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Quantum Information·Captain: Goku

Fast and fault-tolerant logical measurements: Auxiliary hypergraphs and transversal surgeryResearch Paper

Motivation

Fast and fault-tolerant logical measurements: Auxiliary hypergraphs and transversal surgery.

Target

Lemma 2.7

Let C∙,D∙C_\bullet,D_\bulletC∙​,D∙​ be finite based chain complexes over F2\mathbb F_2F2​, and let l∈Zl\in\mathbb Zl∈Z. Their tensor complex has differential ∂C⊗I+I⊗∂D\partial_C\otimes I+I\otimes\partial_D∂C​⊗I+I⊗∂D​. There exists an F2\mathbb F_2F2​-linear isomorphism

Hl(C∙⊗D∙)≅⨁i∈ZHi(C∙)⊗F2Hl−i(D∙).H_l(C_\bullet\otimes D_\bullet)\cong\bigoplus_{i\in\mathbb Z} H_i(C_\bullet)\otimes_{\mathbb F_2}H_{l-i}(D_\bullet).Hl​(C∙​⊗D∙​)≅i∈Z⨁​Hi​(C∙​)⊗F2​​Hl−i​(D∙​).

The direct sum is algebraic; the finite based complexes have only finitely many nonzero graded components. No particular isomorphism or representative map is asserted.

Lemma 3.2

Let binary check matrices HX,HZH_X,H_ZHX​,HZ​ satisfy HXHZT=0H_XH_Z^T=0HX​HZT​=0, and let DX,DZD_X,D_ZDX​,DZ​ be the prescribed pair-reading matrices of Eq. (2). Write LZ=ker⁡HX/im⁡HZTL_Z=\ker H_X/\operatorname{im}H_Z^TLZ​=kerHX​/imHZT​ and LX=ker⁡HZ/im⁡HXTL_X=\ker H_Z/\operatorname{im}H_X^TLX​=kerHZ​/imHXT​. Then

LZ(DX,DZ)≅LZ(HX,HZ),LX(DX,DZ)≅LX(HX,HZ).L_Z(D_X,D_Z)\cong L_Z(H_X,H_Z),\qquad L_X(D_X,D_Z)\cong L_X(H_X,H_Z).LZ​(DX​,DZ​)≅LZ​(HX​,HZ​),LX​(DX​,DZ​)≅LX​(HX​,HZ​).

The deformation of two identical memories therefore retains exactly kkk logical qubits, with no additional logical classes. All spaces and isomorphisms are over F2\mathbb F_2F2​.

Lemma 3.3

Let HX∈F2mX×nH_X\in\mathbb F_2^{m_X\times n}HX​∈F2mX​×n​ and HZ∈F2mZ×nH_Z\in\mathbb F_2^{m_Z\times n}HZ​∈F2mZ​×n​ satisfy HXHZT=0H_XH_Z^T=0HX​HZT​=0, and let P=(1  1)P=(1\;1)P=(11). In the product bases, the three coboundaries of the pair-reading deformation are

DXT=[I2⊗HXTP⊗ImX],DZT=[I2⊗HZTPT⊗In0I1⊗HX],DMT=[PT⊗ImZI1⊗HZT].D_X^T=\begin{bmatrix}I_2\otimes H_X^T\\P\otimes I_{m_X}\end{bmatrix},\quad D_Z^T=\begin{bmatrix}I_2\otimes H_Z^T&P^T\otimes I_n\\0&I_1\otimes H_X\end{bmatrix},\quad D_M^T=\begin{bmatrix}P^T\otimes I_{m_Z}\\I_1\otimes H_Z^T\end{bmatrix}.DXT​=[I2​⊗HXT​P⊗ImX​​​],DZT​=[I2​⊗HZT​0​PT⊗In​I1​⊗HX​​],DMT​=[PT⊗ImZ​​I1​⊗HZT​​].

Here old data precede new data, and old Z checks precede new Z checks; DMD_MDM​ denotes the metachecks. These are the explicit tensor-product differentials, retaining the final degree as in pp.21-22.

Lemma 3.4

Let HX,HZH_X,H_ZHX​,HZ​ define a binary CSS memory with X and Z distances at least d∈Nd\in\mathbb Nd∈N. Its prescribed pair-reading deformation has check matrices DX,DZD_X,D_ZDX​,DZ​ satisfying

dX(DX,DZ)≥d,dZ(DX,DZ)≥d.d_X(D_X,D_Z)\ge d,\qquad d_Z(D_X,D_Z)\ge d.dX​(DX​,DZ​)≥d,dZ​(DX​,DZ​)≥d.

A lower distance bound quantifies over every nontrivial normalizer class modulo stabilizers; the distance is infinite when no such class exists. This is a spatial code-distance assertion.

Lemma 3.8

Let HX,HZH_X,H_ZHX​,HZ​ define a binary CSS memory with both distances at least d∈Nd\in\mathbb Nd∈N. Let P∈F2r×cP\in\mathbb F_2^{r\times c}P∈F2r×c​ have full row rank and every row of Hamming weight greater than one. The prescribed Z-pattern deformation of ccc identical memories, with rmXr m_XrmX​ new data qubits indexed by pattern rows and memory X checks, satisfies

dX(DX,DZ)≥d,dZ(DX,DZ)≥d.d_X(D_X,D_Z)\ge d,\qquad d_Z(D_X,D_Z)\ge d.dX​(DX​,DZ​)≥d,dZ​(DX​,DZ​)≥d.

The conclusion includes CSS commutation and every nontrivial logical class. Sparsity belongs to the separate resource claim.

Theorem 7.8

Let G∈F2V×EG\in\mathbb F_2^{V\times E}G∈F2V×E​ be a finite incidence matrix, W≤F2VW\le\mathbb F_2^VW≤F2V​, and UUU its support union. Put DW(v)=min⁡w∈W∣(v∣U)+w∣D_W(v)=\min_{w\in W}\lvert(v|_U)+w\rvertDW​(v)=minw∈W​∣(v∣U​)+w∣, where restriction to UUU is zero extended and bars denote Hamming weight. For t,M>0t,M>0t,M>0, suppose ∣GTv∣≥Mmin⁡(t,DW(v))|G^Tv|\ge M\min(t,D_W(v))∣GTv∣≥Mmin(t,DW​(v)) for every binary vector vvv. Let the integer L≥1L\ge1L≥1 satisfy L≥1/ML\ge1/ML≥1/M, and form GL=[G⊗IL,IV⊗RL]G_L=[G\otimes I_L,I_V\otimes R_L]GL​=[G⊗IL​,IV​⊗RL​], with RLR_LRL​ the path incidence on LLL vertices. At any selected level ℓ<L\ell<Lℓ<L, embed WWW as WℓW_\ellWℓ​. Then

∣GLTv∣≥min⁡(t,DWℓ(v))for every v.|G_L^Tv|\ge\min(t,D_{W_\ell}(v))\quad\text{for every }v.∣GLT​v∣≥min(t,DWℓ​​(v))for every v.

Thus the thickening has certified modular expansion at least one at every choice of a single level. Cut certificates avoid asserting a largest finite expansion on degenerate inputs.

Lemma 7.9

Let G∈F2V×EG\in\mathbb F_2^{V\times E}G∈F2V×E​ be finite, let W≤F2VW\le\mathbb F_2^VW≤F2V​ contain ker⁡GT\ker G^TkerGT, and let t>0t>0t>0. Let UUU be the support union of WWW, and let DW(v)=min⁡w∈W∣(v∣U)+w∣D_W(v)=\min_{w\in W}\lvert(v|_U)+w\rvertDW​(v)=minw∈W​∣(v∣U​)+w∣, using zero-extended restriction and Hamming weight. Then

∣GTv∣≥t−1min⁡(t,DW(v))for all v.|G^Tv|\ge t^{-1}\min(t,D_W(v))\quad\text{for all }v.∣GTv∣≥t−1min(t,DW​(v))for all v.

Hence 1/t1/t1/t is a certified modular-expansion lower bound, even when no largest finite expansion exists.

Corollary 7.10

Let G∈F2V×EG\in\mathbb F_2^{V\times E}G∈F2V×E​ be finite and ker⁡GT⊆W≤F2V\ker G^T\subseteq W\le\mathbb F_2^VkerGT⊆W≤F2V​. For an integer t≥1t\ge1t≥1, form Gt=[G⊗It,IV⊗Rt]G_t=[G\otimes I_t,I_V\otimes R_t]Gt​=[G⊗It​,IV​⊗Rt​]. Embed WWW at any one level ℓ<t\ell<tℓ<t as WℓW_\ellWℓ​, and write UℓU_\ellUℓ​ for its support union. Then

∣GtTv∣≥min⁡{t,min⁡w∈Wℓ∣(v∣Uℓ)+w∣}for every v.|G_t^Tv|\ge\min\{t,\min_{w\in W_\ell}\lvert(v|_{U_\ell})+w\rvert\}\quad\text{for every }v.∣GtT​v∣≥min{t,w∈Wℓ​min​∣(v∣Uℓ​​)+w∣}for every v.

Restrictions are zero extended and weights are Hamming weights. Integer ttt-fold thickening thus certifies modular expansion one.

Lemma B.4

Let H∈F2m×nH\in\mathbb F_2^{m\times n}H∈F2m×n​ satisfy HHT=0HH^T=0HHT=0, defining a self-dual CSS code with HX=HZ=HH_X=H_Z=HHX​=HZ​=H. Let EEE isometrically encode all kkk logical qubits onto its entire codespace. Suppose matching binary supports vi∈ker⁡Hv_i\in\ker Hvi​∈kerH satisfy vi⋅vj=δijv_i\cdot v_j=\delta_{ij}vi​⋅vj​=δij​, and their physical X and Z products implement the corresponding logical Xi,ZiX_i,Z_iXi​,Zi​ through EEE. There exists a physical Pauli correction PPP, independent of the encoded state, such that

PS⊗nE=ES⊗k.P S^{\otimes n}E=E S^{\otimes k}.PS⊗nE=ES⊗k.

Here S=diag⁡(1,i)S=\operatorname{diag}(1,i)S=diag(1,i), and PPP includes its Pauli phase. The matrix equality holds on the entire encoded space, implementing S on every logical qubit.

§7

Let G∈F2V×EG\in\mathbb F_2^{V\times E}G∈F2V×E​ have finite nonempty vertex and edge sets, with every column weight at most ω∈N\omega\in\mathbb Nω∈N. Let t>0t>0t>0 and M,ρ∈RM,\rho\in\mathbb RM,ρ∈R. Write Mod(W,t,M)\mathrm{Mod}(W,t,M)Mod(W,t,M) for the modular cut inequality using the support union of WWW, and let 1U1_U1U​ indicate U⊆VU\subseteq VU⊆V. Then

Mod(⟨1U⟩,t,M) ⟺ ∣GTv∣≥Mmin⁡(t,∣v∩U∣,∣U∖v∣)(∀v).\mathrm{Mod}(\langle1_U\rangle,t,M)\ \Longleftrightarrow\ |G^Tv|\ge M\min(t,|v\cap U|,|U\setminus v|)\quad(\forall v).Mod(⟨1U​⟩,t,M) ⟺ ∣GTv∣≥Mmin(t,∣v∩U∣,∣U∖v∣)(∀v).

If t≥∣V∣t\ge|V|t≥∣V∣, the relative inequality at U=VU=VU=V is equivalent to global expansion ∣GTv∣≥Mmin⁡(∣v∣,∣V∣−∣v∣)|G^Tv|\ge M\min(|v|,|V|-|v|)∣GTv∣≥Mmin(∣v∣,∣V∣−∣v∣). If also the support union of ker⁡GT\ker G^TkerGT is all of VVV, then

Mod(ker⁡GT,t,ρ∣E∣/∣V∣) ⟺ ∣GTv∣∣E∣≥ρ∣V∣d(v,ker⁡GT)(∀v).\mathrm{Mod}(\ker G^T,t,\rho|E|/|V|)\ \Longleftrightarrow\ \frac{|G^Tv|}{|E|}\ge\frac{\rho}{|V|}d(v,\ker G^T)\quad(\forall v).Mod(kerGT,t,ρ∣E∣/∣V∣) ⟺ ∣E∣∣GTv∣​≥∣V∣ρ​d(v,kerGT)(∀v).

The last inequality, with locality ω\omegaω, is classical soundness ρ\rhoρ. The support condition implements the source's explicit U=VU=VU=V specialization.

AppendixA Eq4

Let f:A∙→C∙f:A_\bullet\to C_\bulletf:A∙​→C∙​ be a chain map of finite based binary complexes and i∈Zi\in\mathbb Zi∈Z. Let Hj(f)H_j(f)Hj​(f) be its induced homology map. Then

dim⁡Hi(cone⁡f)+rank⁡Hi(f)+rank⁡Hi−1(f)=dim⁡Hi(C)+dim⁡Hi−1(A).\dim H_i(\operatorname{cone}f)+\operatorname{rank}H_i(f)+\operatorname{rank}H_{i-1}(f)=\dim H_i(C)+\dim H_{i-1}(A).dimHi​(conef)+rankHi​(f)+rankHi−1​(f)=dimHi​(C)+dimHi−1​(A).

All dimensions are over F2\mathbb F_2F2​, and map images are constructed from fff. The addition form avoids truncated subtraction of natural dimensions.

AppendixA.1

Let C∙C_\bulletC∙​ be a finite binary CSS complex supported in degrees 0,1,20,1,20,1,2, and let ℓ>0\ell>0ℓ>0 be the repetition length. Let F=R⊗CF=R\otimes CF=R⊗C, and let FX′F'_XFX′​ be its prescribed two-endpoint cone. Let FdualF_{\rm dual}Fdual​ and FZ′F'_ZFZ′​ be the cochain-oriented bulk and cone obtained by the specified degree-reversing dual constructions. Put mX=dim⁡C0m_X=\dim C_0mX​=dimC0​ and mZ=dim⁡C2m_Z=\dim C_2mZ​=dimC2​. Then

dim⁡H1(FX′)+dim⁡H0(C)=dim⁡H1(F)+2mX,dim⁡H0(FX′)=0,dim⁡H2(FZ′)+dim⁡H2(C)=dim⁡H2(Fdual)+2mZ,dim⁡H3(FZ′)=0.\begin{aligned}\dim H_1(F'_X)+\dim H_0(C)&=\dim H_1(F)+2m_X,&\dim H_0(F'_X)&=0,\\\dim H_2(F'_Z)+\dim H_2(C)&=\dim H_2(F_{\rm dual})+2m_Z,&\dim H_3(F'_Z)&=0.\end{aligned}dimH1​(FX′​)+dimH0​(C)dimH2​(FZ′​)+dimH2​(C)​=dimH1​(F)+2mX​,=dimH2​(Fdual​)+2mZ​,​dimH0​(FX′​)dimH3​(FZ′​)​=0,=0.​

These retain all boundary homology classes, including immediately terminating classes. They imply no operational fault-distance bound by themselves.

Formalization scope

Only these reviewed original-paper statements are in scope. Definitions have reviewed bodies; target proofs remain open (sorry). Reviewed deferrals are excluded. No theorem proof or whole-paper formal proof is claimed.

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Quantum Information·Captain: Goku

A simple formula for the average gate fidelity of a quantum dynamical operationResearch Paper

Motivation

A simple formula for the average gate fidelity of a quantum dynamical operation establishes the selected mathematical guarantees below. The mission turns those original paper results into precise Lean proof targets.

Setting

Let ddd be a positive integer and let E\mathcal EE be a trace-preserving quantum operation on a ddd-dimensional quantum system QQQ. Define its average fidelity by F‾(E)=∫⟨ψ∣E(∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣)∣ψ⟩ dψ\overline F(\mathcal E)=\int \langle\psi|\mathcal E(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|)|\psi\rangle\,d\psiF(E)=∫⟨ψ∣E(∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣)∣ψ⟩dψ, where dψd\psidψ is the uniform Haar probability measure on normalized pure states. Let RRR be a ddd-dimensional reference system, let ∣ϕd⟩=d−1/2∑j=0d−1∣j⟩R∣j⟩Q|\phi_d\rangle=d^{-1/2}\sum_{j=0}^{d-1}|j\rangle_R|j\rangle_Q∣ϕd​⟩=d−1/2∑j=0d−1​∣j⟩R​∣j⟩Q​, and define Fe(E)=⟨ϕd∣(idR⊗E)(∣ϕd⟩⟨ϕd∣)∣ϕd⟩F_e(\mathcal E)=\langle\phi_d|(\mathrm{id}_R\otimes\mathcal E)(|\phi_d\rangle\langle\phi_d|)|\phi_d\rangleFe​(E)=⟨ϕd​∣(idR​⊗E)(∣ϕd​⟩⟨ϕd​∣)∣ϕd​⟩. Then

F‾(E)=dFe(E)+1d+1.\overline F(\mathcal E)=\frac{d F_e(\mathcal E)+1}{d+1}.F(E)=d+1dFe​(E)+1​.

