x\mathcal MTx​M.

A retraction is a map RRR, (x,η)↦Rx(η)(x, \eta) \mapsto R_x(\eta)(x,η)↦Rx​(η). For every x∈Mx \in \mathcal Mx∈M it sends all of TxMT_x\mathcal MTx​M into M\mathcal MM and is smooth on TxMT_x\mathcal MTx​M, with Rx(0)=xR_x(0) = xRx​(0)=x and differential the identity at 000. The Riemannian gradient of a differentiable fff is grad⁡f(x)=Px∇f(x)\operatorname{grad} f(x) = P_x \nabla f(x)gradf(x)=Px​∇f(x).

The objective is stochastic, f(x)=EξF(x,ξ)f(x) = \mathbb E_\xi F(x, \xi)f(x)=Eξ​F(x,ξ), with noise ξ\xiξ distributed according to a probability measure PξP_\xiPξ​. Two assumptions are imposed:

  • Assumption 2.1 (LLL-retraction-smoothness). For almost every ξ\xiξ, ∣F(Rx(η),ξ)−F(x,ξ)−⟨grad⁡F(x,ξ),η⟩∣≤L2∥η∥2|F(R_x(\eta),\xi) - F(x,\xi) - \langle \operatorname{grad}F(x,\xi), \eta\rangle| \le \frac L2\|\eta\|^2∣F(Rx​(η),ξ)−F(x,ξ)−⟨gradF(x,ξ),η⟩∣≤2L​∥η∥2 for all x∈Mx \in \mathcal Mx∈M and η∈TxM\eta \in T_x\mathcal Mη∈Tx​M.
  • Assumption 2.3 (unbiased oracle, bounded variance). For every x∈Mx \in \mathcal Mx∈M, EξF(x,ξ)=f(x)\mathbb E_\xi F(x,\xi) = f(x)Eξ​F(x,ξ)=f(x), Eξgrad⁡F(x,ξ)=grad⁡f(x)\mathbb E_\xi \operatorname{grad}F(x,\xi) = \operatorname{grad}f(x)Eξ​gradF(x,ξ)=gradf(x) and Eξ∥grad⁡F(x,ξ)−grad⁡f(x)∥2≤σ2\mathbb E_\xi\|\operatorname{grad}F(x,\xi) - \operatorname{grad}f(x)\|^2 \le \sigma^2Eξ​∥gradF(x,ξ)−gradf(x)∥2≤σ2.

Given a smoothing parameter μ>0\mu > 0μ>0 and a batch size mmm, draw mmm independent pairs (u0,i,ξi)(u_{0,i}, \xi_i)(u0,i​,ξi​), each with u0,i∼N(0,I)u_{0,i} \sim \mathcal N(0, I)u0,i​∼N(0,I) independent of ξi∼Pξ\xi_i \sim P_\xiξi​∼Pξ​, and put ui=Pxu0,iu_i = P_x u_{0,i}ui​=Px​u0,i​. The mini-batch zeroth-order Riemannian gradient is

gˉμ,ξ(x)=1m∑i=1mF(Rx(μui),ξi)−F(x,ξi)μ ui.\bar g_{\mu,\xi}(x) = \frac1m\sum_{i=1}^m \frac{F(R_x(\mu u_i), \xi_i) - F(x, \xi_i)}{\mu}\,u_i .gˉ​μ,ξ​(x)=m1​i=1∑m​μF(Rx​(μui​),ξi​)−F(x,ξi​)​ui​.

ZO-RSGD (Algorithm 2) starts at x0∈Mx_0 \in \mathcal Mx0​∈M and iterates xk+1=Rxk(−η^ gˉμ,ξ(xk))x_{k+1} = R_{x_k}(-\hat\eta\,\bar g_{\mu,\xi}(x_k))xk+1​=Rxk​​(−η^​gˉ​μ,ξ​(xk​)) with step η^=1/L\hat\eta = 1/Lη^​=1/L and a fresh batch at every step. x∗x^*x∗ denotes a minimizer of fff over M\mathcal MM.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2

If m≥16(d+4)m \ge 16(d+4)m≥16(d+4), then for every NNN

1N+1∑k=0NE ∥grad⁡f(xk)∥2≤4L f(x0)−f(x∗)N+1+2μ2L2(d+6)3+16(d+4)mσ2.\frac{1}{N+1}\sum_{k=0}^{N}\mathbb E\,\|\operatorname{grad} f(x_k)\|^2 \le 4L\,\frac{f(x_0) - f(x^*)}{N+1} + 2\mu^2L^2(d+6)^3 + \frac{16(d+4)}{m}\sigma^2 .N+11​k=0∑N​E∥gradf(xk​)∥2≤4LN+1f(x0​)−f(x∗)​+2μ2L2(d+6)3+m16(d+4)​σ2.

The constants are the paper's own. The goal states the rate for every μ\muμ, mmm and NNN. It does not state the parameter choices μ=O(ϵ/d3/2)\mu = O(\epsilon/d^{3/2})μ=O(ϵ/d3/2), m=O(dσ2/ϵ2)m = O(d\sigma^2/\epsilon^2)m=O(dσ2/ϵ2), N=O(1/ϵ2)N = O(1/\epsilon^2)N=O(1/ϵ2) that follow from it.

Milestones

  • Lemma 2.1. For a ddd-dimensional subspace X\mathcal XX with projection PPP, u=Pu0u = Pu_0u=Pu0​ and x∈Xx \in \mathcal Xx∈X: E⟨x,u⟩u=x\mathbb E\langle x,u\rangle u = xE⟨x,u⟩u=x and E⟨x,u⟩2=∥x∥2\mathbb E\langle x,u\rangle^2 = \|x\|^2E⟨x,u⟩2=∥x∥2.
  • Lemma 2.2 (Nesterov–Spokoiny). E∥u∥p≤(n+p)p/2\mathbb E\|u\|^p \le (n+p)^{p/2}E∥u∥p≤(n+p)p/2 for a standard Gaussian uuu on Rn\mathbb R^nRn and p≥2p \ge 2p≥2. This is already proved on the platform and is reused.
  • Corollary 2.1. E∥Pu0∥p≤(d+p)p/2\mathbb E\|Pu_0\|^p \le (d+p)^{p/2}E∥Pu0​∥p≤(d+p)p/2.
  • Proposition 2.1(a). ∥E gμ(x)−grad⁡f(x)∥≤μL2(d+3)3/2\|\mathbb E\,g_\mu(x) - \operatorname{grad}f(x)\| \le \frac{\mu L}{2}(d+3)^{3/2}∥Egμ​(x)−gradf(x)∥≤2μL​(d+3)3/2 for the single-sample estimator gμg_\mugμ​.
  • Lemma 3.1. E∥gˉμ,ξ(x)−grad⁡f(x)∥2≤μ2L2(d+6)3+8(d+4)mσ2+8(d+4)m∥grad⁡f(x)∥2\mathbb E\|\bar g_{\mu,\xi}(x) - \operatorname{grad}f(x)\|^2 \le \mu^2L^2(d+6)^3 + \frac{8(d+4)}{m}\sigma^2 + \frac{8(d+4)}{m}\|\operatorname{grad}f(x)\|^2E∥gˉ​μ,ξ​(x)−gradf(x)∥2≤μ2L2(d+6)3+m8(d+4)​σ2+m8(d+4)​∥gradf(x)∥2.

Significance

Theorem 3.2 is the basic complexity result for derivative-free stochastic optimization on manifolds. With the parameter choices of (3.10) it gives an ϵ\epsilonϵ-stationary point in expectation after O(d/ϵ4)O(d/\epsilon^4)O(d/ϵ4) noisy function evaluations. The dependence is on the manifold dimension ddd, not on the ambient dimension nnn. This matches the Euclidean rate of Ghadimi and Lan with nnn replaced by ddd, and it is what makes projected-Gaussian estimators attractive when d≪nd \ll nd≪n (for example, low-dimensional Stiefel manifolds embedded in large matrix spaces).

The results are proved in the paper (main text, p. 17, and Appendix C) but, to our knowledge, none of them has been machine-checked. The Euclidean Gaussian moment bound (Lemma 2.2) is formalized on the platform. The Euclidean RSGF results of Ghadimi and Lan are stated on the platform, and they are different statements: they use x+μux + \mu ux+μu instead of a retraction, the full space instead of a tangent space, and a random output index. A complete formalization would also produce reusable infrastructure: Gaussian identities for orthogonal projections, the projected-Gaussian moment bound, and a template for proving stationarity rates of random iterates on a product probability space.

Difficulty

The Euclidean argument relies on a smoothed function fμ(x)=Ef(x+μu)f_\mu(x) = \mathbb E f(x + \mu u)fμ​(x)=Ef(x+μu) whose gradient is exactly the mean of the estimator. That identity has no Riemannian analogue: Rx(μu)R_x(\mu u)Rx​(μu) is not a translate, so E gμ(x)\mathbb E\,g_\mu(x)Egμ​(x) is not the gradient of any smoothed function. The bias in Proposition 2.1(a) has to be bounded directly from Assumption 2.1, and this is why the estimator is only approximately unbiased.

The convergence proof needs a one-step descent inequality conditioned on the past. The direction at step kkk is projected onto TxkMT_{x_k}\mathcal MTxk​​M, which depends on all earlier draws, so the conditional bound of Lemma 3.1 must be integrated against the product law of the batches. A naive reading that samples every direction from one fixed subspace, or that treats the iterates as deterministic, does not describe the algorithm. A further subtlety is that the gradient term of Lemma 3.1 must be absorbed by the descent of one step. This requires the batch to be large compared with the dimension, m≥16(d+4)m \ge 16(d+4)m≥16(d+4).

Formalization scope

  • EEE is any finite-dimensional real inner product space with its Borel σ-algebra. The Gaussian is Mathlib's stdGaussian E.
  • M\mathcal MM and its dimension are given by the published ProjLikeRetr.Retractor.IsSubmanifold 1 d M (a C1C^1C1 coordinate-slice submanifold), so ddd is tied to M\mathcal MM and is never a free number. TxMT_x\mathcal MTx​M is the published ProjLikeRetr.Retractor.tangentSpace M x, never an arbitrary subspace.
  • The retraction is defined on all of each tangent space, as the paper requires (Assumption 2.1 holds "for all η∈TxM\eta \in T_x\mathcal Mη∈Tx​M, i.e., ρx=∞\rho_x = \inftyρx​=∞"). The objective fff and the samples F(⋅,ξ)F(\cdot,\xi)F(⋅,ξ) are assumed differentiable rather than smooth, which is all the gradient formula (2.3) uses.
  • Added hypotheses. The goal assumes m≥16(d+4)m \ge 16(d+4)m≥16(d+4). The paper's proof assumes it explicitly, but the theorem statement omits it. The goal also assumes that (x,η)↦Rx(η)(x,\eta) \mapsto R_x(\eta)(x,η)↦Rx​(η) and x↦Pxx \mapsto P_xx↦Px​ are measurable, so that the iterates are random variables; this holds for closed M\mathcal MM such as spheres and Stiefel manifolds. Lemma 3.1 is stated for every m≥1m \ge 1m≥1. The paper's last proof step uses m≥2m \ge 2m≥2, but the bound holds for m=1m = 1m=1 as well.
  • The iterates are defined for every kkk on the sequence space of i.i.d. batches (the algorithm without a stopping index), so xN+1x_{N+1}xN+1​ exists.
  • No junk expectations. Every expectation of a nonnegative quantity is a lower Lebesgue integral compared with ENNReal.ofReal of the bound. Every vector-valued expectation comes with an integrability conclusion, and Assumption 2.3 carries the integrability of F(x,⋅)F(x,\cdot)F(x,⋅) and grad⁡F(x,⋅)\operatorname{grad}F(x,\cdot)gradF(x,⋅). So no statement can hold because a Bochner integral defaulted to 000.
  • The O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) parameter choices (3.10) and the oracle complexity mN=O(d/ϵ4)mN = O(d/\epsilon^4)mN=O(d/ϵ4) are not formalized.
  • The development needs projections of Gaussian measures onto subspaces, moments of Gaussian norms, conditional expectation along an i.i.d. sequence of batches, and telescoping. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are general lemmas about the push-forward of stdGaussian under an orthogonal projection.

Selected references

  • J. Li, K. Balasubramanian, S. Ma, Stochastic Zeroth-Order Riemannian Derivative Estimation and Optimization, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023. Preprint arXiv:2003.11238v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.11238
  • Y. Nesterov, V. Spokoiny, Random Gradient-Free Minimization of Convex Functions, Foundations of Computational Mathematics 17, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10208-015-9296-2
  • S. Ghadimi, G. Lan, Stochastic First- and Zeroth-Order Methods for Nonconvex Stochastic Programming, SIAM Journal on Optimization 23(4), 2013. https://arxiv.org/abs/1309.5549
  • K. Balasubramanian, S. Ghadimi, Zeroth-Order Nonconvex Stochastic Optimization: Handling Constraints, High Dimensionality, and Saddle Points, Foundations of Computational Mathematics, 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.06474
  • N. Boumal, P.-A. Absil, C. Cartis, Global Rates of Convergence for Nonconvex Optimization on Manifolds, IMA Journal of Numerical Analysis, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.08101
  • P.-A. Absil, R. Mahony, R. Sepulchre, Optimization Algorithms on Matrix Manifolds, Princeton University Press, 2008.
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Differential GeometryMachine LearningOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Zeroth-Order Riemannian Derivative Estimation and Optimization 1: ZO-RGD Has Average Expected Squared Riemannian Gradient Norm at Most 8(d+4)L(f(x₀) − f(x*))/(N+1) + 8(d+4)L·C(μ)Research Paper

Motivation

Many optimization problems in statistics and machine learning constrain the variable to a smooth manifold: orthonormal frames in sparse PCA and dictionary learning (the Stiefel manifold), unit vectors in phase retrieval (the sphere), fixed-rank matrices in matrix completion. Riemannian optimization handles these problems directly on the manifold. A step is taken in the tangent space and mapped back to the manifold by a retraction.

In several applications the objective can be evaluated but not differentiated: black-box adversarial attacks, simulation-based models, and hyperparameter or policy tuning. Zeroth-order (derivative-free) methods replace the gradient by an estimator built from function values. In Euclidean space the standard construction is Gaussian smoothing, analysed by Nesterov and Spokoiny (2017) and Ghadimi and Lan (2013). Li, Balasubramanian and Ma (arXiv:2003.11238; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023) carry the construction over to embedded submanifolds. They sample a Gaussian vector, project it onto the tangent space, and use the retraction in place of the straight line x+μux+\mu ux+μu. This mission formalizes their first optimization guarantee: the convergence rate of zeroth-order Riemannian gradient descent (ZO-RGD).

Setting

Let EEE be a finite-dimensional real inner product space (the ambient Rn\mathbb R^nRn). Let M⊆EM\subseteq EM⊆E be a C1C^1C1 embedded submanifold of dimension ddd. At each x∈Mx\in Mx∈M the tangent space TxMT_xMTx​M is a ddd-dimensional linear subspace of EEE; let PxP_xPx​ denote the orthogonal projection onto it. MMM carries the metric induced by the inner product of EEE.

A retraction is a map (x,η)↦Rx(η)(x,\eta)\mapsto R_x(\eta)(x,η)↦Rx​(η) such that, for every x∈Mx\in Mx∈M, RxR_xRx​ is smooth on TxMT_xMTx​M, maps TxMT_xMTx​M into MMM, satisfies Rx(0)=xR_x(0)=xRx​(0)=x, and has the identity as its differential at 000. In this mission RxR_xRx​ is defined on all of TxMT_xMTx​M.

For a differentiable f:E→Rf:E\to\mathbb Rf:E→R the Riemannian gradient is grad⁡f(x)=Px∇f(x)\operatorname{grad} f(x)=P_x\nabla f(x)gradf(x)=Px​∇f(x). Assumption 2.1 (retraction smoothness) asks for a constant L≥0L\ge0L≥0 such that

∣f(Rx(η))−f(x)−⟨grad⁡f(x),η⟩∣≤L2∥η∥2(x∈M, η∈TxM).\big|f(R_x(\eta))-f(x)-\langle \operatorname{grad} f(x),\eta\rangle\big|\le \tfrac L2\|\eta\|^2\qquad(x\in M,\ \eta\in T_xM).​f(Rx​(η))−f(x)−⟨gradf(x),η⟩​≤2L​∥η∥2(x∈M, η∈Tx​M).

Given μ>0\mu>0μ>0 and a standard Gaussian vector u0∼N(0,In)u_0\sim N(0,I_n)u0​∼N(0,In​) of EEE, set u=Pxu0u=P_xu_0u=Px​u0​. The zeroth-order Riemannian gradient estimator is

gμ(x)=f(Rx(μu))−f(x)μ u.g_\mu(x)=\frac{f(R_x(\mu u))-f(x)}{\mu}\,u .gμ​(x)=μf(Rx​(μu))−f(x)​u.

ZO-RGD (Algorithm 1) starts at x0∈Mx_0\in Mx0​∈M, draws independent Gaussian vectors u00,u01,…u_0^0,u_0^1,\dotsu00​,u01​,…, and sets xk+1=Rxk(−η^ gμ(xk))x_{k+1}=R_{x_k}(-\hat\eta\, g_\mu(x_k))xk+1​=Rxk​​(−η^​gμ​(xk​)), where gμ(xk)g_\mu(x_k)gμ​(xk​) uses uk=Pxku0ku_k=P_{x_k}u_0^kuk​=Pxk​​u0k​. The step size is η^=1/(2(d+4)L)\hat\eta=1/(2(d+4)L)η^​=1/(2(d+4)L). Let x∗∈Mx^*\in Mx∗∈M be a minimizer of fff over MMM.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1

For every N≥0N\ge0N≥0,

1N+1∑k=0NE ∥grad⁡f(xk)∥2≤4η^(f(x0)−f(x∗)N+1+C(μ)),\frac1{N+1}\sum_{k=0}^{N}\mathbb E\,\|\operatorname{grad} f(x_k)\|^2\le\frac4{\hat\eta}\left(\frac{f(x_0)-f(x^*)}{N+1}+C(\mu)\right),N+11​k=0∑N​E∥gradf(xk​)∥2≤η^​4​(N+1f(x0​)−f(x∗)​+C(μ)),

where 4/η^=8(d+4)L4/\hat\eta=8(d+4)L4/η^​=8(d+4)L and

C(μ)=μ2L16(d+3)3d+4+μ2L16(d+6)3d+4+μ2L16(d+6)3(d+4)2.C(\mu)=\frac{\mu^2L}{16}\frac{(d+3)^3}{d+4}+\frac{\mu^2L}{16}\frac{(d+6)^3}{d+4}+\frac{\mu^2L}{16}\frac{(d+6)^3}{(d+4)^2}.C(μ)=16μ2L​d+4(d+3)3​+16μ2L​d+4(d+6)3​+16μ2L​(d+4)2(d+6)3​.

Milestones

These are the paper's own intermediate results (§2.2, p. 8):

  1. Lemma 2.1. For a subspace X\mathcal XX with projection PPP, u=Pu0u=Pu_0u=Pu0​ and x∈Xx\in\mathcal Xx∈X: E⟨x,u⟩u=x\mathbb E\langle x,u\rangle u=xE⟨x,u⟩u=x and E⟨x,u⟩2=∥x∥2\mathbb E\langle x,u\rangle^2=\|x\|^2E⟨x,u⟩2=∥x∥2.
  2. Lemma 2.2 (Nesterov–Spokoiny). E∥u∥p≤(n+p)p/2\mathbb E\|u\|^p\le(n+p)^{p/2}E∥u∥p≤(n+p)p/2 for p≥2p\ge2p≥2. This result is already on the platform as a proved theorem and is referenced.
  3. Corollary 2.1. If dim⁡X=d\dim\mathcal X=ddimX=d, then E∥Pu0∥p≤(d+p)p/2\mathbb E\|Pu_0\|^p\le(d+p)^{p/2}E∥Pu0​∥p≤(d+p)p/2.
  4. Proposition 2.1(a). ∥Egμ(x)−grad⁡f(x)∥≤μL2(d+3)3/2\|\mathbb E g_\mu(x)-\operatorname{grad} f(x)\|\le\frac{\mu L}{2}(d+3)^{3/2}∥Egμ​(x)−gradf(x)∥≤2μL​(d+3)3/2.
  5. Proposition 2.1(b). ∥grad⁡f(x)∥2≤2∥Egμ(x)∥2+μ22L2(d+6)3\|\operatorname{grad} f(x)\|^2\le2\|\mathbb E g_\mu(x)\|^2+\frac{\mu^2}{2}L^2(d+6)^3∥gradf(x)∥2≤2∥Egμ​(x)∥2+2μ2​L2(d+6)3.
  6. Proposition 2.1(c). E∥gμ(x)∥2≤μ22L2(d+6)3+2(d+4)∥grad⁡f(x)∥2\mathbb E\|g_\mu(x)\|^2\le\frac{\mu^2}{2}L^2(d+6)^3+2(d+4)\|\operatorname{grad} f(x)\|^2E∥gμ​(x)∥2≤2μ2​L2(d+6)3+2(d+4)∥gradf(x)∥2.

Significance

Theorem 3.1 shows that ZO-RGD reaches an ϵ\epsilonϵ-stationary point in expectation using O(d/ϵ2)O(d/\epsilon^2)O(d/ϵ2) function evaluations, provided the smoothing parameter is of order ϵ/d3/2\epsilon/d^{3/2}ϵ/d3/2. The dimension that enters is the intrinsic dimension ddd of the manifold, not the ambient dimension nnn. For the Stiefel manifold of n×pn\times pn×p orthonormal frames this is the difference between np−p(p+1)/2np-p(p+1)/2np−p(p+1)/2 and npnpnp, and for the sphere between n−1n-1n−1 and nnn. More importantly, the estimator never explores normal directions. The three estimates of Proposition 2.1 are the toolkit that the paper reuses for its stochastic (ZO-RSGD), proximal (ZO-ManPG) and second-order variants.

The paper proves these results on paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof. The mission adds three things. It gives a precise model of a random iterate sequence on a submanifold, driven by the infinite product of Gaussian draws. It formalizes the projected-Gaussian identities, which are reusable for any method that samples in tangent spaces. And it pins down the constants. In checking the constants, the printed Proposition 2.1(b) turned out to be false for large LLL (its proof yields L2L^2L2, not LLL), and the middle term of the printed C(μ)C(\mu)C(μ) inherits that slip. The statements here carry the constants the proofs actually give.

Difficulty

In Euclidean space, E gμ(x)\mathbb E\,g_\mu(x)Egμ​(x) is exactly the gradient of the Gaussian-smoothed function fμ(x)=Ef(x+μu)f_\mu(x)=\mathbb E f(x+\mu u)fμ​(x)=Ef(x+μu), and the analysis runs on fμf_\mufμ​. Once a retraction replaces x+μux+\mu ux+μu, no smoothed function has Egμ\mathbb E g_\muEgμ​ as its gradient. The bias must be estimated directly from Assumption 2.1, which controls f∘Rxf\circ R_xf∘Rx​ only along the tangent space. The moment bounds must then be taken for a Gaussian projected onto a subspace that changes with xxx.

In the descent argument, the direction uku_kuk​ is sampled in TxkMT_{x_k}MTxk​​M, which depends on all earlier draws. The expectation of step kkk is therefore conditional on the past. Summing the one-step inequality requires conditional expectations on the product space, together with measurability of the iterate map. Finiteness of Ef(xk)\mathbb E f(x_k)Ef(xk​) is not given and must be handled as well.

Formalization scope

  • Space. The ambient space is a finite-dimensional real inner product space EEE. The standard Gaussian is Mathlib's stdGaussian E, so κ−1∫⋯e−∥u0∥2/2du0\kappa^{-1}\int\cdots e^{-\|u_0\|^2/2}du_0κ−1∫⋯e−∥u0​∥2/2du0​ becomes integration against it.
  • Manifold and tangent spaces. The manifold is given by the published coordinate-slice predicate ProjLikeRetr.Retractor.IsSubmanifold 1 d M, which ties ddd to MMM. The tangent space is the published ProjLikeRetr.Retractor.tangentSpace M x, the span of Mathlib's tangent cone. Neither ddd nor the tangent spaces are free parameters.
  • Retraction. The retraction is global: Assumption 2.1 is required for every η∈TxM\eta\in T_xMη∈Tx​M (the paper's "ρx=∞\rho_x=\inftyρx​=∞"). "Smooth" means C∞C^\inftyC∞, not analytic.
  • Regularity of fff. fff is assumed differentiable on EEE, which is what the definition grad⁡f=Px∇f\operatorname{grad} f=P_x\nabla fgradf=Px​∇f needs. This is weaker than the paper's "smooth".
  • Constants. The goal takes L>0L>0L>0, because the step size divides by LLL. The milestones take L≥0L\ge0L≥0 and μ>0\mu>0μ>0.
  • Draws and iterates. The draws live on ENE^{\mathbb N}EN with the infinite product of standard Gaussian measures. The iterates are defined for every kkk: the algorithm runs without a stopping time, so the sum over k=0,…,Nk=0,\dots,Nk=0,…,N is meaningful.
  • Minimizer. x∗x^*x∗ is an attained minimizer over MMM.
  • Measurability. The goal adds two measurability hypotheses that make the iterates random variables: (x,η)↦Rx(η)(x,\eta)\mapsto R_x(\eta)(x,η)↦Rx​(η) is measurable and x↦Pxx\mapsto P_xx↦Px​ is measurable. Both hold for closed manifolds such as spheres and Stiefel manifolds.
  • Corrected constants. Proposition 2.1(b) carries L2L^2L2, and the middle term of C(μ)C(\mu)C(μ) carries LLL. The milestone texts keep the printed forms. Proposition 2.1(a) and (c) are as printed.
  • Not formalized. The parameter choices μ=O(ϵ/d3/2)\mu=O(\epsilon/d^{3/2})μ=O(ϵ/d3/2), N=O(d/ϵ2)N=O(d/\epsilon^2)N=O(d/ϵ2) in the theorem's second sentence are an O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) statement.

Several trivializing formalizations are ruled out. A Bochner integral of a non-integrable function is 000, so every expectation in a conclusion is either a lower Lebesgue integral compared with a finite bound or paired with an integrability conjunct. The dimension ddd comes from the manifold, not from a free natural number. The projection is onto MMM's own tangent space, never onto an arbitrary subspace field.

A complete development needs the following infrastructure:

  • the law of Pu0P u_0Pu0​ (a standard Gaussian on the subspace);
  • Gaussian moment bounds;
  • conditional expectation along the product filtration;
  • measurability of the iterate map.

The projected-Gaussian lemmas and the iterate model are reusable for the stochastic variant (ZO-RSGD) in the companion mission. Contributions of proofs for any milestone, and of general lemmas about Gaussian measures restricted to subspaces, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Li, K. Balasubramanian, S. Ma, Stochastic Zeroth-Order Riemannian Derivative Estimation and Optimization, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023; preprint arXiv:2003.11238v3, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.11238
  • Y. Nesterov, V. Spokoiny, Random Gradient-Free Minimization of Convex Functions, Foundations of Computational Mathematics 17 (2017) 527–566. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10208-015-9296-2
  • S. Ghadimi, G. Lan, Stochastic First- and Zeroth-Order Methods for Nonconvex Stochastic Programming, SIAM Journal on Optimization 23 (2013) 2341–2368. https://doi.org/10.1137/120880811
  • P.-A. Absil, R. Mahony, R. Sepulchre, Optimization Algorithms on Matrix Manifolds, Princeton University Press, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400830244
13 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Secretary Problems with Biased Evaluations Using Partial Ordinal Information I: ProxyLabel with a Width Estimate ω′ ≥ ω/c Is e^c(ω′+1)/(1−1/k)^{k−1}-CompetitiveResearch Paper

Motivation

In the classical secretary problem, candidates arrive one at a time in uniformly random order, and a decision maker must accept or reject each one irrevocably. The decision maker sees exact scores, or at least a total ranking of the candidates seen so far. In hiring, admissions and procurement the observed scores are often biased: evaluations of candidates from different groups, or produced by different evaluators, cannot be compared reliably, even when comparisons inside a group can. Salem and Gupta (SSRN 3444283; Management Science, 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4926) model this by giving the algorithm only the comparisons it can trust. These form a partial order on the candidates, and the true scores remain hidden.

The question is how much is lost when only partial ordinal information is available. The paper's answer is governed by the width of the partial order, the largest number of mutually incomparable candidates. Width 1 is the classical totally ordered problem. Width NNN means that no comparison is available at all. This mission formalizes the paper's first positive result with explicit constants: an algorithm, ProxyLabel, whose competitive ratio grows linearly in a known estimate of the width.

Setting

A finite set CCC of NNN elements carries a partial order ⪯\preceq⪯. Each element aaa has a hidden true score w(a)≥0w(a) \ge 0w(a)≥0. The scores are pairwise distinct and consistent with the order: a≺ba \prec ba≺b implies w(a)<w(b)w(a) < w(b)w(a)<w(b). The width ω\omegaω of (C,⪯)(C, \preceq)(C,⪯) is the largest size of an antichain, a set of pairwise incomparable elements.

The elements arrive in a uniformly random order. The algorithm knows NNN and a selection capacity k≥1k \ge 1k≥1. At each time it sees the comparisons of ⪯\preceq⪯ among the elements that have arrived. It may select at most kkk elements, and every decision is irrevocable. The offline optimum OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is the largest total score of at most kkk elements. An algorithm is ρ\rhoρ-competitive if, on every instance,

E[w(Alg)OPT]≥1ρ,\mathbb E\Big[\frac{w(\mathrm{Alg})}{\mathrm{OPT}}\Big] \ge \frac1\rho,E[OPTw(Alg)​]≥ρ1​,

where w(Alg)w(\mathrm{Alg})w(Alg) is the total score of the selected elements and the expectation is over the arrival order and the algorithm's randomness.

