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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: iris

Stochastic Linear Programming: Models, Theory, and Computation V: integrated chance constraints with a finite discrete distribution define polyhedraTextbook

Limiting the size of a loss, not its probability

A probability constraint in a stochastic linear program asks that a random linear inequality hold with high probability. It counts every violation the same, however large, and the feasible set it defines is in general not convex, as Klein Haneveld's examples show (Klein Haneveld 1986). Integrated chance constraints replace the probability of a shortfall with its expected size. That single change gives convex feasible sets under no distributional assumption beyond existence of expected values. The models are due to Klein Haneveld, and were investigated further by Klein Haneveld and van der Vlerk, whose paper is the source of the polyhedral representations (2006). This mission formalizes the treatment in Kall and Mayer, Stochastic Linear Programming (2005), Chapter 2, §4.1, which is one of a series of missions on that book.

Setting

Let ξ\xiξ be a random vector with values in Ξ\XiΞ and law PPP. Let T(ξ)T(\xi)T(ξ) be a random s×ns\times ns×n matrix, h(ξ)∈Rsh(\xi)\in\mathbb R^sh(ξ)∈Rs a random vector, and, for a decision x∈Rnx\in\mathbb R^nx∈Rn,

ζ(x,ξ)=T(ξ)x−h(ξ).\zeta(x,\xi)=T(\xi)x-h(\xi).ζ(x,ξ)=T(ξ)x−h(ξ).

Write z+=max⁡{0,z}z^+=\max\{0,z\}z+=max{0,z} and z−=max⁡{0,−z}z^-=\max\{0,-z\}z−=max{0,−z}, componentwise on vectors. Throughout, the expected values of T(ξ)T(\xi)T(ξ) and h(ξ)h(\xi)h(ξ) exist.

When s=1s=1s=1, write ζ(x,ξ)=t(ξ)Tx−h(ξ)\zeta(x,\xi)=t(\xi)^{\mathrm T}x-h(\xi)ζ(x,ξ)=t(ξ)Tx−h(ξ). The separate integrated probability functions are

K(x)=Eξ[ζ+(x,ξ)],H(x)=Eξ[ζ−(x,ξ)].K(x)=\mathbb E_\xi[\zeta^+(x,\xi)],\qquad H(x)=\mathbb E_\xi[\zeta^-(x,\xi)].K(x)=Eξ​[ζ+(x,ξ)],H(x)=Eξ​[ζ−(x,ξ)].

For general sss, the joint integrated probability functions are

KJ(x)=Eξ[max⁡1≤i≤sζi+(x,ξ)],HJ(x)=Eξ[max⁡1≤i≤sζi−(x,ξ)].K_J(x)=\mathbb E_\xi\big[\max_{1\le i\le s}\zeta_i^+(x,\xi)\big],\qquad H_J(x)=\mathbb E_\xi\big[\max_{1\le i\le s}\zeta_i^-(x,\xi)\big].KJ​(x)=Eξ​[1≤i≤smax​ζi+​(x,ξ)],HJ​(x)=Eξ​[1≤i≤smax​ζi−​(x,ξ)].

A variant fixes α\alphaα and bounds the expected positive part by the fraction α\alphaα of Eξ[∣ζ∣]\mathbb E_\xi[|\zeta|]Eξ​[∣ζ∣]. With tˉ=Eξ[t(ξ)]\bar t=\mathbb E_\xi[t(\xi)]tˉ=Eξ​[t(ξ)] and hˉ=Eξ[h(ξ)]\bar h=\mathbb E_\xi[h(\xi)]hˉ=Eξ​[h(ξ)] it leads to the evaluation function

Kα(x)=α(tˉx−hˉ)+(1−2α)Eξ[ζ+(x,ξ)].K_\alpha(x)=\alpha(\bar t x-\bar h)+(1-2\alpha)\mathbb E_\xi[\zeta^+(x,\xi)].Kα​(x)=α(tˉx−hˉ)+(1−2α)Eξ​[ζ+(x,ξ)].

A finite discrete distribution has realizations ξ^1,…,ξ^N\hat\xi^1,\dots,\hat\xi^Nξ^​1,…,ξ^​N with probabilities pk>0p_k>0pk​>0, ∑kpk=1\sum_k p_k=1∑k​pk​=1. Write Tk=T(ξ^k)T^k=T(\hat\xi^k)Tk=T(ξ^​k), hk=h(ξ^k)h^k=h(\hat\xi^k)hk=h(ξ^​k), let tikt^k_itik​ be the iii-th row of TkT^kTk, and let N={1,…,N}\mathcal N=\{1,\dots,N\}N={1,…,N}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.3

For a finite discrete distribution and γ≥0\gamma\ge 0γ≥0, the set SJ(γ)={x∣KJ(x)≤γ}\mathcal S_J(\gamma)=\{x\mid K_J(x)\le\gamma\}SJ​(γ)={x∣KJ​(x)≤γ} is polyhedral, and with I={1,…,s}\mathcal I=\{1,\dots,s\}I={1,…,s},

{x∣KJ(x)≤γ}=⋂K⊂N ⋂l∈IK{x ∣ ∑k∈Kpk(tlkkx−hlkk)≤γ}.\{x\mid K_J(x)\le\gamma\}=\bigcap_{\mathcal K\subset\mathcal N}\ \bigcap_{l\in\mathcal I^{\mathcal K}}\Big\{x\ \Big|\ \sum_{k\in\mathcal K}p_k\big(t^k_{l_k}x-h^k_{l_k}\big)\le\gamma\Big\}.{x∣KJ​(x)≤γ}=K⊂N⋂​ l∈IK⋂​{x ​ k∈K∑​pk​(tlk​k​x−hlk​k​)≤γ}.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 4.1. If E[ϑ]\mathbb E[\vartheta]E[ϑ] exists, then E[(ϑ−z)+]=∫z∞(1−Fϑ(t)) dt\mathbb E[(\vartheta-z)^+]=\int_z^\infty(1-F_\vartheta(t))\,dtE[(ϑ−z)+]=∫z∞​(1−Fϑ​(t))dt and E[(ϑ−z)−]=∫−∞zFϑ(t) dt\mathbb E[(\vartheta-z)^-]=\int_{-\infty}^zF_\vartheta(t)\,dtE[(ϑ−z)−]=∫−∞z​Fϑ​(t)dt.
  2. Proposition 4.2. HHH, KKK and Eξ[∣ζ∣]=H+K\mathbb E_\xi[|\zeta|]=H+KEξ​[∣ζ∣]=H+K are convex on Rn\mathbb R^nRn.
  3. Theorem 4.1. For a finite discrete distribution and γ≥0\gamma\ge 0γ≥0, {x∣K(x)≤γ}=⋂K⊂N{x∣∑k∈Kpk(tkx−hk)≤γ}\{x\mid K(x)\le\gamma\}=\bigcap_{\mathcal K\subset\mathcal N}\{x\mid\sum_{k\in\mathcal K}p_k(t^kx-h^k)\le\gamma\}{x∣K(x)≤γ}=⋂K⊂N​{x∣∑k∈K​pk​(tkx−hk)≤γ}, and this set is polyhedral.
  4. (4.13)–(4.15). Three equivalent forms of the α\alphaα-variant, the identity Kα=(1−α)K−αHK_\alpha=(1-\alpha)K-\alpha HKα​=(1−α)K−αH, and convexity for α<12\alpha<\tfrac12α<21​, concavity for α>12\alpha>\tfrac12α>21​, affinity for α=12\alpha=\tfrac12α=21​.
  5. Theorem 4.2. For a finite discrete distribution and α∈[0,12]\alpha\in[0,\tfrac12]α∈[0,21​], the set {x∣Kα(x)≤0}\{x\mid K_\alpha(x)\le 0\}{x∣Kα​(x)≤0} is polyhedral with the analogous representation.
  6. Proposition 4.3. HJH_JHJ​ and KJK_JKJ​ are convex on Rn\mathbb R^nRn.

Significance

The convexity results say that an expected-shortfall constraint can be added to a convex program with no assumption on the distribution, and with a random technology matrix. This is in sharp contrast with probability functions, whose generalized concavity needs restrictive assumptions and fails for finite discrete distributions in general. The polyhedral representations go further: for scenario models, integrated chance constraints are finitely many linear inequalities, 2N−12^N-12N−1 in the separate case and (s+1)N−1(s+1)^N-1(s+1)N−1 in the joint case. Inequalities of this form are what a dual decomposition method generates one at a time.

All results here are proved in the literature. The mission contributes machine-checked versions of them, in a shared development with the other missions on this book. No formalization of integrated chance constraints was found on the platform when this mission was drafted.

Difficulty

The representations rest on one elementary observation: a sum of positive parts is a maximum over subsets, and a maximum over iii inside a sum is a maximum over tuples. The work is in the passage from the expectation, which is a Bochner integral against a sum of Dirac measures, to the finite sum, and in exhibiting the intersection as a single matrix inequality.

The tail formulas of Proposition 4.1 require more. The book's proof is an integration by parts for Stieltjes integrals, and it needs the limits yP(ϑ>y)→0yP(\vartheta>y)\to 0yP(ϑ>y)→0 and xFϑ(x)→0xF_\vartheta(x)\to 0xFϑ​(x)→0 at infinity. Reusing a layer-cake formula on (ϑ−z)+(\vartheta-z)^+(ϑ−z)+ avoids this, but it does not avoid working out the two improper integrals and proving that they exist.

The convexity statements are not pointwise statements alone. Passing from pointwise convexity to the expectation needs integrability of each integrand, which has to be derived from integrability of the entries of T(ξ)T(\xi)T(ξ) and h(ξ)h(\xi)h(ξ); the Bochner integral of a non-integrable function is 000, so this step cannot be skipped.

Formalization scope

Rn\mathbb R^nRn is Fin n → ℝ, with 000-based indices. The law of ξ\xiξ is a probability measure P on a measurable space Ξ. The book's affine form of T(ξ)T(\xi)T(ξ) and h(ξ)h(\xi)h(ξ) is not used in the chapter, so T and h are arbitrary functions with integrable entries; the book's case is Ξ = ℝʳ. Positive and negative parts are written max 0 z and max 0 (-z). The finite discrete law is discreteLaw, the sum of ENNReal.ofReal (p k) • Measure.dirac (ξhat k), and K, KJ, KAlpha are expectations against it: the finite sums (4.8) and (4.20) are consequences, not definitions, which rules out a trivial formalization. The maximum over rows is Finset.sup' over the nonempty Fin s, so s≥1s\ge 1s≥1 has no junk value at s=0s=0s=0. A polyhedral set is IsPolyhedron from the published development VanderbeiLP.StrictComp: a finite system Ax≤bAx\le bAx≤b, with m=0m=0m=0 allowed.

Theorem 4.2 is stated with α∈[0,12]\alpha\in[0,\tfrac12]α∈[0,21​]. The book's printed hypothesis "γ≥0\gamma\ge 0γ≥0, S(γ)\mathcal S(\gamma)S(γ)" is copied from Theorem 4.1, and the representation fails for α>12\alpha>\tfrac12α>21​.

A complete development needs a tail formula for expectations, integrability of finite maxima of integrable functions, and integration against finite sums of Dirac measures. Those facts are reusable in the other missions on this book. Contributions of any of the milestones are welcome, in any order; Theorem 4.3 depends on none of the convexity results.

Selected references

  • P. Kall and J. Mayer, Stochastic Linear Programming: Models, Theory, and Computation, Kluwer/Springer, 2005, Chapter 2, §4.1. https://doi.org/10.1007/b105472
  • W. K. Klein Haneveld, Duality in Stochastic Linear and Dynamic Programming, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 274, Springer, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-51697-9
  • W. K. Klein Haneveld and M. H. van der Vlerk, Integrated chance constraints: reduced forms and an algorithm, Computational Management Science 3 (2006), 245–269. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10287-005-0007-3
17 thms2 active usersReviewed
Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

Stochastic Linear Programming: Models, Theory, and Computation VIII: under complete fixed recourse the expected recourse is finite, convex and LipschitzTextbook

Motivation

A two-stage stochastic linear program models a decision taken before uncertain data are revealed, followed by a corrective (recourse) decision taken afterwards. Production planning under uncertain demand, capacity expansion under uncertain loads and network design under uncertain traffic all have this form. The first-stage decision xxx is chosen now; once the random vector ξ\xiξ is observed, a second-stage linear program repairs any infeasibility at minimal cost. The quantity the planner minimizes is the first-stage cost plus the expected cost of the repair, the expected recourse Q(x)\mathcal Q(x)Q(x).

Before any algorithm for such a problem can be justified (cutting planes, decomposition, bounding by discrete approximations), one needs to know that the objective is a sensible function: finite, convex and Lipschitz continuous. For a finite number of scenarios this is classical linear programming. For a general distribution of ξ\xiξ it requires an integrability argument. This mission formalizes that foundation as it is presented in Chapter 3, §2.1 of Kall and Mayer's textbook (Kall & Mayer 2005, ISBN 0-387-23385-7). The results go back to Wets (Wets 1974) and Walkup and Wets (1967) and are standard material in every stochastic programming textbook.

Setting

Let ξ\xiξ be a random vector in Rr\mathbb R^rRr with distribution Pξ\mathbb P_\xiPξ​, and let Ξ=supp⁡Pξ\Xi=\operatorname{supp}\mathbb P_\xiΞ=suppPξ​ be its support, the smallest closed set of probability one. The second-stage data depend affinely on ξ\xiξ (equation (2.1)):

T(ξ)=T+∑j=1rTjξj,h(ξ)=h+∑j=1rhjξj,q(ξ)=q+∑j=1rqjξj,T(\xi)=T+\sum_{j=1}^r T^j\xi_j,\qquad h(\xi)=h+\sum_{j=1}^r h^j\xi_j,\qquad q(\xi)=q+\sum_{j=1}^r q^j\xi_j,T(ξ)=T+j=1∑r​Tjξj​,h(ξ)=h+j=1∑r​hjξj​,q(ξ)=q+j=1∑r​qjξj​,

with T(ξ)∈Rm2×n1T(\xi)\in\mathbb R^{m_2\times n_1}T(ξ)∈Rm2​×n1​, h(ξ)∈Rm2h(\xi)\in\mathbb R^{m_2}h(ξ)∈Rm2​, q(ξ)∈Rn2q(\xi)\in\mathbb R^{n_2}q(ξ)∈Rn2​. The recourse matrix W∈Rm2×n2W\in\mathbb R^{m_2\times n_2}W∈Rm2​×n2​ is deterministic (fixed recourse). For a first-stage decision x∈Rn1x\in\mathbb R^{n_1}x∈Rn1​ the recourse function is the optimal value of the second-stage LP

Q(x;T(ξ),h(ξ),q(ξ))=min⁡{qT(ξ)y∣Wy=h(ξ)−T(ξ)x, y≥0},Q(x;T(\xi),h(\xi),q(\xi))=\min\{q^{\mathsf T}(\xi)y\mid Wy=h(\xi)-T(\xi)x,\ y\ge 0\},Q(x;T(ξ),h(ξ),q(ξ))=min{qT(ξ)y∣Wy=h(ξ)−T(ξ)x, y≥0},

equal to +∞+\infty+∞ if the LP is infeasible and −∞-\infty−∞ if it is unbounded. The expected recourse is Q(x)=∫ΞQ(x;T(ξ),h(ξ),q(ξ)) Pξ(dξ)\mathcal Q(x)=\int_\Xi Q(x;T(\xi),h(\xi),q(\xi))\,\mathbb P_\xi(d\xi)Q(x)=∫Ξ​Q(x;T(ξ),h(ξ),q(ξ))Pξ​(dξ).

Two assumptions are in force throughout:

  • Assumption 2.1 (complete fixed recourse): {Wy∣y≥0}=Rm2\{Wy\mid y\ge 0\}=\mathbb R^{m_2}{Wy∣y≥0}=Rm2​, so the second-stage LP is feasible for every xxx and every ξ\xiξ;
  • Assumption 2.2: {u∣WTu≤q(ξ)}≠∅\{u\mid W^{\mathsf T}u\le q(\xi)\}\neq\emptyset{u∣WTu≤q(ξ)}=∅ for every ξ∈Ξ\xi\in\Xiξ∈Ξ, so the second-stage LP is dual feasible on the support.

The standing moment assumption is ξ∈L2\xi\in L^2ξ∈L2.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.3

Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 and ξ∈L2\xi\in L^2ξ∈L2:

Q(x)∈R for every x,Q is convex,∣Q(x(1))−Q(x(2))∣≤L ∥x(1)−x(2)∥ for some L.\mathcal Q(x)\in\mathbb R\ \text{for every }x,\qquad \mathcal Q\ \text{is convex},\qquad |\mathcal Q(x^{(1)})-\mathcal Q(x^{(2)})|\le L\,\|x^{(1)}-x^{(2)}\|\ \text{for some }L .Q(x)∈R for every x,Q is convex,∣Q(x(1))−Q(x(2))∣≤L∥x(1)−x(2)∥ for some L.

The constant LLL is not fixed: the statement asserts only that one exists, so the goal does not depend on any particular bound.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2.1: complete recourse holds if and only if rank⁡W=m2\operatorname{rank}W=m_2rankW=m2​ and the system Wy=0Wy=0Wy=0, yik≥1y_{i_k}\ge 1yik​​≥1, y≥0y\ge 0y≥0 is feasible for a set of m2m_2m2​ linearly independent columns.
  2. Lemma 2.2: for every xxx there is an optimal recourse y(⋅)∈L2y(\cdot)\in L^2y(⋅)∈L2 with Q(x;ξ)=qT(ξ)y(ξ)Q(x;\xi)=q^{\mathsf T}(\xi)y(\xi)Q(x;ξ)=qT(ξ)y(ξ) on Ξ\XiΞ.
  3. Theorem 2.1: Q(⋅;ξ)Q(\cdot;\xi)Q(⋅;ξ) is finite, convex and Lipschitz with a constant D(ξ)∈L1D(\xi)\in L^1D(ξ)∈L1.
  4. Lemma 2.3: if min⁡{cTx∣Ax=b,x≥0}\min\{c^{\mathsf T}x\mid Ax=b,x\ge 0\}min{cTx∣Ax=b,x≥0} is solvable for every bbb, its value φ\varphiφ is convex and ∂φ(b)\partial\varphi(b)∂φ(b) is the set of optimal dual solutions.
  5. Theorem 2.2: ∂xQ(x^;ξ)={−TT(ξ)u^∣u^ dual optimal}\partial_xQ(\hat x;\xi)=\{-T^{\mathsf T}(\xi)\hat u\mid\hat u\ \text{dual optimal}\}∂x​Q(x^;ξ)={−TT(ξ)u^∣u^ dual optimal}.
  6. Corollary 2.1: the conclusions of Theorem 2.3 hold with ξ∈L1\xi\in L^1ξ∈L1 when q(ξ)q(\xi)q(ξ) and (h(ξ),T(ξ))(h(\xi),T(\xi))(h(ξ),T(ξ)) are independent.
  7. Proposition 2.1: with deterministic qqq, ξ↦Q(x;T(ξ),h(ξ))\xi\mapsto Q(x;T(\xi),h(\xi))ξ↦Q(x;T(ξ),h(ξ)) is convex.
  8. Theorem 2.4: with deterministic qqq, Q(x;T(ξˉ),h(ξˉ))≤Q(x)Q(x;T(\bar\xi),h(\bar\xi))\le\mathcal Q(x)Q(x;T(ξˉ​),h(ξˉ​))≤Q(x) for ξˉ=Eξ\bar\xi=\mathbb E\xiξˉ​=Eξ (the Jensen lower bound).

Significance

Theorem 2.3 makes the deterministic equivalent min⁡{cTx+Q(x)∣Ax=b, x≥0}\min\{c^{\mathsf T}x+\mathcal Q(x)\mid Ax=b,\ x\ge 0\}min{cTx+Q(x)∣Ax=b, x≥0} a convex program with a Lipschitz objective. Convexity gives that local minima are global and that subgradient-based and cutting-plane methods apply; Lipschitz continuity bounds the subgradients and controls the error of approximating Q\mathcal QQ. Theorem 2.2 identifies those subgradients as dual solutions of the second-stage LP, which is how the L-shaped method generates its cuts. Proposition 2.1 and Theorem 2.4 give the Jensen lower bound, the starting point for the successive discrete approximation methods developed later in the chapter.

All results here are classical and proved in the source. None of them, to our knowledge, is formalized for a general (not finitely supported) distribution. Related platform items treat finitely many scenarios or other conventions. The work of this mission is to formalize the known proofs. The parametric LP facts (the value function of an LP is piecewise linear on finitely many bases, the dual characterization of its subdifferential) are reusable far beyond stochastic programming.

Difficulty

For finitely many scenarios, each claim reduces to finitely many LPs. The general case has two obstacles. First, measurability and integrability: Q(x)\mathcal Q(x)Q(x) is an integral of an extended-real function. One must show that ξ↦Q(x;ξ)\xi\mapsto Q(x;\xi)ξ↦Q(x;ξ) is measurable and that it is integrable, and the second needs a growth bound. On each decision region Q(x;ξ)=qB(ξ)TB−1(h(ξ)−T(ξ)x)Q(x;\xi)=q_B(\xi)^{\mathsf T}B^{-1}(h(\xi)-T(\xi)x)Q(x;ξ)=qB​(ξ)TB−1(h(ξ)−T(ξ)x) is quadratic in ξ\xiξ, so ξ∈L1\xi\in L^1ξ∈L1 is not enough in general; this is why L2L^2L2 (or independence, Corollary 2.1) is assumed. Second, the Lipschitz constant must be integrable: a constant uniform in ξ\xiξ does not exist when qqq and TTT are random, so the pointwise constant D(ξ)D(\xi)D(ξ) of Theorem 2.1 must itself be shown to be in L1L^1L1. Lemma 2.2's measurable optimal selection has the same character: an optimal y(ξ)y(\xi)y(ξ) exists for each ξ\xiξ, but building a measurable, square-integrable selection requires the finite partition of Ξ\XiΞ into decision regions.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin k → ℝ and matrices Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ. The distribution Pξ\mathbb P_\xiPξ​ is a probability measure μ on Fin r → ℝ (the canonical space, ξ\xiξ the identity), and Ξ\XiΞ is μ.support. ξ∈L2\xi\in L^2ξ∈L2 is MemLp id 2 μ, ξ∈L1\xi\in L^1ξ∈L1 is Integrable id μ. The recourse function is an EReal infimum, so ±∞\pm\infty±∞ are represented exactly. The expected recourse is the Bochner integral of its real part, and the goal states explicitly that the recourse value is finite almost surely and integrable, so the real-valued encoding hides no divergent integral. Lipschitz bounds use the Euclidean norm. Finiteness in Theorems 2.1 and 2.3 is stated for every x∈Rn1x\in\mathbb R^{n_1}x∈Rn1​, which contains the book's x∈B1x\in B_1x∈B1​.

Reused published definitions: KallMayer.Recourse.LPValue (with SolvableEveryRHS, DualOptimizers), CompleteRecourse, PointwiseRecourse, ExpectedRecourse, and the subdifferential StochasticProg.RecourseKKT.subdifferential. The mission adds only the affine data structure (2.1). Contributions of reusable lemmas are welcome: the finite basis decomposition of an LP value function, measurability of LP value functions in the data, and the chain rule for subdifferentials under affine maps.

Selected references

  • P. Kall and J. Mayer, Stochastic Linear Programming: Models, Theory, and Computation, Kluwer/Springer, International Series in Operations Research & Management Science 80, 2005, Chapter 3, §2.1, pp.198–211. ISBN 0-387-23385-7
  • R. J.-B. Wets, Stochastic programs with fixed recourse: the equivalent deterministic program, SIAM Review 16 (1974), 309–339. https://doi.org/10.1137/1016053
  • D. W. Walkup and R. J.-B. Wets, Stochastic programs with recourse, SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 15 (1967), 1299–1314. https://doi.org/10.1137/0115113
  • J. R. Birge and F. Louveaux, Introduction to Stochastic Programming, 2nd ed., Springer, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-0237-4
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CombinatoricsLinear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: iris

Combinatorial Optimization (Cook et al.) XII: Edmonds' Matroid Polytope TheoremTextbook

Why matroids and the Greedy Algorithm

The Greedy Algorithm builds a set one element at a time, always adding the heaviest element that keeps the set feasible. For the forests of a graph it finds a maximum-weight forest (Kruskal's algorithm), but for the matchings of a graph it can fail: on a 4-cycle with edge weights 9, 7, 8, 3 it picks the edges of weight 9 and 3 when the edges of weight 7 and 8 are better. Matroids are the abstraction of the families on which greedy works. They were introduced by Whitney (1935); the optimality of greedy on matroids is due to Rado (1957) and was rediscovered by Edmonds (1970), who also gave the linear description of the convex hull of independent sets that is the goal of this mission.

This mission formalizes §8.1 of Cook, Cunningham, Pulleyblank and Schrijver, Combinatorial Optimization (Wiley, 1998), pp. 273–280. It is the twelfth mission of a series on the book; later missions treat matroid intersection (§8.3) and the matroid intersection polytope (§8.5), which build on the objects defined here.

Timeline:

  • 1935: Whitney defines matroids as an abstraction of linear independence.
  • 1957: Rado shows that the greedy algorithm finds a maximum-weight independent set of a matroid.
  • 1970–1971: Edmonds proves that the polytope {x≥0:x(A)≤r(A)}\{x \ge 0 : x(A) \le r(A)\}{x≥0:x(A)≤r(A)} is the convex hull of independent sets, and that greedy optimality characterizes matroids.

Setting

Let SSS be a finite set and I\mathcal II a family of subsets of SSS, the independent sets. The pair M=(S,I)M=(S,\mathcal I)M=(S,I) is a matroid if

  • (M0) ∅∈I\emptyset \in \mathcal I∅∈I;
  • (M1) if J′⊆J∈IJ' \subseteq J \in \mathcal IJ′⊆J∈I then J′∈IJ' \in \mathcal IJ′∈I;
  • (M2) for every A⊆SA \subseteq SA⊆S, every maximal independent subset of AAA has the same cardinality.

A pair satisfying (M0) and (M1) only is an independence system. A maximal independent subset of AAA is a basis of AAA; its size is the rank r(A)r(A)r(A). The bases of SSS are the bases of MMM.

For weights c∈RSc \in \mathbb R^Sc∈RS the weight of JJJ is c(J)=∑e∈Jcec(J)=\sum_{e\in J} c_ec(J)=∑e∈J​ce​, and for x∈RSx \in \mathbb R^Sx∈RS and A⊆SA \subseteq SA⊆S, x(A)=∑e∈Axex(A)=\sum_{e\in A} x_ex(A)=∑e∈A​xe​. The characteristic vector χJ\chi^JχJ of J⊆SJ \subseteq SJ⊆S has χeJ=1\chi^J_e = 1χeJ​=1 for e∈Je \in Je∈J and 000 otherwise.

The Greedy Algorithm: set J=∅J=\emptysetJ=∅; while there is e∉Je \notin Je∈/J with ce>0c_e>0ce​>0 and J∪{e}∈IJ\cup\{e\}\in\mathcal IJ∪{e}∈I, choose such an eee with cec_ece​ maximum and replace JJJ by J∪{e}J\cup\{e\}J∪{e}. Ties are broken arbitrarily.

The linear program attached to a matroid with rank function rrr is

maximize ∑e∈Scexesubject tox(A)≤r(A) (A⊆S),xe≥0 (e∈S).(8.1)\text{maximize } \sum_{e\in S} c_e x_e \quad\text{subject to}\quad x(A)\le r(A)\ (A\subseteq S),\qquad x_e \ge 0\ (e\in S). \tag{8.1}maximize e∈S∑​ce​xe​subject tox(A)≤r(A) (A⊆S),xe​≥0 (e∈S).(8.1)

Formalization targets

Goal: Edmonds' Matroid Polytope Theorem (Theorem 8.5)

For every matroid (S,I)(S,\mathcal I)(S,I) with rank function rrr,

conv⁡{χJ:J∈I}={x∈RS:x≥0, x(A)≤r(A) for all A⊆S}.\operatorname{conv}\{\chi^J : J \in \mathcal I\} = \{x \in \mathbb R^S : x \ge 0,\ x(A) \le r(A) \text{ for all } A \subseteq S\}.conv{χJ:J∈I}={x∈RS:x≥0, x(A)≤r(A) for all A⊆S}.

Both inclusions are part of the goal.

Milestones

  • Proposition 8.1 (matching matroid): for a graph G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E), the sets J⊆VJ\subseteq VJ⊆V covered by some matching are the independent sets of a matroid on VVV.
  • Theorem 8.2: on a matroid, the Greedy Algorithm returns a maximum-weight independent set, for every c∈RSc\in\mathbb R^Sc∈RS.
  • Theorem 8.3: an independence system is a matroid if and only if the Greedy Algorithm returns an optimal independent set for every c∈RSc \in \mathbb R^Sc∈RS.
  • Theorem 8.4: the characteristic vector of the greedy set is an optimal solution of (8.1).
  • Corollary 8.6: an independent set JJJ is maximum-weight iff (a) ce≥0c_e \ge 0ce​≥0 for e∈Je\in Je∈J, (b) ce≤0c_e\le 0ce​≤0 when e∉Je\notin Je∈/J and J∪{e}∈IJ\cup\{e\}\in\mathcal IJ∪{e}∈I, (c) ce≤cfc_e\le c_fce​≤cf​ when e∉Je\notin Je∈/J, f∈Jf\in Jf∈J and (J∪{e})∖{f}∈I(J\cup\{e\})\setminus\{f\}\in\mathcal I(J∪{e})∖{f}∈I.
  • Corollary 8.7: a basis JJJ is a maximum-weight basis iff condition (c) holds.

Significance

The Matroid Polytope Theorem turns the combinatorial problem of finding a maximum-weight independent set into a linear program over an explicit inequality system, and it is the prototype for the polyhedral descriptions that follow in the book: the forest polytope (Theorem 8.8), from which the spanning-tree description of Theorem 2.8 follows, and the matroid intersection polytope (Theorem 8.20). Theorem 8.3 characterizes matroids by an algorithmic property, which is why matroids appear wherever greedy methods are analysed. Corollaries 8.6 and 8.7 give local certificates of optimality, used in Section 8.5 for weighted matroid intersection.

All results are classical and proved in the book. None is formalized on Prove2Me, and Mathlib, which has a substantial Matroid library (bases, rank, closure, duality), contains neither the greedy theorem nor the matroid polytope. A formalization supplies the polyhedral layer missing from that library and the bridge between the axioms (M0)–(M2) and linear programming.

Difficulty

The inclusion of the convex hull in the polyhedron is immediate: χJ(A)=∣J∩A∣≤r(A)\chi^J(A)=|J\cap A|\le r(A)χJ(A)=∣J∩A∣≤r(A). The reverse inclusion is the content, and the obvious attempt, writing a feasible xxx directly as a convex combination of characteristic vectors, has no evident inductive structure: the constraint system has one inequality per subset of SSS, and a fractional xxx can be tight on many overlapping sets at once. Any route has to relate the exponential system x(A)≤r(A)x(A)\le r(A)x(A)≤r(A) to the combinatorics of (M2), and has to pass from statements about linear objectives to an equality of sets in RS\mathbb R^SRS; Mathlib contains neither LP duality for such a system nor the polytope-theoretic facts linking optimal vertices to convex hulls in the form needed.

For Theorem 8.3 the nontrivial direction is the converse: if (M2) fails on some set AAA, one must produce weights for which greedy goes wrong, and the formal statement must account for the nondeterminism of tie-breaking.

Formalization scope

  • The ground set SSS is a finite type α; subsets are Finset α; the family I\mathcal II is a predicate I : Finset α → Prop. (M0)–(M1) are the published definition SubsamplingSM.Offline.IsIndepSystem; IsMatroid adds (M2) literally (any two bases of the same set have the same size). This is the book's axiom system, not Mathlib's Matroid, to which it can be bridged.
  • rank I A is the largest size of an independent subset of AAA, which for a matroid is the size of every basis of AAA.
  • Vectors live in α → ℝ; constraints of (8.1) are imposed for every subset AAA; the rank is cast to ℝ.
  • The Greedy Algorithm is a relation: GreedyStep allows every admissible choice among ties, and IsGreedyOutput is any set reachable from ∅\emptyset∅ at which the loop stops. Theorems 8.2 and 8.4 are stated for every run. Theorem 8.3 is stated in both readings (every run, some run), which covers every tie-breaking rule.
  • Graphs are finite multigraphs (ends : E → Sym2 V), loops and parallel edges allowed; matchings contain no loops.
  • Trivial cases are not excluded: the empty ground set and loops of the matroid (r({e})=0r(\{e\})=0r({e})=0, forcing xe=0x_e=0xe​=0) are covered by the statements.

Useful contributions: a bridge from IsMatroid to Mathlib's IndepMatroid/Matroid (which gives rank submodularity and exchange properties), LP weak duality and complementary slackness for (8.1), and a lemma reducing equality of a polytope with a convex hull to optimality of hull points for every linear objective. These are reusable in the matroid intersection missions of this series.

Selected references

  • W. J. Cook, W. H. Cunningham, W. R. Pulleyblank, A. Schrijver, Combinatorial Optimization, Wiley-Interscience, 1998, §8.1. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118033142
  • J. Edmonds, Submodular functions, matroids, and certain polyhedra, in Combinatorial Structures and Their Applications (Gordon and Breach, 1970), 69–87. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36478-1_2
  • J. Edmonds, Matroids and the greedy algorithm, Mathematical Programming 1 (1971), 127–136. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01584082
  • R. Rado, A note on independence functions, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society 7 (1957), 300–320. https://doi.org/10.1112/plms/s3-7.1.300
  • H. Whitney, On the abstract properties of linear dependence, American Journal of Mathematics 57 (1935), 509–533. https://doi.org/10.2307/2371182
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CombinatoricsOptimization·Captain: iris

Combinatorial Optimization (Cook et al.) XIII: Edmonds' Matroid Intersection TheoremTextbook

Motivation

Many combinatorial optimization problems ask for a largest set that is simultaneously "independent" in two different senses. A matching in a bipartite graph G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) with bipartition {V1,V2}\{V_1,V_2\}{V1​,V2​} is a set of edges in which every node of V1V_1V1​ meets at most one edge and every node of V2V_2V2​ meets at most one edge. A branching of a digraph is an arc set that is a forest in the underlying graph and has each node as the head of at most one arc. Each condition on its own defines a matroid, a structure for which the greedy algorithm is optimal. The matroid intersection problem asks for a maximum common independent set of two matroids on the same ground set.

Edmonds (Edmonds 1970) proved that the maximum size of a common independent set is given by a min–max formula in terms of the two rank functions, and gave a polynomial-time algorithm. The theorem contains König's theorem on bipartite matchings as the special case of two partition matroids. This mission formalizes §8.2–8.3 of Cook, Cunningham, Pulleyblank and Schrijver, Combinatorial Optimization (Wiley, 1998), which develops this result from the matroid axioms. It is the thirteenth mission of a series covering the book's capstone theorems; the twelfth treats the matroid polytope and the fourteenth the matroid intersection polytope.

Timeline:

  • 1935: Whitney introduces matroids.
  • 1965: Edmonds and Fulkerson show that matching matroids are transversal matroids.
  • 1970: Edmonds proves the Matroid Intersection Theorem and the intersection polytope theorem ("Submodular functions, matroids, and certain polyhedra").
  • 1975: Lawler's textbook gives the augmenting-path algorithm in the form used here; the auxiliary "exchange" digraph becomes standard.

Setting

Let SSS be a finite set and I\mathcal II a family of subsets of SSS, called independent sets. The pair M=(S,I)M=(S,\mathcal I)M=(S,I) is a matroid if (M0) ∅∈I\emptyset\in\mathcal I∅∈I; (M1) subsets of independent sets are independent; (M2) for every A⊆SA\subseteq SA⊆S, every maximal independent subset of AAA has the same cardinality. A maximal independent subset of AAA is a basis of AAA, and its size is the rank r(A)r(A)r(A). A circuit is a minimal dependent set.

For a matroid MMM, a set B⊆SB\subseteq SB⊆S and a basis JJJ of BBB, the contraction M/BM/BM/B has ground set S∖BS\setminus BS∖B and independent sets {J′⊆S∖B:J′∪J∈I}\{J'\subseteq S\setminus B : J'\cup J\in\mathcal I\}{J′⊆S∖B:J′∪J∈I}.

Two matroids M1=(S,I1)M_1=(S,\mathcal I_1)M1​=(S,I1​) and M2=(S,I2)M_2=(S,\mathcal I_2)M2​=(S,I2​) on the same set SSS have rank functions r1,r2r_1,r_2r1​,r2​; a set in I1∩I2\mathcal I_1\cap\mathcal I_2I1​∩I2​ is a common independent set. For A⊆SA\subseteq SA⊆S write Aˉ=S∖A\bar A=S\setminus AAˉ=S∖A.

