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Convex OptimizationLinear algebraOperations Research+1·Captain: Shuze Chen

Lectures on Modern Convex Optimization V: Semidefinite Representability of Symmetric Functions of EigenvaluesTextbook

Motivation

A convex optimization problem can be handed to a semidefinite programming solver only after its constraints and objective have been written as linear matrix inequalities (LMIs): conditions of the form A(x,u)⪰0\mathcal A(x,u) \succeq 0A(x,u)⪰0, where A\mathcal AA is affine in the decision variables xxx and in auxiliary variables uuu, and ⪰0\succeq 0⪰0 means positive semidefinite. A large share of modern engineering optimization is built this way, in robust control, structural design, and statistics and machine learning (nuclear-norm and spectral-norm regularization, eigenvalue optimization). Modeling tools such as CVX and YALMIP rest on a catalog of functions known to admit such a description.

Lecture 4 of A. Ben-Tal and A. Nemirovski, Lectures on Modern Convex Optimization (SIAM, 2001, doi:10.1137/1.9780898718829), builds that catalog for the semidefinite cone. Its central entry is a general rule: a convex function of a symmetric matrix that depends only on the eigenvalues, symmetrically, is expressible by LMIs whenever the underlying function of a vector is. This covers the largest eigenvalue, sums of the kkk largest eigenvalues (Ky Fan, 1949), Schatten norms ∥X∥p\|X\|_p∥X∥p​ and powers of the determinant at once. The tool behind it is the theory of majorization (Hardy, Littlewood and Pólya, 1929; Rado, 1952) together with Birkhoff's theorem on double-stochastic matrices (1946).

Setting

For a symmetric m×mm\times mm×m real matrix XXX, λ(X)=(λ1(X),…,λm(X))\lambda(X) = (\lambda_1(X),\dots,\lambda_m(X))λ(X)=(λ1​(X),…,λm​(X)) denotes its eigenvalues counted with multiplicity in nonascending order, λ1(X)≥⋯≥λm(X)\lambda_1(X) \ge \cdots \ge \lambda_m(X)λ1​(X)≥⋯≥λm​(X). Sk(X)=λ1(X)+⋯+λk(X)S_k(X) = \lambda_1(X) + \cdots + \lambda_k(X)Sk​(X)=λ1​(X)+⋯+λk​(X) is the sum of the kkk largest. For a vector y∈Rmy \in \mathbb R^my∈Rm, Sj(y)S_j(y)Sj​(y) is the sum of its jjj largest entries, and X[x]X[x]X[x] is the convex hull of the m!m!m! coordinate permutations of xxx. A function g:Rm→R∪{+∞}g : \mathbb R^m \to \mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}g:Rm→R∪{+∞} is symmetric if permuting the coordinates of its argument leaves its value unchanged. A matrix is double-stochastic if its entries are nonnegative and every row and column sums to 111.

A function ggg is semidefinite representable (SDr) if there is a map S(x,t,u)\mathcal S(x,t,u)S(x,t,u), affine in (x,t,u)∈Rm×R×Rk(x,t,u) \in \mathbb R^m\times\mathbb R\times\mathbb R^k(x,t,u)∈Rm×R×Rk with values in the symmetric N×NN\times NN×N matrices, such that

t≥g(x)  ⟺  ∃u:S(x,t,u)⪰0for all x∈Rm, t∈R.t \ge g(x) \iff \exists u : \mathcal S(x,t,u) \succeq 0 \qquad \text{for all } x \in \mathbb R^m,\ t\in\mathbb R.t≥g(x)⟺∃u:S(x,t,u)⪰0for all x∈Rm, t∈R.

For a k×lk\times lk×l matrix XXX (k≤lk \le lk≤l), the singular values are σi(X)=λi((XXT)1/2)\sigma_i(X) = \lambda_i((XX^T)^{1/2})σi​(X)=λi​((XXT)1/2), and Σj(X)=σ1(X)+⋯+σj(X)\Sigma_j(X) = \sigma_1(X)+\cdots+\sigma_j(X)Σj​(X)=σ1​(X)+⋯+σj​(X).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4.2.1 (p. 151)

Let ggg be symmetric and SDr with representation S\mathcal SS. Then for every symmetric m×mm\times mm×m matrix XXX and real ttt,

t≥g(λ(X))  ⟺  ∃ x∈Rm, u:  S(x,t,u)⪰0,  x1≥⋯≥xm,  Sj(X)≤x1+⋯+xj (j=1,…,m−1),  Tr⁡X=x1+⋯+xm.(4.2.3)t \ge g(\lambda(X)) \iff \exists\, x \in \mathbb R^m,\ u:\ \ \mathcal S(x,t,u)\succeq 0,\ \ x_1\ge\cdots\ge x_m,\ \ S_j(X)\le x_1+\cdots+x_j\ (j=1,\dots,m-1),\ \ \operatorname{Tr}X = x_1+\cdots+x_m. \tag{4.2.3}t≥g(λ(X))⟺∃x∈Rm, u:  S(x,t,u)⪰0,  x1​≥⋯≥xm​,  Sj​(X)≤x1​+⋯+xj​ (j=1,…,m−1),  TrX=x1​+⋯+xm​.(4.2.3)

Milestones, in attack order

  1. (A), p. 148: X⪰X′⇒λi(X)≥λi(X′)X \succeq X' \Rightarrow \lambda_i(X) \ge \lambda_i(X')X⪰X′⇒λi​(X)≥λi​(X′) for every iii.
  2. Example 18.c, p. 147: for k≤mk \le mk≤m, Sk(X)≤tS_k(X) \le tSk​(X)≤t iff there are s∈Rs \in \mathbb Rs∈R and ZZZ with t−ks−Tr⁡Z≥0t - ks - \operatorname{Tr}Z \ge 0t−ks−TrZ≥0, Z⪰0Z \succeq 0Z⪰0, Z−X+sIm⪰0Z - X + sI_m \succeq 0Z−X+sIm​⪰0 (4.2.2).
  3. Birkhoff's theorem, p. 281: the double-stochastic matrices are exactly the convex combinations of permutation matrices. This is referenced, already proved on the platform as FamousTheorems.birkhoff_von_neumann.
  4. (C), p. 281: f(Px)≤f(x)f(Px) \le f(x)f(Px)≤f(x) for a convex symmetric fff, x∈Dom⁡fx \in \operatorname{Dom} fx∈Domf and double-stochastic PPP.
  5. Claim (majorization principle), p. 285: X[x]={y:Sj(y)≤Sj(x), j=1,…,m−1, ∑iyi=∑ixi}X[x] = \{y : S_j(y) \le S_j(x),\ j = 1,\dots,m-1,\ \sum_i y_i = \sum_i x_i\}X[x]={y:Sj​(y)≤Sj​(x), j=1,…,m−1, ∑i​yi​=∑i​xi​}.
  6. (D), p. 282: for a real-valued convex symmetric fff, f(λ(A))=max⁡V orthogonalf(Dg⁡(VTAV))f(\lambda(A)) = \max_{V \text{ orthogonal}} f(\operatorname{Dg}(V^TAV))f(λ(A))=maxV orthogonal​f(Dg(VTAV)).
  7. Proposition 4.2.2, p. 154: for ggg symmetric, monotone on R+k\mathbb R^k_+R+k​ and SDr, t≥g(σ(X))t \ge g(\sigma(X))t≥g(σ(X)) iff ∃x,u\exists x, u∃x,u with S(x,t,u)⪰0\mathcal S(x,t,u)\succeq 0S(x,t,u)⪰0, x1≥⋯≥xkx_1 \ge \cdots \ge x_kx1​≥⋯≥xk​, Σj(X)≤x1+⋯+xj\Sigma_j(X) \le x_1+\cdots+x_jΣj​(X)≤x1​+⋯+xj​ for j=1,…,kj = 1,\dots,kj=1,…,k (4.2.4).

A further level

A strengthened variant of the goal states that (4.2.3) remains exact when the ordering constraint x1≥⋯≥xmx_1 \ge \cdots \ge x_mx1​≥⋯≥xm​ is removed.

Significance

The result itself. Proposition 4.2.1 reduces semidefinite representability of a spectral function on Sm\mathbf S^mSm, a space of dimension m(m+1)/2m(m+1)/2m(m+1)/2, to semidefinite representability of a symmetric function on Rm\mathbb R^mRm. The extra cost is mmm scalar variables, m−1m-1m−1 ordering inequalities, m−1m-1m−1 Ky Fan constraints (each an LMI of size mmm by 18.c) and one trace equation. The representation is explicit, so a modeling language can generate it mechanically. Proposition 4.2.2 does the same for functions of singular values, which covers the nuclear norm and the operator norm of rectangular matrices. Fact (D) is the variational description that makes X↦g(λ(X))X \mapsto g(\lambda(X))X↦g(λ(X)) convex (Davis, 1957; Lewis, 1996).

Formalizing it. All results here are classical and proved in the book, partly through exercises (4.14–4.16 for the goal). None of them is formalized on Prove2Me beyond Birkhoff's theorem, which Mathlib has as doublyStochastic_eq_convexHull_permMatrix. A related proved platform item, Matrix.IsHermitian.sorted_eigenvalues_le_add_of_re_dotProduct_le, is a Weyl-type inequality that implies (A) when its slack is zero. Mathlib has sorted eigenvalues of Hermitian matrices (eigenvalues₀) but no Ky Fan sums, no majorization theory and no notion of semidefinite representation. This mission produces them.

Difficulty

The forward direction of every representation is a choice of witness. The content is in the converse: from an arbitrary feasible point of the LMI system one must recover the inequality for the eigenvalues. For (4.2.3) this means showing that partial-sum domination plus equal totals places λ(X)\lambda(X)λ(X) inside the convex hull of the permutations of the witness xxx. The obvious coordinatewise comparison fails, because λ(X)\lambda(X)λ(X) is not dominated entrywise by xxx. The hard half of the majorization principle (Exercise 4.15) is this step, and it does not follow from convexity of SjS_jSj​ alone. In Proposition 4.2.2 the witness only dominates the singular values in partial sums, with no equality of totals, so majorization alone does not suffice there.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin m → ℝ (0-based indices) and matrices Matrix (Fin m) (Fin m) ℝ. Symmetric means Matrix.IsHermitian and ⪰0\succeq 0⪰0 means Matrix.PosSemidef, which includes symmetry. λ(X)\lambda(X)λ(X) is Mathlib's antitone IsHermitian.eigenvalues₀; it is applied only to symmetric matrices. Functions with values in R∪{+∞}\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}R∪{+∞} are EReal-valued and never −∞-\infty−∞, and only order comparisons with real numbers are made on them. A representation S\mathcal SS is an explicit affine map with symmetric coefficient matrices. In Proposition 4.2.2 the function ggg, given on R+k\mathbb R^k_+R+k​ only, is extended by +∞+\infty+∞ outside R+k\mathbb R^k_+R+k​. The singular values are written as λi(XXT)\sqrt{\lambda_i(XX^T)}λi​(XXT)​, which equals λi((XXT)1/2)\lambda_i((XX^T)^{1/2})λi​((XXT)1/2). Typos on the page are corrected and listed in the items: Sk(x)S_k(x)Sk​(x) for Sk(X)S_k(X)Sk​(X) in 18.c, and fff and j=1,…,mj = 1,\dots,mj=1,…,m in Proposition 4.2.2.

The claim "fff is SDr" admits a trivializing formalization: asserting that some LMI system projects onto the epigraph, with no control over its shape or size, says nothing beyond convexity. Every statement here instead pins the representation down as the book's explicit system (4.2.2), (4.2.3) or (4.2.4), quantified over every symmetric matrix and every real ttt.

Beyond the paper. One strengthened variant is posed: Proposition 4.2.1 with the constraint x1≥⋯≥xmx_1 \ge \cdots \ge x_mx1​≥⋯≥xm​ removed from (4.2.3) (finding F1). The evidence is that x1+⋯+xjx_1+\cdots+x_jx1​+⋯+xj​ never exceeds the sum of the jjj largest entries of xxx, so the remaining constraints already express majorization. The variant is not a milestone, and the book's statement stays the goal.

A complete development needs:

  • majorization on Rm\mathbb R^mRm (sums of largest entries, the permutation hull);
  • Birkhoff's theorem, available in Mathlib;
  • monotonicity of sorted eigenvalues in the Loewner order;
  • spectral decomposition for constructing witnesses;
  • singular values through XXTXX^TXXT.

Majorization, the Ky Fan representation and fact (A) are reusable well beyond this chapter, for instance in eigenvalue optimization and the analysis of interior-point methods. Contributions of these as standalone results are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Nemirovski, Lectures on Modern Convex Optimization: Analysis, Algorithms, and Engineering Applications, MPS/SIAM Series on Optimization, SIAM, 2001. doi:10.1137/1.9780898718829
  • G. Birkhoff, Tres observaciones sobre el álgebra lineal, Univ. Nac. Tucumán Rev. Ser. A 5 (1946), 147–151.
  • K. Fan, On a theorem of Weyl concerning eigenvalues of linear transformations I, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 35 (1949), 652–655. doi:10.1073/pnas.35.11.652
  • A. S. Lewis, Convex analysis on the Hermitian matrices, SIAM J. Optim. 6 (1996), 164–177. doi:10.1137/0806009
  • A. W. Marshall, I. Olkin, B. C. Arnold, Inequalities: Theory of Majorization and Its Applications, 2nd ed., Springer, 2011. doi:10.1007/978-0-387-68276-1
9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Quantum Information·Captain: Goku

Gaussian classical-quantum channels: gain of entanglement-assistanceResearch Paper

Motivation

In the present paper we introduce and study Bosonic Gaussian classical-quantum (c-q) channels; the embedding of the classical input into quantum is always possible and therefore the classical entanglement-assisted capacity C_{ea} under appropriate input constraint is well defined. We prove a general property of entropy increase for weak complementary channel, that implies the equality C_{ea}=C (where C is the unassisted capacity) for certain class of c-q Gaussian channel under appropriate energy-type constraint. On the other hand, we show by explicit example that the inequality C<C_{ea} is not unusual for constrained c-q Gaussian channel.

This mission is the statement-level formalization of Gaussian classical-quantum channels: gain of entanglement-assistance (arXiv:1211.4774v1). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.

What is formalized

13 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is §3, unnumbered criterion (14): Gaussian c-q iff isotropic K (§3, unnumbered criterion (14): Gaussian c-q iff isotropic K, PDF p. 5). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.

The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.

Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.

Deferred results

3 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:

  • Abstract/main claim: strict entanglement-assistance gain in Example 2: A valid unrestricted unassisted-capacity identification or a valid operational separation for the channel (31). (source-ambiguity)
  • §4.2, printed unassisted capacity (33): A valid unrestricted unassisted-capacity identification or a valid operational separation for the channel (31). (source-ambiguity)
  • §4.2, claimed capacity-gain asymptotics: A valid unrestricted unassisted-capacity identification or a valid operational separation for the channel (31). (source-ambiguity)

Selected references

  • Gaussian classical-quantum channels: gain of entanglement-assistance, arXiv:1211.4774v1, https://arxiv.org/abs/1211.4774v1
28 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsComplexity Theory·Captain: marwahaha

Block Sensitivity vs. Sensitivity: Reach 2.13Open Problem

Improve the separation exponent between block sensitivity and sensitivity of total Boolean functions. This mission targets α≥2.13\alpha\ge2.13α≥2.13; higher is better.

For every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 and every integer S≥2S\ge2S≥2, the goal asks for a total Boolean function fff with s(f)≥Ss(f)\ge Ss(f)≥S and bs(f)≥s(f)2.13−εbs(f)\ge s(f)^{2.13-\varepsilon}bs(f)≥s(f)2.13−ε. The shared definition SensitivityCampaign.AchievesExponent expresses this requirement. This is an open proof target.

Using a finite certificate. Choose a total Boolean function fff, an input xxx, and integers A,B>1A,B>1A,B>1. Prove s(f)≤As(f)\le As(f)≤A, B≤bs(f,x)B\le bs(f,x)B≤bs(f,x), and A2.13≤BA^{2.13}\le BA2.13≤B, then apply SensitivityCampaign.finite_certificate. The shared theorem handles normalization and passage to arbitrarily large sensitivity. Direct proofs of the asymptotic goal are equally welcome. Use exact certified bounds; numerical estimates alone do not establish the target.

Background: OpenAI problem 132 and the campaign proposal.

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsComplexity Theory·Captain: yousofy

Block Sensitivity vs. Sensitivity: Reach 2.13032.13032.1303Open Problem

Comparing single-coordinate and block changes

Two natural ways to measure the local instability of a Boolean function can behave differently. One counts individual input bits whose flips change the answer. The other permits several bits to change together, provided the chosen groups are disjoint. Quantifying the largest possible gap is a question in the complexity of total Boolean functions, and the Block Sensitivity vs. Sensitivity campaign tracks concrete lower bounds on its separation exponent.

The task is to establish a specified asymptotic exponent using the campaign's shared definitions. A numerical score for an abstract recurrence is insufficient: the witnesses must be actual total Boolean functions, and the sensitivities must become arbitrarily large. This mission records one completed construction checkpoint and its exact mathematical scope. Earlier accepted results, the original OpenAI construction and the community's intermediate refinements provide the surrounding research history in the campaign references.

Boolean functions and sensitive blocks

A total Boolean function on nnn coordinates is a map f:{0,1}n→{0,1}f:\{0,1\}^n\to\{0,1\}f:{0,1}n→{0,1} defined at every binary input. At an input xxx, a coordinate is sensitive if flipping that bit changes the output. The sensitivity s(f,x)s(f,x)s(f,x) counts these coordinates, and s(f)s(f)s(f) is the maximum over all inputs.

A sensitive block at xxx is a nonempty subset of coordinates whose simultaneous flip changes the output. The block sensitivity bs(f,x)bs(f,x)bs(f,x) is the maximum size of a collection of pairwise disjoint sensitive blocks at that same input. The global value bs(f)bs(f)bs(f) maximizes this quantity over all inputs. Blocks in one witness share an input and must be disjoint as coordinate sets; their sizes need not agree. These conventions are exactly those in the shared foundation mission.

Formalization target

For every real ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 and every integer S≥2S\ge2S≥2, establish the existence of a dimension nnn and a total Boolean function fff such that

s(f)≥S,bs(f)≥s(f)2.1303−ε.s(f)\ge S,\qquad bs(f)\ge s(f)^{2.1303-\varepsilon}.s(f)≥S,bs(f)≥s(f)2.1303−ε.

The number 2.13032.13032.1303 is an exact finite decimal. The witnesses may depend on both ε\varepsilonε and SSS. This is the campaign proposition AchievesExponent⁡(2.1303)\operatorname{AchievesExponent}(2.1303)AchievesExponent(2.1303), and the main theorem instantiates its template literally.

A supporting finite-family theorem asserts that, for every natural number mmm, there is a finite total Boolean function with

s(fm)≤3418946681687790375032⋅50063687m,bs(fm,0)≥25260794820729601m.s(f_m)\le3418946681687790375032\cdot50063687^m,\qquad bs(f_m,0)\ge25260794820729601^m.s(fm​)≤3418946681687790375032⋅50063687m,bs(fm​,0)≥25260794820729601m.

The associated exact logarithmic quotient is approximately 2.130319939592.130319939592.13031993959. It is a lower bound supplied by this construction, rather than a determination of the optimal separation exponent. The fixed prefactor is independent of mmm, and the lower bound concerns explicit nonempty pairwise disjoint sensitive blocks at the all-zero input.

Consequences and verification status

Any fixed exponent strictly below 2.13032.13032.1303 gives a literal power separation along functions of unbounded sensitivity. Taking increasing thresholds SSS yields an infinite family whose sensitivities tend to infinity. The theorem does not assert a loss-free inequality at the displayed endpoint, an optimality result, or an improved universal upper bound.

The full construction, its actual Boolean functions and the exponent conversion have passed complete local Lean kernel checks with only the standard three axioms. The shared-labeling lemma is separately accepted and publicly Proved. The main theorem currently has a checked reduction on Prove2Me; the larger finite-family dependency still awaits server acceptance after combined submissions exceeded the300-second verification limit. This mission records the exact proved local statement while preserving that server-status distinction.

The reusable content includes the finite-family statement, the unchanged campaign finite-certificate interface, and the exact exponent conversion. Those interfaces permit later constructions to replace the finite witnesses without changing what the campaign's asymptotic goal means. Source attribution to the original OpenAI development, community contributors and Robin Kothari/Codex is retained in the published proof sources. The new contribution is credited to username yousofy with Codex.

Why the quantifiers matter

A high block-sensitivity value at one input does not by itself control maximum sensitivity over all inputs. Likewise, a finite example with a favorable ratio does not by itself state the required unbounded-sensitivity family. A valid contribution must account for both requirements. Checking only selected inputs, allowing overlapping blocks, or changing the shared complexity definitions would establish a different assertion.

A large part of the formal verification concerns this connection between finite construction data and actual Boolean functions. Exact integer comparisons also matter: rounded decimal scores and floating-point feasibility checks do not prove the target inequality. Independent source and numerical audits supplement the Lean kernel checks; the authoritative server status of each referenced theorem remains visible separately.

Formalization scope and reusable interfaces

The formalization uses Lean4.33.1 and Mathlib revision 0df444a360eaa60ab8c11dca51a86af692955474. Finite input coordinates are represented by Fin n, and Boolean outputs by Bool. The shared SensitivitySeparation definitions count single-bit changes and nonempty pairwise disjoint sensitive blocks. The shared SensitivityCampaign definition quantifies over arbitrary positive real exponent loss and integer sensitivity thresholds.

The published goal has no hypothesis assuming the desired construction, separation, or labeling. In particular, zero-dimensional or bounded-sensitivity examples cannot satisfy the threshold quantifier. Standard real powers are used for the final comparison, while construction certificates are checked using exact natural-number arithmetic. The shared finite-certificate theorems and supporting finite-family statements are included as reference items. Corrections to exposition, independently checked proofs of the same goal, reusable supporting lemmas and genuinely stronger constructions are welcome.

Selected references

  • Prove2Me community, Block Sensitivity vs. Sensitivity, collaborative campaign,2026. Campaign and shared definitions.
  • OpenAI, Sensitivity separation construction, Lean mathematical development. Original construction.
  • Robin Kothari and Codex, Separation exponent at least2.075, Prove2Me,2026. Accepted foundation and retained attribution.
  • yousofy with Codex, Shared local-lemma labelings: exponent2.1303, Prove2Me,2026. Main statement and proof submissions.
8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsComplexity Theory·Captain: yousofy

Block Sensitivity vs. Sensitivity: Reach 2.13012.13012.1301Open Problem

Comparing single-coordinate and block changes

Two natural ways to measure the local instability of a Boolean function can behave differently. One counts individual input bits whose flips change the answer. The other permits several bits to change together, provided the chosen groups are disjoint. Quantifying the largest possible gap is a question in the complexity of total Boolean functions, and the Block Sensitivity vs. Sensitivity campaign tracks concrete lower bounds on its separation exponent.

The task is to establish a specified asymptotic exponent using the campaign's shared definitions. A numerical score for an abstract recurrence is insufficient: the witnesses must be actual total Boolean functions, and the sensitivities must become arbitrarily large. This mission records one completed construction checkpoint and its exact mathematical scope. Earlier accepted results, the original OpenAI construction and the community's intermediate refinements provide the surrounding research history in the campaign references.

Boolean functions and sensitive blocks

A total Boolean function on nnn coordinates is a map f:{0,1}n→{0,1}f:\{0,1\}^n\to\{0,1\}f:{0,1}n→{0,1} defined at every binary input. At an input xxx, a coordinate is sensitive if flipping that bit changes the output. The sensitivity s(f,x)s(f,x)s(f,x) counts these coordinates, and s(f)s(f)s(f) is the maximum over all inputs.

A sensitive block at xxx is a nonempty subset of coordinates whose simultaneous flip changes the output. The block sensitivity bs(f,x)bs(f,x)bs(f,x) is the maximum size of a collection of pairwise disjoint sensitive blocks at that same input. The global value bs(f)bs(f)bs(f) maximizes this quantity over all inputs. Blocks in one witness share an input and must be disjoint as coordinate sets; their sizes need not agree. These conventions are exactly those in the shared foundation mission.

Formalization target

For every real ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 and every integer S≥2S\ge2S≥2, establish the existence of a dimension nnn and a total Boolean function fff such that

s(f)≥S,bs(f)≥s(f)2.1301−ε.s(f)\ge S,\qquad bs(f)\ge s(f)^{2.1301-\varepsilon}.s(f)≥S,bs(f)≥s(f)2.1301−ε.

The number 2.13012.13012.1301 is an exact finite decimal. The witnesses may depend on both ε\varepsilonε and SSS. This is the campaign proposition AchievesExponent⁡(2.1301)\operatorname{AchievesExponent}(2.1301)AchievesExponent(2.1301), and the main theorem instantiates its template literally.

A supporting finite-family theorem asserts that, for every natural number mmm, there is a finite total Boolean function with

s(fm)≤32057676379612508934192581⋅7922m,bs(fm,0)≥201838849m.s(f_m)\le32057676379612508934192581\cdot7922^m,\qquad bs(f_m,0)\ge201838849^m.s(fm​)≤32057676379612508934192581⋅7922m,bs(fm​,0)≥201838849m.

The natural number mmm indexes distinct finite construction instances; it is not a dimension bound. The fixed prefactor does not depend on mmm. The associated exact logarithmic quotient is a lower bound supplied by this construction, rather than a determination of the optimal separation exponent.

Consequences and verification status

Any fixed exponent strictly below 2.13012.13012.1301 gives a literal power separation along functions of unbounded sensitivity. Taking increasing thresholds SSS yields an infinite family whose sensitivities tend to infinity. The theorem does not assert a loss-free inequality at the displayed endpoint, an optimality result, or an improved universal upper bound.

The main theorem and its reusable finite-family input have accepted proofs and public Proved status. The exact growth-rate lower bound log(201838849)/log(7922), approximately2.13012479519, is also separately accepted. These facts are recorded with source hashes and acceptance receipts in the accompanying proof package.

The reusable content includes the finite-family statement, the unchanged campaign finite-certificate interface, and the exact exponent conversion. Those interfaces permit later constructions to replace the finite witnesses without changing what the campaign's asymptotic goal means. Source attribution to the original OpenAI development, community contributors and Robin Kothari/Codex is retained in the published proof sources. The new contribution is credited to username yousofy with Codex.

Why the quantifiers matter

A high block-sensitivity value at one input does not by itself control maximum sensitivity over all inputs. Likewise, a finite example with a favorable ratio does not by itself state the required unbounded-sensitivity family. A valid contribution must account for both requirements. Checking only selected inputs, allowing overlapping blocks, or changing the shared complexity definitions would establish a different assertion.

A large part of the formal verification concerns this connection between finite construction data and actual Boolean functions. Exact integer comparisons also matter: rounded decimal scores and floating-point feasibility checks do not prove the target inequality. Independent source and numerical audits supplement the Lean kernel checks; the authoritative server status of each referenced theorem remains visible separately.

Formalization scope and reusable interfaces

The formalization uses Lean4.33.1 and Mathlib revision 0df444a360eaa60ab8c11dca51a86af692955474. Finite input coordinates are represented by Fin n, and Boolean outputs by Bool. The shared SensitivitySeparation definitions count single-bit changes and nonempty pairwise disjoint sensitive blocks. The shared SensitivityCampaign definition quantifies over arbitrary positive real exponent loss and integer sensitivity thresholds.

The published goal has no hypothesis assuming the desired construction, separation, or labeling. In particular, zero-dimensional or bounded-sensitivity examples cannot satisfy the threshold quantifier. Standard real powers are used for the final comparison, while construction certificates are checked using exact natural-number arithmetic. The shared finite-certificate theorems and supporting finite-family statements are included as reference items. Corrections to exposition, independently checked proofs of the same goal, reusable supporting lemmas and genuinely stronger constructions are welcome.

Selected references

  • Prove2Me community, Block Sensitivity vs. Sensitivity, collaborative campaign,2026. Campaign and shared definitions.
  • OpenAI, Sensitivity separation construction, Lean mathematical development. Original construction.
  • Robin Kothari and Codex, Separation exponent at least2.075, Prove2Me,2026. Accepted foundation and retained attribution.
  • yousofy with Codex, Coupled target and guard profiles: exponent2.1301, Prove2Me,2026. Main statement and proof submissions.
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CombinatoricsComplexity Theory·Captain: yousofy

Block Sensitivity vs. Sensitivity: Periodic exponent 2.1192.1192.119Open Problem

Motivation

A rule that assigns an output bit to every input string can respond differently to changing one bit and changing a group of bits. Sensitivity counts individual changes that affect an output. Block sensitivity permits disjoint groups of coordinates to change separately. Understanding the largest possible difference between these measures is a question about the dependence of Boolean functions on their inputs.