ProxyLabel (Algorithm 1 of the paper) takes a width estimate ω′∈N\omega' \in \mathbb Nω′∈N. It works as follows.

  1. Each element receives a label ℓ(a)∈{1,…,k}\ell(a) \in \{1, \dots, k\}ℓ(a)∈{1,…,k}, uniformly and independently.
  2. It draws m∼Bin(N,ω′/(ω′+1))m \sim \mathrm{Bin}(N, \omega'/(\omega'+1))m∼Bin(N,ω′/(ω′+1)) and lets the sample SSS be the first mmm arrivals. Sampled elements are never selected.
  3. A later element aaa is selected if it is maximal among all previously seen elements with its label, sampled or not, and no element with its label has been selected yet.

Each label class therefore contributes at most one element: the first non-sampled one that beats everything of its label seen before.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5.2

If ω′≥ω/c\omega' \ge \omega / cω′≥ω/c for some c≥1c \ge 1c≥1, then ProxyLabel has competitive ratio at most

ρ=ec(ω′+1)(1−1k)k−1 ≤ ec+1(ω′+1),\rho = \frac{e^{c}(\omega'+1)}{\big(1 - \frac1k\big)^{k-1}} \ \le\ e^{c+1}(\omega'+1),ρ=(1−k1​)k−1ec(ω′+1)​ ≤ ec+1(ω′+1),

with the convention 00=10^0 = 100=1. That is, E[w(Alg)]≥OPT/ρ\mathbb E[w(\mathrm{Alg})] \ge \mathrm{OPT}/\rhoE[w(Alg)]≥OPT/ρ.

Milestones, from the proof (pp. 16–17)

  1. Under uniform labels, the jjj-th best element is the maximum of its label class with probability (1−1/k)j−1≥(1−1/k)k−1≥1/e(1 - 1/k)^{j-1} \ge (1 - 1/k)^{k-1} \ge 1/e(1−1/k)j−1≥(1−1/k)k−1≥1/e.
  2. Display (3): conditional on that event, it is selected with probability at least 1ω′+1(1−1ω′+1)ω\frac{1}{\omega'+1}\big(1 - \frac{1}{\omega'+1}\big)^{\omega}ω′+11​(1−ω′+11​)ω.
  3. If ω/c≤ω′\omega/c \le \omega'ω/c≤ω′ with c≥1c \ge 1c≥1, this quantity is at least 1/(ec(ω′+1))1/(e^{c}(\omega'+1))1/(ec(ω′+1)).
  4. Hence each of the top kkk elements is selected with probability at least (1−1/k)k−1/(ec(ω′+1))(1 - 1/k)^{k-1}/(e^{c}(\omega'+1))(1−1/k)k−1/(ec(ω′+1)).
  5. E[w(Alg)]≥∑i=1kP(ai∈Alg) w(ai)\mathbb E[w(\mathrm{Alg})] \ge \sum_{i=1}^k \mathbb P(a_i \in \mathrm{Alg})\, w(a_i)E[w(Alg)]≥∑i=1k​P(ai​∈Alg)w(ai​) over the top kkk elements a1,…,aka_1, \dots, a_ka1​,…,ak​.

Companion: Corollary 5.1

With the exact width ω′=ω\omega' = \omegaω′=ω, the ratio is at most e(ω+1)/(1−1/k)k−1≤e2(ω+1)e(\omega+1)/(1 - 1/k)^{k-1} \le e^2(\omega+1)e(ω+1)/(1−1/k)k−1≤e2(ω+1), and it is e(ω+1)e(\omega+1)e(ω+1) for k=1k = 1k=1.

Significance

Proposition 5.2 shows that partial ordinal information costs at most a factor linear in the width, provided a width estimate within a constant factor is available. Proposition 5.1 of the same paper shows that no algorithm beats ratio ω\omegaω, so the bound is order-optimal. ProxyLabel is also the building block of the paper's width-free algorithm PosetLabel (§5.4), which estimates the width from a first sample and then runs ProxyLabel's selection phase.

The result is proved in the paper and has not been machine-checked. A complete development would give a formal model of online selection on a poset under random arrival, with an explicit selection rule and exact finite averages for probabilities. It would also contain a formal use of Dilworth's theorem inside a probabilistic argument, and the elementary inequalities (1−1/k)k−1≥1/e(1 - 1/k)^{k-1} \ge 1/e(1−1/k)k−1≥1/e and (1−1/(ω′+1))ω≥e−c(1 - 1/(\omega'+1))^{\omega} \ge e^{-c}(1−1/(ω′+1))ω≥e−c in the form the proof needs.

Difficulty

The events of the algorithm are tangled. The sample is a prefix of a random order with a random length. Whether an element is selected depends on everything that arrived before it, on the labels, and on whether an earlier element of the same label was already selected. The bound must be proved for every finite poset and every consistent scoring, with exact constants, on the finite probability space of arrival orders, labellings and sample sizes. The width enters only through the structure of a single label class, a subposet whose width is at most ω\omegaω, so the argument has to pass from the global width to an arbitrary random subposet.

A tempting simplification lets every passing unsampled element be selected. That algorithm can select several elements of one label, so its expected score is larger and the bound becomes easier. It is not ProxyLabel.

Formalization scope

  • Elements are a finite type α with a PartialOrder, so NNN is Fintype.card α. The width ω\omegaω is the published definition AppliedComb.Posets.width α, the maximum size of an antichain. Dilworth's theorem is the published, proved theorem AppliedComb.Posets.dilworth.
  • A consistent scoring is w:α→Rw : \alpha \to \mathbb Rw:α→R with w≥0w \ge 0w≥0, www injective, and a<b⇒w(a)<w(b)a < b \Rightarrow w(a) < w(b)a<b⇒w(a)<w(b). These three conditions are the paper's standing assumptions (§3.1, §3.3), not additions.
  • Arrival orders are bijections α ≃ Fin N, and labellings are functions α → Fin k. Labels are independent of the order, which is the same distribution as assigning labels on arrival.
  • Probabilities and expectations are explicit finite averages with weights 1/N!1/N!1/N!, 1/kN1/k^N1/kN and the binomial weights (Nm)pm(1−p)N−m\binom{N}{m}p^m(1-p)^{N-m}(mN​)pm(1−p)N−m with p=ω′/(ω′+1)p = \omega'/(\omega'+1)p=ω′/(ω′+1).
  • The selection rule is encoded exactly. An element is selected iff it is unsampled, no earlier element of its label (sampled or not) is above it, and no earlier unsampled element of its label passed the same test.
  • OPT is the maximum of ∑a∈sw(a)\sum_{a \in s} w(a)∑a∈s​w(a) over sets with ∣s∣≤k|s| \le k∣s∣≤k, so it is the total score when k≥Nk \ge Nk≥N.
  • The competitive ratio is stated as OPT/ρ≤E[w(Alg)]\mathrm{OPT}/\rho \le \mathbb E[w(\mathrm{Alg})]OPT/ρ≤E[w(Alg)]. This agrees with Definition 3.4 when OPT>0\mathrm{OPT} > 0OPT>0; the page's ratio is undefined when OPT=0\mathrm{OPT} = 0OPT=0.
  • (1−1/k)k−1(1 - 1/k)^{k-1}(1−1/k)k−1 has a natural exponent, so k=1k = 1k=1 gives 00=10^0 = 100=1. The width estimate ω′\omega'ω′ is a natural number.
  • The proposition's "interval order" is a slip of the page: the algorithm and the proof concern arbitrary posets, and the goal is stated for every finite poset.
  • The order-optimality clause of Corollary 5.1 refers to Proposition 5.1, the subject of mission II of this series, and is not stated here.
  • The goal is a statement about the full expectation of the selected score over arrival order, labels and sample size. It is not the conditional bound (3). A formalization in which several elements per label can be selected, or in which "previously seen" excludes the sample, proves a statement about a different algorithm.

Contributions are welcome on every milestone. The prefix-of-a-random-order lemma (a binomially sized prefix is an i.i.d. Bernoulli sample) is reusable well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • J. Salem and S. Gupta, Secretary Problems with Biased Evaluations Using Partial Ordinal Information, SSRN 3444283 (version of 2022-04-17); Management Science, 2023. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3444283, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4926
  • R. P. Dilworth, A Decomposition Theorem for Partially Ordered Sets, Annals of Mathematics 51(1), 1950, 161–166. https://doi.org/10.2307/1969503
  • R. Kleinberg, A Multiple-Choice Secretary Algorithm with Applications to Online Auctions, SODA 2005. https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1070432.1070519
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Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Lightning Network Economics: Channels I: The Expected Discounted Cost of a Bidirectional Payment Channel in Closed FormResearch Paper

Payment channels and the cost of locked capital

Blockchains such as Bitcoin settle every transaction on a public ledger. Each on-chain transaction pays a fee and waits for confirmation, so frequent small payments are expensive. The Lightning Network moves such payments off-chain: two parties lock funds in a shared payment channel and pay each other by updating the channel's balance, touching the blockchain only to open, close or re-fund it. A channel is not free either. The locked funds cannot be used elsewhere, and once one side's balance is exhausted the channel has to be reset on-chain.

Guasoni, Huberman and Shikhelman (Lightning Network Economics: Channels, Management Science, 2023) quantify this trade-off in a stochastic model and compare three ways of settling two opposite streams of payments: on-chain transactions, unidirectional channels, and one bidirectional channel. Their comparisons all rest on a single computation, the expected discounted cost of a channel in closed form (Theorem 1). This mission formalizes that computation.

The model

Two nodes exchange unit payments. Node 1 pays node 2 one unit at each jump of a Poisson process Ntλ1N^{\lambda_1}_tNtλ1​​ with rate λ1\lambda_1λ1​; node 2 pays node 1 one unit at each jump of an independent Poisson process Ntλ2N^{\lambda_2}_tNtλ2​​ with rate λ2\lambda_2λ2​. The paper normalizes λ1≤λ2\lambda_1\le\lambda_2λ1​≤λ2​. The net balance of node 1 is

Xt=Ntλ2−Ntλ1,X0=0.X_t=N^{\lambda_2}_t-N^{\lambda_1}_t,\qquad X_0=0 .Xt​=Ntλ2​​−Ntλ1​​,X0​=0.

In a bidirectional channel node 1 commits l1l_1l1​ units and node 2 commits l2l_2l2​ units. The money is the channel's capacity: the channel works as long as −l1<Xt<l2-l_1<X_t<l_2−l1​<Xt​<l2​. Locked capital has an opportunity cost of r(l1+l2)r(l_1+l_2)r(l1​+l2​) per unit of time, where r>0r>0r>0 is the continuously compounded interest rate, and all costs are discounted at rate rrr. When the balance reaches −l1-l_1−l1​ (node 1 is exhausted) or +l2+l_2+l2​ (node 2 is exhausted), the channel is reset at cost BBB and the balance restarts at 000 with the same commitments.

Let J(n)J(n)J(n) be the expected total future cost when the balance equals nnn. Conditioning on the first payment, which arrives after an exponential time with rate λ1+λ2\lambda_1+\lambda_2λ1​+λ2​, gives the first-step equation (15)

J(n)=(l1+l2)rr+λ2+λ1+J(n+1)λ2r+λ2+λ1+J(n−1)λ1r+λ2+λ1,−l1<n<l2,J(n)=(l_1+l_2)\frac{r}{r+\lambda_2+\lambda_1}+J(n+1)\frac{\lambda_2}{r+\lambda_2+\lambda_1}+J(n-1)\frac{\lambda_1}{r+\lambda_2+\lambda_1},\qquad -l_1<n<l_2,J(n)=(l1​+l2​)r+λ2​+λ1​r​+J(n+1)r+λ2​+λ1​λ2​​+J(n−1)r+λ2​+λ1​λ1​​,−l1​<n<l2​,

with the reset conditions J(−l1)=J(0)+BJ(-l_1)=J(0)+BJ(−l1​)=J(0)+B and J(+l2)=J(0)+BJ(+l_2)=J(0)+BJ(+l2​)=J(0)+B. The cost of the channel is cl1,l2(λ1,λ2)=J(0)c^{l_1,l_2}(\lambda_1,\lambda_2)=J(0)cl1​,l2​(λ1​,λ2​)=J(0).

In a unidirectional channel only node 2 pays (rate λ2\lambda_2λ2​) and only node 2 commits capital (l2l_2l2​ units). The cost satisfies J(n)=l2rr+λ2+J(n+1)λ2r+λ2J(n)=l_2\frac{r}{r+\lambda_2}+J(n+1)\frac{\lambda_2}{r+\lambda_2}J(n)=l2​r+λ2​r​+J(n+1)r+λ2​λ2​​ for 0≤n<l20\le n<l_20≤n<l2​ with J(l2)=J(0)+BJ(l_2)=J(0)+BJ(l2​)=J(0)+B, and c0,l2(0,λ2)=J(0)c^{0,l_2}(0,\lambda_2)=J(0)c0,l2​(0,λ2​)=J(0).

The roots of the characteristic equation λ2α2−(λ1+λ2+r)α+λ1=0\lambda_2\alpha^2-(\lambda_1+\lambda_2+r)\alpha+\lambda_1=0λ2​α2−(λ1​+λ2​+r)α+λ1​=0 are

α±=λ1+λ2+r±(λ2−λ1)2+r2+2r(λ2+λ1)2λ2.(4)\alpha_\pm=\frac{\lambda_1+\lambda_2+r\pm\sqrt{(\lambda_2-\lambda_1)^2+r^2+2r(\lambda_2+\lambda_1)}}{2\lambda_2}. \tag{4}α±​=2λ2​λ1​+λ2​+r±(λ2​−λ1​)2+r2+2r(λ2​+λ1​)​​.(4)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (ii)

For 0<λ1≤λ20<\lambda_1\le\lambda_20<λ1​≤λ2​, r>0r>0r>0, any BBB and natural commitments l1,l2≥1l_1,l_2\ge1l1​,l2​≥1, the bidirectional cost system has a solution, and every solution satisfies

cl1,l2(λ1,λ2)=l1+l2−B α−l1(1−α+l1+l2)−α+l1(1−α−l1+l2)α−l1(1−α+l1+l2)−α+l1(1−α−l1+l2)+α+l1+l2−α−l1+l2.(3)c^{l_1,l_2}(\lambda_1,\lambda_2)=l_1+l_2-B\,\frac{\alpha_-^{l_1}(1-\alpha_+^{l_1+l_2})-\alpha_+^{l_1}(1-\alpha_-^{l_1+l_2})}{\alpha_-^{l_1}(1-\alpha_+^{l_1+l_2})-\alpha_+^{l_1}(1-\alpha_-^{l_1+l_2})+\alpha_+^{l_1+l_2}-\alpha_-^{l_1+l_2}}. \tag{3}cl1​,l2​(λ1​,λ2​)=l1​+l2​−Bα−l1​​(1−α+l1​+l2​​)−α+l1​​(1−α−l1​+l2​​)+α+l1​+l2​​−α−l1​+l2​​α−l1​​(1−α+l1​+l2​​)−α+l1​​(1−α−l1​+l2​​)​.(3)

Milestones

  1. Competing exponential clocks (proof of Theorem 1, p. 10): the minimum τ\tauτ of independent exponential times with rates λ2,λ1\lambda_2,\lambda_1λ2​,λ1​ is exponential with rate λ2+λ1\lambda_2+\lambda_1λ2​+λ1​, and τλ2\tau^{\lambda_2}τλ2​ rings first with probability λ2/(λ2+λ1)\lambda_2/(\lambda_2+\lambda_1)λ2​/(λ2​+λ1​). This is a published, proved platform theorem, reused as is.
  2. The first term (p. 10): E[e−rτ]=(λ2+λ1)/(λ2+λ1+r)E[e^{-r\tau}]=(\lambda_2+\lambda_1)/(\lambda_2+\lambda_1+r)E[e−rτ]=(λ2​+λ1​)/(λ2​+λ1​+r) and E[∫0τe−rsr(l1+l2) ds]=(l1+l2) r/(r+λ2+λ1)E[\int_0^\tau e^{-rs}r(l_1+l_2)\,ds]=(l_1+l_2)\,r/(r+\lambda_2+\lambda_1)E[∫0τ​e−rsr(l1​+l2​)ds]=(l1​+l2​)r/(r+λ2​+λ1​).
  3. The last term (p. 10): E[e−rτJ(Xt+τ)∣Xt=n]=J(n+1)λ2r+λ2+λ1+J(n−1)λ1r+λ2+λ1E[e^{-r\tau}J(X_{t+\tau})\mid X_t=n]=J(n+1)\frac{\lambda_2}{r+\lambda_2+\lambda_1}+J(n-1)\frac{\lambda_1}{r+\lambda_2+\lambda_1}E[e−rτJ(Xt+τ​)∣Xt​=n]=J(n+1)r+λ2​+λ1​λ2​​+J(n−1)r+λ2​+λ1​λ1​​.
  4. General solution of (15) (§5.1): on the lattice −l1≤n≤l2-l_1\le n\le l_2−l1​≤n≤l2​, (15) holds at the interior points if and only if J(n)=l1+l2+k1α−n+k2α+nJ(n)=l_1+l_2+k_1\alpha_-^n+k_2\alpha_+^nJ(n)=l1​+l2​+k1​α−n​+k2​α+n​ for constants k1,k2k_1,k_2k1​,k2​.
  5. The cost function (§5.1): the closed form of J(n)J(n)J(n) at every balance nnn, which gives (3) at n=0n=0n=0.
  6. Theorem 1 (i), (1): c0,l2(0,λ2)=l2+B(((r+λ2)/λ2)l2−1)−1c^{0,l_2}(0,\lambda_2)=l_2+B\big(((r+\lambda_2)/\lambda_2)^{l_2}-1\big)^{-1}c0,l2​(0,λ2​)=l2​+B(((r+λ2​)/λ2​)l2​−1)−1.
  7. Theorem 1 (i), (2): with k=Blog⁡(1+r/λ2)k=B\log(1+r/\lambda_2)k=Blog(1+r/λ2​) and B>0B>0B>0, the minimum of (1) over real sizes is B2k(−k+k(k+4)+2log⁡(12(k+k(k+4)+2)))\frac{B}{2k}\big(-k+\sqrt{k(k+4)}+2\log(\tfrac12(k+\sqrt{k(k+4)}+2))\big)2kB​(−k+k(k+4)​+2log(21​(k+k(k+4)​+2))), attained at l2=Bklog⁡(12(k+k(k+4)+2))l_2=\frac Bk\log(\tfrac12(k+\sqrt{k(k+4)}+2))l2​=kB​log(21​(k+k(k+4)​+2)).

What the closed form gives

Formula (3) is what the rest of the paper works with. Lemma 1 prices on-chain settlement of a stream of rate λ\lambdaλ at Cλ/rC\lambda/rCλ/r. Comparing that price with (1) and (3) yields the paper's thresholds on the on-chain fee below which no channel pays off (Theorem 2), the small-interest-rate asymptotics of the optimal symmetric channel, whose minimal cost scales like 3(2Bλ/r)1/33(2B\lambda/r)^{1/3}3(2Bλ/r)1/3 (Theorem 3), and the long-run number of channel payments per on-chain transaction (Proposition 2). Without an exact expression for the cost these comparisons would rest on simulation.

The paper proves Theorem 1 by a first-step argument and the solution of a linear difference equation. No part of it has been machine-checked. A formal proof would supply what the published argument passes over: that the first-step equation (15) and the reset conditions together have a unique solution on the lattice, that the denominator of (3) does not vanish, and the measure-theoretic computation of the coefficients of (15) from the exponential clocks. The later missions of this series (rate bounds, small-rate asymptotics, the balance walk) build on the same model.

Where the difficulty lies

The algebra of solving a second-order linear recurrence is routine. Two points are not. First, the solution has to be shown to exist and to be unique for every admissible set of parameters. This requires α−≠α+\alpha_-\ne\alpha_+α−​=α+​ and a non-singular 2×22\times 22×2 system for k1,k2k_1,k_2k1​,k2​, whose determinant is the denominator of (3), and the paper does not discuss when that determinant vanishes. Second, the coefficients of (15) come from expectations over exponential times: the joint expectation of the discount factor e−rτe^{-r\tau}e−rτ and the indicator of which clock rang first. The paper factors it as E[e−rτ] P(τ=τλ2)E[e^{-r\tau}]\,P(\tau=\tau^{\lambda_2})E[e−rτ]P(τ=τλ2​), which uses that the minimum is independent of the identity of the first clock, a fact it does not state.

Formalization scope

  • The rates are written lam₁, lam₂; the sizes l1,l2l_1,l_2l1​,l2​ are natural numbers with l1,l2≥1l_1,l_2\ge1l1​,l2​≥1, because payments are of one unit and the balance lives on the lattice {−l1,…,l2}\{-l_1,\dots,l_2\}{−l1​,…,l2​}. The cost function is a map J:Z→RJ:\mathbb Z\to\mathbb RJ:Z→R whose values off the lattice are unconstrained.
  • The cost is defined by its equations, (15) with the reset conditions (IsBiCostFn) and the §5.2 system (IsUniCostFn), never by (3) or (1). Every statement about "the cost" asserts both that a solution exists and that every solution takes the stated value, so it is neither vacuous nor dependent on a choice of solution.
  • The unidirectional system is a separate definition: the bidirectional one at l1=0l_1=0l1​=0 would force B=0B=0B=0. For the same reason the Remark after Theorem 1 ("(1) follows from (3) by substituting λ1=l1=0\lambda_1=l_1=0λ1​=l1​=0") is not posed: with α−=0\alpha_-=0α−​=0 and l1=0l_1=0l1​=0 the denominator of (3) vanishes.
  • Powers are natural powers in (1) and (3), integer powers (zpow) in the general solution and in J(n)J(n)J(n), and real powers (Real.rpow) in the minimization (2), which is over real sizes m>0m>0m>0 as in the paper's proof.
  • The paper prints the exponent in the numerator of the J(n)J(n)J(n) display as l+nl+nl+n; the statement uses l1+nl_1+nl1​+n, which is what the derivation gives and what reduces to (3) at n=0n=0n=0.
  • The probabilistic milestones use Mathlib's expMeasure for the laws (through push-forward measures of measurable random variables) and IndepFun. Integrability is part of what is to be proved.
  • The hypothesis λ1≤λ2\lambda_1\le\lambda_2λ1​≤λ2​ is kept in the goal as printed. No sign of BBB is assumed except B>0B>0B>0 in (2), without which the infimum is not attained.
  • Ruled out as trivializing: defining the cost as its closed form (which turns the goal into a definitional equality), fixing numerical parameters, restricting to λ1=λ2\lambda_1=\lambda_2λ1​=λ2​, and treating the sizes as real numbers in the cost system.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones in any order, and reusable lemmas on linear difference equations with constant coefficients and on Laplace transforms of exponential laws, neither of which Mathlib currently has in this form.

Selected references

  • P. Guasoni, G. Huberman, C. Shikhelman, Lightning Network Economics: Channels, Management Science, Articles in Advance, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01664
  • J. Poon, T. Dryja, The Bitcoin Lightning Network: Scalable Off-Chain Instant Payments, technical report, 2015 (as cited by Guasoni et al.). https://lightning.network/lightning-network-paper.pdf
13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Quantum InformationStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Direct Fidelity Estimation from Few Pauli Measurements 2: A Unit Vector Nearly Orthogonal to 2^{cd} Given States With Every Non-Identity Pauli Expectation ≤ √(72π³)·√(log d)/√dResearch Paper

Motivation

Quantum state tomography reconstructs an unknown ddd-dimensional quantum state from measurements on many copies of it. For nnn qubits, d=2nd = 2^nd=2n, so the number of copies a tomography procedure needs grows exponentially in nnn, and lower bounds on that number decide how far experiments can scale. In many experiments the only measurements available are Pauli measurements: each qubit is measured in the eigenbasis of one of σx,σy,σz\sigma_x, \sigma_y, \sigma_zσx​,σy​,σz​.

Flammia and Liu, Direct fidelity estimation from few Pauli measurements (arXiv:1104.4695, Phys. Rev. Lett. 106, 230501, 2011), show that the fidelity of an experimental state with a target pure state can be estimated with far fewer copies than full tomography needs. To make the comparison meaningful they also prove that full tomography of a pure state with Pauli measurements requires Ω(d2/log⁡d)\Omega(d^2/\log d)Ω(d2/logd) copies. That lower bound has two steps. The first builds a large family of nearly orthogonal pure states whose Pauli expectation values are all small, so that Pauli measurements extract little information about which state is present. Its engine is Lemma 1 of the paper (p. 7), the subject of this mission. The second step, an information-theoretic argument over a noisy classical channel, is not in scope.

Setting

Fix n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 qubits and put d=2nd = 2^nd=2n. States are unit vectors ψ∈Cd\psi \in \mathbb C^dψ∈Cd, ∥ψ∥2=1\|\psi\|_2 = 1∥ψ∥2​=1; the overlap ⟨φ∣ψ⟩=∑xφx‾ψx\langle\varphi|\psi\rangle = \sum_x \overline{\varphi_x}\psi_x⟨φ∣ψ⟩=∑x​φx​​ψx​ is conjugate-linear in φ\varphiφ.

The single-qubit Pauli matrices are III, σx\sigma_xσx​, σy\sigma_yσy​, σz\sigma_zσz​. A Pauli label k∈{0,1,2,3}nk \in \{0,1,2,3\}^nk∈{0,1,2,3}n determines the nnn-qubit Pauli operator Wk=σk1⊗⋯⊗σknW_k = \sigma_{k_1}\otimes\cdots\otimes\sigma_{k_n}Wk​=σk1​​⊗⋯⊗σkn​​ (with σ0=I\sigma_0 = Iσ0​=I). There are d2d^2d2 labels; the all-zero label gives Wk=IW_k = IWk​=I. Every WkW_kWk​ is Hermitian and unitary, so the Pauli expectation ⟨ψ∣Wk∣ψ⟩\langle\psi|W_k|\psi\rangle⟨ψ∣Wk​∣ψ⟩ is a real number in [−1,1][-1, 1][−1,1].

A Haar-random state is a vector ψ\psiψ drawn from the uniform (rotation-invariant) probability measure on the unit sphere of Cd\mathbb C^dCd, a real sphere of dimension 2d−12d - 12d−1. The constants of the lemma are

ε=9π3(log⁡2) c,τ=72π3,C1=29π3,\varepsilon = \sqrt{9\pi^3(\log 2)\,c},\qquad \tau = \sqrt{72\pi^3},\qquad C_1 = \frac{2}{9\pi^3},ε=9π3(log2)c​,τ=72π3​,C1​=9π32​,

with log⁡\loglog the natural logarithm and c>0c > 0c>0 a parameter.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 1

Let φ1,…,φs∈Cd\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_s \in \mathbb C^dφ1​,…,φs​∈Cd be states with s≤2cds \le 2^{cd}s≤2cd. Then there is a state ψ∈Cd\psi \in \mathbb C^dψ∈Cd with

∣⟨φi∣ψ⟩∣≤ε(1≤i≤s),∣⟨ψ∣Wk∣ψ⟩∣≤τlog⁡d/d(Wk≠I).|\langle\varphi_i|\psi\rangle| \le \varepsilon \quad (1 \le i \le s), \qquad |\langle\psi|W_k|\psi\rangle| \le \tau\sqrt{\log d}/\sqrt d \quad (W_k \ne I).∣⟨φi​∣ψ⟩∣≤ε(1≤i≤s),∣⟨ψ∣Wk​∣ψ⟩∣≤τlogd​/d​(Wk​=I).

These are (31) and (32) of the paper. The goal is an existence statement with no measure in it.

Milestones (all p. 7)

  1. (33): for a state φ\varphiφ, ∣⟨φ∣ψ⟩−⟨φ∣ψ′⟩∣≤∥ψ−ψ′∥2|\langle\varphi|\psi\rangle - \langle\varphi|\psi'\rangle| \le \|\psi - \psi'\|_2∣⟨φ∣ψ⟩−⟨φ∣ψ′⟩∣≤∥ψ−ψ′∥2​.
  2. E⟨φ∣ψ⟩=0\mathbb E\langle\varphi|\psi\rangle = 0E⟨φ∣ψ⟩=0 for Haar-random ψ\psiψ.
  3. (34): Pr⁡[∣⟨φ∣ψ⟩∣≥ε]≤4exp⁡(−C1dε2/η2)\Pr[|\langle\varphi|\psi\rangle| \ge \varepsilon] \le 4\exp(-C_1 d\varepsilon^2/\eta^2)Pr[∣⟨φ∣ψ⟩∣≥ε]≤4exp(−C1​dε2/η2) with η=1\eta = 1η=1.
  4. (35): Pr⁡[(31) fails for some i]≤4exp⁡(cdlog⁡2−C1dε2)=4⋅2−cd\Pr[(31)\text{ fails for some } i] \le 4\exp(cd\log 2 - C_1 d\varepsilon^2) = 4\cdot 2^{-cd}Pr[(31) fails for some i]≤4exp(cdlog2−C1​dε2)=4⋅2−cd.
  5. (36): on unit vectors, ∣⟨ψ∣Wk∣ψ⟩−⟨ψ′∣Wk∣ψ′⟩∣≤2∥ψ−ψ′∥2|\langle\psi|W_k|\psi\rangle - \langle\psi'|W_k|\psi'\rangle| \le 2\|\psi - \psi'\|_2∣⟨ψ∣Wk​∣ψ⟩−⟨ψ′∣Wk​∣ψ′⟩∣≤2∥ψ−ψ′∥2​.
  6. E⟨ψ∣Wk∣ψ⟩=0\mathbb E\langle\psi|W_k|\psi\rangle = 0E⟨ψ∣Wk​∣ψ⟩=0 for Wk≠IW_k \ne IWk​=I.
  7. (37): Pr⁡[∣⟨ψ∣Wk∣ψ⟩∣≥τlog⁡d/d]≤4exp⁡(−C1τ2(log⁡d)/η2)\Pr[|\langle\psi|W_k|\psi\rangle| \ge \tau\sqrt{\log d}/\sqrt d] \le 4\exp(-C_1\tau^2(\log d)/\eta^2)Pr[∣⟨ψ∣Wk​∣ψ⟩∣≥τlogd​/d​]≤4exp(−C1​τ2(logd)/η2) with η=2\eta = 2η=2.
  8. (38): Pr⁡[(32) fails for some k]≤4exp⁡(2log⁡d−C1τ2(log⁡d)/4)=4/d2\Pr[(32)\text{ fails for some } k] \le 4\exp(2\log d - C_1\tau^2(\log d)/4) = 4/d^2Pr[(32) fails for some k]≤4exp(2logd−C1​τ2(logd)/4)=4/d2.