Given a common independent set JJJ, the auxiliary digraph G(M1,M2,J)G(M_1,M_2,J)G(M1​,M2​,J) has node set S∪{r,s}S\cup\{r,s\}S∪{r,s} and arcs: eseses for e∉Je\notin Je∈/J with J∪{e}∈I1J\cup\{e\}\in\mathcal I_1J∪{e}∈I1​; rerere for e∉Je\notin Je∈/J with J∪{e}∈I2J\cup\{e\}\in\mathcal I_2J∪{e}∈I2​; efefef for e∉Je\notin Je∈/J, f∈Jf\in Jf∈J with J∪{e}∉I1J\cup\{e\}\notin\mathcal I_1J∪{e}∈/I1​ and (J∪{e})∖{f}∈I1(J\cup\{e\})\setminus\{f\}\in\mathcal I_1(J∪{e})∖{f}∈I1​; and fefefe for e∉Je\notin Je∈/J, f∈Jf\in Jf∈J with J∪{e}∉I2J\cup\{e\}\notin\mathcal I_2J∪{e}∈/I2​ and (J∪{e})∖{f}∈I2(J\cup\{e\})\setminus\{f\}\in\mathcal I_2(J∪{e})∖{f}∈I2​. A chord of a dipath with node sequence v0,…,vkv_0,\dots,v_kv0​,…,vk​ is an arc vivjv_iv_jvi​vj​ with i<j−1i<j-1i<j−1.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8.14 (Matroid Intersection Theorem)

max⁡{∣J∣:J∈I1∩I2}=min⁡{r1(A)+r2(Aˉ):A⊆S}.\max\{|J| : J\in\mathcal I_1\cap\mathcal I_2\}=\min\{r_1(A)+r_2(\bar A) : A\subseteq S\}.max{∣J∣:J∈I1​∩I2​}=min{r1​(A)+r2​(Aˉ):A⊆S}.

Both matroids are arbitrary (loops allowed, any ranks), and SSS may be empty.

Milestones

  • Theorem 8.9. For J∈IJ\in\mathcal IJ∈I and e∈Se\in Se∈S, J∪{e}J\cup\{e\}J∪{e} contains at most one circuit.
  • Theorem 8.11. M/BM/BM/B is a matroid, does not depend on the choice of the basis JJJ of BBB, and has rank function r′(A)=r(A∪B)−r(B)r'(A)=r(A\cup B)-r(B)r′(A)=r(A∪B)−r(B) for A⊆S∖BA\subseteq S\setminus BA⊆S∖B.
  • Weak duality (§8.3). For J∈I1∩I2J\in\mathcal I_1\cap\mathcal I_2J∈I1​∩I2​ and A⊆SA\subseteq SA⊆S, ∣J∣≤r1(A)+r2(Aˉ)|J|\le r_1(A)+r_2(\bar A)∣J∣≤r1​(A)+r2​(Aˉ).
  • Theorem 8.15 (Augmenting Path Theorem). (a) If G(M1,M2,J)G(M_1,M_2,J)G(M1​,M2​,J) has no (r,s)(r,s)(r,s)-dipath, JJJ is maximum, and every A⊆SA\subseteq SA⊆S with no arc leaving A∪{r}A\cup\{r\}A∪{r} satisfies ∣J∣=r1(A)+r2(Aˉ)|J|=r_1(A)+r_2(\bar A)∣J∣=r1​(A)+r2​(Aˉ). (b) If there is an (r,s)(r,s)(r,s)-dipath, JJJ is not maximum, and for a chordless (r,s)(r,s)(r,s)-dipath r,e1,f1,…,em+1,sr,e_1,f_1,\dots,e_{m+1},sr,e1​,f1​,…,em+1​,s, J △ {e1,f1,…,em+1}∈I1∩I2J\,\triangle\,\{e_1,f_1,\dots,e_{m+1}\}\in\mathcal I_1\cap\mathcal I_2J△{e1​,f1​,…,em+1​}∈I1​∩I2​.
  • Lemma 8.16. If e∈C⊆Ae\in C\subseteq Ae∈C⊆A and CCC is a circuit, then r(A∖{e})=r(A)r(A\setminus\{e\})=r(A)r(A∖{e})=r(A).

Significance

The Matroid Intersection Theorem is one of the main min–max theorems of combinatorial optimization. It contains König's theorem (two partition matroids), the characterization of maximum branchings, and Rado's theorem on independent transversals, and it is the cardinality case of the weighted matroid intersection theory of §8.5, whose polyhedral form is the subject of the next mission. The Augmenting Path Theorem turns the min–max formula into an algorithm with polynomially many independence tests, and its part (a) gives the optimality certificate AAA explicitly.

All results of this mission are classical and fully proved in the book. Mathlib has a matroid library (circuits, fundamental circuits, contraction, rank), and it contains the uniqueness of the fundamental circuit (Matroid.IsCircuit.eq_fundCircuit_of_subset), which is Theorem 8.9 in Mathlib's language. To our knowledge Mathlib has neither the matroid intersection theorem nor the augmenting path theorem. The platform has an exchange-graph augmentation statement for shortest walks with oracles (CountingMatroid.Analysis.ShortestExchangeAugmentation.shortest_exchange_augmentation). That is a different statement: it covers shortest walks, while Theorem 8.15 covers chordless dipaths and also the certificate of part (a). The work here is to formalize the book's proofs or to bridge the book's axiomatic matroids to Mathlib's library.

Difficulty

Weak duality takes one line. The other inequality does not follow from any local exchange argument. The book gives two proofs: a short induction on ∣S∣|S|∣S∣ that contracts and deletes one element and then applies submodularity of the rank functions, and the algorithmic proof through Theorem 8.15. In part (b), symmetric difference along an arbitrary augmenting dipath can destroy independence. Chordlessness is what lets the circuit-by-circuit argument with Lemma 8.16 go through, and the book's Exercise 8.37 shows the condition cannot be dropped. Part (a) needs, for each element outside JJJ, the unique circuit of Theorem 8.9 to lie inside the right side of the cut.

Formalization scope

The ground set is a finite type S, all of which is the ground set. A matroid is the structure CombOpt.MatroidIntersection.Matroid S: a predicate Indep : Finset S → Prop bundled with the axioms (M0)–(M2) (IsMatroid). (M2), maximal independent subsets (IsMaxIndepIn) and circuits (IsCircuit) reuse the published definitions of the Edmonds matroid-partition mission (EdmondsPartition.Main), which state the same notions. This is the book's axiom system, not Mathlib's _root_.Matroid; on finite ground sets the two describe the same matroids, and a bridge to Mathlib is welcome. rank Indep A is the size of a basis of A with values in ℕ; Ā is the complement Aᶜ. The contraction lives on the subtype {x // x ∉ B}, and its rank formula is stated as r′(A)+r(B)=r(A∪B)r'(A)+r(B)=r(A\cup B)r′(A)+r(B)=r(A∪B), which avoids truncated subtraction. The auxiliary digraph is the arc relation auxArc M₁ M₂ J on nodes AuxNode S (r, s, elem e). A dipath is a node list (IsDipath), chordless means no arc vivjv_iv_jvi​vj​ with i+1<ji+1<ji+1<j (IsChordless), and the elements visited are innerElems.

The goal states existence of a pair (J,A)(J,A)(J,A) with ∣J∣=r1(A)+r2(Aˉ)|J|=r_1(A)+r_2(\bar A)∣J∣=r1​(A)+r2​(Aˉ) together with weak duality for all pairs. A goal stating only one inequality, or only existence of some JJJ and AAA without the inequality, would not be the theorem.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, the book's induction proof of Theorem 8.14 (which also needs submodularity of rank, Exercise 8.21), a proof through Theorem 8.15, and an equivalence between CombOpt.MatroidIntersection.Matroid and Mathlib's Matroid on finite types.

Selected references

  • W. J. Cook, W. H. Cunningham, W. R. Pulleyblank, A. Schrijver, Combinatorial Optimization, Wiley-Interscience, 1998, §8.2–8.3. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118033142
  • J. Edmonds, Submodular functions, matroids, and certain polyhedra, in Combinatorial Structures and Their Applications (Gordon and Breach, 1970), 69–87; reprinted in Combinatorial Optimization — Eureka, You Shrink!, LNCS 2570, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36478-1_2
  • E. L. Lawler, Matroid intersection algorithms, Mathematical Programming 9 (1975), 31–56. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01681329
  • H. Whitney, On the abstract properties of linear dependence, American Journal of Mathematics 57 (1935), 509–533. https://doi.org/10.2307/2371182
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Graph TheoryLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: iris

Combinatorial Optimization (Cook et al.) II: When Least-Cost Dipaths Exist, the Shortest Dipath Cost Equals the Maximum Feasible PotentialTextbook

Motivation

The shortest path problem asks, in a network whose links carry costs, for a cheapest directed route from a fixed origin to every other point. It is the basic subroutine of network optimization: minimum-cost flow algorithms, matching algorithms and many dynamic programs call it repeatedly, and arc costs that are negative arise naturally, for instance as −log⁡-\log−log of currency exchange rates, where a negative-cost cycle is a profitable sequence of exchanges.

This mission formalizes §2.2 of Cook, Cunningham, Pulleyblank and Schrijver, Combinatorial Optimization (Wiley, 1998), DOI 10.1002/9781118033142, printed pp. 19–26. The section introduces the certificate for optimality of shortest paths, the feasible potential, proves that the simplest label-correcting method (Ford's Algorithm, from L. R. Ford, Jr., Network Flow Theory, RAND P-923, 1956, link) is correct when no negative-cost dicircuit exists, and closes with a min–max theorem: the least cost of a dipath equals the largest value a feasible potential can take. The same min–max equality reappears in the book's treatment of minimum-cost flows and TTT-joins, and every later shortest path algorithm in the book (Bellman–Ford, Dijkstra) is a refinement of Ford's.

Setting

A digraph GGG consists of finite sets VVV of nodes and EEE of arcs, each arc eee having a tail t(e)∈Vt(e)\in Vt(e)∈V and a head h(e)∈Vh(e)\in Vh(e)∈V; one writes e=vwe=vwe=vw when t(e)=vt(e)=vt(e)=v, h(e)=wh(e)=wh(e)=w. Loops and parallel arcs are allowed.

A dipath from v0v_0v0​ to vkv_kvk​ is a sequence v0,e1,v1,…,ek,vkv_0,e_1,v_1,\dots,e_k,v_kv0​,e1​,v1​,…,ek​,vk​ (k≥0k\ge0k≥0) with t(ei)=vi−1t(e_i)=v_{i-1}t(ei​)=vi−1​ and h(ei)=vih(e_i)=v_ih(ei​)=vi​. Nodes and arcs may repeat; the dipath is simple if v0,…,vkv_0,\dots,v_kv0​,…,vk​ are distinct. A dicircuit is a dipath with k≥1k\ge1k≥1, v0=vkv_0=v_kv0​=vk​, distinct arcs and distinct nodes v0,…,vk−1v_0,\dots,v_{k-1}v0​,…,vk−1​; a loop is a dicircuit of length one.

Real arc costs c∈REc\in\mathbb R^Ec∈RE give each dipath the cost c(P)=∑i=1kceic(P)=\sum_{i=1}^k c_{e_i}c(P)=∑i=1k​cei​​, with repeated arcs paid each time. A dipath PPP from rrr to vvv is least-cost if c(P)≤c(Q)c(P)\le c(Q)c(P)≤c(Q) for every dipath QQQ from rrr to vvv. Fix a root r∈Vr\in Vr∈V. A real vector y=(yv:v∈V)y=(y_v:v\in V)y=(yv​:v∈V) is a feasible potential if

yv+cvw ≥ ywfor all vw∈E(2.12),yr=0.y_v+c_{vw}\ \ge\ y_w\quad\text{for all } vw\in E\qquad\text{(2.12)},\qquad y_r=0 .yv​+cvw​ ≥ yw​for all vw∈E(2.12),yr​=0.

Ford's Algorithm keeps labels yv∈R∪{∞}y_v\in\mathbb R\cup\{\infty\}yv​∈R∪{∞} and predecessors p(v)p(v)p(v). It starts from yr=0y_r=0yr​=0, p(r)=0p(r)=0p(r)=0, yv=∞y_v=\inftyyv​=∞, p(v)=−1p(v)=-1p(v)=−1 (v≠rv\ne rv=r), and as long as yyy is not a feasible potential it picks any incorrect arc vwvwvw (one with yv+cvw<ywy_v+c_{vw}<y_wyv​+cvw​<yw​) and corrects it: yw:=yv+cvwy_w:=y_v+c_{vw}yw​:=yv​+cvw​, p(w):=vp(w):=vp(w):=v.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.14 (p. 26)

If for every v∈Vv\in Vv∈V there is a least-cost dipath from rrr to vvv, then for every s∈Vs\in Vs∈V

min⁡{c(P):P a dipath from r to s}  =  max⁡{ys:y a feasible potential},\min\{c(P): P \text{ a dipath from } r \text{ to } s\}\;=\;\max\{y_s: y \text{ a feasible potential}\},min{c(P):P a dipath from r to s}=max{ys​:y a feasible potential},

both optima being attained. The hypothesis is the book's, not "no negative-cost dicircuit": it also requires every node to be reachable from rrr.

Milestones

  • Proposition 2.9 (p. 21): every feasible potential satisfies c(P)≥yvc(P)\ge y_vc(P)≥yv​ for every dipath PPP from rrr to vvv.
  • Proposition 2.10 (p. 24): if (G,c)(G,c)(G,c) has no negative-cost dicircuit, then at every stage of every execution of Ford's Algorithm, a finite label yvy_vyv​ is the cost of a simple dipath from rrr to vvv, and if p(v)≠−1p(v)\ne-1p(v)=−1 then ppp defines a simple dipath from rrr to vvv of cost at most yvy_vyv​.
  • Theorem 2.11 (p. 25): without negative-cost dicircuits, Ford's Algorithm terminates after finitely many iterations, and at termination ppp defines, for each vvv, a least-cost dipath from rrr to vvv of cost yvy_vyv​.
  • Theorem 2.12 (p. 25): (G,c)(G,c)(G,c) has a feasible potential if and only if it has no negative-cost dicircuit, with no assumption on the existence of dipaths.

Significance

Theorem 2.14 says that feasible potentials are complete certificates: whenever shortest dipaths exist, a single vector yyy proves the optimality of all of them at once. It is the special case of linear-programming duality for the pair (2.13)–(2.14) of the book, the maximization of ys−yry_s-y_rys​−yr​ subject to yw−yv≤cvwy_w-y_v\le c_{vw}yw​−yv​≤cvw​ and its dual minimum-cost flow problem, and it is the form in which shortest path optimality is used in later chapters (reduced costs in minimum-cost flow, potentials in TTT-join and matching algorithms). Theorem 2.12 is the standard characterization of negative-cycle-free cost functions, used wherever reduced costs cvw+yv−yw≥0c_{vw}+y_v-y_w\ge0cvw​+yv​−yw​≥0 are needed.

All results of the section are classical and fully proved in the book. What this mission adds is a machine-checked development on the book's own model: multigraph digraphs with loops and parallel arcs, dipaths that may repeat nodes, and Ford's Algorithm as a nondeterministic procedure, so that the termination and invariant statements cover every order in which incorrect arcs may be corrected. To the curators' knowledge no Prove2Me theorem states the feasible-potential characterization or the min–max equality for arbitrary real costs on such digraphs; the existing shortest path items concern specific algorithms (Floyd, breadth-first search) or simple digraphs given by node pairs.

Difficulty

The goal mixes an infinite object with a finite one: the set of dipaths from rrr to sss is infinite as soon as GGG has a dicircuit reachable from rrr, while a feasible potential is a finite vector. The minimum on the left exists only because of the hypothesis, and the maximum on the right requires producing a feasible potential, which is not given by the data. Weak duality (Proposition 2.9) is a telescoping sum; the content of the theorem is the attainment of the maximum, and there the hypothesis is needed at every node, not only at sss: with a node unreachable from rrr the values yvy_vyv​ there can be raised without bound, and a negative-cost dicircuit among such nodes leaves no feasible potential at all, even when sss itself has a least-cost dipath.

The algorithmic milestones carry their own difficulty: Ford's Algorithm is nondeterministic, and with a negative-cost dicircuit it can run forever (Figure 2.4 of the book), so termination is a statement about all executions and depends on the absence of negative dicircuits through the invariants of Proposition 2.10.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in the namespace CombOpt.ShortestPath.

  • A digraph is Digraph V E with tail head : E → V; finiteness is the binder [Fintype V] [Fintype E]. This is not Mathlib's Digraph (an adjacency relation without parallel arcs).
  • A dipath is a start node and a list of arcs, G.IsDipath u P v; its cost is pathCost c P, the sum over the list. Simple dipaths, dicircuits, least-cost dipaths, (2.12) and feasible potentials are separate definitions, each with the book's page in its docstring.
  • Ford's Algorithm is a transition relation FordStep on states (y, p) with y : V → WithTop ℝ (⊤ is the book's ∞\infty∞) and p : V → FordPred E, whose values root, undef, arc e stand for the book's 000, −1-1−1 and the predecessor node; the arc rather than the node is stored, which is equivalent on simple digraphs and well defined with parallel arcs. "At any stage of the execution" is reachability from fordInit r.
  • The goal is stated as the existence of a real number that is IsLeast of the set of dipath costs from rrr to sss and IsGreatest of the set of values ysy_sys​ over feasible potentials. Restricting dipaths to simple ones, or replacing the hypothesis by "no negative-cost dicircuit", would change the theorem and is excluded.

Contributions are welcome at every level: the arithmetic of dipath concatenation and splitting at repeated nodes, the reduction of closed dipaths of negative cost to negative dicircuits (an exercise of the book, p. 23), the invariants of Ford's Algorithm, and the final min–max argument. The dipath and dicircuit layer is reusable by later missions of this series on circulations, minimum-cost flows and TTT-joins.

Selected references

  • W. J. Cook, W. H. Cunningham, W. R. Pulleyblank, A. Schrijver, Combinatorial Optimization, Wiley-Interscience, 1998, §2.2, pp. 19–26. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118033142
  • L. R. Ford, Jr., Network Flow Theory, RAND Corporation Paper P-923, 1956. https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P923.html
  • R. Bellman, On a routing problem, Quarterly of Applied Mathematics 16 (1958), 87–90. https://doi.org/10.1090/qam/102435
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningProbability·Captain: iris

A General Framework for Bandit Problems Beyond Cumulative Objectives: U-UCB has regret O(log T / T) for every stable, smooth EDPM with a linear gapResearch Paper

Motivation

In the classical stochastic multi-armed bandit a decision maker is scored by the sum of the rewards it collects. Many applications score the collected rewards differently: a portfolio manager cares about the conditional value at risk (CVaR) or the Sharpe ratio of the returns, a clinical trial about a quantile, a risk-averse controller about mean–variance. Such criteria are not sums, and the regret analysis of upper-confidence-bound (UCB) policies does not apply to them directly.

Cassel, Mannor and Zeevi (arXiv:1806.01380v3; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023) observe that essentially every criterion that is invariant to the order of the rewards is a function UUU of the empirical distribution of the rewards, and they give conditions on UUU under which a single optimistic policy, U-UCB, has regret O(log⁡T/T)O(\log T/T)O(logT/T), the rate of the classical setting. The paper builds on the (α,ψ)(\alpha,\psi)(α,ψ)-UCB analysis of Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi (2012) and on earlier work on risk-averse bandits (mean–variance, CVaR) that treated one criterion at a time.

Setting

There are KKK arms. Arm iii has a reward law F(i)F^{(i)}F(i), an arbitrary probability distribution on R\mathbb RR, and an i.i.d. reward sequence Xi,1,Xi,2,…X_{i,1},X_{i,2},\dotsXi,1​,Xi,2​,…; all rewards are mutually independent, and a randomization variable VVV is independent of them. An admissible policy chooses the arm πt\pi_tπt​ of round ttt as a measurable function of VVV and of the past arms and rewards. The pull count of arm iii is τi(t)\tau_i(t)τi​(t), and the reward observed in round ttt is Xπ,t=Xi,τi(t)X_{\pi,t}=X_{i,\tau_i(t)}Xπ,t​=Xi,τi​(t)​ on {πt=i}\{\pi_t=i\}{πt​=i}.

The empirical distribution of x1,…,xtx_1,\dots,x_tx1​,…,xt​ is F^t=1t∑s≤tI[xs,∞)\hat F_t=\frac1t\sum_{s\le t}\mathbb I_{[x_s,\infty)}F^t​=t1​∑s≤t​I[xs​,∞)​. The policy's empirical distribution after TTT rounds is F^Tπ\hat F^\pi_TF^Tπ​, built from Xπ,1,…,Xπ,TX_{\pi,1},\dots,X_{\pi,T}Xπ,1​,…,Xπ,T​, and arm iii's is F^t(i)\hat F^{(i)}_tF^t(i)​, built from Xi,1,…,Xi,tX_{i,1},\dots,X_{i,t}Xi,1​,…,Xi,t​. Distribution functions live in a real vector space LLL of functions on R\mathbb RR carrying a seminorm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥, chosen to suit UUU. An empirical distribution performance measure (EDPM) is a map U:L→RU:L\to\mathbb RU:L→R; the decision maker maximizes E U(F^Tπ)\mathbb E\,U(\hat F^\pi_T)EU(F^Tπ​).

Write DΔD^\DeltaDΔ for the mixtures ∑ipiF(i)\sum_ip_iF^{(i)}∑i​pi​F(i) of the arm laws, i∗i^*i∗ for an arm maximizing U(F(i))U(F^{(i)})U(F(i)), Δi=U(F(i∗))−U(F(i))\Delta_i=U(F^{(i^*)})-U(F^{(i)})Δi​=U(F(i∗))−U(F(i)), D=max⁡i,j∥F(i)−F(j)∥D=\max_{i,j}\|F^{(i)}-F^{(j)}\|D=maxi,j​∥F(i)−F(j)∥ and ρ=max⁡i≠i∗∥F(i∗)−F(i)∥/Δi\rho=\max_{i\ne i^*}\|F^{(i^*)}-F^{(i)}\|/\Delta_iρ=maxi=i∗​∥F(i∗)−F(i)∥/Δi​. The pseudo empirical distribution is FTπ=1T∑iτi(T)F(i)F^\pi_T=\frac1T\sum_i\tau_i(T)F^{(i)}FTπ​=T1​∑i​τi​(T)F(i).

  • UUU is stable with parameters υ,b>0\upsilon,b>0υ,b>0, q≥1q\ge1q≥1 if ∣U(F)−U(G)∣≤b(∥F−G∥+∥F−G∥q)|U(F)-U(G)|\le b(\|F-G\|+\|F-G\|^q)∣U(F)−U(G)∣≤b(∥F−G∥+∥F−G∥q) for F∈DΔF\in D^\DeltaF∈DΔ, G∈LG\in LG∈L, and P(∥F^t(i)−F(i)∥≥x)≤2e−υtx2\mathbb P(\|\hat F^{(i)}_t-F^{(i)}\|\ge x)\le2e^{-\upsilon tx^2}P(∥F^t(i)​−F(i)∥≥x)≤2e−υtx2.
  • UUU is smooth with parameter β≥0\beta\ge0β≥0 (and M0=∞M_0=\inftyM0​=∞) if at every F∈DΔF\in D^\DeltaF∈DΔ there is a bounded linear functional ∂U(F)\partial U(F)∂U(F) with ∣U(G)−U(F)−∂U(F)⋅(G−F)∣≤12β∥G−F∥2|U(G)-U(F)-\partial U(F)\cdot(G-F)|\le\frac12\beta\|G-F\|^2∣U(G)−U(F)−∂U(F)⋅(G−F)∣≤21​β∥G−F∥2 for all G∈LG\in LG∈L.
  • UUU has a linear gap with parameter η>0\eta>0η>0 if U(F)≤U(F(i∗))−1η∥F−F(i∗)∥U(F)\le U(F^{(i^*)})-\frac1\eta\|F-F^{(i^*)}\|U(F)≤U(F(i∗))−η1​∥F−F(i∗)∥ on DΔD^\DeltaDΔ.

U-UCB pulls each arm once and then plays arg⁡max⁡i[U(F^τi(t−1)(i))+φ−1(γlog⁡t/τi(t−1))]\arg\max_i\big[U(\hat F^{(i)}_{\tau_i(t-1)})+\varphi^{-1}(\gamma\log t/\tau_i(t-1))\big]argmaxi​[U(F^τi​(t−1)(i)​)+φ−1(γlogt/τi​(t−1))], where φ(y)=min⁡{υ(y/2b)2,υ(y/2b)2/q}\varphi(y)=\min\{\upsilon(y/2b)^2,\upsilon(y/2b)^{2/q}\}φ(y)=min{υ(y/2b)2,υ(y/2b)2/q}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (p.10)

There is a horizon T1T_1T1​, depending only on the problem parameters, such that for every run of U-UCB, every admissible policy π′\pi'π′ and every T≥T1T\ge T_1T≥T1​,

E U(F^Tπ′)−E U(F^TU-UCB)≤LρT∑i≠i∗(γΔilog⁡Tφ(Δi/2)+γ+6γ−2Δi)+12βK2log⁡KTυT,L=b(1+Dq−1).\mathbb E\,U(\hat F^{\pi'}_T)-\mathbb E\,U(\hat F^{U\text{-}UCB}_T)\le\frac{L\rho}T\sum_{i\ne i^*}\Big(\frac{\gamma\Delta_i\log T}{\varphi(\Delta_i/2)}+\frac{\gamma+6}{\gamma-2}\Delta_i\Big)+\frac{12\beta K^2\log KT}{\upsilon T},\qquad L=b(1+D^{q-1}).EU(F^Tπ′​)−EU(F^TU-UCB​)≤TLρ​i=i∗∑​(φ(Δi​/2)γΔi​logT​+γ−2γ+6​Δi​)+υT12βK2logKT​,L=b(1+Dq−1).

The paper states this for the regret RU-UCB(T)R_{U\text{-}UCB}(T)RU-UCB​(T), measured against a finite-horizon oracle π∗(T)∈arg⁡max⁡πE U(F^Tπ)\pi^*(T)\in\arg\max_\pi\mathbb E\,U(\hat F^\pi_T)π∗(T)∈argmaxπ​EU(F^Tπ​). Such an oracle need not exist, so the goal is stated against every admissible comparator; where the oracle exists, choosing it gives the printed statement. The paper's "for all T≥T1T\ge T_1T≥T1​, which is polynomial in problem parameters" is read as: one T1T_1T1​ that depends only on K,υ,b,q,β,η,γ,D,ρK,\upsilon,b,q,\beta,\eta,\gamma,D,\rhoK,υ,b,q,β,η,γ,D,ρ and the gaps, uniform over instances, U-UCB tie-breaking rules and comparators. The paper's explicit condition (29) has log⁡T\log TlogT on both sides and does not by itself support its printed proof, so "polynomial" has no literal content to formalize. As in Theorem 2, whose bound Theorem 4 prints, γ>2\gamma>2γ>2 and Δi>0\Delta_i>0Δi​>0 for i≠i∗i\ne i^*i=i∗ are assumed.

Milestones

In the order the proof uses them: the tail bound of Lemma 2 for ∥F^Tπ−FTπ∥\|\hat F^\pi_T-F^\pi_T\|∥F^Tπ​−FTπ​∥; the integral of Lemma 7 and the moment bounds of Lemma 6; three steps of the proof of Theorem 3 (unbiasedness EF^Tπ=EFTπ\mathbb E\hat F^\pi_T=\mathbb EF^\pi_TEF^Tπ​=EFTπ​, the vanishing of E[∂U(F)⋅(F^Tπ−FTπ)]\mathbb E[\partial U(F)\cdot(\hat F^\pi_T-F^\pi_T)]E[∂U(F)⋅(F^Tπ​−FTπ​)], the bound on the second-order remainder δ1\delta_1δ1​); Lemma 1 and the distance form of its proof; the concentration inequality (26); the pull-count bound of the proof of Theorem 2; and Theorem 2, the pseudo-regret bound of U-UCB.

Significance

Theorem 4 reduces regret analysis under a non-cumulative criterion to three checks on UUU in a chosen seminorm. The paper uses it in §5 to obtain O(log⁡T/T)O(\log T/T)O(logT/T) regret for mean–variance, for CVaR under density assumptions, and for other criteria, and identifies cases where only O(1/T)O(1/\sqrt T)O(1/T​) follows. Without the smoothness and linear-gap conditions the framework gives only the weaker bound of Remark 1.

The result is proved in the paper; none of it is machine-checked. The platform has the classical (α,ψ)(\alpha,\psi)(α,ψ)-UCB pseudo-regret bound (RegretBandits.Stochastic.alpha_psi_ucb_pseudo_regret), which is the linear special case of Theorem 2 in a different model. This mission adds a policy-level regret theorem for criteria that are not sums, together with a reusable model of randomized non-anticipating policies over an independent reward stack. Formalizing it also has to repair the proof: the printed proof of Theorem 3 (p.26) bounds ∥∂U(FTπ)−∂U(F)∥\|\partial U(F^\pi_T)-\partial U(F)\|∥∂U(FTπ​)−∂U(F)∥ by β∥FTπ−F∥\beta\|F^\pi_T-F\|β∥FTπ​−F∥, which Definition 2 does not give. A counterexample to that step has two point-mass arms, the seminorm ∣f(1/2)∣+∣f(2)∣|f(1/2)|+|f(2)|∣f(1/2)∣+∣f(2)∣ and U=β′f(1/2)f(2)U=\beta' f(1/2)f(2)U=β′f(1/2)f(2), and gives the factor 2β2\beta2β; Definition 2 does give 3β3\beta3β. Theorem 3 is therefore not posed. Its verified ingredients are milestones, and the goal, whose threshold T1T_1T1​ absorbs the larger constant, is unaffected.

Difficulty

The pseudo regret is handled by the standard UCB argument (Theorem 2). The difficulty is the horizon gap E[U(F^Tπ)−U(FTπ)]\mathbb E[U(\hat F^\pi_T)-U(F^\pi_T)]E[U(F^Tπ​)−U(FTπ​)]. The first idea, applying the modulus of continuity to ∥F^Tπ−FTπ∥\|\hat F^\pi_T-F^\pi_T\|∥F^Tπ​−FTπ​∥, loses a factor T\sqrt TT​ (Proposition 1) even for linear UUU, and gives only O(1/T)O(1/\sqrt T)O(1/T​). The O(log⁡T/T)O(\log T/T)O(logT/T) rate needs the first-order term E[∂U(F)⋅(F^Tπ−FTπ)]\mathbb E[\partial U(F)\cdot(\hat F^\pi_T-F^\pi_T)]E[∂U(F)⋅(F^Tπ​−FTπ​)] to vanish for an adaptive policy. That holds pointwise in xxx by non-anticipation. Passing the expectation through a functional that is only bounded for a seminorm is not automatic and needs a separate argument. The remaining cross term must then be absorbed by the linear gap, which ties T1T_1T1​ to η\etaη, β\betaβ and the pull-count bound.

Formalization scope

Arms are Fin K. The reward stack X i k is the paper's Xi,k+1X_{i,k+1}Xi,k+1​, mutually independent (iIndepFun), with arbitrary laws: no moment or support assumption. The randomization V takes values in an arbitrary measurable space and is independent of the stack. A policy is a family of jointly measurable decision rules of V and the history, so the comparator class contains every non-anticipating randomized policy. Pull counts reuse the published ImprovedLinBandits.UCBDelta.pullCount. Distribution functions are functions R→R\mathbb R\to\mathbb RR→R; LLL is any submodule containing every indicator I[a,∞)\mathbb I_{[a,\infty)}I[a,∞)​ and every distribution function, with a Seminorm (not a norm). The stability, smoothness and gap parameters are explicit arguments. A differential is any bounded linear functional with the quadratic bound, which determines it uniquely. U-UCB ties and the order of the initial pulls are broken by any non-anticipating rule. The paper's standing assumption that expectations exist is encoded as Borel measurability of UUU and of the seminorm along empirical distributions; no integrability of rewards is assumed. Expectations of LLL-valued quantities are taken pointwise or after applying a functional, never as integrals in LLL. Logarithms are natural, and φ\varphiφ, φ−1\varphi^{-1}φ−1 and Dq−1D^{q-1}Dq−1 use Real.rpow.

The hypotheses are not vacuous. A verification file proves that a two-armed, non-degenerate instance satisfies stability, smoothness, the linear gap and the measurability assumption, and that it has an explicit U-UCB run.

A complete development needs: the measurability of the arm process; the unbiasedness argument under non-anticipation; tail-sum formulas for the moments; the UCB counting argument; and the corrected 3β3\beta3β cross-term estimate. The policy model and the empirical-distribution tail bounds are reusable for other bandit missions. Proofs of the milestones, and an independent statement of Theorem 3 at a constant Definition 2 supports, are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Cassel, S. Mannor, A. Zeevi, A General Framework for Bandit Problems Beyond Cumulative Objectives, arXiv:1806.01380v3, 2021; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.01380v3
  • S. Bubeck, N. Cesa-Bianchi, Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 5(1), 2012. https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.5721
  • P. Auer, N. Cesa-Bianchi, P. Fischer, Finite-time Analysis of the Multiarmed Bandit Problem, Machine Learning 47, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013689704352
  • A. W. van der Vaart, Asymptotic Statistics, Cambridge University Press, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511802256
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Complexity Theory·Captain: Shuze Chen

Sorting by Transpositions Is Difficult: Sorting by Transpositions is NP-hardResearch Paper

Motivation

A transposition exchanges two neighboring stretches of a sequence without changing the order inside either stretch. In comparative genomics, such an operation models moving a contiguous sequence of genes to another position. When each gene occurs once, a genome can be represented by a permutation. The minimum number of transpositions needed to transform one ordering into another gives a measure of rearrangement distance. Bulteau, Fertin and Rusu study the computational difficulty of finding this minimum in Sorting by Transpositions is Difficult, §1.

The operation permits blocks of arbitrary positive lengths. Efficiently checking one proposed rearrangement does not settle the difficulty of finding a shortest sequence. The paper establishes that the associated decision problem is NP-hard. This mission formalizes that result and its intermediate statements using the supplied, pinned arXiv version, whose theorem numbering is used throughout.

Permutations, breakpoints and deletion systems

Fix a positive integer nnn. A sentinel permutation is a bijection π\piπ of {0,…,n}\{0,\ldots,n\}{0,…,n} with π(0)=0\pi(0)=0π(0)=0 and π(n)=n\pi(n)=nπ(n)=n. For 0<i<j<k≤n0<i<j<k\le n0<i<j<k≤n, the transposition τi,j,k\tau_{i,j,k}τi,j,k​ exchanges the entries in the intervals [i,j)[i,j)[i,j) and [j,k)[j,k)[j,k). Applying a move means replacing π\piπ by π∘τi,j,k\pi\circ\tau_{i,j,k}π∘τi,j,k​. The transposition distance dt(π)d_t(\pi)dt​(π) is the minimum length of a sequence of such moves ending at the identity; an empty sequence is permitted. These are the conventions of Definitions 1–3, pp. 2–3.

An adjacency at position xxx, where 1≤x≤n1\le x\le n1≤x≤n, means π(x)=π(x−1)+1\pi(x)=\pi(x-1)+1π(x)=π(x−1)+1. Every other such position is a breakpoint. Write db(π)d_b(\pi)db​(π) for their number, including the position adjacent to the final sentinel. The decision problem asks whether dt(π)≤kd_t(\pi)\le kdt​(π)≤k for a supplied integer budget kkk.

The paper also defines a 3DT-instance: a finite alphabet partitioned into oriented triples, with its symbols injected into the positions 1,…,n1,\ldots,n1,…,n. Unoccupied positions are dots. A triple is well ordered if its cyclic orientation agrees with the increasing order of its occupied positions. A 3DT-step deletes that triple and transports all remaining positions by an associated inverse transposition. The span remains fixed. An instance is collapsible if some finite sequence of steps deletes every triple. These definitions include the empty alphabet and zero-step collapse (Definitions 4–9, pp. 4–6).

A block decomposition divides the positions into consecutive intervals. Variables pair two oriented triples distributed between distinct source and target blocks. Four concrete block words, called copy, and, or and var, specify local transition systems. Their names describe the activation behavior asserted by the paper; that behavior is not assumed in their definitions (§3, pp. 11–27).

Formalization targets

Let SSS be the language of valid encodings of permutations and signed budgets that admit a sorting sequence within budget. The goal is the unconditional assertion

∀A finite and nonempty,∀L∈NPA,L≤pS.\forall A\text{ finite and nonempty},\quad \forall L\in\mathrm{NP}_A,\qquad L\le_p S.∀A finite and nonempty,∀L∈NPA​,L≤p​S.

Here ≤p\le_p≤p​ means polynomial-time many-one reducibility, with membership equivalence on every input word. This is Theorem 21, p. 34. It concerns every legal input permutation and every integer budget. It does not assume that SAT is NP-complete as an extra hypothesis.

The fifteen milestones retain the source's complete statements. Properties 3 and 4 describe adjacency preservation and the breakpoint lower bound. Property 6, Lemmas 7–8 and Theorem 9 concern the relation between a 3DT-instance and an equivalent permutation. In particular,

I collapsible⟺dt(π)=∣T∣=db(π)/3.I\text{ collapsible}\quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad d_t(\pi)=|T|=d_b(\pi)/3.I collapsible⟺dt​(π)=∣T∣=db​(π)/3.

Properties 12–13 describe changes to block membership and variable placement. Properties 14–17 specify the exact possible local activation orders of all four block types, including realizability. Lemma 18 asserts validity after any finite run from an assembling and collapsibility once no external variables remain. Theorems 19 and 20 retain both the semantic claims and the uniform polynomial running-time clauses for their concrete constructions (pp. 12–34).

Significance

NP-hardness classifies the difficulty of exact sorting by these moves: a polynomial algorithm for the full decision problem would provide polynomial algorithms for every language in NP. It does not by itself rule out approximation algorithms or efficient algorithms on restricted instances. The paper distinguishes these issues in its conclusion, p. 35.