Hao Huang's 2019 theorem established a polynomial relation between sensitivity and polynomial degree, resolving the Sensitivity Conjecture. Determining the sharp quantitative relation between sensitivity and block sensitivity remained a separate problem. OpenAI's 2026 result disproved a universal quadratic bound for total Boolean functions. Subsequent accepted results include the 2.075 theorem by Robin Kothari and Codex and the accepted 2.085 certificate developed for yousofy with Codex. This mission records a stronger quantitative target, 2.119.

Setting

A total Boolean function is a map

f:{0,1}n⟶{0,1}f:\{0,1\}^n\longrightarrow\{0,1\}f:{0,1}n⟶{0,1}

that assigns an output to every length-nnn bit string. For an input xxx and a coordinate set BBB, let xBx^BxB denote the string obtained by reversing exactly the bits in BBB.

A coordinate iii is sensitive at xxx if f(x{i})≠f(x)f(x^{\{i\}})\ne f(x)f(x{i})=f(x). Write s(f,x)s(f,x)s(f,x) for the number of such coordinates, and define

s(f)=max⁡xs(f,x).s(f)=\max_x s(f,x).s(f)=xmax​s(f,x).

A sensitive block at xxx is a nonempty coordinate set BBB with f(xB)≠f(x)f(x^B)\ne f(x)f(xB)=f(x). Let bs(f,x)bs(f,x)bs(f,x) be the largest size of a family of pairwise disjoint sensitive blocks at the same input, and set

bs(f)=max⁡xbs(f,x).bs(f)=\max_x bs(f,x).bs(f)=xmax​bs(f,x).

Each member of a block family is flipped separately from the original input. The definitions use finite coordinate sets and finite families of blocks.

Formalization target

The main theorem is

AchievesExponent⁡(2.119),2.119=21191000.\operatorname{AchievesExponent}(2.119),\qquad 2.119=\frac{2119}{1000}.AchievesExponent(2.119),2.119=10002119​.

Explicitly, for every real ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 and every natural number S≥2S\ge2S≥2, there must exist a natural number nnn and a total Boolean function f:{0,1}n→{0,1}f:\{0,1\}^n\to\{0,1\}f:{0,1}n→{0,1} such that

s(f)≥S,bs(f)≥s(f)2.119−ε.s(f)\ge S,\qquad bs(f)\ge s(f)^{2.119-\varepsilon}.s(f)≥S,bs(f)≥s(f)2.119−ε.

The formal statement is SensitivityCampaign.AchievesExponent (2.119 : ℝ). Both nnn and fff may depend on ε\varepsilonε and SSS. The decimal denotes the exact rational number displayed above. The claim includes arbitrarily small positive exponent loss and arbitrarily large sensitivity; neither quantifier is optional.

In particular, the statement gives a fixed exponent 2.118 for functions of unbounded sensitivity, strictly above 2.1. The target is a specific checkpoint in the broader problem of determining the optimal separation exponent. It does not assert that the displayed endpoint is attained without exponent loss.

Significance and verification status

The target extends these earlier quantitative bounds and crosses the campaign's 2.10 checkpoint. It requires the separation to persist beyond every sensitivity threshold, so a favorable comparison confined to bounded sensitivity would not establish the result. It also leaves the exact optimal exponent unresolved.

The new contribution is a certified finite construction and formal proof within the existing nine-predicate framework. The proof retains the generic development and attribution from Kothari and Codex's accepted 2.075 contribution, including its credit to abhishekdpseok's accepted 2.0635 proof and the earlier OpenAI and community work. The new certificate and its assembly were developed for username yousofy with Codex.

The complete self-contained source has passed standalone compilation in Lean 4.33.1, with only the standard axioms propext, Classical.choice, and Quot.sound. Its numerical certificates and source correspondence have also undergone independent checks. Prove2Me accepted the complete proof on 20 October 2026, submission bb3251a4-f00f-4b06-962a-97be2de5db1b. The public theorem and proof record records its verification status. Further work can examine the proof, improve its reusable interfaces, or establish stronger bounds.

Difficulty

The sensitivity bound must hold at every input. A calculation only at an input supporting many sensitive blocks does not control this maximum. Likewise, a collection of output-changing coordinate sets provides the required block bound only when every set is nonempty and the sets are pairwise disjoint.

The asymptotic requirement creates a separate difficulty. Increasing the dimension alone does not force sensitivity to increase, because added coordinates may be ignored. A complete argument must provide witnesses above every prescribed sensitivity threshold. Finally, the exact rational exponent needs rigorous comparisons: an approximate numerical score alone does not prove the stated inequality.

Formalization scope

The shared Lean representation is f : (Fin n → Bool) → Bool, using the definitions in SensitivityCampaign and OAI.Paper320. Sensitivity is the finite supremum over all inputs. Block sensitivity takes the finite supremum over all block families at each input, assigning zero to any family that fails the disjointness, nonemptiness, or output-change conditions. The empty family is allowed.

The target imposes no normalization on fff or a distinguished input, and it includes no promise restricting the function's domain. Dimensions zero and constant functions are permitted by the underlying types, but cannot satisfy s(f)≥S≥2s(f)\ge S\ge2s(f)≥S≥2. Natural-number complexity measures are cast to real numbers before real exponentiation. Every positive ε\varepsilonε is included, even when 2.119−ε2.119-\varepsilon2.119−ε is nonpositive.

The complete source imports Mathlib and the unchanged campaign definition. Existing reusable infrastructure includes the complexity measures, coordinate reindexing results, and the finite-certificate interface. Independent verification, clearer reusable statements, and stronger certified bounds are welcome, while preserving totality, global sensitivity, and the unbounded-sensitivity requirement.

Selected references

  • Hao Huang, Induced subgraphs of hypercubes and a proof of the Sensitivity Conjecture, Annals of Mathematics 190(3), 949–955, 2019. DOI.
  • OpenAI, A superquadratic separation between sensitivity and block sensitivity, OpenAI Math Release preprint, September 2026. Manuscript; formalization scope.
  • Robin Kothari and Codex, Separation exponent at least 2.075, Prove2Me accepted proof, 2026. Theorem and proof record.
  • abhishekdpseok, Separation exponent at least 2.0635, Prove2Me accepted proof, 2026. Theorem and proof record.
  • yousofy with Codex, Separation exponent at least 2.085, Prove2Me accepted proof, 2026. Theorem and proof record.
  • yousofy with Codex, Separation exponent at least 2.119 from a periodic profile invariant, Prove2Me accepted proof, 2026. Theorem and verification record.
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CombinatoricsComplexity Theory·Captain: yousofy

Block Sensitivity vs. Sensitivity: Eight-layer exponent 2.0852.0852.085Open Problem

Motivation

A rule that assigns an output bit to every input string can react very differently to changing one bit and changing several bits together. Quantifying that difference is a basic question about Boolean functions in theoretical computer science. Sensitivity measures how many individual bit changes can affect one output; block sensitivity allows disjoint groups of bits to change separately. The question here is how far apart these two measures can grow.

Hao Huang's 2019 theorem established a polynomial relation between sensitivity and polynomial degree, resolving the Sensitivity Conjecture. The sharper question about the exponent remained. OpenAI's 2026 superquadratic separation ruled out a universal quadratic bound. The subsequent accepted exponent-2.075 contribution by Robin Kothari and Codex provides the established comparison point for this mission. The target is the stronger quantitative bound 2.085.

Setting

A total Boolean function is a map

f:{0,1}n⟶{0,1}f:\{0,1\}^n\longrightarrow\{0,1\}f:{0,1}n⟶{0,1}

that assigns an output to every length-nnn bit string. For an input xxx and a set BBB of coordinate positions, write xBx^BxB for the string obtained by reversing exactly the bits in BBB.

A coordinate iii is sensitive at xxx when f(x{i})≠f(x)f(x^{\{i\}})\ne f(x)f(x{i})=f(x). Write s(f,x)s(f,x)s(f,x) for the number of such coordinates and define

s(f)=max⁡xs(f,x).s(f)=\max_x s(f,x).s(f)=xmax​s(f,x).

A sensitive block at xxx is a nonempty coordinate set BBB with f(xB)≠f(x)f(x^B)\ne f(x)f(xB)=f(x). Define bs(f,x)bs(f,x)bs(f,x) as the largest size of a family of pairwise disjoint sensitive blocks at that same input, and set

bs(f)=max⁡xbs(f,x).bs(f)=\max_x bs(f,x).bs(f)=xmax​bs(f,x).

Each block is flipped separately from the original input. All functions and coordinate sets in these definitions are finite.

Formalization target

The main theorem is the campaign statement

AchievesExponent⁡(2.085),2.085=417200.\operatorname{AchievesExponent}(2.085),\qquad 2.085=\frac{417}{200}.AchievesExponent(2.085),2.085=200417​.

Its full meaning is

∀ε>0  ∀S∈N, S≥2  ⟹  ∃n∈N  ∃f:{0,1}n→{0,1},\forall\varepsilon>0\;\forall S\in\mathbb N,\ S\ge2\;\Longrightarrow\; \exists n\in\mathbb N\;\exists f:\{0,1\}^n\to\{0,1\},∀ε>0∀S∈N, S≥2⟹∃n∈N∃f:{0,1}n→{0,1}, s(f)≥Sandbs(f)≥s(f)2.085−ε.s(f)\ge S\quad\text{and}\quad bs(f)\ge s(f)^{2.085-\varepsilon}.s(f)≥Sandbs(f)≥s(f)2.085−ε.

The exact formal target and its proof status are recorded here. Both the dimension and the function may depend on ε\varepsilonε and SSS. The decimal denotes an exact rational number. The statement permits arbitrarily small positive exponent loss and explicitly requires arbitrarily large sensitivity. For example, choosing ε=0.001\varepsilon=0.001ε=0.001 gives exponent 2.084 at every requested sensitivity threshold. This is a concrete checkpoint within the broader problem of determining the optimal separation exponent.

Significance and current status

The target raises the established exponent bound from 2.075 to 2.085, with the quantifiers stated above. In particular, it supplies a fixed exponent strictly above 2.075 for a family whose sensitivities are unbounded. This distinction matters: a favorable comparison for one finite Boolean function, without an appropriate asymptotic conclusion, would not establish the target.

The new contribution is an eight-layer numerical certificate within the existing nine-predicate framework. Its foundation comes from Kothari and Codex's accepted 2.075 proof, which retains credit to abhishekdpseok's accepted 2.0635 development and the earlier OpenAI and community proofs.

The complete self-contained proof has compiled successfully in Lean 4.33.1. The certificate and its assembly have also passed independent checks. Prove2Me has accepted the complete proof, submission c6096517-61e7-4f51-bc68-c1521d61eb65, on 20 October 2026. The target record is the reference for subsequent verification status. The separate proof explanation supplies the construction details and exact arithmetic.

Difficulty

The sensitivity estimate must hold at every input. Checking only the input that supports many sensitive blocks leaves that requirement unresolved. Likewise, a collection of output-changing sets is insufficient unless its members are nonempty and pairwise disjoint.

The asymptotic quantifiers impose a further requirement: witnesses must exist beyond every sensitivity threshold. Merely increasing the dimension does not establish this, since a function can ignore added coordinates. Finally, the exact rational exponent requires rigorous arithmetic bounds; a numerical logarithm estimate alone does not prove the formal statement.

Formalization scope

The shared Lean representation uses f : (Fin n → Bool) → Bool and the definitions in SensitivityCampaign and OAI.Paper320. Sensitivity is the finite supremum over all inputs. Block sensitivity takes the finite supremum over all block families at each input, assigning zero to a family that fails the disjointness, nonemptiness, or output-change conditions. The empty family is allowed.

The target imposes no normalization on fff or on a distinguished input. Dimensions zero and constant functions are permitted by the underlying types, but cannot satisfy the required sensitivity threshold S≥2S\ge2S≥2. Real exponentiation is applied after casting the natural-number complexity measures to real numbers.

The development uses Mathlib and the unchanged campaign definitions. Reusable infrastructure includes the complexity-measure definitions and the finite-certificate interface. Independent verification, clearer reusable statements, and stronger rigorously certified bounds are welcome contributions. Any stronger target should preserve totality, global sensitivity, and the unbounded-sensitivity requirement.

Selected references

  • Hao Huang, Induced subgraphs of hypercubes and a proof of the Sensitivity Conjecture, Annals of Mathematics 190(3), 949–955, 2019. DOI.
  • OpenAI, A superquadratic separation between sensitivity and block sensitivity, OpenAI Math Release preprint, September 2026. Manuscript; formalization scope.
  • Robin Kothari and Codex, Separation exponent at least 2.075, Prove2Me accepted proof, 2026, submission 819ad4c6-aa25-48ca-82e9-c8df39c182c0. Theorem and proof record.
  • abhishekdpseok, Separation exponent at least 2.0635, Prove2Me accepted proof, 2026, submission f80a3f37-72fa-4d56-a094-3e4d351764f3. Theorem and proof record.
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Quantum Information·Captain: Goku

Composition Operators on Haagerup LpL^pLp-spacesResearch Paper

Motivation

Building on the ideas in L E Labuschagne, Composition Operators on Non-commutative LpL^pLp-spaces, \textit{Expo. Math} \textbf{17}(1999), 429--468, we indicate how the concept of a composition operator may be extended to the context of Haagerup LpL^pLp-spaces.

This mission is the statement-level formalization of Composition Operators on Haagerup LpL^pLp-spaces (arXiv:math/0603612v2). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.

What is formalized

5 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Normal states are epsilon-delta absolutely continuous (Lemma 3.2, PDF p. 4). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.

The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.

Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.

Deferred results

21 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:

  • Lemma 3.3: State-preserving classical L-infinity star-algebra realization of an arbitrary abelian von Neumann algebra, including characteristic projections and genuine measure atomlessness. (hard)
  • Remark 3.8: Actual modular continuous core, canonical trace and dual density; closed ordinary density products and symmetric Haagerup sandwiches, with finite and infinity exponents. (hard)
  • Theorem 4.2: Haagerup Lp spaces and characteristic sandwiches; C(M) generated by the finite-projection span; arbitrary orthogonal strong-net sums and a normal Jordan extension. (hard)
  • Lemma 4.3: Modular group constructed from an fns weight, core representation on L2(R,H), restriction to L2(R,eH), and restricted affiliated density. (hard)
  • Remark 4.4: Extension by zero along L2(R,eH) into L2(R,H) for affiliated operators and its exact Haagerup Lp image. (hard)
  • Lemma 4.5: Nonunital normal Jordan star maps, the normal composed weight, and its canonical support constructed from null projections. (hard)
  • Step (I): canonical support reduction: Canonical support of the composed weight, normal Jordan restriction, central corner Haagerup compression, and faithful restricted composed weight. (hard)
  • Proposition 4.6: Two weights in a canonically identified continuous core, closed density powers/products, bounded symmetric changes of weights, and their interpolation scale. (hard)
  • Theorem 4.8: Actual Haagerup Lp bimodule actions, strong multiplication Lr times Lp into Lq, and bounded complex-linear module maps. (hard)
  • Theorem 4.8: left-module counterpart: Actual Haagerup Lp left modules, right multiplication by Lr elements, and the bilinear trace dual pairing. (hard)
  • Lemma 4.9: Haagerup quasi-Lp spaces at all positive finite exponents, strong product and trace-defined quasi-norm, with the bounded algebra at r=infinity. (hard)
  • Lemma 4.10: Haagerup trace duality adjoint, closed e*h^(1/p), left support of affiliated operators, and a densely defined closed-product map into L1. (hard)
  • Lemma 4.11: Measurable affiliated algebras of two continuous cores, canonical Jordan transport, shift generators and possibly nonmeasurable densities, and onto Lp isometries. (hard)
  • Step (III): Jordan decomposition and WJ: Constructed two-summand Jordan decomposition, canonical support corners with overlapping supports, independent Lq product norm, and onto sandwich isometry WJ. (hard)
  • Proposition 4.12: Actual Haagerup Lp and dense symmetric embedding of m_phi, closed density powers and products, and positive-map weight domination. (hard)
  • Lemma 4.13: Nonunital normal Jordan map, generated von Neumann algebra B acting on J(1)H, and restriction of the target weight to B. (hard)
  • Remark 4.14: Weight modular action, generated invariant B, constructed weight-preserving normal conditional expectation, and isometric Haagerup inclusion with sandwich compatibility. (hard)
  • Lemma 4.15: Modular-invariant nonunital (anti)homomorphic range, support-corner Haagerup spaces, symmetric composition operators and bounded change of weights. (hard)
  • Lemma 4.16: Modular group of an arbitrary fns weight, its actual dual density in the continuous core, and spectral commutation with arbitrary bounded d. (hard)
  • Lemma 4.17: Canonically identified cores for two weights, their actual dual densities, strong spectral commutation, and the Pedersen-Takesaki commuting-weight condition. (hard)
  • Theorem 4.19: All five canonical construction steps for Haagerup composition operators, two-copy weight changes and their scale, nonfaithful commuting weights and Jordan decomposition. (hard)

Selected references

  • Composition Operators on Haagerup LpL^pLp-spaces, arXiv:math/0603612v2, https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0603612v2
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Quantum Information·Captain: Goku

On complementary channels and the additivity problemResearch Paper

Motivation

We explore complementarity between output and environment of a quantum channel (or, more generally, CP map), making an observation that the output purity characteristics for complementary CP maps coincide. Hence, validity of the mutiplicativity/additivity conjecture for a class of CP maps implies its validity for complementary maps. The class of CP maps complementary to entanglement-breaking ones is described and is shown to contain diagonal CP maps as a proper subclass, resulting in new class of CP maps (channels) for which the multiplicativity/additivity holds. Covariant and Gaussian channels are discussed briefly in this context.

This mission is the statement-level formalization of On complementary channels and the additivity problem (arXiv:quant-ph/0509101v3). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.

What is formalized

24 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Theorem 1: complementary transfer of multiplicativity, additivity and superadditivity (Theorem 1: complementary transfer of multiplicativity, additivity and superadditivity, PDF p. 3). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.

The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.

Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.

Deferred results

4 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:

  • Two-mode attenuation Bogoljubov dilation and its marginals: Complete self-adjoint quadratic two-mode Fock generator, its actual unitary evolution, and both all-trace-class marginal identities. (hard)
  • Two-mode amplification Bogoljubov dilation and its marginals: Complete self-adjoint quadratic two-mode Fock generator, its actual unitary evolution, and both all-trace-class marginal identities. (hard)
  • Convex mixtures and constrained Holevo-capacity claim: Specified mixture construction, common output identifications/flags, and the constrained-Holevo product-constraint convention for the four listed classes. (source-ambiguity)
  • Literal true-complement identification of Gaussian environmental marginal: Purity of the Gaussian environment, or retention of its omitted purifying subsystem in the true complement. (source-ambiguity)

Selected references

  • On complementary channels and the additivity problem, arXiv:quant-ph/0509101v3, https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0509101v3
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Quantum Information·Captain: Goku

Improving fidelity of continuous-variable teleportation via local operationsResearch Paper

Motivation

We study the Braunstein-Kimble setup for teleportation of quantum state of a single mode of optical field. We assume that the sender and receiver share a two-mode Gaussian state and we identify optimum local Gaussian operations that maximize the teleportation fidelity. We consider fidelity of teleportation of pure Gaussian states and we also introduce fidelity of the teleportation transformation. We show on an explicit example that in some cases the optimum local operation is not a simple unitary symplectic transformation but some more general completely positive map.

This mission is the statement-level formalization of Improving fidelity of continuous-variable teleportation via local operations (arXiv:quant-ph/0202102v3). Every numbered result of the paper was scanned. The results stated here are open sorry goals, ready for solvers to prove.

What is formalized

11 statements of the paper are in Lean 4 (Mathlib 0df444a). The goal theorem is Dissipative Gaussian preprocessing strictly beats every Bob symplectic unitary (Abstract; §IV, Fig.1, pp.6–7, PDF p. 1). The milestones are the other numbered results, in the paper's order, each quoting the paper.

The paper's own objects are the definition item of this mission. Objects shared across papers come from the prove2quantum library and from earlier papers' missions, listed as references.

Provenance: prove2quantum's pipeline drafted each statement (gpt-6.1-sol on Stanford's Sherlock cluster). A blind read-back, written without seeing the paper, is attached to every item. An independent moderator compared each statement against the paper and passed the whole paper without edits.

Deferred results

3 results of the paper are not stated yet, because the library lacks an interface they need:

  • §III, paragraph after Eq.(42): A proved unrestricted diagonal-optimality theorem for arbitrary diagonal A,B,C,D. (source-ambiguity)
  • §III, claim after Eq.(47): A specified complete analytic diagonal root-search algorithm covering exceptional denominators and filtering squared roots. (source-ambiguity)
  • Appendix A, Eqs.(A1)–(A6), continuation p.8: A well-defined renormalized bosonic process score on the accepted full separable state domain, with a fixed momentum-transpose convention, swap trace pairing, and agreement with regular Wigner slices. (hard)

Selected references

  • Improving fidelity of continuous-variable teleportation via local operations, arXiv:quant-ph/0202102v3, https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0202102v3
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AnalysisControl TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Dynamic Momentum Strategies: For Horizons Within the Look-Back Period, the Optimal Weight Is the Mean-Variance Weight Plus a Hedging Term Weighted Toward Recent ReturnsResearch Paper

Motivation

Time-series momentum is the empirical regularity that an asset's recent excess return predicts its future excess return. It has been documented across equity indices, currencies, commodities and bonds (Moskowitz, Ooi & Pedersen 2012), and momentum portfolios are among the most widely traded systematic strategies. Most of that literature builds portfolios from a single signal: the average return over a look-back window. Li and Liu (Operations Research 2022) ask what a long-horizon investor who rebalances should do when expected returns really are driven by such a moving average. Their answer has a structural feature that a Markovian model such as Merton's (Merton 1971) cannot produce. The optimal weight depends on the whole recent price path, not only on the current momentum.

Setting

A risky asset has price StS_tSt​ and log price st=ln⁡Sts_t=\ln S_tst​=lnSt​, with

dStSt=[αmt+(1−α)μ+r] dt+σ dBt,mt=1τ∫t−τt(dSuSu−r du),\frac{dS_t}{S_t} = [\alpha m_t + (1-\alpha)\mu + r]\,dt + \sigma\,dB_t,\qquad m_t = \frac1\tau\int_{t-\tau}^{t}\Big(\frac{dS_u}{S_u} - r\,du\Big),St​dSt​​=[αmt​+(1−α)μ+r]dt+σdBt​,mt​=τ1​∫t−τt​(Su​dSu​​−rdu),

where BBB is a Brownian motion. Momentum mtm_tmt​ is the equally weighted moving average of excess returns over a look-back window of length τ>0\tau>0τ>0. The parameter 0<α<10<\alpha<10<α<1 measures how strongly momentum enters the expected return, μ\muμ is the unconditional risk premium, rrr is the constant short rate and σ>0\sigma>0σ>0 is the volatility. Because the drift depends on st−st−τs_t - s_{t-\tau}st​−st−τ​, the price is not Markov: the state at time ttt is the whole path on [t−τ,t][t-\tau,t][t−τ,t].

An investor with constant relative risk aversion γ>0\gamma>0γ>0 maximizes expected utility of terminal wealth at a horizon TTT by trading the asset and a riskless bond. The mission works in the paper's short-horizon regime 0≤T≤τ0\le T\le\tau0≤T≤τ, with the investor standing at time 000, so the realized path sss on [−τ,0][-\tau,0][−τ,0] is known.

The paper's analysis (Appendix A.2) produces the following objects:

  • the market price of risk at time 000, θ0=[(1−α)μ−α(r−σ2/2)+ατ(s0−s−τ)]/σ\theta_0 = [(1-\alpha)\mu - \alpha(r-\sigma^2/2) + \frac\alpha\tau(s_0-s_{-\tau})]/\sigmaθ0​=[(1−α)μ−α(r−σ2/2)+τα​(s0​−s−τ​)]/σ;
  • functions A1,A2A_1, A_2A1​,A2​ on [0,T][0,T][0,T] that solve a Riccati equation and a linear equation, the system (A.9), with A1(T)=A2(T)=0A_1(T)=A_2(T)=0A1​(T)=A2​(T)=0 and forcing term su−τs_{u-\tau}su−τ​;
  • the optimal weight ϕ0∗=θ0/(γσ)+A1,0s0+A2,0\phi^*_0 = \theta_0/(\gamma\sigma) + A_{1,0}s_0 + A_{2,0}ϕ0∗​=θ0​/(γσ)+A1,0​s0​+A2,0​ of (A.11);
  • explicit functions C0C_0C0​, ω^\hat\omegaω^, the weight ω\omegaω on [−τ,0][-\tau,0][−τ,0] and a constant C1C_1C1​, all of (A.14).

The Lean development names them theta0, SolvesA9, phiStar, C0, omegaHat, omega and C1 in the namespace DynMomentum.ShortHorizon.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3.3

For every solution (A1,A2)(A_1,A_2)(A1​,A2​) of (A.9),

ϕ0∗=αγσ2∫−τ01τ(dSvSv−r dv)+(1−α)μγσ2⏟ϕ0M+(1−γ)αγσ2∫−τ0ωv(dSvSv−r dv)+C1⏟ϕ0H.(3.8)\phi^*_0 = \underbrace{\frac{\alpha}{\gamma\sigma^2}\int_{-\tau}^{0}\frac1\tau\Big(\frac{dS_v}{S_v}-r\,dv\Big) + \frac{(1-\alpha)\mu}{\gamma\sigma^2}}_{\phi^M_0} + \underbrace{\frac{(1-\gamma)\alpha}{\gamma\sigma^2}\int_{-\tau}^{0}\omega_v\Big(\frac{dS_v}{S_v}-r\,dv\Big) + C_1}_{\phi^H_0}. \tag{3.8}ϕ0∗​=ϕ0M​γσ2α​∫−τ0​τ1​(Sv​dSv​​−rdv)+γσ2(1−α)μ​​​+ϕ0H​γσ2(1−γ)α​∫−τ0​ωv​(Sv​dSv​​−rdv)+C1​​​.(3.8)

Moreover, ω\omegaω is positive on (−τ,0](-\tau,0](−τ,0] when T>0T>0T>0, strictly increasing on [−τ,T−τ][-\tau,T-\tau][−τ,T−τ], and constant on [T−τ,0][T-\tau,0][T−τ,0]. The first summand ϕM\phi^MϕM is the myopic mean-variance weight; the second, ϕH\phi^HϕH, is the hedging demand.

Milestones

  1. (A.9) solves (A.8). The ansatz f(x,t)=exp⁡{A1,tx2/2+A2,tx+A3,t}f(x,t)=\exp\{A_{1,t}x^2/2+A_{2,t}x+A_{3,t}\}f(x,t)=exp{A1,t​x2/2+A2,t​x+A3,t​} solves the Feynman–Kac PDE (A.8) whenever (A1,A2,A3)(A_1,A_2,A_3)(A1​,A2​,A3​) solve (A.9).
  2. (A.13), A1A_1A1​. The closed form A1,t=α(γ−1)(1−e2α(T−t)/(γτ))/(γσ2τD(T,t))A_{1,t}=\alpha(\gamma-1)(1-e^{2\alpha(T-t)/(\sqrt\gamma\tau)})/(\gamma\sigma^2\tau D(T,t))A1,t​=α(γ−1)(1−e2α(T−t)/(γ​τ))/(γσ2τD(T,t)) solves the Riccati equation with A1,T=0A_{1,T}=0A1,T​=0.
  3. (A.13), A2A_2A2​. For any solution A1A_1A1​, the variation-of-constants integral for A2A_2A2​ solves the linear equation with A2,T=0A_{2,T}=0A2,T​=0.
  4. (A.14). ω^u>0\hat\omega_u>0ω^u​>0 for u∈[−τ,−τ+T]u\in[-\tau,-\tau+T]u∈[−τ,−τ+T].
  5. Proposition 3.3, last sentence. The positivity and shape of ω\omegaω, stated on its own.