Every constant is the paper's; none is replaced by an unspecified absolute constant.

Significance

The result. Lemma 1 is a packing statement: applied repeatedly, it yields 2Ω(d)2^{\Omega(d)}2Ω(d) states that are pairwise almost orthogonal and whose non-identity Pauli expectations are all O(log⁡d/d)O(\sqrt{\log d/d})O(logd/d​). Such states are hard to tell apart with Pauli measurements, since each measurement outcome is nearly unbiased. The paper converts this into the Ω(d2/log⁡d)\Omega(d^2/\log d)Ω(d2/logd) copy lower bound for full tomography with Pauli measurements (pp. 3, 7–8). Since direct fidelity estimation of an arbitrary pure state uses O(d)O(d)O(d) copies (for fixed accuracy and failure probability), the lower bound is what shows that the scheme beats tomography followed by a fidelity computation by a factor of about ddd.

Formalizing it. The lemma and its proof are published, but none of it is machine-checked: Mathlib has no Pauli operators, no concentration of measure on spheres with explicit constants, and no Levy lemma. A formal proof needs a concentration inequality on the complex unit sphere with the explicit constant C1=2/(9π3)C_1 = 2/(9\pi^3)C1​=2/(9π3) (or any sharper one), the vanishing of the means by symmetry, and the union bounds. Each milestone is a reusable fact about Haar-random states.

Difficulty

The two union bounds (35) and (38) and the Lipschitz estimates (33) and (36) are elementary. The central difficulty is the tail bounds (34) and (37). The paper obtains them from Levy's lemma, which it cites (P. Lévy, 1951) and does not prove; Levy's lemma rests on the isoperimetric inequality on the sphere, which Mathlib does not have, and (37) concerns a quadratic form of ψ\psiψ rather than a linear one. Both tail bounds also need a working theory of the uniform measure on the complex unit sphere (rotation invariance, the distribution of a coordinate), little of which exists in Lean today.

A second difficulty is that the printed proof does not cover every parameter. The union bound produces a good ψ\psiψ only when 4⋅2−cd+4/d2<14\cdot 2^{-cd} + 4/d^2 < 14⋅2−cd+4/d2<1. For small ddd, or small ccc with few given states, the goal is still true, but a complete proof must handle those cases separately; they are not in the paper.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. Basis labels are Q n = Fin n → Fin 2, Pauli labels P n = Fin n → Fin 4, states live in EuclideanSpace ℂ (Q n), and WkW_kWk​ is the entrywise product of single-qubit Pauli matrices (the Kronecker product). ddd is the real number 2n2^n2n; log⁡\loglog is Real.log; ⟨φ|ψ⟩ is Mathlib's inner ℂ φ ψ.
  • Measure. The uniform measure on the sphere is Mathlib's Measure.toSphere of an additive Haar measure on Cd\mathbb C^dCd (as a real vector space), normalised to total mass one. The paper's "Haar-random vector in Sd−1S^{d-1}Sd−1" is read as this measure on the unit sphere of Cd\mathbb C^dCd.
  • Added hypotheses, all disclosed. The goal assumes n≥1n \ge 1n≥1: at n=0n = 0n=0 (d=1d = 1d=1) and small ccc the lemma is false, since every unit vector of C1\mathbb C^1C1 has overlap 111 with φ1\varphi_1φ1​. It assumes c>0c > 0c>0, under which ε\varepsilonε is defined. "States" means unit vectors, for the given φi\varphi_iφi​ and for the produced ψ\psiψ. The mean-zero statement for Pauli operators assumes Wk≠IW_k \ne IWk​=I (for Wk=IW_k = IWk​=I the mean is 111); the paper's "for each kkk" refers to the non-identity labels of (32). "Wk≠IW_k \ne IWk​=I" is formalized as "the label kkk is not all zeros".
  • Non-trivialization. The produced ψ\psiψ must be a unit vector, so ψ=0\psi = 0ψ=0 does not satisfy the goal; the given states are unit vectors, so (31) is not trivially false; and the mean-zero milestones assert integrability together with the value of the integral, so they cannot hold merely because a non-integrable integral is 000.
  • Infrastructure needed. Facts about nnn-qubit Pauli operators (Hermitian, unitary, traceless for Wk≠IW_k \ne IWk​=I); rotation invariance of the normalised sphere measure; a concentration inequality for Lipschitz functions on the complex unit sphere with an explicit constant. The concentration inequality and the sphere-measure facts are reusable well beyond this mission and are welcome as separate contributions.

Selected references

  • S. T. Flammia and Y.-K. Liu, Direct fidelity estimation from few Pauli measurements, Phys. Rev. Lett. 106, 230501 (2011); arXiv:1104.4695v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/1104.4695
  • P. Lévy, Problèmes concrets d'analyse fonctionnelle, Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 1951 (reference [10] of the paper; no stable online link).
  • M. Ledoux, The Concentration of Measure Phenomenon, Mathematical Surveys and Monographs 89, AMS, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1090/surv/089
  • P. Hayden, D. W. Leung and A. Winter, Aspects of generic entanglement, Comm. Math. Phys. 265, 95–117 (2006); arXiv:quant-ph/0407049. https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0407049
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Quantum InformationStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Direct Fidelity Estimation from Few Pauli Measurements 1: ⌈1/(ε²δ)⌉ Importance-Sampled Pauli Measurements Estimate tr(ρσ) Within 2ε With Probability ≥ 1 − 2δResearch Paper

Certifying a prepared quantum state

Experiments that prepare many-body entangled states (GHZ, W, stabilizer, cluster and matrix product states) need a way to check that the device produced the intended state. Full quantum state tomography answers the question but its cost grows with the dimension d=2nd = 2^nd=2n of an nnn-qubit system: a reconstruction needs on the order of d2d^2d2 measurement settings. Entanglement witnesses are cheap but exist only for special states.

Direct fidelity estimation (S. T. Flammia and Y.-K. Liu, arXiv:1104.4695, Phys. Rev. Lett. 106, 230501, 2011; the same idea appears in M. P. da Silva, O. Landon-Cardinal and D. Poulin, arXiv:1104.3835) estimates only the one number the experimentalist needs, the fidelity of the prepared state σ\sigmaσ to the target pure state ρ\rhoρ. It measures a constant number of randomly chosen Pauli observables, independent of nnn, and needs only single-qubit measurements. The method has since become a standard benchmarking tool in experimental quantum information.

Setting

Consider nnn qubits, d=2nd = 2^nd=2n. Let WkW_kWk​, kkk ranging over the d2=4nd^2 = 4^nd2=4n labels in {0,1,2,3}n\{0,1,2,3\}^n{0,1,2,3}n, be the nnn-fold tensor products of the single-qubit matrices I,σx,σy,σzI, \sigma_x, \sigma_y, \sigma_zI,σx​,σy​,σz​. The characteristic function of a d×dd\times dd×d matrix ρ\rhoρ is

χρ(k)=tr(ρWk/d).\chi_\rho(k) = \mathrm{tr}(\rho W_k/\sqrt d).χρ​(k)=tr(ρWk​/d​).

The target ρ\rhoρ is a pure state, ρ=∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣\rho = |\psi\rangle\langle\psi|ρ=∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣ with ∥ψ∥=1\|\psi\| = 1∥ψ∥=1; the prepared σ\sigmaσ is an arbitrary state (positive semidefinite, trace one). For pure ρ\rhoρ the fidelity is F(ρ,σ)=tr(ρσ)F(\rho,\sigma) = \mathrm{tr}(\rho\sigma)F(ρ,σ)=tr(ρσ), and tr(ρσ)=∑kχρ(k)χσ(k)\mathrm{tr}(\rho\sigma) = \sum_k\chi_\rho(k)\chi_\sigma(k)tr(ρσ)=∑k​χρ​(k)χσ​(k).

Given an additive error ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 and a failure probability δ>0\delta>0δ>0, the protocol runs in two stages.

  1. Importance sampling. Draw ℓ=⌈1/(ε2δ)⌉\ell = \lceil 1/(\varepsilon^2\delta)\rceilℓ=⌈1/(ε2δ)⌉ labels k1,…,kℓk_1,\dots,k_\ellk1​,…,kℓ​ independently with probability Pr⁡(k)=χρ(k)2\Pr(k) = \chi_\rho(k)^2Pr(k)=χρ​(k)2. The ideal estimator is Y=1ℓ∑iXiY = \frac1\ell\sum_i X_iY=ℓ1​∑i​Xi​, Xi=χσ(ki)/χρ(ki)X_i = \chi_\sigma(k_i)/\chi_\rho(k_i)Xi​=χσ​(ki​)/χρ​(ki​).
  2. Finite precision. For each iii, measure the observable WkiW_{k_i}Wki​​ on
mi=⌈2d χρ(ki)2 ℓ ε2log⁡(2/δ)⌉m_i = \Big\lceil\frac{2}{d\,\chi_\rho(k_i)^2\,\ell\,\varepsilon^2}\log(2/\delta)\Big\rceilmi​=⌈dχρ​(ki​)2ℓε22​log(2/δ)⌉

copies of σ\sigmaσ. Each measurement gives an outcome Aij∈{1,−1}A_{ij}\in\{1,-1\}Aij​∈{1,−1} with mean tr(σWki)=d χσ(ki)\mathrm{tr}(\sigma W_{k_i}) = \sqrt d\,\chi_\sigma(k_i)tr(σWki​​)=d​χσ​(ki​), independently. The output is

Y~=1ℓ∑i=1ℓX~i,X~i=1mid χρ(ki)∑j=1miAij.\tilde Y = \frac1\ell\sum_{i=1}^\ell\tilde X_i,\qquad \tilde X_i = \frac{1}{m_i\sqrt d\,\chi_\rho(k_i)}\sum_{j=1}^{m_i}A_{ij}.Y~=ℓ1​i=1∑ℓ​X~i​,X~i​=mi​d​χρ​(ki​)1​j=1∑mi​​Aij​.

Formalization targets

Goal: the direct-fidelity-estimation guarantee (p. 2)

For every nnn, every pure ρ\rhoρ, every state σ\sigmaσ and every ε,δ>0\varepsilon,\delta>0ε,δ>0,

Pr⁡[ tr(ρσ)∈[Y~−2ε, Y~+2ε] ] ≥ 1−2δ,\Pr\Big[\,\mathrm{tr}(\rho\sigma)\in[\tilde Y-2\varepsilon,\ \tilde Y+2\varepsilon]\,\Big]\ \ge\ 1-2\delta ,Pr[tr(ρσ)∈[Y~−2ε, Y~+2ε]] ≥ 1−2δ,

the probability being over both stages of the protocol.

Milestones

  • the fidelity formula (1) and the Pauli expansion (2) (p. 1), and the normalization of (3) (footnote [6], p. 4);
  • unbiasedness EX=tr(ρσ)\mathbb E X = \mathrm{tr}(\rho\sigma)EX=tr(ρσ) and the variance bound Var(X)≤tr(σ2)−[tr(ρσ)]2≤1\mathrm{Var}(X)\le\mathrm{tr}(\sigma^2)-[\mathrm{tr}(\rho\sigma)]^2\le1Var(X)≤tr(σ2)−[tr(ρσ)]2≤1 ((12)–(14), p. 6);
  • the ideal-estimator bound (5), Pr⁡[∣Y−tr(ρσ)∣≥ε]≤δ\Pr[|Y-\mathrm{tr}(\rho\sigma)|\ge\varepsilon]\le\deltaPr[∣Y−tr(ρσ)∣≥ε]≤δ;
  • Hoeffding's bound (16)–(17), Pr⁡[∣Y~−Y∣≥t]≤2exp⁡(−2t2/C)\Pr[|\tilde Y - Y|\ge t]\le 2\exp(-2t^2/C)Pr[∣Y~−Y∣≥t]≤2exp(−2t2/C), the computation (18), C≤2ε2/log⁡(2/δ)C\le2\varepsilon^2/\log(2/\delta)C≤2ε2/log(2/δ), and the finite-precision bound (8), Pr⁡[∣Y~−Y∣≥ε]≤δ\Pr[|\tilde Y - Y|\ge\varepsilon]\le\deltaPr[∣Y~−Y∣≥ε]≤δ for every fixed k1,…,kℓk_1,\dots,k_\ellk1​,…,kℓ​;
  • the resource bounds (9)–(10) on the expected number of copies and the deterministic bound mi≤1+2log⁡(2/δ)/(α2ℓε2)m_i\le1+2\log(2/\delta)/(\alpha^2\ell\varepsilon^2)mi​≤1+2log(2/δ)/(α2ℓε2) for well-conditioned states.

Significance

The guarantee says that ℓ=⌈1/(ε2δ)⌉\ell = \lceil1/(\varepsilon^2\delta)\rceilℓ=⌈1/(ε2δ)⌉ Pauli settings suffice to estimate the fidelity of any nnn-qubit state to any pure target, whatever nnn. The number of copies of σ\sigmaσ is O(d)O(d)O(d) in expectation in the worst case and constant for stabilizer states, while the paper's lower bounds show that full tomography with Pauli measurements needs a number of copies polynomial in ddd. The same scheme, applied to the Choi state, certifies unitary channels and Clifford circuits.

The result is proved on paper but has not been machine-checked. A formal proof requires the Pauli-basis machinery (orthogonality and completeness of the nnn-qubit Pauli operators), the Born-rule model of repeated Pauli measurements, and the combination of a second-moment bound with a sub-Gaussian bound through a two-stage union bound. The formalization also corrects a printed slip: the paper's equality (13) holds only as an inequality (see the milestone's note), which does not affect the result.

Difficulty

Each individual step is classical: Chebyshev's inequality for the first stage, Hoeffding's inequality for the second. The difficulty lies in the bookkeeping that the informal proof leaves implicit. The first-stage estimator involves 1/χρ(k)1/\chi_\rho(k)1/χρ​(k), which is undefined at labels the sampling never produces, so every probability must be weighted by Pr⁡(k)\Pr(k)Pr(k). The second-stage bound holds conditionally on the labels, and its sample sizes mim_imi​ depend on them, so the two stages cannot be treated as one product of independent variables. The constant in Hoeffding's bound must be tracked through the d\sqrt dd​ factors of χ\chiχ and of EAij\mathbb E A_{ij}EAij​, and through the ceiling in mim_imi​. Finally, the Pauli expansion (2) requires the trace orthogonality tr(WkWk′)=d δkk′\mathrm{tr}(W_kW_{k'}) = d\,\delta_{kk'}tr(Wk​Wk′​)=dδkk′​ of nnn-fold tensor products, which is not in Mathlib.

Formalization scope

  • Basis labels are Q n := Fin n → Fin 2, Pauli labels P n := Fin n → Fin 4; matrices are Matrix (Q n) (Q n) ℂ, and WkW_kWk​ is the entrywise product ∏i(Pki)xiyi\prod_i(P_{k_i})_{x_iy_i}∏i​(Pki​​)xi​yi​​. ddd is the real number 2n2^n2n.
  • Traces are real parts of complex traces (real on Hermitian matrices); χρ(k)\chi_\rho(k)χρ​(k) is real-valued.
  • States are WildeQIT.IsDensityOperator (positive semidefinite, trace one), referenced from the platform; purity is ρ=ψψ†\rho = \psi\psi^\daggerρ=ψψ† with ψ†ψ=1\psi^\dagger\psi = 1ψ†ψ=1.
  • ⌈⋅⌉\lceil\cdot\rceil⌈⋅⌉ is Nat.ceil, log⁡\loglog the natural logarithm.
  • The first stage is a finite sum over label tuples weighted by ∏iχρ(ki)2\prod_i\chi_\rho(k_i)^2∏i​χρ​(ki​)2. The second stage is an explicit product measure: each AijA_{ij}Aij​ is +1+1+1 with probability (1+tr(σWki))/2(1+\mathrm{tr}(\sigma W_{k_i}))/2(1+tr(σWki​​))/2 and −1-1−1 otherwise. This Born-rule law is the unique ±1\pm1±1 law with the page's mean d χσ(ki)\sqrt d\,\chi_\sigma(k_i)d​χσ​(ki​). The outcomes are not arbitrary random variables with hypothesised means, which would make the goal vacuous or false.
  • Statements that divide by χρ(ki)\chi_\rho(k_i)χρ​(ki​) either weight by Pr⁡(ki)\Pr(k_i)Pr(ki​) or assume χρ(ki)≠0\chi_\rho(k_i)\neq0χρ​(ki​)=0; none quantifies over all labels without weights.
  • (9), (10), (18) and the well-conditioned bound assume δ<1\delta<1δ<1, so that log⁡(2/δ)>0\log(2/\delta)>0log(2/δ)>0; the goal, (5) and (8) carry no such hypothesis.
  • The goal does not mention variances, Chebyshev, Hoeffding's constant or (15), and it quantifies over every nnn, pure ρ\rhoρ, state σ\sigmaσ and ε,δ>0\varepsilon,\delta>0ε,δ>0. It cannot be discharged by a special case or a degenerate measure.

A complete development needs the Pauli-basis lemmas (Hermiticity, Wk2=IW_k^2 = IWk2​=I, trace orthogonality and the expansion of a matrix in the Pauli basis), a Born-rule lemma for ±1\pm1±1 observables, and Hoeffding and Chebyshev bounds specialised to finite product measures. The Pauli-basis lemmas are reusable well beyond this mission (stabilizer formalism, shadow tomography, randomized benchmarking). Proofs of any milestone, and of auxiliary Pauli-basis facts, are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. T. Flammia and Y.-K. Liu, Direct fidelity estimation from few Pauli measurements, Phys. Rev. Lett. 106, 230501 (2011); arXiv:1104.4695v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/1104.4695
  • M. P. da Silva, O. Landon-Cardinal and D. Poulin, Practical characterization of quantum devices without tomography, Phys. Rev. Lett. 107, 210404 (2011). https://arxiv.org/abs/1104.3835
  • R. Jozsa, Fidelity for mixed quantum states, J. Mod. Opt. 41, 2315 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1080/09500349414552171
  • W. Hoeffding, Probability inequalities for sums of bounded random variables, J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 58, 13–30 (1963). https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1963.10500830
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Linear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Secretaries with Advice 5: With Binary-Classifier Advice of Recall p and Specificity p′, the Optimal Success Probability Tends to ((1−p′)/p)^((1−p′)/p′)·e^((p−1)/p′)Research Paper

Motivation

A secretary problem asks a decision maker to choose one candidate from a sequence, without being able to recall a rejected candidate. Each arrival reveals how the candidate compares with those seen earlier, but the decision maker does not know the candidate's final rank. A classifier can provide an additional Yes or No signal about whether the current candidate is the best overall. The natural performance question is how much this signal improves the chance of selecting the best candidate when the number of arrivals grows. Dütting, Lattanzi, Paes Leme and Vassilvitskii give an exact finite linear program for this setting and an explicit asymptotic value. This mission makes the limit and its finite prerequisites precise.

The classifier's quality has two parameters with different meanings. Recall ppp is the probability of a Yes signal for the top candidate. Specificity p′p'p′ is the probability of a No signal for any other candidate. Both lie in [1/2,1][1/2,1][1/2,1], as in Example 5 of the paper. At p=p′=1/2p=p'=1/2p=p′=1/2 the signal conveys no information, while p=p′=1p=p'=1p=p′=1 is perfect advice. These endpoints matter to the statement rather than being omitted as special cases. Example 5, pp. 7–8.

Setting

There are n≥1n\ge1n≥1 arrivals, indexed by i=1,…,ni=1,\ldots,ni=1,…,n. Their ranks form a uniformly random permutation; the maximum rank is the candidate to select. At each arrival, the observer sees the relative ranking of candidates already seen and a signal s∈{Y,N}s\in\{Y,N\}s∈{Y,N} from the classifier. An admissible decision can depend on this observed history and may use a stopping probability. It cannot inspect a candidate's hidden final rank. The paper shows that, for this signal model, the optimal stopping probability is characterized by a finite primal linear program. Sections 2 and 6.

For each round and signal, zis∈[0,1]z_i^s\in[0,1]zis​∈[0,1] is a primal variable. Put zˉj=(1−p′)zjY+p′zjN\bar z_j=(1-p')z_j^Y+p'z_j^Nzˉj​=(1−p′)zjY​+p′zjN​. The program has constraints zis≤1−∑j<izˉj/jz_i^s\le1-\sum_{j<i}\bar z_j/jzis​≤1−∑j<i​zˉj​/j, and its objective is ∑i=1n[pziY+(1−p)ziN]/n\sum_{i=1}^n[pz_i^Y+(1-p)z_i^N]/n∑i=1n​[pziY​+(1−p)ziN​]/n. Write Opt⁡(n,p,p′)\operatorname{Opt}(n,p,p')Opt(n,p,p′) for its optimal value. The constraints account for the chance that an earlier candidate has already been selected; the objective weights winning selections by the signal probabilities of the top candidate. This is the Opt⁡\operatorname{Opt}Opt of Section 6, rather than a value defined by an asymptotic formula. Section 6, p. 20.

The paper also considers a rescaled dual with variables wiY,wiNw_i^Y,w_i^NwiY​,wiN​ and an associated pair of thresholds tY,tNt_Y,t_NtY​,tN​. The thresholds are the first rounds at which the corresponding greedy dual coordinate is positive. In the finite formalization, n+1n+1n+1 records a signal whose coordinate is never positive. Proof of Theorem 20, p. 21.

Formalization targets

The main target is the limiting primal optimum for every p,p′∈[1/2,1]p,p'\in[1/2,1]p,p′∈[1/2,1]:

lim⁡n→∞Opt⁡(n,p,p′)=(1−p′p)(1−p′)/p′exp⁡(p−1p′).\lim_{n\to\infty}\operatorname{Opt}(n,p,p') =\left(\frac{1-p'}p\right)^{(1-p')/p'} \exp\left(\frac{p-1}{p'}\right).n→∞lim​Opt(n,p,p′)=(p1−p′​)(1−p′)/p′exp(p′p−1​).

The finite milestones identify the primal optimum with the greedy dual objective, give the exact late dual coordinates and the exact range of the early YYY recursion, and establish tY≤tNt_Y\le t_NtY​≤tN​. The asymptotic milestones state

tNn⟶exp⁡(p−1p′),tYn⟶(1−p′p)1/p′exp⁡(p−1p′).\frac{t_N}{n}\longrightarrow \exp\left(\frac{p-1}{p'}\right),\qquad \frac{t_Y}{n}\longrightarrow \left(\frac{1-p'}p\right)^{1/p'}\exp\left(\frac{p-1}{p'}\right).ntN​​⟶exp(p′p−1​),ntY​​⟶(p1−p′​)1/p′exp(p′p−1​).

A separate companion target gives the finite lower bound Opt⁡(n,p,p′)≥L(p,p′)\operatorname{Opt}(n,p,p')\ge L(p,p')Opt(n,p,p′)≥L(p,p′), where LLL denotes the displayed limit. Theorem 20 states the corresponding infimum inequality but does not separately prove it. Theorem 20 and its proof, pp. 20–22.

Significance

The limit quantifies the benefit of advice across the whole parameter square, including asymmetric classifiers. It recovers the classical value e−1e^{-1}e−1 when p=p′=1/2p=p'=1/2p=p′=1/2, and gives value 111 for perfect advice. The two threshold limits say when each signal begins to justify stopping as the horizon grows. Thus the result specifies both the achievable success probability and the scale of the optimal decisions. Theorem 20, p. 20.

The paper already proves threshold optimality through its linear program and presents the limit calculation. The formalization work here is to establish a full Lean limit theorem from an exact finite LP, including the two endpoint regimes and a finite dual characterization. The nearby classical secretary threshold limit on Prove2Me uses a different rank-based model; it does not state this classifier result. Definitions of the primal feasible set and the backward dual sequence can support later results about other advice distributions.

Difficulty

The source uses approximations throughout its asymptotic argument and explicitly omits terms that vanish as nnn grows. Those omissions cannot be carried into an exact finite statement: the YYY recursion, for example, fails at the round immediately before the NNN threshold because the next NNN dual coordinate is then present. A complete argument has to keep the discrete threshold boundaries and the harmonic sums under control while passing to a limit. The source's displayed theorem also contains an exponent inconsistent with the last equation of its proof; the corrected expression must be checked uniformly, including zero base at p′=1p'=1p′=1. Proof of Theorem 20, pp. 21–22.

Formalization scope

Lean represents time by natural numbers 1,…,n1,\ldots,n1,…,n, matching the paper's displayed LP, and signals by Bool, with true meaning YYY. The primal optimum is the real supremum of objective values over exactly the feasible LP variables. For n≥1n\ge1n≥1 and p,p′∈[1/2,1]p,p'\in[1/2,1]p,p′∈[1/2,1], the zero assignment is feasible and the objective is bounded, so this supremum has its ordinary optimization meaning. Values of a variable array outside 1,…,n1,\ldots,n1,…,n are ignored. The greedy dual is a backward finite recursion, not the definition of Opt⁡\operatorname{Opt}Opt; otherwise the central LP-to-dual milestone would disappear.

The formal thresholds are first positive greedy dual coordinates. If there is no positive NNN coordinate, tN=n+1t_N=n+1tN​=n+1; this occurs when p=1p=1p=1 and has the same normalized limit as the paper's informal tN=nt_N=ntN​=n convention at perfect advice. Real powers use Lean's 00=10^0=100=1, yielding the correct p′=1p'=1p′=1 endpoint. All theorems quantify explicitly over n≥1n\ge1n≥1 where finite rounds are used, and over p,p′∈[1/2,1]p,p'\in[1/2,1]p,p′∈[1/2,1]. The limit uses Filter.Tendsto at infinity. The chapter does not formalize the algorithmic running time, Figures 3 and 7, or the policy-level threshold optimality addressed by the series' preceding mission. Contributions to finite LP duality, harmonic asymptotics, and endpoint analysis are within scope. Sections 6 and Appendix C.

Selected references

  • Paul Dütting, Silvio Lattanzi, Renato Paes Leme and Sergei Vassilvitskii, Secretaries with Advice, arXiv:2011.06726v1, 2020; published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024. Preprint.
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Markov ChainOperations ResearchReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimistic Posterior Sampling for Reinforcement Learning: Worst-Case Regret Bounds I: An Extended MDP with δ-Optimistic Samples for Hitting Times Has Diameter at Most D/(1−δ)Research Paper

Motivation

Regret bounds for reinforcement learning in a single, non-episodic Markov decision process (MDP) are stated in terms of the diameter DDD of the MDP: the worst expected time needed to travel between two states when the travel policy is chosen well. UCRL2 (Jaksch, Ortner and Auer, 2010) achieves regret O~(DSAT)\tilde O(DS\sqrt{AT})O~(DSAT​), against a lower bound of Ω(DSAT)\Omega(\sqrt{DSAT})Ω(DSAT​), by planning in an extended MDP, whose action set lets the planner also pick a transition law from a confidence set. Posterior-sampling methods replace the confidence set with random samples from a posterior. Agrawal and Jia (arXiv:1705.07041v3, published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023) show that such a method attains a high-probability worst-case regret bound of O~(DSAT)\tilde O(DS\sqrt{AT})O~(DSAT​) for every communicating MDP (their Theorem 1).

Their analysis plans in an extended MDP built from finitely many sampled transition vectors. Optimal-gain policies of that MDP are only useful if it is itself communicating with a diameter comparable to DDD, so the paper needs a deterministic statement: if every state-action pair has a sample that is optimistic about travel times, the diameter of the extended MDP is at most D/(1−δ)D/(1-\delta)D/(1−δ). This mission formalizes that statement, Lemma 5.6 of the paper (p. 12), together with three claims from its proof.

Setting

A finite MDP M\mathcal MM has a finite state set S\mathcal SS of size SSS, a finite action set A\mathcal AA of size AAA, a probability vector Ps,a∈ΔSP_{s,a}\in\Delta^{S}Ps,a​∈ΔS for each state sss and action aaa, and rewards rs,a∈[0,1]r_{s,a}\in[0,1]rs,a​∈[0,1]. A deterministic policy is a map π:S→A\pi:\mathcal S\to\mathcal Aπ:S→A; under π\piπ the state process is the Markov chain with transition rows Ps,π(s)P_{s,\pi(s)}Ps,π(s)​.

For states s′s's′ and sss, Ts′→sπ∈[0,∞]T^{\pi}_{s'\to s}\in[0,\infty]Ts′→sπ​∈[0,∞] is the expected number of steps to reach sss when starting at s′s's′ and following π\piπ. It is 000 when s′=ss'=ss′=s. The diameter is

D(M)=max⁡s≠s′ min⁡π:S→ATs→s′π,D(\mathcal M)=\max_{s\neq s'}\ \min_{\pi:\mathcal S\to\mathcal A} T^{\pi}_{s\to s'},D(M)=s=s′max​ π:S→Amin​Ts→s′π​,

and M\mathcal MM is communicating when D(M)<∞D(\mathcal M)<\inftyD(M)<∞ (Definitions 1–3, p. 3). For a target sss, the vector EsE^{s}Es collects the minimum expected times, Es′s=min⁡πTs′→sπE^{s}_{s'}=\min_{\pi}T^{\pi}_{s'\to s}Es′s​=minπ​Ts′→sπ​, so Ess=0E^{s}_{s}=0Ess​=0.