The formalization supplies explicit definitions of block moves, fixed-span deletion systems, local activation graphs, assembling syntax and the two source constructions. These objects can support later work on sorting bounds and genome rearrangements. The mathematical result is established in the cited paper; the sixteen Lean theorem items are statements awaiting proofs. The existing platform SAT-completeness theorem remains an Open external dependency.

Difficulty

Counting breakpoints gives a lower bound, but does not generally determine the minimum number of moves. Nor does every deletion system admit an equivalent permutation: the paper explicitly gives an example without one on p. 10. Thus the claims about particular assemblings carry substantial content.

Faithful statements must distinguish local activation possibilities from restrictions imposed by a particular surrounding network. They must also retain the difference between variable placement and full variable validity. A construction with polynomial output length alone does not establish the running-time assertion. These distinctions require explicit transition rules, concrete constructors and a machine model with counted execution steps.

Formalization scope

Finite alphabets use injective natural-number labels; triple lists are duplicate-free and their enumeration is auxiliary. Assemblings allow arbitrary relabeling. Dot positions and the two sentinels remain present throughout. Distance is an infimum in the extended natural numbers, avoiding a default value on an empty feasible set; every legal source permutation is sortable and its finite minimum is attained. Breakpoint inequalities use multiplication by three, preserving exact division.

The sorting language uses a published self-delimiting binary-number encoder. Its code includes the entire permutation and a signed binary budget. Malformed codes and negative budgets reject. The SAT normalization handles empty conjunctions, empty clauses, repeated literals and sparse variable names. Two-leaf chains use one gate; single-variable feedback uses a direct wire. The final conjunction uses Γγ\Gamma_\gammaΓγ​, the intended reading confirmed on p. 29 of the source.

Polynomial time uses the published CookPvsNP finite-alphabet Turing-machine definitions. Construction correctness is never included as a premise or data field. Contributions may establish the stated milestones and the structural facts needed to connect their concrete definitions, while preserving the full decision language and every clause of the source claims.

Selected references

  • Laurent Bulteau, Guillaume Fertin and Irena Rusu, Sorting by Transpositions is Difficult. Supplied artifact: arXiv:1011.1157v1, 2010. Published as Sorting by Transpositions Is Difficult, SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics, 2012, DOI:10.1137/110851390. All theorem numbers and pages above refer to the supplied v1 artifact.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions: the water-filling algorithm finds an ϵ\epsilonϵ-bidder-optimal core point in O(nlog⁡(n/ϵ))O(n\log(n/\epsilon))O(nlog(n/ϵ)) oracle calls and O(n2log⁡(n/ϵ))O(n^2\log(n/\epsilon))O(n2log(n/ϵ)) timeResearch Paper

Why core pricing

Online ad platforms sell a limited number of lines of ad space to advertisers whose ads come in several shapes and sizes, so their preferences over the space are combinatorial and often complementary (Niazadeh et al., arXiv:1610.03564v4, §1). The Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction can earn little revenue on such preferences. Core-selecting auctions (Ausubel and Milgrom 2006) keep the welfare-maximizing allocation and choose payments so that no group of bidders, together with the seller, would prefer to deviate.

The obstacle is computational. The core is cut out by one constraint for each coalition of bidders, and earlier work computes core outcomes with heuristics or with computationally intensive convex and linear programming methods, which are a poor fit for a real-time ad auction (§1, p.4). The paper's Theorem 1 replaces this with a simple deterministic algorithm that uses a winner determination routine as a black box. Its experiments on Bing auction data are out of scope for this mission.

Setting

There are nnn bidders N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n} and mmm items. A bid profile assigns each bidder iii a valuation bib_ibi​ on bundles of items, normalized by bi(∅)=0b_i(\emptyset)=0bi​(∅)=0, with all values in [0,1][0,1][0,1]. No monotonicity is assumed. An allocation is a tuple of pairwise disjoint bundles {xi}i∈N\{x_i\}_{i\in N}{xi​}i∈N​, and w(S)w(S)w(S) is the maximum of ∑ibi(xi)\sum_i b_i(x_i)∑i​bi​(xi​) over allocations that give items only to agents in SSS.

A non-negative utility vector {πi}i∈N\{\pi_i\}_{i\in N}{πi​}i∈N​ is in the core if

w(N)−∑i∈Nπi ≥ w(S)−∑i∈Sπifor all S⊆N.w(N)-\sum_{i\in N}\pi_i\ \ge\ w(S)-\sum_{i\in S}\pi_i\qquad\text{for all } S\subseteq N.w(N)−i∈N∑​πi​ ≥ w(S)−i∈S∑​πi​for all S⊆N.

The left side is the seller's revenue π0\pi_0π0​. A vector π\piπ is ϵ\epsilonϵ-bidder optimal if it is in the core and no core point π′≥π\pi'\ge\piπ′≥π exceeds π\piπ by more than ϵ\epsilonϵ in some coordinate.

WIN-ORAC is the only access to the bids: given truncations π\piπ, it returns the maximum welfare w(N,{max⁡(bi(.)−πi,0)})w(N,\{\max(b_i(.)-\pi_i,0)\})w(N,{max(bi​(.)−πi​,0)}) under the truncated bids, and a winning set. Algorithm 1 starts at π=0\pi=0π=0 with all bidders active, and repeatedly raises the utilities of the active bidders uniformly until a core constraint nearly binds. The subroutine Core-Search finds this point by bisection on [0,1][0,1][0,1], up to ϵ/∣S∣\epsilon/|S|ϵ/∣S∣ per bidder. Bidders outside the next winning set are then frozen.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

There are absolute constants C1,C2>0C_1,C_2>0C1​,C2​>0 such that for all n,mn,mn,m, every bid profile, every oracle meeting the specification, and every ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0, Algorithm 1 halts with an ϵ\epsilonϵ-bidder optimal core point, having made at most

(n+1)+n⌈log⁡2(n/ϵ)⌉+(n+1)+n\lceil\log_2(n/\epsilon)\rceil_+(n+1)+n⌈log2​(n/ϵ)⌉+​

oracle calls and spent additional time at most n((2n+1)+n⌈log⁡2(n/ϵ)⌉+)n((2n+1)+n\lceil\log_2(n/\epsilon)\rceil_+)n((2n+1)+n⌈log2​(n/ϵ)⌉+​). For n≥1n\ge1n≥1 and ϵ≤n/2\epsilon\le n/2ϵ≤n/2, these are at most C1 nlog⁡(n/ϵ)C_1\,n\log(n/\epsilon)C1​nlog(n/ϵ) and C2 n2log⁡(n/ϵ)C_2\,n^2\log(n/\epsilon)C2​n2log(n/ϵ).

Milestones, in the order of the paper's proof

  1. Lemma 1 and the display in its proof: a core point and a maximum welfare allocation give a core outcome, and πi≤w(N)−w(N∖{i})≤bi(xi∗)\pi_i\le w(N)-w(N\setminus\{i\})\le b_i(x^*_i)πi​≤w(N)−w(N∖{i})≤bi​(xi∗​).
  2. Lemma 2 and eq. (5): winners under truncated bids are most binding constraints, the converse, and the identity between the oracle's value and max⁡S(w(S)−∑Sπi)\max_S(w(S)-\sum_S\pi_i)maxS​(w(S)−∑S​πi​). The resulting core test follows.
  3. The Core-Search guarantee, and Proposition 1, Parts (1)–(3), with the persistence of ϵ\epsilonϵ-tightness.
  4. Lemma 3: at most nnn iterations.
  5. The certificate step and the two counts in the proof of Theorem 1.

Significance

The result gives a core point with O(nlog⁡(n/ϵ))O(n\log(n/\epsilon))O(nlog(n/ϵ)) oracle calls, against O((n/ϵ)log⁡n)O((n/\epsilon)\log n)O((n/ϵ)logn) for Vaidya's cutting-plane method as the paper recounts on p.20, and it is a deterministic and combinatorial computation. The dependence on ϵ\epsilonϵ is what makes it usable in a time-sensitive auction. Lemma 2 is of independent use: it says a single winner determination call separates over the exponentially many core constraints.

The statement has not been machine-checked before. Formalizing it adds three things beyond the paper's proof. It fixes the algorithm as a defined transition system, with oracle calls and additional time counted at the call sites, so the complexity claim is a theorem about an actual run. It corrects statements that are false as printed: Proposition 1(1) and the second display on p.14 (the endpoint Δh=1\Delta_h=1Δh​=1 is never tested, so πˉ\bar\piπˉ can be a core point), and the oracle count on p.20 (off by one, and without a ceiling). Theorem 1 itself survives these corrections. It also makes explicit which winner notion each bullet of Lemma 2 needs.

Difficulty

The arithmetic is short. The difficulty is in the invariants of the run. The natural argument says πˉ\bar\piπˉ leaves the core, so the next winner set must lose an active bidder; this fails exactly when Δh\Delta_hΔh​ stays at its untested initial value 111, and that case needs a separate argument through the bound πi≤bi(xi∗)\pi_i\le b_i(x^*_i)πi​≤bi​(xi∗​) and the zero-value convention. A second trap is the choice of winner set: an optimal allocation may hand out bundles of zero truncated value, and an oracle allowed to do so can keep the algorithm running forever. Finally, the invariants are joint: core membership, tightness of all recorded constraints, the identity St=⋂t′<tTt′S_t=\bigcap_{t'<t}T_{t'}St​=⋂t′<t​Tt′​ and the correctness of the stored value w(N)w(N)w(N) have to be carried together along a run in which two nested loops alternate.

Formalization scope

Bidders are Fin n, bundles are Finset (Fin m), and n=0n=0n=0, m=0m=0m=0 are allowed. Allocations and welfare are the published ComplementFreeCA.CFRounding.IsAllocation and welfare. w is a Finset.sup', so it has no junk value. The core is stated through (3), with π0:=w(N)−∑iπi\pi_0:=w(N)-\sum_i\pi_iπ0​:=w(N)−∑i​πi​.

The oracle is a function q of the truncation, and "any set" on line 4 is a universal quantifier over q, constrained by IsWinOrac at π≥0\pi\ge0π≥0. The transition function step has no access to the bids, so the oracle count cannot be evaded, and the iteration count is not hard-wired: the loops are real. The field log is ghost. The return on line 11 is read as the else branch of line 6. Additional time is the counter ticks, with unit-cost operations. The hypothesis IsBidProfile must stay: Δh=1\Delta_h=1Δh​=1 is valid only because values are in [0,1][0,1][0,1].

IsWinOrac is satisfiable for every bid profile, so the goal is not vacuous; a trivial algorithm is excluded because the theorem is about this step.

A complete development needs invariants of the run, a bisection count, and elementary estimates on ⌈log⁡2⌉\lceil\log_2\rceil⌈log2​⌉. Lemma 2 and the core test do not depend on the algorithm and may be reusable for other core-selecting rules. Definition 7, the dynamic program, §4 and the appendices are out of scope. Proofs of any milestone are welcome in any order, as are shorter routes through the invariants.

Selected references

  • R. Niazadeh, J. Hartline, N. Immorlica, M. R. Khani, B. Lucier, Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions, preprint, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.03564v4
  • L. M. Ausubel, P. Milgrom, The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction, in Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0002
  • R. W. Day, S. Raghavan, Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions, Management Science 53(9), 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1060.0662
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CombinatoricsGraph TheoryOptimization·Captain: iris

Exactness of Parrilo’s Conic Approximations for Copositive Matrices and Associated Low Order Bounds for the Stability Number of a Graph: Isolated Nodes Keeping ϑ-Rank 1 for Odd Cycles and ComplementsResearch Paper

Motivation

The stability number α(G)\alpha(G)α(G) of a graph, the largest size of a set of pairwise non-adjacent nodes, is NP-hard to compute. Motzkin and Straus showed that it is the value of a copositive program, α(G)=min⁡{t:t(AG+I)−J copositive}\alpha(G)=\min\{t: t(A_G+I)-J \text{ copositive}\}α(G)=min{t:t(AG​+I)−J copositive}. That turns approximating α(G)\alpha(G)α(G) into approximating the cone of copositive matrices. Parrilo (2000 thesis) proposed inner approximations Kn(r)\mathcal K^{(r)}_nKn(r)​ by sums of squares, and de Klerk and Pasechnik (SIAM J. Optim. 2002) used them to define a hierarchy of semidefinite bounds ϑ(r)(G)≥α(G)\vartheta^{(r)}(G)\ge\alpha(G)ϑ(r)(G)≥α(G). The question is how fast this hierarchy reaches α(G)\alpha(G)α(G).

  • 2002. De Klerk and Pasechnik conjecture that ϑ(α(G)−1)(G)=α(G)\vartheta^{(\alpha(G)-1)}(G)=\alpha(G)ϑ(α(G)−1)(G)=α(G) for every graph, and prove it for α(G)≤2\alpha(G)\le 2α(G)≤2.
  • 2006–2007. Gvozdenović and Laurent (Math. Program. 2007) prove the conjecture for α(G)≤8\alpha(G)\le 8α(G)≤8. They also introduce the reduction that controls the ϑ\varthetaϑ-rank through graphs with an added isolated node (Proposition 4.3 here), and conjecture that adding an isolated node never increases the ϑ\varthetaϑ-rank. That conjecture would imply de Klerk and Pasechnik's.
  • 2021. Laurent and Vargas (arXiv:2109.12876) refute the isolated-node conjecture already at ϑ\varthetaϑ-rank 111. They determine exactly how many isolated nodes an odd cycle or its complement tolerates.

Setting

A graph G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) has a finite node set. AGA_GAG​ is its adjacency matrix, III the identity and JJJ the all-ones matrix. The graph matrix is MG=α(G)(AG+I)−JM_G=\alpha(G)(A_G+I)-JMG​=α(G)(AG​+I)−J: its entries are α(G)−1\alpha(G)-1α(G)−1 on the diagonal and at edges, and −1-1−1 at non-edges. Write x∘2=(x12,…,xn2)x^{\circ2}=(x_1^2,\dots,x_n^2)x∘2=(x12​,…,xn2​) and let Σ\SigmaΣ be the set of sums of squares of real polynomials. Parrilo's cone of order rrr is

Kn(r)={M symmetric: (∑ixi2)r(x∘2)TMx∘2∈Σ}.\mathcal K^{(r)}_n=\Big\{M \text{ symmetric}:\ \Big(\sum_i x_i^2\Big)^r (x^{\circ2})^TMx^{\circ2}\in\Sigma\Big\}.Kn(r)​={M symmetric: (i∑​xi2​)r(x∘2)TMx∘2∈Σ}.

The bound of order rrr is ϑ(r)(G)=min⁡{t:t(AG+I)−J∈Kn(r)}\vartheta^{(r)}(G)=\min\{t: t(A_G+I)-J\in\mathcal K^{(r)}_n\}ϑ(r)(G)=min{t:t(AG​+I)−J∈Kn(r)​}. The ϑ\varthetaϑ-rank of GGG is the least rrr with ϑ(r)(G)=α(G)\vartheta^{(r)}(G)=\alpha(G)ϑ(r)(G)=α(G), and ∞\infty∞ if there is none. Equivalently, it is the least rrr with MG∈Kn(r)M_G\in\mathcal K^{(r)}_nMG​∈Kn(r)​ (equation (1.7)).

C2n+1C_{2n+1}C2n+1​ is the cycle on 2n+12n+12n+1 nodes, C2n+1‾\overline{C_{2n+1}}C2n+1​​ is its complement, and Km‾\overline{K_m}Km​​ is the graph on mmm nodes with no edges. G⊕HG\oplus HG⊕H is the disjoint union of GGG and HHH, so G⊕Km‾G\oplus\overline{K_m}G⊕Km​​ is GGG with mmm added isolated nodes.

An edge eee is critical if α(G∖e)=α(G)+1\alpha(G\setminus e)=\alpha(G)+1α(G∖e)=α(G)+1. GcG_cGc​ is the spanning subgraph formed by the critical edges, and GGG is critical if all its edges are. For a node iii, i⊥i^\perpi⊥ is iii together with its neighbours, and G∖i⊥G\setminus i^\perpG∖i⊥ is the subgraph induced by the remaining nodes. In Lean these objects are graphMatrix, InK, thetaR, thetaRank, delNbhd, Mathlib's cycleGraph, ⊕g and indepNum, and the published criticalGraph.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 6.14

For every integer n≥2n\ge2n≥2 and every m≥0m\ge0m≥0,

ϑ-rank(C2n+1⊕Km‾)=1  ⟺  m≤4+4n−1,ϑ-rank(C2n+1‾⊕Km‾)=1  ⟺  m≤8.\vartheta\text{-rank}(C_{2n+1}\oplus\overline{K_m})=1\iff m\le 4+\frac{4}{n-1},\qquad \vartheta\text{-rank}(\overline{C_{2n+1}}\oplus\overline{K_m})=1\iff m\le 8.ϑ-rank(C2n+1​⊕Km​​)=1⟺m≤4+n−14​,ϑ-rank(C2n+1​​⊕Km​​)=1⟺m≤8.

Both parts and both directions of each equivalence are required. For C5C_5C5​ the threshold is 888, so C5⊕K9‾C_5\oplus\overline{K_9}C5​⊕K9​​ has ϑ\varthetaϑ-rank at least 222 while C5C_5C5​ has ϑ\varthetaϑ-rank 111.

The two general theorems behind it

For integers α>k≥2\alpha> k\ge 2α>k≥2 and a graph HHH with α(H)=k\alpha(H)=kα(H)=k and connected HcH_cHc​, Theorem 6.6 states

ϑ-rank(H⊕Kα−k‾)=1 ⟹ α≤k(k+3)k−1=k+4+4k−1.\vartheta\text{-rank}(H\oplus\overline{K_{\alpha-k}})=1\ \Longrightarrow\ \alpha\le \frac{k(k+3)}{k-1}=k+4+\frac{4}{k-1}.ϑ-rank(H⊕Kα−k​​)=1 ⟹ α≤k−1k(k+3)​=k+4+k−14​.

Theorem 6.13 gives the converse construction: if α≥k≥2\alpha\ge k\ge2α≥k≥2, ϑ-rank(H)=1\vartheta\text{-rank}(H)=1ϑ-rank(H)=1, ϑ-rank(H∖i⊥)=0\vartheta\text{-rank}(H\setminus i^\perp)=0ϑ-rank(H∖i⊥)=0 for every node iii, and α≤k(k+3)/(k−1)\alpha\le k(k+3)/(k-1)α≤k(k+3)/(k−1), then ϑ-rank(H⊕Kα−k‾)=1\vartheta\text{-rank}(H\oplus\overline{K_{\alpha-k}})=1ϑ-rank(H⊕Kα−k​​)=1.

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's proof:

  • the links (1.7) between the cones, ϑ(r)\vartheta^{(r)}ϑ(r) and the ϑ\varthetaϑ-rank;
  • the descriptions of K(0)\mathcal K^{(0)}K(0) and K(1)\mathcal K^{(1)}K(1) (Theorem 2.1, (2.3), Lemma 2.2);
  • the kernel properties of certificates (Lemma 2.5, Lemma 6.1, Lemma 6.4);
  • the upper bound ϑ\varthetaϑ-rank ≤1\le1≤1 (Proposition 4.3, Lemma 4.7);
  • the characterization of ϑ\varthetaϑ-rank 000 for critical graphs (the clique-partition certificate, Proposition 5.2, Corollary 5.3);
  • the facts about odd cycles (Examples 4.8 and 5.4);
  • the symmetric certificate of Dobre and Vera (Proposition 6.7) and the positive semidefiniteness criterion for the matrix (6.5) (Lemma 6.11).

Significance

Corollary 6.14 is a counterexample to a structural conjecture that would have settled de Klerk and Pasechnik's convergence conjecture through an induction on isolated nodes (Proposition 4.4 of the paper). It shows that this route is closed, already at ϑ\varthetaϑ-rank 111. It also gives exact thresholds rather than an existence statement. Theorems 6.6 and 6.13 apply to any graph whose critical edges are connected, so they cover more than the two families in the corollary. The paper derives further consequences from them (Corollaries 6.15 and 6.16).

The result is proved on paper, but not formalized. The mission formalizes the proof, including three results the paper cites rather than proves: the Peña–Vera–Zuluaga decomposition (Theorem 2.1), the Gvozdenović–Laurent bound (Proposition 4.3) and the Dobre–Vera symmetrization (Proposition 6.7). Two printed statements are corrected here. In Lemma 2.5(ii) an index misprint makes the stated identity false. Lemma 6.11 fails as printed when exactly one isolated node is added. Each item states the counterexample.

Difficulty

The lower bound ϑ\varthetaϑ-rank ≥1\ge1≥1 for the cycles is a structural argument about critical edges. The hard direction is "only if": showing that too many isolated nodes force ϑ\varthetaϑ-rank at least 222. That means proving that no K(1)\mathcal K^{(1)}K(1)-certificate exists. The obvious attempt is to exhibit a nonnegative polynomial that is not a sum of squares, and it does not work, because the obstruction is a property of every certificate at once. The paper's argument has three steps:

  • zeros of xTMGxx^TM_GxxTMG​x force linear relations on every certificate;
  • averaging over the symmetries of the added nodes makes one certificate symmetric;
  • these together pin a principal submatrix to the explicit form (6.5), whose positive semidefiniteness reduces to the scalar inequality (6.2).

Each step is exact linear algebra with symbolic parameters α,k,b\alpha,k,bα,k,b. The cited Theorem 2.1 needs a parity argument on the monomials of a sum of squares, and Proposition 4.3 needs an explicit sum-of-squares construction from the cited source.

Formalization scope

  • Matrices and polynomials. Matrices are Matrix ι ι ℝ over a finite index type, and polynomials are MvPolynomial ι ℝ. Sums of squares are Mathlib's IsSumSq. A cone member must be symmetric, as the paper's Kn(r)⊆Sn\mathcal K^{(r)}_n\subseteq\mathcal S^nKn(r)​⊆Sn requires.
  • The bound and the rank. ϑ(r)\vartheta^{(r)}ϑ(r) is an infimum over R\mathbb RR; its feasible set is nonempty and bounded below whenever the graph has a node. The ϑ\varthetaϑ-rank takes values in ℕ∞, with ⊤ for ∞\infty∞, so "=1=1=1" means exactly 111.
  • Graphs. Graphs are SimpleGraph V on a finite type. Km‾\overline{K_m}Km​​ is (⊥ : SimpleGraph (Fin m)), the edgeless graph and not the complete one, and ⊕\oplus⊕ is ⊕g. G∖i⊥G\setminus i^\perpG∖i⊥ is an induced subgraph.
  • Thresholds. The thresholds are computed in R\mathbb RR.
  • Ruled-out trivializations. Reading Km‾\overline{K_m}Km​​ as the complete graph, defining the cone by nonnegativity instead of sums of squares (which makes every ϑ\varthetaϑ-rank 000), or using an ℕ-valued rank with a junk 000 would each change the theorem; the definitions exclude all three.
  • Reused definition. Critical edges reuse the published ChvatalPolytopes_Separation_AlphaCritical.
  • Reusable infrastructure. Theorem 2.1, the K(0)\mathcal K^{(0)}K(0) and K(1)\mathcal K^{(1)}K(1) descriptions and Proposition 6.7 are general facts about copositive and sum-of-squares cones, usable beyond this paper.
  • Contributions. Contributions are welcome at every milestone, and especially on the stability numbers of C2n+1C_{2n+1}C2n+1​, C2n+1‾\overline{C_{2n+1}}C2n+1​​ and disjoint unions, which Mathlib does not yet have.

Selected references

  • M. Laurent and L. F. Vargas, Exactness of Parrilo's conic approximations for copositive matrices and associated low order bounds for the stability number of a graph, arXiv:2109.12876v1, 2021; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.12876
  • E. de Klerk and D. V. Pasechnik, Approximation of the stability number of a graph via copositive programming, SIAM Journal on Optimization 12(4), 2002. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623401383248
  • N. Gvozdenović and M. Laurent, Semidefinite bounds for the stability number of a graph via sums of squares of polynomials, Mathematical Programming 110, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-006-0062-8
  • J. C. Vera, J. Peña and L. F. Zuluaga, Computing the stability number of a graph via linear and semidefinite programming, SIAM Journal on Optimization 18(1), 2007 (the paper's [31], source of Theorem 2.1). https://optimization-online.org/2005/04/1106/
  • C. Dobre and J. C. Vera, Exploiting symmetry in copositive programs via semidefinite hierarchies, Mathematical Programming 151, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-015-0879-0
  • P. A. Parrilo, Structured semidefinite programs and semialgebraic geometry methods in robustness and optimization, PhD thesis, Caltech, 2000. https://doi.org/10.7907/2K6Y-CH43
  • T. S. Motzkin and E. G. Straus, Maxima for graphs and a new proof of a theorem of Turán, Canadian Journal of Mathematics 17, 1965. https://doi.org/10.4153/CJM-1965-053-6
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Algebraic TopologyLinear algebraOptimization·Captain: iris

Hidden Convexity, Optimization, and Algorithms on Rotation Matrices: Every Linear Image of SO(n)\mathrm{SO}(n)SO(n) in the Plane Is Convex for n≥3n \ge 3n≥3Research Paper

Motivation

Many problems in computer vision, robotics, satellite attitude estimation and point-cloud registration ask for the rotation that best explains some data. In matrix form they are linear optimization problems over the special orthogonal group, max⁡{⟨A,X⟩:X∈SO(n)}\max\{\langle A,X\rangle : X\in\mathrm{SO}(n)\}max{⟨A,X⟩:X∈SO(n)}, where ⟨A,X⟩=tr⁡(A⊤X)\langle A,X\rangle=\operatorname{tr}(A^\top X)⟨A,X⟩=tr(A⊤X). Without side constraints this is Wahba's problem and is solved by one singular value decomposition. Applications often add a single linear constraint, ⟨B,X⟩∈[a,b]\langle B,X\rangle\in[a,b]⟨B,X⟩∈[a,b], and SO(n)\mathrm{SO}(n)SO(n) is not convex, so it is not clear a priori that such a problem is tractable or that its convex relaxation is exact.

Ramachandran, Shu and Wang (arXiv:2304.08596v2, published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025) show that this problem has hidden convexity: every linear image of SO(n)\mathrm{SO}(n)SO(n) in the plane is convex once n≥3n\ge 3n≥3. Hence replacing SO(n)\mathrm{SO}(n)SO(n) by its convex hull loses nothing for one-constraint problems.

Timeline.

  • 1954: Horn shows that the set of diagonals of SO(n)\mathrm{SO}(n)SO(n) is a convex polytope.
  • 1961: Brickman proves that the image of the unit sphere Sn−1S^{n-1}Sn−1, n≥3n\ge 3n≥3, under a homogeneous quadratic map to R2\mathbb R^2R2 is convex. Since SO(3)\mathrm{SO}(3)SO(3) is the image of the 3-sphere under a quadratic map (quaternions), this gives the case n=3n=3n=3.
  • 2015: Saunderson, Parrilo and Willsky describe conv⁡SO(n)\operatorname{conv}\mathrm{SO}(n)convSO(n) by linear matrix inequalities, using that π1(SO(n))=Z/2Z\pi_1(\mathrm{SO}(n))=\mathbb Z/2\mathbb Zπ1​(SO(n))=Z/2Z.
  • 2023–2024: Ramachandran, Shu and Wang prove convexity of all planar linear images for every n≥3n\ge 3n≥3. For n≥4n\ge 4n≥4 this does not follow from known quadratic convexity theorems (p.12).

Setting

SO(n)={X∈Rn×n:X⊤X=I, det⁡X=1}\mathrm{SO}(n)=\{X\in\mathbb R^{n\times n}: X^\top X=I,\ \det X=1\}SO(n)={X∈Rn×n:X⊤X=I, detX=1} is the group of rotations of Rn\mathbb R^nRn, with the subspace topology of Rn×n\mathbb R^{n\times n}Rn×n. The trace inner product is ⟨A,X⟩=tr⁡(A⊤X)=∑i,jAijXij\langle A,X\rangle=\operatorname{tr}(A^\top X)=\sum_{i,j}A_{ij}X_{ij}⟨A,X⟩=tr(A⊤X)=∑i,j​Aij​Xij​. For A∈Rn×nA\in\mathbb R^{n\times n}A∈Rn×n and c∈Rc\in\mathbb Rc∈R, the hyperplane section is SO(n)∩{X:⟨A,X⟩=c}\mathrm{SO}(n)\cap\{X:\langle A,X\rangle=c\}SO(n)∩{X:⟨A,X⟩=c}.

A set is connected if it cannot be split into two nonempty, disjoint, relatively closed pieces; the empty set is connected (p.16). The fundamental group π1(X,x)\pi_1(X,x)π1​(X,x) consists of loops at xxx up to homotopy fixing the base point. The punctured plane is R2∖(0,0)\mathbb R^2\setminus(0,0)R2∖(0,0), with base point (0,−1)(0,-1)(0,−1) and standard loop σ(t)=(sin⁡2πt,−cos⁡2πt)\sigma(t)=(\sin 2\pi t,-\cos 2\pi t)σ(t)=(sin2πt,−cos2πt), which winds once anticlockwise around the origin.

For k=⌊n/2⌋k=\lfloor n/2\rfloork=⌊n/2⌋, R(θ1,…,θk)R(\theta_1,\dots,\theta_k)R(θ1​,…,θk​) is the block-diagonal matrix with 2×22\times22×2 rotation blocks (cos⁡θisin⁡θi−sin⁡θicos⁡θi)\begin{pmatrix}\cos\theta_i&\sin\theta_i\\-\sin\theta_i&\cos\theta_i\end{pmatrix}(cosθi​−sinθi​​sinθi​cosθi​​), plus a trailing 111 when nnn is odd. The maximal torus T\mathbb TT is the set of these matrices.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 1 (p.12)

For every n≥3n\ge 3n≥3 and every linear map π:Rn×n→R2\pi:\mathbb R^{n\times n}\to\mathbb R^2π:Rn×n→R2,

π(SO(n)) is convex.\pi(\mathrm{SO}(n))\ \text{is convex}.π(SO(n)) is convex.

Milestones (in proof order)

  1. π1(R2∖(0,0),(0,−1))≅Z\pi_1(\mathbb R^2\setminus(0,0),(0,-1))\cong\mathbb Zπ1​(R2∖(0,0),(0,−1))≅Z, with [σ]↦1[\sigma]\mapsto 1[σ]↦1 (p.13, cited).
  2. π1(SO(n),I)≅Z/2Z\pi_1(\mathrm{SO}(n),I)\cong\mathbb Z/2\mathbb Zπ1​(SO(n),I)≅Z/2Z for n≥3n\ge 3n≥3 (p.13, cited).
  3. Lemma 3. Let n≥3n\ge3n≥3, f:SO(n)→R2f:\mathrm{SO}(n)\to\mathbb R^2f:SO(n)→R2 be continuous, and γ\gammaγ be a loop with f∘γf\circ\gammaf∘γ avoiding the origin. If f∗(γ)f_*(\gamma)f∗​(γ) is not null-homotopic in R2∖(0,0)\mathbb R^2\setminus(0,0)R2∖(0,0), then (0,0)∈f(SO(n))(0,0)\in f(\mathrm{SO}(n))(0,0)∈f(SO(n)).
  4. Theorem 8. For every X∈SO(n)X\in\mathrm{SO}(n)X∈SO(n) there is U∈SO(n)U\in\mathrm{SO}(n)U∈SO(n) with U⊤XU=R(θ)U^\top XU=R(\theta)U⊤XU=R(θ), θi∈[0,2π)\theta_i\in[0,2\pi)θi​∈[0,2π).
  5. Lemma 4. For U,V∈H∩SO(n)U,V\in H\cap\mathrm{SO}(n)U,V∈H∩SO(n) there is a loop γ\gammaγ at UUU with γ(12)=V\gamma(\tfrac12)=Vγ(21​)=V. On (0,12)(0,\tfrac12)(0,21​), either ⟨A,γ⟩≡c\langle A,\gamma\rangle\equiv c⟨A,γ⟩≡c or ⟨A,γ⟩>c\langle A,\gamma\rangle>c⟨A,γ⟩>c. On (12,1)(\tfrac12,1)(21​,1), either ⟨A,γ⟩≡c\langle A,\gamma\rangle\equiv c⟨A,γ⟩≡c or ⟨A,γ⟩<c\langle A,\gamma\rangle<c⟨A,γ⟩<c.
  6. Theorem 3. For n≥3n\ge3n≥3, every hyperplane section SO(n)∩{⟨A,X⟩=c}\mathrm{SO}(n)\cap\{\langle A,X\rangle=c\}SO(n)∩{⟨A,X⟩=c} is connected.
  7. A subset of R2\mathbb R^2R2 is convex iff its intersection with every line is connected (p.12).

Significance

The result. Corollary 1 makes max⁡{⟨A,X⟩:X∈SO(n), ⟨B,X⟩∈[a,b]}\max\{\langle A,X\rangle: X\in\mathrm{SO}(n),\ \langle B,X\rangle\in[a,b]\}max{⟨A,X⟩:X∈SO(n), ⟨B,X⟩∈[a,b]} a convex problem in the plane: its value equals the value over conv⁡SO(n)\operatorname{conv}\mathrm{SO}(n)convSO(n). The paper turns this into an algorithm whose running time is O(n3log⁡2(1/ϵ))O(n^3\log^2(1/\epsilon))O(n3log2(1/ϵ)) (Theorem 4), close to the cost of one SVD. Theorem 3, the connectedness of hyperplane sections, is the statement the convexity rests on. The paper also shows the result is sharp in the target dimension: linear images in R3\mathbb R^3R3 need not be convex (Lemma 13).

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper, but none is formalized. A complete development would give a machine-checked bridge from algebraic topology (π1\pi_1π1​ of SO(n)\mathrm{SO}(n)SO(n) and of the punctured plane) to an optimization statement. The two cited fundamental-group facts are not available in this form on the platform: the closest proved statement is π1\pi_1π1​ of the circle (AlgebraicTopology.fundamentalGroup_circle_equiv_int, on AddCircle), and nothing is known there about π1(SO(n))\pi_1(\mathrm{SO}(n))π1​(SO(n)).

Difficulty

Connectedness of SO(n)\mathrm{SO}(n)SO(n) gives convexity of linear images in R1\mathbb R^1R1 directly. For R2\mathbb R^2R2 one needs connectedness of every hyperplane section. The obvious attempt is to connect two points of a section by a path in the section, and it fails: no explicit path is available, and the section is a singular real-algebraic set in general.

The paper argues by contradiction. A disconnection would give a map f:SO(n)→R2f:\mathrm{SO}(n)\to\mathbb R^2f:SO(n)→R2 that misses the origin, while a loop built from Lemma 4 has an image winding once around it. This is impossible because doubled loops in SO(n)\mathrm{SO}(n)SO(n) are contractible (π1=Z/2Z\pi_1=\mathbb Z/2\mathbb Zπ1​=Z/2Z, n≥3n\ge3n≥3). The hard parts of a formalization are:

  • the fundamental group of SO(n)\mathrm{SO}(n)SO(n), which needs a fibration SO(n)→Sn−1\mathrm{SO}(n)\to S^{n-1}SO(n)→Sn−1 or a spin double cover;
  • winding numbers in the punctured plane;
  • the explicit torus loop of Lemma 4.

The proof of Lemma 4 on p.15 assumes UUU and VVV lie in a common torus. Moving UUU to III first and then conjugating VVV into T\mathbb TT (Theorem 8) repairs it. The statement is unchanged.

Formalization scope

  • SO(n)\mathrm{SO}(n)SO(n) is Mathlib's Matrix.specialOrthogonalGroup (Fin n) ℝ, with the subspace topology of Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ and 0-based indices.
  • ⟨A,X⟩\langle A,X\rangle⟨A,X⟩ is the published definition WainwrightHDS.NucNorm.traceInner, ∑i,jAijXij\sum_{i,j}A_{ij}X_{ij}∑i,j​Aij​Xij​.
  • R2\mathbb R^2R2 is ℝ × ℝ, and the punctured plane is {p : ℝ × ℝ // p ≠ 0}.
  • "Connected" is IsPreconnected, the paper's own definition. It is needed because sections can be empty (for example A=0A=0A=0, c=1c=1c=1).
  • Loops are Mathlib Paths, and equivalence of loops is Path.Homotopic (homotopy rel endpoints). The literal p.13 definition omits the endpoint condition, and would make every two loops in a path-connected space equivalent.
  • The map π\piπ in Corollary 1 is any ℝ-linear map on all of Rn×n\mathbb R^{n\times n}Rn×n, restricted to SO(n)\mathrm{SO}(n)SO(n).
  • R(θ)R(\theta)R(θ) is HiddenConvexSO.torusMat n θ, with θ : Fin (n / 2) → ℝ.

The hypothesis n≥3n\ge 3n≥3 is kept wherever the paper has it. For n=2n=2n=2 both Corollary 1 and Theorem 3 are false: SO(2)\mathrm{SO}(2)SO(2) is a circle. The goal is about SO(n)\mathrm{SO}(n)SO(n) itself, not O(n)\mathrm{O}(n)O(n) or conv⁡SO(n)\operatorname{conv}\mathrm{SO}(n)convSO(n); replacing it by its convex hull would make the statement trivial.

Welcome contributions:

  • proofs of the two fundamental-group facts, which are reusable well beyond this mission;
  • the real normal form of rotations (Theorem 8);
  • the elementary line criterion for planar convexity;
  • the path constructions of Lemma 4.