This identity converts entanglement fidelity into the average probability of preserving a uniformly distributed pure state.

Formalization Note The frozen channel predicate supplies complete positivity, trace preservation and linearity through a normalized Kraus representation. The Haar state measure is the image of normalized full-unitary Haar measure applied to a fixed unit vector; channel integrability is established in the imported definition module. Entanglement fidelity is an overlap probability, independent of the choice of maximally entangled state.

Target

Equation (3); proof on PDF pages 1–2

Let ddd be a positive integer and let E\mathcal EE be a trace-preserving quantum operation on a ddd-dimensional quantum system QQQ. Define its average fidelity by F‾(E)=∫⟨ψ∣E(∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣)∣ψ⟩ dψ\overline F(\mathcal E)=\int \langle\psi|\mathcal E(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|)|\psi\rangle\,d\psiF(E)=∫⟨ψ∣E(∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣)∣ψ⟩dψ, where dψd\psidψ is the uniform Haar probability measure on normalized pure states. Let RRR be a ddd-dimensional reference system, let ∣ϕd⟩=d−1/2∑j=0d−1∣j⟩R∣j⟩Q|\phi_d\rangle=d^{-1/2}\sum_{j=0}^{d-1}|j\rangle_R|j\rangle_Q∣ϕd​⟩=d−1/2∑j=0d−1​∣j⟩R​∣j⟩Q​, and define Fe(E)=⟨ϕd∣(idR⊗E)(∣ϕd⟩⟨ϕd∣)∣ϕd⟩F_e(\mathcal E)=\langle\phi_d|(\mathrm{id}_R\otimes\mathcal E)(|\phi_d\rangle\langle\phi_d|)|\phi_d\rangleFe​(E)=⟨ϕd​∣(idR​⊗E)(∣ϕd​⟩⟨ϕd​∣)∣ϕd​⟩. Then

F‾(E)=dFe(E)+1d+1.\overline F(\mathcal E)=\frac{d F_e(\mathcal E)+1}{d+1}.F(E)=d+1dFe​(E)+1​.

This identity converts entanglement fidelity into the average probability of preserving a uniformly distributed pure state.

Formalization Note The frozen channel predicate supplies complete positivity, trace preservation and linearity through a normalized Kraus representation. The Haar state measure is the image of normalized full-unitary Haar measure applied to a fixed unit vector; channel integrability is established in the imported definition module. Entanglement fidelity is an overlap probability, independent of the choice of maximally entangled state.

Significance

These are known results from the cited paper. The current contribution consists of source-reviewed, compiler-checked theorem statements and mathematical definitions. Formal proofs remain open. Only the listed selected results are in scope; no whole-paper completeness is claimed.

Difficulty

A complete solution must establish every quantified conclusion under the exact stated hypotheses, including error, probability and resource conditions wherever present. The source assumptions and conventions are recorded in the attached statements and independent readbacks.

Formalization scope

Definitions preserve the existing reviewed Lean interfaces. Every target proof is currently sorry, so each target is Open. Printed-source corrections, where necessary, are labeled with the printed claim, the change and its reason.

Selected references

  • A simple formula for the average gate fidelity of a quantum dynamical operation, arXiv:quant-ph/0205035v2. Exact result labels, PDF pages and source SHA-256 values accompany each theorem.

Additional independently reviewed proof targets

Unnumbered claim following Eq. (2): unit average gate fidelity iff perfect implementation

Let d>0d>0d>0, let E\mathcal EE be a completely positive trace-preserving map on ddd-dimensional matrices, and let UUU be a unitary target. Let F‾(E,U)\overline F(\mathcal E,U)F(E,U) denote the normalized Haar average of ⟨ψ∣U†E(∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣)U∣ψ⟩\langle\psi|U^\dagger\mathcal E(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|)U|\psi\rangle⟨ψ∣U†E(∣ψ⟩⟨ψ∣)U∣ψ⟩. Then

F‾(E,U)=1⟺E(X)=UXU† for every matrix X.\overline F(\mathcal E,U)=1\quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad\mathcal E(X)=UXU^\dagger\text{ for every matrix }X.F(E,U)=1⟺E(X)=UXU† for every matrix X.

Thus unit overlap fidelity characterizes exact implementation of the target channel, including its action on all density inputs.

Twirled channel: channel property, fidelity invariance, and unitary covariance; Eqs. (6), (8), (10)

Let d>0d>0d>0 and let E\mathcal EE be a completely positive trace-preserving map. Define its normalized unitary Haar twirl by ET(X)=∫U†E(UXU†)U dU\mathcal E_T(X)=\int U^\dagger\mathcal E(UXU^\dagger)U\,dUET​(X)=∫U†E(UXU†)UdU. Then ET\mathcal E_TET​ is completely positive and trace preserving, and

F‾(ET)=F‾(E),Fe(ET)=Fe(E),VET(ρ)V†=ET(VρV†)\overline F(\mathcal E_T)=\overline F(\mathcal E),\qquad F_e(\mathcal E_T)=F_e(\mathcal E),\qquad V\mathcal E_T(\rho)V^\dagger=\mathcal E_T(V\rho V^\dagger)F(ET​)=F(E),Fe​(ET​)=Fe​(E),VET​(ρ)V†=ET​(VρV†)

for every density matrix ρ\rhoρ and unitary VVV. Here F‾\overline FF is the normalized pure-state Haar overlap average, and FeF_eFe​ is the normalized maximally entangled overlap with identity action on the reference register.

These properties allow the fidelity calculation to be reduced to a unitarily covariant channel.

Unnumbered central proof result: the twirl is depolarizing

Let d>0d>0d>0 and let E\mathcal EE be a completely positive trace-preserving map. Its normalized unitary Haar twirl ET(X)=∫U†E(UXU†)U dU\mathcal E_T(X)=\int U^\dagger\mathcal E(UXU^\dagger)U\,dUET​(X)=∫U†E(UXU†)UdU has a real parameter ppp, independent of the density input, such that

ET(ρ)=pdI+(1−p)ρfor every density matrix ρ.\mathcal E_T(\rho)=\frac p d I+(1-p)\rho\qquad\text{for every density matrix }\rho.ET​(ρ)=dp​I+(1−p)ρfor every density matrix ρ.

No additional interval constraint on ppp is imposed. This identifies the twirl as a depolarizing channel.

Eq. (16): entanglement fidelity in an orthogonal unitary operator basis

Let d>0d>0d>0 and let E\mathcal EE be a completely positive trace-preserving map. Let (Uj)j=1d2(U_j)_{j=1}^{d^2}(Uj​)j=1d2​ be a complex operator basis consisting of unitaries with tr⁡(Uj†Uk)=dδjk\operatorname{tr}(U_j^\dagger U_k)=d\delta_{jk}tr(Uj†​Uk​)=dδjk​. With FeF_eFe​ the overlap of the normalized maximally entangled state before and after applying E\mathcal EE to its system register,

Fe(E)=1d3∑j=1d2Re⁡tr⁡(Uj†E(Uj)).F_e(\mathcal E)=\frac{1}{d^3}\sum_{j=1}^{d^2}\operatorname{Re}\operatorname{tr}(U_j^\dagger\mathcal E(U_j)).Fe​(E)=d31​j=1∑d2​Retr(Uj†​E(Uj​)).

This expresses entanglement fidelity using the channel action on an operator basis.

Eq. (17): the paper's general qudit average gate fidelity formula

Let d>0d>0d>0, let E\mathcal EE be a completely positive trace-preserving map, and let UUU be a unitary target. Let (Uj)j=1d2(U_j)_{j=1}^{d^2}(Uj​)j=1d2​ be a complex operator basis of unitaries satisfying tr⁡(Uj†Uk)=dδjk\operatorname{tr}(U_j^\dagger U_k)=d\delta_{jk}tr(Uj†​Uk​)=dδjk​. The normalized Haar average gate overlap is

F‾(E,U)=∑j=1d2Re⁡tr⁡(UUj†U†E(Uj))+d2d2(d+1).\overline F(\mathcal E,U)=\frac{\sum_{j=1}^{d^2}\operatorname{Re}\operatorname{tr}(U U_j^\dagger U^\dagger\mathcal E(U_j))+d^2}{d^2(d+1)}.F(E,U)=d2(d+1)∑j=1d2​Retr(UUj†​U†E(Uj​))+d2​.

The target inverse conjugates the channel output. This is the paper's general qudit formula, with no unitality assumption.

Eq. (18): qubit Pauli specialization

Let E\mathcal EE be a completely positive trace-preserving map on a qubit, let UUU be a unitary target, and let σ1=X\sigma_1=Xσ1​=X, σ2=Y\sigma_2=Yσ2​=Y, σ3=Z\sigma_3=Zσ3​=Z be the Pauli matrices, with Y=(0−ii0)Y=\begin{pmatrix}0&-i\\i&0\end{pmatrix}Y=(0i​−i0​). Then the normalized Haar gate overlap satisfies

F‾(E,U)=12+112∑j=13Re⁡tr⁡(UσjU†E(σj)).\overline F(\mathcal E,U)=\frac12+\frac1{12}\sum_{j=1}^{3}\operatorname{Re}\operatorname{tr}(U\sigma_jU^\dagger\mathcal E(\sigma_j)).F(E,U)=21​+121​j=1∑3​Retr(Uσj​U†E(σj​)).

This specializes the general operator-basis formula to three nonidentity Pauli operators; trace preservation suffices.

Eq. (19): average gate fidelity from a preparable state operator basis

Let d>0d>0d>0, let E\mathcal EE be a completely positive trace-preserving map, and let UUU be a unitary target. Let (Uj)j=1d2(U_j)_{j=1}^{d^2}(Uj​)j=1d2​ be a complex operator basis of unitaries with tr⁡(Uj†Uk)=dδjk\operatorname{tr}(U_j^\dagger U_k)=d\delta_{jk}tr(Uj†​Uk​)=dδjk​. Let (ρk)k=1d2(\rho_k)_{k=1}^{d^2}(ρk​)k=1d2​ be a complex operator basis whose elements are density matrices. Define the unique complex coordinates αjk\alpha_{jk}αjk​ by Uj=∑kαjkρkU_j=\sum_k\alpha_{jk}\rho_kUj​=∑k​αjk​ρk​. Then

F‾(E,U)=∑j,kRe⁡ ⁣[αjktr⁡(UUj†U†E(ρk))]+d2d2(d+1).\overline F(\mathcal E,U)=\frac{\sum_{j,k}\operatorname{Re}\!\left[\alpha_{jk}\operatorname{tr}(U U_j^\dagger U^\dagger\mathcal E(\rho_k))\right]+d^2}{d^2(d+1)}.F(E,U)=d2(d+1)∑j,k​Re[αjk​tr(UUj†​U†E(ρk​))]+d2​.

This gives an exact algebraic determination from the outputs on the state basis. It asserts no finite-shot accuracy or sample-cost guarantee.

These additional statements have current no-edit source review. Their formal proofs remain open; deferred results are excluded.

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Distributionally Robust Inverse Covariance Estimation: The Wasserstein Shrinkage Estimator: Without Sparsity Information the Robust Estimator Is a Closed-Form Shrinkage of the Sample EigenvaluesResearch Paper

Motivation

The precision matrix X=Σ−1X=\Sigma^{-1}X=Σ−1 of a Gaussian random vector ξ∈Rp\xi\in\mathbb R^pξ∈Rp encodes its conditional independence structure: Xij=0X_{ij}=0Xij​=0 exactly when ξi\xi_iξi​ and ξj\xi_jξj​ are independent given the other coordinates. Estimating it is a basic step in Gaussian graphical models, portfolio selection and linear discriminant analysis. The textbook estimator, the inverse of the sample covariance matrix Σ^\widehat\SigmaΣ, fails when the number nnn of samples is smaller than the dimension ppp: then Σ^\widehat\SigmaΣ is singular and the maximum likelihood problem min⁡X≻0{−log⁡det⁡X+⟨Σ^,X⟩}\min_{X\succ0}\{-\log\det X+\langle\widehat\Sigma,X\rangle\}minX≻0​{−logdetX+⟨Σ,X⟩} has no solution. Even for n>pn>pn>p the inverse sample covariance is badly conditioned.

Nguyen, Kuhn and Mohajerin Esfahani (arXiv:1805.07194, Operations Research 2022) replace the nominal distribution N(0,Σ^)\mathcal N(0,\widehat\Sigma)N(0,Σ) in the likelihood by the worst case over all normal distributions within a type-2 Wasserstein distance ρ\rhoρ of it, and show that the resulting robust problem has a closed-form solution. The solution keeps the eigenvectors of Σ^\widehat\SigmaΣ and maps its eigenvalues through an explicit nonlinear shrinkage, and it is invertible for every sample size. Shrinkage estimators of this kind had been proposed earlier for statistical reasons (Ledoit and Wolf, doi:10.1016/S0047-259X(03)00096-4); here the shrinkage follows from the robust model rather than being imposed.

Setting

Fix a dimension p≥1p\ge1p≥1. Write S+p\mathbb S^p_+S+p​ and S++p\mathbb S^p_{++}S++p​ for the positive semidefinite and positive definite symmetric p×pp\times pp×p matrices, and ⟨A,B⟩=Tr⁡[A⊤B]\langle A,B\rangle=\operatorname{Tr}[A^\top B]⟨A,B⟩=Tr[A⊤B] for the trace inner product. For distributions P1,P2\mathbb P_1,\mathbb P_2P1​,P2​ on Rp\mathbb R^pRp the type-2 Wasserstein distance is

W(P1,P2)=inf⁡Π(∫∥ξ1−ξ2∥2 Π(dξ1,dξ2))1/2,\mathbb W(\mathbb P_1,\mathbb P_2)=\inf_\Pi\Big(\int\|\xi_1-\xi_2\|^2\,\Pi(d\xi_1,d\xi_2)\Big)^{1/2},W(P1​,P2​)=Πinf​(∫∥ξ1​−ξ2​∥2Π(dξ1​,dξ2​))1/2,

the infimum over couplings Π\PiΠ with marginals P1\mathbb P_1P1​, P2\mathbb P_2P2​ (Definition 1.1).

Given a sample covariance matrix Σ^∈S+p\widehat\Sigma\in\mathbb S^p_+Σ∈S+p​ (possibly singular) and a radius ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0, the ambiguity set is

Pρ0={Q=N(0,S): S∈S+p, W(Q,N(0,Σ^))≤ρ},\mathcal P^0_\rho=\big\{\mathbb Q=\mathcal N(0,S):\ S\in\mathbb S^p_+,\ \mathbb W(\mathbb Q,\mathcal N(0,\widehat\Sigma))\le\rho\big\},Pρ0​={Q=N(0,S): S∈S+p​, W(Q,N(0,Σ))≤ρ},

the centred normal distributions, degenerate ones included, within distance ρ\rhoρ of the nominal one. The worst-case expectation is g(Σ^,X)=sup⁡Q∈Pρ0EQ[⟨ξξ⊤,X⟩]g(\widehat\Sigma,X)=\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathcal P^0_\rho}\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}[\langle\xi\xi^\top,X\rangle]g(Σ,X)=supQ∈Pρ0​​EQ[⟨ξξ⊤,X⟩] (7), and the robust estimation problem (5) is

J(Σ^)=inf⁡X∈X{−log⁡det⁡X+g(Σ^,X)},\mathcal J(\widehat\Sigma)=\inf_{X\in\mathcal X}\Big\{-\log\det X+g(\widehat\Sigma,X)\Big\},J(Σ)=X∈Xinf​{−logdetX+g(Σ,X)},

where X⊆S++p\mathcal X\subseteq\mathbb S^p_{++}X⊆S++p​ is the set of admissible precision matrices; without structural information X=S++p\mathcal X=\mathbb S^p_{++}X=S++p​.