The extended MDP (§3, p. 5) starts from ψ\psiψ probability vectors Qs,a1,…,Qs,aψQ^{1}_{s,a},\dots,Q^{\psi}_{s,a}Qs,a1​,…,Qs,aψ​ for every pair (s,a)(s,a)(s,a). In the algorithm these are posterior samples, but here they are arbitrary. The extended MDP M~\tilde{\mathcal M}M~ has the same states and, for every action aaa, the actions a1,…,aψa^{1},\dots,a^{\psi}a1,…,aψ. Taking aja^{j}aj in sss gives reward rs,ar_{s,a}rs,a​, and the next state is drawn from Qs,ajQ^{j}_{s,a}Qs,aj​. Its diameter D(M~)D(\tilde{\mathcal M})D(M~) is defined as above, minimizing over policies π~:S→{aj}\tilde\pi:\mathcal S\to\{a^{j}\}π~:S→{aj}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 5.6

Let δ∈[0,1)\delta\in[0,1)δ∈[0,1). Suppose that for every target state sss, every state s′s's′ and every action aaa there is a sample index jjj with

Qs′,aj⋅Es ≤ Ps′,a⋅Es+δ.(16)Q^{j}_{s',a}\cdot E^{s}\ \le\ P_{s',a}\cdot E^{s}+\delta. \tag{16}Qs′,aj​⋅Es ≤ Ps′,a​⋅Es+δ.(16)

Then

D(M~) ≤ D(M)1−δ.D(\tilde{\mathcal M})\ \le\ \frac{D(\mathcal M)}{1-\delta}.D(M~) ≤ 1−δD(M)​.

Milestones (claims of the proof, p. 13)

  1. In a communicating MDP with at least one action, for every target s2s_2s2​ there is one deterministic policy π\piπ with Ts′→s2π=Es′s2T^{\pi}_{s'\to s_2}=E^{s_2}_{s'}Ts′→s2​π​=Es′s2​​ for every s′s's′.
  2. First-step analysis: for every policy π\piπ and s≠s2s\neq s_2s=s2​,
Ts→s2π=1+∑s′≠s2Ps,π(s)(s′) Ts′→s2π.T^{\pi}_{s\to s_2}=1+\sum_{s'\neq s_2}P_{s,\pi(s)}(s')\,T^{\pi}_{s'\to s_2}.Ts→s2​π​=1+s′=s2​∑​Ps,π(s)​(s′)Ts′→s2​π​.
  1. Comparison (display (17)): if E∈[0,∞]SE\in[0,\infty]^{\mathcal S}E∈[0,∞]S satisfies 1+∑s′≠s2Qs,π~(s)(s′)Es′≤Es+δ1+\sum_{s'\neq s_2}Q_{s,\tilde\pi(s)}(s')E_{s'}\le E_s+\delta1+∑s′=s2​​Qs,π~(s)​(s′)Es′​≤Es​+δ for all s≠s2s\neq s_2s=s2​, then (1−δ) Ts→s2π~≤Es(1-\delta)\,T^{\tilde\pi}_{s\to s_2}\le E_s(1−δ)Ts→s2​π~​≤Es​ for all s≠s2s\neq s_2s=s2​.

Significance

The result. Lemma 5.6 turns a per-pair, one-sided condition on samples into a global bound on the diameter. Agrawal and Jia combine it with their Lemma 5.7, which shows that (16) holds with δ≤1/2\delta\le 1/2δ≤1/2 with high probability for their posterior samples. Together these give D(M~k)≤2DD(\tilde{\mathcal M}^{k})\le 2DD(M~k)≤2D in every epoch, which is what lets the bias span of the sampled MDP enter their regret analysis. The lemma is deterministic and makes no use of how the samples were drawn, so it applies to any optimistic-sampling or perturbation scheme that produces vectors satisfying (16).

Formalizing it. The lemma is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version exists. The paper's proof assumes that every sampled entry is strictly positive ("drawn from Dirichlet distribution") so that the absorbing chain and its fundamental matrix are well defined. That assumption fails for the simple optimistic samples of the same algorithm, which can have zero entries. The statements here drop it, so a formal proof also settles the general case. Milestones 1 and 2 are standard facts about minimum expected hitting times (stochastic shortest paths) that the platform's finite-MDP library does not yet contain. They are reusable for any diameter-based regret analysis.

The main regret bound (Theorem 1) is not posed. Its constants are hidden in O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅), and the algorithm's parameters are given only up to Θ(⋅)\Theta(\cdot)Θ(⋅).

Difficulty

The paper's argument inverts I−Qπ~†I-Q^{\dagger}_{\tilde\pi}I−Qπ~†​ and uses the nonnegativity of the fundamental matrix of an absorbing chain. Without positive entries the policy π~\tilde\piπ~ can have closed classes that avoid the target, so I−Qπ~†I-Q^{\dagger}_{\tilde\pi}I−Qπ~†​ can be singular and the matrix argument does not apply as written. The comparison has to be made with expected travel times that may be infinite.

A second obstacle is that (16) constrains only the minimizing vectors EsE^{s}Es of the true MDP. The bound therefore needs a policy of M\mathcal MM whose travel times equal Es2E^{s_2}Es2​ from every state at once, not merely from the starting state s1s_1s1​. The existence of such a uniformly optimal deterministic policy is not immediate from the definition of the diameter, which minimizes separately for each pair of states.

Finally, the platform's expected travel time is defined through finite-horizon trajectory laws, so first-step analysis is a Markov-property computation on those measures. It does not follow from the definition by unfolding alone.

Formalization scope

  • Library. The mission reuses the published definitions FiniteMDPLearning (namespace BanditAlgorithm): FiniteMDP S A, mdpTravelTime M f src tgt (the expected hitting time minus one, valued in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], equal to Tsrc→tgtfT^{f}_{src\to tgt}Tsrc→tgtf​), and mdpDiameterENN M (Definition 2 verbatim, valued in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]). The mission's own definitions file adds extendedMDP, extendedAction and minTravel (the vector EsE^{s}Es).
  • Indexing. States, actions and samples are 0-based (Fin S, Fin A, Fin ψ). The action aja^{j}aj of the extended MDP is finProdFinEquiv (a, j) : Fin (A * ψ). The epoch index kkk plays no role and is dropped.
  • Extended values. Travel times, diameters, the vectors EsE^{s}Es and the inner products Q⋅EsQ\cdot E^{s}Q⋅Es are computed in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] with 0⋅∞=00\cdot\infty=00⋅∞=0. The bound D/(1−δ)D/(1-\delta)D/(1−δ) is division in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] by the positive real 1−δ1-\delta1−δ, with δ∈[0,1)\delta\in[0,1)δ∈[0,1) as δ : ℝ≥0, δ < 1.
  • Quantifiers of (16). The printed (16) uses the letter sss both for the target of EsE^{s}Es and for the state in Ps,aP_{s,a}Ps,a​. The proof applies it at the current state with a different target, so the goal quantifies the target separately: for every target, state and action there is a sample.
  • Pinned hypotheses. Milestone 1 assumes D(M)<∞D(\mathcal M)<\inftyD(M)<∞ (the paper's "M\mathcal MM has diameter DDD") and A≥1A\ge1A≥1. The goal assumes neither: if D(M)=∞D(\mathcal M)=\inftyD(M)=∞ its bound is trivially true, so it generalizes the paper's statement. No statement assumes positivity of the sampled entries or any distribution of the samples.
  • Ruled-out trivializations. An extended MDP whose transitions ignore jjj or QQQ, an EsE^{s}Es that is not the infimum over policies, a hypothesis comparing QQQ and PPP against different vectors, and a real-valued conclusion through a truncation with junk value 000 for non-communicating MDPs would each make the goal vacuous or different. None is used.
  • Useful existing result. The platform has the proved drift criterion BanditAlgorithm.mdp_travel_time_le_of_lyapunov_drift (a real-valued nonnegative VVV with ∑s′Ps,f(s)(s′)V(s′)+1≤V(s)\sum_{s'}P_{s,f(s)}(s')V(s')+1\le V(s)∑s′​Ps,f(s)​(s′)V(s′)+1≤V(s) off the target bounds the travel time by VVV), which covers the case δ=0\delta=0δ=0 of milestone 3 for finite EEE.
  • Welcome contributions. Proofs of the three milestones and of the goal; a general first-step (Markov property) lemma for mdpMeasure; an existence theorem for uniformly optimal deterministic policies of minimum expected hitting time.

Selected references

  • S. Agrawal and R. Jia, Posterior sampling for reinforcement learning: worst-case regret bounds, arXiv:1705.07041v3, 2020; published as Optimistic posterior sampling for reinforcement learning: worst-case regret bounds, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.07041
  • T. Jaksch, R. Ortner and P. Auer, Near-optimal regret bounds for reinforcement learning, Journal of Machine Learning Research 11, 2010. https://www.jmlr.org/papers/v11/jaksch10a.html
  • D. P. Bertsekas and J. N. Tsitsiklis, An analysis of stochastic shortest path problems, Mathematics of Operations Research 16(3), 1991. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.16.3.580
  • C. M. Grinstead and J. L. Snell, Introduction to Probability, American Mathematical Society, 2nd revised edition, 1997 (Chapter 11, absorbing Markov chains). https://math.dartmouth.edu/~prob/prob/prob.pdf
  • T. Lattimore and C. Szepesvári, Bandit Algorithms, Cambridge University Press, 2020 (Chapter 38, MDPs and the diameter). https://tor-lattimore.com/downloads/book/book.pdf
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption I: Blockchain Adoption Raises Total Welfare for Large Horizontal Differentiation Yet Is Not an EquilibriumResearch Paper

Why blockchain adoption in supply chains is an economic question

A permissioned blockchain is a shared ledger that only invited parties may write to. In supply chains it is promoted as a way to make the provenance and quality of goods verifiable by the end consumer: a manufacturer who joins records how a good was produced, and consumers can read that record. Joining is costly, and the parties who pay the cost are not the parties who benefit most from the information. Whether such a technology is adopted at all is therefore a question about incentives, not engineering.

G. Iyengar, F. Saleh, J. Sethuraman and W. Wang, Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption (SSRN 3602376; Management Science, 2023, DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4532), build a stylised supply chain with vendors, price-competing manufacturers and consumers with an outside option, and show that welfare-improving adoption can fail to arise in equilibrium. This mission formalizes the first of the paper's two main results, Proposition 4.8, together with the welfare comparisons it rests on. A companion mission formalizes the second, the self-financing transfers of Proposition 4.9.

The supply chain

There are two vendors, of high and low quality h>l≥0h > l \ge 0h>l≥0, and a set MMM of 4m4m4m manufacturers, m≥2m \ge 2m≥2 of each type (qi,ξi)∈{A,B}×{h,l}(q_i,\xi_i) \in \{A,B\}\times\{h,l\}(qi​,ξi​)∈{A,B}×{h,l}. A consumer of horizontal type tkt_ktk​ obtains utility HHH from a good with qi=tkq_i = t_kqi​=tk​ and LLL otherwise, plus the vertical utility ξi\xi_iξi​; here 0≤L<H0 \le L < H0≤L<H, and Δ:=H−L>0\Delta := H - L > 0Δ:=H−L>0 measures horizontal differentiation. Consumers can always take an outside option φk\varphi_kφk​, drawn from a continuous distribution GGG supported on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). The high type vendor produces at cost ch(x)=γxc_h(x) = \gamma xch​(x)=γx, γ>0\gamma > 0γ>0; the low type vendor at a strictly increasing convex cost clc_lcl​ with cl(0)=0c_l(0)=0cl​(0)=0 and strictly increasing derivative cl′c_l'cl′​ (Assumption 1, items 1–2).

Manufacturer iii may join the blockchain at cost χi>0\chi_i > 0χi​>0 (ai=1a_i = 1ai​=1) or not (ai=0a_i = 0ai​=0). Three scenarios are compared: full adoption FFF (all adopt), partial adoption PPP (exactly the high type manufacturers adopt) and non-adoption NNN. The paper's Proposition A.1 gives each scenario's equilibrium in closed form: every consumer's best manufacturer offers utility

uF=uP=H+h−γ,uN=H+L+h+l2−γ,u^F = u^P = H + h - \gamma,\qquad u^N = \tfrac{H+L+h+l}{2} - \gamma,uF=uP=H+h−γ,uN=2H+L+h+l​−γ,

the low type vendor price is ΨlF=max⁡{γ−(h−l),0}\Psi^F_l = \max\{\gamma-(h-l),0\}ΨlF​=max{γ−(h−l),0}, ΨlP=max⁡{γ−(h−l)−H−L2,0}\Psi^P_l = \max\{\gamma-(h-l)-\frac{H-L}{2},0\}ΨlP​=max{γ−(h−l)−2H−L​,0}, ΨlN=γ\Psi^N_l = \gammaΨlN​=γ (the high type price is always γ\gammaγ), the low type market shares are slF=(cl′)−1(γ−(h−l))s^F_l = (c_l')^{-1}(\gamma-(h-l))slF​=(cl′​)−1(γ−(h−l)), slP=(cl′)−1(γ−(h−l)−H−L2)s^P_l = (c_l')^{-1}(\gamma-(h-l)-\frac{H-L}{2})slP​=(cl′​)−1(γ−(h−l)−2H−L​), slN=(cl′)−1(γ)s^N_l = (c_l')^{-1}(\gamma)slN​=(cl′​)−1(γ), and shX=G(uX)−slXs^X_h = G(u^X) - s^X_lshX​=G(uX)−slX​. Manufacturers earn zero gross profit Π\PiΠ in every scenario because of price competition.

Welfare in scenario XXX is the sum WX=WVX+WMX+WCXW^X = W^X_V + W^X_M + W^X_CWX=WVX​+WMX​+WCX​ of vendor welfare WVXW^X_VWVX​ (revenue minus production cost of both vendors, (10)), manufacturer welfare WMX=∑i(Π−χiaiX)W^X_M = \sum_{i}(\Pi - \chi_i a^X_i)WMX​=∑i​(Π−χi​aiX​) and consumer welfare WCX=E[max⁡{uX,φ}]W^X_C = \mathbb E[\max\{u^X,\varphi\}]WCX​=E[max{uX,φ}] ((12)). The adoption game (8) lets each manufacturer choose aia_iai​ to maximise Π(ai,a−i)−χiai\Pi(a_i,a_{-i}) - \chi_i a_iΠ(ai​,a−i​)−χi​ai​. An adoption failure is a situation in which full adoption raises total welfare, WF>WNW^F > W^NWF>WN, but is not an equilibrium of the adoption game.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4.8 (p. 19)

With LLL fixed and H=L+ΔH = L + \DeltaH=L+Δ,

∃ Δ‾  ∀ Δ>Δ‾:WF(Δ)>WN(Δ)  and full adoption is not an equilibrium,\exists\,\underline\Delta\ \ \forall\,\Delta > \underline\Delta:\quad W^F(\Delta) > W^N(\Delta)\ \text{ and full adoption is not an equilibrium},∃Δ​  ∀Δ>Δ​:WF(Δ)>WN(Δ)  and full adoption is not an equilibrium,

at every such Δ\DeltaΔ at which Assumption 1 holds. The threshold Δ‾\underline\DeltaΔ​ is left unspecified, as in the paper.

Milestones

  • Proposition 4.1 (pp. 15–16): WCF≥WCP>WCNW^F_C \ge W^P_C > W^N_CWCF​≥WCP​>WCN​.
  • Proposition 4.3 (p. 17): WMF<WMP<WMNW^F_M < W^P_M < W^N_MWMF​<WMP​<WMN​.
  • Proposition 4.4 (p. 17): WVF, WVP<WVNW^F_V,\ W^P_V < W^N_VWVF​, WVP​<WVN​.
  • Proposition 4.6 (p. 18): WF,WP>WNW^F, W^P > W^NWF,WP>WN for all sufficiently large Δ\DeltaΔ; at fixed Δ\DeltaΔ, WF<WNW^F < W^NWF<WN once ∑i∈Mχi\sum_{i\in M}\chi_i∑i∈M​χi​ is large and WP<WNW^P < W^NWP<WN once ∑i:ξi=hχi\sum_{i:\xi_i=h}\chi_i∑i:ξi​=h​χi​ is large.
  • Proposition 4.7 (p. 19): neither full nor partial adoption is an equilibrium.

What the result gives

The proposition isolates a mechanism: blockchain information raises consumer surplus, which grows without bound in Δ\DeltaΔ, while Bertrand competition prevents the manufacturers who pay for adoption from capturing any of it. The conclusion is a market failure that persists however valuable the information is, and it motivates the paper's transfer scheme (Proposition 4.9), in which a consumer access fee finances the adopters. The welfare comparisons of Propositions 4.1–4.6 are reusable on their own: they quantify who gains and who loses from information disclosure in a vertically and horizontally differentiated market.

The results are proved in the paper (App. A.2, pp. 33–36). None is machine-checked. This mission produces a checked version of the welfare comparisons and of the failure result in the reduced form described below; the proofs as printed use a density for GGG and a second derivative of clc_lcl​, neither of which the model assumes, so a formal proof has to avoid both.

Where the difficulty lies

The equilibrium part is light once the gross profit is zero. The substance is in the welfare comparisons. Consumer welfare is an expectation E[max⁡{u,φ}]\mathbb E[\max\{u,\varphi\}]E[max{u,φ}] of an outside option with an arbitrary continuous law: strict monotonicity in uuu needs positive mass of φ\varphiφ below uNu^NuN, which is a consequence of Assumption 1 rather than an assumption, and the growth in Δ\DeltaΔ of WF−WNW^F - W^NWF−WN has to be bounded below without a density. Vendor welfare involves the generalised inverse (cl′)−1(c_l')^{-1}(cl′​)−1, which is 000 below cl′(0)c_l'(0)cl′​(0): the comparison WVF<WVNW^F_V < W^N_VWVF​<WVN​ must handle the regime where the low type vendor's share collapses to zero and the regime where it is interior, and must obtain continuity of cl′c_l'cl′​ from convexity rather than from a second derivative.

Formalization scope

The paper describes a signalling and pricing game but does not define its equilibrium concept precisely; Proposition A.1 states the outcomes and every proof in App. A.2 uses only those closed forms. The mission adopts the same reduced form, disclosed in every item: welfare is evaluated at Proposition A.1's prices, shares and utilities; the manufacturers' gross profit Π\PiΠ is the constant 000 for every adoption profile (the paper's statement in the proof of Proposition 4.3, p. 34); an equilibrium of the adoption stage is a pure Nash equilibrium of (8) with that payoff, expressed with AGT.IsPureNash from the published agt_games vocabulary. The signal accuracy is fixed at α=1/2\alpha = 1/2α=1/2, as in the paper's main text.

Conventions: manufacturers are Fin 2 × Bool × Fin m (the Boolean records ξi=h\xi_i = hξi​=h), adoption profiles are Boolean functions, GGG is ProbabilityTheory.cdf μ for a probability measure μ\muμ on R\mathbb RR, Δ\DeltaΔ is an argument of every statement with H=L+ΔH = L + \DeltaH=L+Δ, and (cl′)−1(x)=sup⁡{s≥0:cl′(s)≤x}(c_l')^{-1}(x) = \sup\{s \ge 0 : c_l'(s) \le x\}(cl′​)−1(x)=sup{s≥0:cl′​(s)≤x}. The standing assumptions are bundled in Model.Standing: m≥2m \ge 2m≥2, 0≤L0 \le L0≤L, 0≤l<h0 \le l < h0≤l<h, γ>0\gamma > 0γ>0, χi>0\chi_i > 0χi​>0, μ\muμ an atomless probability measure with μ((−∞,0))=0\mu((-\infty,0)) = 0μ((−∞,0))=0 and positive mass on every interval (a,b)⊆[0,∞)(a,b) \subseteq [0,\infty)(a,b)⊆[0,∞), clc_lcl​ strictly increasing and convex on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with cl(0)=0c_l(0) = 0cl​(0)=0 and a strictly increasing derivative there. One hypothesis is added to the paper's: φ\varphiφ has a finite mean, which the paper uses (its proof of Proposition 4.1 integrates v p(v)v\,p(v)vp(v)) without stating it. Assumption 1, item 3, depends on Δ\DeltaΔ through HHH and is a hypothesis at each Δ\DeltaΔ; it is satisfiable (for instance with cl(x)=x2c_l(x) = x^2cl​(x)=x2, φ∼Exp(1)\varphi \sim \mathrm{Exp}(1)φ∼Exp(1), γ=1/2\gamma = 1/2γ=1/2, h=1h=1h=1, L=l=0L=l=0L=l=0, Δ=4\Delta = 4Δ=4) and monotone in Δ\DeltaΔ.

The formalization rules out the trivializing readings: the equilibrium predicate is concrete, not an abstract hypothesis; the integrals are of integrable functions, so no junk value 000 enters; the inverse of cl′c_l'cl′​ is the explicit supremum, not Function.invFun; and LLL, not HHH, is held fixed as Δ\DeltaΔ grows.

Needed infrastructure: expectations of max⁡{c,φ}\max\{c,\varphi\}max{c,φ} as a function of ccc (monotonicity, growth), and the generalised inverse of a strictly increasing derivative of a convex function. Both are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome, as are alternative arguments that avoid the density and the second derivative of the printed proofs.

Selected references

  • G. Iyengar, F. Saleh, J. Sethuraman, W. Wang, Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption, SSRN 3602376, version of 2022-08-19. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3602376
  • G. Iyengar, F. Saleh, J. Sethuraman, W. Wang, Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption, Management Science, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4532
  • N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, V. Vazirani (eds.), Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2007, Ch. 1 (pure Nash equilibrium). https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511800481
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EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Gathering Information before Negotiation I: The Buyer's Optimal Information Acquisition Increases with Its Bargaining Power and First Increases, Then Decreases with the Seller's CostResearch Paper

Motivation

Many transactions are priced by negotiation rather than posted prices: business-to-business procurement, used cars, real estate, the purchase of a company. Before negotiating, a buyer can often spend effort finding out how much the object is actually worth to it, through inspections, trials, consultants or market research. That information serves two purposes. It improves the joint decision of whether to trade at all, and it changes how the surplus of trade is split. Liang Guo's Gathering Information before Negotiation (SSRN 3930651; Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4360) studies how a buyer's endogenous information acquisition interacts with the two primitives of bargaining: the parties' bargaining powers and the seller's cost.

The first finding of the paper, Proposition 1, concerns how much information the buyer gathers. Its comparative statics in the seller's cost are non-monotone, and this non-monotonicity drives the later results of the paper, in which a seller can be worse off with more bargaining power or a lower cost. This mission formalizes Proposition 1 in its general form, for an arbitrary prior. A companion mission (Gathering Information before Negotiation II) formalizes the payoff reversals under a uniform prior and a linear information cost.

Setting

A seller can supply one unit of a product at cost ccc. A buyer's true value uuu of the unit is unknown to both parties; the common prior law of uuu is FFF, with a finite mean u^>0\hat u>0u^>0.

Before negotiating, the buyer acquires a truth-or-noise signal www: with probability α\alphaα the signal equals uuu, and with probability 1−α1-\alpha1−α it is an independent draw from FFF. Because the parties are risk neutral, only the buyer's posterior mean

v≡αw+(1−α)u^v\equiv\alpha w+(1-\alpha)\hat uv≡αw+(1−α)u^

matters. Ex ante, vvv has the distribution function

G(v,α)≡F ⁣(v−(1−α)u^α).G(v,\alpha)\equiv F\!\left(\frac{v-(1-\alpha)\hat u}{\alpha}\right).G(v,α)≡F(αv−(1−α)u^​).

The buyer chooses the informativeness α\alphaα in an interval [α‾,αˉ]⊆(0,1)[\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha]\subseteq(0,1)[α​,αˉ]⊆(0,1) at a cost k(α)k(\alpha)k(α) that is increasing, with k(α‾)=0k(\underline\alpha)=0k(α​)=0 and k(αˉ)>0k(\bar\alpha)>0k(αˉ)>0.

After observing vvv, the parties trade exactly when v>cv>cv>c and split the net surplus v−cv-cv−c according to their bargaining powers θs,θb∈(0,1)\theta_s,\theta_b\in(0,1)θs​,θb​∈(0,1), θs+θb=1\theta_s+\theta_b=1θs​+θb​=1. Anticipating this, the buyer chooses α\alphaα to solve

max⁡α∈[α‾,αˉ] Ub(α)=θb A(α,c)−k(α),A(α,c)=∫cvˉ(v−c) dG(v,α),(6)\max_{\alpha\in[\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha]}\ U_b(\alpha)=\theta_b\,A(\alpha,c)-k(\alpha),\qquad A(\alpha,c)=\int_c^{\bar v}(v-c)\,dG(v,\alpha),\tag{6}α∈[α​,αˉ]max​ Ub​(α)=θb​A(α,c)−k(α),A(α,c)=∫cvˉ​(v−c)dG(v,α),(6)

where A(α,c)A(\alpha,c)A(α,c) is the total ex ante surplus (7). A solution of (6) is written α∗\alpha^*α∗; in general there may be several, and A∗(θb,c)\mathcal A^*(\theta_b,c)A∗(θb​,c) denotes the set of all of them.

Two sets S,T⊆RS,T\subseteq\mathbb RS,T⊆R are compared in the induced set order S⊑TS\sqsubseteq TS⊑T when min⁡(s,t)∈S\min(s,t)\in Smin(s,t)∈S and max⁡(s,t)∈T\max(s,t)\in Tmax(s,t)∈T for all s∈Ss\in Ss∈S, t∈Tt\in Tt∈T.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1 (p. 10)

Whenever the optimal sets compared are nonempty,

θb≤θb′ ⟹ A∗(θb,c)⊑A∗(θb′,c),\theta_b\le\theta_b'\ \Longrightarrow\ \mathcal A^*(\theta_b,c)\sqsubseteq\mathcal A^*(\theta_b',c),θb​≤θb′​ ⟹ A∗(θb​,c)⊑A∗(θb′​,c), c≤c′≤u^ ⟹ A∗(θb,c)⊑A∗(θb,c′),u^≤c≤c′ ⟹ A∗(θb,c′)⊑A∗(θb,c).c\le c'\le\hat u\ \Longrightarrow\ \mathcal A^*(\theta_b,c)\sqsubseteq\mathcal A^*(\theta_b,c'),\qquad \hat u\le c\le c'\ \Longrightarrow\ \mathcal A^*(\theta_b,c')\sqsubseteq\mathcal A^*(\theta_b,c).c≤c′≤u^ ⟹ A∗(θb​,c)⊑A∗(θb​,c′),u^≤c≤c′ ⟹ A∗(θb​,c′)⊑A∗(θb​,c).

The buyer's optimal information acquisition increases with its bargaining power, and first increases and then decreases with the seller's cost, turning at the prior mean u^\hat uu^.

Milestones

  1. Display (1), p. 7. G(v,α)G(v,\alpha)G(v,α) is nondecreasing in α\alphaα for v<u^v<\hat uv<u^ and nonincreasing for v>u^v>\hat uv>u^: the family rotates about u^\hat uu^.
  2. Display (2) and footnote 7, p. 8. The mean of vvv is u^\hat uu^ for every α\alphaα, and α↦A(α,c)\alpha\mapsto A(\alpha,c)α↦A(α,c) is nondecreasing.
  3. Proof of Proposition 1, p. 30. Integration by parts: Ub(α)=θb∫c∞[1−G(v,α)] dv−k(α)U_b(\alpha)=\theta_b\int_c^{\infty}[1-G(v,\alpha)]\,dv-k(\alpha)Ub​(α)=θb​∫c∞​[1−G(v,α)]dv−k(α).
  4. Proof of Proposition 1, p. 30. UbU_bUb​ has increasing differences in (α,θb)(\alpha,\theta_b)(α,θb​).
  5. Proof of Proposition 1, p. 30. UbU_bUb​ has increasing differences in (α,c)(\alpha,c)(α,c) for c≤u^c\le\hat uc≤u^ and decreasing differences for c≥u^c\ge\hat uc≥u^.
  6. Topkis's theorem (Topkis 1998, Theorem 2.8.1), already proved on the platform and referenced.

Significance

The result. The first part of Proposition 1 says that a buyer with more bargaining power gathers more information, because it captures a larger share of the surplus that information creates. The second part is the less expected one: a higher seller cost shrinks the gains from trade, yet it raises the buyer's incentive to become informed as long as the cost is below the prior mean u^\hat uu^, and lowers it only beyond. Information is most valuable when trade is a close call. The paper's later results (Corollary 1, Propositions 2 and 3) build on this: since information acquisition responds to θb\theta_bθb​ and ccc, the seller's equilibrium payoff need not increase in its own bargaining power or decrease in its cost. The paper also notes (p. 11) that the monotonicity in θb\theta_bθb​ needs only that a higher α\alphaα is a mean-preserving spread, which is why the statement is posed here for every prior with finite mean.

Formalizing it. The proposition is proved in the paper, in a short appendix argument that differentiates under the integral and appeals to Topkis's theorem. To our knowledge it has not been machine-checked. The mission produces a density-free formalization: the rotation property and the mean-preserving-spread property of the truth-or-noise family, the integration-by-parts identity for the expected positive part, and the two increasing-differences statements, which together with the already formalized Topkis theorem give the goal.