Significance

The result. Proposition 3.3 shows that a momentum investor who rebalances should not trade on momentum alone. The hedging demand weights past returns unequally, with more weight on recent ones, so two price paths with identical momentum lead to different optimal positions. This is the paper's explanation of why path dependence is intrinsic to optimal momentum trading. It underlies the paper's later comparisons with momentum-only strategies, the horizon extension of Proposition 6.3, and the closed-form expansions of Online Appendix III.

Formalizing it. The proof's analytic half, from (A.9) to (3.8), is summarized in the paper by the phrase "after some manipulations". Writing that step out yields a checked identity between an ODE-defined weight and an explicit integral formula. Doing so has already caught an error. The constant C1C_1C1​ printed in (A.14) is wrong: it differs from the true value by a path-independent amount, and it becomes correct after deleting both occurrences of −σ2/2-\sigma^2/2−σ2/2 (a numerical solution of (A.9) agrees with the corrected formula to 10−1010^{-10}10−10). The proposition is proved in the paper. As far as is known, no part of it has been machine-checked.

Difficulty

Each milestone is a direct calculus statement; the goal is not. The obvious approach is to substitute the closed forms (A.13) into (A.11) and simplify. That leaves A2,0A_{2,0}A2,0​ as a double integral of the past path sss against two nested exponential kernels written in the ODE's own parameterization, while (3.8) is a single integral of returns dS/SdS/SdS/S against the weight ω\omegaω of (A.14), which is written in a different parameterization. The paper gives no derivation of the match. The path is only continuous, so no step may differentiate sss. Separately, the Riccati closed form divides by a quantity that vanishes for small γ<1\gamma<1γ<1, so every step has to track where that denominator is positive.

Formalization scope

  • What is formalized. Everything from (A.9) to (3.8). The stochastic layer is not formalized: Lemmas 3.1–3.2 (martingale method), the measure change, the Feynman–Kac representation and the volatility matching (A.10)–(A.12) need stochastic integration, Itô's formula and martingale representation, which Mathlib does not have at this revision. Equation (A.11) is therefore taken as the definition of the optimal weight: ϕ0∗:=θ0/(γσ)+A1,0s0+A2,0\phi^*_0 := \theta_0/(\gamma\sigma) + A_{1,0}s_0 + A_{2,0}ϕ0∗​:=θ0​/(γσ)+A1,0​s0​+A2,0​.
  • Time. The statement is at t=0t=0t=0 with horizon 0≤T≤τ0\le T\le\tau0≤T≤τ and the path on [−τ,0][-\tau,0][−τ,0], as in Appendix A.2. The model is time-homogeneous, so a general ttt is a shift.
  • ODEs. "Solves (A.9)" means a derivative within [0,T][0,T][0,T] at every point of [0,T][0,T][0,T], plus the terminal conditions. At T=0T=0T=0 the derivative clause is vacuous; that is the paper's zero-horizon case.
  • Admissibility. The hypothesis D(T,0)=(γ−1)e2αT/(γτ)+(γ+1)>0D(T,0)=(\sqrt\gamma-1)e^{2\alpha T/(\sqrt\gamma\tau)}+(\sqrt\gamma+1)>0D(T,0)=(γ​−1)e2αT/(γ​τ)+(γ​+1)>0 is added. It holds automatically for γ≥1\gamma\ge1γ≥1. Without it, the Riccati solution blows up for small γ<1\gamma<1γ<1 and the goal would be vacuous.
  • Pathwise returns. The return integral ∫−τ0wv(dSv/Sv−r dv)\int_{-\tau}^0 w_v(dS_v/S_v - r\,dv)∫−τ0​wv​(dSv​/Sv​−rdv), for a deterministic absolutely continuous weight www with derivative w′w'w′, is read as w0s0−w−τs−τ−∫−τ0wv′sv dv+(σ2/2−r)∫−τ0wv dvw_0s_0 - w_{-\tau}s_{-\tau} - \int_{-\tau}^0 w'_vs_v\,dv + (\sigma^2/2-r)\int_{-\tau}^0 w_v\,dvw0​s0​−w−τ​s−τ​−∫−τ0​wv′​sv​dv+(σ2/2−r)∫−τ0​wv​dv. This is its value by Itô's formula and the product rule. With w≡1/τw\equiv1/\tauw≡1/τ it gives back m0m_0m0​ of (2.3).
  • Corrections. C1C_1C1​ is the corrected constant described above. The positivity of ω\omegaω is stated on (−τ,0](-\tau,0](−τ,0] under T>0T>0T>0, because ω−τ=0\omega_{-\tau}=0ω−τ​=0 and ω≡0\omega\equiv0ω≡0 when T=0T=0T=0.
  • What a correct formalization rules out. The goal is not obtained by definition. ϕ∗\phi^*ϕ∗ is (A.11), never ϕM+ϕH\phi^M+\phi^HϕM+ϕH. The functions ω\omegaω, ω^\hat\omegaω^, C0C_0C0​ and C1C_1C1​ are the explicit formulas of (A.14), never derived from the ODE solution. The goal quantifies over every solution of (A.9), not over the closed forms.
  • Infrastructure. The development uses Mathlib's HasDerivWithinAt, interval integrals, Real.exp and Real.sqrt. Two lemmas are reusable well beyond this mission: the closed form of a constant-coefficient scalar Riccati equation, and variation of constants for a scalar linear ODE with merely continuous forcing. Contributions of those lemmas, of uniqueness for (A.9), and of the integration-by-parts step are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. Li and J. Liu, Optimal Dynamic Momentum Strategies, Operations Research, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2254
  • R. C. Merton, Optimum consumption and portfolio rules in a continuous-time model, Journal of Economic Theory 3(4), 1971. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(71)90038-X
  • T. J. Moskowitz, Y. H. Ooi and L. H. Pedersen, Time series momentum, Journal of Financial Economics 104(2), 2012. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.11.003
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Product Selling vs. Pay-Per-Use Service: A Strategic Analysis of Competing Business Models: Pay-Per-Use Out-Earns Selling in Duopoly Equilibrium Iff the Delivery Cost Is Below a ThresholdResearch Paper

Motivation

A firm can sell a product outright or charge customers each time they use it. Selling collects one payment and transfers the asset to the customer. Pay-per-use service (PPU) keeps control of the asset, earns revenue from each use, and incurs a delivery or operating cost each time. These arrangements coexist for equipment, vehicles, and other products whose useful life contains many potential uses. A firm choosing between them needs to know how production cost and delivery cost affect the profit it can earn in competition. Ladas, Kavadias, and Loch study that question in a two-stage game and derive a threshold for which business model earns more in an asymmetric duopoly equilibrium.

The threshold is a result about competitive earnings, not just customer preference. A service provider can attract customers who need few uses, while a seller can attract customers who expect to use the product often. Each firm's price changes the boundary between those groups. The mission focuses on the paper's base model and its Proposition 3: the comparison of the seller's and service provider's equilibrium profits. The paper proves the result in its 2021 SSRN manuscript; this mission asks for a machine-checked account of that known result.

Setting

There are two firms. One sells a product for a single price psp_sps​ and pays a production cost c>0c>0c>0 for each unit sold. The other charges a price pup_upu​ per use. Under the paper's strong pooling assumption, one asset supplies its full capacity of qm>0q_m>0qm​>0 uses, so the provider allocates production cost over those uses. Its effective cost per use is cu=c/qm+δc_u=c/q_m+\deltacu​=c/qm​+δ, where δ≥0\delta\ge0δ≥0 is delivery cost per use. The willingness to pay for one use is a>0a>0a>0. The base model assumes that all customers have this same value but differ in desired lifetime usage qqq, uniformly distributed over [0,qm][0,q_m][0,qm​] with density 1/qm1/q_m1/qm​. Sections 2.1–2.3 set out these assumptions.

The customer utilities are Us(q;ps)=qa−psU_s(q;p_s)=qa-p_sUs​(q;ps​)=qa−ps​ from buying and Uu(q;pu)=q(a−pu)U_u(q;p_u)=q(a-p_u)Uu​(q;pu​)=q(a−pu​) from service. A customer belongs to the seller's segment if buying gives nonnegative utility and at least as much utility as service. A customer belongs to the provider's segment if service gives nonnegative utility and at least as much utility as buying. These conditions define the market segments at every price pair, including prices far from equilibrium. The paper writes both comparisons weakly, so a customer at a tie belongs to both segments. In the relevant equilibria, such ties have zero measure.

The seller's profit is its margin ps−cp_s-cps​−c times the mass of its segment. The provider's profit is the average over its segment of usage qqq times margin pu−cup_u-c_upu​−cu​. Both averages use the uniform density 1/qm1/q_m1/qm​. Firms first select business models and then set prices simultaneously. This mission fixes the asymmetric subgame with one seller and one service provider. A price equilibrium is a pair at which neither firm can increase its profit by changing its own price; the provider's price is constrained by pu≤ap_u\le apu​≤a. The comparison is made where the provider is admissible, cu≤ac_u\le acu​≤a, as the paper specifies before Proposition 3 and when discussing infeasibility in Section 3.2. The model and game timing appear on manuscript pages 7–9.

Formalization targets

Equilibrium profit comparison

Write Πs(ps,pu)\Pi_s(p_s,p_u)Πs​(ps​,pu​) and Πu(ps,pu)\Pi_u(p_s,p_u)Πu​(ps​,pu​) for the integral-defined profits at an equilibrium. Proposition 3 gives a production-cost-dependent delivery threshold:

δˉ(c)={c2qm,c≤aqm3,a−cqm−2a(aqm−caqm+c)2,c>aqm3.\bar\delta(c)= \begin{cases} \dfrac{c}{2q_m}, & c\le\dfrac{aq_m}{3},\\ a-\dfrac{c}{q_m}-2a\left(\dfrac{aq_m-c}{aq_m+c}\right)^2, & c>\dfrac{aq_m}{3}. \end{cases}δˉ(c)=⎩⎨⎧​2qm​c​,a−qm​c​−2a(aqm​+caqm​−c​)2,​c≤3aqm​​,c>3aqm​​.​

The goal asserts that an equilibrium exists and that every price equilibrium has the stated comparison:

Πs(ps,pu)≤Πu(ps,pu)⟺δ≤δˉ(c).\Pi_s(p_s,p_u)\le\Pi_u(p_s,p_u) \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad \delta\le\bar\delta(c).Πs​(ps​,pu​)≤Πu​(ps​,pu​)⟺δ≤δˉ(c).

For delivery cost above the threshold, the seller's equilibrium profit is strictly larger. The milestone list follows the paper's Appendix A.2.1 profit and equilibrium table and Appendix A.2.4's two threshold regimes. Proposition 3, manuscript page 14 states the comparison.

Significance

The result separates two drivers of the business-model choice. Production cost creates a possible pooling advantage for the provider, because many uses can share one asset's cost. Delivery cost erodes that advantage on every use. The threshold states exactly when the provider's equilibrium earnings exceed the seller's, under the base model's assumptions. It also provides a benchmark for the paper's later analyses of usage uncertainty, heterogeneous valuation, and queueing inefficiencies. Those extensions change the model and are outside this mission. Sections 3–6 develop the base result and its extensions.

The result is already proved in the cited manuscript. The formalization would make explicit the price game, its whole strategy spaces, and the passage from the model's utility-defined market segments to equilibrium profits. It would also establish that the comparison is valid at every equilibrium in the admissible region, including boundary parameter values. No machine-checked proof of this model or Proposition 3 is being reused here; the platform search found related duopoly models with different customers, prices, and cost conventions. The definitions of the segments and profit integrals can be reused for later formalizations of this paper's variants.

Difficulty

The paper computes an indifferent customer's usage and then obtains price candidates from an interior first-order condition and a constrained KKT calculation. Those calculations alone do not establish a global equilibrium: a deviation can put all customers on one side of the indifferent point, leave a firm with no customers, or use a nonpositive price. The profit formulas derived for an interior split do not describe those cases. A formal equilibrium statement must compare each firm with every permitted price, rather than treating the stationary equations as a definition of equilibrium.

The boundary c=aqm,δ=0c=aq_m,\delta=0c=aqm​,δ=0 also matters. At that point the seller can have several equilibrium prices with the same zero profits, so uniqueness of prices is too strong. The goal concerns profits at every equilibrium. Appendix A.2.4 switches the algebraic profit comparison according to the provider's price regime, while Proposition 3 switches its threshold formula at c=aqm/3c=aq_m/3c=aqm​/3; the two switches have to describe the same profit ordering over the whole admissible region.

Formalization scope

Lean represents a,qm,c,δ,ps,pua,q_m,c,\delta,p_s,p_ua,qm​,c,δ,ps​,pu​, and customer usage qqq as real numbers. The parameter predicate records a>0a>0a>0, qm>0q_m>0qm​>0, c>0c>0c>0, δ≥0\delta\ge0δ≥0, and c/qm+δ≤ac/q_m+\delta\le ac/qm​+δ≤a. The last condition is the paper's service admissibility condition; it implies c≤aqmc\le aq_mc≤aqm​. Customer mass is real Lebesgue measure restricted to the utility-defined segment and divided by qmq_mqm​; service profit integrates qqq over its segment and divides by the same qmq_mqm​. These segments are bounded and measurable, so their measures and integrals have the intended finite values. The threshold and table formulas only use divisions whose denominators are positive under admissibility.

The paper's weak market inequalities are retained, including their treatment of ties. Seller deviations range over all real prices because no duopoly seller-price bound is imposed in the source. Provider deviations range over all prices at most aaa, matching its stated constraint. The equilibrium predicate requires global profit comparisons. The goal asserts existence before saying what holds at every equilibrium, so an empty equilibrium set cannot satisfy it. Profits in the goal are calculated from customer segments and integrals at an equilibrium; they are not defined by the table. The paper's Appendix A.2.1 table provides a separate milestone proving those values, and the global best-response and equilibrium-profit statements are identified as stronger than the printed calculations.

This mission needs Mathlib's real measure, set integral, and real algebra libraries, plus the paper-specific definitions of utility, market segments, profits, equilibrium, the two pricing regimes, and δˉ(c)\bar\delta(c)δˉ(c). Contributions that establish the closed-form integrals, global best responses, equilibrium table, all-equilibrium profit identity, and regime comparisons are within scope. The earlier monopoly benchmark, the full business-model choice game, and the later heterogeneous, uncertain-usage, and queueing models are separate targets.

Selected references

  • K. Ladas, S. Kavadias, and C. Loch, Product Selling vs. Pay-Per-Use Service: A Strategic Analysis of Competing Business Models, authors' SSRN manuscript, 2021, SSRN 3356458; published in Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.4125. This mission cites manuscript pages 7–9, 13–14, 36–37, and 42.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

I Don’t “Recall”: The Decision to Delay Innovation Launch to Avoid Costly Product Failure: Neither, Both, or Exactly One of Two Identical Firms Tests, by Failure-Probability CutoffsResearch Paper

Motivation

Product recalls are frequent and costly. A firm that launches an innovation without thorough quality assurance testing gains time on the market but risks a recall, which brings direct costs (repairs, refunds, legal settlements) and lasting damage to the product's reputation. Testing removes the risk but delays the launch, and while a firm tests, a rival can take the market with its own innovation. Kim, Koenigsberg and Ofek (SSRN 3492105, November 2019; published in Management Science, 2022, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4303) model this trade-off as a two-period game and ask when competing firms test and when they rush to market. Their answer for two identical firms, Proposition 2, is the goal of this mission: depending on the failure probability of an untested product, neither firm tests, both test, or exactly one tests.

Setting

Two firms each hold an innovation. The mature product has quality V>0V>0V>0 and the innovation quality V+BV+BV+B, with B>0B>0B>0. Production costs nothing. There are two periods, t=1,2t=1,2t=1,2.

Before t=1t=1t=1, each firm chooses its testing decision QA∈{0,1}QA\in\{0,1\}QA∈{0,1} simultaneously. A firm that tests (QA=1QA=1QA=1) sells its mature product at t=1t=1t=1 and a fail-proof innovation at t=2t=2t=2. A firm that does not test (QA=0QA=0QA=0) launches its innovation at t=1t=1t=1. The untested innovation fails during that period with probability θ∈(0,1)\theta\in(0,1)θ∈(0,1), independently across firms. On failure the firm pays a recall cost Δ=ρ+δ π1\Delta=\rho+\delta\,\pi_1Δ=ρ+δπ1​, where ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0 is a fixed cost, δ∈(0,1]\delta\in(0,1]δ∈(0,1] a penalty per unit of first-period revenue and π1\pi_1π1​ the firm's first-period profit, and at t=2t=2t=2 it sells a recalled innovation of quality (V+B)(1−γ)(V+B)(1-\gamma)(V+B)(1−γ), with reputation damage γ∈(0,1)\gamma\in(0,1)γ∈(0,1).

In each period a new unit mass of consumers arrives, with tastes ϕ\phiϕ uniform on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. A consumer of taste ϕ\phiϕ gets utility ϕ q−p\phi\,q-pϕq−p from a product of quality qqq at price ppp and buys the product of greatest utility if that utility is nonnegative. Given the two products on offer, the firms set prices; the pricing subgame is the one-period price game, and its equilibrium profit for quality qqq against q′q'q′ is written π(q,q′)\pi(q,q')π(q,q′). The testing game is the simultaneous 2×22\times22×2 game in which a firm choosing aaa against a rival choosing bbb earns the expected two-period payoff Πa,b\Pi^{a,b}Πa,b, and an equilibrium is a pure Nash equilibrium of it.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2

With the cutoffs of the paper's appendix,

θ~st=4B(V+B)2(3+γ)2(V+B)(4B(V+B)(3+γ)2δ−(3V+4B)2(1−γ)γ)+(3V+4B)2(3+γ)2ρ,\tilde\theta^{st}=\frac{4B(V+B)^2(3+\gamma)^2}{(V+B)\big(4B(V+B)(3+\gamma)^2\delta-(3V+4B)^2(1-\gamma)\gamma\big)+(3V+4B)^2(3+\gamma)^2\rho},θ~st=(V+B)(4B(V+B)(3+γ)2δ−(3V+4B)2(1−γ)γ)+(3V+4B)2(3+γ)2ρ4B(V+B)2(3+γ)2​,

and θ~nt=[θ~‾nt,θ~‾nt]\tilde\theta^{nt}=[\underline{\tilde\theta}^{nt},\overline{\tilde\theta}^{nt}]θ~nt=[θ~​nt,θ~nt], the interval between the two roots of the quadratic in θ\thetaθ given by (A.3):

no firm tests  ⟺  θ∈θ~nt,both test  ⟺  θ≥θ~st,exactly one tests  ⟺  θ≤θ~st and θ∉θ~nt,\text{no firm tests}\iff\theta\in\tilde\theta^{nt},\qquad \text{both test}\iff\theta\ge\tilde\theta^{st},\qquad \text{exactly one tests}\iff\theta\le\tilde\theta^{st}\ \text{and}\ \theta\notin\tilde\theta^{nt},no firm tests⟺θ∈θ~nt,both test⟺θ≥θ~st,exactly one tests⟺θ≤θ~st and θ∈/θ~nt,

and the two symmetric equilibria never coexist.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1 (three bullets): the equilibrium prices and profits of the pricing subgame, namely mature product against innovation, innovation against recalled innovation, and Bertrand pricing at equal qualities.
  2. The four payoffs Π1,1=0\Pi^{1,1}=0Π1,1=0, Π0,1\Pi^{0,1}Π0,1, Π1,0\Pi^{1,0}Π1,0, Π0,0\Pi^{0,0}Π0,0 in closed form (proof of Proposition 2).
  3. (A.3) and (A.4): the best-response conditions Π0,0≥Π1,0  ⟺  θ∈θ~nt\Pi^{0,0}\ge\Pi^{1,0}\iff\theta\in\tilde\theta^{nt}Π0,0≥Π1,0⟺θ∈θ~nt and Π1,1≥Π0,1  ⟺  θ≥θ~st\Pi^{1,1}\ge\Pi^{0,1}\iff\theta\ge\tilde\theta^{st}Π1,1≥Π0,1⟺θ≥θ~st.
  4. (A.5) and the ρ~nt\tilde\rho^{nt}ρ~​nt bound: the recall-cost thresholds under which each cutoff lies in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1).
  5. Corollary 3: a dual-firm-test equilibrium requires ρ≥ρ~st\rho\ge\tilde\rho^{st}ρ≥ρ~​st, and ρ~st>ρ~nt\tilde\rho^{st}>\tilde\rho^{nt}ρ~​st>ρ~​nt.

Significance

Proposition 2 is the paper's main result for competition. It shows that competition changes the testing decision in two directions. A rival's early launch makes simultaneous rushing less costly, because identical products earn nothing in the first period and the revenue-based recall penalty then vanishes. Firms also try to differentiate their timing, which produces the asymmetric equilibrium in which one firm tests and the other does not. Comparing the result with the monopoly benchmark (Proposition 1) gives the paper's managerial conclusions: duopolists may skip a test that a monopolist would run (Corollary 2), and both firms test only when the fixed recall cost is large (Corollary 3).

The proofs in the paper are algebraic and partly omitted ("tedious algebra … available from the authors"). A formal development checks every case of the price equilibria, including the global deviations that the first-order conditions do not cover, and the exact boundaries of each equilibrium region. It also settles the boundary behaviour the paper leaves implicit: the regions are disjoint only off their boundaries. No machine-checked proof of any result of this paper is known.

Difficulty

Most of the work is in Lemma 1. The first-order conditions of the price game give the stated prices, but an equilibrium must also survive non-local deviations: the low-quality firm may undercut to take the whole market, and the high-quality firm may price below the region where both firms sell. Demand is piecewise in the prices, with kinks where one firm's market vanishes and a tie-splitting rule at equal qualities, so each best response is a maximization over several branches. The uniqueness half of the Bertrand bullet needs an undercutting argument. The cutoff characterizations then require sign control of a quadratic in θ\thetaθ whose discriminant can be negative, and of a denominator in θ~st\tilde\theta^{st}θ~st that is negative for small ρ\rhoρ.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real numbers. The parameters are a structure with fields V,B,ρ,δ,γ,θV,B,\rho,\delta,\gamma,\thetaV,B,ρ,δ,γ,θ, and a predicate bundles the standing assumptions V>0V>0V>0, B>0B>0B>0, ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0, 0<δ≤10<\delta\le10<δ≤1, 0<γ<10<\gamma<10<γ<1, 0<θ<10<\theta<10<θ<1. The page writes neither V>0V>0V>0 nor B>0B>0B>0; both are implicit and are made explicit here.

Demand is the Lebesgue measure of the set of tastes in [0,1][0,1][0,1] that buy the product, with indifferent consumers counted with weight 12\tfrac1221​. A price equilibrium allows deviations to every nonnegative price. The period profit π(q,q′)\pi(q,q')π(q,q′) is revenue at the prices computed in the proof of Lemma 1, 2q(q−q′)/(4q−q′)2q(q-q')/(4q-q')2q(q−q′)/(4q−q′) for the higher quality, q(q′−q)/(4q′−q)q(q'-q)/(4q'-q)q(q′−q)/(4q′−q) for the lower and 000 for equal qualities. It is computed from demand, so Lemma 1's profit formulas are theorems. The untested firm's objective (1−θδ) p d−θρ(1-\theta\delta)\,p\,d-\theta\rho(1−θδ)pd−θρ of (A.1) is a positive affine transform of revenue and has the same best responses, so the price game is posed on revenue.

Lemma 1 identifies the unique price equilibrium for each of the two differentiated quality pairs as well as for equal qualities. The payoff Πa,b\Pi^{a,b}Πa,b is built from the recall events, each failing independently with probability θ\thetaθ, and from the period profits. Testing decisions are Booleans (true = test). Equilibria of the testing game are pure Nash equilibria with weak best responses, using the published agt_games predicate AGT.IsPureNash.

The cutoffs are written exactly as on p. 37. Every statement that uses θ~st\tilde\theta^{st}θ~st requires its denominator to be positive, and every statement that uses θ~nt\tilde\theta^{nt}θ~nt requires the discriminant to be nonnegative; when these fail, the corresponding region is empty. The paper calls its regions "mutually exclusive", but at the boundaries a symmetric and an asymmetric equilibrium coexist, so the goal asserts exclusivity only between the two symmetric equilibria.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out. Defining the payoffs by the four closed forms of the paper's proof, or the period profits by Lemma 1's formulas, would make the milestones definitional and the goal pure algebra. Here both are built from consumer choice.

Not in scope: the monopoly benchmark (Proposition 1, Corollary 1), Corollary 2 (proved only in a limit), the comparative statics of Corollary 4, the conditions B<B~ntB<\tilde B^{nt}B<B~nt and γ~nt\tilde\gamma^{nt}γ~​nt of (A.3), and the extensions of §5. Contributions are welcome on any milestone. Lemma 1's analysis of the vertical-differentiation price game with uniform tastes is reusable for other quality-competition models.

Selected references

  • B. Kim, O. Koenigsberg, E. Ofek, I Don’t “Recall”: The Decision to Delay Innovation Launch to Avoid Costly Product Failure, SSRN working paper 3492105, November 2019. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3492105 — published in Management Science, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4303
  • A. Shaked, J. Sutton, Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation, Review of Economic Studies 49(1), 1982. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297136
  • J. Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, 1988.
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Dual Moments and Risk Attitudes: The Rank-Dependent Utility Risk Premium of a Small Risk Is Variance Times Utility Risk Aversion Plus Maxiance Times Probability-Weighting Risk AversionResearch Paper

Motivation

The Pratt–Arrow risk premium is the basic local measure of risk aversion under expected utility (EU): a decision-maker with a twice differentiable utility UUU facing a small zero-mean risk ε~\tilde\varepsilonε~ at wealth w0w_0w0​ pays approximately

π≃σ22(−U′′(w0)U′(w0)),\pi \simeq \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\left(-\frac{U''(w_0)}{U'(w_0)}\right),π≃2σ2​(−U′(w0​)U′′(w0​)​),

variance times the index of absolute risk aversion (Pratt 1964; Arrow 1965). It is used throughout portfolio theory, insurance pricing and decision analysis, wherever a risk attitude has to be summarised by one number.

Much of decision theory since the 1980s replaces EU by rank-dependent utility (RDU, Quiggin 1982), which distorts cumulative probabilities by a probability weighting function hhh. Its special case with linear utility is Yaari's dual theory (DT, Yaari 1987). Under these models risk aversion comes from two sources, the curvature of UUU and the curvature of hhh, and the variance alone no longer measures how much a small risk costs. Eeckhoudt and Laeven (arXiv:1612.03347v2, published in Operations Research, 2022) identify the missing measure: the second dual moment, or maxiance, the expected best of two independent draws of the risk. They show that under DT the local risk premium is proportional to the maxiance, and that under RDU it is the sum of a variance term and a maxiance term.

Setting

A finite lottery lists outcomes x1≤⋯≤xnx_1 \le \dots \le x_nx1​≤⋯≤xn​ in increasing order with unconditional probability masses π1,…,πn\pi_1, \dots, \pi_nπ1​,…,πn​. Write Fi=π1+⋯+πiF_i = \pi_1 + \dots + \pi_iFi​=π1​+⋯+πi​ and F0=0F_0 = 0F0​=0. The masses need not sum to one: the risks below are attached to one branch of a lottery and carry only that branch's mass. An RDU decision-maker with utility UUU and weighting function hhh evaluates a lottery by (4.1):

∫U(x) dh(F(x))=∑i=1nU(xi)(h(Fi)−h(Fi−1)).\int U(x)\,\mathrm dh(F(x)) = \sum_{i=1}^n U(x_i)\bigl(h(F_i) - h(F_{i-1})\bigr).∫U(x)dh(F(x))=i=1∑n​U(xi​)(h(Fi​)−h(Fi−1​)).

DT is the case U(x)=xU(x) = xU(x)=x (3.1). The paper assumes that UUU is twice continuously differentiable with U′>0U' > 0U′>0, and that h:[0,1]→[0,1]h : [0,1] \to [0,1]h:[0,1]→[0,1] is twice continuously differentiable with h(0)=0h(0) = 0h(0)=0, h(1)=1h(1) = 1h(1)=1, h′>0h' > 0h′>0.