Selected references

  • A. Ramachandran, K. Shu, A. L. Wang, Hidden convexity, optimization, and algorithms on rotation matrices, arXiv:2304.08596v2, 2024; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.08596v2
  • L. Brickman, On the field of values of a matrix, Proceedings of the AMS 12 (1961) 61–66. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9939-1961-0122827-1
  • A. Horn, Doubly stochastic matrices and the diagonal of a rotation matrix, American Journal of Mathematics 76 (1954) 620–630. https://doi.org/10.2307/2372705
  • J. Saunderson, P. A. Parrilo, A. S. Willsky, Semidefinite descriptions of the convex hull of rotation matrices, SIAM Journal on Optimization 25 (2015) 1314–1343. https://doi.org/10.1137/14096339X
  • A. Hatcher, Algebraic Topology, Cambridge University Press, 2002. https://pi.math.cornell.edu/~hatcher/AT/ATpage.html
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Control TheoryOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: iris

A Mean-Field Control Problem of Optimal Portfolio Liquidation with Semimartingale Strategies: The Value Function Is Linear-Quadratic in the State's Law and the Optimal Strategy Jumps Only at t and TResearch Paper

Motivation

A large investor who must sell a position of x0x_0x0​ shares by a deadline TTT moves the price against their own position: every sale depresses the price, and the depression decays only gradually. Optimal liquidation models this trade-off between trading fast (incurring impact) and trading slowly (bearing inventory risk), and it is a standard problem in market microstructure and algorithmic trading (Almgren and Chriss, 2001; Obizhaeva and Wang, 2013).

Fu, Horst and Xia (arXiv:2207.00446v3) add two features. First, the investor's trades trigger a flow of child orders from other market participants, so the expected child-order flow, a function of the law of the investor's own state, feeds back into the price: the problem is a mean-field control problem. Second, the investor may use any càdlàg semimartingale strategy, so block trades and infinite-variation trading are both allowed. Earlier work on transient impact with general semimartingale strategies (Lorenz and Schied, 2013, and the references in Section 1 of the paper) did not include the mean-field feedback.

Setting

Time runs over [0,T][0,T][0,T]. A Brownian motion WWW and an independent square-integrable initial position x0x_0x0​ generate the filtration F\mathbb FF. A strategy ZZZ is the cumulative number of shares sold; it belongs to the admissible class At\mathscr A_tAt​ if it is a càdlàg F\mathbb FF-semimartingale started at time ttt (so Zt−=0Z_{t-}=0Zt−​=0) with E[[Z]T]<∞\mathbb E[[Z]_T]<\inftyE[[Z]T​]<∞ and E[sup⁡t≤s≤TZs2]<∞\mathbb E[\sup_{t\le s\le T}Z_s^2]<\inftyE[supt≤s≤T​Zs2​]<∞.

The state X=(X,Y,C)\mathcal X=(X,Y,C)X=(X,Y,C) consists of the inventory XXX, the price impact YYY and the expected child-order flow CCC:

dXs=−dZs,dYs=(−ρYs+γ1Cs′) ds+γ2 dZs+σs dWs,dCs=−(β−α)Cs ds+α(E[x0]−E[Xs]) ds,dX_s=-dZ_s,\quad dY_s=(-\rho Y_s+\gamma_1C'_s)\,ds+\gamma_2\,dZ_s+\sigma_s\,dW_s,\quad dC_s=-(\beta-\alpha)C_s\,ds+\alpha(\mathbb E[x_0]-\mathbb E[X_s])\,ds,dXs​=−dZs​,dYs​=(−ρYs​+γ1​Cs′​)ds+γ2​dZs​+σs​dWs​,dCs​=−(β−α)Cs​ds+α(E[x0​]−E[Xs​])ds,

started from a random state X=(Xt−,Yt−,Ct−)\mathcal X=(X_{t-},Y_{t-},C_{t-})X=(Xt−​,Yt−​,Ct−​) at time ttt, with the liquidation constraint XT=0X_T=0XT​=0. The volatility σ\sigmaσ is any progressively measurable square-integrable process; it may vanish. The cost is

J(t,Z)=E[∫tT(Ys− dZs+γ22 d[Z]s+σs d[Z,W]s)+∫tTλXs2 ds],J(t,Z)=\mathbb E\Big[\int_t^T\big(Y_{s-}\,dZ_s+\tfrac{\gamma_2}{2}\,d[Z]_s+\sigma_s\,d[Z,W]_s\big)+\int_t^T\lambda X_s^2\,ds\Big],J(t,Z)=E[∫tT​(Ys−​dZs​+2γ2​​d[Z]s​+σs​d[Z,W]s​)+∫tT​λXs2​ds],

including the jump at ttt, and the value function is V(t,X)=inf⁡ZJ(t,Z)V(t,\mathcal X)=\inf_{Z}J(t,Z)V(t,X)=infZ​J(t,Z). The six coefficients satisfy the standing assumption: γ1,γ2,α,β,ρ,λ≥0\gamma_1,\gamma_2,\alpha,\beta,\rho,\lambda\ge0γ1​,γ2​,α,β,ρ,λ≥0, β−α>0\beta-\alpha>0β−α>0 and a:=γ2ρ−γ1α+λ>0a:=\gamma_2\rho-\gamma_1\alpha+\lambda>0a:=γ2​ρ−γ1​α+λ>0; also a~:=γ2ρ+λ\tilde a:=\gamma_2\rho+\lambdaa~:=γ2​ρ+λ.

The value is described by deterministic coefficients: symmetric matrices At,BtA_t,B_tAt​,Bt​ solving the backward ODE systems (2.14) and (2.15) (the latter a coupled Riccati system), a vector DtD_tDt​ solving the linear system (2.16), and an adapted process FFF solving the linear BSDE (2.17). For a law μ\muμ with mean μˉ\bar\muμˉ​, Var⁡(μ)(A)=∫(x−μˉ)⊤A(x−μˉ) μ(dx)\operatorname{Var}(\mu)(A)=\int(x-\bar\mu)^\top A(x-\bar\mu)\,\mu(dx)Var(μ)(A)=∫(x−μˉ​)⊤A(x−μˉ​)μ(dx).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.3

Under the standing assumption, if λ=0\lambda=0λ=0, or λργ2>0\lambda\rho\gamma_2>0λργ2​>0 and α<α0\alpha<\alpha_0α<α0​ for a threshold α0\alpha_0α0​ depending only on (γ1,γ2,ρ,λ,β)(\gamma_1,\gamma_2,\rho,\lambda,\beta)(γ1​,γ2​,ρ,λ,β), then the coefficients exist and for every t∈[0,T)t\in[0,T)t∈[0,T) and every initial state X\mathcal XX with law μ\muμ,

V(t,X)=Var⁡(μ)(At)+μˉ⊤Btμˉ+Dt⊤μˉ+E[Ft],V(t,\mathcal X)=\operatorname{Var}(\mu)(A_t)+\bar\mu^\top B_t\bar\mu+D_t^\top\bar\mu+\mathbb E[F_t],V(t,X)=Var(μ)(At​)+μˉ​⊤Bt​μˉ​+Dt⊤​μˉ​+E[Ft​],

and the optimal strategy jumps only at ttt and TTT, with the explicit initial jump (2.21), terminal jump XT−X_{T-}XT−​, and the dynamics (2.22) in between.

Milestones

  1. Well-posedness of the coefficients: (2.14) (p.9); the matrix Riccati form (3.1) and its shift (3.2) (p.12); positive semidefiniteness of M~\tilde{\mathcal M}M~ (pp.12–15); the standard matrix Riccati theorem of Kohlmann and Tang (p.15); Theorem 3.1 and Remark 3.2; the linear system (2.16) and the BSDE (2.17) (p.10).
  2. Verification: the algebraic relations (4.8); the four completion-of-squares identities (p.20); Itô's formula for X⊤AX\mathcal X^\top A\mathcal XX⊤AX (p.17); Proposition 4.1 (the cost is two squares plus the value); admissibility of the candidate strategy; Theorem 4.2 (both squares vanish along it).

Significance

The theorem gives a closed form for the value of a mean-field control problem with singular, possibly infinite-variation controls: it is linear-quadratic in the law of the initial state, so the problem is time-consistent at the level of laws, and the optimal strategy consists of two block trades plus an absolutely continuous part driven by the noise. It shows that the bracket terms in the cost make the problem well posed over all semimartingale strategies.

The result is proved in the paper; nothing in it has a machine-checked proof. The mission produces a formal model of trading with semimartingale strategies and a mean-field state, statements of the Riccati well-posedness results, and a verification argument. Three printed slips are corrected in the statements: a missing factor 222 in (2.16) (without it, the identity on p.20 fails and the printed formula gives the wrong value), the terminal matrix in (3.1), and the class of the BSDE solution in (2.17).

Difficulty

The obvious route to well-posedness of (2.15), standard Riccati theory, fails: in the matrix form (3.1) the constant term M\mathcal MM is not positive semidefinite. The paper shifts the unknown by a rank-one matrix Λ~\tilde\LambdaΛ~ and must find Λ>0\Lambda>0Λ>0 with M~⪰0\tilde{\mathcal M}\succeq0M~⪰0; this works only for small α\alphaα when λ>0\lambda>0λ>0, through a case analysis of a quadratic in Λ\LambdaΛ.

The verification step needs Itô's formula with jumps for a semimartingale state, the continuous part of its bracket, and careful bookkeeping of the jumps at ttt and TTT. The candidate strategy is defined through a linear McKean–Vlasov equation, so even its existence is a claim.

Formalization scope

Time is R≥0\mathbb R_{\ge0}R≥0​, as in the reused KurtzProtter91 and EthierKurtz definitions; strategies vanish before ttt and only [0,T][0,T][0,T] matters. The state is Fin 3 → ℝ in the order (X,Y,C)(X,Y,C)(X,Y,C). The cost writes the initial jump explicitly (Yt−Zt+γ22Zt2Y_{t-}Z_t+\frac{\gamma_2}2Z_t^2Yt−​Zt​+2γ2​​Zt2​), since a left limit at time 000 equals the value there; dropping it would make a block trade at ttt free. ∫σ d[Z,W]\int\sigma\,d[Z,W]∫σd[Z,W] is the bracket [Z,∫σ dW][Z,\int\sigma\,dW][Z,∫σdW], and ∫σ dW\int\sigma\,dW∫σdW is characterized by its brackets because σ\sigmaσ is only progressive. The value is an infimum in EReal, so no boundedness is presupposed, and the liquidation constraint XT=0X_T=0XT​=0 is part of the feasible set. The filtration adjoins σ(x0)\sigma(x_0)σ(x0​) at time 000. The threshold α0\alpha_0α0​ is quantified before the horizon and the random data. The BSDE solution is sought among integrable FFF with a true-martingale stochastic integral; square integrability, as printed, fails in general.

Reusable parts: the Itô-integral characterization, the clipped path and continuous bracket, and the standard matrix Riccati theorem for any dimension. Contributions are welcome on the ODE milestones, which need only real analysis, and on Itô's formula with jumps, which would serve other missions.

Selected references

  • G. Fu, U. Horst, X. Xia, A Mean-Field Control Problem of Optimal Portfolio Liquidation with Semimartingale Strategies, arXiv:2207.00446v3, 2023; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.00446v3
  • M. Kohlmann, S. Tang, Multidimensional backward stochastic Riccati equations and applications, SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization 41(6):1696–1721, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0363012900378760
  • P. Protter, Stochastic Integration and Differential Equations, 2nd ed., Springer, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-10061-5
  • C. Lorenz, A. Schied, Drift dependence of optimal trade execution strategies under transient price impact, Finance and Stochastics 17 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00780-013-0207-z
  • R. Almgren, N. Chriss, Optimal execution of portfolio transactions, Journal of Risk 3 (2001). https://doi.org/10.21314/JOR.2001.041
  • A. Obizhaeva, J. Wang, Optimal trading strategy and supply/demand dynamics, Journal of Financial Markets 16 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.finmar.2012.09.001
24 thms2 active usersReviewed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningReinforcement Learning+1·Captain: iris

Foundations of Reinforcement Learning XII: E2D Regret Is at Most the Decision-Estimation Coefficient Times T Plus γ·EstSqTextbook

Why the Decision-Estimation Coefficient

In a structured bandit a learner repeatedly picks a decision πt\pi^tπt from a possibly huge or continuous set Π\PiΠ and observes a noisy reward with mean f⋆(πt)f^\star(\pi^t)f⋆(πt), where f⋆f^\starf⋆ belongs to a known class F\mathcal FF of functions Π→R\Pi\to\mathbb RΠ→R. The optimal regret depends on F\mathcal FF in ways that are hard to predict: optimism (UCB) and posterior sampling are optimal for some classes and badly suboptimal for others, such as the "cheating code" example of §4.1 in the notes. The Decision-Estimation Coefficient (DEC) of Foster, Kakade, Qian and Rakhlin (arXiv:2112.13487) is one complexity measure that controls the regret of a single generic algorithm, Estimation-to-Decisions (E2D), for every class at once. Lower bounds in terms of the same quantity are proved later in the notes.

This mission is volume XII of the formalization of Foster and Rakhlin's lecture notes Foundations of Reinforcement Learning and Interactive Decision Making (arXiv:2312.16730v1). It covers §4.2 (the DEC and the E2D regret bound), §4.4.1 (E2D with confidence sets and the connection to UCB), §4.5 (contexts) and §4.6 (reference models outside the convex hull).

Setting

Fix a measurable decision space Π\PiΠ and a class F⊆{f:Π→R}\mathcal F\subseteq\{f:\Pi\to\mathbb R\}F⊆{f:Π→R} containing f⋆f^\starf⋆ (realizability). Every f∈Ff\in\mathcal Ff∈F is measurable and has a maximizer πf\pi_fπf​. Write Δ(Π)\Delta(\Pi)Δ(Π) for the probability measures on Π\PiΠ. For a reference model f^:Π→R\hat f:\Pi\to\mathbb Rf^​:Π→R and a scale γ≥0\gamma\ge 0γ≥0,

decγ(F,f^)=inf⁡p∈Δ(Π) sup⁡f∈F Eπ∼p[f(πf)−f(π)−γ (f(π)−f^(π))2],\mathrm{dec}_\gamma(\mathcal F,\hat f)=\inf_{p\in\Delta(\Pi)}\ \sup_{f\in\mathcal F}\ \mathbb E_{\pi\sim p}\Big[f(\pi_f)-f(\pi)-\gamma\,(f(\pi)-\hat f(\pi))^2\Big],decγ​(F,f^​)=p∈Δ(Π)inf​ f∈Fsup​ Eπ∼p​[f(πf​)−f(π)−γ(f(π)−f^​(π))2],

and decγ(F)=sup⁡f^∈co(F)decγ(F,f^)\mathrm{dec}_\gamma(\mathcal F)=\sup_{\hat f\in\mathrm{co}(\mathcal F)}\mathrm{dec}_\gamma(\mathcal F,\hat f)decγ​(F)=supf^​∈co(F)​decγ​(F,f^​), where co(F)\mathrm{co}(\mathcal F)co(F) is the set of finite convex combinations of elements of F\mathcal FF. The first term is the regret of a decision. The second rewards decisions that tell fff apart from the guess f^\hat ff^​.

An online regression oracle (Definition 7) returns at each round an estimate f^t\hat f^tf^​t such that, with probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ, ∑t=1TEπt∼pt(f^t(πt)−f⋆(πt))2≤EstSq(F,T,δ)\sum_{t=1}^T\mathbb E_{\pi^t\sim p^t}(\hat f^t(\pi^t)-f^\star(\pi^t))^2\le\mathrm{Est}_{\mathsf{Sq}}(\mathcal F,T,\delta)∑t=1T​Eπt∼pt​(f^​t(πt)−f⋆(πt))2≤EstSq​(F,T,δ). E2D plays at round ttt a distribution ptp^tpt that attains the infimum in decγ(F,f^t)\mathrm{dec}_\gamma(\mathcal F,\hat f^t)decγ​(F,f^​t). Its regret is Reg=∑t=1TEπt∼pt[f⋆(πf⋆)−f⋆(πt)]\mathrm{Reg}=\sum_{t=1}^T\mathbb E_{\pi^t\sim p^t}[f^\star(\pi_{f^\star})-f^\star(\pi^t)]Reg=∑t=1T​Eπt∼pt​[f⋆(πf⋆​)−f⋆(πt)].

In Lean the decision space is a type D with a MeasurableSpace. dec γ F fhat is the infimum over ProbabilityMeasure D of decGame, the supremum over F of decObjective. decHull is decγ(F)\mathrm{dec}_\gamma(\mathcal F)decγ​(F), and decSup is the supremum over all measurable reference models.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 13, corrected

With probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ,

Reg≤sup⁡f^:Π→Rdecγ(F,f^)⋅T+γ⋅EstSq(F,T,δ)\mathrm{Reg}\le\sup_{\hat f:\Pi\to\mathbb R}\mathrm{dec}_\gamma(\mathcal F,\hat f)\cdot T+\gamma\cdot\mathrm{Est}_{\mathsf{Sq}}(\mathcal F,T,\delta)Reg≤f^​:Π→Rsup​decγ​(F,f^​)⋅T+γ⋅EstSq​(F,T,δ)

for every Π\PiΠ and F\mathcal FF. If in addition Π\PiΠ is finite, or F\mathcal FF is a finite class of bounded functions, then

Reg≤decγ(F)⋅T+γ⋅EstSq(F,T,δ),\mathrm{Reg}\le\mathrm{dec}_\gamma(\mathcal F)\cdot T+\gamma\cdot\mathrm{Est}_{\mathsf{Sq}}(\mathcal F,T,\delta),Reg≤decγ​(F)⋅T+γ⋅EstSq​(F,T,δ),

which is (4.17) as printed. The printed (4.17), with no finiteness condition, is false. For Π=N\Pi=\mathbb NΠ=N and F={fi}i≥1\mathcal F=\{f_i\}_{i\ge1}F={fi​}i≥1​ with fi(π)=1{π≥i}f_i(\pi)=\mathbb 1\{\pi\ge i\}fi​(π)=1{π≥i}, the zero reference model has DEC 111 while every element of co(F)\mathrm{co}(\mathcal F)co(F) has DEC at most 000 for γ≥1\gamma\ge1γ≥1, and an E2D run can have regret TTT. The first display is the last line of the proof on p. 66 and needs no finiteness.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 24 (p. 80), corrected in the same way: if Π\PiΠ is finite or F\mathcal FF is a finite class of bounded functions, sup⁡f^decγ(F,f^)=sup⁡f^∈co(F)decγ(F,f^)\sup_{\hat f}\mathrm{dec}_\gamma(\mathcal F,\hat f)=\sup_{\hat f\in\mathrm{co}(\mathcal F)}\mathrm{dec}_\gamma(\mathcal F,\hat f)supf^​​decγ​(F,f^​)=supf^​∈co(F)​decγ​(F,f^​).
  2. Proposition 19 (p. 76): E2D with confidence sets Ft\mathcal F^tFt of radius β=EstSq\beta=\mathrm{Est}_{\mathsf{Sq}}β=EstSq​ has Reg≤∑tdecγ(Ft)+γ EstSq\mathrm{Reg}\le\sum_t\mathrm{dec}_\gamma(\mathcal F^t)+\gamma\,\mathrm{Est}_{\mathsf{Sq}}Reg≤∑t​decγ​(Ft)+γEstSq​, with the same two-part correction.
  3. Proposition 20 (p. 76): the UCB decision certifies dec0(Ft)≤fˉt(πt)−f‾t(πt)\mathrm{dec}_0(\mathcal F^t)\le\bar f^t(\pi^t)-\underline f^t(\pi^t)dec0​(Ft)≤fˉ​t(πt)−f​t(πt), the confidence width.
  4. Proposition 21 (p. 77): for γ>0\gamma>0γ>0, the UCB decision certifies decγ(Ft,f^t)≤fˉt(πt)−f^t(πt)+14γ\mathrm{dec}_\gamma(\mathcal F^t,\hat f^t)\le\bar f^t(\pi^t)-\hat f^t(\pi^t)+\frac1{4\gamma}decγ​(Ft,f^​t)≤fˉ​t(πt)−f^​t(πt)+4γ1​.
  5. Proposition 23 (p. 79): contextual E2D has Reg≤sup⁡xdecγ(F(x,⋅))⋅T+γ EstSq\mathrm{Reg}\le\sup_{x}\mathrm{dec}_\gamma(\mathcal F(x,\cdot))\cdot T+\gamma\,\mathrm{Est}_{\mathsf{Sq}}Reg≤supx​decγ​(F(x,⋅))⋅T+γEstSq​, with the same correction applied context by context.

Significance

Proposition 13 reduces interactive decision making to online estimation. Any bound on the DEC of a class becomes a regret bound for E2D with any oracle. The notes use this to recover ATlog⁡∣F∣\sqrt{AT\log|\mathcal F|}ATlog∣F∣​ regret for multi-armed bandits from the inverse-gap-weighting solution of the DEC (Proposition 14, proved on the platform as FoundationsRL.Structured.igw_minimizes_dec_v2) and dTlog⁡∣F∣\sqrt{dT\log|\mathcal F|}dTlog∣F∣​ for linear bandits (Proposition 17, open on the platform). Propositions 19 to 21 place UCB inside the same framework, and Proposition 23 recovers SquareCB as the special case F=RA\mathcal F=\mathbb R^AF=RA.

An earlier platform statement of Proposition 13 (FoundationsRL.Structured.e2d_regret_bound) was proved but has been retired. It assumed Π\PiΠ finite and the estimates in co(F)\mathrm{co}(\mathcal F)co(F), which is weaker than the result in the notes. This mission states the general result, and it records the counterexample showing where the printed form needs a finiteness condition. The definitions here work in EReal and ℝ≥0∞ on a general measurable Π\PiΠ, so later volumes can reuse them for infinite decision spaces.

Difficulty

The per-round inequality behind Proposition 13 is close to the definition. The work lies elsewhere. First, the oracle event is stated pathwise and the conclusion is a probability bound, so the sum has to be carried through extended-real arithmetic in which ∞−∞\infty-\infty∞−∞ can occur. Second, for the convex-hull form one needs Proposition 24, which is a minimax argument. Exercise 10 suggests Sion's theorem (Lemma 41). It needs one player's strategy set to be compact, which holds for Δ(Π)\Delta(\Pi)Δ(Π) when Π\PiΠ is finite and for Δ(F)\Delta(\mathcal F)Δ(F) when F\mathcal FF is finite, and it fails for the infinite example above. The obvious idea of moving any f^\hat ff^​ to its projection onto co(F)\mathrm{co}(\mathcal F)co(F) does not work pointwise in ppp: the projection depends on the max player's mixed strategy, which is why the min and max must be exchanged first.

Formalization scope

  • Δ(Π) is MeasureTheory.ProbabilityMeasure D. Expectations of the regret and of the squared error are lintegrals in [0, ∞], combined in EReal. When the regret term is finite and the squared error is infinite, the value is −∞-\infty−∞, as in the notes. The undefined case ∞−∞\infty-\infty∞−∞ is scored −∞-\infty−∞.
  • min/max in (4.15) are read inf/sup. E2D's ptp^tpt is any distribution attaining the infimum (IsE2DChoice).
  • The oracle guarantee is a lower bound on the (outer) probability of the event that the cumulative squared error is at most est. The processes ptp^tpt, f^t\hat f^tf^​t (and contexts xtx^txt) are arbitrary functions of the outcome, which covers the adaptive protocol of the notes.
  • Rounds are indexed 0,…,T−10,\dots,T-10,…,T−1. Reference models in decSup are measurable.
  • The finiteness condition is HasFiniteGame F: Finite D, or F finite with bounded members.
  • A trivializing reading is excluded: the estimates are not assumed to lie in co(F)\mathrm{co}(\mathcal F)co(F), and Π\PiΠ is not assumed finite in the first conjunct.

Useful contributions include a proof of the pathwise bound (a sanity file shows conjunct (a) of the goal from it), Sion's minimax theorem in the form needed for Proposition 24 (FamousTheorems.sion_minimax_theorem is proved on the platform), and lemmas on lintegral against point masses for Propositions 20 and 21.

Selected references

  • D. J. Foster, A. Rakhlin, Foundations of Reinforcement Learning and Interactive Decision Making, lecture notes, 2023. arXiv:2312.16730v1
  • D. J. Foster, S. M. Kakade, J. Qian, A. Rakhlin, The Statistical Complexity of Interactive Decision Making, 2021. arXiv:2112.13487
  • D. J. Foster, A. Rakhlin, Beyond UCB: Optimal and Efficient Contextual Bandits with Regression Oracles, ICML 2020. arXiv:2002.04926
  • M. Sion, On general minimax theorems, Pacific Journal of Mathematics 8(1), 1958. doi:10.2140/pjm.1958.8.171
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Markov ChainOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Improving Blockchain Consistency by Assigning Weights to Random Blocks: Ironclad's Normalized Minimal Adversarial Mining-Power Requirement Strictly Exceeds Nakamoto's (R > 1)Research Paper

Motivation

Proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin keep a ledger consistent only while the honest parties hold enough mining power relative to an adversary. Network delay erodes that margin: when two honest blocks are mined within the delay bound Δ\DeltaΔ, honest parties extend different chains, and an adversary can exploit the fork. The consistency bound of a protocol is the minimal fraction of mining power an adversary needs to break consistency, and analyses of Nakamoto's protocol in the Δ\DeltaΔ-synchronous model (Garay, Kiayias and Leonardos, ePrint 2014/765; Pass, Seeman and shelat, ePrint 2016/454; Kiffer, Rajaraman and shelat, CCS 2018) show that this bound degrades as the block rate grows relative to 1/Δ1/\Delta1/Δ.

Zhang, Gong, Li, Wu and Zhang (arXiv:2107.10467v2, 2021; later in Operations Research) propose Ironclad: each newly mined block is, independently with probability qqq, an iron block of weight θ\thetaθ, while regular blocks weigh 111, and honest parties follow the heaviest chain instead of the longest. Their main quantitative result, Theorem 3.2, says that after normalizing by the mean block weight this always raises the mining power an adversary needs. The proof is a Markov renewal analysis of a three-state chain driven by an i.i.d. symbol string, which is the part this mission formalizes.

Setting

Time is divided into slots t=0,1,2,…t=0,1,2,\dotst=0,1,2,…. The honest characteristic string w=(wt)w=(w_t)w=(wt​) has i.i.d. symbols in {0,h,H}\{0,h,H\}{0,h,H} with

Pr⁡(wt=h)=qh=(1−q)ph,Pr⁡(wt=H)=qH=qph,Pr⁡(wt=0)=1−ph,\Pr(w_t=h)=q_h=(1-q)p_h,\qquad \Pr(w_t=H)=q_H=qp_h,\qquad \Pr(w_t=0)=1-p_h,Pr(wt​=h)=qh​=(1−q)ph​,Pr(wt​=H)=qH​=qph​,Pr(wt​=0)=1−ph​,

where ph∈(0,1)p_h\in(0,1)ph​∈(0,1) is the probability that honest parties mine a block in a slot and q∈(0,1)q\in(0,1)q∈(0,1) the probability that a block is iron (Ironclad.Model).

Starting from the first nonzero symbol, www is cut greedily into characteristic patterns (Definition 3.1, Ironclad.Decomposition): σ1\sigma_1σ1​ is an hhh followed by fewer than Δ\DeltaΔ zeros before the next block, σ2\sigma_2σ2​ an hhh followed by at least Δ\DeltaΔ zeros, σ3\sigma_3σ3​ an HHH followed within Δ\DeltaΔ slots by another HHH, and σ4\sigma_4σ4​ an HHH with no other HHH in the next Δ\DeltaΔ slots, extended by the zeros that follow those slots. After σ2\sigma_2σ2​ or σ4\sigma_4σ4​ the system is in state S0S_0S0​ (a chance to agree), after σ1\sigma_1σ1​ in S1S_1S1​, after σ3\sigma_3σ3​ in S2S_2S2​. For a period of LLL slots, with #L(⋅)\#_L(\cdot)#L​(⋅) counting transitions inside the period,

αL=1L[#L(S0→σ2S0)−#L(S2→σ4S0→σ2S0)+θ(#L(S0→σ4S0)+#L(S1→σ4S0))]\alpha_L=\frac1L\Big[\#_L(S_0\xrightarrow{\sigma_2}S_0)-\#_L(S_2\xrightarrow{\sigma_4}S_0\xrightarrow{\sigma_2}S_0)+\theta\big(\#_L(S_0\xrightarrow{\sigma_4}S_0)+\#_L(S_1\xrightarrow{\sigma_4}S_0)\big)\Big]αL​=L1​[#L​(S0​σ2​​S0​)−#L​(S2​σ4​​S0​σ2​​S0​)+θ(#L​(S0​σ4​​S0​)+#L​(S1​σ4​​S0​))]

is the weight of agreement blocks per slot, the mining power an adversary needs in that period to break convergence. The minimal mining-power requirement is α=lim⁡LαL\alpha=\lim_L\alpha_Lα=limL​αL​; Nakamoto's protocol is the case q=0q=0q=0, with α0=ph(1−ph)2Δ\alpha_0=p_h(1-p_h)^{2\Delta}α0​=ph​(1−ph​)2Δ. The relative performance is

R=α/(θq+1−q)α0/1.\mathcal R=\frac{\alpha/(\theta q+1-q)}{\alpha_0/1}.R=α0​/1α/(θq+1−q)​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2

For all 0<ph<10<p_h<10<ph​<1, 0<q<10<q<10<q<1, integers Δ≥1\Delta\ge1Δ≥1 and θ≥1\theta\ge1θ≥1, αL\alpha_LαL​ converges almost surely to a constant α\alphaα and

R=α/(θq+1−q)ph(1−ph)2Δ>1.\mathcal R=\frac{\alpha/(\theta q+1-q)}{p_h(1-p_h)^{2\Delta}}>1.R=ph​(1−ph​)2Δα/(θq+1−q)​>1.

The goal fixes no parameter value and asserts the existence of the limit; it is stated for the almost-sure limit of αL\alpha_LαL​, not for the closed form.

Milestones, in proof order

  1. The pattern probabilities P(σi)\mathbb P(\sigma_i)P(σi​) and expected lengths E∣σi∣\mathbb E|\sigma_i|E∣σi​∣ (p.9, App. .1.1).
  2. Proposition 3.1: the states form a semi-Markov chain with transition matrix (3), whose embedded chain is ergodic.
  3. The expected edge lengths lijl_{ij}lij​ (App. .2.1) and the stationary distribution π\piπ (App. .2.2).
  4. The renewal limits #LSi/L→πi/∑jπjμj\#_LS_i/L\to\pi_i/\sum_j\pi_j\mu_j#L​Si​/L→πi​/∑j​πj​μj​ and the three edge-count limits of App. .2.3.
  5. Lemma 3.1: αL→α\alpha_L\to\alphaαL​→α almost surely, with α\alphaα given by a (π,P,μ)(\pi,P,\mu)(π,P,μ) expression equal to
α=1ph[(1−qH)Δ(qh2(1−ph)2Δ+qHqh(1−ph)Δ(1−qH)Δ+θphqH(1−qH)Δ)].(4)\alpha=\frac1{p_h}\Big[(1-q_H)^\Delta\big(q_h^2(1-p_h)^{2\Delta}+q_Hq_h(1-p_h)^\Delta(1-q_H)^\Delta+\theta p_hq_H(1-q_H)^\Delta\big)\Big].\tag{4}α=ph​1​[(1−qH​)Δ(qh2​(1−ph​)2Δ+qH​qh​(1−ph​)Δ(1−qH​)Δ+θph​qH​(1−qH​)Δ)].(4)
  1. R\mathcal RR in closed form, strictly increasing in θ\thetaθ (App. .2.6, p.32), and R>1\mathcal R>1R>1 at θ=1\theta=1θ=1 (p.33). The weighted power-mean inequality the paper cites there (Lemma .3) is included as the published platform theorem FamousTheorems.power_mean_inequality.

Significance

Theorem 3.2 is the paper's comparison between Ironclad and Nakamoto's protocol: it says that randomly weighting blocks never hurts the normalized consistency bound and strictly improves it for every positive iron-block probability, uniformly in the delay and in the honest block rate. The closed form (4) is also what the paper's later optimization of qqq (Section 4) starts from.

The result is proved on paper but has not been machine-checked. Two of its steps are claimed rather than written out: the two-step correction #L(S2→σ4S0→σ2S0)/L\#_L(S_2\xrightarrow{\sigma_4}S_0\xrightarrow{\sigma_2}S_0)/L#L​(S2​σ4​​S0​σ2​​S0​)/L is left as "computed similarly", and the identity 1/μii=πi/∑jπjμj1/\mu_{ii}=\pi_i/\sum_j\pi_j\mu_j1/μii​=πi​/∑j​πj​μj​ is cited from Ross's Stochastic Processes (the paper's [29]). A formal proof settles the encoding questions a reader has to resolve (the boundary case of σ3\sigma_3σ3​, the counting window of #L\#_L#L​), and the renewal-reward limits for a pattern-driven semi-Markov chain form a reusable component for other analyses of characteristic strings.

Difficulty

The algebra (Lemma 3.1's identity, the monotonicity in θ\thetaθ, the case θ=1\theta=1θ=1) is finite but heavy. The probabilistic half is the main obstacle. The patterns are not i.i.d.: a σ3\sigma_3σ3​ is always followed by an HHH, so the next pattern from S2S_2S2​ has a different law, and patterns overlap the window of Δ\DeltaΔ slots after an iron block. The obvious argument, a strong law of large numbers for the pattern counts, therefore does not apply: the counts are sums of dependent terms, the pattern boundaries are random times of the symbol string, and the limits are per slot rather than per pattern, so the random pattern lengths enter every rate. Mathlib has the strong law and finite Markov kernels but no renewal-reward theorem for semi-Markov processes.

Formalization scope

  • Symbols are the inductive type {0,h,H}\{0,h,H\}{0,h,H} with the discrete σ\sigmaσ-algebra. The string is a family w:N→Ω→{0,h,H}w:\mathbb N\to\Omega\to\{0,h,H\}w:N→Ω→{0,h,H} on an arbitrary probability space, assumed measurable, mutually independent and identically distributed with the law above; slot ttt is the paper's slot t+1t+1t+1. A satisfying instance under Measure.infinitePi is proved in a verification file.
  • σ3\sigma_3σ3​ uses k<Δk<\Deltak<Δ. Definition 3.1 prints k≤Δk\le\Deltak≤Δ, but the printed P(σ3)\mathbb P(\sigma_3)P(σ3​) and P(σ4)\mathbb P(\sigma_4)P(σ4​), and hence (4), hold only for k<Δk<\Deltak<Δ.
  • The decomposition starts at the first nonzero symbol in state S0S_0S0​. A transition is counted in a period of length LLL when its pattern lies in slots 0,…,L−10,\dots,L-10,…,L−1. This reproduces the paper's example α7=θ/7\alpha_7=\theta/7α7​=θ/7 for Figure 4, which is proved in a verification file. Boundary conventions change LαLL\alpha_LLαL​ by O(1)O(1)O(1).
  • Δ\DeltaΔ is a natural number and exponents are natural powers. The goal assumes θ≥1\theta\ge1θ≥1 in place of θ≥max⁡{θ‾,1}\theta\ge\max\{\underline\theta,1\}θ≥max{θ​,1}, because θ‾\underline\thetaθ​ (Eq. (7)) depends on an unfixed ϵ\epsilonϵ and every admissible θ\thetaθ is at least 111.
  • A formalization of the goal on the closed form (4) alone would make the goal pure algebra. It is ruled out: the goal's α\alphaα is the almost-sure limit of αL\alpha_LαL​.

Contributions are welcome on every milestone. The most reusable are a renewal-reward theorem for finite-state Markov renewal processes and the strong Markov property of i.i.d. sequences at pattern boundaries.

Selected references

  • Q. Zhang, X. Gong, H. Li, H. Wu, J. Zhang, Improving Blockchain Consistency by Assigning Weights to Random Blocks, arXiv:2107.10467v2, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.10467
  • J. Garay, A. Kiayias, N. Leonardos, The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol: Analysis and Applications, EUROCRYPT 2015. https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/765
  • R. Pass, L. Seeman, a. shelat, Analysis of the Blockchain Protocol in Asynchronous Networks, EUROCRYPT 2017. https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/454
  • L. Kiffer, R. Rajaraman, a. shelat, A Better Method to Analyze Blockchain Consistency, ACM CCS 2018. https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243814
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Dynamic ProgrammingMachine LearningReinforcement Learning·Captain: iris

Foundations of Reinforcement Learning XVII: LSVI-UCB Has Regret ≲Hd3Tlog⁡(HT/δ)log⁡(1+T/d)\lesssim H\sqrt{d^3 T\log(HT/\delta)\log(1+T/d)}≲Hd3Tlog(HT/δ)log(1+T/d)​ in Low-Rank MDPsTextbook

Reinforcement learning with large state spaces

In episodic reinforcement learning a learner interacts with an unknown Markov decision process for TTT episodes of HHH steps and is measured by its regret: the total shortfall of the value of the policies it plays against the value of an optimal policy. For tabular problems, where states and actions are few, optimism-based algorithms such as UCB-VI reach regret of order T\sqrt{T}T​ times a polynomial in the numbers of states SSS and actions AAA (Foster & Rakhlin, arXiv:2312.16730v1, Theorem 1, p. 90). Such bounds are useless when the state space is a robot's sensor readings or a game screen, where SSS is astronomically large or infinite.