Difficulty

The paper's argument is first-order: it computes cross-partial derivatives such as ∂2Ub/∂c ∂α=θb ∂G(c,α)/∂α\partial^2U_b/\partial c\,\partial\alpha=\theta_b\,\partial G(c,\alpha)/\partial\alpha∂2Ub​/∂c∂α=θb​∂G(c,α)/∂α and reads off their signs. Without a density these derivatives need not exist, and the information cost kkk is assumed only increasing, so UbU_bUb​ need not be differentiable, concave or even continuous in α\alphaα. The statements here are therefore in difference form, and the cross effects must be established as inequalities between integrals over different distributions of vvv.

The second obstacle is the shape of the comparative statics. Topkis's theorem gives a monotone optimal set in the induced set order on a parameter range where increasing differences hold, but the cost ccc has increasing differences only on (−∞,u^](-\infty,\hat u](−∞,u^] and decreasing differences on [u^,∞)[\hat u,\infty)[u^,∞). The referenced platform theorem, by contrast, asks for increasing differences on the whole product of the decision and parameter spaces, so it does not apply to UbU_bUb​ as it stands.

The obvious shortcut of picking a selection from the optimal set and proving it monotone does not work: the cross differences are only weakly positive (they vanish when ccc lies outside the support of vvv), so the strict version of Topkis's theorem does not apply, and two different maximizers need not be ordered.

Formalization scope

The prior is a probability measure μ\muμ on R\mathbb RR with integrable identity and positive mean u^=∫w dμ\hat u=\int w\,d\muu^=∫wdμ. The paper's additional assumptions on FFF (continuous and differentiable, strictly positive density on a bounded support [u‾,uˉ][\underline u,\bar u][u​,uˉ]) and c∈(u‾,uˉ)c\in(\underline u,\bar u)c∈(u​,uˉ) are dropped: every statement is posed for all priors with finite mean and all real ccc, which implies the paper's case. FFF is ProbabilityTheory.cdf μ, and GGG is defined from it by the page's formula. The interval [α‾,αˉ][\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha][α​,αˉ] satisfies 0<α‾<αˉ<10<\underline\alpha<\bar\alpha<10<α​<αˉ<1; kkk is monotone on it with k(α‾)=0<k(αˉ)k(\underline\alpha)=0<k(\bar\alpha)k(α​)=0<k(αˉ); θb∈(0,1)\theta_b\in(0,1)θb​∈(0,1) in every statement.

The total ex ante surplus is defined as A(α,c)=∫max⁡(αw+(1−α)u^−c,0) dμ(w)A(\alpha,c)=\int\max(\alpha w+(1-\alpha)\hat u-c,0)\,d\mu(w)A(α,c)=∫max(αw+(1−α)u^−c,0)dμ(w), which is (7) after the change of variables v=αw+(1−α)u^v=\alpha w+(1-\alpha)\hat uv=αw+(1−α)u^. The bargaining stage is not modelled; the paper's reduction to (6) is built into UbU_bUb​. The optimal level α∗\alpha^*α∗ is the set of maximizers of UbU_bUb​ over [α‾,αˉ][\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha][α​,αˉ] (optSet), never a chosen element. "Increases" is the induced set order, and every comparison assumes both optimal sets nonempty, which is the paper's presumption that (6) has a solution.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: AAA is never given by a closed form or by the integration-by-parts expression (that identity is a milestone), α∗\alpha^*α∗ is never defined by a formula or a threshold rule, and the nonemptiness hypotheses prevent the induced set order from holding vacuously on an empty optimal set.

The development reuses the platform definitions Supermodularity.Lattices.InducedSetOrder and Supermodularity.Monotonicity.IncreasingDifferencesOn and the proved theorem Supermodularity.Monotonicity.argmax_increasing_of_increasing_differences. The rotation and mean-preserving-spread lemmas for truth-or-noise signals, and the tail-integral identity E[(X−c)+]=∫c∞P(X>x) dx\mathbb E[(X-c)^+]=\int_c^\infty P(X>x)\,dxE[(X−c)+]=∫c∞​P(X>x)dx for integrable XXX, are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions of any of the milestones, of alternative proofs that avoid the integration by parts, and of the strict versions under the paper's density assumption are welcome.

Not posed in this mission: the benchmark (3)–(5), Corollary 1, Propositions 2–7, and the extensions of §4–§5.

Selected references

  • L. Guo, Gathering Information before Negotiation, author's manuscript of 15 Feb 2022, SSRN 3930651. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3930651 ; published in Management Science (2022), https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4360
  • D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
  • J. P. Johnson and D. P. Myatt, On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design, American Economic Review 96(3), 756–784, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.3.756
10 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsMarkov ChainOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Stall Economy: The Value of Mobility in Retail on Wheels I: The Magnet Rule Makes the Rendezvous Chain Doubly Stochastic, and Its Stationary Distribution Is Uniform on the Inner DiamondResearch Paper

Motivation

A mobile retail stall can travel toward its next customer while that customer walks toward the stall. The customer's walking allowance changes where the stall stops, so it also changes the location from which the next trip begins. A useful trip-length calculation therefore needs a distribution for successive meeting points, not just a rule for one meeting. Cao and Qi study this question in a service zone assigned to one stall and give a particular magnet rule whose rendezvous chain has a simple stationary law Cao and Qi, §3.3. The result supplies the location model used in their analysis of repositioning distances.

The rule matters because different choices of a meeting point can produce different chains even when each choice lets the customer walk the same maximum distance. The paper's Theorem 1 establishes a distributional property of the specified rule, for every admissible finite grid. Its proof is in Appendix B, pp. 46–49 of the cited SSRN manuscript.

Setting

The service zone is a square drawn as a diamond in ordinary horizontal and vertical coordinates. Its edge length is RRR in Euclidean distance, while stall and customer travel is measured in Manhattan distance. For the chain, use the paper's two edge coordinates, aligned with the lower edges of the zone. The full customer grid is Gk={0,…,k}2G_k=\{0,\ldots,k\}^2Gk​={0,…,k}2, so it contains (k+1)2(k+1)^2(k+1)2 points. A customer is uniform on this full grid.

Write h=ϕkh=\phi kh=ϕk, where ϕ=r/(2R)\phi=r/(\sqrt2R)ϕ=r/(2​R) and rrr is the customer's maximum walking distance. The paper chooses kkk so that hhh is an integer and assumes 2h≤k2h\le k2h≤k. The stall docks only at points of the inner diamond

I0=[h,k−h]2∩Z2.\mathcal I_0=[h,k-h]^2\cap\mathbb Z^2.I0​=[h,k−h]2∩Z2.

The name “diamond” refers to its appearance in ordinary coordinates; in edge coordinates it is an axis-aligned square. A type-1 origin lies in I1=[2h,k−2h]2∩Z2\mathcal I_1=[2h,k-2h]^2\cap\mathbb Z^2I1​=[2h,k−2h]2∩Z2. The other origins in I0\mathcal I_0I0​ are type 2. The closed small diamond around an origin zo=(xo,yo)z_o=(x_o,y_o)zo​=(xo​,yo​) is I(zo)=[xo−h,xo+h]×[yo−h,yo+h]∩Z2\mathcal I(z_o)=[x_o-h,x_o+h]\times[y_o-h,y_o+h]\cap\mathbb Z^2I(zo​)=[xo​−h,xo​+h]×[yo​−h,yo​+h]∩Z2.

The magnet rule maps the origin zoz_ozo​ and next customer location zcz_czc​ to a rendezvous zdz_dzd​. The stall stays at zoz_ozo​ when zc∈I(zo)z_c\in\mathcal I(z_o)zc​∈I(zo​). Otherwise, the location of zcz_czc​ in one of eight surrounding regions selects one of eight customer movement arrows. At a type-1 origin the head of that arrow is the rendezvous. At a type-2 origin the rule changes an arrow whose head would leave I0\mathcal I_0I0​, keeping the rendezvous inside it while preserving the customer's allowed walking distance. These are Definitions 1 and 2 of the paper pp. 14–16.

For zo,zd∈I0z_o,z_d\in\mathcal I_0zo​,zd​∈I0​, let A(zo,zd)\mathcal A(z_o,z_d)A(zo​,zd​) be the customer grid locations sent from zoz_ozo​ to zdz_dzd​. The transition probability is

P(zo,zd)=∣A(zo,zd)∣(k+1)2.\mathbb P(z_o,z_d)=\frac{|\mathcal A(z_o,z_d)|}{(k+1)^2}.P(zo​,zd​)=(k+1)2∣A(zo​,zd​)∣​.

Thus the denominator is the number of possible customers, not the number of stall locations. Repeated independent customer locations produce a finite Markov chain on I0\mathcal I_0I0​.

Formalization targets

The goal is Theorem 1 p. 17. For every k,h∈Nk,h\in\mathbb Nk,h∈N with 2h≤k2h\le k2h≤k, its first part says that P\mathbb PP is doubly stochastic:

∑zd∈I0P(zo,zd)=1and∑zo∈I0P(zo,zd)=1.\sum_{z_d\in\mathcal I_0}\mathbb P(z_o,z_d)=1 \quad\text{and}\quad \sum_{z_o\in\mathcal I_0}\mathbb P(z_o,z_d)=1.zd​∈I0​∑​P(zo​,zd​)=1andzo​∈I0​∑​P(zo​,zd​)=1.

Its second part says that the stationary distribution is uniform on I0\mathcal I_0I0​. The formal target states existence and uniqueness: a probability vector π\piπ is stationary for P\mathbb PP if and only if π(z)=1/∣I0∣\pi(z)=1/|\mathcal I_0|π(z)=1/∣I0​∣ for every state zzz.

The milestones follow the source's intermediate assertions: the rule keeps the rendezvous in I0\mathcal I_0I0​ at the prescribed customer distance; each row counts (k+1)2(k+1)^2(k+1)2 customers; the type-1 self-transition counts (2h+1)2(2h+1)^2(2h+1)2 customers; type-1 and type-2 columns each count (k+1)2(k+1)^2(k+1)2 incoming customer events; and every transition entry is positive. The last assertion supports the uniqueness clause.

Significance

A uniform stationary law replaces an unknown, history-dependent location distribution with one specified directly by the inner diamond. In the paper, that distribution is the location input for later within-radius repositioning calculations Cao and Qi, §§3.2–3.3. The result is specific to the magnet rule. It does not say that every reasonable meeting rule has a uniform stationary law.

The paper proves the finite-grid theorem in Appendix B. This mission asks for a machine-checked account of its exact finite combinatorial statement. The development will provide reusable definitions of the grid rule and its transition counts, while using an existing formal library interface for finite Markov chains. The theorem statements are open proof targets; a successful local compilation of their statements alone is not a proof.

Difficulty

Unit row sums follow from assigning each customer location to one next rendezvous. Unit column sums are subtler: fixing a destination and varying the origin gives overlapping sets of customer locations. Interior destinations and boundary destinations have different counts because a type-2 origin can redirect an arrow that would otherwise leave the allowed stall region. The source treats these as Case I and Case II on pp. 46–49. An interior-only count cannot establish the theorem for all of I0\mathcal I_0I0​, and positivity of every transition is a separate requirement for identifying the unique stationary law.

Formalization scope

Lean uses integer coordinate pairs for grid points and finite sets for GkG_kGk​, I0\mathcal I_0I0​, I1\mathcal I_1I1​, and I(zo)\mathcal I(z_o)I(zo​). The region boundaries use the paper's strict or inclusive inequalities exactly. The permitted parameters are all natural numbers k,hk,hk,h satisfying 2h≤k2h\le k2h≤k, including h=0h=0h=0, k=0k=0k=0, and 2h=k2h=k2h=k. In physical units h=ϕkh=\phi kh=ϕk; no division by kkk occurs in the formal statements. When k=0k=0k=0, there is one customer point and one state.

The matrix is computed from the paper's two-part magnet rule and uniform demand on the full grid. Defining it as a uniform matrix, using a nearest-point rule, dropping the type-2 correction, fixing one grid size, or proving only column sums would miss the target. The definition of A\mathcal AA counts customer locations that induce a transition. This includes customers already inside I(zo)\mathcal I(z_o)I(zo​) in a self-transition, as required by the paper's Case I(IX) and row-count formula. The paper's separate Proposition 2 is not a claim of this mission because it is false as printed; none of these targets assumes it. The finite-grid theorem does not formalize the subsequent informal k→∞k\to\inftyk→∞ statement.

The complete development needs finite-set counting, integer interval bounds, real-valued stochastic matrices, and the stationary-distribution interface of the published MarkovChain definition. Contributions proving any of the stated counting milestones or strengthening the finite-chain consequences are welcome. The paper's own proof is in Appendix B, pp. 46–49.

Selected references

  • J. Cao and W. Qi, Stall Economy: The Value of Mobility in Retail on Wheels, SSRN manuscript 3711896, 2022, §§3.2–3.3 and Appendix B, pp. 46–49. Manuscript.
11 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Intersectionality: Affirmative Action with Multidimensional Identities 1: For Generic Score Distributions No Nonintersectional Policy Yields a Representative Outcome but an Intersectional One DoesResearch Paper

Motivation

Affirmative action policies are usually designed reductively: one adjustment for women, another for a racial minority, a third for applicants from low-income families. An applicant who belongs to several categories gets the combined adjustments. A long literature in sociology and law, beginning with Crenshaw's account of intersectionality (1989), argues that people at the intersection of several disadvantaged categories (for instance Black women) can stay underrepresented even when every single category is proportionally represented. Carvalho, Pradelski and Williams, Intersectionality: Affirmative Action with Multidimensional Identities (Management Science, 2025), give this debate a decision-theoretic model. They ask whether any policy that treats identity dimensions independently can achieve proportional representation of every intersectional group.

Their first main result answers that question for a general class of score adjustments and for generic score distributions. This mission formalizes that result, Theorem 1, together with the lemmas its proof uses.

Setting

A decision maker admits a share α∈(0,1)\alpha \in (0,1)α∈(0,1) of a unit-mass pool of applicants. Each applicant has a score xxx in an interval X⊂RX \subset \mathbb{R}X⊂R and an identity g=(g1,…,gn)∈G={0,1}ng = (g_1,\dots,g_n) \in G = \{0,1\}^ng=(g1​,…,gn​)∈G={0,1}n, with n≥2n \ge 2n≥2. Category iii is the set of identities with gi=1g_i = 1gi​=1. Write 0\mathbf 00 and 1\mathbf 11 for the vectors of zeros and ones and eie_iei​ for the iii-th basis vector. The identity ggg equals g′+g′′g' + g''g′+g′′ when the sum is computed coordinatewise in the integers.

The population is a probability measure ppp on X×GX \times GX×G, with marginal masses p(g)=p(X×{g})p(g) = p(X \times \{g\})p(g)=p(X×{g}). The space PPP consists of those ppp whose conditional score laws Fg=p(⋅∣g)F_g = p(\cdot \mid g)Fg​=p(⋅∣g) are continuous (atomless) and have full support on XXX. PPP carries the relative weak∗^*∗ topology, the topology of weak convergence of probability measures.

A policy family QQQ is a set of strictly increasing bijections X→XX \to XX→X that is rich (for all x,y∈Xx, y \in Xx,y∈X some q∈Qq \in Qq∈Q has q(x)=yq(x) = yq(x)=y) and commutative (q∘q′=q′∘qq \circ q' = q' \circ qq∘q′=q′∘q). Additive shifts x↦x+δx \mapsto x + \deltax↦x+δ on X=RX = \mathbb{R}X=R are an example. A policy assigns to each identity a map qg∈Qq_g \in Qqg​∈Q. Given a threshold x∗∈Xx^* \in Xx∗∈X, an applicant of group ggg is accepted when qg(x)≥x∗q_g(x) \ge x^*qg​(x)≥x∗, subject to the capacity constraint

∑g∈GPr⁡(qg(x)≥x∗∣g) p(g)=α.\sum_{g \in G} \Pr(q_g(x) \ge x^* \mid g)\, p(g) = \alpha .g∈G∑​Pr(qg​(x)≥x∗∣g)p(g)=α.

The accepted share of ggg is p^(g)\hat p(g)p^​(g), the fraction of the accepted who belong to ggg. The outcome is representative if p^(g)=p(g)\hat p(g) = p(g)p^​(g)=p(g) for every ggg (Definition 2). A policy is nonintersectional if g=g′+g′′g = g' + g''g=g′+g′′ implies qg=qg′∘qg′′q_g = q_{g'} \circ q_{g''}qg​=qg′​∘qg′′​, and intersectional otherwise (Definition 1). Nonintersectional policies are the reductive ones: qgq_gqg​ is the composition of the maps qeiq_{e_i}qei​​ over the categories iii that ggg belongs to.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

A property is generic in PPP if it holds on a dense open subset of PPP. Theorem 1 states: there is a dense open U⊆PU \subseteq PU⊆P such that for every p∈Up \in Up∈U,

(a) no nonintersectional policy in Q∣G∣ yields a representative outcome at p,\text{(a) no nonintersectional policy in } Q^{|G|} \text{ yields a representative outcome at } p,(a) no nonintersectional policy in Q∣G∣ yields a representative outcome at p, (b) some intersectional policy in Q∣G∣ yields a representative outcome at p.\text{(b) some intersectional policy in } Q^{|G|} \text{ yields a representative outcome at } p.(b) some intersectional policy in Q∣G∣ yields a representative outcome at p.

"Yields a representative outcome" means that some threshold x∗∈Xx^* \in Xx∗∈X satisfies the capacity constraint at level α\alphaα and gives p^(g)=p(g)\hat p(g) = p(g)p^​(g)=p(g) for every ggg. Nothing about QQQ is fixed beyond richness and commutativity, and nothing about ppp beyond membership in PPP.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1(a)–(e) (p. 22). Every q∈Qq \in Qq∈Q is continuous. For each pair x,yx, yx,y exactly one element of QQQ maps xxx to yyy. QQQ contains the identity, is closed under composition, and contains inverses.
  2. Displays (1)–(2) (p. 10). When every p(g)>0p(g) > 0p(g)>0, (q,x∗)(q, x^*)(q,x∗) is representative if and only if qg(βg)=x∗q_g(\beta_g) = x^*qg​(βg​)=x∗ for all ggg, where βg=Fg−1(1−α)\beta_g = F_g^{-1}(1-\alpha)βg​=Fg−1​(1−α).
  3. The β1\beta_{\mathbf 1}β1​ identity (p. 10). A representative nonintersectional policy forces x∗=β0x^* = \beta_{\mathbf 0}x∗=β0​ and qei(βei)=β0q_{e_i}(\beta_{e_i}) = \beta_{\mathbf 0}qei​​(βei​​)=β0​. It also forces β1=(qen−1∘⋯∘qe1−1)(β0)\beta_{\mathbf 1} = (q_{e_n}^{-1} \circ \cdots \circ q_{e_1}^{-1})(\beta_{\mathbf 0})β1​=(qen​−1​∘⋯∘qe1​−1​)(β0​).
  4. Lemma 2 (p. 23). For n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, the set of p∈Pp \in Pp∈P with every p(g)>0p(g) > 0p(g)>0 on which that identity fails is open and dense in PPP.
  5. Part (b) construction (p. 10). For every p∈Pp \in Pp∈P and every threshold there is a policy in Q∣G∣Q^{|G|}Q∣G∣ satisfying (2) whose outcome is representative.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 separates two classes of policy. The reductive class, which covers the way most affirmative action programmes are written, cannot generically deliver proportional representation of intersectional groups, however its category-wise adjustments are tuned. A policy that adjusts each intersectional group separately can. The negative part holds for every rich commutative family, not only for additive or multiplicative adjustments, so the impossibility does not come from a particular functional form. The later results of the paper build on this one. They measure how badly reductive policies fail, give the nongeneric conditions under which they succeed (Proposition 3, which is the subject of the companion mission), and treat imperfectly intersectional policies.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; to our knowledge no machine-checked version exists. A formalization has to make several things precise:

  • the weak∗^*∗ topology on the constrained space PPP;
  • the passage from representativeness to quantile conditions;
  • the continuity of quantiles under weak convergence;
  • the group structure that commutativity and richness impose on QQQ.

The paper's proof of Lemma 2 also concludes with a formula valid only for the additive family (p. 23), so a complete formal proof would supply the missing argument for a general QQQ.

Difficulty

Part (b) and the necessary conditions behind part (a) follow from the definitions. The hard step is genericity (Lemma 2). Openness requires the quantiles βg\beta_gβg​ to depend continuously on ppp in the weak∗^*∗ topology. It also requires the map (βg)g↦(qen−1∘⋯∘qe1−1)(β0)(\beta_g)_g \mapsto (q_{e_n}^{-1} \circ \cdots \circ q_{e_1}^{-1})(\beta_{\mathbf 0})(βg​)g​↦(qen​−1​∘⋯∘qe1​−1​)(β0​) to be continuous, where each qeiq_{e_i}qei​​ is itself determined by βei\beta_{e_i}βei​​ and β0\beta_{\mathbf 0}β0​. The obvious argument writes this map as an explicit formula, ∑iβei−(n−1)β0\sum_i \beta_{e_i} - (n-1)\beta_{\mathbf 0}∑i​βei​​−(n−1)β0​, and that formula holds only for additive shifts. For a general rich commutative family, continuity of the transport map (x,y)↦qx→y(x, y) \mapsto q_{x \to y}(x,y)↦qx→y​ must come from the structure of QQQ as a group of homeomorphisms of an interval acting freely and transitively. Density requires perturbing the law of group 1\mathbf 11 while keeping the perturbation inside PPP. This is where n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 enters: for n=1n = 1n=1, 1=e1\mathbf 1 = e_11=e1​ and there is nothing to perturb independently.

Formalization scope

The Lean development fixes the following conventions.

  • Scores. Scores live in the subtype ↑X\uparrow X↑X of an order-connected, nonempty set X⊆RX \subseteq \mathbb{R}X⊆R.
  • Identities. Identities are Boolean vectors Fin n → Bool, and g=g′+g′′g = g' + g''g=g′+g′′ is checked coordinatewise on Bool.toNat.
  • Distributions. Distributions are ProbabilityMeasures on ↑X×G\uparrow X \times G↑X×G, whose Mathlib topology is that of weak convergence. PPP is the subtype of measures for which every group of positive mass has no atoms and positive mass on every nonempty open subinterval of XXX.
  • Convention C1. Groups with p(g)=0p(g) = 0p(g)=0 are unconstrained. The page is silent on them, and the paper's proofs need such ppp in PPP.
  • Policy maps. "Increasing" is strict monotonicity.
  • Representativeness. Representativeness always includes the capacity constraint at the given α\alphaα. Acceptance probabilities appear as the joint masses Pr⁡(qg(x)≥x∗∣g) p(g)\Pr(q_g(x) \ge x^* \mid g)\,p(g)Pr(qg​(x)≥x∗∣g)p(g).
  • Genericity. "Generic" is existence of a set that is open and dense in the subtype PPP, with both parts (a) and (b) holding on that one set.
  • Milestone-only objects. Quantiles βg\beta_gβg​ and the transport maps appear only in milestones, which carry p(g)>0p(g) > 0p(g)>0 wherever a quantile is used.

Several trivializing formalizations are ruled out:

  • PPP is nonempty and rich commutative families exist (both checked in a sorry-free sanity file), so the goal is not vacuous;
  • representation is not weakened to "every group accepted at a common rate", because the capacity constraint fixes the rate to α\alphaα;
  • openness and density are not taken in the ambient space of probability measures;
  • policies are required to take values in QQQ.

A complete development needs:

  • the structure theory of rich commutative families (Lemma 1, in effect Hölder's theorem for free transitive actions on an interval);
  • continuity of quantiles of conditional laws under weak convergence;
  • a perturbation argument inside PPP.

The first two are reusable well beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone are welcome, and proofs of the quantile-continuity facts as standalone lemmas are especially useful.

Selected references

  • J.-P. Carvalho, B. S. R. Pradelski and C. Williams, Intersectionality: Affirmative Action with Multidimensional Identities, Management Science 71(5), 2025; author manuscript hal-04788142v1. https://hal.science/hal-04788142v1
  • K. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, University of Chicago Legal Forum, 1989. https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1989/iss1/8
  • C. D. Aliprantis and K. C. Border, Infinite Dimensional Analysis, 3rd ed., Springer, 2006 (topologies on spaces of measures, Chapters 2 and 15). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-29587-9
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design IV: The Fixed-Reserve Second-Price Auction Has Worst-Case Regret (n/(n+1))ⁿ at Its Best Reserve 1/(n+1)Research Paper

Motivation

A seller who must auction one item without knowing how buyers value it needs a mechanism that performs acceptably against every plausible value distribution. Anunrojwong, Balseiro and Besbes (arXiv:2204.10478, Operations Research 2025) measure performance by regret: the expected revenue lost relative to a seller who knows the realized valuations and extracts the highest one. Their main result (Theorem 1, the subject of mission I of this series) shows that against independent and identically distributed valuations the minimax-regret mechanism is a second-price auction whose reserve price is random, drawn from an explicit distribution.

Practitioners rarely randomize reserves. The natural benchmark is the familiar second-price auction with a fixed deterministic reserve rrr, and the question this mission addresses is how much is lost by insisting on a deterministic reserve: what is the worst-case regret of that auction, and which reserve minimizes it? The paper answers this exactly in Proposition 5 (§5.2.1, p. 24, proof in Appendix D, pp. App-10–11). For a single buyer, regret-optimal posted pricing was studied by Bergemann and Schlag (2008), where a deterministic price 1/21/21/2 has worst-case regret 1/21/21/2; Proposition 5 is the nnn-buyer version of that benchmark.

Setting

There are n≥1n\ge1n≥1 buyers with valuations v=(v1,…,vn)v=(v_1,\dots,v_n)v=(v1​,…,vn​) in the type cube [0,1]n[0,1]^n[0,1]n, drawn from a joint distribution F\mathbf FF unknown to the seller. Write v(1)=max⁡iviv^{(1)}=\max_i v_iv(1)=maxi​vi​ and v(2)v^{(2)}v(2) for the second-highest valuation. A direct mechanism charges buyer iii a payment pi(v)p_i(v)pi​(v), and its regret under F\mathbf FF is

Rn(m,F)=Ev∼F[v(1)−∑i=1npi(v)].R_n(m,\mathbf F)=\mathbb E_{v\sim\mathbf F}\Big[v^{(1)}-\sum_{i=1}^n p_i(v)\Big].Rn​(m,F)=Ev∼F​[v(1)−i=1∑n​pi​(v)].

The second-price auction with reserve rrr, SPA(r)\mathrm{SPA}(r)SPA(r), gives the item to the highest bidder if the highest bid is at least rrr, at price max⁡(v(2),r)\max(v^{(2)},r)max(v(2),r), and otherwise does not sell. Its revenue is max⁡(v(2),r) 1(v(1)≥r)\max(v^{(2)},r)\,\mathbf 1(v^{(1)}\ge r)max(v(2),r)1(v(1)≥r).

Three classes of distributions on [0,1]n[0,1]^n[0,1]n are considered:

  • Fiid\mathcal F_{\mathrm{iid}}Fiid​: product laws G⊗nG^{\otimes n}G⊗n, with GGG a law on [0,1][0,1][0,1];
  • Faff\mathcal F_{\mathrm{aff}}Faff​: exchangeable laws (invariant under permuting buyers) that are affiliated, meaning Pr⁡(A∩B∣S)≥Pr⁡(A∣S)Pr⁡(B∣S)\Pr(A\cap B\mid S)\ge\Pr(A\mid S)\Pr(B\mid S)Pr(A∩B∣S)≥Pr(A∣S)Pr(B∣S) for all increasing sets A,BA,BA,B and every sublattice SSS (a set closed under coordinatewise minimum and maximum);
  • Fmix\mathcal F_{\mathrm{mix}}Fmix​: mixtures of i.i.d. laws, whose joint CDF is F(v)=∫∏iG(vi) dμ(G)\mathbf F(v)=\int\prod_i G(v_i)\,d\mu(G)F(v)=∫∏i​G(vi​)dμ(G) for a probability measure μ\muμ on distributions.

The worst-case regret of SPA(r)\mathrm{SPA}(r)SPA(r) over a class F\mathcal FF is sup⁡F∈FRn(SPA(r),F)\sup_{\mathbf F\in\mathcal F}R_n(\mathrm{SPA}(r),\mathbf F)supF∈F​Rn​(SPA(r),F). The closed form found by the paper is

Wn(r)={max⁡(1−r, r),n=1,(1−r)n(n−1)n−1((1−r)n−r)n−1,n≥2, r≤12,r,n≥2, r>12,W_n(r)=\begin{cases}\max(1-r,\,r), & n=1,\\[2pt] \dfrac{(1-r)^n(n-1)^{n-1}}{((1-r)n-r)^{n-1}}, & n\ge 2,\ r\le\tfrac12,\\[4pt] r, & n\ge2,\ r>\tfrac12,\end{cases}Wn​(r)=⎩⎨⎧​max(1−r,r),((1−r)n−r)n−1(1−r)n(n−1)n−1​,r,​n=1,n≥2, r≤21​,n≥2, r>21​,​

called wcFixed n r in the Lean development.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5

For every n≥1n\ge1n≥1, every class F∈{Fiid,Faff,Fmix}\mathcal F\in\{\mathcal F_{\mathrm{iid}},\mathcal F_{\mathrm{aff}},\mathcal F_{\mathrm{mix}}\}F∈{Fiid​,Faff​,Fmix​} and every r∈[0,1]r\in[0,1]r∈[0,1],

sup⁡F∈FRn(SPA(r),F)=Wn(r),\sup_{\mathbf F\in\mathcal F}R_n(\mathrm{SPA}(r),\mathbf F)=W_n(r),F∈Fsup​Rn​(SPA(r),F)=Wn​(r),

the no-reserve auction has Wn(0)=1W_n(0)=1Wn​(0)=1 for n=1n=1n=1 and (n−1n)n−1\big(\frac{n-1}{n}\big)^{n-1}(nn−1​)n−1 for n≥2n\ge2n≥2, and

min⁡r∈[0,1]Wn(r)=Wn(1n+1)=(nn+1)n,\min_{r\in[0,1]}W_n(r)=W_n\Big(\frac1{n+1}\Big)=\Big(\frac n{n+1}\Big)^n,r∈[0,1]min​Wn​(r)=Wn​(n+11​)=(n+1n​)n,

with r∗=1/(n+1)r^*=1/(n+1)r∗=1/(n+1) the unique minimizer.