The paper reformulates (5) through the metric WS(Σ1,Σ2)=Tr⁡[Σ1]+Tr⁡[Σ2]−2Tr⁡[Σ2Σ1Σ2]\mathbb W_S(\Sigma_1,\Sigma_2)=\sqrt{\operatorname{Tr}[\Sigma_1]+\operatorname{Tr}[\Sigma_2]-2\operatorname{Tr}[\sqrt{\sqrt{\Sigma_2}\Sigma_1\sqrt{\Sigma_2}}]}WS​(Σ1​,Σ2​)=Tr[Σ1​]+Tr[Σ2​]−2Tr[Σ2​​Σ1​Σ2​​​]​ on S+p\mathbb S^p_+S+p​ (Definition 2.3), the scalar program (8)

inf⁡γ: γI≻X γ(ρ2−Tr⁡[Σ^])+γ2⟨(γI−X)−1,Σ^⟩,\inf_{\gamma:\ \gamma I\succ X}\ \gamma\big(\rho^2-\operatorname{Tr}[\widehat\Sigma]\big)+\gamma^2\big\langle(\gamma I-X)^{-1},\widehat\Sigma\big\rangle,γ: γI≻Xinf​ γ(ρ2−Tr[Σ])+γ2⟨(γI−X)−1,Σ⟩,

and the joint convex program (6), which minimizes −log⁡det⁡X-\log\det X−logdetX plus the objective of (8) over γI≻X≻0\gamma I\succ X\succ0γI≻X≻0, X∈XX\in\mathcal XX∈X.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1 (p. 12)

Let ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0, X=S++p\mathcal X=\mathbb S^p_{++}X=S++p​, and Σ^=∑i=1pλivivi⊤\widehat\Sigma=\sum_{i=1}^p\lambda_iv_iv_i^\topΣ=∑i=1p​λi​vi​vi⊤​ with orthonormal viv_ivi​. Then the equation

(ρ2−12∑i=1pλi)γ−p+12∑i=1pλi2γ2+4λiγ=0(16b)\Big(\rho^2-\tfrac12\sum_{i=1}^p\lambda_i\Big)\gamma-p+\tfrac12\sum_{i=1}^p\sqrt{\lambda_i^2\gamma^2+4\lambda_i\gamma}=0\tag{16b}(ρ2−21​i=1∑p​λi​)γ−p+21​i=1∑p​λi2​γ2+4λi​γ​=0(16b)

has a unique positive solution γ⋆\gamma^\starγ⋆, and the unique minimizer of (5) is

X⋆=∑i=1pxi⋆vivi⊤,xi⋆=γ⋆[1−12(λi2(γ⋆)2+4λiγ⋆−λiγ⋆)].(16a)X^\star=\sum_{i=1}^px^\star_iv_iv_i^\top,\qquad x^\star_i=\gamma^\star\Big[1-\tfrac12\Big(\sqrt{\lambda_i^2(\gamma^\star)^2+4\lambda_i\gamma^\star}-\lambda_i\gamma^\star\Big)\Big].\tag{16a}X⋆=i=1∑p​xi⋆​vi​vi⊤​,xi⋆​=γ⋆[1−21​(λi2​(γ⋆)2+4λi​γ⋆​−λi​γ⋆)].(16a)

Milestones

  1. The worst case over Pρ0\mathcal P^0_\rhoPρ0​ equals sup⁡{⟨S,X⟩:S∈S+p, WS(S,Σ^)≤ρ}\sup\{\langle S,X\rangle: S\in\mathbb S^p_+,\ \mathbb W_S(S,\widehat\Sigma)\le\rho\}sup{⟨S,X⟩:S∈S+p​, WS​(S,Σ)≤ρ} (proof of Proposition 2.8, p. 8).
  2. Lemma 2.7 (p. 7): partial infima of functions continuous in ε\varepsilonε are upper semicontinuous; under uniform calmness from below they are lower semicontinuous.
  3. Proposition 2.8 (p. 7): for Σ^⪰0\widehat\Sigma\succeq0Σ⪰0, X≻0X\succ0X≻0, g(Σ^,X)g(\widehat\Sigma,X)g(Σ,X) equals the value of (8), and ggg is continuous on S+p×S++p\mathbb S^p_+\times\mathbb S^p_{++}S+p​×S++p​.
  4. Theorem 2.6 (p. 7): for every X⊆S++p\mathcal X\subseteq\mathbb S^p_{++}X⊆S++p​, J(Σ^)\mathcal J(\widehat\Sigma)J(Σ) equals the value of (6), and J\mathcal JJ is continuous on S+p\mathbb S^p_+S+p​.
  5. Equation (16b) has a unique root in [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), and it is positive (p. 12).
  6. Identity (17), (γ⋆)2xi⋆λi=(γ⋆−xi⋆)2(\gamma^\star)^2x^\star_i\lambda_i=(\gamma^\star-x^\star_i)^2(γ⋆)2xi⋆​λi​=(γ⋆−xi⋆​)2 (p. 12), and ρ2(γ⋆)2=∑ixi⋆\rho^2(\gamma^\star)^2=\sum_ix^\star_iρ2(γ⋆)2=∑i​xi⋆​ (p. 13).
  7. For Σ^≻0\widehat\Sigma\succ0Σ≻0, (X⋆,γ⋆)(X^\star,\gamma^\star)(X⋆,γ⋆) is feasible and optimal in (6) (p. 12).

Significance

The result. Theorem 3.1 gives the robust estimator in closed form up to an eigendecomposition and a scalar root, so it costs no more than the sample covariance itself. It shows that the estimator commutes with Σ^\widehat\SigmaΣ, is positive definite for every ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0 even when Σ^\widehat\SigmaΣ is singular, and depends on the data only through the eigenvalues; the paper's later sensitivity results (Proposition 3.5) and the numerical comparisons with Ledoit–Wolf shrinkage and the graphical lasso rest on this formula. Theorem 2.6 shows more generally, for sparsity-constrained X\mathcal XX, that the robust problem is a convex program although the ambiguity set is not convex.

Formalizing it. The results are proved on paper; none is machine-checked. The formalization exercises a measure-level definition of the robust problem, with the ambiguity set defined through the coupling Wasserstein distance, and connects it to matrix analysis: the Gelbrich formula for Gaussians, a semidefinite duality, continuity of optimal value functions, and a first-order optimality argument for a matrix-fractional objective. Each milestone is reusable for other Gaussian–Wasserstein robust models, of which the platform already has several (Kalman filtering, minimax mean-square-error estimation).

Difficulty

The obvious argument is to plug X⋆X^\starX⋆ into the first-order conditions of (6). This works only when Σ^≻0\widehat\Sigma\succ0Σ≻0: for singular Σ^\widehat\SigmaΣ, every zero eigenvalue gives xi⋆=γ⋆x^\star_i=\gamma^\starxi⋆​=γ⋆, so γ⋆I−X⋆\gamma^\star I-X^\starγ⋆I−X⋆ is singular and (X⋆,γ⋆)(X^\star,\gamma^\star)(X⋆,γ⋆) is not even feasible in (6). The singular case, which is the case of interest (p>np>np>n), therefore needs continuity of the optimal value J\mathcal JJ and of the worst-case expectation ggg in Σ^\widehat\SigmaΣ, which is the content of Theorem 2.6 and Proposition 2.8. Those in turn require the reduction from distributions to covariance matrices (the Gelbrich formula, which holds for degenerate normals and is an optimal-transport theorem in its own right), a Lagrangian duality with a Lyapunov-equation inner problem, and a priori eigenvalue bounds on near-optimal XXX that vary continuously with Σ^\widehat\SigmaΣ. Sufficiency of the first-order conditions also needs joint convexity of γ2⟨(γI−X)−1,Σ^⟩\gamma^2\langle(\gamma I-X)^{-1},\widehat\Sigma\rangleγ2⟨(γI−X)−1,Σ⟩, which the paper cites.

Formalization scope

Rp\mathbb R^pRp is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin p) and matrices are Matrix (Fin p) (Fin p) ℝ with the entrywise topology. N(0,S)\mathcal N(0,S)N(0,S) is Mathlib's multivariateGaussian 0 S, which allows singular SSS. The Wasserstein distance is the published coupling distance WassersteinDRO.Gelbrich.wassersteinDistance 2, valued in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; the radius enters through ENNReal.ofReal ρ. The square root is the published psdSqrt, and ⟨⋅,⋅⟩\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle⟨⋅,⋅⟩ the published WassMMSE.Sandwich.frob. The worst-case expectation, J\mathcal JJ, and the values of (6) and (8) are suprema and infima in EReal. Every distribution in Pρ0\mathcal P^0_\rhoPρ0​ is Gaussian, so the integrand ⟨ξξ⊤,X⟩\langle\xi\xi^\top,X\rangle⟨ξξ⊤,X⟩ is integrable. Every matrix inverse sits under the constraint γI≻X\gamma I\succ XγI≻X inside the infimum. "Unique minimizer" is stated as IsMinOn over all positive definite XXX together with equality of every positive definite minimizer to X⋆X^\starX⋆. The eigendecomposition is an arbitrary orthonormal one, not a basis chosen by the library.

One hypothesis is added: p≥1p\ge1p≥1, because for p=0p=0p=0 (16b) has no positive solution. Definition 2.1 prints the normal density without the factor 12\tfrac1221​ in the exponent; the standard normal distribution is used.

The goal is stated for the measure-level problem (5). Stating it on the matrix program (6) would be a different and, for singular Σ^\widehat\SigmaΣ, false theorem. Replacing Pρ0\mathcal P^0_\rhoPρ0​ by the covariance ball or by all distributions, or computing suprema as real sSup (which returns 000 on unbounded sets), would trivialize or change the statement.

The mission concerns the zero-mean problem (5) with X=S++p\mathcal X=\mathbb S^p_{++}X=S++p​ for the goal; Theorem 2.6 is posed for general X⊆S++p\mathcal X\subseteq\mathbb S^p_{++}X⊆S++p​. Out of scope: Theorem 2.10 (the unknown-mean problem (4)), Corollary 2.9, Lemma 3.3, Proposition 3.5, the algorithm of §4, the extremal distributions of §5 (Theorem 5.1) and the experiments of §6. The Gelbrich formula (Proposition 2.2) is not posed here; it is Open on the platform as WassKF.Reform.proposition_2_2. The Open theorem WassMMSE.Sandwich.proposition_A_4_i, a covariance-level duality behind Proposition 2.8, is included for reuse. Welcome contributions: the Gelbrich formula for possibly degenerate centred normals, second moments of multivariateGaussian, continuity of optimal value functions (Berge's maximum theorem), and convexity of the matrix-fractional function.

Selected references

  • V. A. Nguyen, D. Kuhn, P. Mohajerin Esfahani, Distributionally Robust Inverse Covariance Estimation: The Wasserstein Shrinkage Estimator, Operations Research 70(1), 2022; read as arXiv:1805.07194v1, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.07194
  • C. R. Givens, R. M. Shortt, A class of Wasserstein metrics for probability distributions, Michigan Mathematical Journal 31(2), 1984. https://doi.org/10.1307/mmj/1029003026
  • O. Ledoit, M. Wolf, A well-conditioned estimator for large-dimensional covariance matrices, Journal of Multivariate Analysis 88(2), 2004. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-259X(03)00096-4
  • S. Boyd, L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization, Cambridge University Press, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804441
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Dynamic Incentive-Aware Learning: Robust Pricing in Contextual Auctions: Against Utility-Maximizing Buyers the CORP Policy Has Regret O(Nd(log(Td) log T + log²T / log²(1/γ)))Research Paper

Motivation

Display advertising is sold one impression at a time, mostly through second-price auctions with reserve prices. A reserve tailored to each buyer and to the features of the impression can raise the seller's revenue considerably, but the right reserve depends on the buyers' valuations, which the seller does not know and must learn from past auctions. The buyers participate in the same exchange day after day and know that their bids feed the seller's learning, so a patient buyer may bid untruthfully today to obtain lower reserves tomorrow. Learning reserve prices from strategic buyers is therefore a joint problem of statistics and incentives.

Golrezaei, Javanmard and Mirrokni (arXiv:2002.11137, Operations Research 69(1), 2021) study this problem in a contextual model and propose the policy CORP (Contextual Robust Pricing). Earlier work on learning against strategic buyers considered a single buyer facing posted prices, without contexts: Amin, Rostamizadeh and Syed (NeurIPS 2013) introduced the discounted strategic buyer, and contextual and revenue-optimization variants followed (Amin, Rostamizadeh and Syed, NeurIPS 2014; Mohri and Muñoz Medina, NeurIPS 2015). Personalized reserves in second-price auctions were studied by Paes Leme, Pál and Vassilvitskii (2016). The present paper treats many buyers, personalized reserves, contexts in Rd\mathbb R^dRd and censored observations (the seller sees who won, not the valuations).

Setting

In every period t=1,2,…t=1,2,\dotst=1,2,… the seller observes a feature vector xt∈Rdx_t\in\mathbb R^dxt​∈Rd, drawn i.i.d. from a law D\mathcal DD supported in the unit ball. Each of NNN buyers has the valuation

vit=⟨xt,βi⟩+zit,v_{it}=\langle x_t,\beta_i\rangle+z_{it},vit​=⟨xt​,βi​⟩+zit​,

where βi∈Rd\beta_i\in\mathbb R^dβi​∈Rd is an unknown preference vector with ∥βi∥≤Bp\|\beta_i\|\le B_p∥βi​∥≤Bp​ and the noises zitz_{it}zit​ are i.i.d. with a known density fff on [−Bn,Bn][-B_n,B_n][−Bn​,Bn​], mean zero, and distribution function FFF. Assumption 1 asks FFF and 1−F1-F1−F to be log-concave on [−Bn,Bn][-B_n,B_n][−Bn​,Bn​].

Each period runs a lazy second-price auction with personalized reserves ritr_{it}rit​: the highest bidder i⋆i^\stari⋆ gets the item if bi⋆t≥ri⋆tb_{i^\star t}\ge r_{i^\star t}bi⋆t​≥ri⋆t​ and pays max⁡{ri⋆t,max⁡j≠i⋆bjt}\max\{r_{i^\star t},\max_{j\neq i^\star}b_{jt}\}max{ri⋆t​,maxj=i⋆​bjt​}; nobody else pays. The benchmark knows the βi\beta_iβi​ and sets ri⋆(x)=arg⁡max⁡yy (1−F(y−⟨x,βi⟩))r^\star_i(x)=\arg\max_y y\,(1-F(y-\langle x,\beta_i\rangle))ri⋆​(x)=argmaxy​y(1−F(y−⟨x,βi​⟩)) (4); its expected revenue against truthful buyers is revt⋆\mathrm{rev}^\star_trevt⋆​ (5).

CORP works in episodes Ek={ℓk,…,ℓk+1−1}E_k=\{\ell_k,\dots,\ell_{k+1}-1\}Ek​={ℓk​,…,ℓk+1​−1} with ℓk=2k−1\ell_k=2^{k-1}ℓk​=2k−1. At the start of episode kkk it computes, for each buyer, a maximum-likelihood estimate β^ik\hat\beta_{ik}β^​ik​ over ∥β∥≤Bp\|\beta\|\le B_p∥β∥≤Bp​ from the censored outcomes of episode k−1k-1k−1 (8)–(9). In each period of episode kkk, with probability 1/ℓk1/\ell_k1/ℓk​ it explores: one uniformly chosen buyer is offered the item at a price uniform on [0,Bp+Bn][0,B_p+B_n][0,Bp​+Bn​]. Otherwise it exploits with reserves rit=arg⁡max⁡yy (1−F(y−⟨xt,β^ik⟩))r_{it}=\arg\max_y y\,(1-F(y-\langle x_t,\hat\beta_{ik}\rangle))rit​=argmaxy​y(1−F(y−⟨xt​,β^​ik​⟩)) (10).

Buyer iii's bid may depend on his own history of valuations, bids, allocations and payments, on xtx_txt​, on vitv_{it}vit​ and on private randomness. His utility is ∑tγt E[vitqit−pit]\sum_t\gamma^t\,\mathbb E[v_{it}q_{it}-p_{it}]∑t​γtE[vit​qit​−pit​] with a discount factor γ∈(0,1)\gamma\in(0,1)γ∈(0,1), and buyers are utility-maximizing. The regret after TTT periods is ∑t=1T(revt⋆−revt)\sum_{t=1}^T(\mathrm{rev}^\star_t-\mathrm{rev}_t)∑t=1T​(revt⋆​−revt​), worst case over β\betaβ and D\mathcal DD (7).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.1 (p. 23)

There is CCC, depending only on Bp,Bn,M,f,cmin⁡,cmax⁡B_p,B_n,M,f,c_{\min},c_{\max}Bp​,Bn​,M,f,cmin​,cmax​, such that for all N,d≥1N,d\ge1N,d≥1, T≥2T\ge2T≥2, γ∈(0,1)\gamma\in(0,1)γ∈(0,1), all admissible D,β\mathcal D,\betaD,β and all utility-maximizing buyers,

Regret(T)≤C Nd(log⁡(Td)log⁡T+log⁡2Tlog⁡2(1/γ)).\mathrm{Regret}(T)\le C\,N d\Big(\log(Td)\log T+\frac{\log^2T}{\log^2(1/\gamma)}\Big).Regret(T)≤CNd(log(Td)logT+log2(1/γ)log2T​).