For a risk with cumulative distribution FFF and mean m=∫x dF(x)m = \int x\,\mathrm dF(x)m=∫xdF(x), the unconditional variance and maxiance are

m2=∫(x−m)2 dF(x),mˉ2=∫(x−m) d(F(x))2,m_2 = \int (x - m)^2\,\mathrm dF(x), \qquad \bar m_2 = \int (x - m)\,\mathrm d(F(x))^2,m2​=∫(x−m)2dF(x),mˉ2​=∫(x−m)d(F(x))2,

and Pr⁡\PrPr denotes the total unconditional mass. For a probability distribution, mˉ2=E[max⁡(ε~(1),ε~(2))]−E[ε~]\bar m_2 = \mathbb E[\max(\tilde\varepsilon^{(1)}, \tilde\varepsilon^{(2)})] - \mathbb E[\tilde\varepsilon]mˉ2​=E[max(ε~(1),ε~(2))]−E[ε~] (2.1).

Fix 0<p0<10 < p_0 < 10<p0​<1, 0<ε1<min⁡{p0,1−p0}0 < \varepsilon_1 < \min\{p_0, 1 - p_0\}0<ε1​<min{p0​,1−p0​}, ε2>0\varepsilon_2 > 0ε2​>0 and initial wealth w0w_0w0​. Lottery CCC pays w0−ε2w_0 - \varepsilon_2w0​−ε2​ with probability p0p_0p0​ and w0+ε2w_0 + \varepsilon_2w0​+ε2​ with probability 1−p01 - p_01−p0​. Lottery DDD takes mass ε1\varepsilon_1ε1​ from each branch of CCC and puts the released mass 2ε12\varepsilon_12ε1​ on a middle outcome w0+yw_0 + yw0​+y with −ε2<y<ε2-\varepsilon_2 < y < \varepsilon_2−ε2​<y<ε2​. The RDU risk premium is λ=0−y\lambda = 0 - yλ=0−y for the yyy that makes the decision-maker indifferent between CCC and DDD, that is, the solution of (4.2). The spread from DDD with y=0y = 0y=0 to CCC attaches to the middle branch the risk ε~12\tilde\varepsilon_{12}ε~12​, which takes the values ±ε2\pm\varepsilon_2±ε2​ each with unconditional probability ε1\varepsilon_1ε1​. The DT construction with lotteries AAA, BBB, outcomes ±1\pm1±1, premium ρ\rhoρ and risk ε~1\tilde\varepsilon_1ε~1​ (±1\pm1±1 with probability ε1\varepsilon_1ε1​ each) is the same with ε2=1\varepsilon_2 = 1ε2​=1 and U(x)=xU(x) = xU(x)=x.

Formalization targets

Goal: the RDU risk premium, (4.3)

As (ε1,ε2)→(0+,0+)(\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2) \to (0^+, 0^+)(ε1​,ε2​)→(0+,0+) jointly, with m2m_2m2​, mˉ2\bar m_2mˉ2​, Pr⁡\PrPr the moments of ε~12\tilde\varepsilon_{12}ε~12​,

λ=m22Pr⁡(−U′′(w0)U′(w0))+mˉ22Pr⁡(−h′′(p0)h′(p0))+o ⁣(m2Pr⁡+mˉ2Pr⁡).\lambda = \frac{m_2}{2\Pr}\left(-\frac{U''(w_0)}{U'(w_0)}\right) + \frac{\bar m_2}{2\Pr}\left(-\frac{h''(p_0)}{h'(p_0)}\right) + o\!\left(\frac{m_2}{\Pr} + \frac{\bar m_2}{\Pr}\right).λ=2Prm2​​(−U′(w0​)U′′(w0​)​)+2Prmˉ2​​(−h′(p0​)h′′(p0​)​)+o(Prm2​​+Prmˉ2​​).

Milestones

  1. The moments of ε~1\tilde\varepsilon_1ε~1​: mˉ2=2ε12\bar m_2 = 2\varepsilon_1^2mˉ2​=2ε12​, Pr⁡=2ε1\Pr = 2\varepsilon_1Pr=2ε1​ (§3, p. 6).
  2. The moments of ε~12\tilde\varepsilon_{12}ε~12​: m2=2ε1ε22m_2 = 2\varepsilon_1\varepsilon_2^2m2​=2ε1​ε22​, mˉ2=2ε12ε2\bar m_2 = 2\varepsilon_1^2\varepsilon_2mˉ2​=2ε12​ε2​, Pr⁡=2ε1\Pr = 2\varepsilon_1Pr=2ε1​ (footnote 21).
  3. DT indifference between AAA and BBB is equation (3.2).
  4. The explicit DT premium (3.3): ρ=(h(p0)−h(p0−ε1))−(h(p0+ε1)−h(p0))h(p0+ε1)−h(p0−ε1)\rho = \dfrac{(h(p_0) - h(p_0 - \varepsilon_1)) - (h(p_0 + \varepsilon_1) - h(p_0))}{h(p_0 + \varepsilon_1) - h(p_0 - \varepsilon_1)}ρ=h(p0​+ε1​)−h(p0​−ε1​)(h(p0​)−h(p0​−ε1​))−(h(p0​+ε1​)−h(p0​))​.
  5. The DT approximation (3.4): ρ=mˉ22Pr⁡(−h′′(p0)h′(p0))+o ⁣(mˉ2Pr⁡)\rho = \dfrac{\bar m_2}{2\Pr}\left(-\dfrac{h''(p_0)}{h'(p_0)}\right) + o\!\left(\dfrac{\bar m_2}{\Pr}\right)ρ=2Prmˉ2​​(−h′(p0​)h′′(p0​)​)+o(Prmˉ2​​) as ε1→0+\varepsilon_1 \to 0^+ε1​→0+.
  6. RDU indifference between CCC and DDD is equation (4.2), and it has exactly one solution λ\lambdaλ with −ε2<λ<ε2-\varepsilon_2 < \lambda < \varepsilon_2−ε2​<λ<ε2​.

Significance

The result. Formula (4.3) shows that, for a small zero-mean risk, an RDU decision-maker's premium splits additively into an EU part (variance times utility risk aversion −U′′/U′-U''/U'−U′′/U′) and a DT part (maxiance times probability-weighting risk aversion −h′′/h′-h''/h'−h′′/h′). Variance and maxiance appear on an equal footing, so the maxiance is the natural second risk measure for non-EU preferences, as the variance is for EU. The DT index −h′′(p0)/h′(p0)-h''(p_0)/h'(p_0)−h′′(p0​)/h′(p0​) plays the role of the Arrow–Pratt coefficient in the probability plane. The paper builds its global comparative risk aversion result (Proposition 5.1), its examples with Prelec's weighting function and its portfolio application on this local index.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper by Taylor expansion, with "≃\simeq≃" left informal. This mission fixes the precise asymptotic meaning: a little-o remainder in the joint limit. It also makes definite the claims the paper takes for granted: that the premium exists and is unique, and that the moments of ε~1\tilde\varepsilon_1ε~1​ and ε~12\tilde\varepsilon_{12}ε~12​ take the stated values. No part of this development, nor any rank-dependent utility evaluation, is formalized on the platform or, as far as is known, elsewhere.

Difficulty

The obvious argument expands both sides of (4.2) and keeps "the second-order terms". This needs care on two counts. First, the premium is defined only implicitly, so its size has to be controlled before U(w0−λ)U(w_0 - \lambda)U(w0​−λ) is expanded: the λ2\lambda^2λ2 term is negligible only once λ=O(ε22+ε1ε2)\lambda = O(\varepsilon_2^2 + \varepsilon_1\varepsilon_2)λ=O(ε22​+ε1​ε2​) is known. Second, the two leading terms have different orders, ε22\varepsilon_2^2ε22​ and ε1ε2\varepsilon_1\varepsilon_2ε1​ε2​, and the remainder must be uniformly small relative to their sum in a two-parameter limit. The tempting reading "small variance and small maxiance" (p. 4) with ε1\varepsilon_1ε1​ fixed is false: at fixed ε1\varepsilon_1ε1​ the dual term carries a relative error of order ε1\varepsilon_1ε1​ that does not vanish as ε2→0\varepsilon_2 \to 0ε2​→0. The DT step (3.4) needs the explicit solution (3.3) and the strict positivity of h(p0+ε1)−h(p0−ε1)h(p_0 + \varepsilon_1) - h(p_0 - \varepsilon_1)h(p0​+ε1​)−h(p0​−ε1​).

Formalization scope

All quantities are real. A lottery is a pair of vectors indexed by Fin n\mathrm{Fin}\,nFinn; the evaluation (4.1) is the finite rank-dependent sum, with cumulative masses computed from the vector. The sum equals the Stieltjes integral only for outcomes in increasing order, so the premium predicates keep the page's ranges −1<x<1-1 < x < 1−1<x<1 and −ε2<y<ε2-\varepsilon_2 < y < \varepsilon_2−ε2​<y<ε2​, which order BBB and DDD. Initial wealth w0w_0w0​ is added to every outcome.

Committed conventions:

  • UUU is C2C^2C2 on R\mathbb RR with U′>0U' > 0U′>0 everywhere (footnote 1). hhh is C2C^2C2 on [0,1][0,1][0,1], maps [0,1][0,1][0,1] into itself, satisfies h(0)=0h(0) = 0h(0)=0, h(1)=1h(1) = 1h(1)=1, and has positive one-sided derivative within [0,1][0,1][0,1] (p. 5, footnote 12). These are the page's hypotheses, kept although local differentiability at w0w_0w0​ and p0p_0p0​ would suffice.
  • U′′(w0)U''(w_0)U′′(w0​), h′(p0)h'(p_0)h′(p0​), h′′(p0)h''(p_0)h′′(p0​) are ordinary iterated derivatives; p0p_0p0​ is interior.
  • Pinned reading of "≃\simeq≃". (4.3) is a little-o statement along the filter of (0,0)(0,0)(0,0) restricted to (0,∞)2(0,\infty)^2(0,∞)2, relative to m2/Pr⁡+mˉ2/Pr⁡m_2/\Pr + \bar m_2/\Prm2​/Pr+mˉ2​/Pr; (3.4) is the one-variable analogue as ε1→0+\varepsilon_1 \to 0^+ε1​→0+, relative to mˉ2/Pr⁡\bar m_2/\Prmˉ2​/Pr.
  • The premium is any function of (ε1,ε2)(\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2)(ε1​,ε2​) satisfying the indifference on the feasible region; milestone 6 shows it exists and is unique.
  • The moments m2m_2m2​, mˉ2\bar m_2mˉ2​, Pr⁡\PrPr in the goal are computed from ε~12\tilde\varepsilon_{12}ε~12​ by the definitions, not written as 2ε1ε222\varepsilon_1\varepsilon_2^22ε1​ε22​, 2ε12ε22\varepsilon_1^2\varepsilon_22ε12​ε2​, 2ε12\varepsilon_12ε1​. Pr⁡=2ε1>0\Pr = 2\varepsilon_1 > 0Pr=2ε1​>0 on the filter, so no division by zero enters.

A formalization that defined the premium by its Taylor polynomial, replaced λ\lambdaλ by the leading terms, or took the limit in ε2\varepsilon_2ε2​ alone would be trivial or false; the goal quantifies over every solution of the indifference and uses the joint limit.

Not formalized: the equivalence of (2.1) with the Stieltjes form, Proposition 5.1 (global comparative risk aversion), the examples of §6, the portfolio application of §7 and the non-binary generalisation of Appendix A.

Needed infrastructure: finite rank-dependent sums, Taylor expansion of C2C^2C2 functions with little-o remainders (Mathlib's taylor_mean_remainder family and Asymptotics), and the intermediate value theorem. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, and a general Stieltjes-integral version of (4.1) for finitely supported distributions that would let later missions treat non-binary risks.

Selected references

  • L. R. Eeckhoudt, R. J. A. Laeven, Dual Moments and Risk Attitudes, arXiv:1612.03347v2, 2018 (the version formalized here; later published in Operations Research, 2022). https://arxiv.org/abs/1612.03347v2
  • J. W. Pratt, Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large, Econometrica 32, 1964. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913738
  • J. Quiggin, A Theory of Anticipated Utility, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 3, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(82)90008-7
  • M. E. Yaari, The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk, Econometrica 55, 1987. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911158
  • K. J. Arrow, Aspects of the Theory of Risk-Bearing, Yrjö Jahnssonin Säätiö, Helsinki, 1965.
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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Government Loan Guarantees, Market Liquidity, and Lending Standards: Loan Insurance Raises the Price of Uninsured Loans and Lowers Screening in the Liquid EquilibriumResearch Paper

Motivation

Mortgage lenders in the United States and Canada can insure a loan against default when it is originated. In the US the guarantee is typically provided by government-sponsored enterprises, in Canada by government-backed mortgage insurers. Such guarantees are usually discussed as risk-sharing devices, or criticized because they weaken lenders' incentives to screen borrowers. Ahnert and Kuncl (Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper 2019-47; published as Government Loan Guarantees, Market Liquidity, and Lending Standards, Management Science, 2024) isolate a different channel. Loans are later sold in a secondary market where buyers cannot tell good loans from bad ones, the lemons problem of Akerlof (1970). Insurance bought at origination changes which loans reach that market, and therefore its price and its liquidity.

The model is deliberately risk-neutral, so insurance has no risk-sharing value. Every effect comes from the interaction of screening incentives, private information at the interim date, and market segmentation between insured and uninsured loans. This mission formalizes the paper's characterization of the liquid equilibrium with loan insurance (Proposition 2, existence and parts 1–2) and the results that the paper's proof uses.

Setting

There are dates t=0,1,2t=0,1,2t=0,1,2 and a continuum of lenders i∈[0,1]i\in[0,1]i∈[0,1], each with one loan. A loan pays A>0A>0A>0 at t=2t=2t=2 with probability μ∈(0,1)\mu\in(0,1)μ∈(0,1), or ψ∈(μ,1)\psi\in(\mu,1)ψ∈(μ,1) if the lender screens at t=0t=0t=0, and 000 otherwise. Screening costs lender iii a private amount ηi\eta_iηi​, distributed with distribution function FFF supported on [0,ηˉ][0,\bar\eta][0,ηˉ​]. At t=1t=1t=1 each lender privately learns the quality Ai∈{0,A}A_i\in\{0,A\}Ai​∈{0,A} of its loan and a liquidity shock λi∈{1,λ}\lambda_i\in\{1,\lambda\}λi​∈{1,λ}, λ>1\lambda>1λ>1, with Pr⁡{λi=λ}=ν∈(0,1)\Pr\{\lambda_i=\lambda\}=\nu\in(0,1)Pr{λi​=λ}=ν∈(0,1). Its utility is λici1+ci2−ηisi\lambda_ic_{i1}+c_{i2}-\eta_is_iλi​ci1​+ci2​−ηi​si​, so a shocked lender values interim consumption more.

At t=0t=0t=0 a lender may insure its loan for a fee kkk. Insurance guarantees AAA, so an insured loan pays the safe amount π=A−k\pi=A-kπ=A−k. At t=1t=1t=1 loans can be sold to competitive outside financiers who do not observe screening, shocks or quality, but do observe insurance. There are therefore two markets, for insured loans at price pIp_IpI​ and for uninsured loans at price pUp_UpU​.

Write κ=νλ+1−ν\kappa=\nu\lambda+1-\nuκ=νλ+1−ν. Lenders use a threshold rule: those with cost ηi≤η\eta_i\le\etaηi​≤η screen. The market for uninsured loans is liquid when shocked lenders sell good loans, λpU≥A\lambda p_U\ge AλpU​≥A (condition (2)). A liquid equilibrium (Definition 1) consists of screening and insurance choices, prices and a fee such that:

  1. every lender's choices are optimal, with t=1t=1t=1 sales chosen optimally;
  2. the insurer and the buyers in both markets break even;
  3. condition (2) holds.

Without insurance, the break-even price (4) and the marginal lender's indifference (5) characterize the benchmark equilibrium of Lemma 1.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2, existence and parts 1–2

Assume ψ>ψ‾=λμ/(λμ+κ(1−μ))\psi>\underline\psi=\lambda\mu/(\lambda\mu+\kappa(1-\mu))ψ>ψ​=λμ/(λμ+κ(1−μ)), λ≥λ~L=12μ+14μ2+(1−μ)(1−ν)μν\lambda\ge\tilde\lambda_L=\frac1{2\mu}+\sqrt{\frac1{4\mu^2}+\frac{(1-\mu)(1-\nu)}{\mu\nu}}λ≥λ~L​=2μ1​+4μ21​+μν(1−μ)(1−ν)​​, and condition (35), which is equivalent to μ>μ~I\mu>\tilde\mu_Iμ>μ~​I​. Then a liquid equilibrium exists in which a share m∗∈(0,1)m^*\in(0,1)m∗∈(0,1) of high-cost lenders insures, with

η∗=(1−ν)(1−μ)(ψ−μ)κAνλ+(1−ν)(1−μ),pU∗=νλμAνλ+(1−ν)(1−μ)∈[Aλ, pI∗),\eta^*=\frac{(1-\nu)(1-\mu)(\psi-\mu)\kappa A}{\nu\lambda+(1-\nu)(1-\mu)},\qquad p^*_U=\frac{\nu\lambda\mu A}{\nu\lambda+(1-\nu)(1-\mu)}\in\Big[\frac A\lambda,\,p^*_I\Big),η∗=νλ+(1−ν)(1−μ)(1−ν)(1−μ)(ψ−μ)κA​,pU∗​=νλ+(1−ν)(1−μ)νλμA​∈[λA​,pI∗​), m∗=1−(κ(1−μ)ψ−(1−ψ)λμ)F(η∗)μ(λ−1)(1−ν)(1−μ)(1−F(η∗)),m^*=1-\frac{(\kappa(1-\mu)\psi-(1-\psi)\lambda\mu)F(\eta^*)}{\mu(\lambda-1)(1-\nu)(1-\mu)(1-F(\eta^*))},m∗=1−μ(λ−1)(1−ν)(1−μ)(1−F(η∗))(κ(1−μ)ψ−(1−ψ)λμ)F(η∗)​,

fee (1−μ)A(1-\mu)A(1−μ)A and pI∗=μAp^*_I=\mu ApI∗​=μA. Moreover, the price of uninsured loans is higher and the screening threshold lower than in every solution (η0,p0)(\eta_0,p_0)(η0​,p0​) of the no-insurance system (4)–(5):

p0<pU∗,η∗<η0.p_0<p^*_U,\qquad \eta^*<\eta_0.p0​<pU∗​,η∗<η0​.

Milestones

In attack order:

  1. Lemma 1, the no-insurance benchmark.
  2. Proposition 1 (liquid case), which gives the insurance fee and the price of insured loans, and bounds the share of insuring high-cost lenders below one.
  3. The indifference condition (8), which pins down pU∗p^*_UpU∗​.
  4. The screening condition (5), which pins down η∗\eta^*η∗.
  5. The root condition behind λ~L\tilde\lambda_Lλ~L​.
  6. Equations (34)–(35): m∗m^*m∗, and when insurance is used.
  7. Equation (38): more insurance raises pUp_UpU​ and lowers η\etaη.
  8. Equation (37): the bound μ~I\tilde\mu_Iμ~​I​ is unique.

Significance

The result is the paper's positive case for loan guarantees. Insured loans are removed from the uninsured market in two ways. Shocked lenders who insure hold average-quality loans. Unshocked high-cost lenders who insure give up the option to sell their lemons later. Both effects improve the pool of uninsured loans traded, so pUp_UpU​ rises, and the liquid equilibrium survives for smaller liquidity shocks: λ~L\tilde\lambda_Lλ~L​ replaces the benchmark bound λ‾L\underline\lambda_Lλ​L​. The cost is lower lending standards (η∗<η0\eta^*<\eta_0η∗<η0​). The paper's welfare analysis (Proposition 4) and its regulation results (Proposition 5) start from this trade-off.

On the formal side, the paper's arguments are informal derivative computations and limit arguments in Appendix B. As far as is known, nothing in this model is machine-checked. Formalizing the result requires the equilibrium to be posed as a genuine fixed point: optimality among all screening and insurance choices, with t=1t=1t=1 sales chosen optimally, and break-even prices. The closed forms then become theorems, not definitions. The comparative statics in part 3 of Proposition 2 remain open for later work.

Difficulty

The closed forms follow quickly once one assumes the equilibrium structure: screeners do not insure, high-cost lenders are exactly indifferent about insurance, and the marginal screener is indifferent about screening. The work is in deriving that structure from Definition 1 and then exhibiting the equilibrium.

  • Fee. The fee is pinned down by break-even only if a positive mass of loans is insured.
  • Pooling price. The price of uninsured loans pools screened and unscreened loans, so it depends on the threshold through FFF. The threshold in turn depends on the price.
  • Comparison with the benchmark. Showing that the benchmark fixed point lies on the other side of (η∗,pU∗)(\eta^*,p^*_U)(η∗,pU∗​) needs the monotonicity of (4) in the threshold, combined with (35).
  • The bound μ~I\tilde\mu_Iμ~​I​. Its uniqueness rests on single crossing along a curve whose right side involves F(η∗(μ))F(\eta^*(\mu))F(η∗(μ)). The paper's appeal to "continuity in μ\muμ" fails when F(η∗(μ))F(\eta^*(\mu))F(η∗(μ)) reaches 111, which is why the milestone carries a heterogeneity assumption.

Formalization scope

Everything is defined in the namespace LoanInsurance.Liquid, in one definitions file LoanInsurance.Liquid.Model. The conventions are:

  • Parameters. These are a structure Params with fields A, μ, ψ, ν, lam (the paper's λ\lambdaλ), etaBar (ηˉ\bar\etaηˉ​) and F. The standing assumptions of §2 form the predicate Standing. The density f>0f>0f>0 on [0,ηˉ][0,\bar\eta][0,ηˉ​] is replaced by what the paper uses: FFF is continuous and strictly increasing on [0,ηˉ][0,\bar\eta][0,ηˉ​], 000 below 000, and 111 above ηˉ\bar\etaηˉ​.
  • Profiles. Strategy profiles are threshold–share profiles: the threshold η\etaη, the share mLm_LmL​ of screeners who insure, the share mmm of high-cost lenders who insure, pIp_IpI​, pUp_UpU​ and kkk. This is the paper's own reduction (p. 10).
  • Payoffs. Payoffs use max⁡\maxmax, so t=1t=1t=1 sales are optimal by construction. The break-even condition for uninsured loans uses the sales (3), which (2) licenses.
  • Derived quantities. κ\kappaκ, ψ‾\underline\psiψ​, λ~L\tilde\lambda_Lλ~L​, η∗\eta^*η∗, pU∗p^*_UpU∗​, m∗m^*m∗, the prices (4) and (33), and condition (35) are definitions computed from the parameters, never free variables.
  • Goal hypotheses. The goal carries ψ>ψ‾\psi>\underline\psiψ>ψ​ (the paper's standing focus from p. 14) and (35) in place of μ>μ~I\mu>\tilde\mu_Iμ>μ~​I​; their equivalence is milestone 8.
  • Milestone 8. It adds the heterogeneity assumption (1−ν)ψA≤ηˉ(1-\nu)\psi A\le\bar\eta(1−ν)ψA≤ηˉ​. Without it the claim can fail.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the equilibrium is never defined by the equations (5), (8) and (33) or by the closed forms. It is optimality among all four choices (s,ℓ)(s,\ell)(s,ℓ) plus break-even. Neither k=(1−μ)Ak=(1-\mu)Ak=(1−μ)A nor pI=μAp_I=\mu ApI​=μA is built into the definition. The goal is an existence statement whose witness must satisfy Definition 1.

A complete development needs elementary real analysis: monotonicity of linear-fractional functions, the intermediate value theorem for the fixed points (6) and (37), and case analysis on max⁡\maxmax. Lemmas about the prices (4) and (33) are reusable across the milestones. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative formulations of Definition 1 that are proved equivalent, are welcome.

Selected references

  • T. Ahnert and M. Kuncl, Loan Insurance, Market Liquidity, and Lending Standards, Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper 2019-47 (last updated August 2020). https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2019/12/staff-working-paper-2019-47/
  • T. Ahnert and M. Kuncl, Government Loan Guarantees, Market Liquidity, and Lending Standards, Management Science, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01571
  • G. A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3), 1970. https://doi.org/10.2307/1879431
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Delegation of Stocking Decisions Under Asymmetric Demand Information: With Two Demand States, Early Stock-Out Inspection Makes the Store Manager Order the Principal's Optimal QuantityResearch Paper

Motivation

Retail chains routinely delegate replenishment decisions to store managers. The manager sees signals the head office does not: local events, weather, the mood of the neighbourhood. The head office (the principal) knows only the probabilities of these demand states. It also cannot observe lost sales directly, because unmet demand leaves no record, so it cannot simply pay the manager (the agent) on the true newsvendor cost. What it can observe is leftover stock and whether the shelf was empty when someone checked.

Alp and Şen (M&SOM 23(1):55–69, 2021) study performance measures built from these observable quantities. Under scheme [M][M][M], the agent is charged for leftover stock and pays a lump-sum penalty MMM if the shelf is empty at the end of the period. One value of MMM aligns the agent's order with the principal's optimal order in every demand state only when all states have the same demand variability (their Corollary 1). The paper's response is early inspection: scheme [M,t][M,t][M,t] checks the shelf at an earlier time t<1t<1t<1. Its Proposition 2 shows that with two demand states, a suitable inspection time and one penalty restore perfect alignment, even though the principal does not know the state.

The question belongs to the literature on sales-force and inventory incentives (e.g. F. Chen, Sales-force incentives and inventory management, M&SOM 2(2):186–202, 2000), where the agent's private information about demand is the central obstacle.

Setting

There is one period of length 111 and two demand states j∈{1,2}j\in\{1,2\}j∈{1,2}. The agent knows jjj; the principal does not. In state jjj, cumulative demand is a Wiener process with drift μj\mu_jμj​ and standard deviation σj>0\sigma_j>0σj​>0. So the period demand is Dj∼N(μj,σj2)D_j\sim N(\mu_j,\sigma_j^2)Dj​∼N(μj​,σj2​) and the demand up to time ttt is Yt,j∼N(tμj,tσj2)Y_{t,j}\sim N(t\mu_j,t\sigma_j^2)Yt,j​∼N(tμj​,tσj2​). Write Φ\PhiΦ and φ\varphiφ for the standard normal distribution function and density, and kj=μj/σjk_j=\mu_j/\sigma_jkj​=μj​/σj​.

The stock starts at a level I≥0I\ge0I≥0 and is raised to an order-up-to level S≥IS\ge IS≥I. Leftover stock costs co>0c_o>0co​>0 per unit and lost demand cu>0c_u>0cu​>0 per unit, so the principal's expected cost is the newsvendor cost

ETCj(S)=co E[(S−Dj)+]+cu E[(Dj−S)+].\mathrm{ETC}_j(S)=c_o\,\mathbb E[(S-D_j)^+]+c_u\,\mathbb E[(D_j-S)^+].ETCj​(S)=co​E[(S−Dj​)+]+cu​E[(Dj​−S)+].

Let z^\hat zz^ be the critical fractile, Φ(z^)=cu/(co+cu)\Phi(\hat z)=c_u/(c_o+c_u)Φ(z^)=cu​/(co​+cu​). The principal's optimal level is μj+z^σj\mu_j+\hat z\sigma_jμj​+z^σj​.

Under scheme [M,t][M,t][M,t] with unit weight on leftover stock, the agent's expected score, eq. (4) of the paper, is

ETPMj(S)=E[(S−Dj)+]+M P{Yt,j≥S}.\mathrm{ETPM}_j(S)=\mathbb E[(S-D_j)^+]+M\,\mathbb P\{Y_{t,j}\ge S\}.ETPMj​(S)=E[(S−Dj​)+]+MP{Yt,j​≥S}.

Its derivative in SSS, at S=μ+zσS=\mu+z\sigmaS=μ+zσ, is the function of eq. (9):

ω(z)=Φ(z)−Mt σφ ⁣(k(1−t)+zt).\omega(z)=\Phi(z)-\frac{M}{\sqrt t\,\sigma}\varphi\!\left(\frac{k(1-t)+z}{\sqrt t}\right).ω(z)=Φ(z)−t​σM​φ(t​k(1−t)+z​).