Milestones

  1. The regret of SPA(r)\mathrm{SPA}(r)SPA(r) under an i.i.d. law with marginal CDF FFF: rF−(r)n−∫0rFn+∫r1(nFn−1−nFn)rF_-(r)^n-\int_0^rF^n+\int_r^1(nF^{n-1}-nF^n)rF−​(r)n−∫0r​Fn+∫r1​(nFn−1−nFn).
  2. For n≥2n\ge2n≥2, the maximum of rcn+(1−r)(ncn−1−ncn)rc^n+(1-r)(nc^{n-1}-nc^n)rcn+(1−r)(ncn−1−ncn) over c∈[n−1n,1]c\in[\frac{n-1}{n},1]c∈[nn−1​,1] equals Wn(r)W_n(r)Wn​(r).
  3. For n=1n=1n=1, the maximum of rc+(1−r)(1−c)rc+(1-r)(1-c)rc+(1−r)(1−c) over c∈[0,1]c\in[0,1]c∈[0,1] is max⁡(1−r,r)\max(1-r,r)max(1−r,r).
  4. WnW_nWn​ is minimized on [0,1][0,1][0,1] exactly at 1/(n+1)1/(n+1)1/(n+1), with value (n/(n+1))n(n/(n+1))^n(n/(n+1))n.
  5. For n≥2n\ge2n≥2, every exchangeable affiliated law gives SPA(r)\mathrm{SPA}(r)SPA(r) regret at most Wn(r)W_n(r)Wn​(r).

Significance

The result. Proposition 5 gives the exact price of determinism. The optimal fixed reserve 1/(n+1)1/(n+1)1/(n+1) has worst-case regret (n/(n+1))n(n/(n+1))^n(n/(n+1))n: 1/21/21/2 for one buyer, 4/94/94/9 for two. The minimax regret of the optimal randomized auction is about 0.3680.3680.368 and 0.3240.3240.324 for the same cases, so the benchmark shows how much of the paper's improvement comes from randomizing the reserve. Both values converge to 1/e1/e1/e as n→∞n\to\inftyn→∞. Proposition 5 also shows that the worst case does not change when valuations are positively dependent (affiliated, or mixtures of i.i.d.), the same robustness the paper establishes for its optimal mechanism.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper in the paper's Appendix D, and no machine-checked version is known. A formal proof needs an expression of the expected revenue of a second-price auction through the order-statistic CDFs, a careful treatment of atoms at the reserve, two elementary but fiddly one-variable optimizations, and, for Faff\mathcal F_{\mathrm{aff}}Faff​ and Fmix\mathcal F_{\mathrm{mix}}Fmix​, the reduction to the i.i.d. case.

Difficulty

The supremum over Fiid\mathcal F_{\mathrm{iid}}Fiid​ is not attained. The auction's revenue jumps at the reserve: a buyer valued exactly at rrr buys, while one valued just below does not. Nature exploits this with two-point laws placing mass just below rrr and the rest at 111, and the regret approaches Wn(r)W_n(r)Wn​(r) only in the limit. So the first idea, exhibiting a maximizing distribution, fails, and any formalization must treat the worst case as a least upper bound. The upper bound over Faff\mathcal F_{\mathrm{aff}}Faff​ is the real difficulty: it rests on an order-statistic identity and on an inequality between the CDFs of the maxima of n−1n-1n−1 and nnn affiliated valuations, which in turn needs properties of affiliation that are quoted from Milgrom and Weber (1982) rather than proved in the paper. For Fmix\mathcal F_{\mathrm{mix}}Fmix​ the bound needs the regret to be linear in the mixing measure, i.e. a disintegration of the mixture law through its joint CDF.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. Buyers are Fin n; valuations are vectors Fin n → ℝ; a distribution is a probability measure on Fin n → ℝ whose complement of the cube [0,1]n[0,1]^n[0,1]n is null. Fiid\mathcal F_{\mathrm{iid}}Fiid​ is the set of products Measure.pi (fun _ => G) of a probability law G on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. Fmix\mathcal F_{\mathrm{mix}}Fmix​ uses a probability measure on Measure ℝ with the Giry σ-algebra and states the CDF identity of Definition 6 for every vvv.
  • The auction. SPA(r)\mathrm{SPA}(r)SPA(r) is the random-reserve auction SPA ρ at ρ = Measure.dirac r; the winner pays max⁡(v(2),r)\max(v^{(2)},r)max(v(2),r) when its bid is at least rrr. Ties go to the lowest index (the paper breaks them arbitrarily; revenue does not depend on the rule).
  • Affiliation is stated cross-multiplied, μ(A∩S)μ(B∩S)≤μ(A∩B∩S)μ(S)\mu(A\cap S)\mu(B\cap S)\le\mu(A\cap B\cap S)\mu(S)μ(A∩S)μ(B∩S)≤μ(A∩B∩S)μ(S), for measurable increasing A,BA,BA,B and measurable sublattices SSS.
  • Conventions committed to. The reserve ranges over [0,1][0,1][0,1] (the page leaves this implicit; for r>1r>1r>1 the closed form is false). Worst-case regret is IsLUB of the set of regrets, not a maximum and not sSup. "The optimal reserve" is IsLeast of WnW_nWn​ on [0,1][0,1][0,1], its value at 1/(n+1)1/(n+1)1/(n+1), and uniqueness of the minimizer.
  • Ruled out. A statement with IsGreatest would be false (the supremum is not attained); sSup of the regret image would be a junk value if the image were unbounded; classes without the [0,1]n[0,1]^n[0,1]n support condition, or rrr unconstrained, change the theorem.
  • Infrastructure. Expected revenue of a second-price auction via order statistics, the CDF of the maximum and second maximum of i.i.d. variables, and the reduction of mixtures to their components are reusable for the rest of this series and for auction theory generally. Contributions to the affiliation inequalities (Milgrom–Weber) are particularly welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Anunrojwong, S. R. Balseiro, O. Besbes, On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design, arXiv:2204.10478v5, 2024; Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.10478
  • D. Bergemann, K. Schlag, Pricing without Priors, Journal of the European Economic Association 6(2–3), 560–569, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1162/JEEA.2008.6.2-3.560
  • P. R. Milgrom, R. J. Weber, A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, Econometrica 50(5), 1089–1122, 1982. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911865
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EconomicsMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Selling Data to Marketers 3: Under the Rotation Order, Marketing Lists Serve Low-Cost Marketers Efficiently and Over- (Under-) Supply High-Cost Ones Below (Above) the Rotation PointResearch Paper

Motivation

Data brokers sell two kinds of products to marketers. A marketing list supplies the contacts a marketer needs in order to act at all; a data append enriches a list the marketer already holds. In both cases the broker can also choose how informative its accompanying analytics are, and it can price a menu of plans of different informativeness to marketers whose costs of acting it cannot observe. Liang Guo's Selling Data to Marketers (Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.01350) studies how such a seller should design this menu, and in particular when it should sell more or less information than would be efficient.

The paper first works with a two-point value distribution (Sections 2–3) and then, in Section 4, with a general information structure in which informativeness is ordered by the rotation order of the distribution of the posterior mean (Johnson and Myatt 2006). This mission formalizes the marketing-list result of Section 4.1: Proposition 4 (comparative statics of the efficient informativeness) and Proposition 5 (the optimal screening menu). It is the third mission of a four-mission series on the paper; the first two treat the two-point model, the fourth treats data appends under the rotation order.

Setting

A marketer's value uuu from targeting a consumer is unknown. The seller supplies a signal of informativeness α∈[α‾,αˉ]⊂(0,1)\alpha\in[\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha]\subset(0,1)α∈[α​,αˉ]⊂(0,1). The marketer's posterior mean v=E[u∣w]v=E[u\mid w]v=E[u∣w] has cumulative distribution function H(v,α)H(v,\alpha)H(v,α) on a support [v‾,vˉ][\underline v,\bar v][v​,vˉ], with a strictly positive density h(v,α)h(v,\alpha)h(v,α). Bayesian updating keeps the mean fixed: ∫v‾vˉv h(v,α) dv=u^\int_{\underline v}^{\bar v} v\,h(v,\alpha)\,dv=\hat u∫v​vˉ​vh(v,α)dv=u^ for every α\alphaα, where u^\hat uu^ is the prior mean. The rotation order (9) requires a point v+∈(v‾,vˉ)v^+\in(\underline v,\bar v)v+∈(v​,vˉ) such that

∂H(v,α)∂α>0 for v<v+,∂H(v,α)∂α<0 for v>v+.\frac{\partial H(v,\alpha)}{\partial\alpha}>0\ \text{for } v<v^+,\qquad \frac{\partial H(v,\alpha)}{\partial\alpha}<0\ \text{for } v>v^+ .∂α∂H(v,α)​>0 for v<v+,∂α∂H(v,α)​<0 for v>v+.

Raising α\alphaα moves probability mass from the middle of the distribution to its tails.

The seller incurs a selling cost k(α)k(\alpha)k(α), increasing, with k(α‾)=0k(\underline\alpha)=0k(α​)=0. A marketer's targeting cost is cHc_HcH​ with probability θ∈(0,1)\theta\in(0,1)θ∈(0,1) and cLc_LcL​ with probability 1−θ1-\theta1−θ, with cH>cL>0c_H>c_L>0cH​>cL​>0. A marketer with cost ccc targets exactly when v>cv>cv>c, so informativeness α\alphaα is worth

P(α,c)=∫cvˉ(v−c) dH(v,α).P(\alpha,c)=\int_c^{\bar v}(v-c)\,dH(v,\alpha).P(α,c)=∫cvˉ​(v−c)dH(v,α).

With observable costs (the benchmark), the seller sells to type iii the informativeness maximizing (12), Πi=θi [P(α,ci)−k(α)]\Pi_i=\theta_i\,[P(\alpha,c_i)-k(\alpha)]Πi​=θi​[P(α,ci​)−k(α)]; a maximizer is an efficient level αie\alpha^e_iαie​. With private costs, the seller offers a menu of plans (TH,αH)(T_H,\alpha_H)(TH​,αH​), (TL,αL)(T_L,\alpha_L)(TL​,αL​), with fees Tj≥0T_j\ge0Tj​≥0. A type-iii marketer choosing plan jjj gets Uij=−Tj+P(αj,ci)U_{ij}=-T_j+P(\alpha_j,c_i)Uij​=−Tj​+P(αj​,ci​) (13). The seller maximizes Π=θ[TH−k(αH)]+(1−θ)[TL−k(αL)]\Pi=\theta[T_H-k(\alpha_H)]+(1-\theta)[T_L-k(\alpha_L)]Π=θ[TH​−k(αH​)]+(1−θ)[TL​−k(αL​)] subject to individual rationality Uii≥0U_{ii}\ge0Uii​≥0 and incentive compatibility Uii≥Uii′U_{ii}\ge U_{ii'}Uii​≥Uii′​ (problem (6)). Its solutions are written αH∗,αL∗\alpha^*_H,\alpha^*_LαH∗​,αL∗​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5

In general αL∗=αLe\alpha^*_L=\alpha^e_LαL∗​=αLe​, and if cL<cH<v+c_L<c_H<v^+cL​<cH​<v+ (resp. v+<cL<cHv^+<c_L<c_Hv+<cL​<cH​), then

αH∗>αHe(resp. αH∗<αHe).\alpha^*_H>\alpha^e_H\quad(\text{resp. } \alpha^*_H<\alpha^e_H).αH∗​>αHe​(resp. αH∗​<αHe​).

The first identity says that the low-cost marketer, the "high type" of the screening problem, receives the efficient informativeness. The second says that the high-cost marketer's informativeness is distorted, upward when both costs lie below the rotation point and downward when both lie above it. Both are stated for every optimal menu and every efficient level.

Milestones

  1. Integration by parts: P(α,c)=∫cvˉ[1−H(v,α)] dvP(\alpha,c)=\int_c^{\bar v}[1-H(v,\alpha)]\,dvP(α,c)=∫cvˉ​[1−H(v,α)]dv (proof of Proposition 4).
  2. The cross derivative ∂2Πi/∂αi∂ci=θi ∂H(ci,αi)/∂αi\partial^2\Pi_i/\partial\alpha_i\partial c_i=\theta_i\,\partial H(c_i,\alpha_i)/\partial\alpha_i∂2Πi​/∂αi​∂ci​=θi​∂H(ci​,αi​)/∂αi​ and its sign on either side of v+v^+v+.
  3. Proposition 4: αie\alpha^e_iαie​ first increases and then decreases with cic_ici​, with the turning point at v+v^+v+.
  4. The reduction of (6) to the two-variable problem (14) by the binding constraints IRHIR_HIRH​ and ICL,HIC_{L,H}ICL,H​.
  5. (14) integrated by parts, with the high type's rent R(αH)=∫cLcH[1−H(v,αH)] dvR(\alpha_H)=\int_{c_L}^{c_H}[1-H(v,\alpha_H)]\,dvR(αH​)=∫cL​cH​​[1−H(v,αH​)]dv, and its separation, which gives αL∗=αLe\alpha^*_L=\alpha^e_LαL∗​=αLe​ for (14).
  6. The derivative ∂Π/∂αH\partial\Pi/\partial\alpha_H∂Π/∂αH​ of (14) compared with the benchmark derivative.

Significance

Proposition 4 states that the value of information to a marketer is non-monotone in the cost of acting: it is largest for costs near the rotation point v+v^+v+, where the targeting decision is hardest. Proposition 5 turns this into a pricing rule. In the two-point model the direction of the distortion depends only on the prior (Proposition 2, φ<1/2\varphi<1/2φ<1/2 or φ>1/2\varphi>1/2φ>1/2). Under the rotation order it depends on where the costs lie relative to v+v^+v+, so a seller facing marketers with low costs over-supplies information to its less profitable segment, and one facing high costs under-supplies it. The comparison with the two-point model (pp. 17–18 of the manuscript) connects the two settings through the single-crossing point of the posterior-mean distributions.

The results are proved in the paper, through integration by parts, signs of derivatives and Topkis's monotonicity theorem. None of them is formalized. Formalizing them checks the reduction of the screening problem, which the paper performs by analogy with the two-point model, including the constraints it drops without comment. It also produces a reusable treatment of rotation-ordered distribution families on an interval. Topkis's Theorem 2.8.4 is already proved on the platform and is part of this mission as a reference.

Difficulty

The obvious argument has two gaps. The first is the reduction (14). The paper substitutes the binding IRHIR_HIRH​ and ICL,HIC_{L,H}ICL,H​ constraints and drops IRLIR_LIRL​, ICH,LIC_{H,L}ICH,L​ and Tj≥0T_j\ge0Tj​≥0. That the dropped constraints hold at a solution of (14) is not shown in the paper. The second gap is strictness: Topkis's theorem compares maximizers weakly. The strict inequalities αH∗≷αHe\alpha^*_H\gtrless\alpha^e_HαH∗​≷αHe​ require showing that efficient levels are interior and that the first-order conditions differ there. This uses the footnote-5 behaviour of kkk at the endpoints and the mean-preserving property (10), which follows from (9) and the constancy of the mean.

Formalization scope

The model is one Lean structure, SellingData.ListsRotation.Model, with real parameters and its standing assumptions as fields. The committed conventions are:

  • The support [v‾,vˉ][\underline v,\bar v][v​,vˉ] is a bounded real interval; the paper allows an unbounded one.
  • H(⋅,α)H(\cdot,\alpha)H(⋅,α) is continuous on the support, with H(v‾,α)=0H(\underline v,\alpha)=0H(v​,α)=0, H(vˉ,α)=1H(\bar v,\alpha)=1H(vˉ,α)=1 and a strictly positive continuous density h(⋅,α)h(\cdot,\alpha)h(⋅,α). The derivative ∂H/∂α\partial H/\partial\alpha∂H/∂α exists on the support, for α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1)α∈(0,1).
  • dH(v,α)dH(v,\alpha)dH(v,α) is h(v,α) dvh(v,\alpha)\,dvh(v,α)dv, so P(α,c)=∫cvˉ(v−c) h(v,α) dvP(\alpha,c)=\int_c^{\bar v}(v-c)\,h(v,\alpha)\,dvP(α,c)=∫cvˉ​(v−c)h(v,α)dv.
  • The rotation order (9) is imposed on the open support. The mean property is a field of the model; (10) is not assumed, since it follows.
  • The costs satisfy v‾<cL<cH<vˉ\underline v<c_L<c_H<\bar vv​<cL​<cH​<vˉ.
  • kkk is monotone on [α‾,αˉ][\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha][α​,αˉ] with k(α‾)=0k(\underline\alpha)=0k(α​)=0.

Two further hypotheses are pinned, and only on the statements that need strictness or differentiation under the integral sign:

  • the footnote-5 conditions on kkk: continuity on [α‾,αˉ][\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha][α​,αˉ], differentiability inside, k′(α‾)=0k'(\underline\alpha)=0k′(α​)=0 from the right and k′(α)→+∞k'(\alpha)\to+\inftyk′(α)→+∞ as α→αˉ−\alpha\to\bar\alpha^-α→αˉ−; convexity and twice differentiability are not assumed;
  • joint continuity of ∂H/∂α\partial H/\partial\alpha∂H/∂α on [v‾,vˉ]×(0,1)[\underline v,\bar v]\times(0,1)[v​,vˉ]×(0,1).

Optimal menus and efficient levels are sets of maximizers, not chosen maximizers, because kkk need not be convex. "αL∗=αLe\alpha^*_L=\alpha^e_LαL∗​=αLe​" is the equality of the set of low-cost plans of optimal menus with the set of efficient levels. The goal is stated for the screening problem (6) itself, with all four constraints and nonnegative fees. Defining the optimal menu through (14), or efficient levels through a first-order condition, would make half of the goal a restatement of a milestone, and is ruled out. As on the page, αL∗=αLe\alpha^*_L=\alpha^e_LαL∗​=αLe​ is stated with no condition on the position of the costs relative to v+v^+v+; only the comparison of αH∗\alpha^*_HαH∗​ with αHe\alpha^e_HαHe​ carries the two cost ranges. A sorry-free instance shows that the model's hypotheses are jointly satisfiable: [v‾,vˉ]=[0,1][\underline v,\bar v]=[0,1][v​,vˉ]=[0,1], H(v,α)=v+α2v(1−v)(1−2v)H(v,\alpha)=v+\tfrac{\alpha}{2}v(1-v)(1-2v)H(v,α)=v+2α​v(1−v)(1−2v), v+=u^=1/2v^+=\hat u=1/2v+=u^=1/2.

Contributions are welcome on the integration-by-parts and differentiation-under-the-integral lemmas for families of distributions on an interval, which are reusable beyond this paper, and on any milestone in any order.

Selected references

  • Liang Guo, Selling Data to Marketers, Management Science, 2025, author's manuscript. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01350
  • Justin P. Johnson and David P. Myatt, On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design, American Economic Review 96(3), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.3.756
  • Donald M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998 (Theorem 2.8.4). https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Imperfect Targeting and Advertising Strategies: With Costless Advertising and A < 1/4, Equilibrium Industry Profit Falls as Targeting Improves, Jumps Up at α̂₂(A), Then Stays ConstantResearch Paper

Motivation

Online advertising lets a firm aim its messages at the consumers most likely to want its product, but the data behind that aim is noisy: a platform's prediction of who belongs to a demographic or interest segment is right only with some probability. A natural expectation is that sharper targeting raises firms' profits, since fewer messages are wasted. Karle and Reisinger (SSRN 4626076, March 2024; published in Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.03632) show that this can fail: when both firms chase the same valuable consumers, better targeting also increases the number of consumers who see both firms' advertisements, which intensifies price competition.

The model combines a targeting stage with the clearinghouse price-competition model of Varian (1980) and Narasimhan (1988), in which some consumers are informed about one firm only (loyal consumers) and others about both (shoppers), and equilibrium prices are dispersed. This mission formalizes the paper's result for costless advertising: industry profit first falls as targeting improves, then jumps up when firms switch to segmenting the market, then stays flat.

Setting

There are two consumer groups aaa and bbb, each of mass one. Group-bbb consumers value the product at 111, group-aaa consumers at AAA, with 0<A<10 < A < 10<A<1. Two firms produce at zero cost. For every consumer each firm receives a signal of the consumer's group that is correct with probability α∈(1/2,1]\alpha \in (1/2, 1]α∈(1/2,1], independently across firms. Only consumers of the group a firm targets are interested in its product.

Stage 1. Each firm chooses a target group k∈{a,b}k \in \{a, b\}k∈{a,b} and a message scope: expected (message only the consumers its signal places in group kkk, which reaches a mass α\alphaα of group kkk) or all (message every consumer, which reaches all of group kkk). Messages cost c≥0c \ge 0c≥0 each; in this mission c=0c = 0c=0.

Stage 2. Having observed stage 1, firms set prices. For a stage-1 profile sss, if both firms target the same group, the shoppers S(s)=r1r2S(s) = r_1 r_2S(s)=r1​r2​ are the targeted consumers reached by both, where ri∈{α,1}r_i \in \{\alpha, 1\}ri​∈{α,1} is firm iii's reach; firm iii's loyal mass is Li(s)=ri−S(s)L_i(s) = r_i - S(s)Li​(s)=ri​−S(s). If they target different groups, S(s)=0S(s) = 0S(s)=0 and Li(s)=riL_i(s) = r_iLi​(s)=ri​. A consumer buys if the price does not exceed her valuation; shoppers buy from the cheaper firm and split equally on ties. Firm iii's profit at prices (p,q)(p, q)(p,q) is p (Li+S)p\,(L_i + S)p(Li​+S), p (Li+S/2)p\,(L_i + S/2)p(Li​+S/2) or p Lip\,L_ipLi​ according as p<qp < qp<q, p=qp = qp=q or p>qp > qp>q, and 000 if ppp exceeds the valuation.

Firms may randomize prices: a price strategy is a probability measure on [0,1][0,1][0,1], and Ui(s;μ,ν)U_i(s; \mu, \nu)Ui​(s;μ,ν) is firm iii's expected profit. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is a pure stage-1 profile s⋆s^\stars⋆ and a continuation that assigns to each of the sixteen stage-1 profiles a Nash equilibrium of its pricing subgame, such that no firm gains at stage 1 by changing its action. The sum of expected profits is V1(s⋆)+V2(s⋆)V_1(s^\star) + V_2(s^\star)V1​(s⋆)+V2​(s⋆).

Two cumulative distribution functions appear, on [1−α,1)[1-\alpha, 1)[1−α,1):

F(p)=1α−1−ααp,H(p)=p−(1−α)p,F(p) = \frac1\alpha - \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha p}, \qquad H(p) = \frac{p - (1-\alpha)}{p},F(p)=α1​−αp1−α​,H(p)=pp−(1−α)​,

both 000 below 1−α1-\alpha1−α and 111 from 111 on, so HHH has an atom 1−α1 - \alpha1−α at p=1p = 1p=1. The thresholds are α^1(A)=1−A\hat\alpha_1(A) = 1 - Aα^1​(A)=1−A and α^2(A)=(1+1−4A)/2\hat\alpha_2(A) = \bigl(1 + \sqrt{1 - 4A}\bigr)/2α^2​(A)=(1+1−4A​)/2.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (p. 15)

For 0<A<1/40 < A < 1/40<A<1/4: 1/2<α^2(A)<α^1(A)1/2 < \hat\alpha_2(A) < \hat\alpha_1(A)1/2<α^2​(A)<α^1​(A); for every α∈(1/2,α^2(A))\alpha \in (1/2, \hat\alpha_2(A))α∈(1/2,α^2​(A)) there is an SPNE with

∑iE[πi⋆(α)]=1−α2,\textstyle\sum_i E[\pi_i^\star(\alpha)] = 1 - \alpha^2,∑i​E[πi⋆​(α)]=1−α2,

which is strictly decreasing in α\alphaα; for every α∈(α^2(A),1]\alpha \in (\hat\alpha_2(A), 1]α∈(α^2​(A),1] there is an SPNE with sum 1+A1 + A1+A; and 1−α^2(A)2<1+A1 - \hat\alpha_2(A)^2 < 1 + A1−α^2​(A)2<1+A (the upward jump).

Milestones

  1. Display (1), p. 11. If both firms target bbb and message expected consumers, both pricing by FFF is an equilibrium with profit α(1−α)\alpha(1-\alpha)α(1−α) each.
  2. Lemma 2 part 1, display (2), pp. 14–15. If firm 1 messages expected and firm 2 all group-bbb consumers, (F,H)(F, H)(F,H) is an equilibrium with profits α(1−α)\alpha(1-\alpha)α(1−α) and 1−α1-\alpha1−α.
  3. Bertrand, p. 13. If both message all group-bbb consumers, pricing at 000 is an equilibrium with zero profits.
  4. Segmentation, pp. 9, 13. If firm 1 targets aaa and firm 2 targets bbb, prices AAA and 111 are an equilibrium.
  5. Threshold, p. 14. For α∈(1/2,1]\alpha \in (1/2, 1]α∈(1/2,1] and A≤1/4A \le 1/4A≤1/4: α(1−α)≥A  ⟺  α≤α^2(A)\alpha(1-\alpha) \ge A \iff \alpha \le \hat\alpha_2(A)α(1−α)≥A⟺α≤α^2​(A).
  6. Footnote 36, p. 15. α^2(A)<α^1(A)\hat\alpha_2(A) < \hat\alpha_1(A)α^2​(A)<α^1​(A) for 0<A<1/40 < A < 1/40<A<1/4.
  7. Lemma 2, pp. 14–15. The SPNE with c=0c = 0c=0 in both regimes.

Significance

The proposition shows that the non-monotonicity of industry profit in targeting precision, which the paper first derives for high advertising costs, does not rely on advertising being costly. With free messages a firm could inform every consumer, which is equivalent to perfect targeting; the equilibrium instead has one firm refrain from doing so, because the resulting asymmetry keeps prices high. For regulation of consumer data and for platforms selling targeting precision, the result says that better targeting technology can lower sellers' profits over a range of precisions and raise them discontinuously elsewhere.

The result is proved in the paper (main text and Online Appendix A). It has not been machine-checked. Formalizing it means verifying mixed-strategy equilibria of a pricing game with a continuum of prices, including an atom at the valuation, in all sixteen subgames of a two-stage game, a pattern that recurs throughout the clearinghouse and price-dispersion literature.

Difficulty

The stage-1 comparison is arithmetic once the stage-2 payoffs are known; the work is in the pricing subgames. Each mixed equilibrium must be verified against every real price deviation, which needs the expected profit at price ppp against a distribution with an atom, where the tie-splitting rule matters exactly at the atom. Subgame perfection requires a pricing equilibrium in every off-path subgame too, including those where both firms target group aaa (the group-bbb equilibria rescaled by AAA) and the Bertrand subgames. The obvious shortcut, assigning each subgame its textbook profit as a number, is not available: the stage-1 values are defined as integrals against the equilibrium strategies.

Formalization scope

Lean 4 with Mathlib. The pricing game is a separate definition (a general clearinghouse duopoly with valuations viv_ivi​, loyal masses LiL_iLi​ and shopper mass SSS); the targeting game builds on it. Committed conventions:

  • price strategies are probability measures on R\mathbb RR with no mass outside [0,1][0,1][0,1]; expected profits are Bochner integrals; deviations range over all real prices;
  • a consumer buys at a price equal to her valuation (the page says "lower than"; the atom of HHH at 111 needs the sale);
  • targeting is in pure strategies (the paper's footnotes 26 and 34); the message scope is binary, the paper's options (1) and (2); the no-message option and the continuous message masses of the appendix proof are not modelled;
  • cdfs are Mathlib's ProbabilityTheory.cdf; statements about all measures with cdf FFF also assert that such a measure exists;
  • the paper's "firm iii / firm −i-i−i" are firm 1 (the expected-only firm, and the group-aaa firm) and firm 2;
  • for A>1/4A > 1/4A>1/4 Lean's square root gives α^2(A)=1/2\hat\alpha_2(A) = 1/2α^2​(A)=1/2, the reading Lemma 2's range (max⁡{1/2,α^2(A)},1](\max\{1/2, \hat\alpha_2(A)\}, 1](max{1/2,α^2​(A)},1] needs;
  • pricing-stage profits exclude the sunk message cost; the goal and Lemma 2 are at c=0c = 0c=0.

The goal is Proposition 2 in existence form: it asserts an SPNE with the stated total. The paper exhibits that equilibrium; uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs is not claimed. Propositions 1 and 3 (high and general costs) are not posed. Trivializing encodings are excluded by construction: stage-1 values are integrals of the continuation strategies, not a table; the equilibrium condition quantifies over all sixteen subgames, not just the path; strategies are probability measures on [0,1][0,1][0,1], so no integral takes a junk value; and statements quantifying over measures with a given cdf include the existence of one.

Contributions welcome: integration of the tie-split profit against cdfs with atoms, a reusable lemma that a clearinghouse with given loyal and shopper masses has an equilibrium, and the rescaling of equilibria by the valuation.