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  • Proposition 3.1 (p. 15): the reserves (4) are revenue-optimal against truthful buyers.
  • Lemma 1 (p. 56): the conditional revenue WitW_{it}Wit​ is flat at rit⋆r^\star_{it}rit⋆​ and has a bounded second derivative.
  • Lemma 2 (p. 56): ∣rit⋆−rit∣≤∣⟨xt,βi−β^ik⟩∣|r^\star_{it}-r_{it}|\le|\langle x_t,\beta_i-\hat\beta_{ik}\rangle|∣rit⋆​−rit​∣≤∣⟨xt​,βi​−β^​ik​⟩∣.
  • Lemma 3 (p. 57): the second-highest bid and the competing bid move by at most the shading and overbidding.
  • Proposition 9.2 (p. 53): per episode, a utility-maximizing buyer lies O(log⁡(ℓ/δ)+log⁡(ℓN)/log⁡(1/γ))O(\log(\ell/\delta)+\log(\ell N)/\log(1/\gamma))O(log(ℓ/δ)+log(ℓN)/log(1/γ)) times, and his total shading and overbidding are O(log⁡(ℓN)/log⁡(1/γ))O(\log(\ell N)/\log(1/\gamma))O(log(ℓN)/log(1/γ)), with high probability.
  • Corollary 18.2 (p. 88): the vector Freedman inequality.

Significance

If true, Theorem 4.1 says that a seller can learn personalized, contextual reserves from censored data at a cost logarithmic in TTT and linear in NdNdNd, even when buyers manipulate their bids. The strategic term vanishes as buyers become impatient. The episodic delay between a bid and its effect on reserves, together with the random exploration prices, is what makes untruthful bidding unprofitable. The lemmas are of independent use. Proposition 3.1 and Lemma 2 concern the monopoly price under log-concave noise. Lemma 3 is a deterministic fact about second-price auctions. Corollary 18.2 is a vector concentration inequality.

Status. None of these results is machine-checked anywhere known to us. The paper's printed proof has gaps. Proposition 9.1 (p. 52), which bounds the estimation error of the MLE by the number of lies, fails as printed. With uniform noise a single lie per episode keeps the estimate a constant distance from βi\beta_iβi​. Its supporting Lemma 5 uses a constant uFu_FuF​ that is infinite for every compactly supported FFF (p. 71). Its curvature bound (89) also fails when a likelihood term leaves the support of fff. Lemma 6 (p. 76) conditions on an event the exploration lottery itself moves. A proof of Theorem 4.1, or a counterexample to it, would settle the question. The goal is stated as the paper states it, and is neither asserted nor denied here.

Difficulty

The natural route is the paper's. First bound the estimation error of the censored MLE in terms of the number of lies. Then bound the number of lies by comparing a lie's discounted future gain with its immediate loss under the exploration lottery. Finally sum over episodes.

The first step is where it breaks. With noise supported on [−Bn,Bn][-B_n,B_n][−Bn​,Bn​], an observation whose threshold falls outside the support carries no curvature. Its likelihood term is constant or +∞+\infty+∞, so the minimizer of (9) is in general a set, not a point. A minimizer at the wrong end of that set can keep the reserve below the benchmark for many episodes, even with truthful buyers. Any proof must say which minimizer CORP takes, or show that all of them work. The second step must handle buyers who react to one another through their histories; the paper's proof holds the other buyers' bids fixed. The concentration steps need a vector martingale inequality and a covariance concentration bound, neither of which is in Mathlib.

Formalization scope

Lean represents features as EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) and buyers as Fin N. Periods are indexed from 000 internally (Lean's nnn is the paper's t=n+1t=n+1t=n+1), and episodes likewise (Lean's eee is the paper's k=e+1k=e+1k=e+1, so ℓk=2e\ell_k=2^eℓk​=2e). Period 111 always explores. The per-period randomness consists of the features, the noises, the exploration coin, the chosen buyer, the exploration price and the buyers' seeds. It is independent across periods, under Measure.infinitePi, and the play is defined by recursion over periods. The likelihood (9) takes values in [0,+∞][0,+\infty][0,+∞] with −log⁡0=+∞-\log 0=+\infty−log0=+∞; a real-valued Real.log would make impossible observations free and change the estimator. The estimator (8) and the reserve rule (10) are arbitrary measurable selections of the argmin and argmax, quantified universally. No tie-break or uniqueness is added. The same reserve rule defines the benchmark (4).

Standing assumptions and added hypotheses.

  • The noise density is continuous on [−Bn,Bn][-B_n,B_n][−Bn​,Bn​], with mass one and mean zero, and Assumption 1 holds.
  • ∥x∥≤1\|x\|\le1∥x∥≤1 almost surely, and cmin⁡/d ∥u∥2<E⟨x,u⟩2≤cmax⁡/d ∥u∥2c_{\min}/d\,\|u\|^2<\mathbb E\langle x,u\rangle^2\le c_{\max}/d\,\|u\|^2cmin​/d∥u∥2<E⟨x,u⟩2≤cmax​/d∥u∥2; the proof uses these eigenvalue bounds (pp. 57, 72–73).
  • Bids are at most MMM (p. 14) and pairwise distinct almost surely (p. 20).
  • Strategies and selections are measurable, N,d≥1N,d\ge1N,d≥1 and T≥2T\ge2T≥2.
  • Utility-maximizing is pinned as the inequality the proof uses on p. 77: no buyer gains by switching to truthful bidding from the start of any episode on. Every best-response profile satisfies it, and the all-truthful profile does too.
  • Exploration is a posted price to the chosen buyer.
  • Lemma 1 adds f∈C1(R)f\in C^1(\mathbb R)f∈C1(R), which its proof uses.
  • Lemma 2 adds that both indices exceed −Bn-B_n−Bn​; without that, the argmax is unbounded.
  • Lemma 3's (45) adds that another buyer wins; as printed it fails when nobody wins.
  • Corollary 18.2 adds u0=0u_0=0u0​=0.

Ruled out. The constant CCC comes before every instance, horizon, selection and strategy, so a bound depending on TTT or on the instance does not count. The policy is CORP as defined, not any reserve-setting rule. The rationality hypothesis is satisfiable.

Infrastructure. A complete development needs the following.

  • Measurability of the recursive play.
  • The monopoly price under log-concavity (Proposition 3.1, Lemma 2).
  • Censored-likelihood estimation with compactly supported noise.
  • A vector Freedman inequality (Corollary 18.2, reusable).
  • Covariance concentration for bounded vectors.

Contributions on any milestone are welcome. So is a formal counterexample to the goal in the model as stated, for example with one truthful buyer, uniform noise and the smallest minimizer of (9).

Out of scope. CORP-II and SCORP (Theorems 5.1–5.3, Propositions 11.1–11.2) and the extensions of Appendix 8 are not part of this mission. Proposition 9.1, Lemma 5, Lemma 6 and Theorem 18.1 are not posed (see Significance).

Selected references

  • N. Golrezaei, A. Javanmard, V. Mirrokni, Dynamic Incentive-Aware Learning: Robust Pricing in Contextual Auctions, Operations Research 69(1), 2021; read as arXiv:2002.11137v1. https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.11137
  • K. Amin, A. Rostamizadeh, U. Syed, Learning Prices for Repeated Auctions with Strategic Buyers, NeurIPS 2013. https://papers.nips.cc/paper/2013/hash/1e6e0a04d20f50967c64dac2d639a577-Abstract.html
  • R. Paes Leme, M. Pál, S. Vassilvitskii, A Field Guide to Personalized Reserve Prices, WWW 2016. https://doi.org/10.1145/2872427.2883071
  • J. A. Tropp, Freedman's inequality for matrix martingales, Electronic Communications in Probability 16, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1214/ECP.v16-1624
  • R. B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
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Bandit AlgorithmsOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Bayesian Sequential Learning for Clinical Trials of Multiple Correlated Medical Interventions: The cPDE Allocation Policy Is Asymptotically ConsistentResearch Paper

Motivation

A clinical trial that compares several treatments for the same condition must decide, patient by patient, which treatment the next patient receives. When the treatments are related (doses of one drug, drugs of one class), an outcome observed on one arm is informative about the others, and a good allocation rule should exploit that correlation. Chick, Gans and Yapar (SSRN 3184758, version of August 31, 2020; later in Management Science) model this as Bayesian sequential sampling with a correlated Gaussian prior and propose the cPDE allocation policy, which samples the arm with the largest value of an adaptive-lookahead optimal-stopping index. Their one theorem, Theorem 1, says that cPDE is asymptotically consistent: run forever, it learns every arm's mean and identifies the best arm.

Consistency is the minimal guarantee asked of an allocation heuristic: a rule that can stop sampling an arm whose value is still uncertain may settle on the wrong treatment forever. The argument follows the consistency proof of Xie, Frazier and Chick (Operations Research 64(2):542–559, 2016; "XFC") for one-step knowledge-gradient (cKG) policies, extended to an index whose lookahead is itself an optimal stopping time.

Setting

There are M≥2M\ge2M≥2 arms. Arm iii has unknown mean θi\theta_iθi​; an observation of arm iii is Y∣θi∼N(θi,λi)Y\mid\theta_i\sim N(\theta_i,\lambda_i)Y∣θi​∼N(θi​,λi​) with known λi>0\lambda_i>0λi​>0, independent across observations. The prior is θ∼N(μ0,Σ0)\theta\sim N(\mu^0,\Sigma^0)θ∼N(μ0,Σ0) with Σ0\Sigma^0Σ0 positive definite, and sampling arm iii costs ci>0c_i>0ci​>0. After ttt observations the belief is (μt,Σt)(\mu^t,\Sigma^t)(μt,Σt); one observation yyy of arm iii updates it by Bayes' rule (8):

μ′=μ+y−μiλi+Σi,iΣei,Σ′=Σ−Σeiei⊤Σλi+Σi,i.\mu'=\mu+\frac{y-\mu_i}{\lambda_i+\Sigma_{i,i}}\Sigma e_i,\qquad \Sigma'=\Sigma-\frac{\Sigma e_ie_i^\top\Sigma}{\lambda_i+\Sigma_{i,i}}.μ′=μ+λi​+Σi,i​y−μi​​Σei​,Σ′=Σ−λi​+Σi,i​Σei​ei⊤​Σ​.

From a belief (μ,Σ)(\mu,\Sigma)(μ,Σ), imagine sampling arm iii alone. The predictive change Ziτ=μit+τ−μitZ^\tau_i=\mu^{t+\tau}_i-\mu^t_iZiτ​=μit+τ​−μit​ after τ\tauτ samples is a centred Gaussian with variance λiτ/(ni(ni+τ))\lambda_i\tau/(n_i(n_i+\tau))λi​τ/(ni​(ni​+τ)), ni=λi/Σi,in_i=\lambda_i/\Sigma_{i,i}ni​=λi​/Σi,i​ ((9)–(10)). The cPDE allocation index is (EC.8):

νi∗(μ,Σ)=sup⁡Ti≥1E[−Ti+1cimax⁡j{μj+Σi,jΣi,iZiTi}]−1cimax⁡jμj,\nu^*_i(\mu,\Sigma)=\sup_{T_i\ge1}\mathbb E\Big[-T_i+\frac1{c_i}\max_j\Big\{\mu_j+\frac{\Sigma_{i,j}}{\Sigma_{i,i}}Z^{T_i}_i\Big\}\Big]-\frac1{c_i}\max_j\mu_j,νi∗​(μ,Σ)=Ti​≥1sup​E[−Ti​+ci​1​jmax​{μj​+Σi,i​Σi,j​​ZiTi​​}]−ci​1​jmax​μj​,

the supremum over stopping times of the sampling of arm iii. The one-step index νicKG1\nu^{cKG_1}_iνicKG1​​ is the same expression with Ti≡1T_i\equiv1Ti​≡1 ((EC.6)). The cPDE policy allocates observation t+1t+1t+1 to an arm maximizing νi∗(μt,Σt)\nu^*_i(\mu^t,\Sigma^t)νi∗​(μt,Σt); the trial never stops.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 13)

For each arm iii, almost surely,

Σi,iT→0,νi∗(μT,ΣT)→−1,μiT→θi (also in L2),\Sigma^T_{i,i}\to0,\qquad \nu^*_i(\mu^T,\Sigma^T)\to-1,\qquad \mu^T_i\to\theta_i\ \text{(also in }L^2),Σi,iT​→0,νi∗​(μT,ΣT)→−1,μiT​→θi​ (also in L2),

and almost surely θ\thetaθ has a unique maximizer which, for all large TTT, is also the unique maximizer of μT\mu^TμT.

Milestones

  1. Prop. 3 (p. 12): ZiτZ^\tau_iZiτ​ is a uniformly integrable martingale and E[ZiT]=0\mathbb E[Z^{T}_i]=0E[ZiT​]=0 for a.s. finite stopping times.
  2. Lemma EC.1, first inequality (p. ec3): νicKG1≤νi∗\nu^{cKG_1}_i\le\nu^*_iνicKG1​​≤νi∗​.
  3. Lemma EC.3 (p. ec6): if lim inf⁡TνicKG1(μT,ΣT)=−1\liminf_T\nu^{cKG_1}_i(\mu^T,\Sigma^T)=-1liminfT​νicKG1​​(μT,ΣT)=−1 for all iii, then every Σi,iT→0\Sigma^T_{i,i}\to0Σi,iT​→0.
  4. Lemma EC.4 (p. ec7): an arm sampled infinitely often has Σi,iT→0\Sigma^T_{i,i}\to0Σi,iT​→0, and Σi,iT→0\Sigma^T_{i,i}\to0Σi,iT​→0 forces νi∗(μT,ΣT)→−1\nu^*_i(\mu^T,\Sigma^T)\to-1νi∗​(μT,ΣT)→−1.
  5. Lemma EC.5 (p. ec7): if lim inf⁡Tνi∗(μT,ΣT)=−1\liminf_T\nu^*_i(\mu^T,\Sigma^T)=-1liminfT​νi∗​(μT,ΣT)=−1 for all iii, then every Σi,iT→0\Sigma^T_{i,i}\to0Σi,iT​→0.

Significance

Theorem 1 is the only theoretical guarantee the paper gives for cPDE; the rest of the paper is computational (bounds, comparators, experiments). It also covers, through the same sandwich argument, the cheaper variants cPDELower and cPDEUpper (Corollary 1), which are not part of this mission. A consistent policy cannot lock onto a wrong treatment, which is the property a trial designer needs before comparing finite-horizon performance.

The result is proved on paper but has no machine-checked proof. Formalizing it requires a correlated-Gaussian Bayesian learning model, optimal stopping indices defined as suprema over stopping times, and the XFC consistency argument, none of which exist in Lean. The paper's proof also routes Lemma EC.4 through an upper bound that is false as printed (see below), so a checked proof replaces that step with a correct one.

Difficulty

The obvious route bounds νi∗\nu^*_iνi∗​ above by a one-step index with a fixed lookahead τˉ\bar\tauτˉ, as the paper's Lemma EC.1 does. That bound fails: τˉ\bar\tauτˉ of (EC.11) changes under a change of currency while every index is invariant. For M=2M=2M=2, μ=(0,10−3)\mu=(0,10^{-3})μ=(0,10−3), Σ=diag(10−6,10−6)\Sigma=\mathrm{diag}(10^{-6},10^{-6})Σ=diag(10−6,10−6), λ=(10−4,10−4)\lambda=(10^{-4},10^{-4})λ=(10−4,10−4), c=(10−7,10−7)c=(10^{-7},10^{-7})c=(10−7,10−7), the formula gives τˉ=1\bar\tau=1τˉ=1 and ν1cKG1:1≈−1\nu^{cKG_1:1}_1\approx-1ν1cKG1​:1​≈−1, while the lookahead T≡242T\equiv242T≡242 already yields a value above 240240240. Any upper bound on νi∗\nu^*_iνi∗​ must instead be uniform over stopping times of unbounded length, and showing that it tends to −1-1−1 needs (Σi,jT)2/Σi,iT→0(\Sigma^T_{i,j})^2/\Sigma^T_{i,i}\to0(Σi,jT​)2/Σi,iT​→0 along posterior covariances, not only Σi,iT→0\Sigma^T_{i,i}\to0Σi,iT​→0.