Function approximation replaces SSS by the complexity of a model class. Linearity of the optimal value function alone is not enough: for the Linear-Q⋆Q^\starQ⋆ model every algorithm can be forced to have regret exponential in ddd or HHH (Weisz et al. 2021, arXiv:2010.01374; Wang et al. 2021, arXiv:2103.12690; Proposition 45 of the notes). The low-rank MDP, in which the transition kernel itself factors through known features, is the standard structural assumption under which sample-efficient learning is possible. Jin, Yang, Wang and Jordan introduced the algorithm LSVI-UCB for this model and proved regret O~(d3H3T)\tilde O(\sqrt{d^3H^3T})O~(d3H3T​) in their normalization (arXiv:1907.05388, COLT 2020). This mission formalizes the version of that result in §7.2 of Foster and Rakhlin's lecture notes, where rewards are normalized so that the return of an episode lies in [0,1][0,1][0,1].

Setting

An episodic MDP M=(S,A,{PhM}h=1H,{RhM}h=1H,d1)M=(\mathcal S,\mathcal A,\{P^M_h\}_{h=1}^H,\{R^M_h\}_{h=1}^H,d_1)M=(S,A,{PhM​}h=1H​,{RhM​}h=1H​,d1​) has a countable state space S\mathcal SS, an action space A\mathcal AA (any set), transition laws PhM(⋅∣s,a)P^M_h(\cdot\mid s,a)PhM​(⋅∣s,a), reward distributions RhM(s,a)R^M_h(s,a)RhM​(s,a) on R\mathbb RR, and an initial distribution d1d_1d1​. An episode draws s1∼d1s_1\sim d_1s1​∼d1​ and, for h=1,…,Hh=1,\dots,Hh=1,…,H, plays aha_hah​, receives rh∼RhM(sh,ah)r_h\sim R^M_h(s_h,a_h)rh​∼RhM​(sh​,ah​) and moves to sh+1∼PhM(⋅∣sh,ah)s_{h+1}\sim P^M_h(\cdot\mid s_h,a_h)sh+1​∼PhM​(⋅∣sh​,ah​). The Bellman operator acts on Q:S×A→RQ:\mathcal S\times\mathcal A\to\mathbb RQ:S×A→R by

[ThMQ](s,a)=E[rh∣s,a]+∑s′PhM(s′∣s,a)max⁡a′Q(s′,a′),[\mathcal T^M_hQ](s,a)=\mathbb E[r_h\mid s,a]+\sum_{s'}P^M_h(s'\mid s,a)\max_{a'}Q(s',a'),[ThM​Q](s,a)=E[rh​∣s,a]+s′∑​PhM​(s′∣s,a)a′max​Q(s′,a′),

the optimal value functions satisfy QhM,⋆=ThMQh+1M,⋆Q^{M,\star}_h=\mathcal T^M_hQ^{M,\star}_{h+1}QhM,⋆​=ThM​Qh+1M,⋆​ with QH+1M,⋆≡0Q^{M,\star}_{H+1}\equiv0QH+1M,⋆​≡0, and fM(π)f^M(\pi)fM(π) denotes the expected return of a policy π\piπ, with fM(πM)=Es1∼d1max⁡aQ1M,⋆(s1,a)f^M(\pi_M)=\mathbb E_{s_1\sim d_1}\max_aQ^{M,\star}_1(s_1,a)fM(πM​)=Es1​∼d1​​maxa​Q1M,⋆​(s1​,a) the optimal one.

A feature map ϕ:S×A→Rd\phi:\mathcal S\times\mathcal A\to\mathbb R^dϕ:S×A→Rd with ∥ϕ(s,a)∥≤1\|\phi(s,a)\|\le1∥ϕ(s,a)∥≤1 is known. MMM is a low-rank MDP if for unknown μhM:S→Rd\mu^M_h:\mathcal S\to\mathbb R^dμhM​:S→Rd and whM∈Rdw^M_h\in\mathbb R^dwhM​∈Rd

PhM(s′∣s,a)=⟨ϕ(s,a),μhM(s′)⟩,E[rh∣s,a]=⟨ϕ(s,a),whM⟩,P^M_h(s'\mid s,a)=\langle\phi(s,a),\mu^M_h(s')\rangle,\qquad\mathbb E[r_h\mid s,a]=\langle\phi(s,a),w^M_h\rangle,PhM​(s′∣s,a)=⟨ϕ(s,a),μhM​(s′)⟩,E[rh​∣s,a]=⟨ϕ(s,a),whM​⟩,

with ∥whM∥≤d\|w^M_h\|\le\sqrt d∥whM​∥≤d​, ∥∑s′∣μhM(s′)∣∥≤d\|\sum_{s'}|\mu^M_h(s')|\|\le\sqrt d∥∑s′​∣μhM​(s′)∣∥≤d​, and individual and cumulative rewards in [0,1][0,1][0,1].

LSVI-UCB with inputs R,ρ>0R,\rho>0R,ρ>0 runs, in each episode ttt, a backward pass h=H,…,1h=H,\dots,1h=H,…,1 with QˉH+1t≡0\bar Q^t_{H+1}\equiv0Qˉ​H+1t​≡0: it solves the constrained least-squares problem

θ^ht∈arg min⁡∥θ∥≤ρ∑i<t(⟨ϕ(shi,ahi),θ⟩−rhi−max⁡aQˉh+1t(sh+1i,a))2,\hat\theta^t_h\in\operatorname*{arg\,min}_{\|\theta\|\le\rho}\sum_{i<t}\Big(\langle\phi(s^i_h,a^i_h),\theta\rangle-r^i_h-\max_a\bar Q^t_{h+1}(s^i_{h+1},a)\Big)^2,θ^ht​∈∥θ∥≤ρargmin​i<t∑​(⟨ϕ(shi​,ahi​),θ⟩−rhi​−amax​Qˉ​h+1t​(sh+1i​,a))2,

forms Σht=∑i<tϕ(shi,ahi)ϕ(shi,ahi)⊤+I\Sigma^t_h=\sum_{i<t}\phi(s^i_h,a^i_h)\phi(s^i_h,a^i_h)^\top+IΣht​=∑i<t​ϕ(shi​,ahi​)ϕ(shi​,ahi​)⊤+I and the optimistic estimate Qˉht(s,a)={⟨ϕ(s,a),θ^ht⟩+R ∥ϕ(s,a)∥(Σht)−1}∧1\bar Q^t_h(s,a)=\{\langle\phi(s,a),\hat\theta^t_h\rangle+\sqrt R\,\|\phi(s,a)\|_{(\Sigma^t_h)^{-1}}\}\wedge1Qˉ​ht​(s,a)={⟨ϕ(s,a),θ^ht​⟩+R​∥ϕ(s,a)∥(Σht​)−1​}∧1, and then plays the greedy policy π^ht(s)∈arg⁡max⁡aQˉht(s,a)\hat\pi^t_h(s)\in\arg\max_a\bar Q^t_h(s,a)π^ht​(s)∈argmaxa​Qˉ​ht​(s,a). The regret is Reg=∑t=1TfM(πM)−fM(π^t)\mathrm{Reg}=\sum_{t=1}^Tf^M(\pi_M)-f^M(\hat\pi^t)Reg=∑t=1T​fM(πM​)−fM(π^t).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 46

There is a numerical c0c_0c0​ such that for every c≥c0c\ge c_0c≥c0​ there is CCC with: for every low-rank MDP, every TTT with HT≥2HT\ge2HT≥2 and every δ>0\delta>0δ>0, LSVI-UCB with R=c⋅d2log⁡(HT/δ)R=c\cdot d^2\log(HT/\delta)R=c⋅d2log(HT/δ) and ρ=2d\rho=2\sqrt dρ=2d​ satisfies, with probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ,

Reg≤C Hd3 Tlog⁡(HT/δ)log⁡(1+T/d).\mathrm{Reg}\le C\,H\sqrt{d^3\,T\log(HT/\delta)\log(1+T/d)}.Reg≤CHd3Tlog(HT/δ)log(1+T/d)​.

Two corrections to the printed (7.8). It has no condition on HHH and TTT; at H=T=1H=T=1H=T=1 it fails as δ↑1\delta\uparrow1δ↑1 (the bound tends to 000 while a greedy action can have regret 1/21/21/2), and HT≥2HT\ge2HT≥2 is the minimal correction. It also has one logarithm, while the proof (p. 137) gives R HdTlog⁡(1+T/d)\sqrt R\,H\sqrt{dT\log(1+T/d)}R​HdTlog(1+T/d)​, which carries two. The second logarithm cannot be dropped: with H=1H=1H=1, d=3d=3d=3, deterministic rewards and a tie-break among actions clipped at Qˉ=1\bar Q=1Qˉ​=1, there is an instance with Reg≍cTlog⁡Tlog⁡(2T)\mathrm{Reg}\asymp\sqrt{cT\log T\log(2T)}Reg≍cTlogTlog(2T)​, larger than the printed rate by log⁡T\sqrt{\log T}logT​.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 25 (p. 132): in a low-rank MDP, ThMQ=⟨ϕ,θQM⟩\mathcal T^M_hQ=\langle\phi,\theta^M_Q\rangleThM​Q=⟨ϕ,θQM​⟩ for every QQQ for which the backup is defined, QhM,πQ^{M,\pi}_hQhM,π​ is linear in ϕ\phiϕ for every policy, and ∥θQM∥≤2d\|\theta^M_Q\|\le2\sqrt d∥θQM​∥≤2d​ when QQQ takes values in [0,1][0,1][0,1].
  2. Lemma 26 (pp. 134–135): least squares over a finite class F\mathcal FF with fixed design and 111-sub-Gaussian outcomes indexed by a finite latent set GGG has in-sample error ≲log⁡(∣F∣∣G∣/δ)\lesssim\log(|\mathcal F||G|/\delta)≲log(∣F∣∣G∣/δ), uniformly over GGG.
  3. Lemma 11 (p. 45): the elliptic potential lemma, already proved on the platform in a more general form.
  4. Lemma 27 (p. 135): with probability 1−δ1-\delta1−δ, ∑i<t(Q^ht−ThMQˉh+1t)2(shi,ahi)≲d2log⁡(HT/δ)\sum_{i<t}(\hat Q^t_h-\mathcal T^M_h\bar Q^t_{h+1})^2(s^i_h,a^i_h)\lesssim d^2\log(HT/\delta)∑i<t​(Q^​ht​−ThM​Qˉ​h+1t​)2(shi​,ahi​)≲d2log(HT/δ) for all t,ht,ht,h.
  5. Lemma 28 (p. 136): on that event, ∣Q^ht−ThMQˉh+1t∣(s,a)≲d2log⁡(HT/δ) ∥ϕ(s,a)∥(Σht)−1|\hat Q^t_h-\mathcal T^M_h\bar Q^t_{h+1}|(s,a)\lesssim\sqrt{d^2\log(HT/\delta)}\,\|\phi(s,a)\|_{(\Sigma^t_h)^{-1}}∣Q^​ht​−ThM​Qˉ​h+1t​∣(s,a)≲d2log(HT/δ)​∥ϕ(s,a)∥(Σht​)−1​ and Qˉht≥QhM,⋆\bar Q^t_h\ge Q^{M,\star}_hQˉ​ht​≥QhM,⋆​ everywhere (with the same correction HT≥2HT\ge2HT≥2).

Significance

The proposition shows that the regret of optimistic value iteration depends on the feature dimension and the horizon only, not on the number of states or actions. It is the template for a long line of results on linear and low-rank MDPs, misspecified models and representation learning, and it is the step from linear bandits (LinUCB) and tabular reinforcement learning (UCB-VI) to reinforcement learning with function approximation.

The platform has a proved formalization of the misspecified variant of Jin et al.'s theorem (LinearMDPRL.Misspec.lsvi_ucb_misspecified_regret), with a different normalization (per-step rewards in [0,1][0,1][0,1], return up to HHH), deterministic rewards, finite action sets, a ridge-regression step and a different bonus. The notes' version differs in each of these: rewards are random, the return is normalized to [0,1][0,1][0,1], actions may be infinite, the regression is constrained to a ball, and the bound is Hd3Tlog⁡(HT/δ)log⁡(1+T/d)H\sqrt{d^3T\log(HT/\delta)\log(1+T/d)}Hd3Tlog(HT/δ)log(1+T/d)​. None of these statements follows from the other, and the uniform-convergence route of the notes (Lemma 26 and the class (7.10)) is not formalized anywhere.

Difficulty

The regression targets rhi+max⁡aQˉh+1t(sh+1i,a)r^i_h+\max_a\bar Q^t_{h+1}(s^i_{h+1},a)rhi​+maxa​Qˉ​h+1t​(sh+1i​,a) are built from Qˉh+1t\bar Q^t_{h+1}Qˉ​h+1t​, which depends on all past data, including the very samples being regressed on. A fixed-target least-squares bound (Proposition 1 of the notes) therefore does not apply. The notes resolve this by uniform convergence over the class (7.10) of all possible optimistic estimates, but Lemma 26 assumes a fixed design, while the design points ϕ(shi,ahi)\phi(s^i_h,a^i_h)ϕ(shi​,ahi​) of LSVI-UCB are collected adaptively; the proof sketch of Lemma 27 passes over this. A complete argument needs a martingale version of Lemma 26 (for example a self-normalized or Freedman-type inequality) together with a covering of (7.10) whose logarithmic factors in ddd and 1/ε1/\varepsilon1/ε are absorbed into d2log⁡(HT/δ)d^2\log(HT/\delta)d2log(HT/δ). The final step combines optimism, the Bellman residual decomposition, an Azuma bound and the elliptic potential lemma; the Azuma step should be applied to the residuals clipped at 111, since the unclipped term RHTlog⁡(1/δ)\sqrt{RHT\log(1/\delta)}RHTlog(1/δ)​ printed on p. 137 exceeds the rate when log⁡(1/δ)≫Hd\log(1/\delta)\gg Hdlog(1/δ)≫Hd.

Formalization scope

States form a countable type, so transitions are probability mass functions and the Bellman backup is a series; actions form an arbitrary type, so max⁡\maxmax is a supremum and the greedy policy is any selection of a maximizer. A run of the algorithm is a filtered probability space carrying the states, rewards, least-squares solutions and policies, with the conditional laws of the episode protocol and the algorithm's computations holding along every realization; ties in every arg⁡min⁡\arg\minargmin and arg⁡max⁡\arg\maxargmax are left open. The "cumulative rewards in [0,1][0,1][0,1]" assumption enters as QhM,⋆≤1Q^{M,\star}_h\le1QhM,⋆​≤1 at every layer, the form the proof of Lemma 28 uses. Constants are explicit: "sufficiently large ccc" is ∃c0 ∀c≥c0\exists c_0\,\forall c\ge c_0∃c0​∀c≥c0​, and the constant of ≲\lesssim≲ may depend on ccc only.

A degenerate run cannot satisfy these hypotheses trivially: a sanity check builds a one-state low-rank MDP and an explicit run of LSVI-UCB on it for every TTT.

Contributions welcome: proofs of Lemmas 25 and 26 (self-contained), a martingale least-squares bound for adaptive designs, a covering of the class (7.10), and the reduction of the goal to Lemmas 11, 27, 28.

Selected references

  • D. J. Foster and A. Rakhlin, Foundations of Reinforcement Learning and Interactive Decision Making, lecture notes, 2023. arXiv:2312.16730v1
  • C. Jin, Z. Yang, Z. Wang and M. I. Jordan, Provably Efficient Reinforcement Learning with Linear Function Approximation, COLT 2020. arXiv:1907.05388
  • G. Weisz, P. Amortila and C. Szepesvári, Exponential Lower Bounds for Planning in MDPs with Linearly-Realizable Optimal Action-Value Functions, ALT 2021. arXiv:2010.01374
  • Y. Wang, R. Wang and S. M. Kakade, An Exponential Lower Bound for Linearly-Realizable MDPs with Constant Suboptimality Gap, NeurIPS 2021. arXiv:2103.12690
  • Y. Abbasi-Yadkori, D. Pál and C. Szepesvári, Improved Algorithms for Linear Stochastic Bandits, NeurIPS 2011. https://papers.nips.cc/paper/4417
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningReinforcement Learning+1·Captain: iris

Foundations of Reinforcement Learning XV: A Family Embedding the Multi-Armed Bandit Forces the Constrained DEC to Be ≳ αTextbook

Motivation

In interactive decision making a learner repeatedly picks a decision π\piπ from a decision space Π\PiΠ, receives a reward and an observation drawn from an unknown model M⋆M^\starM⋆, and is judged by its regret against the best decision of M⋆M^\starM⋆. Foster and Rakhlin's lecture notes (arXiv:2312.16730) organize the whole theory around one complexity measure, the Decision-Estimation Coefficient (DEC). Section 6.5 shows that the DEC is not only sufficient but necessary: Proposition 28 (p. 105, due to Foster, Golowich and Han 2023) bounds the minimax regret from below by TTT times the constrained DEC decεTc(M)\mathrm{dec}^{\mathrm c}_{\varepsilon_T}(\mathcal M)decεT​c​(M) with εT∝1/T\varepsilon_T\propto1/\sqrt TεT​∝1/T​.

A lower bound in terms of a coefficient is only useful once the coefficient itself is bounded below for concrete classes. Section 6.5.4 does this. It first works out the Gaussian multi-armed bandit by hand (Example 6.4), then abstracts the argument into Proposition 30: any class that contains a copy of the multi-armed bandit has constrained DEC of order the gap α\alphaα of that copy. Examples 6.5 and 6.6 are then read off. This mission formalizes Proposition 30 and those examples.

Setting

A model is a map M:Π→Δ(R×O)M:\Pi\to\Delta(\mathcal R\times\mathcal O)M:Π→Δ(R×O) from decisions to distributions of a reward r∈R⊆Rr\in\mathcal R\subseteq\mathbb Rr∈R⊆R and an observation o∈Oo\in\mathcal Oo∈O. Its mean reward is fM(π)=E(r,o)∼M(π)[r]f^M(\pi)=\mathbb E_{(r,o)\sim M(\pi)}[r]fM(π)=E(r,o)∼M(π)​[r], its optimal decision πM=arg⁡max⁡πfM(π)\pi_M=\arg\max_\pi f^M(\pi)πM​=argmaxπ​fM(π), and fM(πM)−fM(π)f^M(\pi_M)-f^M(\pi)fM(πM​)−fM(π) is the regret of π\piπ under MMM. Two distributions P,QP,QP,Q are compared by the squared Hellinger distance

DH2(P,Q)=∫(dP/dν−dQ/dν)2dν∈[0,2].D^2_{\mathrm H}(P,Q)=\int\Bigl(\sqrt{dP/d\nu}-\sqrt{dQ/d\nu}\Bigr)^2d\nu\in[0,2].DH2​(P,Q)=∫(dP/dν​−dQ/dν​)2dν∈[0,2].

For a class M\mathcal MM of models, a reference model M^\widehat MM and a radius ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, the constrained DEC is

decεc(M,M^)=inf⁡p∈Δ(Π)sup⁡M∈M{Eπ∼p[fM(πM)−fM(π)] ∣ Eπ∼p[DH2(M(π),M^(π))]≤ε2},\mathrm{dec}^{\mathrm c}_\varepsilon(\mathcal M,\widehat M)=\inf_{p\in\Delta(\Pi)}\sup_{M\in\mathcal M}\Bigl\{\mathbb E_{\pi\sim p}\bigl[f^M(\pi_M)-f^M(\pi)\bigr]\ \Big|\ \mathbb E_{\pi\sim p}\bigl[D^2_{\mathrm H}(M(\pi),\widehat M(\pi))\bigr]\le\varepsilon^2\Bigr\},decεc​(M,M)=p∈Δ(Π)inf​M∈Msup​{Eπ∼p​[fM(πM​)−fM(π)] ​ Eπ∼p​[DH2​(M(π),M(π))]≤ε2},

with value 000 if some ppp leaves no feasible model (footnote 15). The class coefficient is decεc(M)=sup⁡M^∈co(M)decεc(M∪{M^},M^)\mathrm{dec}^{\mathrm c}_\varepsilon(\mathcal M)=\sup_{\widehat M\in\mathrm{co}(\mathcal M)}\mathrm{dec}^{\mathrm c}_\varepsilon(\mathcal M\cup\{\widehat M\},\widehat M)decεc​(M)=supM∈co(M)​decεc​(M∪{M},M). The learner chooses ppp; an adversary answers with a model that is hard to tell apart from M^\widehat MM under ppp yet has large regret.

The three example classes, all with AAA actions Π=[A]\Pi=[A]Π=[A]:

  • Gaussian bandit MMAB-G\mathcal M_{\mathrm{MAB\text{-}G}}MMAB-G​: M(π)=N(f(π),1)M(\pi)=\mathcal N(f(\pi),1)M(π)=N(f(π),1) with f:[A]→[0,1]f:[A]\to[0,1]f:[A]→[0,1].
  • Structured noise MMAB-SN={M1,…,MA}∪{M^}\mathcal M_{\mathrm{MAB\text{-}SN}}=\{M_1,\dots,M_A\}\cup\{\widehat M\}MMAB-SN​={M1​,…,MA​}∪{M}: Mi(π)=N(1/2,1)M_i(\pi)=\mathcal N(1/2,1)Mi​(π)=N(1/2,1) for π≠i\pi\ne iπ=i, Mi(i)=Ber(3/4)M_i(i)=\mathrm{Ber}(3/4)Mi​(i)=Ber(3/4), M^(π)=N(1/2,1)\widehat M(\pi)=\mathcal N(1/2,1)M(π)=N(1/2,1).
  • Full information: a reward vector r∈[0,1]Ar\in[0,1]^Ar∈[0,1]A is drawn from some law ν\nuν; playing π\piπ yields r(π)r(\pi)r(π) and reveals all of rrr.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 30 (p. 111)

Suppose M\mathcal MM contains models M1,…,MNM_1,\dots,M_NM1​,…,MN​, N≥2N\ge2N≥2, and distinct decisions π1,…,πN\pi_1,\dots,\pi_Nπ1​,…,πN​ with, for all iii and π\piπ, DH2(Mi(π),M^(π))≤β2 I{π=πi}D^2_{\mathrm H}(M_i(\pi),\widehat M(\pi))\le\beta^2\,\mathbb I\{\pi=\pi_i\}DH2​(Mi​(π),M(π))≤β2I{π=πi​} and fMi(πMi)−fMi(π)≥α I{π≠πi}f^{M_i}(\pi_{M_i})-f^{M_i}(\pi)\ge\alpha\,\mathbb I\{\pi\ne\pi_i\}fMi​(πMi​​)−fMi​(π)≥αI{π=πi​}. Then

decεc(M,M^) ≥ α2 I{ε≥β/N}.\mathrm{dec}^{\mathrm c}_\varepsilon(\mathcal M,\widehat M)\ \ge\ \frac{\alpha}{2}\,\mathbb I\bigl\{\varepsilon\ge\beta/\sqrt N\bigr\}.decεc​(M,M) ≥ 2α​I{ε≥β/N​}.

The notes write ≳\gtrsim≳; the goal fixes the constant 1/21/21/2. No reward range, no finiteness of Π\PiΠ and no membership M^∈M\widehat M\in\mathcal MM∈M is assumed.

Milestones

  1. Example 6.4, p. 110: for Δ≤1/2\Delta\le1/2Δ≤1/2, decεc(MMAB-G,M^)≥inf⁡pmax⁡i{(1−p(i))Δ∣p(i)Δ2/2≤ε2}\mathrm{dec}^{\mathrm c}_\varepsilon(\mathcal M_{\mathrm{MAB\text{-}G}},\widehat M)\ge\inf_p\max_i\{(1-p(i))\Delta\mid p(i)\Delta^2/2\le\varepsilon^2\}decεc​(MMAB-G​,M)≥infp​maxi​{(1−p(i))Δ∣p(i)Δ2/2≤ε2}.
  2. Example 6.4, p. 111: for A≥2A\ge2A≥2 and ε2A≤1/2\varepsilon\sqrt{2A}\le1/2ε2A​≤1/2, decεc(MMAB-G,M^)≥εA/2\mathrm{dec}^{\mathrm c}_\varepsilon(\mathcal M_{\mathrm{MAB\text{-}G}},\widehat M)\ge\varepsilon\sqrt{A/2}decεc​(MMAB-G​,M)≥εA/2​.
  3. Example 6.5, p. 111: for A≥2A\ge2A≥2, decεc(MMAB-SN)≥18 I{ε≥2/A}\mathrm{dec}^{\mathrm c}_\varepsilon(\mathcal M_{\mathrm{MAB\text{-}SN}})\ge\frac18\,\mathbb I\{\varepsilon\ge\sqrt{2/A}\}decεc​(MMAB-SN​)≥81​I{ε≥2/A​}.
  4. Example 6.6, p. 111: there is an absolute c>0c>0c>0 with decεc(M)≥c ε\mathrm{dec}^{\mathrm c}_\varepsilon(\mathcal M)\ge c\,\varepsilondecεc​(M)≥cε for the full-information class, all A≥2A\ge2A≥2 and ε∈(0,1]\varepsilon\in(0,1]ε∈(0,1].

Significance

Proposition 30 is the step that turns Proposition 28 into concrete regret lower bounds: Ω~(AT)\widetilde\Omega(\sqrt{AT})Ω(AT​) for Gaussian bandits, a bound of order AAA for structured noise, and T\sqrt TT​ under full information. Any class that "embeds" a multi-armed bandit in this sense inherits a lower bound once the family is exhibited; the notes obtain all their bandit-type examples this way. Together with Proposition 28 (posed, Open, in mission V of this series), a formal proof closes the loop from a model class to a minimax lower bound.

The results are proved in the notes (Example 6.4 in full, Proposition 30 by "generalizing the argument", Examples 6.5 and 6.6 by sketch). None has a machine-checked proof. The printed statements need small corrections, recorded in each item: Proposition 30 fails for N=1N=1N=1 or coinciding decisions, the examples fail for a single action, and the explicit bounds of Examples 6.4 and 6.6 hold only for bounded ε\varepsilonε, since the coefficient of a class with rewards in [0,1][0,1][0,1] never exceeds 111.

Difficulty

The combinatorial core is short: some decision πi\pi_iπi​ receives mass at most 1/N1/N1/N. The work is measure-theoretic. The coefficient involves an infimum over all probability measures on an arbitrary decision space, expectations of functions with no assumed integrability, and Hellinger distances defined through Radon–Nikodym derivatives. The examples need closed-form Hellinger bounds: for two unit-variance Gaussians (via DH2≤DKL=12(μ1−μ2)2D^2_{\mathrm H}\le D_{\mathrm{KL}}=\frac12(\mu_1-\mu_2)^2DH2​≤DKL​=21​(μ1​−μ2​)2, inequality (6.12)), for a Gaussian against a Bernoulli law (mutually singular, so DH2=2D^2_{\mathrm H}=2DH2​=2), and for product Bernoulli laws. In the class coefficients the reference model ranges over a convex hull, and the lower bound must find a good reference inside it. For Example 6.6 the notes give only "by adapting the argument in Example 6.4"; the family and the constant have to be supplied.

Formalization scope

Models are ProbabilityTheory.Kernel D (ℝ × O); decision distributions are ProbabilityMeasure D; the decision space has MeasurableSingletonClass so that p(πi)p(\pi_i)p(πi​) is defined. Mean reward, squared Hellinger distance (no factor 1/21/21/2) and the convex hull of a class reuse the published definitions of mission V (FoundationsRL.DECLower.meanReward, hellingerSq, kernelHull). The suboptimality gap and both constrained coefficients are defined anew in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]: suboptGap M π = sup_{π'} (f^M(π') − f^M(π)), and expectations are lower Lebesgue integrals. This is needed because Proposition 30 and Examples 6.4–6.5 have unbounded (Gaussian) rewards, and the published constrainedDECRef takes a real supremum, which is the true one only for rewards in [0,1][0,1][0,1]. An empty feasible set contributes 000, which is footnote 15.

Action sets are Fin A (0-based), the empty observation is Unit, and the full-information observation is the reward vector in Fin A → ℝ. Constants: the goal states 1/21/21/2, Example 6.5 states 1/81/81/8, Example 6.6 quantifies one absolute ccc before AAA and ε\varepsilonε.

Contributions welcome: Hellinger computations for Gaussian and Bernoulli laws, monotonicity and convex-hull lemmas for the constrained coefficient, and proofs of the examples from the goal.

Selected references

  • D. J. Foster and A. Rakhlin, Foundations of Reinforcement Learning and Interactive Decision Making, lecture notes, arXiv:2312.16730v1, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.16730
  • D. J. Foster, N. Golowich and Y. Han, Tight Guarantees for Interactive Decision Making with the Decision-Estimation Coefficient, COLT 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.08215
  • D. J. Foster, S. M. Kakade, J. Qian and A. Rakhlin, The Statistical Complexity of Interactive Decision Making, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/2112.13487
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Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: iris

Approximating the Set of Nash Equilibria for Convex Games: Algorithm 4.8's output contains every Nash equilibrium and consists of (ε₁ + (2+κ)Lε₂)-approximate Nash equilibriaResearch Paper

Motivation

A game with a shared constraint couples the players twice: through their costs and through a joint feasible set that restricts which strategy profiles are allowed. Such generalized Nash games model system-wide limits, for example a common capacity or emission budget (Rosen 1965; Facchinei–Kanzow 2010). They typically have a continuum of equilibria, so one computed equilibrium says little about the others, and selecting among equilibria needs the whole set.

Feinstein and Rudloff (2024) showed that the Nash equilibria of any such game are exactly the Pareto optimal points of a vector optimization problem. Exact algorithms for the set of Pareto optimal points exist only for linear problems, so the characterization computed the full equilibrium set only for linear games. Feinstein, Hey and Rudloff (arXiv:2310.04176v4, 2024; Operations Research, 2025) extend it to convex games. They give an algorithm whose output contains every Nash equilibrium and consists of approximate Nash equilibria.

Setting

There are finitely many players iii. Player iii chooses xi∈Xi=Rnix_i\in X_i=\mathbb R^{n_i}xi​∈Xi​=Rni​. A joint strategy is x∈∏jXjx\in\prod_j X_jx∈∏j​Xj​, and x−ix_{-i}x−i​ lists the strategies of the players j≠ij\ne ij=i. Player iii has a cost fi:∏jXj→Rf_i:\prod_jX_j\to\mathbb Rfi​:∏j​Xj​→R, and X⊆∏jXj\mathbb X\subseteq\prod_jX_jX⊆∏j​Xj​ is the shared constraint set. A Nash equilibrium is an x∗∈Xx^*\in\mathbb Xx∗∈X with fi(x∗)≤fi(xi,x−i∗)f_i(x^*)\le f_i(x_i,x^*_{-i})fi​(x∗)≤fi​(xi​,x−i∗​) for every iii and every xix_ixi​ with (xi,x−i∗)∈X(x_i,x^*_{-i})\in\mathbb X(xi​,x−i∗​)∈X. The set of these is NE(f,X)\mathrm{NE}(f,\mathbb X)NE(f,X). An ε-approximate Nash equilibrium satisfies fi(x∗)≤fi(xi,x−i∗)+εf_i(x^*)\le f_i(x_i,x^*_{-i})+\varepsilonfi​(x∗)≤fi​(xi​,x−i∗​)+ε instead, and these form ε NE(f,X)\varepsilon\,\mathrm{NE}(f,\mathbb X)εNE(f,X).

For player iii, problem (3) minimizes gi(x)=(x−i,−x−i,fi(x))g_i(x)=(x_{-i},-x_{-i},f_i(x))gi​(x)=(x−i​,−x−i​,fi​(x)) over X\mathbb XX in Rmi\mathbb R^{m_i}Rmi​ with the componentwise order. A feasible x∗x^*x∗ is Pareto optimal if no x∈Xx\in\mathbb Xx∈X has gi(x)≤gi(x∗)g_i(x)\le g_i(x^*)gi​(x)≤gi​(x∗) and gi(x)≠gi(x∗)g_i(x)\ne g_i(x^*)gi​(x)=gi​(x∗). Fix the direction cˉi=(0,…,0,1)\bar c_i=(0,\dots,0,1)cˉi​=(0,…,0,1). A feasible x∗x^*x∗ is ε-Pareto optimal if no x∈Xx\in\mathbb Xx∈X has gi(x)≤gi(x∗)−εcˉig_i(x)\le g_i(x^*)-\varepsilon\bar c_igi​(x)≤gi​(x∗)−εcˉi​ and gi(x)≠gi(x∗)−εcˉig_i(x)\ne g_i(x^*)-\varepsilon\bar c_igi​(x)=gi​(x∗)−εcˉi​.

Under the paper's assumptions, X=conv⁡V\mathbb X=\operatorname{conv}VX=convV for a nonempty finite VVV, every fif_ifi​ is convex, and LLL is a common Lipschitz constant of the fif_ifi​ on X\mathbb XX in the L1 norm ∥x∥1=∑j∑k∣xjk∣\|x\|_1=\sum_j\sum_k|x_{jk}|∥x∥1​=∑j​∑k​∣xjk​∣. Given ε1,ε2>0\varepsilon_1,\varepsilon_2>0ε1​,ε2​>0, Algorithm 4.8 runs three subroutines for each player iii:

  1. It finds a finite Xˉi⊆X\bar{\mathcal X}_i\subseteq\mathbb XXˉi​⊆X containing VVV whose inner approximation PiIn=conv⁡gi[Xˉi]+R+miP^{In}_i=\operatorname{conv}g_i[\bar{\mathcal X}_i]+\mathbb R^{m_i}_+PiIn​=convgi​[Xˉi​]+R+mi​​ is within ε1\varepsilon_1ε1​ of the upper image Pi=gi[X]+R+miP_i=g_i[\mathbb X]+\mathbb R^{m_i}_+Pi​=gi​[X]+R+mi​​ in direction cˉi\bar c_icˉi​.
  2. It finds the maximal efficient faces F1,…,FkiF^1,\dots,F^{k_i}F1,…,Fki​ of PiInP^{In}_iPiIn​, whose union is the set of minimal elements of PiInP^{In}_iPiIn​.
  3. It finds finite sets X^ij⊆X\hat X^j_i\subseteq\mathbb XX^ij​⊆X with conv⁡X^ij⊆Xˉij⊆conv⁡X^ij+Bε2\operatorname{conv}\hat X^j_i\subseteq\bar X^j_i\subseteq\operatorname{conv}\hat X^j_i+B_{\varepsilon_2}convX^ij​⊆Xˉij​⊆convX^ij​+Bε2​​. Here Xˉij={x∈X:∃y∈Fj, gi(x)≤y}\bar X^j_i=\{x\in\mathbb X:\exists y\in F^j,\ g_i(x)\le y\}Xˉij​={x∈X:∃y∈Fj, gi​(x)≤y} is a convex projection.

The output is X=⋂iXi\mathcal X=\bigcap_i\mathcal X_iX=⋂i​Xi​, where Xi=⋃j(conv⁡X^ij+Bε2)∩X\mathcal X_i=\bigcup_j(\operatorname{conv}\hat X^j_i+B_{\varepsilon_2})\cap\mathbb XXi​=⋃j​(convX^ij​+Bε2​​)∩X.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.9, corrected

A number κ≥0\kappa\ge0κ≥0 is a slice modulus of X\mathbb XX if for every iii and all x,z∈Xx,z\in\mathbb Xx,z∈X there is x′∈Xx'\in\mathbb Xx′∈X with x−i′=z−ix'_{-i}=z_{-i}x−i′​=z−i​ and ∥xi′−xi∥1≤κ∑j≠i∥xj−zj∥1\|x'_i-x_i\|_1\le\kappa\sum_{j\ne i}\|x_j-z_j\|_1∥xi′​−xi​∥1​≤κ∑j=i​∥xj​−zj​∥1​. The goal is

NE(f,X)⊆X,X⊆(ε1+(2+κ)Lε2) NE(f,X)  for every slice modulus κ≥0.\mathrm{NE}(f,\mathbb X)\subseteq\mathcal X,\qquad \mathcal X\subseteq(\varepsilon_1+(2+\kappa)L\varepsilon_2)\,\mathrm{NE}(f,\mathbb X)\ \text{ for every slice modulus }\kappa\ge0 .NE(f,X)⊆X,X⊆(ε1​+(2+κ)Lε2​)NE(f,X)  for every slice modulus κ≥0.

The printed Theorem 4.9 claims the right inclusion with ε1+2Lε2\varepsilon_1+2L\varepsilon_2ε1​+2Lε2​. That claim is false for polytopes that are not products. Take X=conv⁡{(0,0),(0,110),(1,110)}\mathbb X=\operatorname{conv}\{(0,0),(0,\tfrac1{10}),(1,\tfrac1{10})\}X=conv{(0,0),(0,101​),(1,101​)}, f1=−x1f_1=-x_1f1​=−x1​, f2=0f_2=0f2​=0, L=1L=1L=1 and ε1=ε2=1100\varepsilon_1=\varepsilon_2=\tfrac1{100}ε1​=ε2​=1001​. These data satisfy every assumption. For the run that takes the three vertices in step 1 and, for player 1, the two ends (0,0),(1,110)(0,0),(1,\tfrac1{10})(0,0),(1,101​) of the efficient edge in step 3, xˉ=(0,1100)\bar x=(0,\tfrac1{100})xˉ=(0,1001​) lies in X\mathcal XX. But player 1 gains 110>3100\tfrac1{10}>\tfrac3{100}101​>1003​ by moving to (110,1100)∈X(\tfrac1{10},\tfrac1{100})\in\mathbb X(101​,1001​)∈X. The proof of Lemma 4.11 uses ε₁-optimality of x∗x^*x∗ at (xi,x−i∗)(x_i,x^*_{-i})(xi​,x−i∗​), which need not lie in X\mathbb XX. When X\mathbb XX is a product of its projections (boxes, classical games), κ=0\kappa=0κ=0 is a slice modulus and the goal is the printed sandwich.