Selected references

  • H. Karle and M. Reisinger, Imperfect Targeting and Advertising Strategies, SSRN working paper 4626076, March 25, 2024. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4626076 ; published in Management Science, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.03632
  • H. R. Varian, A Model of Sales, American Economic Review 70(4), 651–659, 1980. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1805229
  • C. Narasimhan, Competitive Promotional Strategies, Journal of Business 61(4), 427–449, 1988. https://doi.org/10.1086/296442
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EconomicsMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Selling Data to Marketers 4: Under the Rotation Order, Data Appends with Costs Below the Prior Mean Serve High-Cost Marketers Efficiently and Under- (Over-) Supply Low-Cost Ones Below (Above) v⁺Research Paper

Motivation

Data brokers sell consumer data to firms that use it to decide whom to target, whom to lend to, or where to open a store. Two kinds of products are common: a marketing list, which supplies contact information without which the buyer cannot act at all, and a data append, which enriches information about consumers the buyer can already reach (Federal Trade Commission, Data Brokers, 2014). A seller who does not know a buyer's cost of acting must screen buyers with a menu of plans that differ in price and in how informative the data are.

Liang Guo's paper Selling Data to Marketers (Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.01350) characterizes the optimal menu, first for a binary-value model (§3) and then for a general information structure ordered by rotation (§4), following Johnson and Myatt (2006). This mission formalizes Proposition 7: data appends under the rotation order. It is the fourth mission of a series built from the same manuscript; the first three cover marketing lists and data appends in the binary model and marketing lists under the rotation order.

Setting

A marketer can take an action (target a consumer) at cost ccc; the action's value uuu is uncertain with prior mean u^\hat uu^. A data service of informativeness α∈[α‾,αˉ]⊂(0,1)\alpha\in[\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha]\subset(0,1)α∈[α​,αˉ]⊂(0,1) produces a signal, and its information is summarized by the posterior mean vvv. For each α\alphaα, vvv has cumulative distribution function H(v,α)H(v,\alpha)H(v,α) on a support [v‾,vˉ][\underline v,\bar v][v​,vˉ], with a strictly positive density h(v,α)h(v,\alpha)h(v,α) and mean u^\hat uu^ for every α\alphaα. The family is rotation ordered: there is a point v+∈(v‾,vˉ)v^+\in(\underline v,\bar v)v+∈(v​,vˉ) with

∂H(v,α)∂α>0 (v<v+),∂H(v,α)∂α<0 (v>v+).\frac{\partial H(v,\alpha)}{\partial\alpha}>0 \ (v<v^+),\qquad \frac{\partial H(v,\alpha)}{\partial\alpha}<0 \ (v>v^+).∂α∂H(v,α)​>0 (v<v+),∂α∂H(v,α)​<0 (v>v+).

A more informative service spreads the posterior mean away from u^\hat uu^.

A service plan (T,α)(T,\alpha)(T,α) charges a fixed fee T≥0T\ge0T≥0. Serving a marketer with informativeness α\alphaα costs the seller k(α)k(\alpha)k(α), with k(α‾)=0k(\underline\alpha)=0k(α​)=0 and kkk increasing. A marketer targets exactly when v>cv>cv>c, so a marketer with cost cic_ici​ who buys (Tj,αj)(T_j,\alpha_j)(Tj​,αj​) earns

Uij=−Tj+∫civˉ(v−ci) dH(v,αj).U_{ij}=-T_j+\int_{c_i}^{\bar v}(v-c_i)\,dH(v,\alpha_j).Uij​=−Tj​+∫ci​vˉ​(v−ci​)dH(v,αj​).

Costs are cHc_HcH​ with probability θ∈(0,1)\theta\in(0,1)θ∈(0,1) and cLc_LcL​ with probability 1−θ1-\theta1−θ, 0<cL<cH0<c_L<c_H0<cL​<cH​. A data-append buyer can act without the data, so its outside option is Ui0=max⁡{u^−ci,0}U_{i0}=\max\{\hat u-c_i,0\}Ui0​=max{u^−ci​,0}.

The seller offers a menu (TH,αH),(TL,αL)(T_H,\alpha_H),(T_L,\alpha_L)(TH​,αH​),(TL​,αL​) and maximizes Π=θ[TH−k(αH)]+(1−θ)[TL−k(αL)]\Pi=\theta[T_H-k(\alpha_H)]+(1-\theta)[T_L-k(\alpha_L)]Π=θ[TH​−k(αH​)]+(1−θ)[TL​−k(αL​)] subject to individual rationality Uii≥Ui0U_{ii}\ge U_{i0}Uii​≥Ui0​ and incentive compatibility Uii≥Uii′U_{ii}\ge U_{ii'}Uii​≥Uii′​ for both types. Call any maximizer an optimal menu, with levels αH∗,αL∗\alpha^*_H,\alpha^*_LαH∗​,αL∗​. The benchmark with observable costs is

max⁡α∈[α‾,αˉ] θi[∫civˉ(v−ci) dH(v,α)−k(α)],\max_{\alpha\in[\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha]}\ \theta_i\Big[\int_{c_i}^{\bar v}(v-c_i)\,dH(v,\alpha)-k(\alpha)\Big],α∈[α​,αˉ]max​ θi​[∫ci​vˉ​(v−ci​)dH(v,α)−k(α)],

and its maximizers are the efficient levels αie\alpha^e_iαie​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 7

Assume cL<cH<u^c_L<c_H<\hat ucL​<cH​<u^. If cL<cH<v+c_L<c_H<v^+cL​<cH​<v+, then

αH∗=αHe,αL∗<αLe,\alpha^*_H=\alpha^e_H,\qquad \alpha^*_L<\alpha^e_L ,αH∗​=αHe​,αL∗​<αLe​,

and if v+<cL<cHv^+<c_L<c_Hv+<cL​<cH​, then

αH∗=αHe,αL∗>αLe.\alpha^*_H=\alpha^e_H,\qquad \alpha^*_L>\alpha^e_L .αH∗​=αHe​,αL∗​>αLe​.

Here αH∗=αHe\alpha^*_H=\alpha^e_HαH∗​=αHe​ means that the set of αH\alpha_HαH​-levels of optimal menus equals the set of efficient levels, and each strict inequality holds for every optimal menu and every efficient level.

Milestones

  1. The willingness to pay for a data append (p. 20): for c≤u^c\le\hat uc≤u^, Uij−Ui0=−Tj+∫v‾ci(ci−v) dH(v,αj)U_{ij}-U_{i0}=-T_j+\int_{\underline v}^{c_i}(c_i-v)\,dH(v,\alpha_j)Uij​−Ui0​=−Tj​+∫v​ci​​(ci​−v)dH(v,αj​), which is increasing in cic_ici​.
  2. Its integrated form (proof of Proposition 8, p. 33): Uij−Ui0=−Tj+∫v‾ciH(v,αj) dvU_{ij}-U_{i0}=-T_j+\int_{\underline v}^{c_i}H(v,\alpha_j)\,dvUij​−Ui0​=−Tj​+∫v​ci​​H(v,αj​)dv.
  3. The reduction (15) (p. 20): substituting the binding IRLIR_LIRL​ and ICH,LIC_{H,L}ICH,L​ turns the screening problem into a maximization over (αH,αL)(\alpha_H,\alpha_L)(αH​,αL​).
  4. (15) integrated by parts, and αH∗=αHe\alpha^*_H=\alpha^e_HαH∗​=αHe​ for it (p. 33).
  5. The derivative ∂Π/∂αL\partial\Pi/\partial\alpha_L∂Π/∂αL​ of (15) compared with the benchmark's (p. 33).

Significance

Proposition 7 is the general-distribution form of a "double reversal". With marketing lists the low-cost marketers are the high type: they get efficient information, and the high-cost marketers' information is distorted (Proposition 5 of the paper). With data appends and costs below the prior mean, the outside option makes the high-cost marketers value data more. The roles of the types swap, and the direction of the distortion flips with the position of the costs relative to the rotation point. The result tells a data seller which customers to under- or over-supply, and shows that the answer depends on whether its data enable an action or only refine it.

The paper proves the result on a few pages, partly by phrases such as "it can be readily verified". No machine-checked version exists. A formalization makes explicit what the printed argument leaves implicit: that the dropped constraints hold at the reduced optimum, which regularity of kkk and HHH the strict inequalities need, and that statements about "the" optimum hold for every optimum when maximizers are not unique.

Difficulty

The obvious approach substitutes the binding constraints and compares first-order conditions. Two steps of it fail as stated. First, the reduction to (15) drops IRHIR_HIRH​ and ICL,HIC_{L,H}ICL,H​; ICL,HIC_{L,H}ICL,H​ holds at a maximizer of (15) only when the two informativeness levels are ordered as the rotation order dictates. That ordering is available only when both costs lie on the same side of v+v^+v+. Second, first-order conditions say nothing at a corner of [α‾,αˉ][\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha][α​,αˉ]. The strict comparison αL∗≠αLe\alpha^*_L\ne\alpha^e_LαL∗​=αLe​ needs the efficient level to be interior, where the derivative of kkk exists. That comes from the conditions of footnote 5 together with the mean-preserving property of the family. The selling cost need not be convex, so maximizers can be non-unique, and every comparison must hold for every pair of maximizers.

Formalization scope

  • Information structure. A structure RotationFamily with a bounded support v‾<vˉ\underline v<\bar vv​<vˉ (the paper allows an unbounded one). H(⋅,α)H(\cdot,\alpha)H(⋅,α) is continuous on [v‾,vˉ][\underline v,\bar v][v​,vˉ] with H(v‾,α)=0H(\underline v,\alpha)=0H(v​,α)=0, H(vˉ,α)=1H(\bar v,\alpha)=1H(vˉ,α)=1 and derivative h(⋅,α)>0h(\cdot,\alpha)>0h(⋅,α)>0, continuous on the closed support. ∂H/∂α\partial H/\partial\alpha∂H/∂α exists on the closed support. The rotation order (9) holds on the open support, and the mean is u^\hat uu^ for every α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1)α∈(0,1). Condition (10) is not assumed; it follows.
  • Model. Model extends it with 0<α‾<αˉ<10<\underline\alpha<\bar\alpha<10<α​<αˉ<1, θ∈(0,1)\theta\in(0,1)θ∈(0,1), and 0<cL<cH0<c_L<c_H0<cL​<cH​ with both costs in (v‾,vˉ)(\underline v,\bar v)(v​,vˉ) (a pin: the integrals ∫civˉ\int_{c_i}^{\bar v}∫ci​vˉ​ presume it). It also fixes k(α‾)=0k(\underline\alpha)=0k(α​)=0 with kkk monotone on [α‾,αˉ][\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha][α​,αˉ]. dHdHdH is written as h dvh\,dvhdv.
  • Objects of the goal. Optimal menus are maximizers of the full problem: fees T≥0T\ge0T≥0, levels in [α‾,αˉ][\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha][α​,αˉ], IRiIR_iIRi​ with outside option max⁡{u^−ci,0}\max\{\hat u-c_i,0\}max{u^−ci​,0}, and both IC constraints. Efficient levels are maximizers of the benchmark (12). Neither is defined through (15) or a first-order condition. That would make the first half of the goal a restatement of milestone 4, and writing the outside option as u^−c\hat u-cu^−c instead of the maximum would change the model.
  • Pinned hypotheses. On the goal only: the part of footnote 5 the strict results use (kkk continuous on [α‾,αˉ][\underline\alpha,\bar\alpha][α​,αˉ], differentiable inside, k′(α‾)=0k'(\underline\alpha)=0k′(α​)=0 from the right, k′(α)→+∞k'(\alpha)\to+\inftyk′(α)→+∞ as α→αˉ−\alpha\to\bar\alpha^-α→αˉ−) and joint continuity of ∂H/∂α\partial H/\partial\alpha∂H/∂α on [v‾,vˉ]×(0,1)[\underline v,\bar v]\times(0,1)[v​,vˉ]×(0,1). The derivative milestone uses only the latter. Convexity of kkk is not assumed.
  • Range restriction. The first sentence of Proposition 7 (αH∗=αHe\alpha^*_H=\alpha^e_HαH∗​=αHe​) is posed on the full problem only within the two ranges cH<v+c_H<v^+cH​<v+ and v+<cLv^+<c_Lv+<cL​. For (15) it is posed without restriction in milestone 4. The branch v+<cL<cH<u^v^+<c_L<c_H<\hat uv+<cL​<cH​<u^ is empty when v+≥u^v^+\ge\hat uv+≥u^, for example for symmetric structures; non-symmetric rotation families with v+<u^v^+<\hat uv+<u^ inhabit it.
  • Reuse. Topkis's monotonicity theorem (Theorem 2.8.4) is on the platform and is the tool the paper invokes. The integration-by-parts facts for distribution functions on a bounded support, and differentiation of ∫cvˉH(v,α) dv\int_c^{\bar v}H(v,\alpha)\,dv∫cvˉ​H(v,α)dv in α\alphaα, are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome.

Selected references

  • Liang Guo, Selling Data to Marketers, Management Science, 2025 (author's manuscript used here). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01350
  • Justin P. Johnson and David P. Myatt, On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design, American Economic Review 96(3), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282806777211946
  • Donald M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
  • Federal Trade Commission, Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability, 2014. https://www.ftc.gov/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014
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Operations Research·Captain: Lucas

Symmetric Rendezvous on the LineOpen Problem

Motivation

Rendezvous search asks how two agents who cannot communicate should move so as to meet as quickly as possible. It was introduced as a mathematical problem by Alpern (The rendezvous search problem, SIAM J. Control Optim. 1995) and developed systematically in Alpern and Gal's monograph The Theory of Search Games and Rendezvous (Kluwer, 2003). Besides its game-theoretic interest, it is a model for coordination without prior agreement: robots or searchers that must find each other with no shared map or orientation.

The simplest non-trivial domain is the line. Even there, the version in which both agents must follow the same strategy remains open, and it is listed on the Open Problem Garden with importance "High".

Timeline:

  • 1995. Alpern formulates symmetric rendezvous search problems, in which the players must use the same mixed strategy.
  • 1995. Alpern and Gal (Rendezvous search on the line with distinguishable players, SIAM J. Control Optim. 33(4)) solve the asymmetric problem on the line, where the players may use different strategies: the optimal expected meeting time is 3.253.253.25.
  • 1995–2008. A series of papers improve upper and lower bounds on the symmetric value.
  • 2008. Han, Du, Vera and Zuluaga (Improved bounds for the symmetric rendezvous search problem on the line, Operations Research 56(3)) show that strategies moving at full speed and turning only at integer times dominate, reducing the problem to a discrete one, prove 4.1520<R<4.25744.1520 < R < 4.25744.1520<R<4.2574, and conjecture R=4.25R = 4.25R=4.25.

Setting

Two players are placed on the real line at distance 222; player I starts at 000 and player II at 222. Each player has a private sense of "forward", fixed by an independent fair coin, so neither knows in which direction the other lies. Both move with speed at most 111.

A feasible path is a function fff with f(0)=0f(0)=0f(0)=0 and ∣f(s)−f(t)∣≤∣s−t∣|f(s)-f(t)|\le |s-t|∣f(s)−f(t)∣≤∣s−t∣ for s,t≥0s,t\ge 0s,t≥0, describing a player's position in its own frame. A mixed strategy SSS is a probability distribution over feasible paths, realised as a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega,P)(Ω,P) and a random path ω↦fω\omega\mapsto f_\omegaω↦fω​ whose position at each fixed time is measurable.

If player I follows fff with orientation ε1∈{±1}\varepsilon_1\in\{\pm1\}ε1​∈{±1} and player II follows ggg with orientation ε2\varepsilon_2ε2​, their positions are ε1f(t)\varepsilon_1 f(t)ε1​f(t) and 2+ε2g(t)2+\varepsilon_2 g(t)2+ε2​g(t). The meeting time is

T=inf⁡{t≥0: ε1f(t)=2+ε2g(t)}∈[0,∞].T=\inf\{t\ge 0:\ \varepsilon_1 f(t) = 2+\varepsilon_2 g(t)\}\in[0,\infty].T=inf{t≥0: ε1​f(t)=2+ε2​g(t)}∈[0,∞].

For strategies S1,S2S_1,S_2S1​,S2​ with independent randomisations, the expected meeting time E(S1,S2)E(S_1,S_2)E(S1​,S2​) averages TTT over f∼S1f\sim S_1f∼S1​, g∼S2g\sim S_2g∼S2​ and the four equally likely orientation pairs. The symmetric rendezvous value and the asymmetric rendezvous value are

R=inf⁡SE(S,S),Ra=inf⁡S1,S2E(S1,S2).R=\inf_{S} E(S,S),\qquad R^a=\inf_{S_1,S_2}E(S_1,S_2).R=Sinf​E(S,S),Ra=S1​,S2​inf​E(S1​,S2​).

An integer zigzag is a path that on each interval [n,n+1][n,n+1][n,n+1], n∈Nn\in\mathbb Nn∈N, moves with velocity +1+1+1 or −1-1−1; RdiscR_{\mathrm{disc}}Rdisc​ denotes the infimum of E(S,S)E(S,S)E(S,S) over strategies supported on integer zigzags.

Formalization targets

Goal: the conjectured value

R=174.R=\frac{17}{4}.R=417​.

This is the Han–Du–Vera–Zuluaga conjecture and answers the Open Problem Garden question. A formal disproof is equally valuable.

Milestones from the literature

  1. Alpern–Gal: Ra=134R^a = \dfrac{13}{4}Ra=413​.
  2. Han–Du–Vera–Zuluaga reduction: R=RdiscR = R_{\mathrm{disc}}R=Rdisc​.
  3. Han–Du–Vera–Zuluaga lower bound: 4.1520<R4.1520 < R4.1520<R.
  4. Han–Du–Vera–Zuluaga upper bound: R<4.2574R < 4.2574R<4.2574.

Significance

The value RRR measures the cost of symmetry in the most basic rendezvous problem: Ra=3.25R^a = 3.25Ra=3.25 when roles can be pre-assigned, while the best known symmetric strategies need about 4.254.254.25. Determining RRR exactly would settle a problem that has been open since 1995 and would calibrate numerical methods (linear and semidefinite relaxations over discretised strategies) used for related search games.

None of these results is formalized. The milestones are proved on paper; formalizing them requires a measure-theoretic treatment of mixed strategies over path space, a rigorous version of the discretisation argument, and certified numerical bounds. The goal itself is open.

Difficulty

The obvious approach is to optimise over finitely many turning times, but a symmetric strategy must be randomised (any deterministic symmetric strategy fails to meet with probability 1/21/21/2, when both players face the same way), so the optimisation is over probability distributions on infinite paths and the objective is a quadratic, non-convex function of the distribution. Truncating to finite horizons gives upper bounds by explicit strategies, but lower bounds require controlling all strategies, including those that delay indefinitely, and the known gap 4.15204.15204.1520–4.25744.25744.2574 has resisted closing.

Formalization scope

All values live in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] and expectations are Lebesgue integrals of non-negative functions; a strategy that fails to meet with positive probability has value ∞\infty∞. Sample spaces range over a fixed universe, which loses no generality. Paths are required to be 111-Lipschitz on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with f(0)=0f(0)=0f(0)=0, and positions at fixed times are measurable, so meeting times are random variables. The four orientation pairs are weighted equally. The infimum in RRR ranges over all such strategies, not only over integer zigzags; the restriction appears only in RdiscR_{\mathrm{disc}}Rdisc​. A trivializing reading (e.g. a meeting time of 000 or an unrestricted speed) is excluded: by construction every strategy pair has expected meeting time at least 111.

Contributions are welcome on: measurability of hitting times for continuous processes, the discretisation argument, explicit strategies with certified expected meeting times, and certified lower-bound certificates.

Selected references

  • S. Alpern, The rendezvous search problem, SIAM J. Control Optim. 33(3) (1995), 673–683.
  • S. Alpern, S. Gal, Rendezvous search on the line with distinguishable players, SIAM J. Control Optim. 33(4) (1995), 1270–1276.
  • S. Alpern, S. Gal, The Theory of Search Games and Rendezvous, International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 55, Kluwer, 2003.
  • Q. Han, D. Du, J. C. Vera, L. F. Zuluaga, Improved bounds for the symmetric rendezvous search problem on the line, Operations Research 56(3) (2008).
  • Open Problem Garden, Rendezvous on a line. http://www.openproblemgarden.org/op/rendezvous_on_a_line
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Prophet Secretary Through Blind Strategies 2: No Stopping Strategy Can Guarantee More Than √3 − 1 of the Prophet's Expected Maximum in Random OrderResearch Paper

Motivation

In a prophet inequality a gambler sees the realizations of independent nonnegative random variables one at a time and must decide irrevocably, at each step, whether to stop and keep the current value. Her performance is compared with that of a prophet who sees everything in advance and takes the maximum. The ratio between the two is the standard benchmark for online selection, and through the correspondence between threshold stopping rules and posted prices it governs the efficiency of sequential posted-price mechanisms in algorithmic mechanism design.

The constant depends on the order in which the values arrive. In adversarial order the best guarantee is 1/21/21/2 (Krengel and Sucheston; Samuel-Cahn). For independent and identically distributed values it is about 0.7450.7450.745 (Hill and Kertz 1982 gave the upper bound; Correa, Foncea, Hoeksma, Oosterwijk and Vredeveld 2017 proved it tight). The prophet secretary problem sits between these two: the distributions may differ, but the values arrive in a uniformly random order.

Timeline.

  • 2015: Esfandiari, HajiAghayi, Liaghat and Monemizadeh introduce the prophet secretary problem and give a guarantee of 1−1/e≈0.6321-1/e\approx0.6321−1/e≈0.632 with nonincreasing thresholds.
  • 2018: Ehsani, Hajiaghayi, Kesselheim and Singla obtain 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e with a single threshold and random tie-breaking.
  • 2018: Azar, Chiplunkar and Kaplan beat 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e slightly. They also show that deterministic distribution-insensitive algorithms cannot beat 11/15≈0.73311/15\approx0.73311/15≈0.733.
  • 2019 (arXiv:1807.07483v2): Correa, Saona and Ziliotto prove a guarantee of 0.6690.6690.669 for blind strategies. They also prove the upper bound of 3−1≈0.732\sqrt3-1\approx0.7323​−1≈0.732 for all strategies, the subject of this mission.

Before this bound no separation between the prophet secretary problem and the i.i.d. prophet inequality was known.

Setting

An instance with NNN variables is a family of laws μ0,…,μN−1\mu_0,\dots,\mu_{N-1}μ0​,…,μN−1​ on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). The values Vi∼μiV_i\sim\mu_iVi​∼μi​ are independent. A permutation σ\sigmaσ of {0,…,N−1}\{0,\dots,N-1\}{0,…,N−1}, uniform and independent of the values, fixes the arrival order: at time jjj the gambler sees which variable σj\sigma_jσj​ arrives and its value VσjV_{\sigma_j}Vσj​​.

A strategy decides at each time jjj whether to stop. The decision may use the observed history ((σ0,Vσ0),…,(σj,Vσj))((\sigma_0,V_{\sigma_0}),\dots,(\sigma_j,V_{\sigma_j}))((σ0​,Vσ0​​),…,(σj​,Vσj​​)) and an independent seed ω\omegaω, uniform on [0,1][0,1][0,1], and must depend on them measurably. These are the randomized stopping times TTT of the gambler's information. The gambler knows the distributions, so a strategy may be chosen after the instance. The reward is VσT1T<∞V_{\sigma_T}\mathbf 1_{T<\infty}VσT​​1T<∞​: the value at the first stop, and 000 if she never stops. The value of a strategy is E(VσT)\mathbb E(V_{\sigma_T})E(VσT​​), and the prophet's value is E(max⁡iVi)\mathbb E(\max_i V_i)E(maxi​Vi​).

A strategy guarantees ccc if E(VσT)≥c E(max⁡iVi)\mathbb E(V_{\sigma_T})\ge c\,\mathbb E(\max_iV_i)E(VσT​​)≥cE(maxi​Vi​) on every instance.

The §5 instance has n+1n+1n+1 variables, for n≥1n\ge1n≥1 and a∈[0,1]a\in[0,1]a∈[0,1]. Each of V1,…,VnV_1,\dots,V_nV1​,…,Vn​ equals nnn with probability 1/n21/n^21/n2 and 000 otherwise, and Vn+1≡aV_{n+1}\equiv aVn+1​≡a. For j∈{1,…,n+1}j\in\{1,\dots,n+1\}j∈{1,…,n+1}, the time-jjj rule accepts a value nnn whenever one appears, and accepts Vn+1V_{n+1}Vn+1​ exactly when it arrives at time jjj or later.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1.3 (p. 4)

For every c>3−1c>\sqrt3-1c>3​−1 there is an instance with 0<E(max⁡iVi)<∞0<\mathbb E(\max_iV_i)<\infty0<E(maxi​Vi​)<∞ on which every strategy satisfies

E(VσT)<c⋅E(max⁡iVi).\mathbb E(V_{\sigma_T}) < c\cdot\mathbb E\Big(\max_{i}V_i\Big).E(VσT​​)<c⋅E(imax​Vi​).

The instance comes first and all strategies second. This is what "no strategy can guarantee more than 3−1\sqrt3-13​−1" means once strategies may depend on the distributions. Universally quantifying a fixed strategy first would describe a weaker gambler.

Milestones (all from §5, p. 19)

  1. The prophet's value on the §5 instance:
E(max⁡i≤n+1Vi)=n[1−(1−1n2)n]+(1−1n2)na →n→∞ 1+a.\mathbb E\Big(\max_{i\le n+1}V_i\Big)=n\Big[1-\Big(1-\tfrac1{n^2}\Big)^n\Big]+\Big(1-\tfrac1{n^2}\Big)^na\ \xrightarrow[n\to\infty]{}\ 1+a .E(i≤n+1max​Vi​)=n[1−(1−n21​)n]+(1−n21​)na n→∞​ 1+a.
  1. The elementary bound n[1−(1−1/n2)i−1]≤(i−1)/nn[1-(1-1/n^2)^{i-1}]\le (i-1)/nn[1−(1−1/n2)i−1]≤(i−1)/n, which is a published platform theorem (1−(1−t)m≤mt1-(1-t)^m\le mt1−(1−t)m≤mt for t∈[0,1]t\in[0,1]t∈[0,1]).
  2. The conditional values of the time-jjj rule given that Vn+1V_{n+1}Vn+1​ arrives at position iii: n[1−(1−1/n2)n]n[1-(1-1/n^2)^n]n[1−(1−1/n2)n] for i<ji<ji<j, and n[1−(1−1/n2)i−1]+(1−1/n2)i−1an[1-(1-1/n^2)^{i-1}]+(1-1/n^2)^{i-1}an[1−(1−1/n2)i−1]+(1−1/n2)i−1a for i≥ji\ge ji≥j.
  3. For every strategy on the §5 instance,
E(VσT)≤1+a22+O(1n).\mathbb E(V_{\sigma_T})\le 1+\frac{a^2}{2}+O\Big(\frac1n\Big).E(VσT​​)≤1+2a2​+O(n1​).

At a=3−1a=\sqrt3-1a=3​−1 the ratio of milestones 4 and 1 tends to (1+a2/2)/(1+a)=3−1(1+a^2/2)/(1+a)=\sqrt3-1(1+a2/2)/(1+a)=3​−1.

Significance

The bound shows that random order with non-identical distributions is strictly harder for the gambler than i.i.d. values: the constant cannot exceed 3−1≈0.732\sqrt3-1\approx0.7323​−1≈0.732, which is below 0.7450.7450.745. It improves the 11/1511/1511/15 bound of Azar, Chiplunkar and Kaplan and extends it from deterministic distribution-insensitive algorithms to all strategies, including randomized ones that know the distributions. With the 0.6690.6690.669 guarantee of the same paper, it brackets the optimal prophet secretary constant in [0.669,0.732][0.669, 0.732][0.669,0.732]. Later work raised the lower end, but the exact value is still open.

The result is proved in the paper. It is not formalized anywhere we know of, and no prophet secretary statement exists on the platform. Formalizing it means writing down a general model of randomized stopping strategies in random order, which other random-order results can reuse. The heart of the proof is a dynamic-programming argument that is easy to state informally and has never been machine-checked. The finite-nnn bound of milestone 4, with an explicit constant in place of O(1/n)O(1/n)O(1/n), is also a welcome contribution.

Difficulty

Computing the value of one good strategy on the §5 instance is routine (milestone 3). The goal, though, quantifies over every strategy, including randomized ones that observe identities and the whole history. The paper's sentence "Solving the dynamic programming, the algorithm picks the value aaa if and only if it appears at time jjj or later" carries the whole reduction. It requires:

  • showing that accepting a value nnn is always optimal;
  • showing that accepting a 000 never helps;
  • showing that randomization does not help;
  • showing that the only relevant state is the time and whether Vn+1V_{n+1}Vn+1​ has already passed.

Bounding a few natural strategies does not suffice. The asymptotic analysis must also be made uniform in the strategy, so that a single constant CCC in O(1/n)O(1/n)O(1/n) works for all of them.

Formalization scope

  • Indices are 0-based. The paper's ViV_iVi​ is coordinate i−1i-1i−1 of Fin (n+1), and Vn+1V_{n+1}Vn+1​ is Fin.last n.
  • Independence is built in through the product measure Measure.pi μ.
  • The uniform order is the average over all N!N!N! permutations.
  • The seed is uniform on [0,1][0,1][0,1] (volume.restrict (Icc 0 1)).
  • Expectations are lower Lebesgue integrals in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] of ENNReal.ofReal of the reward, so no integrability hypotheses appear.
  • A conditional expectation given σi=n+1\sigma_i=n+1σi​=n+1 is written in joint form, as (n+1)(n+1)(n+1) times the expectation on that event.
  • The strategy class (Strategy N) is the class of all measurable decision rules on the full observed history plus an independent seed, and it is quantified after the instance. Restricting it to threshold rules, time-jjj rules or deterministic rules would make the goal a different, weaker theorem; that restriction is ruled out. The class is nonempty, and its measurability requirement is satisfiable: jRule carries its proof.
  • The instance is not required to have continuous laws. The paper assumes continuity only for its blind strategies, and the §5 instance has atoms.
  • The goal adds 0<E(max⁡)<∞0<\mathbb E(\max)<\infty0<E(max)<∞, which the §5 instance satisfies; this excludes a degenerate instance.
  • §5 writes max⁡i∈[n]\max_{i\in[n]}maxi∈[n]​, but the maximum is over all n+1n+1n+1 variables, since the formula contains aaa. The Lean states the corrected reading.
  • The PDF used is arXiv:1807.07483v2. Pages are PDF pages, because the preprint prints no page numbers.