In Lean these objects are agentCost, Φ, φ, omega, incentiveM, inspectionLHS and argminFrom in EarlyInspect.Align.Model. The principal's cost is the published InventoryControl.newsboyCost co cu μ σ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (with one disclosed hypothesis)

Assume 0<σ2<σ10<\sigma_2<\sigma_10<σ2​<σ1​, k2>k1k_2>k_1k2​>k1​ and μ1+z^σ1≥0\mu_1+\hat z\sigma_1\ge0μ1​+z^σ1​≥0. Then there is τ∈(0,1)\tau\in(0,1)τ∈(0,1) with

e−12[(k2(1−τ)+z^)2−(k1(1−τ)+z^)2τ]=σ2σ1,e^{-\frac12\left[\frac{(k_2(1-\tau)+\hat z)^2-(k_1(1-\tau)+\hat z)^2}{\tau}\right]}=\frac{\sigma_2}{\sigma_1},e−21​[τ(k2​(1−τ)+z^)2−(k1​(1−τ)+z^)2​]=σ1​σ2​​,

and the penalty

M=Φ(z^)φ ⁣(k1(1−τ)+z^τ)τ σ1=Φ(z^)φ ⁣(k2(1−τ)+z^τ)τ σ2M=\frac{\Phi(\hat z)}{\varphi\!\left(\frac{k_1(1-\tau)+\hat z}{\sqrt\tau}\right)}\sqrt\tau\,\sigma_1=\frac{\Phi(\hat z)}{\varphi\!\left(\frac{k_2(1-\tau)+\hat z}{\sqrt\tau}\right)}\sqrt\tau\,\sigma_2M=φ(τ​k1​(1−τ)+z^​)Φ(z^)​τ​σ1​=φ(τ​k2​(1−τ)+z^​)Φ(z^)​τ​σ2​

achieves the following with inspection time t=τt=\taut=τ. For every I≥0I\ge0I≥0 and both jjj,

argmin⁡S≥IETPMj(S)={max⁡(I,μj+z^σj)}=argmin⁡S≥IETCj(S).\operatorname*{argmin}_{S\ge I}\mathrm{ETPM}_j(S)=\{\max(I,\mu_j+\hat z\sigma_j)\}=\operatorname*{argmin}_{S\ge I}\mathrm{ETC}_j(S).S≥Iargmin​ETPMj​(S)={max(I,μj​+z^σj​)}=S≥Iargmin​ETCj​(S).

Milestones

  1. The newsvendor optimum: ETC\mathrm{ETC}ETC has the unique minimizer μ+z^σ\mu+\hat z\sigmaμ+z^σ, and over S≥IS\ge IS≥I the unique minimizer max⁡(I,μ+z^σ)\max(I,\mu+\hat z\sigma)max(I,μ+z^σ).
  2. Eq. (9): ETPM′(S)=ω((S−μ)/σ)\mathrm{ETPM}'(S)=\omega((S-\mu)/\sigma)ETPM′(S)=ω((S−μ)/σ).
  3. Lemma 1: the shape of ω\omegaω on either side of the threshold e−12k2(1−t)t σ/ke^{-\frac12k^2(1-t)}\sqrt t\,\sigma/ke−21​k2(1−t)t​σ/k.
  4. Theorem 3 part 1: if M>Φ(−k)t σ/φ(−kt)M>\Phi(-k)\sqrt t\,\sigma/\varphi(-k\sqrt t)M>Φ(−k)t​σ/φ(−kt​), ω\omegaω has a unique root z′≥−kz'\ge-kz′≥−k, and the agent's optimum is z∗=max⁡(z′,(I−μ)/σ)z^*=\max(z',(I-\mu)/\sigma)z∗=max(z′,(I−μ)/σ).
  5. The first part of Proposition 2: existence of τ\tauτ, and the agreement of the two expressions for MMM.

Significance

The result shows that when the principal inspects is an incentive instrument in its own right. With end-of-period inspection, one penalty cannot align a manager across states that differ in variability. Moving the inspection earlier changes the stock-out probability differently in each state, and with two states that extra freedom is enough to make the manager's privately optimal order equal the principal's in both. Proposition 2 is the paper's headline claim, stated in the abstract and the conclusion. The paper generalizes its second consequence in Theorem 4: for more than two states, some [M,t][M,t][M,t] with t<1t<1t<1 yields lower expected cost for the principal than scheme [M][M][M].

The paper states its results without proofs in the journal text; all proofs are in an online appendix. This mission states the goal and the results it rests on as machine-checkable statements. Two of them needed repair. As printed, Proposition 2 is false without a sign condition: in the paper's own case μ1=μ2\mu_1=\mu_2μ1​=μ2​, σ1>σ2\sigma_1>\sigma_2σ1​>σ2​, with z^=−2\hat z=-2z^=−2, no τ\tauτ exists. Theorem 3's "unique root" holds only on the feasible region z≥−kz\ge-kz≥−k. None of these results has been formalized before.

Difficulty

The principal's problem is the convex newsvendor problem. The agent's is not convex. The score ETPM\mathrm{ETPM}ETPM adds a decreasing Gaussian tail M P{Yt≥S}M\,\mathbb P\{Y_t\ge S\}MP{Yt​≥S} to a convex function, and its derivative ω\omegaω can change sign more than once on the real line. The obvious argument, "ω(z^)=0\omega(\hat z)=0ω(z^)=0 by the choice of MMM, hence z^\hat zz^ is the agent's optimum", fails twice. First, a stationary point need not be a minimizer: the agent's choice is the argmin of the score over [I,∞)[I,\infty)[I,∞), and that requires the sign pattern of ω\omegaω on all of [−k,∞)[-k,\infty)[−k,∞), which is Lemma 1 and Theorem 3. Second, the same MMM must serve both states, and the condition of §4.2.2 under which the root is unique has to hold at the constructed (τ,M)(\tau,M)(τ,M) in each state. The existence of τ\tauτ is an intermediate-value argument whose sign condition is exactly the added hypothesis.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real. Only the two normal marginals of the demand process are used, so the Wiener process is not formalized. The normal law is the published InventoryControl.newsboyDemand m s (mean mmm, standard deviation sss), and YtY_tYt​ is newsboyDemand (t * μ) (Real.sqrt t * σ), with variance tσ2t\sigma^2tσ2. The agent's weight c^o\hat c_oc^o​ is fixed to 111, as in Proposition 2. The principal's cost follows the text (leftover coc_oco​, lost demand cuc_ucu​), not eq. (1), which prints the coefficients swapped. z^\hat zz^ is characterized by Φ(z^)=cu/(co+cu)\Phi(\hat z)=c_u/(c_o+c_u)Φ(z^)=cu​/(co​+cu​).

The following hypotheses are added and disclosed in the items. 0≤μ1+z^σ10\le\mu_1+\hat z\sigma_10≤μ1​+z^σ1​ appears in Proposition 2 and in milestone 5. μ>0\mu>0μ>0 and M≥0M\ge0M≥0 appear in Lemma 1, whose threshold divides by kkk and whose second clause fails for negative MMM. I≥0I\ge0I≥0 (nonnegative starting stock) appears in Theorem 3 and the goal. Standing hypotheses σ>0\sigma>0σ>0 and t,τ∈(0,1)t,\tau\in(0,1)t,τ∈(0,1) appear throughout.

The goal cannot be trivialized by defining the agent's choice as a root of ω\omegaω or as max⁡(z′,zI)\max(z',z^I)max(z′,zI). Both choices are stated as sets of minimizers of the expected costs, and these sets are claimed to be singletons, so no vacuous reading is possible. A sorry-free check shows that the goal's hypotheses are satisfiable.

Useful infrastructure includes derivatives of Gaussian expectations of (S−x)+(S-x)^+(S−x)+ and of Gaussian tails, monotonicity and convexity of Φ\PhiΦ and φ\varphiφ, and the uniqueness of the critical fractile. These are reusable for any newsvendor-type model with normal demand. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome, as are proofs of the remaining results of the paper (Corollary 1, Theorem 3 parts 2–3, Theorem 4) as new statements.

Selected references

  • O. Alp, A. Şen, Delegation of Stocking Decisions Under Asymmetric Demand Information, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 23(1):55–69, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2019.0810
  • F. Chen, Sales-force incentives and inventory management, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 2(2):186–202, 2000.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

How Complementors Benefit from Taking Competition to the System Level: Squeezing the Complementor Makes Launching an Integrated System Profitable Even When the System Itself Loses MoneyResearch Paper

Motivation

Customers often need several complementary products, such as hardware and software, cars and financing, or jet engines and maintenance, sold by specialist firms that are complementors to one another. A recurring strategic move is for one complementor to launch an integrated system: a single offering that competes with the multi-component system its complementor still helps to supply. The paper's examples are AT&T's bundles of internet and entertainment services after the Time Warner merger, BMW's financing and leasing, Rolls-Royce's "power-by-the-hour" package of engines with maintenance, and Apple's music service competing with Spotify.

Reisinger, Schmidt and Stieglitz (Management Science, 2021) ask when such a move pays, and why it is observed even when the integrated system is neither better than the two-component system nor aimed at a different customer segment. Their answer separates the entrant's incremental profit into a direct effect (market expansion and conversion of customers to the integrated system) and a strategic effect: once an integrated system competes with the two-component system, the rival complementor cuts its component price while the entrant raises its own. The entrant thereby squeezes its complementor's margin. This decomposition follows the direct/strategic-effect analysis of Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1984).

Setting

Two complementors AAA and BBB each sell one component of a two-component system with gross utility UC>0U_C>0UC​>0. Either may launch an integrated system with gross utility UI>0U_I>0UI​>0 by paying an investment K≥0K\ge0K≥0. Production costs are zero. The parameter γ∈(0,1)\gamma\in(0,1)γ∈(0,1) measures substitutability between systems. Inverse demand is linear:

PCA+PCB=UC−QC−γ∑iQIi,PIi=UI−QIi−γ(QC+QI−i),P_{C_A}+P_{C_B}=U_C-Q_C-\gamma\textstyle\sum_i Q_{I_i},\qquad P_{I_i}=U_I-Q_{I_i}-\gamma\big(Q_C+Q_{I_{-i}}\big),PCA​​+PCB​​=UC​−QC​−γ∑i​QIi​​,PIi​​=UI​−QIi​​−γ(QC​+QI−i​​),

a system that is not offered having quantity zero. The model restricts γ\gammaγ to an admissible range: γ≤UC/(2UI−UC)\gamma\le U_C/(2U_I-U_C)γ≤UC​/(2UI​−UC​) if UI≥UCU_I\ge U_CUI​≥UC​, and γ≤γˉ:=(UC2+3UI2−UC)/UI\gamma\le\bar\gamma:=(\sqrt{U_C^2+3U_I^2}-U_C)/U_Iγ≤γˉ​:=(UC2​+3UI2​​−UC​)/UI​ if UI<UCU_I<U_CUI​<UC​.

The game has two stages. In stage 1 the complementors decide simultaneously whether to launch an integrated system. In stage 2 they set prices. This gives three price subgames: no entry (i), accommodation (ii), in which only AAA enters, and escalation (iii), in which both enter. A price equilibrium of a subgame is a pure Nash equilibrium in which a firm selling two products may change both prices at once. In stage 1, AAA's benefit of entering when BBB stays out is ΠA(ii)−K−ΠA(i)\Pi_A^{(ii)}-K-\Pi_A^{(i)}ΠA(ii)​−K−ΠA(i)​, and BBB's benefit of entering when AAA is in is ΠB(iii)−K−ΠB(ii)\Pi_B^{(iii)}-K-\Pi_B^{(ii)}ΠB(iii)​−K−ΠB(ii)​. The thresholds Kˉ\bar KKˉ and K‾\underline KK​ are the values of KKK at which these vanish.

AAA's incremental profit from entry splits into three parts:

ΔΠAZ=(QIA(ii)+QC(ii)−QC(i))PIA(ii),ΔΠAY=(QC(i)−QC(ii))(PIA(ii)−PCA(i)),ΔΠAX=QC(ii)(PCA(ii)−PCA(i)).\Delta\Pi_A^Z=(Q_{I_A}^{(ii)}+Q_C^{(ii)}-Q_C^{(i)})P_{I_A}^{(ii)},\quad \Delta\Pi_A^Y=(Q_C^{(i)}-Q_C^{(ii)})(P_{I_A}^{(ii)}-P_{C_A}^{(i)}),\quad \Delta\Pi_A^X=Q_C^{(ii)}(P_{C_A}^{(ii)}-P_{C_A}^{(i)}).ΔΠAZ​=(QIA​(ii)​+QC(ii)​−QC(i)​)PIA​(ii)​,ΔΠAY​=(QC(i)​−QC(ii)​)(PIA​(ii)​−PCA​(i)​),ΔΠAX​=QC(ii)​(PCA​(ii)​−PCA​(i)​).

These are the profits from market expansion, from conversion of customers to the integrated system, and from squeezing the complementor.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3

In the accommodation equilibrium, for every admissible γ>0\gamma>0γ>0:

UI<UC ⇒ ΔΠAX>ΔΠAY,UI>UC ⇒ ΔΠAY>ΔΠAX.U_I<U_C\ \Rightarrow\ \Delta\Pi_A^X>\Delta\Pi_A^Y,\qquad U_I>U_C\ \Rightarrow\ \Delta\Pi_A^Y>\Delta\Pi_A^X .UI​<UC​ ⇒ ΔΠAX​>ΔΠAY​,UI​>UC​ ⇒ ΔΠAY​>ΔΠAX​.

Moreover, when UI<UCU_I<U_CUI​<UC​ there is a threshold γ^<γˉ\hat\gamma<\bar\gammaγ^​<γˉ​ such that for every admissible γ>γ^\gamma>\hat\gammaγ>γ^​ some K≥0K\ge0K≥0 makes the stage-1 outcome accommodation while

PIA(ii)QIA(ii)−K<0,P_{I_A}^{(ii)}Q_{I_A}^{(ii)}-K<0,PIA​(ii)​QIA​(ii)​−K<0,

that is, AAA enters although its integrated system loses money. The goal states this existence claim and does not fix the threshold.

Milestones

  1. The no-entry equilibrium: PCi(i)=UC/3P_{C_i}^{(i)}=U_C/3PCi​(i)​=UC​/3 and profit UC2/9U_C^2/9UC2​/9.
  2. The accommodation equilibrium: PCA(ii)=UC/3+γUI/6P_{C_A}^{(ii)}=U_C/3+\gamma U_I/6PCA​(ii)​=UC​/3+γUI​/6, PCB(ii)=UC/3−γUI/3P_{C_B}^{(ii)}=U_C/3-\gamma U_I/3PCB​(ii)​=UC​/3−γUI​/3, PIA(ii)=UI/2P_{I_A}^{(ii)}=U_I/2PIA​(ii)​=UI​/2, with both profits.
  3. The escalation equilibrium and its symmetric profit.
  4. Proposition 1 (i): 0<K‾<Kˉ0<\underline K<\bar K0<K​<Kˉ, accommodation exactly for K‾<K≤Kˉ\underline K<K\le\bar KK​<K≤Kˉ, and escalation for K≤K‾K\le\underline KK≤K​.
  5. Closed forms of ΔΠAX\Delta\Pi_A^XΔΠAX​ and ΔΠAY\Delta\Pi_A^YΔΠAY​.
  6. The identity ΔΠAX−ΔΠAY=γ(UC−UI)(UI(3+γ)−2γUC)/(18(1−γ)(1+γ))\Delta\Pi_A^X-\Delta\Pi_A^Y=\gamma(U_C-U_I)(U_I(3+\gamma)-2\gamma U_C)/(18(1-\gamma)(1+\gamma))ΔΠAX​−ΔΠAY​=γ(UC​−UI​)(UI​(3+γ)−2γUC​)/(18(1−γ)(1+γ)), whose second factor is positive.
  7. The split of AAA's accommodation profit into component and integrated-system profit.
  8. The equivalence of (8) and (9), γ≥UCUI/(2UC2−UI2)\gamma\ge U_CU_I/(2U_C^2-U_I^2)γ≥UC​UI​/(2UC2​−UI2​), and the fact that this threshold lies below γˉ\bar\gammaγˉ​.

Significance

The result gives a rationale for entry with an integrated system that is unprofitable on its own terms. The value of entry can lie entirely in the entrant's old business, through the margin it takes from its complementor. This matters for reading platform and ecosystem strategy, where launches of "first-party" hardware or bundles are often judged by their own profitability, and for competition policy, where the same move lowers the rival complementor's price and changes how the gains of the system are divided. Proposition 1, which the goal relies on, also shows that the asymmetric outcome, where one complementor integrates and the other does not, occurs for an intermediate band of entry costs, so the asymmetry arises endogenously between identical firms.

The paper proves these statements with computer-algebra-style calculations on closed forms. As far as is known, none of it is formalized. A complete development checks every equilibrium derivation, including uniqueness of the equilibria under joint deviations, and the inequalities that the paper's appendix treats briefly. The positivity of Kˉ−K‾\bar K-\underline KKˉ−K​ (Proposition 1 (i)) is argued in the appendix through a monotonicity claim that does not hold as written, and the two displayed formulas listed under Formalization scope contain misprints. The formal record settles these points.

Difficulty

The equilibrium computations are linear algebra, but each is stated as an equivalence: a profile is an equilibrium if and only if it equals the closed form. The "only if" direction needs strict concavity of each firm's two-price profit in both prices jointly. The comparison ΔΠAX\Delta\Pi_A^XΔΠAX​ versus ΔΠAY\Delta\Pi_A^YΔΠAY​ needs the admissible range: the factor UI(3+γ)−2γUCU_I(3+\gamma)-2\gamma U_CUI​(3+γ)−2γUC​ is positive only because γ≤γˉ\gamma\le\bar\gammaγ≤γˉ​, and this has to be extracted from a square-root bound. The loss-making-entry claim needs more than AAA's entry benefit being nonnegative. BBB must also stay out, so KKK has to lie in (K‾,Kˉ](\underline K,\bar K](K​,Kˉ] and above AAA's integrated-system profit at the same time. That is why the goal depends on Proposition 1 (i), whose central inequality 0<K‾<Kˉ0<\underline K<\bar K0<K​<Kˉ is a polynomial inequality in three variables over a region bounded by a square root. Plugging in boundary values of UIU_IUI​, as the appendix does, does not by itself establish it.

Formalization scope

All objects are over R\mathbb RR in the namespace SystemSqueeze.Accommodation, in one definition file:

  • Standing UC UI γ bundles UC>0U_C>0UC​>0, UI>0U_I>0UI​>0, 0<γ<10<\gamma<10<γ<1 and Admissible UC UI γ. Positivity of UC,UIU_C, U_IUC​,UI​ and K≥0K\ge0K≥0 are added; the paper uses them without stating them.
  • Prices range over R\mathbb RR, and the direct demands are the untruncated linear expressions of §4.2. This is the paper's first-order approach; equilibrium prices are nonnegative on the admissible range as a consequence, not an assumption.
  • IsNoEntryEq, IsAccEq and IsEscEq are pure Nash equilibria with joint deviations in a firm's two prices.
  • Entry benefits, ΔΠAX\Delta\Pi_A^XΔΠAX​, ΔΠAY\Delta\Pi_A^YΔΠAY​ and ΔΠAZ\Delta\Pi_A^ZΔΠAZ​ are computed from equilibrium profiles passed as arguments. Every statement quantifies over the equilibrium predicates, so substituting the closed-form prices into the goal is ruled out: that would turn Proposition 3 into its own lemmas.
  • In stage 1 an indifferent firm enters, as in the proof of Proposition 1. The entering complementor is called AAA, as by the paper's selection rule.
  • The de novo entrant of §5 is absent: its quantity is zero throughout.
  • Three printed slips are corrected: ΠB(ii)\Pi_B^{(ii)}ΠB(ii)​ (a stray factor 1−γ1-\gamma1−γ), the interval [Kˉ,K‾)[\bar K,\underline K)[Kˉ,K​) of Proposition 1 (i) (the proof has K‾<K≤Kˉ\underline K<K\le\bar KK​<K≤Kˉ), and ΔΠAY\Delta\Pi_A^YΔΠAY​ (an extra factor UIU_IUI​ and a flipped sign).

The equilibrium lemmas are reusable for any linear-demand analysis of this model, including Propositions 2 and 4–8 of the paper, which are not part of this mission. Contributions of proofs for any milestone are welcome, as are alternative proofs of K‾<Kˉ\underline K<\bar KK​<Kˉ.

Selected references

  • M. Reisinger, J. Schmidt, N. Stieglitz, How Complementors Benefit from Taking Competition to the System Level, Management Science 67(5), 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3771
  • J. Bulow, J. Geanakoplos, P. Klemperer, Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements, Journal of Political Economy 93(3), 1985. https://doi.org/10.1086/261312
  • D. Fudenberg, J. Tirole, The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look, American Economic Review 74(2), 1984. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1816385
  • L. Cabral, J. M. Villas-Boas, Bertrand Supertraps, Management Science 51(4), 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0337
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AnalysisEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Following the Customers: Dynamic Competitive Repositioning: For Small Repositioning Costs, the Thresholds Rise Infinitely Fast, Increase with σ², Decrease with δ, and Become Independent of rResearch Paper

Motivation

Firms reposition their products as consumer tastes drift: car makers redesign models, retailers change assortments, media outlets shift their editorial line. Each move costs money, and competitors respond to it. Ning and Villas-Boas (2020) study when two competing firms should incur a fixed cost to move toward consumers whose preferred position follows a random path. The answer is a pair of repositioning thresholds. The paper characterizes them through a system of two transcendental equations and, for small repositioning costs, derives explicit asymptotic expansions. Those expansions give the paper's comparative statics in volatility, attribute importance and patience.

This mission formalizes that small-cost analysis: Proposition 2 of the paper, together with the chain of identities and limits in its appendix that leads to it.

Setting

Consumers have preferences (x,z)∈[0,1]2(x,z)\in[0,1]^2(x,z)∈[0,1]2. All consumers share the same position xtx_txt​ on the repositionable attribute, and they are uniformly spread on the fixed attribute zzz. The position xtx_txt​ follows a driftless Brownian motion with variance σ2\sigma^2σ2, reflected at 000 and 111. Two firms sit at the ends of [0,1][0,1][0,1] in xxx, and at opposite ends in zzz. A consumer buying from a firm at distance xxx gets utility v−δx−z−pv-\delta x-z-pv−δx−z−p, so δ>0\delta>0δ>0 measures how much the repositionable attribute matters. A firm may jump to the other end of the xxx-line at a cost K>0K>0K>0. Firms discount at rate r>0r>0r>0. All these parameters are standing assumptions.

Under price competition, a firm earns the flow profit πs=12\pi_s=\tfrac12πs​=21​ when both firms are on the same side. When they are on different sides and the firm is at distance xxx from the consumers, it earns

πd(x)=12(1+δ(1−2x)3)2.\pi_d(x)=\tfrac12\Big(1+\frac{\delta(1-2x)}{3}\Big)^2 .πd​(x)=21​(1+3δ(1−2x)​)2.

Write λ=2r/σ2\lambda=\sqrt{2r/\sigma^2}λ=2r/σ2​. In the symmetric equilibrium, a firm on the far side repositions when its distance reaches a threshold x∗x^*x∗. Firms on the same side reposition at a positive hazard rate on (x‾,x∗)(\underline x,x^*)(x​,x∗). Value matching and smooth pasting of the value functions

Vd(x)=πd(x)r+4δ29rλ2+Aeλx+Be−λx,Vs(x)=πsr+C(eλx+e−λx)V_d(x)=\frac{\pi_d(x)}{r}+\frac{4\delta^2}{9r\lambda^2}+Ae^{\lambda x}+Be^{-\lambda x},\qquad V_s(x)=\frac{\pi_s}{r}+C\big(e^{\lambda x}+e^{-\lambda x}\big)Vd​(x)=rπd​(x)​+9rλ24δ2​+Aeλx+Be−λx,Vs​(x)=rπs​​+C(eλx+e−λx)

give five conditions (5)–(9). Eliminating A,B,CA,B,CA,B,C leaves the threshold system (14)–(15) in (x‾,x∗)(\underline x,x^*)(x​,x∗) alone. With G=eλ(x∗+x‾−1)G=e^{\lambda(x^*+\underline x-1)}G=eλ(x∗+x​−1):

G=πd(x∗)−πs+πd′(x∗)/λ+rK+4δ29λ2πd(1−x‾)−πs+πd′(1−x‾)/λ−rK+4δ29λ2,G=πd(1−x‾)−πs−πd′(1−x‾)/λ−rK+4δ29λ2πd(x∗)−πs−πd′(x∗)/λ+rK+4δ29λ2.G=\frac{\pi_d(x^*)-\pi_s+\pi_d'(x^*)/\lambda+rK+\frac{4\delta^2}{9\lambda^2}}{\pi_d(1-\underline x)-\pi_s+\pi_d'(1-\underline x)/\lambda-rK+\frac{4\delta^2}{9\lambda^2}},\qquad G=\frac{\pi_d(1-\underline x)-\pi_s-\pi_d'(1-\underline x)/\lambda-rK+\frac{4\delta^2}{9\lambda^2}}{\pi_d(x^*)-\pi_s-\pi_d'(x^*)/\lambda+rK+\frac{4\delta^2}{9\lambda^2}} .G=πd​(1−x​)−πs​+πd′​(1−x​)/λ−rK+9λ24δ2​πd​(x∗)−πs​+πd′​(x∗)/λ+rK+9λ24δ2​​,G=πd​(x∗)−πs​−πd′​(x∗)/λ+rK+9λ24δ2​πd​(1−x​)−πs​−πd′​(1−x​)/λ−rK+9λ24δ2​​.

A threshold pair at cost KKK is a solution of (14)–(15) with 12<x‾<x∗<1\tfrac12<\underline x<x^*<121​<x​<x∗<1 and δ(2x∗−1)<3\delta(2x^*-1)<3δ(2x∗−1)<3. A solution branch is a pair of functions K↦(x‾(K),x∗(K))K\mapsto(\underline x(K),x^*(K))K↦(x​(K),x∗(K)) that is a threshold pair for every sufficiently small K>0K>0K>0. The appendix uses the prices p∗=(3+δ−2δx∗)/3p^*=(3+\delta-2\delta x^*)/3p∗=(3+δ−2δx∗)/3 and p‾=(3−δ+2δx‾)/3\underline p=(3-\delta+2\delta\underline x)/3p​=(3−δ+2δx​)/3, and their sum y=p∗+p‾y=p^*+\underline py=p∗+p​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2

For every solution branch, as K→0+K\to0^+K→0+:

  1. the thresholds rise infinitely fast:
x∗(K)−12K→∞,x‾(K)−12K→∞;\frac{x^*(K)-\tfrac12}{K}\to\infty,\qquad\frac{\underline x(K)-\tfrac12}{K}\to\infty;Kx∗(K)−21​​→∞,Kx​(K)−21​​→∞;
  1. comparing two parameter tuples with equal r,δr,\deltar,δ and σ12<σ22\sigma_1^2<\sigma_2^2σ12​<σ22​, for all small KKK,
x1∗<x2∗,x‾1<x‾2,x1∗−x‾1<x2∗−x‾2;x_1^*<x_2^*,\qquad\underline x_1<\underline x_2,\qquad x_1^*-\underline x_1<x_2^*-\underline x_2;x1∗​<x2∗​,x​1​<x​2​,x1∗​−x​1​<x2∗​−x​2​;
  1. comparing equal r,σ2r,\sigma^2r,σ2 and δ1<δ2\delta_1<\delta_2δ1​<δ2​, for all small KKK, both thresholds decrease and the gap increases:
x2∗<x1∗,x‾2<x‾1,x1∗−x‾1<x2∗−x‾2;x_2^*<x_1^*,\qquad\underline x_2<\underline x_1,\qquad x_1^*-\underline x_1<x_2^*-\underline x_2;x2∗​<x1∗​,x​2​<x​1​,x1∗​−x​1​<x2∗​−x​2​;
  1. comparing equal σ2,δ\sigma^2,\deltaσ2,δ and arbitrary r1,r2r_1,r_2r1​,r2​,
x1∗−x2∗x1∗−12→0,x‾1−x‾2x‾1−12→0.\frac{x_1^*-x_2^*}{x_1^*-\tfrac12}\to0,\qquad\frac{\underline x_1-\underline x_2}{\underline x_1-\tfrac12}\to0 .x1∗​−21​x1∗​−x2∗​​→0,x​1​−21​x​1​−x​2​​→0.

The goal fixes no constant. It asserts only the directions and the vanishing relative effect of rrr, so it survives any refinement of the expansions.