Milestones

  • Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2: NE(f,X)=⋂iargMin⁡\mathrm{NE}(f,\mathbb X)=\bigcap_i\operatorname{argMin}NE(f,X)=⋂i​argMin and ε NE(f,X)=⋂iεargMin⁡\varepsilon\,\mathrm{NE}(f,\mathbb X)=\bigcap_i\varepsilon\operatorname{argMin}εNE(f,X)=⋂i​εargMin, together with their per-player step (proof of Theorem 3.2).
  • Remark 4.5 and two steps of the proof of Lemma 4.10: a minimal point above every fibre, and minimal points lying in the convex hull.
  • Lemma 4.10: argMin⁡⊆⋃jXˉij⊆ε1argMin⁡\operatorname{argMin}\subseteq\bigcup_j\bar X^j_i\subseteq\varepsilon_1\operatorname{argMin}argMin⊆⋃j​Xˉij​⊆ε1​argMin.
  • Lemma 4.11, corrected: argMin⁡⊆Xi⊆(ε1+(2+κ)Lε2)argMin⁡\operatorname{argMin}\subseteq\mathcal X_i\subseteq(\varepsilon_1+(2+\kappa)L\varepsilon_2)\operatorname{argMin}argMin⊆Xi​⊆(ε1​+(2+κ)Lε2​)argMin.

Significance

The sandwich gives a finitely generated set that misses no equilibrium and admits no point whose gain from deviating exceeds ε. Equilibrium selection, sensitivity analysis and the computation of welfare ranges over all equilibria can therefore run on a computable set. The ε-characterization of Theorem 3.2 holds for any game and is independent of the algorithm.

The paper proves Theorem 4.9, but its right inclusion is wrong for general polytopes. The mission records the gap, states a corrected constant that reduces to the printed one on product sets, and formalizes the full chain of the proof. As far as is known, none of these results has a machine-checked proof. The platform already has Feinstein–Rudloff's characterization with a non-convex ordering cone (NashVecOpt.SharedConstraint.theorem_2_6). The natural-cone form (Theorem 3.1) and its ε-version are new.

Difficulty

Theorems 3.1–3.2 and Lemma 4.11 are short order-theoretic and Lipschitz arguments once the definitions are fixed. The difficulty is in Lemma 4.10's left inclusion. A Pareto point x∗x^*x∗ of problem (3) must be shown to lie below a minimal element of the inner approximation PiInP^{In}_iPiIn​, although PiInP^{In}_iPiIn​ is built only from finitely many points. Three things are needed for this. Every x−i∗x^*_{-i}x−i∗​ must be a convex combination of the step-1 points, which requires the generators of X\mathbb XX to be among them (Remark 4.5). A minimal element must exist over that fibre, which needs closedness of PiInP^{In}_iPiIn​; the paper's argument through pointedness has a gap. Minimal elements must carry no recession part. Convexity of fif_ifi​ then closes the chain. The weighted-sum route does not work here, because every feasible point of (3) is weakly Pareto optimal (Remark 3.4).

Formalization scope

Players form a nonempty finite type ι, and strategy spaces are Fin (n i) → ℝ. The objective space is (∏_{j≠i} ℝ^{n_j}) × (∏_{j≠i} ℝ^{n_j}) × ℝ with Mathlib's componentwise order. The L1 norm is written out, because Mathlib's norm on function types is the sup norm. The ε-NE set uses the universal form of Definition 2.2, not its infimum form. Pareto and ε-Pareto optimality are stated literally as in Definitions 2.3–2.4, and minimality is strict, not weak.

The run of Algorithm 4.8 is a structure that records the outputs of the external subroutines together with the guarantees the paper states for them: (10), (12), the cover of the minimal elements and (15). PiInP^{In}_iPiIn​, the convex projections, Xi\mathcal X_iXi​ and X\mathcal XX are computed from the run. A formalization in which X\mathcal XX is any set satisfying (9) would assume Lemma 4.11 and is ruled out. The Nash equilibrium set is the published NashVecOpt.SharedConstraint.NE.

A complete development needs closedness of a finitely generated convex hull plus orthant, convex combinations under linear maps, and Jensen's inequality on finite convex combinations. These pieces are reusable for multi-objective optimization in general. Proofs of any milestone are welcome. So are proofs that every polytope has a finite slice modulus (Walkup–Wets), which would show that the corrected goal never holds vacuously.

Selected references

  • Z. Feinstein, N. Hey, B. Rudloff, Approximating the set of Nash equilibria for convex games, arXiv:2310.04176v4, 2024; Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2310.04176
  • Z. Feinstein, B. Rudloff, Characterizing and computing the set of Nash equilibria via vector optimization, Operations Research, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2023.2457
  • J. B. Rosen, Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for concave n-person games, Econometrica 33, 1965. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911749
  • F. Facchinei, C. Kanzow, Generalized Nash equilibrium problems, Annals of Operations Research 175, 2010 (online 2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-009-0653-x
  • A. Löhne, B. Rudloff, F. Ulus, Primal and dual approximation algorithms for convex vector optimization problems, Journal of Global Optimization 60, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10898-013-0136-0
  • D. W. Walkup, R. J.-B. Wets, Lifting projections of convex polyhedra, Pacific Journal of Mathematics 28, 1969. https://doi.org/10.2140/pjm.1969.28.465
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Existence and Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Polynomial Games of Degree d With No α-PNE for Any α < α(d), Where α(d) ≥ √d/(2 ln d) for Large dResearch Paper

Motivation

Weighted congestion games model players of different sizes sharing resources whose cost grows with load: traffic of different volumes on network links, jobs of different lengths on machines. Rosenthal (1973) showed that unweighted congestion games always have a pure Nash equilibrium, but weighted games may have none, already with polynomial costs. The natural relaxation is the α\alphaα-approximate pure Nash equilibrium (α\alphaα-PNE): a profile in which no player can lower her cost by more than a factor α\alphaα by changing strategy alone. The question is how large α\alphaα must be for every weighted polynomial congestion game of degree ddd to have one.

Timeline (as reported in §1.1 of the paper).

  • Rosenthal (1973): unweighted congestion games always have a pure Nash equilibrium; later work showed that weighted games may have none, even with quadratic costs.
  • Caragiannis, Fanelli, Gravin and Skopalik (FOCS 2011): d!d!d!-PNE always exist in weighted polynomial games of degree ddd.
  • Hansknecht, Klimm and Skopalik (APPROX/RANDOM 2014) and Christodoulou, Gairing, Giannakopoulos and Spirakis (SICOMP 2019): (d+1)(d+1)(d+1)-PNE always exist. Hansknecht et al. also gave two-player games of degree 444 without α\alphaα-PNE for α≈1.153\alpha\approx 1.153α≈1.153, found by solving an optimization program numerically; this was the best nonexistence bound.
  • Caragiannis and Fanelli (ICALP 2019) and Giannakopoulos and Poças (arXiv:2005.10101): ddd-PNE always exist.
  • Christodoulou, Gairing, Giannakopoulos, Poças and Waldmann (arXiv:2002.07466; Math. Oper. Res. 2023): games of degree ddd without α\alphaα-PNE for any α<α(d)\alpha<\alpha(d)α<α(d), with α(d)=Ω(d/ln⁡d)\alpha(d)=\Omega(\sqrt d/\ln d)α(d)=Ω(d​/lnd), the first super-constant nonexistence bound. This mission formalizes that theorem (Theorem 1 of arXiv:2002.07466v3).

Setting

A weighted congestion game has a finite nonempty set NNN of players and a finite nonempty set EEE of resources. Each resource eee has a nondecreasing cost function cec_ece​; each player iii has a weight wi>0w_i>0wi​>0 and a nonempty set Si⊆2ES_i\subseteq 2^ESi​⊆2E of strategies. For a profile s=(s1,…,sn)s=(s_1,\dots,s_n)s=(s1​,…,sn​) the load of eee is xe(s)=∑i: e∈siwix_e(s)=\sum_{i:\,e\in s_i}w_ixe​(s)=∑i:e∈si​​wi​, and player iii pays

Ci(s)=∑e∈sice(xe(s)).C_i(s)=\sum_{e\in s_i}c_e\bigl(x_e(s)\bigr).Ci​(s)=e∈si​∑​ce​(xe​(s)).

The game is a polynomial congestion game of degree ddd if every cec_ece​ is a polynomial of degree at most ddd with nonnegative coefficients. For α≥1\alpha\ge 1α≥1 a profile sss is an α\alphaα-PNE if

Ci(s)≤α⋅Ci(si′,s−i)for all i∈N, si′∈Si.(1)C_i(s)\le\alpha\cdot C_i(s_i',s_{-i})\qquad\text{for all } i\in N,\ s_i'\in S_i. \tag{1}Ci​(s)≤α⋅Ci​(si′​,s−i​)for all i∈N, si′​∈Si​.(1)

The gadget G(n,k,w,β)d\mathcal G^d_{(n,k,w,\beta)}G(n,k,w,β)d​ has a heavy player of weight 111, nnn light players of weight www, resources a0,…,an,b0,…,bna_0,\dots,a_n,b_0,\dots,b_na0​,…,an​,b0​,…,bn​ with ca0=cb0=xkc_{a_0}=c_{b_0}=x^kca0​​=cb0​​=xk and all others βxd\beta x^dβxd, and strategies S0={{a0,…,an},{b0,…,bn}}S_0=\{\{a_0,\dots,a_n\},\{b_0,\dots,b_n\}\}S0​={{a0​,…,an​},{b0​,…,bn​}}, Si={{a0,bi},{b0,ai}}S_i=\{\{a_0,b_i\},\{b_0,a_i\}\}Si​={{a0​,bi​},{b0​,ai​}}. The bound is

α(d)=sup⁡n,k,w,βmin⁡{1+nβ(1+w)d(1+nw)k+nβ, (1+w)k+βwd(nw)k+β(1+w)d}(3)\alpha(d)=\sup_{n,k,w,\beta}\min\left\{\frac{1+n\beta(1+w)^d}{(1+nw)^k+n\beta},\ \frac{(1+w)^k+\beta w^d}{(nw)^k+\beta(1+w)^d}\right\} \tag{3}α(d)=n,k,w,βsup​min{(1+nw)k+nβ1+nβ(1+w)d​, (nw)k+β(1+w)d(1+w)k+βwd​}(3)

over n∈Nn\in\mathbb Nn∈N, k∈{1,…,d}k\in\{1,\dots,d\}k∈{1,…,d}, w,β∈[0,1]w,\beta\in[0,1]w,β∈[0,1]. In Lean: playerCost, IsApproxPNE, IsPolyGame, gadget, ratioOne, ratioTwo, alphaBound.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

For every integer d≥2d\ge 2d≥2 there is one weighted polynomial congestion game of degree ddd with no α\alphaα-PNE for any α∈[1,α(d))\alpha\in[1,\alpha(d))α∈[1,α(d)), and

α(d)=Ω ⁣(dln⁡d),α(d)≥d2ln⁡d  for all large d.\alpha(d)=\Omega\!\left(\frac{\sqrt d}{\ln d}\right),\qquad \alpha(d)\ge\frac{\sqrt d}{2\ln d}\ \text{ for all large } d.α(d)=Ω(lndd​​),α(d)≥2lndd​​  for all large d.

α(d)\alpha(d)α(d) is the exact supremum (3), not an explicit smaller value; the existence clause asks for a single game serving every α<α(d)\alpha<\alpha(d)α<α(d).

Milestones

  1. Cases 1 and 2 of the proof: in every profile of the gadget, either the heavy player improves by the first ratio of (3), or a light player sharing her hub improves by at least the second.
  2. No α\alphaα-PNE in one gadget below both ratios, and the gadget is polynomial of degree ddd.
  3. Attainment: when α(d)>1\alpha(d)>1α(d)>1 the supremum (3) is attained at a positive light weight.
  4. Parameter choice w=ln⁡d2dw=\frac{\ln d}{2d}w=2dlnd​, k=⌈ln⁡d2ln⁡ln⁡d⌉k=\lceil\frac{\ln d}{2\ln\ln d}\rceilk=⌈2lnlndlnd​⌉, β=1dk/(2(k+1))(1+w)d\beta=\frac{1}{d^{k/(2(k+1))}(1+w)^d}β=dk/(2(k+1))(1+w)d1​, n=⌊1d1/(2(k+1))w⌋n=\lfloor\frac{1}{d^{1/(2(k+1))}w}\rfloorn=⌊d1/(2(k+1))w1​⌋ is admissible for d≥4d\ge4d≥4, and satisfies displays (4)–(7).
  5. Lemma 3 with its two halves and the inequality (21): g(d)=(1+d−1/(2(kd+1)))kd+2dln⁡d (1+ln⁡d/(2d))d→1g(d)=\left(1+d^{-1/(2(k_d+1))}\right)^{k_d}+\frac{2\sqrt d}{\ln d\,(1+\ln d/(2d))^d}\to 1g(d)=(1+d−1/(2(kd​+1)))kd​+lnd(1+lnd/(2d))d2d​​→1.
  6. Final ratio bounds: both ratios are at least d/(2ln⁡d)\sqrt d/(2\ln d)d​/(2lnd) at the choice, the first for large ddd, the second for d≥4d\ge 4d≥4.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 shows that the existence threshold for approximate equilibria in weighted polynomial congestion games grows with the degree: no constant factor suffices. Together with the existence of ddd-PNE it places the threshold between Ω(d/ln⁡d)\Omega(\sqrt d/\ln d)Ω(d​/lnd) and ddd. It is also the input to the paper's complexity results: the gadget is combined with a circuit gadget to show that deciding whether a game has an α\alphaα-PNE is NP-hard for every α<α(d)\alpha<\alpha(d)α<α(d) (Corollary 1).

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved on paper; no part of it is machine-checked. A formal proof would certify the case analysis of the gadget, the exact supremum (3) and the asymptotic estimates, including the attainment step needed for the one-game reading, which the paper leaves implicit. The game model reuses the published HarksKlimm.Consistency.Game, so the definitions here connect to existing congestion-game developments on the platform.

Difficulty

The game-theoretic half is a short case analysis, but it has to be carried out on a concrete game with 2(n+1)2(n+1)2(n+1) resources indexed in Lean, for both symmetric sides, with loads computed as sums over players. The supremum (3) is over a set that mixes an integer parameter with a compact box; attainment needs a uniform bound in nnn, since a naive compactness argument fails over n∈Nn\in\mathbb Nn∈N.

The asymptotic half is where most of the work lies. The choice of kkk involves ln⁡ln⁡d\ln\ln dlnlnd, so every estimate must track a ceiling inside a real power d1/(2(k+1))d^{1/(2(k+1))}d1/(2(k+1)), and the passage from k≥ln⁡d2ln⁡ln⁡dk\ge\frac{\ln d}{2\ln\ln d}k≥2lnlndlnd​ to d1/(2(k+1))≤ln⁡dd^{1/(2(k+1))}\le\ln dd1/(2(k+1))≤lnd requires ln⁡ln⁡d>0\ln\ln d>0lnlnd>0. Lemma 3 combines (21) with growth comparisons of ln⁡d\ln dlnd, ln⁡ln⁡d\ln\ln dlnlnd and ddd; bounding ggg by a constant for one explicit ddd is not enough, since the theorem needs it for all large ddd.

Formalization scope

Players are Fin N and resources Fin M, through the published HarksKlimm.Consistency.Game N M, which requires at least one player and one resource, nonempty strategy sets and positive weights in R≥0\mathbb R_{\ge0}R≥0​. Costs are functions on loads x∈R≥0x\in\mathbb R_{\ge0}x∈R≥0​ (the paper uses R>0\mathbb R_{>0}R>0​; the value at 000 never enters a player's cost). A player's cost has no weight factor. α\alphaα-PNE is defined for real α\alphaα; theorems assume 1≤α1\le\alpha1≤α, as the paper does.

α(d)\alpha(d)α(d) is the real sSup over the points where (3) is defined, which excludes the points with nw=0nw=0nw=0 and β=0\beta=0β=0; n=0n=0n=0 is allowed. The set is nonempty and bounded above by 2d2^d2d, so the supremum is a genuine one rather than Lean's default value. In the gadget the light weight is w>0w>0w>0; the family's w=0w=0w=0 points are not games and contribute only values at most 111 to (3). ln⁡\lnln is Real.log, ⌈⋅⌉,⌊⋅⌋\lceil\cdot\rceil,\lfloor\cdot\rfloor⌈⋅⌉,⌊⋅⌋ are Nat.ceil, Nat.floor, non-integer powers of ddd are Real.rpow. "Ω\OmegaΩ" is stated with Asymptotics.IsBigO over d∈Nd\in\mathbb Nd∈N, and "for large ddd" as ∃d0 ∀d≥d0\exists d_0\,\forall d\ge d_0∃d0​∀d≥d0​.

The existence clause cannot be met by a trivial game: the witness must be a polynomial game of degree ddd with nonempty strategy sets, and the bound must hold for every α\alphaα below the exact supremum, not a weaker constant.

Needed infrastructure: finite sums over loads, Real.rpow manipulation, and limit lemmas for ln⁡d\ln dlnd, ln⁡ln⁡d\ln\ln dlnlnd and (1+x/y)y(1+x/y)^y(1+x/y)y. The bounds (21) and the estimates of Lemma 3 are reusable for other Θ(d)\Theta(\sqrt d)Θ(d​)-type asymptotics. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative arguments for Lemma 3, are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. Christodoulou, M. Gairing, Y. Giannakopoulos, D. Poças, C. Waldmann, Existence and Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games, arXiv:2002.07466v3, 2022; Math. Oper. Res., 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.07466, https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2022.1272
  • G. Christodoulou, M. Gairing, Y. Giannakopoulos, P. G. Spirakis, The price of stability of weighted congestion games, SIAM J. Comput. 48(5), 2019. https://doi.org/10.1137/18M1207880
  • T. Hansknecht, M. Klimm, A. Skopalik, Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games, APPROX/RANDOM 2014. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242
  • I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli, On Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games with Polynomial Latencies, ICALP 2019. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2019.133
  • R. W. Rosenthal, A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria, Int. J. Game Theory, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01737559
  • F. W. J. Olver et al., NIST Handbook of Mathematical Functions, Eq. 4.5.13, 2010. http://dlmf.nist.gov/4.5.E13
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Actuarial ScienceEconomicsOperations Research+1·Captain: iris

An Unexpected Stochastic Dominance: Pareto Distributions, Dependence, and Diversification: A Weighted Average of Negatively Associated Super-Pareto Losses Stochastically Dominates a Single LossResearch Paper

Motivation

Diversification is the default advice of risk management: spreading a unit of exposure over several independent losses reduces risk. For losses with finite mean this is true in a strong sense: if X1,…,XnX_1,\dots,X_nX1​,…,Xn​ are identically distributed with finite mean, the weighted average ∑iθiXi\sum_i\theta_iX_i∑i​θi​Xi​ can never be larger than a single X1X_1X1​ in first-order stochastic dominance unless all XiX_iXi​ coincide almost surely (Proposition 2 of the source).

Some losses, however, are modelled by Pareto laws without finite mean: catastrophe and insurance losses in extreme value theory (Embrechts, Klüppelberg and Mikosch 1997), nuclear power accidents (Hofert and Wüthrich 2012), and fraud losses (Cheynel, Cianciaruso and Zhou 2022), as surveyed on p.2 of the source. For iid losses with such tails it has been observed that P(1n∑iXi>t)≥P(X>t)P(\frac1n\sum_iX_i>t)\ge P(X>t)P(n1​∑i​Xi​>t)≥P(X>t) holds asymptotically as t→∞t\to\inftyt→∞ (Kaas et al. 2004; Albrecher, Asmussen and Kortschak 2006; Embrechts et al. 2009, as cited in Remark 1 of the source). Chen, Embrechts and Wang (arXiv:2208.08471, published in Operations Research, 2025) show that the inequality holds at every level ttt, not only asymptotically, for a broad class of infinite-mean laws and under negative dependence. For a regulator or an insurer, this means that pooling such risks raises the Value-at-Risk at every confidence level.

Setting

All random variables live on one probability space (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)(Ω,F,P).

  • Stochastic dominance. X≤stYX\le_{\mathrm{st}}YX≤st​Y if P(X≤x)≥P(Y≤x)P(X\le x)\ge P(Y\le x)P(X≤x)≥P(Y≤x) for all x∈Rx\in\mathbb Rx∈R. Strict dominance X<stYX<_{\mathrm{st}}YX<st​Y means P(X>x)<P(Y>x)P(X>x)<P(Y>x)P(X>x)<P(Y>x) for every xxx with P(X>x)∈(0,1)P(X>x)\in(0,1)P(X>x)∈(0,1).
  • Pareto(1). Y∼Pareto(1)Y\sim\mathrm{Pareto}(1)Y∼Pareto(1) if P(Y>y)=1/yP(Y>y)=1/yP(Y>y)=1/y for y≥1y\ge1y≥1; it has infinite mean.
  • Super-Pareto. XXX is super-Pareto if X=df(Y)X\overset d=f(Y)X=df(Y) for some increasing, convex, non-constant fff and Y∼Pareto(1)Y\sim\mathrm{Pareto}(1)Y∼Pareto(1); it is regular if moreover this fff has f(0)=0f(0)=0f(0)=0 and f(1)>0f(1)>0f(1)>0. Pareto laws with tail index α≤1\alpha\le1α≤1, generalized Pareto laws with ξ≥1\xi\ge1ξ≥1 and Burr laws with α,τ≤1\alpha,\tau\le1α,τ≤1 are super-Pareto.
  • Weak negative association. X1,…,XnX_1,\dots,X_nX1​,…,Xn​ are weakly negatively associated if for every iii, every decreasing set S⊆Rn−1S\subseteq\mathbb R^{n-1}S⊆Rn−1 and every xxx,
P(X−i∈S, Xi≤x)≤P(X−i∈S) P(Xi≤x),P(\mathbf X_{-i}\in S,\ X_i\le x)\le P(\mathbf X_{-i}\in S)\,P(X_i\le x),P(X−i​∈S, Xi​≤x)≤P(X−i​∈S)P(Xi​≤x),

with X−i\mathbf X_{-i}X−i​ the vector of the other variables. Independence is a special case. WNAID means weakly negatively associated and identically distributed.

  • Weights. Δn={θ∈[0,1]n:∑iθi=1}\Delta_n=\{\theta\in[0,1]^n:\sum_i\theta_i=1\}Δn​={θ∈[0,1]n:∑i​θi​=1}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

Let X1,…,XnX_1,\dots,X_nX1​,…,Xn​ be WNAID super-Pareto, θ∈Δn\theta\in\Delta_nθ∈Δn​ and X=dX1X\overset d=X_1X=dX1​. Then

X≤st∑i=1nθiXi,X<st∑i=1nθiXi  if two θi>0,X\le_{\mathrm{st}}\sum_{i=1}^n\theta_iX_i,\qquad X<_{\mathrm{st}}\sum_{i=1}^n\theta_iX_i\ \text{ if two }\theta_i>0,X≤st​i=1∑n​θi​Xi​,X<st​i=1∑n​θi​Xi​  if two θi​>0,

and, if XXX is regular, for events A1,…,AnA_1,\dots,A_nA1​,…,An​ jointly independent of (X1,…,Xn)(X_1,\dots,X_n)(X1​,…,Xn​) and AAA independent of XXX with P(A)=∑iθiP(Ai)P(A)=\sum_i\theta_iP(A_i)P(A)=∑i​θi​P(Ai​),

X1A≤st∑i=1nθiXi1Ai.X\mathbb 1_A\le_{\mathrm{st}}\sum_{i=1}^n\theta_iX_i\mathbb 1_{A_i}.X1A​≤st​i=1∑n​θi​Xi​1Ai​​.

Milestones

  1. Independence implies weak negative association (§2.1).
  2. Independent Pareto(1): P(∑θiYi≥x)>1/xP(\sum\theta_iY_i\ge x)>1/xP(∑θi​Yi​≥x)>1/x for x>1x>1x>1, θ∈Δn+\theta\in\Delta_n^+θ∈Δn+​ (display (7)).
  3. The product bound P(∑i≠kθiXi≥t, Xk<δ)≥P(∑i≠kθiXi≥t)P(Xk<δ)P(\sum_{i\ne k}\theta_iX_i\ge t,\ X_k<\delta)\ge P(\sum_{i\ne k}\theta_iX_i\ge t)P(X_k<\delta)P(∑i=k​θi​Xi​≥t, Xk​<δ)≥P(∑i=k​θi​Xi​≥t)P(Xk​<δ) under weak negative association (step (b)).
  4. Weakly negatively associated Pareto(1): P(∑θiYi>x)>1/xP(\sum\theta_iY_i>x)>1/xP(∑θi​Yi​>x)>1/x (step (b)).
  5. Lemma 1: WNAID transforms f(Yi)f(Y_i)f(Yi​) pull back to WNAID YiY_iYi​.
  6. Lemma 2: Y≤st∑θiYiY\le_{\mathrm{st}}\sum\theta_iY_iY≤st​∑θi​Yi​ implies f(Y)≤st∑θif(Yi)f(Y)\le_{\mathrm{st}}\sum\theta_if(Y_i)f(Y)≤st​∑θi​f(Yi​) for increasing convex fff.
  7. Display (10), f(Y)≤st∑θif(Yi)f(Y)\le_{\mathrm{st}}\sum\theta_if(Y_i)f(Y)≤st​∑θi​f(Yi​), with its strict version.
  8. Proposition 1: XXX is super-Pareto iff g(x)=1/P(X>x)g(x)=1/P(X>x)g(x)=1/P(X>x) is strictly increasing and concave from the essential infimum zXz_XzX​ on; for regular XXX, zX>0z_X>0zX​>0 and g(x)≤x/zXg(x)\le x/z_Xg(x)≤x/zX​.
  9. g(t/c)≤g(t)/cg(t/c)\le g(t)/cg(t/c)≤g(t)/c for regular XXX, t≥0t\ge0t≥0, c∈(0,1]c\in(0,1]c∈(0,1] (step (d)).
  10. Display (11): X1B≤st∑kckX1BkX\mathbb 1_B\le_{\mathrm{st}}\sum_kc_kX\mathbb 1_{B_k}X1B​≤st​∑k​ck​X1Bk​​ for mutually exclusive events.
  11. –13. The decomposition over the events BS=⋂i∈SAi∩⋂i∉SAicB_S=\bigcap_{i\in S}A_i\cap\bigcap_{i\notin S}A_i^cBS​=⋂i∈S​Ai​∩⋂i∈/S​Aic​, the term-by-term comparison, and ∑SP(BS)∑i∈Sθi=P(A)\sum_SP(B_S)\sum_{i\in S}\theta_i=P(A)∑S​P(BS​)∑i∈S​θi​=P(A) (step (d)).

Significance

The theorem gives an exact, non-asymptotic diversification penalty: for every capital level xxx, a pooled position of super-Pareto losses has a larger probability of exceeding xxx than an individual one, so VaRp\mathrm{VaR}_pVaRp​ is strictly superadditive at every level p∈(0,1)p\in(0,1)p∈(0,1) for such portfolios (display (6) of the source). Part (ii) extends this to catastrophe losses triggered by events, the standard model X1AX\mathbb 1_AX1A​ of insurance. It also explains why the finite-mean intuition (Proposition 2) cannot be transferred to infinite-mean models.

The result is proved in the source; this mission formalizes it. Nothing here is machine-checked yet. The development adds to Lean a family of infinite-mean laws defined as convex transforms of Pareto(1), a negative-dependence notion weaker than negative association, strict stochastic dominance, and the survival-function characterization of super-Pareto laws, all of which are reusable in risk theory and actuarial science.

Difficulty

The obvious route through independence and convolution formulas does not apply: the hypothesis is weak negative association, which only controls probabilities of decreasing sets, so the proof keeps one variable conditioned and inducts on nnn, which requires weak negative association to pass to subfamilies, a fact the source uses without stating. Passing from Pareto(1) to super-Pareto losses needs the dependence structure to be transported back through fff, which is not injective on the flat part where XXX has an atom (Lemma 1). Strictness is delicate: the printed induction bounds P(S≥x)P(S\ge x)P(S≥x), while strict dominance needs P(S>x)P(S>x)P(S>x), including at an atom of XXX at its essential infimum. Part (ii) mixes sub-portfolios over the events BSB_SBS​, and the paper's comparison silently treats XXX as independent of these events; a correct argument compares laws, not random variables, and needs the scaling g(t/c)≤g(t)/cg(t/c)\le g(t)/cg(t/c)≤g(t)/c, which holds only for regular XXX.

Formalization scope

Random variables are measurable functions Ω→R\Omega\to\mathbb RΩ→R on a probability space; laws are Measure.map; Pareto(1) is Mathlib's paretoMeasure 1 1. The index set [n][n][n] is a finite type of any size, and the atomless assumption of the source is not made: the statements depend only on joint laws, so the source's case is a special case. ≤st\le_{\mathrm{st}}≤st​ is the platform definition StarShapedRisk.LawInvariant.FSD, where FSD P X Y means X≤stYX\le_{\mathrm{st}}YX≤st​Y. Weak negative association quantifies over measurable decreasing sets (IsLowerSet in the componentwise order) and is written in product form. The function fff of the super-Pareto definition is defined on R\mathbb RR, and regularity uses the same fff. The essential infimum is Mathlib's essInf; the source's printed formula for it (p.4) gives −∞-\infty−∞ for every random variable and is not used. g(x)=1/P(X>x)g(x)=1/P(X>x)g(x)=1/P(X>x) is real-valued and equals 000 where P(X>x)=0P(X>x)=0P(X>x)=0, which happens only for bounded XXX, never for a super-Pareto one.

In part (ii) the events A1,…,AnA_1,\dots,A_nA1​,…,An​ are jointly independent of the vector (X1,…,Xn)(X_1,\dots,X_n)(X1​,…,Xn​). Requiring only each AiA_iAi​ separately to be independent of the vector makes (5) false, so that weaker hypothesis must not be used. The strict clause quantifies over every level with P(X>x)∈(0,1)P(X>x)\in(0,1)P(X>x)∈(0,1), and part (ii) must not be dropped.

Contributions are welcome on the subfamily property of weak negative association, the Pareto(1) tail computations, the quantile-transform construction behind Lemma 1, and the closure of ≤st\le_{\mathrm{st}}≤st​ under mixtures.

Selected references

  • Y. Chen, P. Embrechts, R. Wang, An unexpected stochastic dominance: Pareto distributions, dependence, and diversification, arXiv:2208.08471v4, 2024; Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.08471
  • H. Albrecher, S. Asmussen, D. Kortschak, Tail asymptotics for the sum of two heavy-tailed dependent risks, Extremes 9(2):107–130, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10687-006-0011-1
  • H. W. Block, T. H. Savits, M. Shaked, Some concepts of negative dependence, Annals of Probability 10(3):765–772, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176993784
  • K. Joag-Dev, F. Proschan, Negative association of random variables with applications, Annals of Statistics 11(1):286–295, 1983. https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1176346079
  • M. Shaked, J. G. Shanthikumar, Stochastic Orders, Springer, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-34675-5
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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: iris

Inventory Systems with Record Inaccuracy: Transaction Errors vs. Unobservable Loss: the restocking cost is unimodal in the restocking time, so the optimal restocking policy is a threshold policyResearch Paper

Motivation

Retail inventory records are often wrong. In an audit of 370,000 inventory records from 37 stores of one retailer, only 35% were accurate (DeHoratius and Raman 2008, as reported by the paper, p.1). The record drifts for two reasons. Unobservable loss (theft, damage, misplacement) removes units without touching the record. Transaction errors at the checkout record the sale of one product as the sale of another. A transaction error removes a unit of the focal product without updating its record, and it can also lower the focal product's record with no physical sale behind it (a phantom sale). A retailer who restocks by the record can then leave a shelf empty for a long time.

Chehrazi (2025) models a single product on a shelf whose stock is never observed between restockings. The retailer sees only the inventory record and chooses when to restock. The paper's analytical result is that the optimal restocking policy is a threshold policy: after each observed change in the record, restock once enough time has passed without a further change. This mission formalizes that result and the four results its proof uses.

Setting

A shelf holds at most qmq_mqm​ units. Demand arrives as a Poisson process with rate λD>0\lambda_D>0λD​>0. Each sale is recorded correctly with probability 1−α1-\alpha1−α, and otherwise it is a transaction error. This gives λE=αλD\lambda_E=\alpha\lambda_DλE​=αλD​ and λD^=(1−α)λD\lambda_{\hat D}=(1-\alpha)\lambda_DλD^​=(1−α)λD​. Unobservable loss occurs at rate λL≥0\lambda_L\ge0λL​≥0, and phantom sales at rate λP≥0\lambda_P\ge0λP​≥0. Unobserved stock reductions occur at rate λL^=λL+λE\lambda_{\hat L}=\lambda_L+\lambda_EλL^​=λL​+λE​. Costs are discounted at rate ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0. They are a goodwill cost cDc_DcD​ plus margin mmm per unit of unmet demand, cLc_LcL​ per lost unit, a price difference Δp\Delta pΔp per transaction error, and kRk_RkR​ per restocking. A restocking fills the shelf and reveals its stock.

The retailer's belief Π=(Π0,…,Πqm)\Pi=(\Pi_0,\dots,\Pi_{q_m})Π=(Π0​,…,Πqm​​) is the conditional distribution of the shelf stock given the record. Between observable events (a correctly recorded sale while in stock, or a phantom sale) the belief follows the ODE (1) of the paper. Its solution from Π(0)=F\Pi(0)=FΠ(0)=F is

ΠF(s)=esMF1⊤esMF,(Mψ)q=λL^ψq+11{q<qm}−(λL^+λD^)ψq1{q>0}.\Pi^F(s)=\frac{e^{sM}F}{\mathbf 1^\top e^{sM}F},\qquad (M\psi)_q=\lambda_{\hat L}\psi_{q+1}\mathbb 1_{\{q<q_m\}}-(\lambda_{\hat L}+\lambda_{\hat D})\psi_q\mathbb 1_{\{q>0\}}.ΠF(s)=1⊤esMFesMF​,(Mψ)q​=λL^​ψq+1​1{q<qm​}​−(λL^​+λD^​)ψq​1{q>0}​.

Observable events occur at rate h(Π)=λD^(1−Π0)+λPh(\Pi)=\lambda_{\hat D}(1-\Pi_0)+\lambda_Ph(Π)=λD^​(1−Π0​)+λP​. At an event the belief jumps by Bayes' rule (2) to

J(Π)q=λD^Πq+11{q<qm}+λPΠqh(Π).J(\Pi)_q=\frac{\lambda_{\hat D}\Pi_{q+1}\mathbb 1_{\{q<q_m\}}+\lambda_P\Pi_q}{h(\Pi)}.J(Π)q​=h(Π)λD^​Πq+1​1{q<qm​}​+λP​Πq​​.

Let uuu be the minimum cost starting from a full shelf. A restocking at time τ\tauτ then costs kR+uk_R+ukR​+u. Problem (4) of the paper asks for the best restocking time τ≥0\tau\ge0τ≥0, which is preempted by the next observable event ι\iotaι if that event comes first. Its objective is

vu(F;τ)=∫0τe−ρsSF(s)[c(ΠF(s))+h(ΠF(s)) vu∗(J(ΠF(s)))]ds+(kR+u)e−ρτSF(τ),v_u(F;\tau)=\int_0^\tau e^{-\rho s}S^F(s)\Big[c(\Pi^F(s))+h(\Pi^F(s))\,v^*_u\big(J(\Pi^F(s))\big)\Big]ds+(k_R+u)e^{-\rho\tau}S^F(\tau),vu​(F;τ)=∫0τ​e−ρsSF(s)[c(ΠF(s))+h(ΠF(s))vu∗​(J(ΠF(s)))]ds+(kR​+u)e−ρτSF(τ),

where SFS^FSF is the survival function of ι\iotaι and ccc the running cost. The value function is vu∗(F)=inf⁡τ≥0vu(F;τ)v^*_u(F)=\inf_{\tau\ge0}v_u(F;\tau)vu∗​(F)=infτ≥0​vu​(F;τ), and u=vu∗(1{q=qm})u=v^*_u(\mathbb 1_{\{q=q_m\}})u=vu∗​(1{q=qm​}​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (unimodality)

Assume λL+αλD>0\lambda_L+\alpha\lambda_D>0λL​+αλD​>0. Then for every initial distribution FFF there is τu∗(F)≥0\tau^*_u(F)\ge0τu∗​(F)≥0 such that

τ↦vu(F;τ) is strictly decreasing on [0,τu∗(F)] and strictly increasing on [τu∗(F),∞).\tau\mapsto v_u(F;\tau)\ \text{is strictly decreasing on }[0,\tau^*_u(F)]\ \text{and strictly increasing on }[\tau^*_u(F),\infty).τ↦vu​(F;τ) is strictly decreasing on [0,τu∗​(F)] and strictly increasing on [τu∗​(F),∞).