The second difficulty is the "finitely sampled arms" half of the argument (Lemmas EC.3, EC.5): an arm whose variance stays positive must keep a one-step value of sampling bounded away from zero, even while correlated arms are learned. This uses almost sure convergence of the posterior means and the structure of the piecewise linear terminal reward.

Formalization scope

Arms are Fin M (0-based) and time ttt counts observations, t=0t=0t=0 being the prior. The trial lives on the canonical space θ∈RM\theta\in\mathbb R^Mθ∈RM times an array of standard normal noises εi,k\varepsilon_{i,k}εi,k​, with law multivariateGaussian µ0 Σ0 times an infinite product of gaussianReal 0 1; the kkk-th sample of arm iii is θi+λi εi,k\theta_i+\sqrt{\lambda_i}\,\varepsilon_{i,k}θi​+λi​​εi,k​. The index νi∗\nu^*_iνi∗​ is built on its own auxiliary space (a prior draw of θi−μi\theta_i-\mu_iθi​−μi​ and i.i.d. noise), not as a conditional expectation on the trial space.

Committed conventions, each a disclosed reading of the page:

  • νi∗\nu^*_iνi∗​ is (EC.8). The printed definition (15) omits −1cimax⁡jμj-\frac1{c_i}\max_j\mu_j−ci​1​maxj​μj​; with (15) Theorem 1 ii) would be false.
  • The supremum in (EC.8) is a real sSup over stopping times of the auxiliary filtration with 1≤Ti≤N1\le T_i\le N1≤Ti​≤N for some NNN; this has the paper's value and keeps every expectation finite.
  • Ties in the cPDE argmax go to the least index (the paper: randomly). Every arm is eligible at every time (Mt=M\mathcal M_t=\mathcal MMt​=M), so Assumption 1 iii) is trivial.
  • Theorem 1 ii) and Lemmas EC.4–EC.5 are read with (μT,ΣT)(\mu^T,\Sigma^T)(μT,ΣT). Theorem 1 iv) is uniqueness of the maximizer of θ\thetaθ plus eventual agreement of the unique maximizer of μT\mu^TμT. The L2L^2L2 claim is MemLp plus eLpNorm → 0.
  • "liminf =−1=-1=−1" in Lemmas EC.3, EC.5 is "for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, the index is below −1+ε-1+\varepsilon−1+ε infinitely often"; since both indices are ≥−1\ge-1≥−1 this is the printed hypothesis. Lemma EC.4 is stated for every sample path.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: νi∗\nu^*_iνi∗​ is defined from (μ,Σ,λi,ci)(\mu,\Sigma,\lambda_i,c_i)(μ,Σ,λi​,ci​), not a parameter, a fixed-lookahead index or a supremum over non-adapted times; the policy is defined, not assumed; μt\mu^tμt and Σt\Sigma^tΣt both come from (8); the L2L^2L2 part does not use an integral that is 000 for non-integrable functions; iv) asserts uniqueness; and the false upper bound of Lemma EC.1 is not posed or used.

A complete development needs Gaussian conditioning for the update (8) (that μt=E[θ∣Ft]\mu^t=\mathbb E[\theta\mid\mathcal F_t]μt=E[θ∣Ft​]), the closed form Σt=(Σ0−1+diag(nkt/λk))−1\Sigma^t=(\Sigma_0^{-1}+\mathrm{diag}(n^t_k/\lambda_k))^{-1}Σt=(Σ0−1​+diag(nkt​/λk​))−1, optional stopping for uniformly integrable martingales, measurability of the index, and the XFC argument. The Gaussian-update and optional-stopping parts are reusable for other Bayesian ranking-and-selection results; contributions of those as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. E. Chick, N. Gans, Ö. Yapar, Bayesian Sequential Learning for Clinical Trials of Multiple Correlated Medical Interventions, SSRN 3184758 (INSEAD Working Paper 2020/40/TOM/ACGRE), version of August 31, 2020. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3184758
  • J. Xie, P. I. Frazier, S. E. Chick, Bayesian Optimization via Simulation with Pairwise Sampling and Correlated Prior Beliefs, Operations Research 64(2):542–559, 2016.
  • P. I. Frazier, W. B. Powell, S. Dayanik, The Knowledge-Gradient Policy for Correlated Normal Beliefs, INFORMS Journal on Computing 21(4):599–613, 2009.
  • S. E. Chick, P. I. Frazier, Sequential Sampling for Selection with Economics of Selection Procedures, Management Science 58(3):550–569, 2012.
  • D. Williams, Probability with Martingales, Cambridge University Press, 1991.
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Operations ResearchOptimizationStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Static Pricing: Universal Guarantees for Reusable Resources: Some Static Price Guarantees 15/19 of the Profit Rate, Market Share and Service Level of an Optimal Dynamic Pricing PolicyResearch Paper

Motivation

Many services rent out a fixed stock of units that come back after use: hotel rooms, rental cars, cloud servers, hospital beds, parking spaces. Such reusable resources differ from perishable inventory because a unit sold now returns to the stock later, so the provider's pricing problem is a queueing control problem rather than a stock-depletion problem. A provider can change its price with the number of free units (dynamic pricing), or post one price and keep it (static pricing). Static prices are simpler to run, and easier to explain to customers, but they forgo the gains of reacting to congestion. How much a single price can lose is the question.

For perishable inventory, Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) showed that under a concave revenue rate a static price loses a vanishing fraction in large systems and at most a fraction 1/e1/e1/e in every regime. For reusable resources the evidence for static pricing was numerical or asymptotic: Paschalidis and Tsitsiklis (2000) reported numerical results for multi-class systems, and Gans and Savin (2007) showed near-optimality of static pricing in rental systems whose offered load and capacity are both large. Besbes, Elmachtoub and Sun (arXiv:1905.00731) gave a guarantee that does not depend on the scale of the system: a constant fraction 15/19≈78.9%15/19 \approx 78.9\%15/19≈78.9% that holds for every capacity, service rate, demand curve and weighting of the provider's objectives.

Setting

A provider owns C≥1C \ge 1C≥1 identical units. Customers arrive as a Poisson process of rate Λ>0\Lambda > 0Λ>0, and at price ppp a customer buys with probability Fˉ(p)\bar F(p)Fˉ(p); the effective arrival rate is λ(p)=ΛFˉ(p)\lambda(p) = \Lambda \bar F(p)λ(p)=ΛFˉ(p). Prices and rates are in one-to-one correspondence, so the provider chooses a rate λ∈[0,Λ]\lambda \in [0,\Lambda]λ∈[0,Λ] and charges p(λ)p(\lambda)p(λ). A buyer holds one unit for an exponential time of mean 1/μ1/\mu1/μ, pays p(λ)p(\lambda)p(λ), and costs the provider c>0c > 0c>0. A customer who finds every unit busy is lost.

A stationary policy is a vector of rates λ1,…,λC∈[0,Λ]\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_C \in [0,\Lambda]λ1​,…,λC​∈[0,Λ], with λi\lambda_iλi​ used while iii units are free; a static policy uses one rate lll in every state. The number of free units is a birth–death process with steady-state probabilities

Pi(π)=C!(C−i)!∏j=i+1Cλjμ∑k=0CC!(C−k)!∏j=k+1Cλjμ,i=0,…,C.\mathbb P_i(\pi) = \frac{\frac{C!}{(C-i)!}\prod_{j=i+1}^{C}\frac{\lambda_j}{\mu}}{\sum_{k=0}^{C}\frac{C!}{(C-k)!}\prod_{j=k+1}^{C}\frac{\lambda_j}{\mu}}, \qquad i = 0, \dots, C .Pi​(π)=∑k=0C​(C−k)!C!​∏j=k+1C​μλj​​(C−i)!C!​∏j=i+1C​μλj​​​,i=0,…,C.

The profit rate, market share and service level of the policy are

Pπ=∑i=1Cλi(p(λi)−c) Pi(π),MSπ=∑i=1Cλi Pi(π),SLπ=1−P0(π),\mathcal P^\pi = \sum_{i=1}^{C}\lambda_i(p(\lambda_i)-c)\,\mathbb P_i(\pi),\qquad \mathcal{MS}^\pi = \sum_{i=1}^{C}\lambda_i\,\mathbb P_i(\pi),\qquad \mathcal{SL}^\pi = 1-\mathbb P_0(\pi),Pπ=i=1∑C​λi​(p(λi​)−c)Pi​(π),MSπ=i=1∑C​λi​Pi​(π),SLπ=1−P0​(π),

and the provider maximizes α1Pπ+α2MSπ+α3SLπ\alpha_1\mathcal P^\pi+\alpha_2\mathcal{MS}^\pi+\alpha_3\mathcal{SL}^\piα1​Pπ+α2​MSπ+α3​SLπ for weights αi≥0\alpha_i \ge 0αi​≥0 summing to 111. The instance class Ω\OmegaΩ requires the profit rate λ(p(λ)−c)\lambda(p(\lambda)-c)λ(p(λ)−c) to be concave in λ\lambdaλ.

For a policy λ\lambdaλ, the static rate λ~=∑i≥1λiPi/∑i≥1Pi\tilde\lambda = \sum_{i\ge1}\lambda_i\mathbb P_i/\sum_{i\ge1}\mathbb P_iλ~=∑i≥1​λi​Pi​/∑i≥1​Pi​ is its average rate over the states with a free unit. The proof works in the variables zi=∏j=iCλj/μz_i = \prod_{j=i}^{C}\lambda_j/\muzi​=∏j=iC​λj​/μ (with zC+1=1z_{C+1} = 1zC+1​=1), ai=C!/(C−i)!a_i = C!/(C-i)!ai​=C!/(C−i)!, x=∑k=1Cakzk+1x = \sum_{k=1}^{C}a_kz_{k+1}x=∑k=1C​ak​zk+1​ and y=∑k=2Cakzky = \sum_{k=2}^{C}a_kz_ky=∑k=2C​ak​zk​, in which the ratio of service levels of λ~\tilde\lambdaλ~ and λ\lambdaλ becomes a rational function R(z1,…,zC)R(z_1,\dots,z_C)R(z1​,…,zC​), and in a truncation R~≤R\tilde R \le RR~≤R used for C≥4C \ge 4C≥4.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 11)

For every instance of Ω\OmegaΩ and every optimal stationary policy π∗\pi^*π∗ there is a static rate l∈[0,Λ]l \in [0,\Lambda]l∈[0,Λ] with

MSl≥1519 MSπ∗,SLl≥1519 SLπ∗,Pl≥1519 Pπ∗  if Pπ∗≥0.\mathcal{MS}^{l} \ge \tfrac{15}{19}\,\mathcal{MS}^{\pi^*},\qquad \mathcal{SL}^{l} \ge \tfrac{15}{19}\,\mathcal{SL}^{\pi^*},\qquad \mathcal P^{l} \ge \tfrac{15}{19}\,\mathcal P^{\pi^*}\ \text{ if } \mathcal P^{\pi^*} \ge 0 .MSl≥1915​MSπ∗,SLl≥1915​SLπ∗,Pl≥1915​Pπ∗  if Pπ∗≥0.

One price serves all three objectives at once, whatever the weights.

Milestones

  • Lemma 1 (p. 11): optimal rates are non-decreasing in the number of free units on the states the optimal policy reaches, and λC∗\lambda^*_CλC∗​ is at most the myopic rate λˉ\bar\lambdaλˉ.
  • (11), (12) (pp. 12–13): for the static rate λ~\tilde\lambdaλ~ of any policy, the market-share ratio equals the service-level ratio and the profit ratio is at least it.
  • Step 2 (p. 13): the service-level ratio equals R(z1,…,zC)R(z_1,\dots,z_C)R(z1​,…,zC​).
  • Step 2a (p. 14): R≥4/5R \ge 4/5R≥4/5 for C=2C = 2C=2 and R≥15/19R \ge 15/19R≥15/19 for C=3C = 3C=3.
  • Step 2b (p. 14): R~≤R\tilde R \le RR~≤R for C≥4C \ge 4C≥4.
  • Lemmas 2–4 (p. 15): ∂R~/∂z1≥0\partial\tilde R/\partial z_1 \ge 0∂R~/∂z1​≥0 when y≥a1z1y \ge a_1z_1y≥a1​z1​; R~(0,z2,…,zC)≥104/131\tilde R(0,z_2,\dots,z_C) \ge 104/131R~(0,z2​,…,zC​)≥104/131; R~≥6/7\tilde R \ge 6/7R~≥6/7 when y≤a1z1y \le a_1z_1y≤a1​z1​.
  • Combination (p. 15): R≥R~≥min⁡{104/131,6/7}≥15/19R \ge \tilde R \ge \min\{104/131, 6/7\} \ge 15/19R≥R~≥min{104/131,6/7}≥15/19 for C≥4C \ge 4C≥4.

Significance

The theorem bounds the value of dynamic pricing for reusable resources by a universal constant: dynamic pricing can improve each objective by at most a factor 19/1519/1519/15, so a provider can adopt a single price at a known, bounded cost. Since the same price works for all weights, the optimal static price also earns at least 15/1915/1915/19 of the optimal weighted objective. Section 3.2 of the paper shows that the constructed static rate λ~\tilde\lambdaλ~ attains exactly 15/1915/1915/19 in a limit, so the analysis of that rate cannot be improved.

The result is proved in the paper (arXiv v3, 2020; Operations Research, 2022). No part of it has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing it checks a proof whose second half is a case analysis of high-degree rational functions spread over ten pages of an e-companion, and produces closed-form, reusable statements about the stationary distribution of finite birth–death chains with state-dependent rates.

Difficulty

Step 1 is algebra and one application of Jensen's inequality. The difficulty is in bounding RRR for every CCC. For C≤3C \le 3C≤3 the bound is coefficient matching between two explicit polynomials. For C≥4C \ge 4C≥4 the numerator and denominator of RRR have degree growing with CCC, and no term-by-term comparison works uniformly; the paper's lemmas each cover a regime of y/z1y/z_1y/z1​ and require bookkeeping that is uniform in CCC.

A second difficulty is Lemma 1. It is a statement about the average-reward optimal policy of a controlled birth–death chain, proved in the paper by value iteration. In the formal statement optimality is a maximization over the closed-form objective, so a proof must either develop the average-reward optimality equation for this chain or argue directly on the closed form. The goal itself quantifies over every optimal policy, including any that is not monotone; the paper's combination step assumes the monotone structure that Lemma 1 provides only on reached states, so a complete proof of the goal must handle this gap.

Formalization scope

The model is posed over stationary state-dependent pricing policies with the closed-form steady state of §2.3; the paper's reduction from general non-anticipating policies to stationary ones, and the long-run averages (1)–(2), are taken as the model and not re-proved. A policy is a function lam : ℕ → ℝ read at the states 1,…,C1,\dots,C1,…,C with rates in [0,Λ][0,\Lambda][0,Λ]; optimality is IsMaxOn of the weighted objective over this set, and existence of an optimal policy is not assumed. Standing assumptions (the structure Standing): C≥1C \ge 1C≥1; μ,Λ,c>0\mu,\Lambda,c > 0μ,Λ,c>0; αi≥0\alpha_i \ge 0αi​≥0 with α1+α2+α3=1\alpha_1+\alpha_2+\alpha_3 = 1α1​+α2​+α3​=1; λ(p(λ)−c)\lambda(p(\lambda)-c)λ(p(λ)−c) concave on [0,Λ][0,\Lambda][0,Λ]; ppp strictly decreasing on (0,Λ](0,\Lambda](0,Λ].

Added hypotheses, each disclosed in its item: Theorem 1's profit bound is conditional on Pπ∗≥0\mathcal P^{\pi^*} \ge 0Pπ∗≥0 (the profit ratio is meaningless otherwise); Lemma 1 assumes α1>0\alpha_1 > 0α1​>0 and strict concavity, and restricts monotonicity to states of positive probability (the printed version is false without these). Lemma 2 and the combination step are stated for every nonnegative zzz, as printed. Identities (11), (12) and the RRR identity are stated for every stationary policy, since their derivations use no optimality.