Milestones

In attack order:

  • (14)–(15) follow from (5)–(9);
  • Proposition 1, existence part: a solution branch exists;
  • the polynomial form (x)–(xi) of (14)–(15);
  • the identities (xii) and (xiii);
  • the limit (xviii): lim⁡G→1(log⁡G−2G−1G+1)/(G−1)3=112\lim_{G\to1}\big(\log G-2\tfrac{G-1}{G+1}\big)/(G-1)^3=\tfrac1{12}limG→1​(logG−2G+1G−1​)/(G−1)3=121​;
  • convergence x‾,x∗→12\underline x,x^*\to\tfrac12x​,x∗→21​;
  • the limits (xix): (G−1)3/K→36rλ/δ(G-1)^3/K\to36r\lambda/\delta(G−1)3/K→36rλ/δ, and (xx): (y−2)/(G−1)2→−δ2σ2/(54r)(y-2)/(G-1)^2\to-\delta^2\sigma^2/(54r)(y−2)/(G−1)2→−δ2σ2/(54r);
  • the expansions (16)–(18):
x∗=12+9σ24δ3K1/3+12δσ4183K2/3+o(K2/3),x‾=12+9σ24δ3K1/3−12δσ4183K2/3+o(K2/3),x∗−x‾K2/3→δσ4183.x^*=\tfrac12+\sqrt[3]{\tfrac{9\sigma^2}{4\delta}}K^{1/3}+\tfrac12\sqrt[3]{\tfrac{\delta\sigma^4}{18}}K^{2/3}+o(K^{2/3}),\quad \underline x=\tfrac12+\sqrt[3]{\tfrac{9\sigma^2}{4\delta}}K^{1/3}-\tfrac12\sqrt[3]{\tfrac{\delta\sigma^4}{18}}K^{2/3}+o(K^{2/3}),\quad \frac{x^*-\underline x}{K^{2/3}}\to\sqrt[3]{\tfrac{\delta\sigma^4}{18}} .x∗=21​+34δ9σ2​​K1/3+21​318δσ4​​K2/3+o(K2/3),x​=21​+34δ9σ2​​K1/3−21​318δσ4​​K2/3+o(K2/3),K2/3x∗−x​​→318δσ4​​.

Significance

The result. Proposition 2 is the paper's main qualitative statement about cheap repositioning. More volatile tastes make firms wait longer before moving: with high σ2\sigma^2σ2 the consumers are likely to drift back. A more important repositioning attribute makes them move sooner. In both cases the band (x‾,x∗)(\underline x,x^*)(x​,x∗), in which same-side firms randomize, widens. Patience, by contrast, drops out to first order. The K1/3K^{1/3}K1/3 law also quantifies how strongly repositioning reacts to its cost: a small cost has a large effect on behaviour.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper by an asymptotic computation in its appendix. As far as a search of the Prove2Me catalog shows, none of it is formalized. The mission produces a checked version of every step, in the paper's own notation. Two places need more than transcription. The printed (16)–(17) have right sides that still depend on KKK, so they are restated as two-term expansions. The paper also never states that solutions of (14)–(15) exist for small KKK; the existence milestone supplies that.

Difficulty

The thresholds are defined only implicitly, as solutions of a transcendental system, and the goal is about every solution branch. Nothing is known in advance about such a branch: not continuity, not uniqueness, not a closed form. The natural first idea, to substitute the expansions (16)–(18) and compare coefficients, assumes what has to be shown. The expansions must be derived from (14)–(15) for an arbitrary branch.

The derivation is delicate because the leading behaviour cancels. The left side of (xii) vanishes to third order at G=1G=1G=1, so the rate of G−1G-1G−1 is the cube root of a ratio of small quantities. The gap x∗−x‾x^*-\underline xx∗−x​ is of order K2/3K^{2/3}K2/3, one order below the thresholds' own displacement. Clause 4 of the goal needs the leading coefficient to be independent of rrr, and clauses 2–3 need strict inequalities between leading coefficients.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real. The parameters are a structure with fields r, σ2 (the variance σ2\sigma^2σ2 itself) and δ, and Standing requires all three to be positive. Primes are deriv evaluated at the point, and πd′\pi_d'πd′​ is the derivative of pid, not a hand-coded formula. Equations (14)–(15) keep the paper's ratio form: since G>0G>0G>0, a vanishing denominator makes them false, not vacuously true. The milestone deriving (14)–(15) from (5)–(9) states the displayed ratios with both denominators nonzero.

Commitments beyond the printed text:

  • The region. A threshold pair must satisfy 12<x‾<x∗<1\tfrac12<\underline x<x^*<121​<x​<x∗<1, the paper's own description of the thresholds, and δ(2x∗−1)<3\delta(2x^*-1)<3δ(2x∗−1)<3, which keeps the far firm's Hotelling price positive. The latter is not a global restriction on δ\deltaδ: the paper's examples use δ=4\delta=4δ=4.
  • Small KKK. "For a small KKK" and "K not too large" mean "for all sufficiently small K>0K>0K>0". Limits are along K→0+K\to0^+K→0+.
  • Infinitely fast. This is divergence of the chord slope (x∗(K)−12)/K(x^*(K)-\tfrac12)/K(x∗(K)−21​)/K, since no differentiability in KKK is established.
  • The effect of rrr. Its vanishing is relative to the displacement of the threshold from 12\tfrac1221​.
  • (16)–(17) are two-term expansions.

Two readings are ruled out as trivializing. Defining the thresholds by formulas, or assuming (16)–(18) for the branch, would make the goal a computation; the goal instead quantifies over every branch. Stating clause 4 as x1∗−x2∗→0x_1^*-x_2^*\to0x1∗​−x2∗​→0 would be contentless, because both thresholds tend to 12\tfrac1221​.

The development needs real asymptotics: Taylor control of log⁡\loglog near 111, cube roots as real powers, and filters on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞). It needs no stochastic calculus, since the value functions enter only through their closed forms. The limit (xviii) and the asymptotic analysis of an implicitly defined branch are reusable beyond this paper. Contributions to any milestone are welcome. Not formalized: the hazard rate (13), the verification that the thresholds form a Markov perfect equilibrium, Propositions 3–6, the asymmetric equilibrium and the limit r→0r\to0r→0.

Selected references

  • Z. Eddie Ning and J. Miguel Villas-Boas, Following the Customers: Dynamic Competitive Repositioning, SSRN working paper 3695318, December 2020. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3695318
  • Z. Eddie Ning and J. Miguel Villas-Boas, Following the Customers: Dynamic Competitive Repositioning, Management Science, published version. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.3962
  • Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, The Economic Journal 39(153), 41–57, 1929. https://doi.org/10.2307/2224214
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Ranking Distributions When Only Means and Variances Are Known: Y Dominates X by First-Order Almost Stochastic Dominance for γ ≥ 1/(1 + 2t(t + √(t² + 1))), t = (μ_Y − μ_X)/(σ_Y + σ_X)Research Paper

Motivation

Decision analysts routinely have to rank two risky prospects, with returns XXX and YYY, when nothing is known about them beyond a mean and a standard deviation for each. The classical tools are of two kinds. First-order stochastic dominance (FSD) ranks YYY above XXX for every increasing utility, but it can never be certified from means and variances alone: with only the first two moments fixed, the admissible laws of XXX and YYY include pairs that FSD does not rank. Mean–variance rules such as the Sharpe ratio rank everything, but lack a general expected-utility justification. Müller, Scarsini, Tsetlin and Winkler (Ranking distributions when only means and variances are known, Operations Research 69(3), 2021; SSRN 3440103) close the gap by restricting the utilities: they bound the ratio of marginal utilities, and they ask how strong that bound must be for every pair of laws with the given moments to be ranked.

The relevant order between the two extremes is almost first-order stochastic dominance (AFSD), introduced by Leshno and Levy (Management Science, 2002) to rule out "pathological" utilities that FSD must accommodate. Müller, Scarsini, Tsetlin and Winkler (Management Science, 2017) discuss that this symmetric case of their order is AFSD, i.e. the order generated by utilities whose marginal utilities differ at most by a fixed factor. Leshno and Levy computed the smallest parameter for which one given pair of laws is ranked; the present mission concerns a bound that holds for all pairs with prescribed means and variances.

Setting

Fix γcv,γcx∈R\gamma_{cv},\gamma_{cx}\in\mathbb Rγcv​,γcx​∈R. The utility class Uγcv,γcx\mathcal U_{\gamma_{cv},\gamma_{cx}}Uγcv​,γcx​​ consists of continuously differentiable u:R→Ru:\mathbb R\to\mathbb Ru:R→R with

0≤γcv u′(y)≤u′(x)and0≤γcx u′(x)≤u′(y)for all x≤y.0\le\gamma_{cv}\,u'(y)\le u'(x)\quad\text{and}\quad0\le\gamma_{cx}\,u'(x)\le u'(y)\qquad\text{for all }x\le y.0≤γcv​u′(y)≤u′(x)and0≤γcx​u′(x)≤u′(y)for all x≤y.

For 0≤γcv,γcx≤10\le\gamma_{cv},\gamma_{cx}\le10≤γcv​,γcx​≤1 and real random variables X,YX,YX,Y, YYY dominates XXX by (1+γcv,1+γcx)(1+\gamma_{cv},1+\gamma_{cx})(1+γcv​,1+γcx​)-SD, written X≤(1+γcv,1+γcx)YX\le_{(1+\gamma_{cv},1+\gamma_{cx})}YX≤(1+γcv​,1+γcx​)​Y, if E u(X)≤E u(Y)\mathbb E\,u(X)\le\mathbb E\,u(Y)Eu(X)≤Eu(Y) for every u∈Uγcv,γcxu\in\mathcal U_{\gamma_{cv},\gamma_{cx}}u∈Uγcv​,γcx​​. The symmetric case γcv=γcx=γ\gamma_{cv}=\gamma_{cx}=\gammaγcv​=γcx​=γ is ε\varepsilonε-AFSD with ε=γ/(1+γ)\varepsilon=\gamma/(1+\gamma)ε=γ/(1+γ): γ=0\gamma=0γ=0 gives FSD, and γ=1\gamma=1γ=1 gives the increasing affine utilities, i.e. ranking by means. Increasing γ\gammaγ shrinks Uγ,γ\mathcal U_{\gamma,\gamma}Uγ,γ​ and makes the order easier to satisfy.

Write μX,μY\mu_X,\mu_YμX​,μY​ for the means and σX,σY\sigma_X,\sigma_YσX​,σY​ for the standard deviations, and

t=μY−μXσY+σX,γ∗=11+2t(t+t2+1).t=\frac{\mu_Y-\mu_X}{\sigma_Y+\sigma_X},\qquad \gamma^*=\frac{1}{1+2t\big(t+\sqrt{t^2+1}\big)}.t=σY​+σX​μY​−μX​​,γ∗=1+2t(t+t2+1​)1​.

The quantity ttt is a standardized advantage of YYY over XXX; γ∗\gamma^*γ∗ decreases from 111 at t=0t=0t=0 towards 000 as t→∞t\to\inftyt→∞.

The proof works with the piecewise-linear utilities uU(x;δ)=γ(x−δ)+(1−γ)(x−δ)+u_U(x;\delta)=\gamma(x-\delta)+(1-\gamma)(x-\delta)_+uU​(x;δ)=γ(x−δ)+(1−γ)(x−δ)+​ and uL(x;δ)=γ(x−δ)−(1−γ)(δ−x)+u_L(x;\delta)=\gamma(x-\delta)-(1-\gamma)(\delta-x)_+uL​(x;δ)=γ(x−δ)−(1−γ)(δ−x)+​, with x+=max⁡{x,0}x_+=\max\{x,0\}x+​=max{x,0}, and with the closed forms

B(γ,δ)=γ(μX−δ)+(1−γ)12(μX−δ+σX2+(μX−δ)2),A(γ,δ)=γ(μY−δ)−(1−γ)12(δ−μY+σY2+(μY−δ)2),B(\gamma,\delta)=\gamma(\mu_X-\delta)+(1-\gamma)\tfrac12\Big(\mu_X-\delta+\sqrt{\sigma_X^2+(\mu_X-\delta)^2}\Big),\quad A(\gamma,\delta)=\gamma(\mu_Y-\delta)-(1-\gamma)\tfrac12\Big(\delta-\mu_Y+\sqrt{\sigma_Y^2+(\mu_Y-\delta)^2}\Big),B(γ,δ)=γ(μX​−δ)+(1−γ)21​(μX​−δ+σX2​+(μX​−δ)2​),A(γ,δ)=γ(μY​−δ)−(1−γ)21​(δ−μY​+σY2​+(μY​−δ)2​),

the paper's worst-case values of E uU(X;δ)\mathbb E\,u_U(X;\delta)EuU​(X;δ) and E uL(Y;δ)\mathbb E\,u_L(Y;\delta)EuL​(Y;δ) given the moments, and the point δ∗=(μXσY+μYσX)/(σY+σX)\delta^*=(\mu_X\sigma_Y+\mu_Y\sigma_X)/(\sigma_Y+\sigma_X)δ∗=(μX​σY​+μY​σX​)/(σY​+σX​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7 (p. 6)

For square-integrable X,YX,YX,Y with μY>μX\mu_Y>\mu_XμY​>μX​,

γ∗≤γ≤1 ⟹ X≤(1+γ,1+γ)Y.\gamma^*\le\gamma\le1\ \Longrightarrow\ X\le_{(1+\gamma,1+\gamma)}Y.γ∗≤γ≤1 ⟹ X≤(1+γ,1+γ)​Y.

The goal quantifies over all X,YX,YX,Y with the given moments; nothing about their laws is fixed. The upper bound γ≤1\gamma\le1γ≤1 is the domain of the order in Definition 1(b).

Milestones (proof of Theorem 7, pp. 6–8)

  1. Every v∈Uγ,γv\in\mathcal U_{\gamma,\gamma}v∈Uγ,γ​ with 0<γ≤10<\gamma\le10<γ≤1 is a u+ba\,u+bau+b with a≥0a\ge0a≥0, u(δ)=0u(\delta)=0u(δ)=0 and γ≤u′≤1\gamma\le u'\le1γ≤u′≤1.
  2. Such a uuu satisfies uL(x;δ)≤u(x)≤uU(x;δ)u_L(x;\delta)\le u(x)\le u_U(x;\delta)uL​(x;δ)≤u(x)≤uU​(x;δ).
  3. Lemma 4 (Scarf's bound) E X+≤12(μ+σ2+μ2)\mathbb E\,X_+\le\frac12\big(\mu+\sqrt{\sigma^2+\mu^2}\big)EX+​≤21​(μ+σ2+μ2​) — already proved on the platform as PricingRM.DetHeuristic.gallego_bound (the case C=0C=0C=0).
  4. E uU(X;δ)≤B(γ,δ)\mathbb E\,u_U(X;\delta)\le B(\gamma,\delta)EuU​(X;δ)≤B(γ,δ) and 5. E uL(Y;δ)≥A(γ,δ)\mathbb E\,u_L(Y;\delta)\ge A(\gamma,\delta)EuL​(Y;δ)≥A(γ,δ).
  5. f(−t)2t+f(−t)=−t+1+t2t+1+t2=γ∗\dfrac{f(-t)}{2t+f(-t)}=\dfrac{-t+\sqrt{1+t^2}}{t+\sqrt{1+t^2}}=\gamma^*2t+f(−t)f(−t)​=t+1+t2​−t+1+t2​​=γ∗, with f(z)=z+1+z2f(z)=z+\sqrt{1+z^2}f(z)=z+1+z2​.
  6. A(γ,δ∗)≥B(γ,δ∗)A(\gamma,\delta^*)\ge B(\gamma,\delta^*)A(γ,δ∗)≥B(γ,δ∗) for all γ≥γ∗\gamma\ge\gamma^*γ≥γ∗.
  7. δ∗\delta^*δ∗ is the unique minimizer of h(δ)=σYf(δ−μYσY)+σXf(μX−δσX)h(\delta)=\sigma_Y f\big(\frac{\delta-\mu_Y}{\sigma_Y}\big)+\sigma_X f\big(\frac{\mu_X-\delta}{\sigma_X}\big)h(δ)=σY​f(σY​δ−μY​​)+σX​f(σX​μX​−δ​) for σX,σY>0\sigma_X,\sigma_Y>0σX​,σY​>0.

Significance

The result. Theorem 7 turns two summary statistics into an expected-utility guarantee: once (μY−μX)/(σY+σX)(\mu_Y-\mu_X)/(\sigma_Y+\sigma_X)(μY​−μX​)/(σY​+σX​) exceeds the value making γ∗≤γ\gamma^*\le\gammaγ∗≤γ, every decision maker whose marginal utility varies by at most the factor 1/γ1/\gamma1/γ prefers YYY, concave or not. It complements the paper's Theorems 3 and 6, which restrict to concave and to convex utilities and give tight bounds in (μY−μX)/σY(\mu_Y-\mu_X)/\sigma_Y(μY​−μX​)/σY​ and (μY−μX)/σX(\mu_Y-\mu_X)/\sigma_X(μY​−μX​)/σX​; the class Uγ,γ\mathcal U_{\gamma,\gamma}Uγ,γ​ contains utilities that are neither, and both standard deviations enter. The paper's Example 8 shows the practical use: with γ=0.37\gamma=0.37γ=0.37 the rule "t>0.53t>0.53t>0.53" settles a project choice for a whole team with heterogeneous, non-concave preferences. The authors note that the bound of Theorem 7 is not tight; the tight constant is open in the paper (Remarks 9–10).

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; none of it is formalized. A formal development produces a reusable definition of the bounded-marginal-utility-ratio class and of AFSD in Mathlib's probability language, distribution-free bounds on expectations of piecewise-linear functions of a square-integrable variable, and a machine-checked version of the threshold. The Scarf/Gallego bound, which the proof uses twice, is already proved on the platform.

Difficulty

The obvious argument fails at the first step: a stochastic dominance relation is usually checked through distribution functions, but nothing about the distribution functions of XXX and YYY is known. For concave utilities (Theorem 3) Jensen's inequality disposes of XXX entirely, which is why that bound ignores σX\sigma_XσX​; for the symmetric class no such step is available, both variables must be controlled at once, and the worst case over all laws with given moments must be computed in closed form for a family of utilities rather than for a single one. On the formal side, the normalization step needs the boundedness of u′u'u′ to be derived from the ratio condition (there is no supremum hypothesis), the bounds need integrability of u(X)u(X)u(X) for an unbounded uuu, and the threshold computation is real algebra with nested square roots.

Formalization scope

Random variables are measurable functions X,Y:Ω→RX,Y:\Omega\to\mathbb RX,Y:Ω→R on one probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega,P)(Ω,P), with MemLp X 2 P and MemLp Y 2 P in the goal; only their laws matter. Means are Bochner integrals and σX=Var⁡X\sigma_X=\sqrt{\operatorname{Var}X}σX​=VarX​ with Mathlib's variance, never free reals in the goal. "Continuously differentiable" is ContDiff ℝ 1 and u′u'u′ is deriv u. The order SDle carries 0≤γcv,γcx≤10\le\gamma_{cv},\gamma_{cx}\le10≤γcv​,γcx​≤1 and integrability of XXX and YYY, because the identity utility is in the class. It compares the expectations for every utility in the class for which both compositions are integrable. This excludes Lean's zero value for a non-integrable integral from a comparison, while keeping the order reflexive when γ=0\gamma=0γ=0; every class utility is integrable under the goal's hypotheses. Divisions follow Lean's a/0=0a/0=0a/0=0; when σX=σY=0\sigma_X=\sigma_Y=0σX​=σY​=0 the paper's ttt is undefined, Lean gives t=0t=0t=0 and γ∗=1\gamma^*=1γ∗=1, and the goal then asserts dominance for increasing affine utilities only, which is true. The worst-case quantities BBB and AAA are stated as the inequalities the proof uses; attainment (the two-point laws) is not formalized.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the goal is stated for every uuu in the class, not only for uU,uLu_U,u_LuU​,uL​ or at a fixed δ\deltaδ; for every pair X,YX,YX,Y with the moments as hypotheses, not for chosen laws; and with γ≤1\gamma\le1γ≤1, since for γ>1\gamma>1γ>1 the class contains only constants.

A complete development needs: the mean value inequality for deriv; integrability of Lipschitz functions of an L2L^2L2 variable; the Gallego bound (available); and elementary real algebra with Real.sqrt. The utility class, the order, and the bounds on E uU\mathbb E\,u_UEuU​, E uL\mathbb E\,u_LEuL​ are reusable for Theorems 3 and 6 of the same paper and for other almost-dominance results. Proofs of any milestone, alternative proofs of the goal, and formalizations of Theorems 3 and 6 are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Müller, M. Scarsini, I. Tsetlin, R. L. Winkler, Ranking distributions when only means and variances are known, Operations Research 69(3), 2021; INSEAD Working Paper 2020/36/DSC, 2020. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3440103
  • A. Müller, M. Scarsini, I. Tsetlin, R. L. Winkler, Between first- and second-order stochastic dominance, Management Science 63(9):2933–2947, 2017.
  • M. Leshno, H. Levy, Preferred by "all" and preferred by "most" decision makers: almost stochastic dominance, Management Science 48(8):1074–1085, 2002.
  • H. Scarf, A min-max solution of an inventory problem, in K. J. Arrow, S. Karlin, H. Scarf (eds.), Studies in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Production, pp. 201–209, Stanford University Press, 1958.
  • J. R. Birge, J. H. Dulá, Bounding separable recourse functions with limited distribution information, Annals of Operations Research 30:277–298, 1991.
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Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations: Homogeneous Organization Optimal for Weak Signals, Heterogeneous Optimal Above a Threshold in k for Strong SignalsResearch Paper

Motivation

In most organizations the person who decides is not the person who carries the decision out. A board ratifies a product and engineers build it; a studio approves a film and a director makes it. The implementer usually also knows more, or can learn more, about which course of action will work. A long literature in organizational economics asks whether such an organization should be staffed with people who share the decision maker's preferences or with people who disagree with her: Aghion and Tirole (1997) on formal and real authority, Dessein (2002) on communication, Van den Steen (2010) on homogeneity, and Landier, Sraer and Thesmar (2009) on "optimal dissent" between a decision maker and an implementer.

Itoh and Morita add endogenous information acquisition to the decision–implementation setting of Landier et al. The implementer chooses how much effort to spend learning which project is efficient, and that choice responds to whether his preferences agree with the decision maker's. Their main result (Proposition 2) says when the principal, who only cares about success, should prefer a heterogeneous organization (one where the two agents disagree) to a homogeneous one.

Setting

A principal employs a decision maker (DM) and an implementer (IM). There are two projects d∈{1,2}d\in\{1,2\}d∈{1,2} and two equally likely states θ∈{1,2}\theta\in\{1,2\}θ∈{1,2}; project ddd is efficient iff θ=d\theta=dθ=d. A project succeeds iff it is efficient and IM exerts implementation effort, which costs him a random c~\tilde cc~ with CDF FFF and density fff, where F(0)=0F(0)=0F(0)=0, FFF is strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and F(bH)≤1F(b_H)\le1F(bH​)≤1. Success is worth 111 to the principal.

On success, DM receives BHB_HBH​ from her favourite project 1 and BL<BHB_L<B_HBL​<BH​ from project 2. IM receives bHb_HbH​ from his favourite project and bL<bHb_L<b_HbL​<bH​ from the other. The organization is homogeneous if IM's favourite is project 1 and heterogeneous if it is project 2. Write Γ=BH/BL\Gamma=B_H/B_LΓ=BH​/BL​ and γ=bH/bL\gamma=b_H/b_Lγ=bH​/bL​ for the two biases.

Before the project is chosen, IM picks information effort π∈[0,1]\pi\in[0,1]π∈[0,1] at cost π2/(2k)\pi^2/(2k)π2/(2k), k>0k>0k>0. With probability π\piπ he observes a signal σ∈{1,2}\sigma\in\{1,2\}σ∈{1,2} that points to the efficient project with probability α∈(1/2,1]\alpha\in(1/2,1]α∈(1/2,1]; otherwise σ=ϕ\sigma=\phiσ=ϕ. The signal is public. The posterior that project ddd is efficient is 1/21/21/2 after ϕ\phiϕ, α\alphaα after σ=d\sigma=dσ=d, and 1−α1-\alpha1−α after σ≠d\sigma\ne dσ=d.

Moves are solved backwards:

  1. IM implements iff c~\tilde cc~ is at most his expected benefit, so the success probability is p(b,d,σ)=Pr⁡[θ=d∣σ] F(Pr⁡[θ=d∣σ] b)p(b,d,\sigma)=\Pr[\theta=d\mid\sigma]\,F(\Pr[\theta=d\mid\sigma]\,b)p(b,d,σ)=Pr[θ=d∣σ]F(Pr[θ=d∣σ]b).
  2. DM chooses the project with the larger p(b,d,σ)Bp(b,d,\sigma)Bp(b,d,σ)B, and project 1 when indifferent.
  3. IM chooses π\piπ to maximize his expected net benefit minus π2/(2k)\pi^2/(2k)π2/(2k).
  4. The principal's payoff Vhom(α,k)V_{hom}(\alpha,k)Vhom​(α,k) or Vhet(α,k)V_{het}(\alpha,k)Vhet​(α,k) is the resulting success probability.

Three thresholds in α\alphaα appear: αhom\alpha_{hom}αhom​, αhet\alpha_{het}αhet​ and α^\hat\alphaα^, the solutions of

αF(αbL)=(1−α)F((1−α)bH)Γ,αF(αbH)=(1−α)F((1−α)bL)Γ,αF(αbL)=(1−α)F((1−α)bH).\alpha F(\alpha b_L)=(1-\alpha)F((1-\alpha)b_H)\Gamma,\quad \alpha F(\alpha b_H)=(1-\alpha)F((1-\alpha)b_L)\Gamma,\quad \alpha F(\alpha b_L)=(1-\alpha)F((1-\alpha)b_H).αF(αbL​)=(1−α)F((1−α)bH​)Γ,αF(αbH​)=(1−α)F((1−α)bL​)Γ,αF(αbL​)=(1−α)F((1−α)bH​).

DM follows a signal for project 2 iff α>αhom\alpha>\alpha_{hom}α>αhom​ (homogeneous) or α>αhet\alpha>\alpha_{het}α>αhet​ (heterogeneous). Let α^het=max⁡{αhet,α^}\hat\alpha_{het}=\max\{\alpha_{het},\hat\alpha\}α^het​=max{αhet​,α^}, and let kˉh(α)\bar k_h(\alpha)kˉh​(α) be the least kkk at which IM's optimal effort in organization hhh reaches 111.

The paper's assumptions are:

  • Assumption 1, Γ≥F(bH/2)/F(bL/2)\Gamma\ge F(b_H/2)/F(b_L/2)Γ≥F(bH​/2)/F(bL​/2);
  • Assumption 2, Γ≥γ\Gamma\ge\gammaΓ≥γ;
  • Assumption 3, xf(x)xf(x)xf(x) weakly increasing on x>0x>0x>0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2

Under Assumptions 1–3:

α∈(1/2,αhet] ⟹ Vhet(α,k)<Vhom(α,k)for all k>0,\alpha\in(1/2,\alpha_{het}]\ \Longrightarrow\ V_{het}(\alpha,k)<V_{hom}(\alpha,k)\quad\text{for all }k>0,α∈(1/2,αhet​] ⟹ Vhet​(α,k)<Vhom​(α,k)for all k>0,

and for α∈(α^het,1]\alpha\in(\hat\alpha_{het},1]α∈(α^het​,1] there is k(α)∈(0,kˉhet(α))k(\alpha)\in(0,\bar k_{het}(\alpha))k(α)∈(0,kˉhet​(α)) with

Vhet(α,k)<Vhom(α,k) (k<k(α)),Vhet(α,k)≥Vhom(α,k) (k≥k(α)),V_{het}(\alpha,k)<V_{hom}(\alpha,k)\ (k<k(\alpha)),\qquad V_{het}(\alpha,k)\ge V_{hom}(\alpha,k)\ (k\ge k(\alpha)),Vhet​(α,k)<Vhom​(α,k) (k<k(α)),Vhet​(α,k)≥Vhom​(α,k) (k≥k(α)),

strictly for k∈(k(α),kˉhom(α))k\in(k(\alpha),\bar k_{hom}(\alpha))k∈(k(α),kˉhom​(α)). The threshold k(α)k(\alpha)k(α) is existential, not a formula.

Milestones

In attack order:

  1. Lemma 1: 1/2≤αhet<αhom<11/2\le\alpha_{het}<\alpha_{hom}<11/2≤αhet​<αhom​<1, and DM's choice in the three α\alphaα-regions.
  2. IM's net benefit equals K(x)=∫0xFK(x)=\int_0^xFK(x)=∫0x​F, which is increasing and strictly convex (§3.3, p. 17).
  3. IM's optimal effort is min⁡{k⋅(marginal benefit),1}\min\{k\cdot(\text{marginal benefit}),1\}min{k⋅(marginal benefit),1} (pp. 18–20).
  4. Lemma 2: the reactive homogeneous effort is positive.
  5. Proposition 1: the comparison of the two efforts.
  6. The closed forms of Vhom,VhetV_{hom},V_{het}Vhom​,Vhet​ (Appendix A3).
  7. Lemmas A1, A2, A3: the three regions of Proposition 2.