The goal states no formula for τu∗\tau^*_uτu∗​, only its existence.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 1(a): for t1<t2t_1<t_2t1​<t2​, Π(t2)≤lrΠ(t1)\Pi(t_2)\le_{lr}\Pi(t_1)Π(t2​)≤lr​Π(t1​) along the flow (1).
  2. Theorem 1(b): the dynamics (1)–(2) preserve ≤lr\le_{lr}≤lr​ along a common history of events.
  3. Corollary 1: a later jjj-th event gives an ≤lr\le_{lr}≤lr​-smaller belief.
  4. Theorem 2: Q01≤stQ02⇒vu∗(FQ01)≥vu∗(FQ02)Q^1_0\le_{st}Q^2_0\Rightarrow v^*_u(F_{Q^1_0})\ge v^*_u(F_{Q^2_0})Q01​≤st​Q02​⇒vu∗​(FQ01​​)≥vu∗​(FQ02​​).
  5. Theorem 3: if Q01≤stQ02Q^1_0\le_{st}Q^2_0Q01​≤st​Q02​ and vu(FQ02;τ)>kR+uv_u(F_{Q^2_0};\tau)>k_R+uvu​(FQ02​​;τ)>kR​+u, then vu(FQ01;τ)>kR+uv_u(F_{Q^1_0};\tau)>k_R+uvu​(FQ01​​;τ)>kR​+u.

Significance

The theorem reduces a partially observed control problem with a qmq_mqm​-dimensional belief state to one scalar threshold per observed history. The policy is easy to state: after the jjj-th change in the record, restock when the time since that change reaches τu∗(Π(ιj))\tau^*_u(\Pi(\iota_j))τu∗​(Π(ιj​)). Corollary 2 of the paper adds that the threshold is monotone in the belief. The paper's numerical study and its dynamic-filtration approximation (§4) rest on this structure.

The results are proved in the paper (Appendix A) and have no machine-checked proof. The mission adds to the platform a continuous-time, partially observed inventory model in piecewise-deterministic form, with likelihood-ratio and stochastic-order monotonicity results for its belief dynamics.

The printed Theorem 4 needs one extra hypothesis. If λL+αλD=0\lambda_L+\alpha\lambda_D=0λL​+αλD​=0, the full-shelf belief is a rest point of (1). In that case the objective can decrease forever. With qm=1q_m=1qm​=1, λD=ρ=kR=m=1\lambda_D=\rho=k_R=m=1λD​=ρ=kR​=m=1, cD=2c_D=2cD​=2 and all other rates and costs 000, every assumption of the paper holds with u=1u=1u=1, and vu(1{q=1};τ)=1+e−2τv_u(\mathbb 1_{\{q=1\}};\tau)=1+e^{-2\tau}vu​(1{q=1}​;τ)=1+e−2τ has no minimizer. The goal carries the hypothesis λL+αλD>0\lambda_L+\alpha\lambda_D>0λL​+αλD​>0. Theorems 1–3 keep the paper's assumptions.

Difficulty

The belief dynamics are nonlinear, and the belief has qm+1q_m+1qm​+1 coordinates with no small sufficient statistic. Unimodality of vu(F;⋅)v_u(F;\cdot)vu​(F;⋅) is not a convexity statement. The obvious route, differentiating in τ\tauτ and signing the derivative, fails because the derivative involves vu∗v^*_uvu∗​ at the jumped belief, which is known only through the fixed-point equation (4).

The paper's route needs two order-theoretic facts. First, the belief drifts down in the likelihood-ratio order (Theorem 1), and this survives Bayes updates. Second, vu∗v^*_uvu∗​ is antitone in the first-order stochastic order (Theorem 2), proved by coupling two partially observed systems and by induction on the number of observed events. Existence of a minimizer then needs the stockout probability to tend to 111, which is where λL+αλD>0\lambda_L+\alpha\lambda_D>0λL​+αλD​>0 enters.

Formalization scope

States are Fin (q_m+1), with index qqq equal to the stock level. Beliefs live in stdSimplex ℝ (Fin (q_m+1)). The flow is written in closed form with NormedSpace.exp on matrices. The orders ≤st\le_{st}≤st​ and ≤lr\le_{lr}≤lr​ are the published LovejoyPOMDP.Monotone.StochGE and MLRGE, both with the larger argument first.

The value function vu∗v^*_uvu∗​ is not defined by a formula. Every theorem quantifies over any VVV that is measurable, bounded on the simplex, and satisfies (4) as a greatest lower bound (IsGLB) over τ∈[0,∞)\tau\in[0,\infty)τ∈[0,∞), together with u=V(1{q=qm})u=V(\mathbb 1_{\{q=q_m\}})u=V(1{q=qm​}​) and the feasibility conditions (FC1) and (FC2) of Appendix B. Equation (4) is a contraction on bounded functions, so this VVV is unique on the simplex and is vu∗v^*_uvu∗​. Unbounded or junk solutions are excluded by boundedness and measurability. The infimum is never Lean's ⨅, which returns 000 on unbounded sets.

Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 concern shelf inventory distributions: beliefs reachable from 1{q=qm}\mathbb 1_{\{q=q_m\}}1{q=qm​}​ by (1)–(2). For arbitrary beliefs Theorem 1(a) is false. Theorems 2–4 hold for every distribution.

A complete development needs ODE uniqueness for (1), positivity and total-positivity properties of esMe^{sM}esM, interchange of expectation and integral for the law of ι\iotaι, and the contraction argument for (4). The total-positivity and contraction parts are reusable for other continuous-time belief models. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative arguments for Theorem 2 that avoid coupling, are welcome.

Selected references

  • N. Chehrazi, Inventory Systems with Record Inaccuracy: Transaction Errors vs. Unobservable Loss, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0274
  • N. DeHoratius, A. Raman, Inventory Record Inaccuracy: An Empirical Analysis, Management Science 54(4), 2008. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1070.0788
  • M. H. A. Davis, Piecewise-Deterministic Markov Processes: A General Class of Non-Diffusion Stochastic Models, J. Royal Statistical Society B 46(3), 1984. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1984.tb01308.x
  • M. Shaked, J. G. Shanthikumar, Stochastic Orders, Springer, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-34675-5
  • W. S. Lovejoy, Some Monotonicity Results for Partially Observed Markov Decision Processes, Operations Research 35(5), 1987. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.35.5.736
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Operations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Dynamic Stochastic Matching Under Limited Time: Constant-factor reward approximation on arbitrary and bipartite graphsResearch Paper

Matching agents before they leave

A matching platform must decide whether to pair available agents now or wait for a more valuable partner. Waiting creates an opportunity and a risk: an agent may leave before that partner arrives. Ride sharing, service exchanges and matching markets motivate models in which arrivals continue indefinitely and departure times are not announced in advance. A policy therefore needs to make decisions from the information currently available, rather than from the complete future arrival sequence.

Aouad and Sarıtaç study this tradeoff through dynamic stochastic matching. Their reward-maximization result gives constant-factor guarantees relative to the best online policy, even when finding that policy exactly is computationally difficult. The comparison is with an informed online controller subject to the same observations, rather than a controller that knows future arrivals and departures. This mission concerns Theorem 2 and its supporting benchmark, decomposition and population-comparison statements. Aouad and Sarıtaç, 2022.

The stochastic system and its decisions

There are finitely many agent types. Type iii has a positive arrival rate λi\lambda_iλi​. Arrivals form independent Poisson streams; an arriving agent of type iii has an independent exponential sojourn time of positive rate μi\mu_iμi​. The system starts empty, but the horizon, the total number of arriving agents and the population are unbounded. A symmetric real reward r(i,j)r(i,j)r(i,j) is assigned to each type pair. A type self-loop permits matching two distinct agents of that type; an individual agent cannot be matched with itself.

A matching policy observes arrivals, types and departures as they occur, together with its own independent randomization. It may match only agents currently present, and each agent can be used once. If RtπR_t^\piRtπ​ is the sum of rewards from matches executed by time ttt, its performance is

rπ=lim inf⁡t→∞E[Rtπ]t.r^\pi=\liminf_{t\to\infty}\frac{\mathbb E[R_t^\pi]}{t}.rπ=t→∞liminf​tE[Rtπ​]​.

The optimal online value r∗r^*r∗ is derived from the whole admissible policy class. No optimal reward or successful policy is an input to the model. A bipartite instance has a partition of the types such that every nonzero-reward edge crosses the partition. In the bipartite-asymmetric regime, one side departs immediately after its arrival decision; agents on the other side have positive finite exponential lifetimes. An immediate agent can match on arrival, and is unavailable afterward. This is represented separately from a finite exponential lifetime, without multiplying by an infinite real parameter. These are the regimes of Section 5. Source, printed pp. 20–21.

Formalization targets

The goal preserves the polynomial-time construction and all three constants in Theorem 2. A single concrete randomized compatibility policy must satisfy

rπ^≥e−14e r∗r^{\widehat\pi}\ge\frac{e-1}{4e}\,r^*rπ≥4ee−1​r∗

on arbitrary graphs, with the stronger guarantees

rπ^≥e−12e r∗on bipartite graphs,rπ^≥(1−1e)r∗in the bipartite-asymmetric regime.r^{\widehat\pi}\ge\frac{e-1}{2e}\,r^*\quad\text{on bipartite graphs},\qquad r^{\widehat\pi}\ge\left(1-\frac1e\right)r^*\quad\text{in the bipartite-asymmetric regime}.rπ≥2ee−1​r∗on bipartite graphs,rπ≥(1−e1​)r∗in the bipartite-asymmetric regime.

Its offline construction and online decisions have explicit computational semantics. Uniform finite programs perform exact arithmetic, comparisons and memory operations. Offline work permits one polynomial-size linear-programming call through an explicit exact-solver interface. Online work uses two independent exact samples and polynomial work in the finite type input and current realization size. This specifies the operational interpretation for real input; it is not a claim about the bit complexity of arbitrary real numbers. Theorem 2 and Algorithm 2.

The nine supporting milestones retain their source numbering: Claim 1, Lemma 1, Claim 3, Lemma 9, Claim 5, Lemma 11, Claim 6, Lemma 12 and Lemma 10. They concern modified match counts, cost and reward flow benchmarks, polynomial flow construction, nested compatibility decomposition, virtual empty-population probabilities, boundary-coordinate equality, lower-orthant population comparison and the policy's three reward guarantees. The goal is not duplicated as a milestone. Sections 3 and 5; Appendices A.2 and B.

What the guarantees establish

A constant-factor guarantee gives a uniform performance floor across arrival intensities, finite departure rates and graph structures. The improved bipartite factors identify settings where the graph partition permits stronger guarantees. The immediate-departure regime includes online demand that must be served at arrival while the other side is replenished stochastically. The reward target imposes no common departure rate, triangle inequality or population bound. Theorem 2.

The formal development specifies reusable marked-arrival processes, observable matching policies, extended-value objectives, finite linear programs, continuous-time jump execution and operational computation. Published LP and birth–death balance definitions are reused. The remaining theorems are open Lean statements: successful compilation establishes that the declarations are well-formed, not that the paper's proofs have been machine checked.

Dependence and source discrepancies

Active populations are coupled by competition for each arriving passive agent. Independent birth–death coordinates describe the virtual system, while the matching policy can remove only one compatible active partner per passive arrival. A stationary balance equation alone does not determine the complete matching execution or establish its long-run reward. Preserving the observation restrictions is equally important: knowing a future sojourn endpoint would change the admissible controller. Appendix B.4.

The held source also contains discrepancies that remain visible. Lemma 9 prints r∗≤κQ∗r^*\le\kappa Q^*r∗≤κQ∗, although the preceding guarantee has the opposite placement of the factor. Claim 5 prints an abandonment-flow equality without the saturation condition invoked later in its proof. Without that equality, the printed active-label birth intensity can differ from the actual labeling intensity. The affected assertions are retained, and the numerical findings are recorded separately. Lemma 12 explicitly includes comparisons for both actual policy populations and the separately defined printed-generator process. The virtual generator’s diagonal uses the conservative off-diagonal sum; the printed sum omits that restriction, although the coordinate-generator formula supplies it. These issues do not justify a weaker approximation target. Printed pp. 22, 43–49.

Formalization scope and conventions

Types use finite indices and agents use natural-number identities starting at zero. Count coordinates are unbounded natural numbers. A countable product of exponential seeds realizes arrivals, lifetime marks and independent internal coins. Policies are specified by pairwise matching stopping times up to null events, with infinity denoting a pair that is never matched. This removes restrictions on impossible seed paths while preserving all observable decision laws. Positive and negative cumulative rewards are summed separately before taking expectations, avoiding the default value of a divergent real series. Cost sums allow infinite forbidden costs.

Benchmark values use complete extended orders. Their statements explicitly include the attainment implicit in the source's minimum and maximum terminology; the goal also asserts stationary attainment of the online optimum. Empty type graphs are included as a declared extension with zero reward and flow. Empty compatibility supports have an explicit isolated-label branch. Ties are fixed by observable type, compatibility index and agent identity. The source's stochastic order is the lower-orthant probability order, not a silently substituted upper-set order.

Every theorem declares its representation choices and extensions in a terminal differences list. In particular, Claim 1 also permits stationary rules to inspect relative arrival order, and the population-comparison statements permit feasible flows without a reward guarantee. All original source instances remain included. Finite simulations, supplied performance bounds and truncated horizons do not replace the model or the goal.

Selected references

  • Ali Aouad and Ömer Sarıtaç, Dynamic Stochastic Matching Under Limited Time, Operations Research, 2022. DOI: 10.1287/opre.2022.2293. Citations use the held published-basis manuscript: printed pages 1–64 correspond to PDF pages 2–65; PDF page 1 is the repository cover.
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Supply Chain Performance with Target-Oriented Firms: a target-oriented retailer raises wholesale-price supply-chain profit for moderate targets and reaches first-best at αr=bξc+a\alpha^r = b\xi^c + aαr=bξc+aResearch Paper

Why wholesale prices and targets

A wholesale price contract is the simplest agreement between a supplier and a retailer: the supplier names a unit price and the retailer chooses how much to buy. It is widely used and it is known to be inefficient when both firms maximize expected profit. The retailer bears all the demand risk and orders less than a centralized firm would, the double marginalization effect of Spengler (1950). The price-only model of Lariviere and Porteus (2001) is the standard reference for this game, and the survey of Cachon (2003) records the accepted conclusion that a wholesale price contract does not coordinate a supply chain.

That conclusion assumes risk-neutral firms. Many firms instead plan around targets. Brown and Sim (2009) proposed the CVaR-satisficing measure, which scores a random payoff by how robustly it reaches a target, and Chen, Long and Perakis (2015) applied it to the newsvendor. Chen and Tang (2021) ask what happens to the supply chain as a whole when the retailer is target-oriented. This mission formalizes their answer for the total supply-chain profit.

Setting

A supplier with marginal cost ccc sells to a retailer at wholesale price www. The retailer sells at a fixed retail price ppp and faces demand DDD uniformly distributed on [a,a+b][a,a+b][a,a+b], with 0<c<p0<c<p0<c<p, a≥0a\ge0a≥0, b>0b>0b>0. Unsold units have no salvage value and unmet demand is lost. An order y≥0y\ge0y≥0 yields the random retailer profit

V(y;D)=pmin⁡{D,y}−wy.V(y;D)=p\min\{D,y\}-wy .V(y;D)=pmin{D,y}−wy.

The extended CVaR of a random variable VVV at level η∈(−1,1)\eta\in(-1,1)η∈(−1,1) is a tail average: for η≥0\eta\ge0η≥0 the average of the worst 1−η1-\eta1−η of the distribution, and for η<0\eta<0η<0 the average of the best 1+η1+\eta1+η. The CVaR-satisficing measure with target τ\tauτ is

ρτ(V)=sup⁡{η∈(−1,1): CVaRη(V)≥τ}\rho_\tau(V)=\sup\{\eta\in(-1,1):\ \mathrm{CVaR}_\eta(V)\ge\tau\}ρτ​(V)=sup{η∈(−1,1): CVaRη​(V)≥τ}

when that set is nonempty, and −1-1−1 otherwise.

The supplier is a Stackelberg leader and maximizes (w−c)y(w-c)y(w−c)y. A risk-neutral retailer answers www with an order maximizing E[V(y;D)]\mathbb E[V(y;D)]E[V(y;D)]. A target-oriented retailer with target coefficient αr\alpha^rαr answers with an order maximizing ρτr(V(y;D))\rho_{\tau^r}(V(y;D))ρτr​(V(y;D)), where τr=αr(p−w)\tau^r=\alpha^r(p-w)τr=αr(p−w). These are the settings "NN" and "NT". Write ξc=(p−c)/p\xi^c=(p-c)/pξc=(p−c)/p for the critical fractile. The total profit at a decision pair is Π=(w−c)y+p E[min⁡(D,y)]−wy\Pi=(w-c)y+p\,\mathbb E[\min(D,y)]-wyΠ=(w−c)y+pE[min(D,y)]−wy, and the centralized profit is Πnnc(y)=p E[min⁡(y,D)]−cy\Pi^c_{nn}(y)=p\,\mathbb E[\min(y,D)]-cyΠnnc​(y)=pE[min(y,D)]−cy, with maximum Πnnc∗\Pi^{c*}_{nn}Πnnc∗​ over y≥0y\ge0y≥0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 8

For αr∈Dom={αr:0<αr, a≤αr<a+b}\alpha^r\in\mathrm{Dom}=\{\alpha^r: 0<\alpha^r,\ a\le\alpha^r<a+b\}αr∈Dom={αr:0<αr, a≤αr<a+b}, NN and NT outcomes exist, and there are thresholds αˉIr1,αˉIr2\bar\alpha^{r1}_I,\bar\alpha^{r2}_IαˉIr1​,αˉIr2​ such that

Πnt∗≤Πnn∗  if  αr≤αˉIr1  or  αr≥αˉIr2,Πnt∗≥Πnn∗  if  αr∈(αˉIr1,αˉIr2);\Pi^*_{nt}\le\Pi^*_{nn}\ \text{ if }\ \alpha^r\le\bar\alpha^{r1}_I\ \text{ or }\ \alpha^r\ge\bar\alpha^{r2}_I,\qquad \Pi^*_{nt}\ge\Pi^*_{nn}\ \text{ if }\ \alpha^r\in(\bar\alpha^{r1}_I,\bar\alpha^{r2}_I);Πnt∗​≤Πnn∗​  if  αr≤αˉIr1​  or  αr≥αˉIr2​,Πnt∗​≥Πnn∗​  if  αr∈(αˉIr1​,αˉIr2​);

Πnt∗\Pi^*_{nt}Πnt∗​ is concave in αr\alpha^rαr from αˉIr1\bar\alpha^{r1}_IαˉIr1​ on and attains its maximum at αr=bξc+a\alpha^r=b\xi^c+aαr=bξc+a; and

Πnt∗=Πnnc∗atαr=bξc+a.\Pi^*_{nt}=\Pi^{c*}_{nn}\quad\text{at}\quad\alpha^r=b\xi^c+a .Πnt∗​=Πnnc∗​atαr=bξc+a.

The thresholds are existential, as printed, and one pair serves the first two parts. Every clause is part of the goal.

Milestones

In the order the paper's argument uses them:

  1. the centralized solution for uniform demand (display after (8), p.11);
  2. the NN solution (9)–(10) and footnote 6 (p.12);
  3. the uniform clause of Lemma 1, the target-oriented retailer's order y(w)y(w)y(w) (Online Appendix p.1);
  4. Proposition 2, the NT decisions in the three target regimes (p.13);
  5. the step ynt∗=ynt1≤ynn∗y^*_{nt}=y^1_{nt}\le y^*_{nn}ynt∗​=ynt1​≤ynn∗​ for αr∈[αntr1,αntr2)\alpha^r\in[\alpha^{r1}_{nt},\alpha^{r2}_{nt})αr∈[αntr1​,αntr2​) from the proof of Proposition 6 (Online Appendix p.6), which the proof of Proposition 8 cites.

Significance

The result. Part 3 is the paper's contribution to the coordination literature: with a suitably chosen target, a wholesale price contract alone delivers the first-best supply-chain profit. Parts 1 and 2 locate it. Total profit rises above the risk-neutral level only on a middle band of targets, so both a modest and an overly ambitious retailer leave the chain no better off. The paper's other comparisons (Proposition 7 on the firms' individual profits, Propositions 9 to 17 on the other settings) are not part of this mission.

The formalization. The results are proved in the paper's Online Appendix. They have no machine-checked proof on this platform: the goal and the milestones are all new statements here. The mission adds to the platform an extended, two-sided CVaR, the Brown–Sim satisficing measure with its infeasible branch, and a price-only newsvendor Stackelberg game in which the leader's supremum need not be attained. Building these exposes three places where the printed statements need a correction or a precise reading, listed under Formalization scope.

Difficulty

The retailer's objective is not expected profit, so the classical critical-fractile calculation does not apply. Finding the order that maximizes the satisficing measure means working with tail averages of a law that has an atom, because every unit beyond realized demand is wasted and every order caps sales. The retailer's reaction then has two regimes with a kink, which depend on whether the optimal measure is positive or negative, and the supplier optimizes against that kinked reaction. The supplier's problem has three target regimes: in one the optimum sits at the kink, in one it has a radical closed form, and in one the supremum is not attained. The comparison in Proposition 8 has to hold across all of these regimes and across the two regimes of the risk-neutral benchmark.

Formalization scope

Representation. Demand is the law (1/b)⋅(1/b)\cdot(1/b)⋅Lebesgue measure restricted to [a,a+b][a,a+b][a,a+b], and V(y;D)V(y;D)V(y;D) is its push-forward. CVaR is defined from the quantile function QVQ_VQV​ (the published RiskFunctionals_StochDominance_QuantileFunction) as the average of QVQ_VQV​ over (0,1−η](0,1-\eta](0,1−η], respectively (−η,1](-\eta,1](−η,1]. Best responses are defined as maximizers of (6) and (7) over y≥0y\ge0y≥0. None of the closed forms of the retailer's reaction or of the equilibria is a definition. Only the quantities αntr1,αntr2,wnt1,ynt1\alpha^{r1}_{nt},\alpha^{r2}_{nt},w^1_{nt},y^1_{nt}αntr1​,αntr2​,wnt1​,ynt1​ named by Proposition 2 are transcribed.

Conventions and corrections.

  • Quantile averages. The paper's conditional expectations presuppose a unique η\etaη-quantile. V(y;D)V(y;D)V(y;D) has an atom at (p−w)y(p-w)y(p−w)y, so that quantile does not exist in general, and the average form is used.
  • The excluded endpoint. αr=a+b\alpha^r=a+bαr=a+b, which the paper's ranges include, is excluded. There every order has satisficing measure −1-1−1, every y≥0y\ge0y≥0 is a best response, and the NT outcome is undefined.
  • Lemma 1 at w=pw=pw=p. The uniform clause is stated for w∈[c,p)w\in[c,p)w∈[c,p). At w=pw=pw=p the printed value αr\alpha^rαr is wrong: the maximizers are exactly [0,a][0,a][0,a], as the paper itself says on p.13.
  • "p−ϵp-\epsilonp−ϵ". The paper's "infinitely small" ϵ\epsilonϵ is read as a limit. An outcome is a limit of pairs (wn,yn)(w_n,y_n)(wn​,yn​) with wn∈[c,p)w_n\in[c,p)wn​∈[c,p), yny_nyn​ a best response, and supplier profits tending to the supremum. Profits at an outcome are evaluated at the limit pair.
  • Conditions on b/ab/ab/a are written without division, for example bξc≤2ab\xi^c\le2abξc≤2a, so that a=0a=0a=0 means b/a=+∞b/a=+\inftyb/a=+∞.

Non-triviality. Outcome statements are quantified over all outcomes and also assert that outcomes exist, so they cannot hold vacuously.

Infrastructure. A complete development needs tail-average calculus for laws with one atom and the attainment and uniqueness analysis for the two retailer problems. The extended CVaR and satisficing measure are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions welcome: the general log-concave analogues of the milestones, and the paper's other settings as further statements.

Selected references

  • J. J. Spengler, Vertical integration and antitrust policy, Journal of Political Economy 58(4), 1950, 347–352. https://doi.org/10.1086/256962
  • M. A. Lariviere, E. L. Porteus, Selling to the newsvendor: An analysis of price-only contracts, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3(4), 2001, 293–305. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.3.4.293.9971
  • G. P. Cachon, Supply chain coordination with contracts, Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science 11, 2003, 227–339. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • D. B. Brown, M. Sim, Satisficing measures for analysis of risky positions, Management Science 55(1), 2009, 71–84. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0929
  • L. G. Chen, D. Z. Long, G. Perakis, The impact of a target on newsvendor decisions, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 17(1), 2015, 78–86. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2014.0500
  • L. G. Chen, Q. Tang, Supply chain performance with target-oriented firms, SSRN 3533746, version of July 6, 2021, with Online Appendix. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3533746
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CombinatoricsConvex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: iris

A Characterization of Simultaneous Optimization, Majorization, and (Bi-)Submodular Polyhedra: Compact Convex Sets with Least (a, b)-Majorized Elements for All (a, b) Are Exactly Base PolyhedraResearch Paper

Motivation

Many resource allocation problems ask for a vector xxx in a feasible set C⊆RnC\subseteq\mathbb R^nC⊆Rn that minimizes a symmetric convex cost: the variance of a load profile in energy scheduling, the makespan of a schedule, an egalitarian division of a joint gain. Different symmetric objectives usually have different minimizers, so the choice of objective matters. For one important class of feasible sets it does not: on the base polyhedron of a submodular function there is a single point that minimizes every separable convex objective at once, and even every Schur-convex objective. This "simultaneous optimization" property goes back to Fujishige's lexicographically optimal bases for b=0b=0b=0, and was established for scaled and shifted objectives by Schoot Uiterkamp, Gerards and Hurink (On a reduction for a class of resource allocation problems, INFORMS Journal on Computing, 2022).

The paper behind this mission, M. H. H. Schoot Uiterkamp, A characterization of simultaneous optimization, majorization, and (bi)submodular polyhedra (arXiv:2201.06596v2, 2023; later in Mathematics of Operations Research), asks the converse: which sets have this property for every scaling and every shift? Its answer, Theorem 5, is that among compact convex sets these are exactly the base polyhedra. The result explains why trade-offs between symmetric objectives are unavoidable in allocation problems whose feasible set is not a base polyhedron, and it yields a characterization of convex cooperative games through egalitarian solutions (Theorem 9 of the paper).

Setting

Let N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n} and 2N2^N2N its power set. For x∈Rnx\in\mathbb R^nx∈Rn and S⊆NS\subseteq NS⊆N write x(S)=∑i∈Sxix(S)=\sum_{i\in S}x_ix(S)=∑i∈S​xi​.

A set function f:2N→Rf:2^N\to\mathbb Rf:2N→R is submodular if f(∅)=0f(\emptyset)=0f(∅)=0 and f(A)+f(B)≥f(A∪B)+f(A∩B)f(A)+f(B)\ge f(A\cup B)+f(A\cap B)f(A)+f(B)≥f(A∪B)+f(A∩B) for all A,BA,BA,B. Its submodular polyhedron and base polyhedron are

P(f)={x∈Rn:x(A)≤f(A) ∀A∈2N},B(f)={x∈P(f):x(N)=f(N)}.P(f)=\{x\in\mathbb R^n: x(A)\le f(A)\ \forall A\in 2^N\},\qquad B(f)=\{x\in P(f): x(N)=f(N)\}.P(f)={x∈Rn:x(A)≤f(A) ∀A∈2N},B(f)={x∈P(f):x(N)=f(N)}.

For x∈Rnx\in\mathbb R^nx∈Rn let x↓x^{\downarrow}x↓ be its non-increasing rearrangement. Then xxx is majorized by yyy, x≺yx\prec yx≺y, if ∑i≤kxi↓≤∑i≤kyi↓\sum_{i\le k}x^{\downarrow}_i\le\sum_{i\le k}y^{\downarrow}_i∑i≤k​xi↓​≤∑i≤k​yi↓​ for all kkk and x(N)=y(N)x(N)=y(N)x(N)=y(N). A function Φ:Rn→R\Phi:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb RΦ:Rn→R is Schur-convex if x≺yx\prec yx≺y implies Φ(x)≤Φ(y)\Phi(x)\le\Phi(y)Φ(x)≤Φ(y).

Fix a scaling vector a∈R>0na\in\mathbb R^n_{>0}a∈R>0n​ and a shift b∈Rnb\in\mathbb R^nb∈Rn. A vector xxx is (a,b)(a,b)(a,b)-majorized by yyy, x≺(a,b)yx\prec_{(a,b)}yx≺(a,b)​y, if x(N)=y(N)x(N)=y(N)x(N)=y(N) and

∑i∈Nai ϕ(xi+biai)≤∑i∈Nai ϕ(yi+biai)\sum_{i\in N}a_i\,\phi\Big(\frac{x_i+b_i}{a_i}\Big)\le\sum_{i\in N}a_i\,\phi\Big(\frac{y_i+b_i}{a_i}\Big)i∈N∑​ai​ϕ(ai​xi​+bi​​)≤i∈N∑​ai​ϕ(ai​yi​+bi​​)

for every continuous convex ϕ:R→R\phi:\mathbb R\to\mathbb Rϕ:R→R. It is weakly (a,b)(a,b)(a,b)-supermajorized, x≺(a,b)↑yx\prec^{\uparrow}_{(a,b)}yx≺(a,b)↑​y, if the same inequality holds for every non-increasing continuous convex ϕ\phiϕ (no sum condition). A point x∈Cx\in Cx∈C is a least (a,b)(a,b)(a,b)-majorized element of CCC if x≺(a,b)yx\prec_{(a,b)}yx≺(a,b)​y for all y∈Cy\in Cy∈C, and similarly for the weak version. For a set CCC define fC(A)=max⁡x∈Cx(A)f_C(A)=\max_{x\in C}x(A)fC​(A)=maxx∈C​x(A).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5 (p.18)

For a compact convex C⊆RnC\subseteq\mathbb R^nC⊆Rn the following are equivalent:

  1. CCC has a least (a,b)(a,b)(a,b)-majorized element for every a∈R>0na\in\mathbb R^n_{>0}a∈R>0n​, b∈Rnb\in\mathbb R^nb∈Rn;
  2. CCC has a least (1,b)(1,b)(1,b)-majorized element for every b∈Rnb\in\mathbb R^nb∈Rn;
  3. for every bbb there is one x∗∈Cx^*\in Cx∗∈C minimizing Φ(x+b)\Phi(x+b)Φ(x+b) over CCC for every continuous Schur-convex Φ\PhiΦ;
  4. fCf_CfC​ is submodular and C=B(fC)C=B(f_C)C=B(fC​).

All four statements and all six implications are part of the goal, for every nnn and every compact convex CCC.

Milestones

  • Lemma 2 (p.5): every extreme point zzz of B(f)B(f)B(f), fff submodular, is a greedy vector: for some permutation π\piπ, zπ(k)=f({π(1),…,π(k)})−f({π(1),…,π(k−1)})z_{\pi(k)}=f(\{\pi(1),\dots,\pi(k)\})-f(\{\pi(1),\dots,\pi(k-1)\})zπ(k)​=f({π(1),…,π(k)})−f({π(1),…,π(k−1)}).
  • Lemma 6 (p.7): x≺yx\prec yx≺y iff Φ(x)≤Φ(y)\Phi(x)\le\Phi(y)Φ(x)≤Φ(y) for all continuous Schur-convex Φ\PhiΦ, iff ∑ϕ(xi)≤∑ϕ(yi)\sum\phi(x_i)\le\sum\phi(y_i)∑ϕ(xi​)≤∑ϕ(yi​) for all continuous convex ϕ\phiϕ, iff x(N)=y(N)x(N)=y(N)x(N)=y(N) and ∑max⁡(0,α−xi)≤∑max⁡(0,α−yi)\sum\max(0,\alpha-x_i)\le\sum\max(0,\alpha-y_i)∑max(0,α−xi​)≤∑max(0,α−yi​) for all α\alphaα.
  • Lemma 9 (p.10): for submodular fff, B(f)B(f)B(f) has a unique least (a,b)(a,b)(a,b)-majorized element for every a∈R>0na\in\mathbb R^n_{>0}a∈R>0n​, b∈Rnb\in\mathbb R^nb∈Rn; if moreover fff and bbb are integral, every minimizer of ∑i12(xi+bi)2\sum_i\frac12(x_i+b_i)^2∑i​21​(xi​+bi​)2 over BZ(f)=B(f)∩ZnB^{\mathbb Z}(f)=B(f)\cap\mathbb Z^nBZ(f)=B(f)∩Zn is a least (1,b)(1,b)(1,b)-majorized element of BZ(f)B^{\mathbb Z}(f)BZ(f).
  • Lemma 14 (p.15): if a closed bounded CCC has a least weakly (1,b)(1,b)(1,b)-supermajorized element for every bbb, then for every permutation π\piπ some x∗∈Cx^*\in Cx∗∈C maximizes all nested sums ∑i≤kxπ(i)\sum_{i\le k}x_{\pi(i)}∑i≤k​xπ(i)​ over CCC.
  • Lemma 15 (p.16): under that nested-sum condition on a closed bounded CCC, fCf_CfC​ is submodular and B(fC)⊆co(C)⊆P(fC)B(f_C)\subseteq\mathrm{co}(C)\subseteq P(f_C)B(fC​)⊆co(C)⊆P(fC​).

Significance

Theorem 5 turns an optimization property into a polyhedral one. A modeller who needs one allocation that is optimal for all symmetric convex objectives, after any shift by a fixed load bbb, knows exactly when this is possible: precisely when the feasible set is a base polyhedron. Outside that class there is a shift bbb for which no single point minimizes all Schur-convex objectives of x+bx+bx+b, so trade-offs between such objectives cannot be avoided. The equivalence of statements 2 and 4 is also the content of the paper's characterization of convex transferable-utility games by the existence of egalitarian allocations for every shifted game.

The result is proved in the paper; nothing here is open. No part of it is formalized as far as the platform's catalog shows: majorization exists in published form (the definition reused here and Karamata's inequality, the direction (1) ⇒ (3) of Lemma 6), but there is no Lean statement about least majorized elements, the vertices of base polyhedra, or the converse characterization. A complete development would give machine-checked versions of the greedy description of base-polyhedron vertices, the classical characterizations of majorization, and the existence theorem for least (a,b)(a,b)(a,b)-majorized elements of base polyhedra, each reusable well beyond this paper.

Difficulty

The implication (4) ⇒ (1) is not proved in the paper: it is imported from earlier work of Schoot Uiterkamp, Gerards and Hurink (Lemma 9), so a complete formalization must also formalize that existence result for every scaling aaa and shift bbb. The converse (2) ⇒ (4) is the paper's contribution and is where the obvious approach fails: knowing that one point minimizes all separable convex objectives says nothing directly about the facets of CCC. The route from the optimization property to the facet structure goes through points that maximize nested sums along every permutation (Lemma 14) and through the vertex description of base polyhedra (Lemma 2, used in Lemma 15); neither is a one-line consequence of the hypothesis. Lemma 6, although classical, needs a genuine argument for "Schur-convex optimality implies majorization", and the shift bbb cannot be dropped: with b=0b=0b=0 only, statement 2 does not force CCC to be a base polyhedron (for n≥3n\ge 3n≥3, a Euclidean disc in the hyperplane x(N)=0x(N)=0x(N)=0 has 000 as a least (1,0)(1,0)(1,0)-majorized element).

Formalization scope

Vectors in Rn\mathbb R^nRn are Fin n → ℝ, indices are 0-based, 2N2^N2N is Finset (Fin n), permutations are Equiv.Perm (Fin n), and a nested sum ∑i=1kxπ(i)\sum_{i=1}^k x_{\pi(i)}∑i=1k​xπ(i)​, k∈Nk\in Nk∈N, is the sum of x (π i) over i ≤ k for k : Fin n. Majorization is the published definition RetailVariety.Fashion.Majorized; submodularity includes f(∅)=0f(\emptyset)=0f(∅)=0; P(f)P(f)P(f) and B(f)B(f)B(f) are real polyhedra defined for every set function, with submodularity as a hypothesis. Continuous convex test functions are ConvexOn ℝ Set.univ φ together with Continuous φ. The maximum max⁡x∈Cx(A)\max_{x\in C}x(A)maxx∈C​x(A) is sSup, which is the maximum for nonempty compact CCC; for C=∅C=\emptysetC=∅ every statement of Theorem 5 is false, so the equivalence holds without a nonemptiness hypothesis. Convexity is assumed in Theorem 5 only; Lemmas 14 and 15 assume closed and bounded sets, as in the paper.

Statement 3 quantifies ∀b ∃x∗ ∀Φ\forall b\ \exists x^*\ \forall\Phi∀b ∃x∗ ∀Φ: a single minimizer for all objectives. The reversed order ∀Φ ∃x∗\forall\Phi\ \exists x^*∀Φ ∃x∗ holds for every compact set and would trivialize the theorem. Likewise (a,b)(a,b)(a,b)-majorization keeps the equal-sum condition x(N)=y(N)x(N)=y(N)x(N)=y(N); without it statement 4 would weaken to B(f)⊆C⊆P(f)B(f)\subseteq C\subseteq P(f)B(f)⊆C⊆P(f).

Contributions are welcome at every level: proofs of the milestones, proof sketches that decompose Lemma 9 or Lemma 2 into smaller steps, and general infrastructure such as Krein–Milman-type representations of compact convex sets in Fin n → ℝ, already available on the platform.