The objectives are the closed forms above, not free functions constrained by hypotheses; ratios are cross-multiplied so that no objective is divided by a possibly zero quantity; zC+1=1z_{C+1} = 1zC+1​=1 is built into the definitions so that RRR and R~\tilde RR~ never divide by zero for z≥0z \ge 0z≥0; the derivative in Lemma 2 is asserted with HasDerivAt, not deriv. Every constant (15/1915/1915/19, 4/54/54/5, 104/131104/131104/131, 6/76/76/7) appears as stated.

Needed beyond Mathlib's finite sums and products, Nat.descFactorial, ConcaveOn and HasDerivAt: nothing. Theorem 2 (the 95.5% guarantee for two units and linear demand), its Lemmas 5–6, the tightness example of §3.2 and the numerical experiments are out of scope. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative proofs of the bound on RRR, are welcome.

Selected references

  • O. Besbes, A. N. Elmachtoub, Y. Sun, Static Pricing: Universal Guarantees for Reusable Resources, arXiv:1905.00731v3, 2020; Operations Research, 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.00731
  • I. Ch. Paschalidis, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Congestion-dependent pricing of network services, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 8(2), 2000. https://doi.org/10.1109/90.842141
  • G. Gallego, G. van Ryzin, Optimal dynamic pricing of inventories with stochastic demand over finite horizons, Management Science 40(8), 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999
  • N. Gans, S. Savin, Pricing and capacity rationing for rentals with uncertain durations, Management Science 53(3) 390–407, 2007 (cited on p. 11 for the monotonicity of optimal prices in a discounted setting).
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Functional Analysis·Captain: Yuxuan Xu

Sharp diagonal Hlawka constant: formalize cutoff 21Research Paper

Motivation

A norm measures the size of a vector. The triangle inequality says that adding two vectors cannot increase their size beyond the sum of their sizes. The Hlawka constant problem asks for a quantitative comparison between the deficit in a three-vector triangle inequality and the sum of the deficits in the three two-vector inequalities. For operator norms, the comparison constant must work in every matrix dimension. Audenaert and Kittaneh state this question in Section 8.2, Problem 7 of Problems and Conjectures in Matrix and Operator Inequalities.

This mission concerns the diagonal, or commuting, case. For a complex diagonal matrix, its Schatten p-norm equals the coordinate p-norm of its diagonal. An exact answer in this setting identifies a concrete extremal family while preserving the requirement that the constant work in every finite dimension. It does not settle the sharp constant for arbitrary noncommuting matrices.

The foundation mission formalizes the cyclic formula for real exponents at least 256. The accepted cutoff-32 theorem, recorded on 16 October 2026, lowers that threshold. The present source is Yuxuan Xu's AI-assisted research preprint, which supplies a computer-assisted argument extending the formula to all real exponents at least 21. The preprint has not undergone independent analytic review. Its new interval has numerical verification reports but no Lean proof.

Setting

For a real exponent p greater than one and a finite complex vector x, define the coordinate p-norm by

Np(x)=(∑i∣xi∣p)1/p.N_p(x)=\left(\sum_i |x_i|^p\right)^{1/p}.Np​(x)=(i∑​∣xi​∣p)1/p.

For three vectors x, y, and z in the same dimension, set

S=Np(x)+Np(y)+Np(z),T=Np(x+y+z),S=N_p(x)+N_p(y)+N_p(z),\qquad T=N_p(x+y+z),S=Np​(x)+Np​(y)+Np​(z),T=Np​(x+y+z), P=Np(x+y)+Np(x+z)+Np(y+z),G=2S−P.P=N_p(x+y)+N_p(x+z)+N_p(y+z),\qquad G=2S-P.P=Np​(x+y)+Np​(x+z)+Np​(y+z),G=2S−P.

The quantity S minus T is the triple deficit. The quantity G is the sum of the three pair deficits and is nonnegative by the triangle inequality. A real number C is a uniform Hlawka constant when

S−T≤CGS-T\le C GS−T≤CG

for all triples and all finite complex dimensions. No equal-norm or nonzero-vector restriction is part of this property.

The candidate sharp constant is specified by an explicit scalar formula. For a real parameter t in the closed interval from one half to two, let

Ap(t)=(tp+2)1/p,Bp(t)=(2∣1−t∣p+2p)1/p,A_p(t)=(t^p+2)^{1/p},\qquad B_p(t)=(2|1-t|^p+2^p)^{1/p},Ap​(t)=(tp+2)1/p,Bp​(t)=(2∣1−t∣p+2p)1/p, Rp(t)=3Ap(t)−31/p∣2−t∣6Ap(t)−3Bp(t),Kp=sup⁡1/2≤t≤2Rp(t).R_p(t)=\frac{3A_p(t)-3^{1/p}|2-t|}{6A_p(t)-3B_p(t)},\qquad K_p=\sup_{1/2\le t\le2}R_p(t).Rp​(t)=6Ap​(t)−3Bp​(t)3Ap​(t)−31/p∣2−t∣​,Kp​=1/2≤t≤2sup​Rp​(t).

The ratio comes from the cyclic triple (-t,1,1), (1,-t,1), and (1,1,-t). In the exponent range of the mission its denominator is positive, and continuity makes the supremum an attained maximum. The mission imports the campaign's existing definitions of these quantities.

Formalization targets

The goal is Theorem 1.1 of the source preprint, in the campaign's exact statement format:

∀p∈R,21≤p ⟹ Kp=min⁡{C∈R: ∀n∈N, S−T≤CG on Cn}.\forall p\in\mathbb R,\quad 21\le p\ \Longrightarrow\ K_p=\min\{C\in\mathbb R:\ \forall n\in\mathbb N,\ S-T\le C G\text{ on }\mathbb C^n\}.∀p∈R,21≤p ⟹ Kp​=min{C∈R: ∀n∈N, S−T≤CG on Cn}.

Here the minimum notation includes both admissibility and leastness; existence of an admissible constant is part of the conclusion. The theorem does not assume that certificate validation, localization, or convexity already holds. It does not assert that 21 is the smallest possible exponent threshold.

Four supporting targets follow the source's two finite windows. Equation (7) and Table 1 give, on each full real interval, the scalar inequalities

cp<Kp≤p/2,Ep(q)<Kp,Ep(q)=1−q2(1−((1+qp)/2)1/p).cp<K_p\le p/2,\qquad E_p(q)<K_p,\qquad E_p(q)=\frac{1-q}{2\left(1-((1+q^p)/2)^{1/p}\right)}.cp<Kp​≤p/2,Ep​(q)<Kp​,Ep​(q)=2(1−((1+qp)/2)1/p)1−q​.

Window I is [21,26], with c=273/625 and q=1011/2500. Window II is [26,32], with c=443/1000 and q=197/500. Two further targets are the unconditional real three-dimensional Hlawka inequalities on these respective windows, as concluded in Section 7 of the source. The previously proved tail for p at least 32 is included as a referenced theorem, preserving its published identity and attribution.

Significance

The proposed result would extend the known formalized range of the exact diagonal constant from p at least 32 to p at least 21. It would give one constant simultaneously for all complex dimensions and for all real exponents in that range, rather than separate statements at selected integer exponents. The cyclic witnesses also explain the obstruction to decreasing the constant itself.

Formalizing this source means closing the gap between its analytic argument and its finite computations. The release replay report records exact rational linear-dual replay and directed interval checks. Those reports support the paper's computer-assisted claim; they are not kernel-checked proofs of the mission's open statements. A completed mission must establish those statements in the platform's ordinary proof system.

Difficulty

The least constant is defined through a special three-dimensional family, but admissibility quantifies over arbitrary triples in arbitrary dimensions. Unequal singleton norms and degenerate triples are included. Arguments that verify only the cyclic family establish a lower bound and leave the main admissibility assertion unresolved.

The source also requires inequalities uniform in a continuously varying real exponent. Pointwise numerical optimization and dense sampling cannot establish such interval statements. Its localized convexity estimates retain norm bounds and linear coordinate-sum constraints; each retained constraint must genuinely follow from the preceding localization argument, and the averaging domain must remain convex. In particular, retaining a norm-sum equality as if it defined a convex domain would not justify the required averaging step. These issues are part of the formalization target, not additional assumptions supplied to solvers.

Formalization scope

The environment is Mathlib commit 0df444a360eaa60ab8c11dca51a86af692955474, using Lean v4.33.1. The goal uses Fin n → ℂ, real p, the existing lpNorm, cyclicConstant, and HasHlawkaConstant, and IsLeast over real constants. Natural-number dimensions include zero. In dimension zero all coordinate norms vanish, so the inequality is harmless; triples containing zero vectors remain included in positive dimensions. All quantities must retain their foundation definitions.

The four new milestone declarations use the same scalar and coordinate definitions, including the existing scalarEnvelope. They introduce no replacement norm and no axiom saying that an external Python execution is correct. The source package contains exact certificates, two arithmetic implementations, and explicit remainder estimates for its rational interval backend. Those implementations share the mathematical model and are not independent end-to-end proofs. Independent analytic review remains pending.

Contributions may reuse the existing dimension reduction, complex transfer, cyclic sharpness, and cutoff-32 results when their hypotheses match the target range. Formalization of the new scalar bounds, exact linear-dual implications, interval arithmetic soundness, and real three-dimensional admissibility is welcome. Proof details and the proposed dependency order are available in the source paper and the milestone descriptions. The declarations uploaded with this proposal are statements to prove, with the standard by sorry placeholders; compiling them checks well-formedness only.

Selected references

  • Yuxuan Xu (徐宇轩), School of Computer Science, Wuhan University, A computer-assisted sharp diagonal Hlawka inequality for real exponents p ≥ 21, research preprint, v1 (2026). PDF, LaTeX, certificates and code. AI assistance is disclosed in the paper.
  • K. M. R. Audenaert and F. Kittaneh, Problems and Conjectures in Matrix and Operator Inequalities, arXiv:1201.5232v3 (2012), Section 8.2, Problem 7. Source.
  • D.-Ş. Marinescu and C. P. Niculescu, A survey of the Hornich–Hlawka inequality, arXiv:2407.03278 (2024). Source.
  • Ezzeri Esa / savarin and contributors, Dimension-independent Hlawka constants for Schatten norms, Lean source repository (2026). Repository.
  • Prove2Me contributors, including @bwdaugherty, Sharp diagonal Hlawka constant: cutoff 32 (2026). Accepted theorem, campaign. Exact source identifiers and hashes are preserved in the paper repository's provenance record.
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CombinatoricsGraph Theory·Captain: marwahaha

Sands–Sauer–Woodrow: monochromatic paths in two-coloured tournamentsResearch Paper

Motivation

A tournament is a directed graph in which every two distinct vertices are joined by exactly one arc — the model of a round-robin competition, and the setting of Ramsey theory's oldest questions.

In 1982 Sands, Sauer and Woodrow asked: if the arcs of a tournament are coloured with two colours, must some vertex be reachable from every other vertex along a monochromatic path, one whose arcs all carry the same colour? They answered yes [SSW82, Corollary 2, p. 273], through a theorem on arbitrary digraphs [SSW82, Theorem 1, pp. 271–273]. That theorem is also the two-colour case of kernel theory: kernels are independent dominating sets, they exist in digraphs whose arcs split into two transitive classes, and the stable-marriage theorem is a special case [Ch26, §1].

The tournament statement is the settled case of a question of Erdős that remains open: with three colours, must either a rainbow directed triangle occur, or a vertex reach every other vertex monochromatically [SSW82, PROBLEM, p. 275]? The platform already carries that open problem as the mission "Monochromatic reachability or rainbow triangles" (OPG1808.root_problem). This mission is the two-colour theory beside it, not a duplicate: it collects the results that are known and that any attack on the three-colour question builds on.

Timeline. Sands–Sauer–Woodrow (1982) prove Theorem 1, deduce the two-colour tournament statement, exhibit a three-coloured tournament with no vertex reaching all others, and ask whether three colours force a rainbow triangle or such a vertex [SSW82]. Shen Minggang (1988) proves the theorem for any number of colours when no triangle carries three distinct colours [Mi88]. Galeana-Sánchez and Rojas-Monroy (2005) give a six-vertex four-coloured tournament with neither, so three colours is the last case of the rainbow formulation [GR05]. Bousquet, Lochet and Thomassé (2017) show that a k-coloured tournament has a dominating set of size O(ln⁡2k⋅kk+2)O(\ln 2k \cdot k^{k+2})O(ln2k⋅kk+2) built from monochromatic paths — bounded, but not the single vertex of the two-colour case [BLT17]. Chancelier (2026) gives the first machine-checked proof of the general theorem, in Rocq, and records that no Lean formalization exists [Ch26].

Setting

Fix a vertex type VVV. A digraph is a relation D:V→V→PropD : V \to V \to \mathrm{Prop}D:V→V→Prop, written x→yx \to yx→y; an arc colouring assigns each ordered pair a colour in Fin 3\mathrm{Fin}\,3Fin3; a colouring uses at most two colours when every arc has colour 000 or colour 111. A tournament is a loopless digraph in which every two distinct vertices are joined by exactly one arc.

A monochromatic path from xxx to yyy has distinct vertices, consecutive ones joined by an arc, all those arcs of one colour; write x⇝yx \rightsquigarrow yx⇝y when one exists, and say that xxx monochromatically reaches yyy. A set SSS is monochromatically independent when no two distinct members are connected by a monochromatic path in either direction — this is not graph independence: in a tournament a single arc joins any two vertices, so such a set has at most one element. A digraph has no monochromatic infinite outward path when no injective x:N→Vx : \mathbb{N} \to Vx:N→V has all arcs xn→xn+1x_n \to x_{n+1}xn​→xn+1​ of one colour.

Formalization targets

Goal — the two-coloured tournament theorem (SSW Corollary 2)

DDD a tournament on a nonempty finite vertex type, its arcs coloured with at most two colours:

∃v, ∀x, x≠v⇒x⇝v.\exists v,\ \forall x,\ x \neq v \Rightarrow x \rightsquigarrow v .∃v, ∀x, x=v⇒x⇝v.

Milestone — the two-coloured digraph theorem (SSW Theorem 1)

DDD any digraph on any vertex type, arcs coloured with at most two colours, with no monochromatic infinite outward path:

∃S, S monochromatically independent ∧ ∀x, x∉S⇒∃s∈S, x⇝s.\exists S,\ S \text{ monochromatically independent} \ \wedge\ \forall x,\ x \notin S \Rightarrow \exists s \in S,\ x \rightsquigarrow s .∃S, S monochromatically independent ∧ ∀x, x∈/S⇒∃s∈S, x⇝s.

Milestone — the source form of the goal

The goal in the orientation of the platform's existing definition, the distinguished vertex reaching the others:

∃s, ∀t, s⇝t.\exists s,\ \forall t,\ s \rightsquigarrow t .∃s, ∀t, s⇝t.

Milestone — the blocked three-coloured theorem (SSW Theorem 3)

TTT a tournament whose arcs carry three colours and whose vertices are partitioned into blocks, two vertices of different blocks always joined by a red arc and two of the same block by a blue or a green arc; then some vertex is monochromatically reached by every other.

Significance

The result. The goal settles the two-colour case of Erdős's question in the sharp form that one vertex suffices, and it is the base of the known theory: the paper's own block-coloured three-colour theorem is proved from it by iteration, and the kernel and stable-matching corollaries of the general theorem make it standard digraph theory. Without it the three-colour question has no settled case to compare against.

Formalizing it. No Lean formalization of these statements is recorded, for the corollary or for the general theorem [Ch26]; the machine-checked development that exists is in Rocq, for the general theorem, and is the first for the infinite case. This mission produces, in Lean, a classical theorem the platform does not have, together with the definitions it rests on: monochromatic reachability and monochromatic independence over an arbitrary vertex type. Status is stated per target: the goal is a theorem of the source paper, not an open question; the three-colour problem beside it remains open.

Difficulty

The first idea — take a longest monochromatic path and read off its end — does not close the argument. It gives monochromatic reachability only for the vertices on the path; for a vertex outside it, one knows only that the arcs from the path to that vertex cannot continue the path's colour, which yields no path back to the path's end. The source instead takes a maximal element, under a relation mixing the two colours, of a family of monochromatically independent sets — S⪯TS \preceq TS⪯T when every s∈Ss \in Ss∈S has s∈Ts \in Ts∈T, or a blue path to some t∈Tt \in Tt∈T with no red path back — and shows by a minimal-counterexample argument on red reachability that a maximal element is the required set. Over an arbitrary vertex type the family needs Zorn's lemma, and the no-infinite-outward-path hypothesis, not finiteness, is what bounds the argument. A second trap is definitional: because independence here is monochromatic, the tournament case collapses to one vertex; a formalization using graph independence would state a different and false theorem.