Significance

The result. Proposition 2 identifies a channel through which disagreement between a decision maker and an implementer raises an organization's success probability: the implementer, anticipating that without information the decision maker will pick his unfavourite project, invests more in information (the paper's "ignorance-avoiding effect"). Against this, a heterogeneous implementer is less willing to execute the decision maker's default. The proposition says exactly when each force wins: never for weak signals, and above a cost threshold k(α)k(\alpha)k(α) for informative ones. Corollary 1 and the comparative statics of Proposition 3 build on it.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; this mission formalizes the statement from the primitives (DM's argmax, IM's maximizer, success probability) rather than from the closed forms, and then the paper's chain of lemmas. Two of the paper's arguments need repair along the way: the proofs of Lemmas A2 and A3 claim the payoff difference is increasing in kkk, which fails once the heterogeneous effort saturates at 111, although the lemma statements remain true. No part of this model is formalized elsewhere.

Difficulty

The comparison is between two maximizers of different concave programs, each built on a different branch of DM's decision rule, so the obvious argument of differentiating Vhet−VhomV_{het}-V_{hom}Vhet​−Vhom​ in kkk has to handle kinks: the efforts are min⁡{k⋅const,1}\min\{k\cdot\text{const},1\}min{k⋅const,1} and saturate at different kkk, and DM's choice switches at different α\alphaα. The single-crossing property in kkk (one sign change of Vhet−VhomV_{het}-V_{hom}Vhet​−Vhom​) is not monotonicity of the difference on the whole half-line; on the interval where only the heterogeneous effort is saturated the difference is not increasing, and the sign has to be read off directly. For α∈(αhet,αhom]\alpha\in(\alpha_{het},\alpha_{hom}]α∈(αhet​,αhom​] DM reacts in one organization and not the other, and the positivity of the relevant brackets rests on the definition of α^\hat\alphaα^ and on Assumption 3.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real. The model is one definition file, OrgDiversity.Optimal.Model:

  • Parameters. A record of bL,bH,BL,BH,F,fb_L,b_H,B_L,B_H,F,fbL​,bH​,BL​,BH​,F,f, with the standing assumptions as one predicate.
  • Density and regularity. The paper calls fff the density of FFF; Standing makes this precise by requiring fff to be integrable on every [0,x][0,x][0,x] and F(x)=∫0xf(c) dcF(x)=\int_0^x f(c)\,dcF(x)=∫0x​f(c)dc for x≥0x\ge0x≥0. The formalization also assumes FFF is continuous on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) and F′=fF'=fF′=f on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞).
  • Domain of FFF. "FFF strictly increasing" is read on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), which is the only reading consistent with F(0)=0F(0)=0F(0)=0.
  • Signal. It is encoded by the posteriors the paper states, not by a joint law.
  • Thresholds. αhom,αhet,α^\alpha_{hom},\alpha_{het},\hat\alphaαhom​,αhet​,α^ are passed as solutions of their equations, in the intervals (1/2,1)(1/2,1)(1/2,1), [1/2,1)[1/2,1)[1/2,1) and (1/2,1)(1/2,1)(1/2,1). Each solution is unique, and existence of the first two is part of Lemma 1.
  • The bound kˉh(α)\bar k_h(\alpha)kˉh​(α). "k<kˉh(α)k<\bar k_h(\alpha)k<kˉh​(α)" is encoded as "the optimal effort is <1<1<1".
  • Tie-breaks. DM chooses project 1 when indifferent; IM implements when indifferent.
  • IM's net benefit. It is defined as on p. 17, p b−∫0xcf(c) dcp\,b-\int_0^{x}c f(c)\,dcpb−∫0x​cf(c)dc; the identity with ∫0xF\int_0^xF∫0x​F is a milestone.

VVV is never defined by its closed form, and optimal efforts are arbitrary maximizers of IM's payoff on [0,1][0,1][0,1], not the formula min⁡{k⋅const,1}\min\{k\cdot\text{const},1\}min{k⋅const,1}; stating the goal about the closed forms would reduce it to elementary inequalities and is ruled out.

Contributions of any milestone are welcome; the convexity lemma for KKK and the maximizer of a concave quadratic on [0,1][0,1][0,1] are reusable beyond this mission. Corollary 1, Proposition 3, §4 and the cheap-talk extension of §5 are not part of this mission.

Selected references

  • Hideshi Itoh and Kimiyuki Morita, Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations, Management Science, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4373 — read in the SSRN version of August 5, 2019, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2751969
  • Augustin Landier, David Sraer and David Thesmar, Optimal Dissent in Organizations, Review of Economic Studies 76, 761–794, 2009.
  • Wouter Dessein, Authority and Communication in Organizations, Review of Economic Studies 69, 811–838, 2002.
  • Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole, Formal and Real Authority in Organizations, Journal of Political Economy 105, 1–29, 1997.
  • Eric Van den Steen, Culture Clash: The Costs and Benefits of Homogeneity, Management Science 56, 1718–1738, 2010.
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Curbing Emissions: Environmental Regulations and Product Offerings Across Markets: Horizontal Negotiation Unifies a Split Market at the Exact Global Standard and Lowers Total EmissionsResearch Paper

Motivation

Energy-efficiency and emission standards for products such as vehicles and appliances are set by regulators whose jurisdictions overlap a single manufacturer's markets. The best-known case is United States fuel-economy regulation. California has long been allowed to set stricter vehicle standards than the federal government, and the 2019 dispute between California and the federal administration over a single "50-state" standard put the question of split versus unified markets on the policy agenda. A manufacturer facing two different standards can sell two product versions (a split market), sell one version that meets the stricter standard everywhere (a unified market), or withdraw from the stricter market.

Han, Hu and Dawande (Curbing Emissions: Environmental Regulations and Product Offerings Across Markets, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2022) model this as a game between an environmentally concerned regulator, an environmentally agnostic regulator, and a monopolist. They ask when the market splits, and whether negotiation between the regulators can unify a split market and lower total emissions. This mission formalizes their answer for one negotiation format, the exact global standard (§4.1.1), together with the base-model results it rests on. Citations refer to the authors' accepted manuscript of 28 July 2022, including its Online Appendices.

Setting

A monopolist sells in two markets M1,M2M_1, M_2M1​,M2​ of sizes m1,m2>0m_1, m_2 > 0m1​,m2​>0. Regulator RiR_iRi​ sets a minimum efficiency standard si≥0s_i \ge 0si​≥0 for products sold in MiM_iMi​. Consumers' valuations are uniform on [0,uˉ][0, \bar u][0,uˉ]. A consumer with valuation uuu who buys a product of efficiency eee at price ppp receives u−p+γeu - p + \gamma eu−p+γe, where γ\gammaγ is the efficiency bonus, and buys when this is positive. Producing efficiency eee costs cec ece per unit plus a fixed setup cost r>0r > 0r>0 per product.

Regulator R1R_1R1​ maximizes consumer utility in M1M_1M1​ minus h1∑i(b−ei)⋅salesih_1 \sum_i (b - e_i)\cdot\text{sales}_ih1​∑i​(b−ei​)⋅salesi​. Here bbb is a benchmark efficiency, h1h_1h1​ is the perceived per-unit environmental impact, and the sum runs over both markets. Regulator R2R_2R2​ maximizes consumer utility in M2M_2M2​ only and therefore sets s2=0s_2 = 0s2​=0. The total emissions are ∑i(b−ei)⋅salesi\sum_i (b - e_i)\cdot\text{sales}_i∑i​(b−ei​)⋅salesi​.

Given s1s_1s1​, the firm chooses among three strategies: DDD (differentiated products at s1s_1s1​ and 000), UUU (one unified product at s1s_1s1​ in both markets), and SSS (one product at 000, sold in M2M_2M2​ only). Each product is priced at p∗=[(c+γ)e+uˉ]/2p^* = [(c+\gamma)e + \bar u]/2p∗=[(c+γ)e+uˉ]/2. A base-model outcome is a standard s1≥0s_1 \ge 0s1​≥0 together with a profit-maximizing strategy of the firm, such that R1R_1R1​ cannot do better with another standard paired with any profit-maximizing response.

In the exact-standard negotiation, R1R_1R1​ and R2R_2R2​ agree on one standard ses_ese​ for both markets and a transfer tht_hth​ from R1R_1R1​ to R2R_2R2​. Their total utility is Th(se)T_h(s_e)Th​(se​) (eq. (4)). The disagreement point (D1,D2)(D_1, D_2)(D1​,D2​) is the pair of utilities at the split-market base outcome, and the negotiated pair maximizes the Nash product (Π1−D1)(Π2−D2)(\Pi_1 - D_1)(\Pi_2 - D_2)(Π1​−D1​)(Π2​−D2​) over the feasible pairs that split the gain equally.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3 (p. 19)

Assume condition (1) of Lemma A.1, where xˉ\bar xxˉ is the larger root of an auxiliary quadratic:

0<r≤min⁡{m2uˉ4−m2[uˉ−b(c−γ)]2uˉ(4−c−γh1)2, m1[uˉ−b(c−γ)]2uˉ(4−c−γh1)2, m24uˉ(uˉ2−xˉ2)}.0<r\le\min\Big\{\tfrac{m_2\bar u}{4}-\tfrac{m_2[\bar u-b(c-\gamma)]^2}{\bar u(4-\frac{c-\gamma}{h_1})^2},\ \tfrac{m_1[\bar u-b(c-\gamma)]^2}{\bar u(4-\frac{c-\gamma}{h_1})^2},\ \tfrac{m_2}{4\bar u}(\bar u^2-\bar x^2)\Big\}.0<r≤min{4m2​uˉ​−uˉ(4−h1​c−γ​)2m2​[uˉ−b(c−γ)]2​, uˉ(4−h1​c−γ​)2m1​[uˉ−b(c−γ)]2​, 4uˉm2​​(uˉ2−xˉ2)}.

Then a split-market base outcome (s1,D)(s_1, D)(s1​,D) exists. For every such outcome, the negotiation has a Nash bargaining solution, and every solution has standard

se∗=2h1[uˉ+b(c−γ)]−(c−γ)uˉ(c−γ)[4h1−(c−γ)].s^*_e=\frac{2h_1[\bar u+b(c-\gamma)]-(c-\gamma)\bar u}{(c-\gamma)[4h_1-(c-\gamma)]}.se∗​=(c−γ)[4h1​−(c−γ)]2h1​[uˉ+b(c−γ)]−(c−γ)uˉ​.

The regulators' total utility at se∗s^*_ese∗​ strictly exceeds D1+D2D_1 + D_2D1​+D2​, and total emissions at se∗s^*_ese∗​ are strictly lower than at the split-market outcome.

Milestones

  1. The optimal price p∗p^*p∗ (§3.1, p. 12).
  2. Lemma 1 (p. 12): the firm's best response is UUU for s1≤τUs_1 \le \tau_Us1​≤τU​, DDD for τU≤s1≤τS\tau_U \le s_1 \le \tau_SτU​≤s1​≤τS​, and SSS for s1≥τSs_1 \ge \tau_Ss1​≥τS​.
  3. The constant xˉ\bar xxˉ is well defined (proof of Lemma A.1, Online Appendix p. 12).
  4. Lemma A.1(1): under condition (1), (s1D∗,D)(s^*_{1D}, D)(s1D∗​,D) is a base-model outcome, and every split outcome has s1=s1D∗s_1 = s^*_{1D}s1​=s1D∗​.
  5. The arbitrator's optimal standard sa∗s^*_asa∗​ for eq. (3) (p. 16).
  6. The reduction of the Nash bargaining solution to maximizing ThT_hTh​ (§4.1.1, p. 19).
  7. The closed-form gain Th(se∗)−D1−D2T_h(s^*_e) - D_1 - D_2Th​(se∗​)−D1​−D2​ (proof of Proposition 3, Online Appendix p. 13).
  8. Proposition 2, split-market half (p. 16): a split outcome emits more than the arbitrator outcome.

Significance

The result. Proposition 3 shows that, whenever the base model predicts a split market under the paper's sufficient condition, two regulators who negotiate an exact global standard with side payments always reach agreement. The agreed standard unifies the market and lowers total emissions. The negotiated standard coincides with the standard a neutral arbitrator would choose. This makes the exact global standard the benchmark against which the paper compares its other negotiation formats (a baseline global standard, and vertical negotiation with the firm). It also qualifies the policy debate: unification through an exact standard requires the stricter regulator to give up its power to exceed the common standard.

Formalizing it. The proofs in Online Appendix C are short computations in which several steps are "straightforward" or "easy to show". In particular, the existence and use of xˉ\bar xxˉ, the comparison between strategies at the regime boundaries, and the truncated branch of Proposition 2 are argued only briefly. A machine-checked development fixes the equilibrium notion, including how ties between strategies are treated, and verifies every inequality. To our knowledge none of these results has been formalized before.

Difficulty

The algebra of each step is elementary, but the base equilibrium is a bilevel object. R1R_1R1​ optimizes over s1s_1s1​ against a firm response that switches between three regimes at τU\tau_UτU​ and τS\tau_SτS​, and R1R_1R1​'s utility is a different concave quadratic in each regime. Showing that the split outcome sits at s1D∗s^*_{1D}s1D∗​ requires comparing the maximum over the DDD regime with the maxima over the UUU and SSS regimes. Only the third term of condition (1), through the implicitly defined xˉ\bar xxˉ, controls the UUU comparison. Simply substituting the closed forms of Lemma A.1 into the negotiation does not prove the goal: the goal quantifies over every split-market base outcome, so the characterization of the base equilibrium must actually be established. The emissions comparison also needs a strict inequality. At se∗=s1D∗s^*_e = s^*_{1D}se∗​=s1D∗​ the emissions in M1M_1M1​ are equal and only M2M_2M2​ changes, and the case se∗=0s^*_e = 0se∗​=0 must be excluded using condition (1).

Formalization scope

All quantities are real numbers in one parameter record (c,γ,h1,m1,m2,uˉ,b,r)(c, \gamma, h_1, m_1, m_2, \bar u, b, r)(c,γ,h1​,m1​,m2​,uˉ,b,r), and every statement assumes the standing assumptions of §3: c>0c > 0c>0, r>0r > 0r>0, h1≥(c−γ)/2h_1 \ge (c-\gamma)/2h1​≥(c−γ)/2, and uˉ≥max⁡{4r(m1+m2)/(m1m2), b(c−γ)}\bar u \ge \max\{4r(m_1+m_2)/(m_1 m_2),\ b(c-\gamma)\}uˉ≥max{4r(m1​+m2​)/(m1​m2​), b(c−γ)}. The formalization departs from or adds to the page in these places:

  • the page's c≥γc \ge \gammac≥γ is strengthened to c>γc > \gammac>γ, because every threshold divides by c−γc - \gammac−γ;
  • m1,m2>0m_1, m_2 > 0m1​,m2​>0 and b≥0b \ge 0b≥0 are made explicit;
  • γ\gammaγ's sign is left free;
  • s2=0s_2 = 0s2​=0 is fixed, as on p. 11;
  • the buying share is clipped to [0,1][0,1][0,1] and the margin uˉ−(c−γ)e\bar u - (c-\gamma)euˉ−(c−γ)e at 000. On [0,uˉ/(c−γ)][0, \bar u/(c-\gamma)][0,uˉ/(c−γ)] every quantity equals the page's formula, and above it a negative margin cannot square into a positive profit;
  • profits, sales and consumer utilities are the closed forms at p∗p^*p∗;
  • the firm's best response is not tie-broken, and a base-model outcome must beat R1R_1R1​'s utility at every alternative standard paired with every best response there. This makes the equilibrium value independent of tie-breaking;
  • xˉ\bar xxˉ enters as the greatest element of the root set of π1D(s1D∗)=π1U((uˉ−x)/(c−γ))\pi_{1D}(s^*_{1D}) = \pi_{1U}((\bar u - x)/(c-\gamma))π1D​(s1D∗​)=π1U​((uˉ−x)/(c−γ)), and a milestone shows that this greatest element exists;
  • under condition (1) with equalities, a unified outcome can tie with the split outcome for R1R_1R1​, so Lemma A.1(1) is stated as "(s1D∗,D)(s^*_{1D}, D)(s1D∗​,D) is an outcome, and every split outcome has s1=s1D∗s_1 = s^*_{1D}s1​=s1D∗​", not as uniqueness of the outcome;
  • the page's positivity argument for the gain fails when 2h1[uˉ+b(c−γ)]=(c−γ)uˉ2h_1[\bar u + b(c-\gamma)] = (c-\gamma)\bar u2h1​[uˉ+b(c−γ)]=(c−γ)uˉ, so positivity is stated under condition (1), which excludes that case.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the goal does not take the disagreement point from Lemma A.1's closed form or compare two formulas. It reads the disagreement point off an arbitrary split-market base outcome, asserts that one exists, and characterizes the negotiated standard through the Nash-product maximization. A sorry-free verification file checks that the goal's hypotheses hold together at a concrete parameter point (c=1c = 1c=1, γ=1/2\gamma = 1/2γ=1/2, h1=1h_1 = 1h1​=1, m1=m2=1/2m_1 = m_2 = 1/2m1​=m2​=1/2, uˉ=1000\bar u = 1000uˉ=1000, b=100b = 100b=100, r=20r = 20r=20).

The development needs only real algebra: quadratics, square roots and case analysis over three strategies. The lemmas on piecewise-quadratic best responses, and on the reduction of a transferable-utility Nash bargaining problem to total-utility maximization, may be reused for other regulator–firm models. Proofs of any milestone are welcome. Propositions 4 and 5 (baseline global standard, vertical negotiation) and the unified half of Proposition 2 are outside this mission.

Selected references

  • Z. Han, B. Hu, M. Dawande, Curbing Emissions: Environmental Regulations and Product Offerings Across Markets, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.1141
  • J. F. Nash, The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica 18(2), 155–162, 1950. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907266
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Reciprocity in Dynamic Employment Relationships: Effort and Bonus Weakly Decrease and the Upfront Wage Weakly Increases over the Course of EmploymentResearch Paper

Motivation

Most employment relationships rely on incentives that no court enforces. A relational contract is a self-enforcing promise: the employer pays a discretionary bonus after observing effort, and keeps the promise because reneging would destroy the value of the future relationship (Bull 1987; MacLeod and Malcomson 1989; Levin 2003). This mechanism has a well-known weakness. When the relationship has a known last period, no bonus is credible in that period, and backward induction removes it from every earlier period as well.

A second source of incentives is reciprocity. Workers respond to a generous upfront wage with higher effort, the "gift exchange" of Akerlof (1982), a pattern documented in many laboratory and field studies. Fahn (Reciprocity in Dynamic Employment Relationships, Management Science 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4657; working paper CRC TRR 190 Discussion Paper No. 198, 2019) combines the two in a finite-horizon principal–agent model. In this model the agent's reciprocity is tied to the relational contract and vanishes if the principal reneges. Because reciprocity is valuable even in the last period, the employer has something to lose by reneging at every date, so bonuses stay credible despite the known end date.

The paper's main dynamic result, Proposition 1, describes how the two incentive instruments evolve over the relationship. This mission formalizes that result, together with the lemmas its proof uses, in the reduced optimization problem the paper derives. All page references are to the 2019 working paper.

Setting

There is one principal and one agent, both risk neutral, over periods t=1,…,Tt=1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T with 1<T<∞1<T<\infty1<T<∞. Effort e≥0e\ge0e≥0 costs the agent c(e)=e3/3c(e)=e^3/3c(e)=e3/3 and yields output eθe\thetaeθ to the principal, with productivity θ>0\theta>0θ>0. The reciprocity parameter η≥0\eta\ge0η≥0 measures how strongly the agent responds to an upfront wage, and the two parties share a discount factor δ∈(0,1]\delta\in(0,1]δ∈(0,1].

In each period the principal pays an upfront wage w≥0w\ge0w≥0 before effort is chosen and may pay a bonus afterwards. An agent who reacts only to the wage chooses the deviation effort e~=ηwθ\tilde e=\sqrt{\eta w\theta}e~=ηwθ​. The paper reduces the equilibrium analysis (its Lemma 2) to the following per-period problem. To implement effort eee at wage www, the principal must pay the bonus

b(e,w)=e33−ηwθe+23(ηwθ)3,b(e,w)=\frac{e^3}{3}-\eta w\theta e+\frac23\big(\sqrt{\eta w\theta}\big)^3 ,b(e,w)=3e3​−ηwθe+32​(ηwθ​)3,

and her per-period profit is π(e,w)=eθ−b(e,w)−w\pi(e,w)=e\theta-b(e,w)-wπ(e,w)=eθ−b(e,w)−w. A promised bonus is credible only if it does not exceed what the principal would lose by reneging. This is the dynamic enforcement constraint

b(e,w)≤δ Πt+1,(DE)b(e,w)\le\delta\,\Pi_{t+1},\tag{DE}b(e,w)≤δΠt+1​,(DE)

where Πt+1\Pi_{t+1}Πt+1​ denotes the principal's continuation profit from period t+1t+1t+1 on, and ΠT+1=0\Pi_{T+1}=0ΠT+1​=0. A profit-maximizing path (et,wt,Πt)t=1T(e_t,w_t,\Pi_t)_{t=1}^{T}(et​,wt​,Πt​)t=1T​ is one in which, for every ttt, the pair (et,wt)(e_t,w_t)(et​,wt​) maximizes π\piπ over e,w≥0e,w\ge0e,w≥0 subject to (DE), and Πt=π(et,wt)+δΠt+1\Pi_t=\pi(e_t,w_t)+\delta\Pi_{t+1}Πt​=π(et​,wt​)+δΠt+1​. The bonus paid in period ttt is bt=b(et,wt)b_t=b(e_t,w_t)bt​=b(et​,wt​). In the last period the bound is 000, so the problem becomes the reciprocity spot contract, in which no bonus is paid.

The first-best levels maximize π\piπ without (DE). (DE) is said to bind in period ttt when no first-best pair satisfies it. Two reciprocity thresholds appear in the results: ηˉ=1/θ3\bar\eta=\sqrt{1/\theta^3}ηˉ​=1/θ3​, and, for a (DE) multiplier λ\lambdaλ, η~=1/(θ3(1+λ))\tilde\eta=\sqrt{1/(\theta^3(1+\lambda))}η~​=1/(θ3(1+λ))​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1 (p. 20)

Along every profit-maximizing path, for 2≤t≤T2\le t\le T2≤t≤T:

et≤et−1,wt≥wt−1,bt≤bt−1.e_t\le e_{t-1},\qquad w_t\ge w_{t-1},\qquad b_t\le b_{t-1}.et​≤et−1​,wt​≥wt−1​,bt​≤bt−1​.

Moreover, whenever t+1≤Tt+1\le Tt+1≤T, strict changes propagate forward and equalities propagate backward:

et<et−1⇒et+1<et,et+1=et⇒et=et−1,e_t<e_{t-1}\Rightarrow e_{t+1}<e_t,\qquad e_{t+1}=e_t\Rightarrow e_t=e_{t-1},et​<et−1​⇒et+1​<et​,et+1​=et​⇒et​=et−1​, (wt>wt−1∧bt<bt−1)⇒(wt+1>wt∧bt+1<bt),(wt+1=wt∧bt+1=bt)⇒(wt=wt−1∧bt=bt−1).(w_t>w_{t-1}\wedge b_t<b_{t-1})\Rightarrow(w_{t+1}>w_t\wedge b_{t+1}<b_t),\qquad (w_{t+1}=w_t\wedge b_{t+1}=b_t)\Rightarrow(w_t=w_{t-1}\wedge b_t=b_{t-1}).(wt​>wt−1​∧bt​<bt−1​)⇒(wt+1​>wt​∧bt+1​<bt​),(wt+1​=wt​∧bt+1​=bt​)⇒(wt​=wt−1​∧bt​=bt−1​).

The goal is stated for every θ>0\theta>0θ>0, η≥0\eta\ge0η≥0, δ∈(0,1]\delta\in(0,1]δ∈(0,1] and T≥2T\ge2T≥2, and contains no closed-form expression.

Milestones

These follow the paper's proof order:

  • the deviation effort (p. 16);
  • the existence of a profit-maximizing path (Lemma 2, existence part);
  • the spot contract w=ηθ3/4w=\eta\theta^3/4w=ηθ3/4, e∗=ηθ2/2e^*=\eta\theta^2/2e∗=ηθ2/2 (Lemma 1);
  • the first-best levels and the threshold ηˉ\bar\etaηˉ​ (Lemma 3);
  • the binding case, in which effort falls below first best, the wage rises, and the threshold drops to η~<ηˉ\tilde\eta<\bar\etaη~​<ηˉ​ (Lemma 4);
  • strictly declining continuation profits, Πt−1>Πt\Pi_{t-1}>\Pi_tΠt−1​>Πt​ (Lemma 5);
  • the forward propagation of a binding (DE) constraint (p. 20);
  • the signs ∂w/∂λ>0\partial w/\partial\lambda>0∂w/∂λ>0 and ∂e∗/∂λ<0\partial e^*/\partial\lambda<0∂e∗/∂λ<0;
  • the comparison of the last period with every earlier one;
  • the bonus formula and its decrease in λ\lambdaλ (pp. 43–44).

Significance

Proposition 1 predicts the shape of incentive pay over a finite employment spell. Effort, wage and bonus are flat early on, while the future is valuable enough that (DE) does not bind. Once it binds, the bonus falls and the upfront wage rises in every remaining period, and effort declines because the substitution is incomplete. Relational and reciprocity-based incentives are therefore dynamic substitutes. The paper relates this to observed effort patterns near the end of employment relationships and to the experimental evidence of Boosey and Goerg (2018).

The result is proved in the paper, with an argument that mixes first-order conditions, the implicit function theorem, and an induction on continuation profits. To our knowledge none of it has been machine-checked. A formal proof would check the case split between zero and positive wages and between slack and binding periods, which the paper's proof treats in prose. It would also establish the uniqueness and existence facts that the phrase "the equilibrium" presupposes. The milestones are reusable on their own: they give the explicit optimizers of a one-period contracting problem with a cubic cost and a square-root reciprocity term.

Difficulty

The obvious approach is comparative statics. Treat each period's problem as a parametric program in the bound K=δΠt+1K=\delta\Pi_{t+1}K=δΠt+1​, show that its solution moves monotonically in KKK, and combine this with Πt\Pi_tΠt​ decreasing in ttt. Two steps of this approach fail as stated.

First, the profit π(e,w)\pi(e,w)π(e,w) is not jointly concave on the feasible set: the term 23(ηwθ)3/2\frac23(\eta w\theta)^{3/2}32​(ηwθ)3/2 and the cross term ηwθe\eta w\theta eηwθe make the Hessian indefinite where e<ηwθe<\sqrt{\eta w\theta}e<ηwθ​. In addition, the wage has a corner at w=0w=0w=0 that is active for some parameters and not for others. Uniqueness of the optimum, and the regularity needed to differentiate it, have to be obtained rather than assumed.

Second, the bound KKK is not exogenous. It is the discounted value of the next period's problem, so monotonicity in ttt requires an induction that runs backward through the value functions (Lemma 5). The step from monotone bounds to monotone wages and bonuses must also handle the switch between the zero-wage and positive-wage branches.

The strict-propagation clauses are sharper than plain monotonicity: they also require that the solution responds strictly to KKK whenever (DE) binds.