Reusable infrastructure includes the random-order stopping model, the reward of the first stop, and the dynamic-programming reduction for a single deterministic variable. Contributions are welcome on any milestone, and on an explicit CCC in milestone 4.

Selected references

  • J. Correa, R. Saona, B. Ziliotto, Prophet Secretary Through Blind Strategies, arXiv:1807.07483v2, 2019; Mathematical Programming, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.07483
  • S. Esfandiari, M. HajiAghayi, V. Liaghat, M. Monemizadeh, Prophet Secretary, ESA 2015; SIAM J. Discrete Math. 31(3), 2017. https://doi.org/10.1137/15M1029394
  • S. Ehsani, M. Hajiaghayi, T. Kesselheim, S. Singla, Prophet Secretary for Combinatorial Auctions and Matroids, SODA 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.11213
  • Y. Azar, A. Chiplunkar, H. Kaplan, Prophet Secretary: Surpassing the 1 − 1/e Barrier, EC 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.01834
  • T. P. Hill, R. P. Kertz, Comparisons of stop rule and supremum expectations of i.i.d. random variables, Annals of Probability 10(2), 1982. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176993772
  • J. Correa, P. Foncea, R. Hoeksma, T. Oosterwijk, T. Vredeveld, Posted Price Mechanisms for a Random Stream of Customers, EC 2017. https://doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3085137
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Complexity TheoryLinear algebraTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Candidate Indistinguishability Obfuscation and Functional Encryption for All Circuits: Garblings of Equivalent Partial Assignments Are O(nT²/p)-Close in the Generic Colored Matrix ModelResearch Paper

Motivation

An indistinguishability obfuscator (iO) is a compiler that scrambles a program so that any two programs computing the same function become computationally indistinguishable after compilation. Garg, Gentry, Halevi, Raykova, Sahai and Waters gave the first candidate construction for all circuits (SIAM J. Comput. 45(3), 2016; conference version FOCS 2013). The candidate later became the starting point of a large body of work on iO, functional encryption and their applications (Sahai–Waters, STOC 2014).

The security of the candidate rests on a new assumption about garbled branching programs (the paper's Assumption 1, "Equivalent Program Indistinguishability"). Appendix C of the paper gives evidence for it: in an idealised generic colored matrix model, where an attacker can only add, scale and multiply the published matrices in an order that respects their colours, the assumption holds unconditionally. That unconditional statement is Theorem 6, and it is the target of this mission. It is an information-theoretic counting statement over finite fields; it involves no machines, no running times and no negligible functions.

Timeline. Barrington (1986) showed that width-5 permutation branching programs compute NC¹. Kilian (1988) randomised such programs by conjugating consecutive matrices with random invertible matrices. Garg, Gentry and Halevi (2013) proposed approximate multilinear maps. The present paper (2013) combined the three, adding a dummy program, bookend vectors and bundling scalars, and analysed the result in the generic colored matrix model. Later work (Barak et al. 2014; Brakerski–Rothblum 2014) proved security in a generic multilinear-map model for modified constructions.

Setting

A branching program BPBPBP of length nnn on ℓ\ellℓ input bits consists of a map inp:[n]→[ℓ]\mathsf{inp}:[n]\to[\ell]inp:[n]→[ℓ] and, for every step iii and bit bbb, a 5×55\times55×5 permutation matrix Ai,bA_{i,b}Ai,b​. On input χ∈{0,1}ℓ\chi\in\{0,1\}^\ellχ∈{0,1}ℓ it outputs 111 iff ∏i=1nAi,χinp(i)=I\prod_{i=1}^n A_{i,\chi_{\mathsf{inp}(i)}}=I∏i=1n​Ai,χinp(i)​​=I. A partial assignment (J,σ)(J,\sigma)(J,σ) fixes the input bits in J⊆[ℓ]J\subseteq[\ell]J⊆[ℓ]; two partial assignments (J,σ)(J,\sigma)(J,σ), (J,σ′)(J,\sigma')(J,σ′) are functionally equivalent if the program computes the same function of the remaining bits under both.

Fix a prime ppp, m=2n+5m=2n+5m=2n+5 and N=2m+5N=2m+5N=2m+5. The randomized program RNDp(BP)\mathcal{RND}_p(BP)RNDp​(BP) consists of the N×NN\times NN×N matrices D~i,b=Ri−1Di,bRi−1\tilde D_{i,b}=R_{i-1}D_{i,b}R_i^{-1}D~i,b​=Ri−1​Di,b​Ri−1​ and D~i,b′=Ri−1′Di,b′Ri′−1\tilde D'_{i,b}=R'_{i-1}D'_{i,b}R_i'^{-1}D~i,b′​=Ri−1′​Di,b′​Ri′−1​, together with bookend vectors s~=sR0−1\tilde{\mathbf s}=\mathbf sR_0^{-1}s~=sR0−1​, t~=Rnt\tilde{\mathbf t}=R_n\mathbf tt~=Rn​t and their primed versions. Here the Ri,Ri′R_i,R'_iRi​,Ri′​ are uniform invertible matrices over Zp\mathbb Z_pZp​; Di,bD_{i,b}Di,b​ is block diagonal with 2m2m2m random diagonal entries and the block αi,bAi,b\alpha_{i,b}A_{i,b}αi,b​Ai,b​; Di,b′D'_{i,b}Di,b′​ has the block αi,b′I\alpha'_{i,b}Iαi,b′​I (the "dummy program"). The vector s\mathbf ss is zero on its first mmm entries and t\mathbf tt on its next mmm, and their last five entries s∗,t∗\mathbf s^*,\mathbf t^*s∗,t∗ (and s∗′,t∗′\mathbf s^{*\prime},\mathbf t^{*\prime}s∗′,t∗′) are random subject to ⟨s∗,t∗⟩=⟨s∗′,t∗′⟩\langle\mathbf s^*,\mathbf t^*\rangle=\langle\mathbf s^{*\prime},\mathbf t^{*\prime}\rangle⟨s∗,t∗⟩=⟨s∗′,t∗′⟩. The bundling scalars αi,b,αi,b′\alpha_{i,b},\alpha'_{i,b}αi,b​,αi,b′​ are products of random γ\gammaγ's arranged so that their products over each block Ij=inp−1(j)I_j=\mathsf{inp}^{-1}(j)Ij​=inp−1(j) agree.

In the generic colored matrix model each matrix carries a left and a right colour (s~\tilde{\mathbf s}s~: 0→10\to10→1; D~i,b\tilde D_{i,b}D~i,b​: i→i+1i\to i+1i→i+1; D~i,b′\tilde D'_{i,b}D~i,b′​: i′→(i+1)′i'\to(i+1)'i′→(i+1)′; t~\tilde{\mathbf t}t~: n+1→n+2n+1\to n+2n+1→n+2). A representation oracle holds the database DB(p,BP,(J,σ))DB(p,BP,(J,\sigma))DB(p,BP,(J,σ)): the bookends, one matrix per step and program for the fixed steps (bit σ(inp(i))\sigma(\mathsf{inp}(i))σ(inp(i))), and both for the free steps. An adversary sees only handles. It may ask to add two matrices of the same colours, scale one, or multiply two whose colours match. The oracle answers with the handle of an existing record whenever the result equals a stored matrix mod ppp, so equality of matrices is all the adversary learns.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6

For every prime ppp, branching program BPBPBP, functionally equivalent (J,σ),(J,σ′)(J,\sigma),(J,\sigma')(J,σ),(J,σ′) and adversary A\mathcal AA receiving at most TTT handles,

∣Pr⁡[ADB(p,BP,(J,σ))=1]−Pr⁡[ADB(p,BP,(J,σ′))=1]∣≤C nT2p\Big|\Pr[\mathcal A^{DB(p,BP,(J,\sigma))}=1]-\Pr[\mathcal A^{DB(p,BP,(J,\sigma'))}=1]\Big|\le C\,\frac{nT^2}{p}​Pr[ADB(p,BP,(J,σ))=1]−Pr[ADB(p,BP,(J,σ′))=1]​≤CpnT2​

for an absolute constant CCC. No value of CCC is fixed, as the paper gives none.

Milestones

  1. §4.2 (a): if BP(χ)=1BP(\chi)=1BP(χ)=1, the form Fχ=s~∏D~ t~−s~′∏D~′ t~′F_\chi=\tilde{\mathbf s}\prod\tilde D\,\tilde{\mathbf t}-\tilde{\mathbf s}'\prod\tilde D'\,\tilde{\mathbf t}'Fχ​=s~∏D~t~−s~′∏D~′t~′ vanishes.
  2. The bookend identity: s~∏iD~i,bit~=(∏iαi,bi) s∗(∏iAi,bi)t∗\tilde{\mathbf s}\prod_i\tilde D_{i,b_i}\tilde{\mathbf t}=(\prod_i\alpha_{i,b_i})\,\mathbf s^*(\prod_iA_{i,b_i})\mathbf t^*s~∏i​D~i,bi​​t~=(∏i​αi,bi​​)s∗(∏i​Ai,bi​​)t∗, and its primed analogue.
  3. Partial evaluations: two distinct formal combinations of products of the Di,bD_{i,b}Di,b​ coincide with probability at most n/pn/pn/p.
  4. The Schwartz–Zippel lemma (already on the platform).
  5. Lemma 2 (Straddling Lemma).
  6. The display of p. 43: 1/p<Pr⁡[c′⟨s∗′,t∗′⟩+c s∗Πt∗=0]<2/p1/p<\Pr[c'\langle\mathbf s^{*\prime},\mathbf t^{*\prime}\rangle+c\,\mathbf s^*\Pi\mathbf t^*=0]<2/p1/p<Pr[c′⟨s∗′,t∗′⟩+cs∗Πt∗=0]<2/p for Π≠I\Pi\ne IΠ=I.

Significance

Theorem 6 says that the candidate cannot be broken by any attack that stays within linear algebra over the published matrices in the intended order: partial evaluations, mixing the primal and dummy programs, and mixing inputs that are inconsistent within a block are all detected or harmless. The proof explains the purpose of each design element: the bookend zero patterns kill the random diagonals, and the dummy program and bundling scalars defeat mixed-input attacks.

The theorem has a pen-and-paper proof in the paper and, as far as is known, no machine-checked proof. A formalization would pin down the model exactly: how ⊥ replies, handle reuse and adaptivity behave, and which distribution the bundling scalars follow. These are points the paper leaves informal, and the formal statement records them. The milestones are reusable on their own: the bookend identity and Lemma 2 are pure algebra, and the partial-evaluation bound is a Schwartz–Zippel application to block-diagonal matrix products.

Difficulty

The obvious argument says each new handle is a "new polynomial", and Schwartz–Zippel makes a collision unlikely. That argument fails for 1×11\times11×1 bookend products. There, a primal and a dummy evaluation on an accepting input are equal as field elements but different as formal expressions, so a simulator must identify them using only BP∣σBP|_\sigmaBP∣σ​. No other cancellation may survive, including those between products that mix the two values of an input bit within a block, and those on rejected inputs, where the 5-vectors are correlated through ⟨s∗,t∗⟩=⟨s∗′,t∗′⟩\langle\mathbf s^*,\mathbf t^*\rangle=\langle\mathbf s^{*\prime},\mathbf t^{*\prime}\rangle⟨s∗,t∗⟩=⟨s∗′,t∗′⟩. The bundling scalars are products of two uniform field elements, so they vanish with probability about 2/p2/p2/p, and the counting has to absorb such degenerate events. Finally, the adversary is adaptive: its later queries depend on earlier equality patterns, so the comparison of the two executions must go through a simulator that does not depend on σ\sigmaσ.

Formalization scope

Everything is over ZMod p with [Fact p.Prime]. Probabilities are counting fractions over finite product types; no measure theory is used. Steps, handles and γ\gammaγ-indices are 0-based. Branching programs output 111 iff the ordered product of permutation matrices is the identity; this is the convention of §3, §4.2 and App. C, not the (A0,A1)(A_0,A_1)(A0​,A1​) outputs of Definition 9. The bundling scalars follow the γ\gammaγ-procedure of p. 42. §4.1 instead says "random subject to the constraint", and over Zp\mathbb Z_pZp​ the two distributions differ; the proof analyses the γ\gammaγ-procedure. A malformed query (unknown handle, mismatched dimensions or colours) is answered ⊥ and leaves the database unchanged. Adversaries have coins uniform on Fin K, make qqq adaptive queries and output a bit. The statistical distance between the views is expressed as the largest acceptance gap over all adversaries; this is equivalent, since every distinguisher of the views is an adversary's final decision. TTT is taken to be ∣DB∣+q|DB|+q∣DB∣+q, the number of handles a qqq-query adversary receives. The page's Rj−1R_j^{-1}Rj−1​ in the partial-evaluation case is read as Rj−1−1R_{j-1}^{-1}Rj−1−1​.

Trivializing formalizations are excluded. The constant CCC comes before ppp, so the bound cannot absorb the trivial distance 111. The oracle compares matrices mod ppp together with dimensions and colours, never formal expressions, and it respects colours. The sampler keeps every random component of §4.1.

The development needs only Mathlib (matrices, GL, MvPolynomial, Schwartz–Zippel). Proofs of the milestones are welcome independently. A formal treatment of the paper's simulator (non-commutative formal polynomials, canonical forms) would be a reusable contribution for other generic-model arguments. The paper's PPT security reductions (Theorems 2–4) are out of scope; the mission formalizes the paper's evidence for Assumption 1, not the obfuscator's security.

Selected references

  • S. Garg, C. Gentry, S. Halevi, M. Raykova, A. Sahai, B. Waters, Candidate Indistinguishability Obfuscation and Functional Encryption for All Circuits, SIAM J. Comput. 45(3), 2016. https://doi.org/10.1137/14095772x (authors' version: https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/451)
  • D. A. Barrington, Bounded-width polynomial-size branching programs recognize exactly those languages in NC¹, STOC 1986. https://doi.org/10.1145/12130.12131
  • J. Kilian, Founding cryptography on oblivious transfer, STOC 1988. https://doi.org/10.1145/62212.62215
  • S. Garg, C. Gentry, S. Halevi, Candidate Multilinear Maps from Ideal Lattices, EUROCRYPT 2013. https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/610
  • B. Barak, S. Garg, Y. T. Kalai, O. Paneth, A. Sahai, Protecting Obfuscation against Algebraic Attacks, EUROCRYPT 2014. https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/631
  • Z. Brakerski, G. N. Rothblum, Virtual Black-Box Obfuscation for All Circuits via Generic Graded Encoding, TCC 2014. https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/563
  • J. T. Schwartz, Fast probabilistic algorithms for verification of polynomial identities, J. ACM 27(4), 1980. https://doi.org/10.1145/322217.322225
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Optimal TransportStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Finite-Sample Guarantees for Wasserstein Distributionally Robust Optimization: Breaking the Curse of Dimensionality 1: Under T_p(τ), True Loss ≤ Empirical Loss + R(√(τt/n); −f) w.p. ≥ 1 − e^(−t)Research Paper

Motivation

Wasserstein distributionally robust optimization (Wasserstein DRO) replaces the expected loss under an empirical distribution by the worst-case expected loss over all distributions within a Wasserstein distance ρ\rhoρ of it. It is used in operations research, statistics and machine learning to guard decisions and predictors against the gap between the sample and the population. The statistical question it raises is how large ρ\rhoρ must be for the robust loss to bound the true loss with high probability. Classical answers go through the concentration of the empirical measure in Wasserstein distance, which forces ρ≍n−1/d\rho\asymp n^{-1/d}ρ≍n−1/d in dimension ddd: the curse of dimensionality.

Gao (arXiv:2009.04382; Operations Research, 2023) shows that a radius of order n−1/2n^{-1/2}n−1/2 suffices, independently of the dimension. The first ingredient, and the subject of this mission, is a new concentration inequality for the empirical mean of a single loss function, whose rate is governed by the Wasserstein regularizer itself.

Setting

Let Z\mathcal ZZ be a separable Banach space with norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ and let p∈[1,2]p\in[1,2]p∈[1,2]. Pp(Z)\mathcal P_p(\mathcal Z)Pp​(Z) is the set of Borel probability measures with E[∥z∥p]<∞\mathbb E[\|z\|^p]<\inftyE[∥z∥p]<∞, and the Wasserstein distance of order ppp is

Wp(P,Q)p=inf⁡π E(z~,z)∼π[∥z~−z∥p],\mathcal W_p(\mathbb P,\mathbb Q)^p=\inf_\pi\ \mathbb E_{(\tilde z,z)\sim\pi}\big[\|\tilde z-z\|^p\big],Wp​(P,Q)p=πinf​ E(z~,z)∼π​[∥z~−z∥p],

the infimum over couplings π\piπ of P\mathbb PP and Q\mathbb QQ. For a loss f:Z→Rf:\mathcal Z\to\mathbb Rf:Z→R, a nominal distribution Q\mathbb QQ and a radius ρ≥0\rho\ge0ρ≥0, the Wasserstein regularizer is the excess of the robust loss over the nominal loss,

RQ,p(ρ;f)=sup⁡P∈Pp(Z){EP[f]:Wp(P,Q)≤ρ}−EQ[f].\mathcal R_{\mathbb Q,p}(\rho;f)=\sup_{\mathbb P\in\mathcal P_p(\mathcal Z)}\big\{\mathbb E_{\mathbb P}[f]:\mathcal W_p(\mathbb P,\mathbb Q)\le\rho\big\}-\mathbb E_{\mathbb Q}[f].RQ,p​(ρ;f)=P∈Pp​(Z)sup​{EP​[f]:Wp​(P,Q)≤ρ}−EQ​[f].

The data are nnn i.i.d. samples z1,…,znz_1,\dots,z_nz1​,…,zn​ from an unknown Ptrue\mathbb P_{\rm true}Ptrue​; P⊗\mathbb P_\otimesP⊗​ is their joint law and EPn[f]=1n∑if(zi)\mathbb E_{\mathbb P_n}[f]=\frac1n\sum_i f(z_i)EPn​​[f]=n1​∑i​f(zi​) is the empirical loss. A distribution P\mathbb PP satisfies the transportation-information inequality Tp(τ)T_p(\tau)Tp​(τ) if

Wp(Q,P)≤τ H(Q∥P)∀ Q∈Pp(Z),\mathcal W_p(\mathbb Q,\mathbb P)\le\sqrt{\tau\,H(\mathbb Q\|\mathbb P)}\qquad\forall\,\mathbb Q\in\mathcal P_p(\mathcal Z),Wp​(Q,P)≤τH(Q∥P)​∀Q∈Pp​(Z),

with HHH the relative entropy. T1T_1T1​ holds for every distribution with a Gaussian moment E[ea∥z∥2]<∞\mathbb E[e^{a\|z\|^2}]<\inftyE[ea∥z∥2]<∞, and T2T_2T2​ (Talagrand's inequality) is implied by a log-Sobolev inequality.

The rate function is built from

Φg(t)=Ez∼Ptrue[sup⁡z~∈Z{t(g(z~)−g(z))−∥z~−z∥p}],Ip(ε;g)p=sup⁡t>0{εt−Φg(t)}.\Phi_g(t)=\mathbb E_{z\sim\mathbb P_{\rm true}}\Big[\sup_{\tilde z\in\mathcal Z}\big\{t(g(\tilde z)-g(z))-\|\tilde z-z\|^p\big\}\Big],\qquad \mathcal I_p(\varepsilon;g)^p=\sup_{t>0}\{\varepsilon t-\Phi_g(t)\}.Φg​(t)=Ez∼Ptrue​​[z~∈Zsup​{t(g(z~)−g(z))−∥z~−z∥p}],Ip​(ε;g)p=t>0sup​{εt−Φg​(t)}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (variation-based concentration, p. 7)

If f≤M+L∥z∥pf\le M+L\|z\|^pf≤M+L∥z∥p with M,L>0M,L>0M,L>0 and Ptrue\mathbb P_{\rm true}Ptrue​ satisfies Tp(τ)T_p(\tau)Tp​(τ), then for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0

P⊗{EPn[f]−EPtrue[f]<−ε}≤exp⁡(−n Ip(ε;−f)2/τ),\mathbb P_\otimes\big\{\mathbb E_{\mathbb P_n}[f]-\mathbb E_{\mathbb P_{\rm true}}[f]<-\varepsilon\big\}\le\exp\big(-n\,\mathcal I_p(\varepsilon;-f)^2/\tau\big),P⊗​{EPn​​[f]−EPtrue​​[f]<−ε}≤exp(−nIp​(ε;−f)2/τ),

and for every t>0t>0t>0, with probability at least 1−e−t1-e^{-t}1−e−t,

EPtrue[f]≤EPn[f]+RPtrue,p(τtn;−f).\mathbb E_{\mathbb P_{\rm true}}[f]\le\mathbb E_{\mathbb P_n}[f]+\mathcal R_{\mathbb P_{\rm true},p}\Big(\sqrt{\tfrac{\tau t}{n}};-f\Big).EPtrue​​[f]≤EPn​​[f]+RPtrue​,p​(nτt​​;−f).

Milestones

  1. Lemma 4 (p. 21): if P\mathbb PP satisfies Tp(τ)T_p(\tau)Tp​(τ), the product P⊗n\mathbb P^{\otimes n}P⊗n satisfies Tp(τn2/p−1)T_p(\tau n^{2/p-1})Tp​(τn2/p−1) for the ℓp\ell_pℓp​ product distance dp(z,z~)p=∑i∥zi−z~i∥p\mathsf d_p(z,\tilde z)^p=\sum_i\|z_i-\tilde z_i\|^pdp​(z,z~)p=∑i​∥zi​−z~i​∥p.
  2. Identity (5) (p. 21): the relative entropy of an exponential tilt, H(ν(g)∥ν)=Eν(g)[g]−ln⁡Eν[eg]H(\nu^{(g)}\|\nu)=\mathbb E_{\nu^{(g)}}[g]-\ln\mathbb E_\nu[e^g]H(ν(g)∥ν)=Eν(g)​[g]−lnEν​[eg]. Already proved on the platform and referenced.
  3. Proposition 1 (p. 6): Ip(⋅;f)\mathcal I_p(\cdot;f)Ip​(⋅;f) inverts the regularizer, Ip(RPtrue,p(ρ;f);f)=ρ\mathcal I_p(\mathcal R_{\mathbb P_{\rm true},p}(\rho;f);f)=\rhoIp​(RPtrue​,p​(ρ;f);f)=ρ when the dual minimizer λo\lambda_oλo​ of the strong-duality problem (1) exceeds the growth rate λ‾\underline\lambdaλ​ of fff, and ≥ρ\ge\rho≥ρ when they coincide.
  4. Lemma 5 (p. 21): the same two bounds for a general F:Zn→RF:\mathcal Z^n\to\mathbb RF:Zn→R with E⊗[F]=0\mathbb E_\otimes[F]=0E⊗​[F]=0 and ppp-growth, with rate J(ε;F)\mathcal J(\varepsilon;F)J(ε;F) and bound R(τt/n;F)\mathcal R(\sqrt{\tau t/n};F)R(τt/n​;F).
  5. Corollary 1 (p. 7), two items: for p=1p=1p=1 under a uniform Lipschitz bound, EPtrue[f]≤EPn[f]+τt/n ∥f∥Lip\mathbb E_{\mathbb P_{\rm true}}[f]\le\mathbb E_{\mathbb P_n}[f]+\sqrt{\tau t/n}\,\|f\|_{\rm Lip}EPtrue​​[f]≤EPn​​[f]+τt/n​∥f∥Lip​; for p=2p=2p=2 under a Lipschitz gradient, the bound τt/n ∥∥∇f∥∗∥Ptrue,2+ℏτt/n\sqrt{\tau t/n}\,\|\|\nabla f\|_*\|_{\mathbb P_{\rm true},2}+\hbar\tau t/nτt/n​∥∥∇f∥∗​∥Ptrue​,2​+ℏτt/n.

Significance

Theorem 1 says that the large-deviation rate of the empirical loss is the inverse of the Wasserstein regularizer, and that the regularizer at radius τt/n\sqrt{\tau t/n}τt/n​ is a valid high-probability correction of the empirical loss. Neither involves the dimension of Z\mathcal ZZ or the complexity of a covering of it. The paper builds its covering-number and local-Rademacher guarantees for Wasserstein DRO (Sections 4.1–4.2, the subject of two companion missions) on this single-function result, and Corollary 1 recovers, for p=1p=1p=1, the Lipschitz-norm bound known from transportation inequalities while sharpening it for p=2p=2p=2.

The results are proved in the paper; none is formalized. A complete development would give a machine-checked tensorization of transportation-information inequalities on Banach spaces and a Marton–Herbst-type concentration argument, both of which are used well beyond DRO.

Difficulty

The proof combines three ingredients that Mathlib does not yet connect. Tensorization (Lemma 4) needs disintegration of a measure on Zn\mathcal Z^nZn and the chain rule for relative entropy, together with a gluing of couplings and Hölder's inequality for the dimension constant. Lemma 5 combines TpT_pTp​ with Kantorovich duality for the cost 1ndpp\frac1n\mathsf d_p^pn1​dpp​ and the entropy of an exponential tilt, then optimizes a Young-inequality split over two parameters for p<2p<2p<2, and extends from bounded FFF to ppp-growth by monotone truncation. Proposition 1 rests on the strong duality (1) of Gao and Kleywegt, an external result, and on the first-order optimality condition of a convex perspective function. A naive approach that bounds the deviation by Wp(Pn,Ptrue)\mathcal W_p(\mathbb P_n,\mathbb P_{\rm true})Wp​(Pn​,Ptrue​) fails: that distance decays like n−1/dn^{-1/d}n−1/d, which is exactly the curse the theorem avoids.

Formalization scope

The source is arXiv:2009.04382; its printed page numbers equal the PDF's. The Lean development lives in the namespace WassFSG.Conc and uses these conventions:

  • Z\mathcal ZZ is a real Banach space with its Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebra and is second countable (separable), as the cited duality results require; Wpp\mathcal W_p^pWpp​ is the published optimal transport cost with cost ∥u−w∥p\|u-w\|^p∥u−w∥p, and HHH is Mathlib's klDiv.
  • Expectations of a loss inside the robust supremum are extended integrals ∫f+−∫f−\int f^+-\int f^-∫f+−∫f− in [−∞,∞][-\infty,\infty][−∞,∞]; the regularizer is valued in [−∞,∞][-\infty,\infty][−∞,∞].
  • Ipp\mathcal I_p^pIpp​ and Jp\mathcal J^pJp are read as max⁡(0,sup⁡t>0{⋯ })∈[0,∞]\max(0,\sup_{t>0}\{\cdots\})\in[0,\infty]max(0,supt>0​{⋯})∈[0,∞], since the paper's declared codomain R+∪{+∞}\mathbb R_+\cup\{+\infty\}R+​∪{+∞} fails without it; an infinite rate gives the bound 000, never 111.
  • Lemma 5's printed "min" is an infimum, and Proposition 1's printed limit λ‾\underline\lambdaλ​ is a lim sup⁡\limsuplimsup.
  • The product space carries the ℓp\ell_pℓp​-sum cost, not the sup metric.
  • "With probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ" bounds the outer measure of the bad set by δ\deltaδ; the sample size satisfies n≥1n\ge1n≥1.
  • Added hypotheses: measurability and Ptrue\mathbb P_{\rm true}Ptrue​-integrability of fff in Theorem 1 and Proposition 1, measurability of FFF in Lemma 5, and a nontrivial Z\mathcal ZZ and Ptrue∈Pp(Z)\mathbb P_{\rm true}\in\mathcal P_p(\mathcal Z)Ptrue​∈Pp​(Z) (presupposed by the dual problem (1)) in Proposition 1.
  • Theorem 1's growth hypothesis is kept as printed, an upper bound on fff. When −f-f−f has no ppp-growth bound, both conclusions hold trivially (the rate is 000 and the regularizer is +∞+\infty+∞).

A formalization that reads an infinite Ip\mathcal I_pIp​ through a real coercion would turn the tail bound into the trivial bound 111; the conventions above rule this out. Likewise a regularizer whose supremum ranged only over measures supported on the sample, or a TpT_pTp​ condition over a restricted class of Q\mathbb QQ, would be a different statement.

Contributions welcome: Lemma 4 and Corollary 1 are independent entry points; a proof of the duality (1) under the paper's growth condition would be reusable by every Wasserstein DRO mission.

Selected references

  • R. Gao, Finite-Sample Guarantees for Wasserstein Distributionally Robust Optimization: Breaking the Curse of Dimensionality, Operations Research, 2023; preprint arXiv:2009.04382.
  • R. Gao and A. Kleywegt, Distributionally Robust Stochastic Optimization with Wasserstein Distance, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023; arXiv:1604.02199.
  • C. Villani, Optimal Transport: Old and New, Springer, 2009; doi:10.1007/978-3-540-71050-9.
  • N. Gozlan and C. Léonard, Transport Inequalities. A Survey, Markov Processes and Related Fields, 2010; arXiv:1003.3852.
  • F. Bolley and C. Villani, Weighted Csiszár–Kullback–Pinsker inequalities and applications to transportation inequalities, Annales de la Faculté des Sciences de Toulouse, 2005; doi:10.5802/afst.1095.
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