Formalization scope

  • Reuses the platform module opg1808_colored_tournaments: Digraph V := V → V → Prop, ArcColoring V := V → V → Fin 3, IsTournament, and MonochromaticallyReaches, the reflexive-transitive closure of one colour's arcs. A new definition supplies monochromatic independence; prose and statements use the same notation.
  • Colours are three-valued even when two occur, matching that module; the two-colour hypothesis says every arc has colour 000 or colour 111. Relabelling two used colours into {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1} preserves which paths are monochromatic, so nothing is lost.
  • The source allows loops and multiple edges; the formalization uses a simple relation. Multiple edges are irrelevant, since reachability depends only on the presence of an arc, and loops are excluded by IsTournament. For the general digraph target loops change nothing, as the source's paths have distinct vertices.
  • The source's paths have distinct vertices while MonochromaticallyReaches uses walks; the two agree for reachability, and independence is stated through walks, so no distinctness hypothesis is needed.
  • The goal is stated on [Fintype V] [Nonempty V]; nonemptiness is required, the target being false on an empty vertex type. The general target is stated on an arbitrary type, and its hypothesis is vacuous in the finite case, which is the entry point for the goal.
  • The platform's IsMonochromaticSource is the reversed orientation of the goal; the goal follows the source paper, which orients paths towards the distinguished vertex.

Needed: the reused module, a definition of monochromatic independence, reachability lemmas for two colour classes, and for the general target Zorn's lemma and infinite outward paths. The reachability and independence layer is reusable by any later mission on coloured digraphs, including the three-colour problem beside this one. Contributions to any target are welcome.

Selected references

  • B. Sands, N. Sauer, R. Woodrow, On monochromatic paths in edge-coloured digraphs, J. Combin. Theory Ser. B 33 (1982), no. 3, 271–275. Theorem 1 (pp. 271–273), Corollary 2 (p. 273), Theorem 3 (pp. 274–275), PROBLEM (p. 275). https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-8956(82)90047-8
  • S. Minggang, On monochromatic paths in m-coloured tournaments, J. Combin. Theory Ser. B 45 (1988), 108–111. https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-8956(88)90062-2
  • H. Galeana-Sánchez, R. Rojas-Monroy, Monochromatic paths and at most 2-colored arc sets in edge-coloured tournaments, Graphs Combin. 21 (2005), 307–317. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00373-005-0627-y
  • M. Melcher, K. B. Reid, Monochromatic sinks in nearly transitive arc-colored tournaments, Discrete Math. 310 (2010), 2697–2704. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.disc.2010.05.017
  • N. Bousquet, W. Lochet, S. Thomassé, A proof of the Erdős–Sands–Sauer–Woodrow conjecture, arXiv:1703.08123 (2017). https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.08123
  • J.-P. Chancelier, A formal proof of the Sands-Sauer-Woodrow theorem using the Rocq prover and mathcomp/ssreflect, arXiv:2604.21376 (2026). https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.21376
  • Open Problem Garden, Monochromatic reachability or rainbow triangles. https://www.openproblemgarden.org/op/monochromatic_reachability_vs_rainbow_triangles
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CombinatoricsComplexity Theory·Captain: Abhishek Anand

Block Sensitivity vs. Sensitivity: Reach 2.0635Open Problem

Establish a separation exponent of at least 2.06352.06352.0635 between block sensitivity and sensitivity of total Boolean functions.

For every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 and integer S≥2S\ge2S≥2, construct fff with s(f)≥Ss(f)\ge Ss(f)≥S and bs(f)≥s(f)2.0635−εbs(f)\ge s(f)^{2.0635-\varepsilon}bs(f)≥s(f)2.0635−ε.

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Actuarial Science·Captain: WillR

Actuarial Mathematics CII: Multiple-Life Survival, Joint-and-Survivor Annuities and Contingent AssurancesTextbook

Multiple-Life Survival, Joint-and-Survivor Annuities and Contingent Assurances

Motivation

A multiple-life contract has payments depending on the survival of more than one individual. A joint-life pension might stop at the first death, while a last-survivor annuity continues until both lives have died. A retirement pension may continue in a smaller amount to a surviving spouse, and a policy may instead pay one capital sum on the first or second death. These arrangements arise in pension schemes, life insurance and the valuation of dependent beneficiaries. They have different claim events, beneficiaries and settlement dates. The distinction matters in actual valuation, especially when both deaths occur between scheduled pension dates.

The basic mathematical objects are laid out in Promislow's Fundamentals of Actuarial Mathematics, third edition (2015, Chapter 10), and Dickson, Hardy and Waters' Actuarial Mathematics for Life Contingent Risks, third edition (2020, Chapter 10). Both discuss joint and last-survivor states. The latter also treats dependent future lifetimes and common shocks. The mission develops event-consistent formulas from a shared joint mortality law, rather than selecting unrelated survival probabilities for different contract components.

Setting

Let two future lifetimes be represented by death-time states KxK_xKx​ and KyK_yKy​ on a finite grid with right-censoring horizon hhh. For i<hi<hi<h, state Kx=iK_x=iKx​=i means the first life dies in the interval after anniversary iii and its death benefit is payable at tick i+1i+1i+1 under the annual settlement convention. The terminal state Kx=hK_x=hKx​=h means that this death has not been observed before the horizon. The same convention applies to the second life. More finely spaced ticks can represent payment and death dates within a year, so ordering is retained when the two deaths fall in different subannual intervals.

The joint probability mass function is pij=Pr⁡(Kx=i,Ky=j)p_{ij}=\Pr(K_x=i,K_y=j)pij​=Pr(Kx​=i,Ky​=j), with pij≥0p_{ij}\geq0pij​≥0 and ∑i=0h∑j=0hpij=1\sum_{i=0}^{h}\sum_{j=0}^{h}p_{ij}=1∑i=0h​∑j=0h​pij​=1. It determines both one-life margins and their dependence. In particular, the probability that both lives are alive at tick ttt is ∑i,jpij1{t≤i}1{t≤j}\sum_{i,j}p_{ij}\mathbf{1}_{\{t\leq i\}}\mathbf{1}_{\{t\leq j\}}∑i,j​pij​1{t≤i}​1{t≤j}​. Products of the two marginal survival probabilities are valid only under an explicit independence assumption.

At a scheduled payment anniversary there are four disjoint in-force states: both alive, member only, spouse only and neither alive. The joint-life status is the both-alive state. The last-survivor status consists of all states except neither alive. The reversionary spouse status is specifically member dead and spouse alive. A reversionary pension starts once member death makes the spouse entitled and pays only when the spouse is alive at the relevant instalment date. This is contractually distinct from an unqualified joint-and-survivor pension, whose original member and survivor amounts may follow a different schedule.

Write dtd_tdt​ for a discount factor taking a payment at tick ttt to commencement, and btb_tbt​ for its gross benefit amount. A member pension may pay btb_tbt​ while the member is alive and ρbt\rho b_tρbt​ when the member is dead but the spouse remains alive. The ratio ρ\rhoρ is the spouse continuation factor. Unless stated otherwise, the status is tested at each scheduled payment date, so a spouse who dies before the first eligible instalment receives no instalment. Death lump sums use the tick immediately after their death-year state and are distinct from these scheduled pension payments.

Formalization targets

Joint-law occupation states

The first group constructs the joint law, marginal survivals and four exclusive occupation states. Their probability sums and event identities must agree without assuming independent lives. Strict order events Kx<KyK_x<K_yKx​<Ky​ and Ky<KxK_y<K_xKy​<Kx​ are accompanied by the tie event Kx=KyK_x=K_yKx​=Ky​; both terminal states are right-censored and must not cause a fictitious death claim. Equal grid times are treated as genuine ties in the grid model. Physical simultaneous death in continuous time requires a separate law assigning it positive mass.

Annuity and reversionary values

The second group gives realised annuity cashflows and expected present values for joint-life, last-survivor, member-only and reversionary spouse statuses. A key identity for identical payment dates and discounting is

alast=ax+ay−axy,ay∣x=ay−axy.a_{\text{last}}=a_x+a_y-a_{xy},\qquad a_{y\mid x}=a_y-a_{xy}.alast​=ax​+ay​−axy​,ay∣x​=ay​−axy​.

The first term values any surviving life, and the second values the spouse-only reversion. These identities are valid under general dependence because all terms come from the same joint distribution. For a member pension with a separately contractual spouse continuation of ρ\rhoρ, its expected value is

V=ax+ρay∣x=(1−ρ)ax+ρalast.V=a_x+\rho a_{y\mid x} =(1-\rho)a_x+\rho a_{\text{last}}.V=ax​+ρay∣x​=(1−ρ)ax​+ρalast​.

This formula presumes the member payment and spouse payment are evaluated at the same dates with no overlapping guarantee or independent payment entitlement. Guarantee cashflows require separate contractual events.

Order-sensitive death claims

The third group models a unit claim on the first death, a unit claim on the second death, the member dying first, the spouse dying first and simultaneous-grid death. It also models a later death of the survivor and pure endowments contingent on joint or last-survivor survival. Payment at death and payment on a pension anniversary can differ even when the same person eventually receives a benefit. Both deaths within a year are represented with a sufficiently fine tick grid; annual year-end states alone do not identify their physical order.

Integrated capstone

The capstone values a combined pension and assurance from the realised cashflow across all death-time pairs. It then reconciles the expected value independently against single-life, reversionary and last-survivor annuity factors, together with the disjoint first- and second-death assurance values. The event partition is incorporated in the total cashflow rather than appended as an unrelated identity.

Significance

The identities provide actuarially auditable bridges between benefits administered by member and spouse status and factors calculated by conventional life-contingency methods. In Dickson, Hardy and Waters (2020, Chapter 11), pension mathematics supplies further context. They can be used to check spouse continuation calculations in defined benefit pension administration, premium valuations of first- and second-death assurances, and mortality stress tests where lives in a household may be dependent. A dependent joint law can change the joint annuity and first-death insurance values while preserving each single-life margin.

The formalisation keeps payment timing, benefit entitlement, event order and valuation date visible in the mathematics. In the published sources the classical factor relations are known results, while the present finite-grid cashflow definitions and their combined capstone are original derived formulations. Each proposed theorem remains an open formal target until independently verified by Prove2Me's authoritative remote Lean compiler and, separately, proved.

Difficulty

Marginal survivals do not determine joint survival or within-year death order. A spouse may become entitled before the first payable instalment, and may die between those events. Death settlement, grid ties and terminal censoring therefore require careful treatment. The capstone reconciles expected realised cashflows with independently calculated factors, preserving the same joint law, dates and entitlement rules in both valuations.

Formalization scope

The Lean kernel uses finite double sums over one right-censored joint law. Due, arrears, subannual, deferred and guaranteed member/spouse cashflows are defined. Death timing is represented on an integer grid; periods can be made subannual by changing the tick size. Scheduled pension payments are due at their specified ticks. Lump sums are settled at the following death tick. Discount factors and benefit amounts are parameterised as schedules; no particular flat interest rate is built into the definitions.

In the guarantee kernel, ggg is an absolute expiry tick and aaa starts the payment window. Guaranteed member payments do not require survival to aaa: they model an already vested obligation, not a pension conditional on reaching retirement. A guarantee lasting GGG periods from aaa would expire at a+Ga+Ga+G and require a separate retirement-eligibility condition. UK defined benefit death-in-deferment and dependant entitlements are scheme-specific and outside this kernel.

The main decomposition identities do not need independence, and explicit independent/dependent finite counterexamples are staged for remote theorem proofs. Equal-tick ties are explicit. A smooth continuous-time law, arbitrary within-tick death times, integrals for immediate death settlement, changing spouse eligibility and other pension guarantee arrangements require further declarations and remote verification before the complete mission can be released. The finite model does not imply those continuous-time results. Annuity-certain or single-life results from other unpublished owner Drafts are not assumed to be importable.

Formal contributors must preserve the same probability law and the same discount and settlement conventions across all components of any identity. A vacuous statement established by assuming its intended conclusion, using inconsistent marginals or suppressing the tie event does not meet the mission's mathematical contract.

Selected references

  • S. David Promislow, Fundamentals of Actuarial Mathematics, third edition, Wiley, 2015, Chapter 10, Sections 10.2–10.8, publisher-linked contents.

  • D. C. M. Dickson, M. R. Hardy and H. R. Waters, Actuarial Mathematics for Life Contingent Risks, third edition, Cambridge University Press, 2020, Chapter 10, book DOI.

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CombinatoricsComplexity Theory·Captain: @bwdaugherty

Block Sensitivity vs. Sensitivity: α ≥ 2.0391Open Problem

Improve the separation exponent between block sensitivity and sensitivity of total Boolean functions. This mission targets α≥2.0391\alpha\ge2.0391α≥2.0391; higher is better.

For every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 and every integer S≥2S\ge2S≥2, the goal asks for a function fff with s(f)≥Ss(f)\ge Ss(f)≥S and bs(f)≥s(f)2.0391−εbs(f)\ge s(f)^{2.0391-\varepsilon}bs(f)≥s(f)2.0391−ε. The shared definition SensitivityCampaign.AchievesExponent expresses exactly this requirement.

Using a finite certificate. Choose a total Boolean function fff, an input xxx, and integers A,B>1A,B>1A,B>1. Prove s(f)≤As(f)\le As(f)≤A, B≤bs(f,x)B\le bs(f,x)B≤bs(f,x), and A2.0391≤BA^{2.0391}\le BA2.0391≤B, then apply SensitivityCampaign.finite_certificate. Here bs(f,x)bs(f,x)bs(f,x) means block sensitivity at the chosen input. The shared theorem handles normalization and passage to arbitrarily large sensitivity. Its proof is a foundation milestone; a proof depending on an open milestone remains conditional until that milestone is proved.

Direct proofs of the asymptotic goal are equally welcome. Keep the shared definitions, replace the target value, and give your theorem a unique name. Use exact certified bounds; numerical estimates alone do not establish a record.

Background: the campaign proposal.

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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Cross-licensing in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Manufacturers II: Every Innovation Equilibrium Is a Downstream Duopoly, Boundary or InteriorResearch Paper

Motivation

In industries built on a key component sold by one dominant supplier, such as smartphone chipsets, the supplier's contract terms shape how much its downstream customers innovate. Some suppliers require their customers to cross-license their own patents to each other as a condition of buying the component, so that each manufacturer's innovation also improves its rival's product. Wang, Huang and Lee (SSRN 3053682; published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2023, doi:10.1287/msom.2019.0477) ask when a supplier facing two manufacturers of unequal innovation ability benefits from imposing cross-licensing. Their answer runs through the equilibrium of the manufacturers' innovation game, which is the subject of this mission: Proposition 2 describes how much each manufacturer innovates and shows that the supplier never ends up selling to a single manufacturer.

Setting

A supplier sells a component at wholesale price r≥0r \ge 0r≥0 to manufacturers M1M_1M1​ and M2M_2M2​. Manufacturer MiM_iMi​ chooses a quality improvement Ti≥0T_i \ge 0Ti​≥0 at cost kiTi2k_iT_i^2ki​Ti2​. With cross-licensing of effectiveness β∈[0,1]\beta \in [0, 1]β∈[0,1], the quality improvement of MiM_iMi​ is Ti+βTjT_i + \beta T_jTi​+βTj​ (j≠ij \ne ij=i), and its inverse demand is pi=1+Ti+βTj−qi−qjp_i = 1 + T_i + \beta T_j - q_i - q_jpi​=1+Ti​+βTj​−qi​−qj​. The standing assumptions are

0≤β≤1,49144<k2<k1,0 \le \beta \le 1, \qquad \tfrac{49}{144} < k_2 < k_1,0≤β≤1,14449​<k2​<k1​,

so M2M_2M2​ is the superior manufacturer. The game has three stages.