Formalization scope

The Lean development formalizes the reduced problem of p. 17, not the paper's game. Histories, strategies, the norm function ηt\eta_tηt​ and subgame norm-perfect equilibrium do not appear, and Lemma 2's reduction from the game to the per-period problem is not part of the mission. The conventions are as follows:

  • All quantities are real numbers; periods are natural numbers, and paths are functions N→R\mathbb N\to\mathbb RN→R of which only the indices 1,…,T+11,\dots,T+11,…,T+1 carry meaning, with ΠT+1=0\Pi_{T+1}=0ΠT+1​=0.
  • Optimality means that the pair is feasible and that every feasible pair has weakly smaller profit. No supremum is taken over the reals.
  • "(DE) binds" means that no first-best pair satisfies the period's constraint. No multiplier enters the goal.
  • The standing assumptions θ>0\theta>0θ>0, η≥0\eta\ge0η≥0, δ∈(0,1]\delta\in(0,1]δ∈(0,1], T≥2T\ge2T≥2 are bundled in one predicate. Milestones whose formulas divide by η\etaη, together with Lemma 5, add η>0\eta>0η>0. The goal keeps η≥0\eta\ge0η≥0, because at η=0\eta=0η=0 the only profit-maximizing path is identically zero and the statement still holds.
  • The printed last clause of Proposition 1 ("wt+1=wtw_{t+1}=w_twt+1​=wt​ and bt+1=btb_{t+1}=b_tbt+1​=bt​ imply wt+1=wtw_{t+1}=w_twt+1​=wt​ and bt=bt−1b_t=b_{t-1}bt​=bt−1​") repeats its own premise. The goal uses wt=wt−1w_t=w_{t-1}wt​=wt−1​, in parallel with the effort clause and with the paper's proof.

A formalization that fixes the path by closed forms in a given multiplier sequence, or that assumes (DE) slack or binding throughout, would make the goal a computation. The goal therefore quantifies over every profit-maximizing path, and a separate milestone shows that such a path exists.

A complete development needs elementary real analysis (one-variable calculus, monotonicity from derivatives, and existence of maximizers of continuous coercive functions) and an induction over the finite horizon. All of this is available in Mathlib. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are alternative routes to the goal that avoid multipliers.

Selected references

  • M. Fahn, Reciprocity in Dynamic Employment Relationships, Management Science, 2023. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4657. Working paper: CRC TRR 190 Discussion Paper No. 198, 2019 (the version cited here).
  • G. A. Akerlof, Labor contracts as partial gift exchange, Quarterly Journal of Economics 97(4):543–569, 1982. doi:10.2307/1885099
  • C. Bull, The existence of self-enforcing implicit contracts, Quarterly Journal of Economics 102(1):147–159, 1987. doi:10.2307/1884684
  • W. B. MacLeod and J. M. Malcomson, Implicit contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment, Econometrica 57(2):447–480, 1989. doi:10.2307/1912562
  • J. Levin, Relational incentive contracts, American Economic Review 93(3):835–857, 2003. doi:10.1257/000282803322157115
  • M. Dufwenberg and G. Kirchsteiger, A theory of sequential reciprocity, Games and Economic Behavior 47(2):268–298, 2004. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.003
  • L. Boosey and S. Goerg, The timing of discretionary bonuses: Effort, signals, and reciprocity, IZA Discussion Paper No. 11580, 2018. IZA DP 11580
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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Plumbing of Securities Markets: The Impact of Post-trade Fees on Trading and Welfare: Neither Uniform nor Trade-Specific Post-Trade Fees Maximize Welfare at Every Post-Trade CostResearch Paper

Why post-trade fees matter

Securities traders commonly pay for clearing and settlement after a trade is executed. A fee that is the same for every transaction is simple to administer, but processing a transaction between customers of the same broker can cost less than processing one between brokers. Degryse, Van Achter, and Wuyts ask whether charging everyone the same fee, or charging each transaction its processing cost, leads traders to make the trades that create the most total value. Their answer depends on the processing cost and on how traders' choice of limit-order quotes changes the next trader's choice. The October 2016 working paper develops this question in a single-security limit-order market; this mission uses its preprint page and result numbering.

Market and fee setting

In each period, one risk-neutral trader arrives. She is a buyer with probability 1/21/21/2 and values the security at VhV_hVh​, or a seller with probability 1/21/21/2 and values it at VlV_lVl​, where Vh>Vl≥0V_h>V_l\ge0Vh​>Vl​≥0. Each trader belongs to one of N>1N>1N>1 brokers, with equal arrival shares. A limit order offers one unit at a quoted bid or ask. It remains available for one period, so only the next trader can accept it. A market order accepts the standing quote immediately. The next trader may instead post her own limit order. Broker affiliations are visible, so a trader can choose a quote that attracts counterparties at every broker, called the all strategy, or only counterparties at her own broker, called the own strategy. The market description and tie rules appear in §3 of the working paper, pp. 8–9.

A trade within one broker is internalized; its processing cost is normalized to zero. A trade across brokers costs the post-trade service provider c>0c>0c>0 per leg. The uniform fee structure charges (N−1)c/N(N-1)c/N(N−1)c/N on each leg of every trade, while the trade-specific structure charges zero on an internalized leg and ccc on a cross-broker leg. These are the fee schedules analyzed in §4, pp. 10–13. They alter the gains from accepting a standing quote, and therefore the quotes that traders choose to post. A trader indifferent between a market order and a new limit order chooses the market order; a limit-order trader indifferent between attracting all brokers and only her own chooses all brokers.

The model tracks three possible actions in an order-flow chain: posting a limit order, executing an internalized market order, and executing a non-internalized market order. A stationary distribution φ=(φ0,φ1,φ2)\varphi=(\varphi_0,\varphi_1,\varphi_2)φ=(φ0​,φ1​,φ2​) gives their long-run frequencies. A trade's price transfers value between buyer and seller, while processing uses real resources. Thus expected welfare per period is

W(φ)=φ1(Vh−Vl)+φ2(Vh−Vl−2c).W(\varphi)=\varphi_1(V_h-V_l)+\varphi_2(V_h-V_l-2c).W(φ)=φ1​(Vh​−Vl​)+φ2​(Vh​−Vl​−2c).

This is the stationary-distribution form of Equation (6) in §5 and the Appendix, pp. 14–15 and Appendix pp. 1–2. It also gives welfare zero if no trade occurs.

Formalization targets

The goal is Corollary 3 of the working paper, p. 16. Two cost thresholds divide the outcomes:

c1=2N(N−1)(Vh−Vl)(2N+1)(2N−1),c2=N(Vh−Vl)2N+1.c_1=\frac{2N(N-1)(V_h-V_l)}{(2N+1)(2N-1)},\qquad c_2=\frac{N(V_h-V_l)}{2N+1}.c1​=(2N+1)(2N−1)2N(N−1)(Vh​−Vl​)​,c2​=2N+1N(Vh​−Vl​)​.

For c≤c1c\le c_1c≤c1​, the all strategy gives strictly higher welfare than own, and both fee structures induce all. For c1<c≤c2c_1<c\le c_2c1​<c≤c2​, all gives at least as much welfare; uniform fees induce all, while trade-specific fees induce own. For c>c2c>c_2c>c2​, own gives strictly higher welfare; trade-specific fees induce own and realize higher welfare than uniform fees. At c=c2c=c_2c=c2​, all and own have equal welfare. The two fee structures still induce different strategies there. The paper says that only uniform fees achieve the maximum in its middle range; at the equality endpoint, both welfare values attain the same maximum, so the formal statement preserves the equality and the distinct strategy choices.

Seven milestones support this target, in the paper's order. Equation (1) is the indifference system that optimal limit-order quotes satisfy. Proposition 1 classifies the equilibrium strategy under uniform fees, Equation (5) locates the cost c1c_1c1​ at which the limit-order profits of all and own coincide under trade-specific fees, and Proposition 2 classifies the trade-specific equilibrium. Appendix Equation (A3) gives the stationary distributions of the two order-flow chains, Equation (7) their trading rates, internalization rates and welfare, and Equation (8) the cost at which the two welfare levels agree. The proposition milestones also identify the resulting quotes and spreads; the welfare goal retains the paper's comparison of actual equilibrium outcomes.

What the result establishes

The distinction between the privately chosen strategy and the socially preferred one is operational: trade-specific fees can steer traders toward broker-only trading before that is best for total welfare, while uniform fees can leave them targeting every broker after broker-only trading becomes preferable. The theorem identifies the exact cost ranges in which each mismatch occurs. Its thresholds depend on the number of brokers and the spread in buyer and seller valuations. These claims, including the fact that neither fee schedule is best for the whole cost range, are stated in Corollary 3 and the discussion following it, pp. 16–17.

The result is proved in the paper. The remaining task here is to formalize its equilibrium classification and stationary welfare comparison in Lean, then give the published mathematical statements machine-checked proofs. The mission reuses a published finite-chain stationary-distribution definition; its three-state welfare accounting can serve related trading models, while the exact fee schedules and quote formulas belong to this paper's setting.

Main mathematical difficulty

The equilibrium cannot be found by comparing the welfare formulas alone: traders maximize their own expected limit-order profits. Whether a quote is accepted changes discretely when it crosses a counterparty's market-order threshold, and the value of posting the counterparty's new limit order is itself an equilibrium value. A quote attractive to all brokers and a quote attractive only to the same broker may each be optimal in different cost ranges. The analysis must also respect the paper's tie rules at both switching thresholds. Once the strategies are classified, the two three-state chains have different stationary trading frequencies, so a fee comparison at a fixed trade volume would not answer the question.

Formalization scope

Lean represents NNN as a natural number with 1<N1<N1<N and all money amounts as real numbers. The standing assumptions are 0≤Vl<Vh0\le V_l<V_h0≤Vl​<Vh​ and c>0c>0c>0; the latter expresses that the zero internalized cost is lower than the non-internalized cost. Division in threshold and quote formulas uses the real cast of NNN. A market order is chosen at equality, and an optimal all-broker quote is preferred at an all-versus-own tie. An equilibrium is a stationary pair of buyer and seller continuation values, each an attained greatest expected limit-order profit given the other. Optimal quotes determine the strategy; strategy labels are not defined by the cost thresholds.

The transition matrix has state indices 0,1,20,1,20,1,2 for limit, internalized market, and non-internalized market orders. A stationary distribution uses the published finite-chain definition: it is nonnegative, sums to one, and is a fixed row vector of that matrix. The printed third row of Appendix (A2) is all zeros even though the text calls the matrix stochastic. The formal matrix sends that unreachable state back to state 000; this changes no stationary probability in (A3). Welfare is calculated from the stationary distribution and true processing costs, not assigned one of the closed formulas in Equation (7). The goal quantifies over equilibrium continuation values and stationary distributions, while the milestones assert their existence and identify the distributions. Contributions that establish these equilibrium, finite-chain, and threshold results are within scope.

Selected references

  • Hans Degryse, Michael Van Achter, and Gunther Wuyts, Plumbing of Securities Markets: The Impact of Post-Trade Fees on Trading and Welfare, SSRN working paper 2023597, October 2016. SSRN.
  • Hans Degryse, Michael Van Achter, and Gunther Wuyts, Plumbing of Securities Markets: The Impact of Post-Trade Fees on Trading and Welfare, Management Science, 2021. DOI. The source used for formalization is the October 2016 working paper.
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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

A Theory of Assurance: Balancing Costly Formal Control with Tone at the Top: The Authority's Optimal Formal Control and the High-Type CEO's Tipping Point in the Diversion ModelResearch Paper

Motivation

Boards and audit committees use formal controls to limit the resources that an executive can divert. Controls can also change the executive's decision: a CEO who values her future reputation may comply when the remaining opportunity to divert is too small. Penno's diversion model puts these two effects in one decision problem. It asks how much costly control the authority should buy when it does not know in advance which CEO type it will draw. The answer depends on the chance of drawing a reputation-sensitive CEO and on the strength of that CEO's career concerns. Penno calls their product tone at the top.

The source for this mission is the May 2019 revision of Penno's SSRN working paper. Its Proposition 1 gives an explicit optimal control level and the corresponding temptation threshold for the high CEO type. The result belongs to a theoretical accounting model; the mission concerns that model's mathematical assertion, rather than an estimate of actual control costs or misconduct.

Setting

An authority chooses a formal control level ccc before a CEO sees a temptation xxx. The temptation is uniform on [0,xˉ][0,\bar x][0,xˉ], where xˉ>0\bar x>0xˉ>0. If the CEO diverts resources, the authority loses (1−c)x(1-c)x(1−c)x; if the CEO complies, it loses none to diversion. The authority also pays the direct cost K(c)=λ/(1−c)K(c)=\lambda/(1-c)K(c)=λ/(1−c), with λ>0\lambda>0λ>0. The control domain is 0≤c<10\le c<10≤c<1: full control has infinite cost in the paper.

A CEO has type η∈{0,ηH}\eta\in\{0,\eta_H\}η∈{0,ηH​}, with ηH>0\eta_H>0ηH​>0. The high type is drawn with probability p∈(0,1)p\in(0,1)p∈(0,1) and the low type with probability 1−p1-p1−p. For a CEO of type η\etaη, diversion gives utility βη+γ(1−c)x\beta\eta+\gamma(1-c)xβη+γ(1−c)x and compliance gives utility η\etaη, where β<1\beta<1β<1 and 0<γ<10<\gamma<10<γ<1. Define τ=(1−β)ηH/γ\tau=(1-\beta)\eta_H/\gammaτ=(1−β)ηH​/γ. The high type diverts when xxx exceeds her tipping point xT(c)=τ/(1−c)x_T(c)=\tau/(1-c)xT​(c)=τ/(1−c); the low type diverts for any positive temptation. The paper assumes τ<xˉ\tau<\bar xτ<xˉ so that the high type can divert under some control levels.

Write L(c)L(c)L(c) for the authority's expected loss: the expected amount diverted, averaged over both CEO types and the uniform temptation, plus K(c)K(c)K(c). When c<1−τ/xˉc<1-\tau/\bar xc<1−τ/xˉ, both types can divert. At and above that boundary the high type never diverts, so only the low type contributes to expected diversion. The definition of LLL in this mission starts from the CEO's utility comparison and integrates the resulting diverted amount. This preserves the decision mechanism underlying the two closed forms in the paper's appendix.

Formalization targets

Proposition 1: optimal control and tipping point

Under the standing model assumptions and the two conditions of Lemma 1, let q=2λxˉ/(1+p)q=\sqrt{2\lambda\bar x/(1+p)}q=2λxˉ/(1+p)​. Proposition 1 states that the unique optimal control and its high-type tipping point are

c∗={1−2λxˉ−pτ2xˉ,τ≤q,1−τxˉ,τ≥q,xT(c∗)={τxˉ2λxˉ−pτ2,τ≤q,xˉ,τ≥q.c^*=\begin{cases} 1-\dfrac{\sqrt{2\lambda\bar x-p\tau^2}}{\bar x},&\tau\le q,\\[4pt] 1-\dfrac{\tau}{\bar x},&\tau\ge q, \end{cases} \qquad x_T(c^*)=\begin{cases} \dfrac{\tau\bar x}{\sqrt{2\lambda\bar x-p\tau^2}},&\tau\le q,\\[4pt] \bar x,&\tau\ge q. \end{cases}c∗=⎩⎨⎧​1−xˉ2λxˉ−pτ2​​,1−xˉτ​,​τ≤q,τ≥q,​xT​(c∗)=⎩⎨⎧​2λxˉ−pτ2​τxˉ​,xˉ,​τ≤q,τ≥q.​

Both branches include equality at qqq; their values agree there. The formal goal states that the displayed control belongs to [0,1)[0,1)[0,1) and has strictly less expected loss than every other admissible control. The paper's printed formula can be negative for sufficiently large λ\lambdaλ, even when Lemma 1 holds. The goal therefore adds the necessary condition 2λxˉ−pτ2≤xˉ22\lambda\bar x-p\tau^2\le\bar x^22λxˉ−pτ2≤xˉ2, which ensures that the first branch remains an admissible control.

The milestone list follows the model's tipping point (5), the two expected-loss formulas, the convexity and increasing-loss assertions of Lemma 1, and the appendix's first-order and branch-threshold equations. These are source claims used to identify the optimizer, with their original indices and page provenance.

Significance

The result describes when stronger reputational incentives accompany more formal control and when they allow the authority to reduce it. The threshold qqq separates an interior solution, where the high type can still divert at sufficiently large temptations, from a boundary solution that keeps the high type compliant throughout the support of xxx. The accompanying expression for xTx_TxT​ makes the behavioral meaning of each branch explicit. Penno uses the result to discuss the relation between tone at the top and formal control in the basic diversion model.

The paper supplies an analytic proof. This mission seeks machine-checked proofs of the same optimization claim and of its supporting statements. Its definition of expected loss also provides a small reusable example of a two-type decision model with a choice-dependent threshold inside an integral. The mathematical result is known from the paper; its Lean proof remains the work of the mission.

Difficulty

A direct optimization of λ/(1−c)\lambda/(1-c)λ/(1−c) alone misses the expected diversion term, while treating the high type as always compliant misses the change of behavior at xT(c)x_T(c)xT​(c). The loss is piecewise because the high type's tipping point can move past the upper end of the temptation interval. A complete argument must establish the two losses from the utility-based diversion rule, control their behavior on the correct intervals, and compare the candidate in the first interval with their shared boundary. The value c=1c=1c=1 also needs separate attention: ordinary real division assigns λ/0\lambda/0λ/0 a value, whereas the paper assigns infinite cost to full control.

Formalization scope

Lean uses real parameters xˉ,λ,p,β,γ,ηH\bar x,\lambda,p,\beta,\gamma,\eta_Hxˉ,λ,p,β,γ,ηH​ bundled in Params, together with the standing inequalities of §3. It represents uniform temptation by an interval integral of the diverted amount with density 1/xˉ1/\bar x1/xˉ. The CEO diverts exactly when her diversion utility is strictly greater than her compliance utility. At equality, the formal model takes compliance; that single threshold point has no effect on the integral. The high type's tipping point is the unconstrained value τ/(1−c)\tau/(1-c)τ/(1−c), which can exceed xˉ\bar xxˉ even though realized temptations cannot.

All optimization statements use c∈[0,1)c\in[0,1)c∈[0,1). This agrees with the source convention K(1)=∞K(1)=\inftyK(1)=∞ and avoids treating Lean's real division by zero as a finite control cost. The added inequality 2λxˉ−pτ2≤xˉ22\lambda\bar x-p\tau^2\le\bar x^22λxˉ−pτ2≤xˉ2 is disclosed in the goal and is needed only to keep the printed interior formula nonnegative. There is no assumption that β\betaβ is nonnegative: the source only requires β<1\beta<1β<1. The first part of Lemma 1 is strict convexity; its second part is expressed as strict increase, as stated in the appendix proof.

The development needs Mathlib's interval integrals, real square root, and real convexity and monotonicity predicates. Contributions that establish the integral closed forms, the behavior of the two loss regions, and the global optimality claim are within scope. A definition that merely hard-codes the appendix's closed forms as LLL, or a goal about an unconstrained control, would lose the CEO choice and the authority's actual feasible set.

Selected references

  • M. Penno, A Theory of Assurance: Balancing Costly Formal Control with Tone at the Top, SSRN working paper 2876700, revision of May 2019, §§3–4 and Appendix, pp. 6–13, 28–29. SSRN
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EconomicsMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Voting with Time Commitment for Decentralized Governance: Bond Voting as a Sybil-Resistant Mechanism: Bond Voting Is Robustly v-ImplementableResearch Paper

Motivation

Blockchain platforms and decentralized autonomous organizations take governance decisions by token-weighted voting: an account's influence grows with the governance tokens it stakes. Two problems are associated with this design (Buterin 2021). The first is plutocracy: holders of many tokens control decisions. The second is the Sybil attack (Douceur 2002): accounts are pseudonymous, so one person can split her tokens over many identities. A rule that dampens the influence of large stakes — for example votes proportional to the square root of tokens — invites exactly this splitting, because the dampening is undone by holding many small stakes.

Mohan, Khezr and Berg (SSRN 4259599; Management Science 2024, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.01536) set up a model in which votes depend on two resources, staked tokens and time commitment. They characterize Sybil resistance (Theorem 1), show that token weighting alone cannot be both plutocracy- and Sybil-resistant (Theorem 2, the Plutocracy–Sybil dilemma), and propose bond voting, in which votes are bought with voting bonds that lock tokens until maturity. This mission formalizes the paper's main positive result: bond voting is robustly v-implementable (Proposition 2).

Setting

A platform fixes a maximal commitment horizon T>0T > 0T>0. A vote function v(q,t)v(q, t)v(q,t) turns a stake of q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 tokens locked for t∈[0,T]t \in [0, T]t∈[0,T] units of time into votes, with v(q,0)=v(0,t)=0v(q, 0) = v(0, t) = 0v(q,0)=v(0,t)=0 (Definition 1). It values commitment if ∂v/∂t>0\partial v/\partial t > 0∂v/∂t>0, and has non-increasing influence of tokens if ∂v/∂q>0\partial v/\partial q > 0∂v/∂q>0 and ∂2v/∂q2≤0\partial^2 v/\partial q^2 \le 0∂2v/∂q2≤0, for all q>0q > 0q>0 and t∈(0,T]t \in (0, T]t∈(0,T] (Definitions 2, 3).

An agent with budget q>0q > 0q>0 and payoff function π(q,t)\pi(q, t)π(q,t) chooses t∈[0,T]t \in [0, T]t∈[0,T]. A Sybil attack with MMM identities assigns stakes q1,…,qM≥0q_1, \dots, q_M \ge 0q1​,…,qM​≥0 and commitments t1,…,tMt_1, \dots, t_Mt1​,…,tM​. It is feasible if ∑mqm≤q\sum_m q_m \le q∑m​qm​≤q and every tm∈(0,T]t_m \in (0, T]tm​∈(0,T], and profitable if its payoff ∑mπ(qm,tm)\sum_m \pi(q_m, t_m)∑m​π(qm​,tm​) strictly exceeds what the agent obtains as a single entity (Definition 5). A payoff function is Sybil resistant if no budget admits a feasible and profitable attack (Definition 6), and a mechanism is robustly v-implementable if its vote function values commitment, has non-increasing influence of tokens, and is Sybil resistant (Definition 7).

Bond voting. The platform sets a voting bond rate rrr. A ttt-bond costs Pt=e−rtP_t = e^{-rt}Pt​=e−rt tokens, returns them at maturity, and carries one vote, so a budget qqq buys V=q/Pt=qertV = q/P_t = q e^{rt}V=q/Pt​=qert votes. An agent of type (θ,u,ri)(\theta, u, r_i)(θ,u,ri​) — marginal pivotality θ\thetaθ, value uuu of the policy, outside return rir_iri​ on her tokens — receives benefit ∣u∣θV|u|\theta V∣u∣θV and bears the opportunity cost q(erit−1)q(e^{r_i t} - 1)q(eri​t−1), so for t>0t > 0t>0

πi(q,t)=∣u∣θ q ert−q (erit−1),πi(q,0)=0.\pi_i(q, t) = |u|\theta\, q\, e^{rt} - q\,(e^{r_i t} - 1), \qquad \pi_i(q, 0) = 0.πi​(q,t)=∣u∣θqert−q(eri​t−1),πi​(q,0)=0.

Agent types are admissible when ∣u∣θ>1|u|\theta > 1∣u∣θ>1 and ri>rr_i > rri​>r.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2

For every rate r>0r > 0r>0 and horizon T>0T > 0T>0,

bond voting  =  (v(q,t)=qert, {πi:(θ,u,ri) admissible}) is robustly v-implementable.\text{bond voting} \;=\; \Bigl(v(q,t) = q e^{rt},\ \{\pi_i : (\theta, u, r_i)\ \text{admissible}\}\Bigr)\ \text{is robustly v-implementable.}bond voting=(v(q,t)=qert, {πi​:(θ,u,ri​) admissible}) is robustly v-implementable.

The goal quantifies over every admissible agent type and every budget, and leaves rrr and TTT free.

Milestones

  1. Equation (5): the closed form of πi\pi_iπi​ above.
  2. The bond vote function satisfies Definitions 2 and 3.
  3. Proposition 1, cases 1–2: if ri<θ∣u∣rr_i < \theta|u| rri​<θ∣u∣r, the optimal bond length is ti∗=Tt^*_i = Tti∗​=T when ri≤θ∣u∣r e−T(ri−r)r_i \le \theta|u| r\, e^{-T(r_i - r)}ri​≤θ∣u∣re−T(ri​−r), and ti∗=ln⁡(θ∣u∣r/ri)/(ri−r)t^*_i = \ln(\theta|u| r/r_i)/(r_i - r)ti∗​=ln(θ∣u∣r/ri​)/(ri​−r) otherwise; it is the unique maximizer of πi(q,⋅)\pi_i(q, \cdot)πi​(q,⋅) on [0,T][0, T][0,T] and does not depend on qqq.
  4. Theorem 1, "if" direction: a payoff linear in qqq for every t∈(0,T]t \in (0, T]t∈(0,T], vanishing at q=0q = 0q=0 and at t=0t = 0t=0, is Sybil resistant.
  5. The Sybil step of the proof of Proposition 2: under the hypotheses of milestone 3, no feasible attack earns more than πi(q,ti∗)\pi_i(q, t^*_i)πi​(q,ti∗​).

Significance

The result. Proposition 2 shows that a second voting resource, time, can be added to token voting without reopening the Sybil problem: bond votes are linear in tokens, so splitting across identities earns nothing, while voters with a low opportunity cost of locking tokens, or a strong stake in the outcome, gain influence through longer commitments. Together with Theorem 2, which shows that token weighting alone cannot dampen large holdings without inviting Sybil attacks, it is the paper's case for bond voting as a governance mechanism.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper; it has no machine-checked proof. Formalization adds two things beyond a check. First, it fixes the definitions the paper leaves implicit: the payoff of a multi-identity attack, and which single-entity commitment a profitable attack must beat. Second, it states Proposition 1 precisely: the printed third case of equation (6) (ti∗=0t^*_i = 0ti∗​=0 when ri≥θ∣u∣rr_i \ge \theta|u| rri​≥θ∣u∣r) has no maximizer, because the payoff tends to θ∣u∣q>0\theta|u| q > 0θ∣u∣q>0 as t→0+t \to 0^+t→0+ but is 000 at t=0t = 0t=0. The goal is stated so that it remains true for those agent types.

Difficulty

The mathematics is elementary real analysis; the difficulty is in the definitions. The naive reading of Definition 5(c) compares an attack with the agent's payoff at a fixed commitment tit_iti​. Under that reading the "if" half of Theorem 1 fails: an agent with a suboptimal tit_iti​ gains by moving her whole budget to one identity with a better commitment. Comparing with the formula ti∗t^*_iti∗​ instead fails in the third case of (6). The statement holds when the attack must beat every commitment the agent could choose herself, and proving it then requires handling agent types with no optimal commitment, where Proposition 1 cannot be invoked. Discontinuity of πi\pi_iπi​ at t=0t = 0t=0 also rules out arguments that take a maximum over the compact interval [0,T][0, T][0,T].

Formalization scope

Everything is real-valued (ℝ), with Real.exp and Real.log. Identities are indexed by Fin M; M=0M = 0M=0 (no identities) and identities with zero stake are allowed. Derivatives in Definitions 2–3 are encoded with HasDerivAt witnesses, not with deriv, so a non-differentiable function cannot satisfy them by default values. The payoff of an attack is the sum of the identities' payoffs, as computed in the paper's proofs (pp. 16, 25). An attack is profitable only if it beats every single-entity commitment t∈[0,T]t \in [0, T]t∈[0,T], including t=0t = 0t=0 (not voting). Bond votes and payoffs are 000 at t=0t = 0t=0, as the paper imposes. The hypothesis r>0r > 0r>0 is added: the paper never states the sign of rrr, and Definition 2 fails without it.

Fixing the single entity's commitment to ti∗t^*_iti∗​, or proving Sybil resistance only for agent types covered by Proposition 1 cases 1–2, would be a trivializing formalization of the goal; the goal quantifies over all admissible types and all single-entity commitments.

Theorem 1 is stated "given Assumptions 1 and 2" for mechanisms with non-increasing influence of tokens; milestone 4 drops these hypotheses because its proof uses only linearity and the boundary conditions. Not formalized: Theorem 1's "only if" direction (its proof uses a fixed single-entity commitment and equates nonlinearity with strict concavity), Theorem 2 and Corollaries 1–4, Remarks 1–4, Proposition 3, and the numerical sensitivity analysis of §3.3. All definitions live in one file in the namespace BondVoting.Sybil; the attack and resistance definitions are stated for an arbitrary payoff function and can be reused for other voting rules, such as quadratic voting.

Selected references

  • V. Mohan, P. Khezr, C. Berg, Voting with time commitment for decentralized governance: Bond voting as a Sybil-resistant mechanism, SSRN 4259599 (version of 2024-02-20); Management Science, 2024. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4259599, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01536
  • J. R. Douceur, The Sybil attack, International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS), LNCS 2429, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45748-8_24
  • V. Buterin, Moving beyond coin voting governance, 2021. https://vitalik.ca/general/2021/08/16/voting3.html
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