Selected references

  • M. H. H. Schoot Uiterkamp, A characterization of simultaneous optimization, majorization, and (bi)submodular polyhedra, arXiv:2201.06596v2, 2023; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2201.06596v2
  • M. H. H. Schoot Uiterkamp, M. E. T. Gerards, J. L. Hurink, On a reduction for a class of resource allocation problems, INFORMS Journal on Computing 34(3):1387–1402, 2022 (reference [42] of the paper: Condition 1 and Theorem 1; source of Lemma 9).
  • S. Fujishige, N. Tomizawa, A note on submodular functions on distributive lattices, Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan 26(4):309–318, 1983 (reference [25] of the paper; Theorem 3.4 is Lemma 2).
  • S. Fujishige, Submodular Functions and Optimization, 2nd ed., Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2005 (reference [22] of the paper).
  • A. W. Marshall, I. Olkin, B. C. Arnold, Inequalities: Theory of Majorization and Its Applications, 2nd ed., Springer, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-68276-1
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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

When Liability Is Not Enough: Regulating Bonus Payments in Markets with Advice: below w*_f the unique symmetric bonus-and-commission equilibrium has advice cutoffs independent of liabilityResearch Paper

Motivation

Financial products, insurance and many other goods are sold through advisors whose pay comes from the product providers. A large policy literature asks whether such advice is biased and how regulation should respond; a common answer is liability: make the advisor bear more of the cost of an unsuitable recommendation, through penalties, fiduciary duties or professional standards. Earlier models with linear commissions (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2012) predict that higher liability makes the advisor less responsive to commissions and so reduces the bias.

Honda, Inderst and Ottaviani (SSRN 4125013, published in Management Science, 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4750) observe that real compensation is nonlinear: volume bonuses are paid when an advisor reaches a sales target. With two customers and a bonus for a second sale, firms can respond to higher liability by changing the shape of pay, not only its level. The paper's Proposition 2 shows that, below a liability threshold, this response exactly offsets the liability: the bias of advice does not move at all.

Setting

Two firms AAA and BBB with common unit cost ccc and common price ppp sell only through one advisor. Two customers arrive one after the other. For each customer the advisor holds a posterior q∈[0,1]q\in[0,1]q∈[0,1] that product AAA suits; the posteriors are i.i.d. with a density ggg, continuous and positive on [0,1][0,1][0,1], and c.d.f. G(q)=∫0qgG(q)=\int_0^q gG(q)=∫0q​g. The distribution is symmetric, G(q)=1−G(1−q)G(q)=1-G(1-q)G(q)=1−G(1−q), and has an increasing hazard rate g(q)/[1−G(q)]g(q)/[1-G(q)]g(q)/[1−G(q)].

The advisor earns whw_hwh​ from a suitable sale and wl<whw_l<w_hwl​<wh​ from an unsuitable one; the liability is w=wh−wl>0w=w_h-w_l>0w=wh​−wl​>0. Firm nnn offers a commission fnf_nfn​ and a bonus bnb_nbn​: it pays fnf_nfn​ for one sale and 2fn+bn2f_n+b_n2fn​+bn​ for two. Limited liability makes payments non-negative, so a firm's strategy set is X={(f,b):f≥0, 2f+b≥0}X=\{(f,b): f\ge0,\ 2f+b\ge0\}X={(f,b):f≥0, 2f+b≥0}; a negative bonus is allowed.

The advisor recommends by cutoffs: after a first sale of AAA she recommends AAA to the second customer when q2≥qˉ2A=12−(fA−fB+bA)/(2w)q_2\ge\bar q^A_2=\tfrac12-(f_A-f_B+b_A)/(2w)q2​≥qˉ​2A​=21​−(fA​−fB​+bA​)/(2w), after a first sale of BBB when q2≥qˉ2B=12−(fA−fB−bB)/(2w)q_2\ge\bar q^B_2=\tfrac12-(f_A-f_B-b_B)/(2w)q2​≥qˉ​2B​=21​−(fA​−fB​−bB​)/(2w), and to the first customer when q1≥qˉ1=12−(fA−fB+ZA−ZB)/(2w)q_1\ge\bar q_1=\tfrac12-(f_A-f_B+Z^A-Z^B)/(2w)q1​≥qˉ​1​=21​−(fA​−fB​+ZA−ZB)/(2w), where ZA,ZBZ^A,Z^BZA,ZB are her expected continuation payoffs (all cutoffs clamped to [0,1][0,1][0,1]). With Pr⁡(1)\Pr(1)Pr(1) the probability of two different recommendations and Pr⁡n(2)\Pr_n(2)Prn​(2) the probability that nnn is recommended twice, firm nnn's expected sales and profit are

Sn=Pr⁡(1)+2Pr⁡n(2),πn=Sn(p−c−fn)−Pr⁡n(2) bn.S_n=\Pr(1)+2\Pr_n(2),\qquad \pi_n=S_n(p-c-f_n)-\Pr_n(2)\,b_n .Sn​=Pr(1)+2nPr​(2),πn​=Sn​(p−c−fn​)−nPr​(2)bn​.

A symmetric equilibrium compensation scheme is a scheme (f,b)∈X(f,b)\in X(f,b)∈X such that both firms offering (f,b)(f,b)(f,b) is a pure Nash equilibrium of the game in which each firm chooses a scheme in XXX to maximize πn\pi_nπn​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2

Let qˉ∈(0,1/2)\bar q\in(0,1/2)qˉ​∈(0,1/2) solve qˉ=12−2G(qˉ)/g(qˉ)\bar q=\tfrac12-2G(\bar q)/g(\bar q)qˉ​=21​−2G(qˉ​)/g(qˉ​) (15), and put

H(q)=G(q)g(q)+14g(1/2)[1−G(q)]2+g(q),wf∗=p−c2H(qˉ).H(q)=\frac{G(q)}{g(q)}+\frac1{4g(1/2)[1-G(q)]^2+g(q)},\qquad w^*_f=\frac{p-c}{2H(\bar q)} .H(q)=g(q)G(q)​+4g(1/2)[1−G(q)]2+g(q)1​,wf∗​=2H(qˉ​)p−c​.

For every 0<w<wf∗0<w<w^*_f0<w<wf∗​: every symmetric equilibrium scheme with f>0f>0f>0 and 0<b<w0<b<w0<b<w (advice to the second customer informative) is

f=p−c−2wH(qˉ),b=4G(qˉ)g(qˉ) w;f=p-c-2wH(\bar q),\qquad b=\frac{4G(\bar q)}{g(\bar q)}\,w ;f=p−c−2wH(qˉ​),b=g(qˉ​)4G(qˉ​)​w;

this scheme is an equilibrium whenever each firm's profit satisfies first-order sufficiency against it; both components are positive; the cutoffs there are (qˉ1,qˉ2A,qˉ2B)=(1/2,qˉ,1−qˉ)(\bar q_1,\bar q^A_2,\bar q^B_2)=(1/2,\bar q,1-\bar q)(qˉ​1​,qˉ​2A​,qˉ​2B​)=(1/2,qˉ​,1−qˉ​), independent of www; and fff is strictly decreasing and bbb strictly increasing in www.

Milestones

Lemma 1 (the cutoff rule is the advisor's optimal policy), Lemma 5 (qˉ1=qˉ2A+∫qˉ2Aqˉ2BG\bar q_1=\bar q^A_2+\int_{\bar q^A_2}^{\bar q^B_2}Gqˉ​1​=qˉ​2A​+∫qˉ​2A​qˉ​2B​​G), Claim (32) (sales stay constant along df=−12dbdf=-\tfrac12dbdf=−21​db), the derivative values (36)–(37), Lemma 2 (the bonus (14)), Lemma 3 (the cutoff equation (15) has one solution in (0,1/2)(0,1/2)(0,1/2)) and Lemma 4 (the commission (16)).

Significance

The result separates two policy instruments. Liability alone cannot reduce the bias of advice while firms pay both commissions and bonuses: firms raise the bonus, cut the commission, and the advisor's recommendations stay exactly as biased as before, while total expected compensation f+b/2f+b/2f+b/2 rises. Liability bites only above wf∗w^*_fwf∗​, where commissions hit zero. This is the paper's case for regulating bonus payments directly rather than relying on liability.

The result is proved in the paper; nothing here is open. No part of it is formalized anywhere. The mission produces a machine-checked version of the model (advisor cutoffs with continuation payoffs, sales probabilities, the compensation game on the limited-liability strategy set) and of the equilibrium characterization. Moderation found that the paper's uniqueness claim needs the restriction b<wb<wb<w: for the uniform distribution, p−c=1p-c=1p−c=1 and w=1/5w=1/5w=1/5, the scheme (f,b)=(3/5,3/5)(f,b)=(3/5,3/5)(f,b)=(3/5,3/5) is a symmetric equilibrium in which both firms lock in the second customer, so the statements carry b<wb<wb<w as a declared correction.

Difficulty

The derivative computations (Claim (32), (36), (37)) are calculus at a point where all cutoffs are interior, after Lemma 5 rewrites qˉ1\bar q_1qˉ​1​ through an integration by parts that uses symmetry of GGG. Two steps go beyond them. First, uniqueness: the first-order conditions apply when 0<b<w0<b<w0<b<w, the class the statements quantify over. When b≥wb\ge wb≥w both second-customer cutoffs sit at a corner and each firm locks in the second customer; such symmetric equilibria do exist (the uniform example above), which is why the corrected statements exclude them. Second, existence: the paper assumes strict quasiconcavity of profits, which taken literally fails for every distribution, since profit is affine where one firm wins both sales. The formal statement therefore conditions existence on first-order sufficiency against the candidate scheme: every own scheme with interior cutoffs at which both own partial derivatives vanish is a best response. The restriction to interior cutoffs is needed, since where a firm never sells its profit is identically zero and every point is critical.

Formalization scope

A scheme is a pair (f,b)∈R2(f,b)\in\mathbb R^2(f,b)∈R2. The constant wlw_lwl​ is dropped from all advisor payoffs, since it cancels from every comparison. Cutoffs are clamped to [0,1][0,1][0,1] (footnote 19 for qˉ2A\bar q^A_2qˉ​2A​; the same convention for qˉ2B\bar q^B_2qˉ​2B​ and qˉ1\bar q_1qˉ​1​). The hazard rate is required to be weakly increasing on [0,1)[0,1)[0,1), where it is defined. Prices are given (§4); the customer-side assumption (1) is not imposed, and the results hold for all real p,cp,cp,c.

The equilibrium is the Nash condition on the profits, built on the published two-player definition CompetingChains.Cournot.IsPureNash; the closed forms (14)–(16) are conclusions, never definitions. A definition of the equilibrium by its formulas, or of the cutoffs by 1/2∓b/(2w)1/2\mp b/(2w)1/2∓b/(2w), would make the goal arithmetic and is ruled out. The uniqueness clause ranges over all symmetric equilibria with f>0f>0f>0 and 0<b<w0<b<w0<b<w (a declared correction); first-order sufficiency is a hypothesis of the existence clause only.

Needed infrastructure: interval integrals with variable limits and the fundamental theorem of calculus, derivatives of clamped expressions at interior points, and the intermediate value theorem for (15). Proofs of the milestones and of first-order sufficiency for concrete distributions such as the uniform one are all welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Honda, R. Inderst, M. Ottaviani, When Liability is Not Enough: Regulating Bonus Payments in Markets With Advice, SSRN working paper 4125013, May 2022. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4125013 — published in Management Science, 2023, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4750
  • R. Inderst, M. Ottaviani, Competition through Commissions and Kickbacks, American Economic Review 102(2), 780–809, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.2.780
  • R. Inderst, M. Ottaviani, Misselling through Agents, American Economic Review 99(3), 883–908, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.3.883
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

Geometrically Convergent Simulation of the Extrema of Lévy Processes: the stick-breaking errors of the supremum and its time decay geometrically in L^p, at rate η_p ∈ [3/2, 2] with explicit constantsResearch Paper

Motivation

The supremum of a Lévy process over a finite horizon, and the time at which it is attained, enter the prices of lookback and barrier options, ruin probabilities in insurance, and the workload of queues and storage systems. Their law is explicit only in special cases, so in practice they are computed by Monte Carlo simulation. The classical method, the random walk approximation on a grid of mesh T/nT/nT/n, has a strong error that decays only polynomially in nnn (Asmussen–Glynn–Pitman 1995; Dia–Lamberton 2011).

González Cázares, Mijatović and Uribe Bravo (arXiv:1810.11039v3) introduced the stick-breaking approximation (SBA). It rests on the description by Pitman and Uribe Bravo (2012) of the concave majorant of a Lévy process: the faces of the majorant, taken in size-biased order, have the law of a uniform stick-breaking of [0,T][0,T][0,T] paired with the increments of an independent copy of the process. The approximation needs only n+1n+1n+1 samples of increments of XXX, and the paper shows that its error decays geometrically in nnn.

Setting

A Lévy process X=(Xt)t≥0X=(X_t)_{t\ge0}X=(Xt​)t≥0​ is a real process with X0=0X_0=0X0​=0, independent and stationary increments and right-continuous paths with left limits. Its law is determined by its generating triplet (σ2,ν,b)(\sigma^2,\nu,b)(σ2,ν,b): a Gaussian coefficient σ≥0\sigma\ge0σ≥0, a Lévy measure ν\nuν on R\mathbb RR with ν({0})=0\nu(\{0\})=0ν({0})=0 and ∫min⁡{1,x2}ν(dx)<∞\int\min\{1,x^2\}\nu(dx)<\infty∫min{1,x2}ν(dx)<∞, and a drift bbb, through E[eiuXt]=e−tΨ(u)\mathbb E[e^{iuX_t}]=e^{-t\Psi(u)}E[eiuXt​]=e−tΨ(u) with the cutoff 1{∣x∣<1}\mathbb 1_{\{|x|<1\}}1{∣x∣<1}​. XXX is compound Poisson with drift when σ=0\sigma=0σ=0 and ν(R)<∞\nu(\mathbb R)<\inftyν(R)<∞; the paper excludes this case, which is equivalent to P(Xt=x)=0\mathbb P(X_t=x)=0P(Xt​=x)=0 for all xxx and t>0t>0t>0 (Assumption 2).

Fix T>0T>0T>0. Write X‾t=sup⁡s≤tXs\overline X_t=\sup_{s\le t}X_sXt​=sups≤t​Xs​ for the running supremum and τt=inf⁡{s∈[0,t]:X‾s=X‾t}\tau_t=\inf\{s\in[0,t]:\overline X_s=\overline X_t\}τt​=inf{s∈[0,t]:Xs​=Xt​} for the first time it is reached. The target is χ=(XT,X‾T,τT)\chi=(X_T,\overline X_T,\tau_T)χ=(XT​,XT​,τT​).

The stick-breaking process on [0,T][0,T][0,T] is L0=TL_0=TL0​=T, ℓn=VnLn−1\ell_n=V_nL_{n-1}ℓn​=Vn​Ln−1​, Ln=Ln−1−ℓnL_n=L_{n-1}-\ell_nLn​=Ln−1​−ℓn​, with (Vn)(V_n)(Vn​) i.i.d. uniform on (0,1)(0,1)(0,1). A stick-breaking coupling is a triple (X,ℓ,Y)(X,\ell,Y)(X,ℓ,Y) in which YYY has the law of XXX, YYY is independent of ℓ\ellℓ, and almost surely

χ=∑k=1∞(YLk−1−YLk, (YLk−1−YLk)+, ℓk1{YLk−1−YLk>0}).(1.1)\chi=\sum_{k=1}^\infty\Big(Y_{L_{k-1}}-Y_{L_k},\ (Y_{L_{k-1}}-Y_{L_k})^+,\ \ell_k\mathbb 1_{\{Y_{L_{k-1}}-Y_{L_k}>0\}}\Big).\tag{1.1}χ=k=1∑∞​(YLk−1​​−YLk​​, (YLk−1​​−YLk​​)+, ℓk​1{YLk−1​​−YLk​​>0}​).(1.1)

The SBA χn\chi_nχn​ (1.2) keeps the first nnn summands and adds (YLn,YLn+,Ln1{YLn>0})(Y_{L_n},Y^+_{L_n},L_n\mathbb 1_{\{Y_{L_n}>0\}})(YLn​​,YLn​+​,Ln​1{YLn​​>0}​). Its errors are Δn\Delta_nΔn​, δn\delta_nδn​ (the partial-sum errors of the supremum and of its time, (1.3)) and ΔnSB=Δn−YLn+\Delta^{SB}_n=\Delta_n-Y^+_{L_n}ΔnSB​=Δn​−YLn​+​, δnSB=δn−Ln1{YLn>0}\delta^{SB}_n=\delta_n-L_n\mathbb 1_{\{Y_{L_n}>0\}}δnSB​=δn​−Ln​1{YLn​​>0}​.

The rate is built from four indices. The Blumenthal–Getoor index is β=inf⁡{p>0:I0p<∞}\beta=\inf\{p>0:I^p_0<\infty\}β=inf{p>0:I0p​<∞} with I0p=∫(−1,1)∣x∣pν(dx)I^p_0=\int_{(-1,1)}|x|^p\nu(dx)I0p​=∫(−1,1)​∣x∣pν(dx). With a free parameter δ\deltaδ, the paper sets β+=β+δ1{I0β=∞}\beta_+=\beta+\delta\mathbb 1_{\{I^\beta_0=\infty\}}β+​=β+δ1{I0β​=∞}​ (4.6). The index α\alphaα (4.21) is 222 if σ≠0\sigma\ne0σ=0, 111 if σ=0\sigma=0σ=0, the jumps have finite variation and the natural drift b0=b−∫(−1,1)xν(dx)b_0=b-\int_{(-1,1)}x\nu(dx)b0​=b−∫(−1,1)​xν(dx) is nonzero, and β\betaβ otherwise. Then α+=α+(β+−β)1{α=β}\alpha_+=\alpha+(\beta_+-\beta)\mathbb 1_{\{\alpha=\beta\}}α+​=α+(β+​−β)1{α=β}​ and

ηp=1+1{p>α}+pα+1{p≤α}.(4.22)\eta_p=1+\mathbb 1_{\{p>\alpha\}}+\frac p{\alpha_+}\mathbb 1_{\{p\le\alpha\}}.\tag{4.22}ηp​=1+1{p>α}​+α+​p​1{p≤α}​.(4.22)

The large-jump moments are I+p=∫[1,∞)xpν(dx)I^p_+=\int_{[1,\infty)}x^p\nu(dx)I+p​=∫[1,∞)​xpν(dx) and I−p=∫(−∞,−1]∣x∣pν(dx)I^p_-=\int_{(-\infty,-1]}|x|^p\nu(dx)I−p​=∫(−∞,−1]​∣x∣pν(dx).

A correction. As printed, (4.6) gives β+=0\beta_+=0β+​=0 for Brownian motion (β=0\beta=0β=0, I00<∞I^0_0<\inftyI00​<∞), and then the explicit constants of (4.12), (4.13) and (4.23) contain p/0p/0p/0. The mission sets β+=β+δ\beta_+=\beta+\deltaβ+​=β+δ also when β=0\beta=0β=0. The change affects no instance where the printed formulas are defined, and it never changes α+\alpha_+α+​ or ηp\eta_pηp​. Every statement quantifies over every admissible δ\deltaδ: δ∈(0,2−β)\delta\in(0,2-\beta)δ∈(0,2−β), with β+δ<1\beta+\delta<1β+δ<1 when β<1\beta<1β<1, whenever I0β=∞I^\beta_0=\inftyI0β​=∞ or β=0\beta=0β=0. This is the stronger of the two readings of "pick δ\deltaδ".

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 with (4.24)

For every stick-breaking coupling with XXX not compound Poisson with drift and every p≥1p\ge1p≥1:

max⁡{E∣δnSB∣p, Eδnp}≤Tp(1+p)−n(n≥1),\max\big\{\mathbb E|\delta^{SB}_n|^p,\ \mathbb E\delta_n^p\big\}\le T^p(1+p)^{-n}\qquad(n\ge1),max{E∣δnSB​∣p, Eδnp​}≤Tp(1+p)−n(n≥1),

ηp∈[3/2,2]\eta_p\in[3/2,2]ηp​∈[3/2,2], and

E[Δnp]≤Cp(X) Tηp−1ηp−n  (I+p<∞),E[(ΔnSB)p]≤Cp∗(X) Tηp−1ηp−n  (min⁡{I+p,I−p}<∞),\mathbb E[\Delta_n^p]\le C_p(X)\,T^{\eta_p-1}\eta_p^{-n}\ \ (I^p_+<\infty),\qquad \mathbb E[(\Delta^{SB}_n)^p]\le C^*_p(X)\,T^{\eta_p-1}\eta_p^{-n}\ \ (\min\{I^p_+,I^p_-\}<\infty),E[Δnp​]≤Cp​(X)Tηp​−1ηp−n​  (I+p​<∞),E[(ΔnSB​)p]≤Cp∗​(X)Tηp​−1ηp−n​  (min{I+p​,I−p​}<∞),

with Cp(X)C_p(X)Cp​(X), Cp∗(X)C^*_p(X)Cp∗​(X) explicit in (σ2,ν,b)(\sigma^2,\nu,b)(σ2,ν,b) (4.23). The goal also contains the O(ηp−n)\mathcal O(\eta_p^{-n})O(ηp−n​) form for every admissible δ\deltaδ. The explicit form carries the restriction α<p⇒α+<p\alpha<p\Rightarrow\alpha_+<pα<p⇒α+​<p on δ\deltaδ, which the paper's proof imposes.

Milestones

In proof order: the equivalence of Assumption 2 with "not compound Poisson with drift"; existence of the coupling; (1.1) in law on any horizon; Theorem 1 (the error of the SBA given LnL_nLn​ has the law of the supremum of YYY over [0,Ln][0,L_n][0,Ln​], with monotone a.s. bounds); E[Lnp]=Tp(1+p)−n\mathbb E[L_n^p]=T^p(1+p)^{-n}E[Lnp​]=Tp(1+p)−n; Lemma 1 (bounds on ν\nuν); Lemma 2 (explicit small-time moments E[X‾tp]≤mXp(t)\mathbb E[\overline X_t^p]\le m^p_X(t)E[Xtp​]≤mXp​(t)); Corollary 3 (E[X‾tp]≤Cp(X)tηp−1\mathbb E[\overline X_t^p]\le C_p(X)t^{\eta_p-1}E[Xtp​]≤Cp​(X)tηp​−1); Lemma 3 (a bound CtqCt^qCtq gives CTq(1+q)−nCT^q(1+q)^{-n}CTq(1+q)−n).

Significance

The theorem is the reason the SBA is useful. Geometric decay means that O(log⁡(1/ϵ))\mathcal O(\log(1/\epsilon))O(log(1/ϵ)) sticks suffice for accuracy ϵ\epsilonϵ. In the paper this gives multilevel Monte Carlo and unbiased estimators of optimal complexity for Lipschitz and barrier-type functionals of χ\chiχ, and a central limit theorem for the Monte Carlo estimator. The rate ηp≥3/2\eta_p\ge3/2ηp​≥3/2, for p≥1p\ge1p≥1, holds for every Lévy process that is not compound Poisson with drift, including infinite-variation and heavy-tailed ones.

The result is proved in the paper. It has no machine-checked proof, and to the platform's knowledge no Lean formalization of stick-breaking, concave majorants or small-time moment bounds for general Lévy processes exists. A full formalization would check the constants of (4.13) and (4.23), which no reader has machine-verified. It would also expose the boundary case β=0\beta=0β=0 that the printed (4.6) mishandles.

Difficulty

The analytic part, Lemmas 1–2 and Corollary 3, needs the Lévy–Itô decomposition at a truncation level κ=(t/T)1/β+\kappa=(t/T)^{1/\beta_+}κ=(t/T)1/β+​ that depends on time. Each component is then bounded separately: Doob's inequality for the small-jump martingale, a Poisson-moment bound with Stirling numbers for the large jumps, and the reflection principle for the Brownian part. The constants must be tracked exactly.

The probabilistic part rests on two results that are not in Mathlib: the law of the faces of the concave majorant (Pitman–Uribe Bravo), and a transfer theorem that realises the coupling on an extension of the probability space. A natural first idea is to bound Δn\Delta_nΔn​ by a random-walk discretisation error. This fails, because the SBA uses no grid. The decay comes from LnL_nLn​ being a product of nnn independent uniform factors, and that structure is visible only through Theorem 1.

Formalization scope

Time is R≥0\mathbb R_{\ge0}R≥0​. Lévy processes are SingCtrlLevy.Barrier.IsLevyWith, a published definition whose paths are càdlàg and start at 000 for every ω\omegaω. Its triplet uses the cutoff 1{∣x∣<1}\mathbb 1_{\{|x|<1\}}1{∣x∣<1}​. The coupling is a predicate IsSBCoupling listing the properties the proofs use: same triplet, i.i.d. uniform VVV, independence of YYY and VVV, and (1.1) almost surely. Its non-vacuity is a milestone. "Conditionally on LnL_nLn​" is equality of joint laws with LnL_nLn​. Expectations are lintegrals, and the Lévy-measure moments are extended reals. Every constant that uses toReal comes with a finiteness hypothesis, so an infinite moment is never silently read as 000. Sticks are indexed from 000, and n≥1n\ge1n≥1 as in the paper. The goal fixes no δ\deltaδ and contains no free rate or constant: ηp\eta_pηp​, Cp(X)C_p(X)Cp​(X) and Cp∗(X)C^*_p(X)Cp∗​(X) are the paper's formulas.

A complete development needs the Lévy–Itô decomposition, Doob's maximal inequality in continuous time, the reflection principle for Brownian motion, the concave majorant of a càdlàg path, and size-biased sampling. All of these are reusable well beyond this mission. Contributions to any of them, and proofs of the self-contained milestones (Lemma 1 and the moment identity for LnL_nLn​), are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. I. González Cázares, A. Mijatović, G. Uribe Bravo, Geometrically Convergent Simulation of the Extrema of Lévy Processes, arXiv:1810.11039v3, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.11039v3
  • J. Pitman, G. Uribe Bravo, The convex minorant of a Lévy process, Annals of Probability 40(4), 1636–1674, 2012. https://mathscinet.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=2978134
  • K. Sato, Lévy Processes and Infinitely Divisible Distributions, Cambridge Studies in Advanced Mathematics 68, Cambridge University Press, revised ed., 2013. https://mathscinet.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=3185174
  • O. Kallenberg, Foundations of Modern Probability, Springer, 2nd ed., 2002. https://mathscinet.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=1876169
  • S. Asmussen, P. Glynn, J. Pitman, Discretization error in simulation of one-dimensional reflecting Brownian motion, Annals of Applied Probability 5(4), 875–896, 1995. https://mathscinet.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=1384357
  • E. H. A. Dia, D. Lamberton, Connecting discrete and continuous lookback or hindsight options in exponential Lévy models, Advances in Applied Probability 43(4), 1136–1165, 2011. https://mathscinet.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=2867949
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Operations ResearchPartial Differential EquationsProbability·Captain: iris

A Stochastic Representation for Nonlocal Parabolic PDEs with Applications: the nonlocal terminal-boundary problem has a unique bounded solution, given by a Feynman-Kac formula with boundary jumpsResearch Paper

Motivation

Classical Feynman–Kac theorems connect a parabolic equation with fixed boundary data to the expectation of a functional of a diffusion stopped at the boundary. Several models in finance and physics do not fit this frame, because the terminal and boundary values depend on the solution in the interior. Dai, Kou and Yang (SSRN 3541591, later in Mathematics of Operations Research, doi:10.1287/moor.2020.1061) treat this class. Their motivating examples are the pricing of dual-purpose funds, whose value at a reset date feeds back into the contract, the regenerative processes of inventory control, and the entropy of a one-dimensional thermoelastic body, where Day (1982) derived a parabolic equation with nonlocal boundary conditions.

Nonlocal parabolic problems have an analytic literature: Friedman (1986) and Pao (1995, 1998) on nonlocal boundary conditions, Chabrowski (1984) on nonlocal initial conditions, Lieberman (1999) on time-periodic problems. The process side goes back to Grigorescu and Kang (2013), who study diffusions that jump from the boundary, with a nondegenerate transition probability that the clock process here does not have.

Setting

Let O⊂Rd\mathcal O\subset\mathbb R^dO⊂Rd, d≥1d\ge1d≥1, be a bounded smooth domain, T>0T>0T>0, Q=[0,T)×OQ=[0,T)\times\mathcal OQ=[0,T)×O, Qˉ=[0,T]×Oˉ\bar Q=[0,T]\times\bar{\mathcal O}Qˉ​=[0,T]×Oˉ, and let the parabolic boundary be ∂pQ=({T}×Oˉ)∪([0,T)×∂O)\partial_pQ=(\{T\}\times\bar{\mathcal O})\cup([0,T)\times\partial\mathcal O)∂p​Q=({T}×Oˉ)∪([0,T)×∂O). With continuous coefficients b,σb,\sigmab,σ, Lipschitz and of linear growth, a=σσTa=\sigma\sigma^{\mathsf T}a=σσT uniformly elliptic on QQQ, a rate r>0r>0r>0, and fff Hölder on Qˉ\bar QQˉ​, set

LW=12∑i,jaij ∂xixjW+∑ibi ∂xiW−rW.\mathcal LW=\tfrac12\sum_{i,j}a_{ij}\,\partial_{x_ix_j}W+\sum_ib_i\,\partial_{x_i}W-rW.LW=21​i,j∑​aij​∂xi​xj​​W+i∑​bi​∂xi​​W−rW.

For each (t,x)∈∂pQ(t,x)\in\partial_pQ(t,x)∈∂p​Q let νt,x\nu_{t,x}νt,x​ be a positive Borel measure on QQQ of mass νˉ(t,x)≤1\bar\nu(t,x)\le1νˉ(t,x)≤1 with νt,x((t,T)×O)=0\nu_{t,x}((t,T)\times\mathcal O)=0νt,x​((t,T)×O)=0. The nonlocal problem is

−∂tW−LW=f  in Q,W=h+BW  on ∂pQ,BW(t,x)=∬QW(s,z) νt,x(ds,dz).-\partial_tW-\mathcal LW=f\ \text{ in }Q,\qquad W=h+\mathcal BW\ \text{ on }\partial_pQ,\qquad \mathcal BW(t,x)=\iint_QW(s,z)\,\nu_{t,x}(ds,dz).−∂t​W−LW=f  in Q,W=h+BW  on ∂p​Q,BW(t,x)=∬Q​W(s,z)νt,x​(ds,dz).

The data hhh and ν\nuν may be discontinuous on a small set D⊂∂pQD\subset\partial_pQD⊂∂p​Q, which covers finitely many time slices of the lateral boundary and a null part of the terminal slice.

The underlying process is a clock vvv and a diffusion XXX in QQQ. On hitting ∂pQ\partial_pQ∂p​Q at ξ\xiξ, the pair jumps to a point of QQQ with law ν~ξ=νξ/νˉ(ξ)\tilde\nu_\xi=\nu_\xi/\bar\nu(\xi)ν~ξ​=νξ​/νˉ(ξ) and the mass YYY is multiplied by νˉ(ξ)\bar\nu(\xi)νˉ(ξ). The clock can only jump backwards. θi\theta_iθi​ is the iii-th hitting time.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1

W(t,x)=Etx[∫t∞e−r(s−t)Ys−f(vs−,Xs−) ds+∑θi≥te−r(θi−t)Yθi−h(vθi−,Xθi−)]on Qˉ,W(t,x)=E_t^x\Big[\int_t^\infty e^{-r(s-t)}Y_{s-}f(v_{s-},X_{s-})\,ds+\sum_{\theta_i\ge t}e^{-r(\theta_i-t)}Y_{\theta_i-}h(v_{\theta_i-},X_{\theta_i-})\Big]\quad\text{on }\bar Q,W(t,x)=Etx​[∫t∞​e−r(s−t)Ys−​f(vs−​,Xs−​)ds+θi​≥t∑​e−r(θi​−t)Yθi​−​h(vθi​−​,Xθi​−​)]on Qˉ​,

for the unique bounded solution W∈C1,2(Q)∩C(Qˉ∖D)W\in C^{1,2}(Q)\cap C(\bar Q\setminus D)W∈C1,2(Q)∩C(Qˉ​∖D). The statement asserts existence, uniqueness and the representation at every point of Qˉ\bar QQˉ​, boundary included.

Milestones

In proof order: the construction of the process (§2.2); non-explosion, Lemma 2.3; geometric decay, (A.2); the bound on the value functions, Proposition 2.4; the local Feynman–Kac theorem with discontinuous data, Proposition A.1; the identification of the iterates Wi+1W_{i+1}Wi+1​, solving the problem with data h+BWih+\mathcal BW_ih+BWi​, with finite-horizon value functions, Lemma A.2; uniform convergence, Lemma A.3; the limit is a solution, Proposition A.4; and the finite-step representation of every bounded solution, (A.16).

Significance

The theorem gives existence and uniqueness for nonlocal parabolic problems with discontinuous dependence on the parameter, a setting more general than Chabrowski (1984), and it gives a representation of the solution by a cash-flow expectation. The paper uses it to obtain a pricing equation for dual-purpose funds, a regenerative interpretation of band controls, and a particle interpretation of thermoelastic entropy. The iteration behind the existence proof is also a numerical scheme.

The result is proved, in print, and not formalized anywhere to our knowledge. The platform's FeynmanKac series treats one-dimensional problems on the whole line with terminal data, given a solution. This mission adds statements on a bounded domain in general dimension, with discontinuous boundary data, and a process with random redistribution from the boundary.

Difficulty

A Dirichlet argument cannot start, because the boundary data depends on the solution and inherits its unknown regularity. A contraction argument is unavailable since νˉ\bar\nuνˉ may equal 111, so the operator W↦BWW\mapsto\mathcal BWW↦BW has norm 111. Discontinuous data rule out the classical Feynman–Kac theorem directly. Non-explosion cannot be read off from the process being strong Markov with a nondegenerate kernel, because the clock is degenerate: θi→∞\theta_i\to\inftyθi​→∞ needs an argument that rules out rapid alternation between terminal and lateral hits, through Assumption 2.2. Interior Schauder estimates, parabolic regularity up to the slice t=0t=0t=0, Itô's formula, and the strong Markov property of a process built on random intervals are each substantial in Lean.

Formalization scope

The domain is a set in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) with a global C∞C^\inftyC∞ defining function. Functions take the pair (t,x)(t,x)(t,x). Jump measures are FiniteMeasure on the subtype QQQ, so the weak topology is the one on QQQ and mass cannot escape to ∂Q\partial Q∂Q. QQQ contains t=0t=0t=0, and the time derivative there is one-sided. The boundary equation holds on all of ∂pQ\partial_pQ∂p​Q, including DDD. The bound on hhh is ∣h∣≤KhT|h|\le K_hT∣h∣≤Kh​T, implied by the paper's ∣h(s,x)∣≤Khs|h(s,x)|\le K_hs∣h(s,x)∣≤Kh​s. It is the form the proofs use.

The process is given through Realization: a filtered probability space under the usual assumptions, independent Brownian motions, stopping times, and cycles in QQQ ending at a left limit in ∂pQ\partial_pQ∂p​Q. Non-explosion is not assumed. Stochastic integrals are the published EntropyMFG.Enhanced.HasItoIntegral.

The representation cannot hold trivially. The goal asserts that a realization exists at every point, that the time integral exists and the series converges, and that the payoff is integrable, so neither a vacuous quantifier nor a default integral value can satisfy it.

A full development needs a multidimensional Itô formula for these integrals, strong solutions of Lipschitz SDEs, the strong Markov property, parabolic Schauder estimates, and classical solvability of the Dirichlet problem. These are reusable far beyond this mission, and contributions to any of them are welcome. Proposition A.1 and the construction in §2.2 are natural separate entry points.

Selected references

  • M. Dai, S. Kou, C. Yang, A Stochastic Representation for Nonlocal Parabolic PDEs with Applications, SSRN 3541591. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3541591
  • M. Dai, S. Kou, C. Yang, same title, Mathematics of Operations Research. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2020.1061

The remaining entries are cited as in the paper's bibliography.

  • J. Chabrowski, On nonlocal problems for parabolic equations, Nagoya Mathematical Journal 93, 109–131, 1984.
  • J. Chabrowski, On the nonlocal problem with a functional for parabolic equation, Funkcialaj Ekvacioj 27(1), 101–123, 1984.
  • W. A. Day, Extensions of a property of the heat equation to linear thermoelasticity and other theories, Quarterly of Applied Mathematics 40(3), 319–330, 1982.
  • A. Friedman, Monotonic decay of solutions of parabolic equations with nonlocal boundary conditions, Quarterly of Applied Mathematics 44(3), 401–407, 1986.
  • A. Friedman, Stochastic Differential Equations and Applications, Courier Corporation, 2012.
  • A. Friedman, Partial Differential Equations of Parabolic Type, Courier Dover Publications, 2013.
  • I. Grigorescu, M. Kang, Markov processes with redistribution, Markov Processes and Related Fields 19(3), 497–520, 2013.
  • G. M. Lieberman, Time-periodic solutions of linear parabolic differential equations, Communications in Partial Differential Equations 24(3–4), 631–663, 1999.
  • C. V. Pao, Reaction diffusion equations with nonlocal boundary and nonlocal initial conditions, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications 195(3), 702–718, 1995.
  • C. V. Pao, Asymptotic behavior of solutions of reaction-diffusion equations with nonlocal boundary conditions, Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics 88(1), 225–238, 1998.
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