  1. Quantities. Given (T1,T2)(T_1, T_2)(T1​,T2​) and rrr, each MiM_iMi​ chooses qi≥0q_i \ge 0qi​≥0 to maximize Πi=(1+Ti+βTj−qi−qj−r)qi\Pi_i = (1 + T_i + \beta T_j - q_i - q_j - r)q_iΠi​=(1+Ti​+βTj​−qi​−qj​−r)qi​ (display (1)). The equilibrium quantities, display (2), are a duopoly when rrr is low and a monopoly of the manufacturer with the higher quality when rrr is higher.
  2. Price. The supplier chooses r≥0r \ge 0r≥0 to maximize r(q1+q2)r(q_1 + q_2)r(q1​+q2​). Its price r∗(T1,T2)r^*(T_1, T_2)r∗(T1​,T2​) is the least maximizer. Lemma 1 computes it: the supplier induces a duopoly exactly when β≥3−1\beta \ge \sqrt3 - 1β≥3​−1 or T2≤T^2(T1∣β)T_2 \le \hat T_2(T_1\mid\beta)T2​≤T^2​(T1​∣β), where
T^2(T1∣β)=2−3+T1(1−β(3−1))3−1−β.\hat T_2(T_1\mid\beta) = \frac{2 - \sqrt3 + T_1(1 - \beta(\sqrt3 - 1))}{\sqrt3 - 1 - \beta}.T^2​(T1​∣β)=3​−1−β2−3​+T1​(1−β(3​−1))​.
  1. Innovation. Each MiM_iMi​ chooses Ti≥0T_i \ge 0Ti​≥0 to maximize Πi∗(T1,T2∣β)−kiTi2\Pi^*_i(T_1, T_2\mid\beta) - k_iT_i^2Πi∗​(T1​,T2​∣β)−ki​Ti2​, where Πi∗\Pi^*_iΠi∗​ is its Cournot profit at the supplier's price. An innovation equilibrium is a pure Nash equilibrium of this game.

The proof of Proposition 2 defines two candidate profiles in closed form: the interior candidate TI=(T1I,T2I)T^I = (T^I_1, T^I_2)TI=(T1I​,T2I​), which solves both manufacturers' first-order conditions, and the boundary candidate TB=(T1B,T2B)T^B = (T^B_1, T^B_2)TB=(T1B​,T2B​), where M2M_2M2​ invests exactly up to T^2\hat T_2T^2​. A threshold k^2(k1∣β)\hat k_2(k_1\mid\beta)k^2​(k1​∣β) separates them, and T∗(β)=TBT^*(\beta) = T^BT∗(β)=TB if k2<k^2(k1∣β)k_2 < \hat k_2(k_1\mid\beta)k2​<k^2​(k1​∣β), T∗(β)=TIT^*(\beta) = T^IT∗(β)=TI otherwise.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (p. 12)

Under the standing assumptions:

  1. every innovation equilibrium is a duopoly, meaning both manufacturers sell a positive quantity at the supplier's price;
  2. T∗(β)T^*(\beta)T∗(β) is an innovation equilibrium and a duopoly;
  3. if k2<k^2(k1∣β)k_2 < \hat k_2(k_1\mid\beta)k2​<k^2​(k1​∣β), then β<3−1\beta < \sqrt3 - 1β<3​−1 and M2M_2M2​ is on the boundary:
T2∗=T^2(T1∗∣β);T^*_2 = \hat T_2(T^*_1\mid\beta);T2∗​=T^2​(T1∗​∣β);
  1. if k2≥k^2(k1∣β)k_2 \ge \hat k_2(k_1\mid\beta)k2​≥k^2​(k1​∣β), then T∗(β)=TIT^*(\beta) = T^IT∗(β)=TI and both duopoly first-order conditions hold at T∗(β)T^*(\beta)T∗(β).

Milestones

  • display (2): the Cournot quantities are the unique equilibrium of the quantity game;
  • Lemma 1: the supplier's price, the regime, its optimal profit, and the gross profits Π1∗,Π2∗\Pi^*_1, \Pi^*_2Π1∗​,Π2∗​;
  • monopoly infeasibility at T1=0T_1 = 0T1​=0, from the proof (p. A.1): M2M_2M2​'s monopoly optimum 1/(16k2−1)1/(16k_2 - 1)1/(16k2​−1) lies below T^2(0∣β)\hat T_2(0\mid\beta)T^2​(0∣β);
  • TIT^ITI is the unique solution of the two first-order conditions (p. A.1);
  • T2B=T^2(T1B∣β)T^B_2 = \hat T_2(T^B_1\mid\beta)T2B​=T^2​(T1B​∣β), and T1BT^B_1T1B​ is M1M_1M1​'s best response to T2BT^B_2T2B​ (p. A.1);
  • k^2\hat k_2k^2​ is where T2I=T2BT^I_2 = T^B_2T2I​=T2B​, and above it TIT^ITI lies in the duopoly region (p. A.2);
  • k^2(k1∣β)\hat k_2(k_1\mid\beta)k^2​(k1​∣β) is strictly decreasing in β\betaβ with k^2(k1∣1)=0\hat k_2(k_1\mid 1) = 0k^2​(k1​∣1)=0 (p. A.2), so the boundary region shrinks to empty as β\betaβ grows.

Significance

Proposition 2 is the paper's equilibrium characterization. Proposition 3 is its instance β=0\beta = 0β=0 (no cross-licensing), and Proposition 4 compares the supplier's equilibrium profits with and without cross-licensing on the closed forms TBT^BTB, TIT^ITI and k^2\hat k_2k^2​ established here. The economic content is that, under cross-licensing, the supplier always ends up selling to both manufacturers. When the superior manufacturer's cost advantage is large it caps its own innovation exactly where the supplier stops preferring a monopoly.

The paper's proof states the closed forms and asserts the checks ("one can obtain", "we verify"). This mission produces a machine-checked version: a complete definition of the three-stage game, with the supplier's price defined as an optimization rather than by its solution, and the equilibrium claims stated against that game. To our knowledge no part of this result has been formalized before.

Difficulty

The innovation payoff of the superior manufacturer is discontinuous. When T2T_2T2​ moves just above T^2(T1∣β)\hat T_2(T_1\mid\beta)T^2​(T1​∣β), the supplier switches from a duopoly price to a monopoly price, and M2M_2M2​'s gross profit jumps down. A first-order argument therefore does not show that T∗T^*T∗ is an equilibrium. One must also show that M2M_2M2​ never gains by moving into the monopoly region, and that M1M_1M1​ never gains by deviating above T2T_2T2​, where M1M_1M1​ itself becomes the potential monopolist. The boundary candidate is an equilibrium only because the supplier breaks its indifference at the boundary toward the duopoly.

Part 1 quantifies over every equilibrium, not only T∗T^*T∗. The paper checks monopoly infeasibility only at T1=0T_1 = 0T1​=0, so the general case needs its own argument. The equilibrium is not unique: for some parameters a mirrored profile with M1M_1M1​ at its own boundary is also an equilibrium. Uniqueness is therefore not claimed. The remaining steps are polynomial and rational inequalities in (k1,k2,β)(k_1, k_2, \beta)(k1​,k2​,β) involving 3\sqrt33​.

Formalization scope

  • Parameters β,k1,k2\beta, k_1, k_2β,k1​,k2​ are real numbers. The standing assumptions 0≤β≤10 \le \beta \le 10≤β≤1 and 49/144<k2<k149/144 < k_2 < k_149/144<k2​<k1​ are bundled as Standing β k1 k2.
  • Quantities and innovation levels range over R≥0\mathbb R_{\ge 0}R≥0​ (NNReal). Equilibria use the published two-player predicate CompetingChains.Cournot.IsPureNash.
  • Wholesale prices range over [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞). The paper leaves this implicit, so it is a disclosed addition.
  • Display (2) is encoded in symmetric form, with the manufacturer of larger quality as the possible monopolist. The paper prints it for T2≥T1T_2 \ge T_1T2​≥T1​, but deviations in the innovation game reach T1>T2T_1 > T_2T1​>T2​.
  • The supplier's price is the least maximizer of r(q1+q2)r(q_1 + q_2)r(q1​+q2​) over r≥0r \ge 0r≥0. This is the tie-break Lemma 1 uses at T2=T^2T_2 = \hat T_2T2​=T^2​.
  • First-order conditions are stated as derivatives (HasDerivAt … 0) of Lemma 1's duopoly polynomials, because the game payoff is not differentiable at the boundary.
  • All closed forms are transcribed as printed, with 3\sqrt33​ as Real.sqrt 3. Every denominator is proved nonzero in its regime, never assumed.

Two trivializing formalizations are ruled out. Equilibria are never defined by first-order conditions or by the closed forms, and the supplier's price is never defined by Lemma 1's case rule. Both are theorems here.

The source is the authors' SSRN manuscript (abstract 3053682, version of 2023-04-27); its proofs are in the appendix, pp. A.1–A.9. The paper's equivalent threshold β^(k1,k2)\hat\beta(k_1, k_2)β^​(k1​,k2​) is not formalized. Proofs of any milestone are welcome. Lemma 1 and display (2) are self-contained, and the closed-form milestones need only real-algebraic inequalities with 3\sqrt33​.

Selected references

  • J. Wang, T. Huang, H. Lee, Cross-licensing in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Manufacturers, SSRN 3053682, version of 2023-04-27. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3053682
  • J. Wang, T. Huang, H. Lee, Cross-licensing in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Manufacturers, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2019.0477
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Improving Access to Rare Disease Treatments: Subsidy, Pricing, and Payment Schemes II: Consortium Price, No Cure No Pay: Subsidize Only Patients When the Price Is High, Only the Manufacturer When LowResearch Paper

Motivation

A rare disease affects few patients, so a drug for it has a small market and its research and development (R&D) cost is spread over few sales. Governments respond with two kinds of subsidy: cost subsidies that pay part of the manufacturer's R&D bill (orphan drug programmes), and price subsidies that pay part of what each patient is charged. At the same time two practices change how drugs are priced and paid for. In some markets an independent consortium negotiates the price instead of the manufacturer, and some manufacturers offer outcome-based payment ("No Cure No Pay", as in a programme of Bristol-Myers Squibb), under which the patient pays only if the drug works.

W. Olsder, T. Martagan and C. S. Tang ask how a government with a fixed budget should divide it between the manufacturer and the patients under each pricing and payment regime. This mission formalizes their analysis of the regime with a consortium price and outcome-based payment, Setting (2B) of the paper, where the answer depends on the price: for a high price only patients should be subsidized, and for a low price only the manufacturer. The source is the SSRN working paper 3481150 (version of 2019-11-13); the article later appeared in Management Science (2023) with possibly different numbering, which is not used here.

Setting

The market has size one. A patient's valuation VVV of an efficacious drug is uniform on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. The model has three positive primitives: the R&D cost scale kkk, the government's budget BBB, and the unit price ppp, which the consortium fixes and which lies in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1).

  • A subsidy policy is a pair (α,β)(\alpha,\beta)(α,β) with α∈[0,1)\alpha\in[0,1)α∈[0,1) and β∈[0,1)\beta\in[0,1)β∈[0,1). The government pays the share α\alphaα of the R&D cost and the share β\betaβ of the unit price.
  • The manufacturer chooses a target efficacy e>0e>0e>0, the probability that the drug works, at R&D cost ke2ke^2ke2. Under outcome-based payment it is paid ppp per patient only when the drug works, and the demand is 1−(1−β)p1-(1-\beta)p1−(1−β)p. Its profit, the bracket of the paper's (9), is
πm(e)=e p [1−(1−β)p]−(1−α)ke2.\pi_m(e)=e\,p\,[1-(1-\beta)p]-(1-\alpha)ke^2 .πm​(e)=ep[1−(1−β)p]−(1−α)ke2.

A best response to (α,β)(\alpha,\beta)(α,β) is a maximizer of πm\pi_mπm​ over e>0e>0e>0.

  • At efficacy eee the patient welfare (7) and the government spending, the left-hand side of the budget constraint in (10), are
W=12 e (1−(1−β)p)2,M=αke2+e βp [1−(1−β)p].W=\tfrac12\,e\,(1-(1-\beta)p)^2,\qquad M=\alpha k e^2+e\,\beta p\,[1-(1-\beta)p].W=21​e(1−(1−β)p)2,M=αke2+eβp[1−(1−β)p].
  • A policy is optimal when it has a best response at which M≤BM\le BM≤B and its welfare there is at least the welfare of every other policy at each of that policy's best responses with M≤BM\le BM≤B.
  • αmax⁡\alpha_{\max}αmax​ is the largest α∈[0,1)\alpha\in[0,1)α∈[0,1) for which the policy (α,0)(\alpha,0)(α,0) is affordable at the manufacturer's best response.

The Lean development names these objects IsPolicy, profit, BR, welfare, spend, IsOptimal and IsAlphaMax, in the namespace RareDisease.ExogOutcome.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3, parts 1 and 3

For k>0k>0k>0, B>0B>0B>0, 0<p<10<p<10<p<1 and αmax⁡\alpha_{\max}αmax​ as above:

  1. At every optimal policy the budget constraint binds: M=BM=BM=B at the best response.
  2. If
p ≥ 25−αmax⁡andB<p22k,p\ \ge\ \frac{2}{5-\alpha_{\max}}\quad\text{and}\quad B<\frac{p^2}{2k},p ≥ 5−αmax​2​andB<2kp2​,

then there is a β1\beta_1β1​ such that (0,β1)(0,\beta_1)(0,β1​) is optimal and every optimal policy equals (0,β1)(0,\beta_1)(0,β1​). Only patients are subsidized. 3. If

p ≤ 2(1−αmax⁡)5,p\ \le\ \frac{2(1-\alpha_{\max})}{5},p ≤ 52(1−αmax​)​,

then (αmax⁡,0)(\alpha_{\max},0)(αmax​,0) is optimal, every optimal policy equals it, and

αmax⁡=8Bk+p4−2p3+p2−(p−p2)16Bk+p4−2p3+p28Bk.\alpha_{\max}=\frac{8Bk+p^4-2p^3+p^2-(p-p^2)\sqrt{16Bk+p^4-2p^3+p^2}}{8Bk}.αmax​=8Bk8Bk+p4−2p3+p2−(p−p2)16Bk+p4−2p3+p2​​.

Only the manufacturer is subsidized.

The thresholds are the printed ones. They are not the sharpest possible (see Formalization scope), but they are what the paper states.

Milestones

In attack order: the best response (19), e∗=p(1−(1−β)p)/(2(1−α)k)e^*=p(1-(1-\beta)p)/(2(1-\alpha)k)e∗=p(1−(1−β)p)/(2(1−α)k); the reduced problem (20), giving welfare and spending at the best response; the fact that both expressions of (20) are increasing in α\alphaα and in β\betaβ; and the marginal-rate identity from the proof of Proposition 3 (Appendix C, p. 37), whose sign is that of (5−α)p−2(1−α)(5-\alpha)p-2(1-\alpha)(5−α)p−2(1−α).

Significance

The result splits the decision between subsidizing patients and subsidizing the manufacturer by a single comparison of the consortium's price with thresholds that depend only on the budget and the cost scale. For a policy maker the consequence is concrete. A high negotiated price already gives the manufacturer enough incentive to develop an efficacious drug, so every unit of budget should lower what patients pay. A low price leaves the manufacturer short of incentive, so every unit should go to R&D. Splitting the budget is never optimal in either regime.

The formalization adds three things. First, it checks a statement whose printed form has errors. Part 2 of the proposition, "subsidize both" for intermediate prices, is false as printed: B=0.05B=0.05B=0.05, k=0.3k=0.3k=0.3, p=0.2p=0.2p=0.2 lies in the printed middle range, yet the unique optimum is manufacturer-only. The printed closed form for the patient subsidy in part 1 does not satisfy the binding budget constraint. Second, the proof in the paper is a marginal argument along the binding curve, and its extremal step takes a maximum over α\alphaα at the wrong end; the parts posed here stay true because their thresholds are stronger than needed, which a machine-checked proof makes explicit. Third, the game is stated as a game: the government's problem is posed over the manufacturer's best-response set, not over the reduced formulas, so the reduction (19)–(20) is itself a theorem. None of these results has a machine-checked proof yet.

Difficulty

The reduced problem (20) is a two-variable optimization with a nonlinear constraint, and its feasible region has no simple shape. The obvious first idea is to solve the first-order conditions of the Lagrangian, but the optimum of parts 1 and 3 is on the boundary of the policy square (α=0\alpha=0α=0 or β=0\beta=0β=0), so stationarity says nothing there. What has to be shown instead is a global sign property along the whole binding curve: trading manufacturer subsidy for patient subsidy changes welfare per unit of spending with the sign of (5−α)p−2(1−α)(5-\alpha)p-2(1-\alpha)(5−α)p−2(1−α), and this sign must be controlled for every α\alphaα the curve passes through. That requires knowing that the curve stays in α≤αmax⁡\alpha\le\alpha_{\max}α≤αmax​, which comes from the monotonicity of spending. Two existence and uniqueness questions also arise. In part 1 a patient-only policy must exhaust the budget with β<1\beta<1β<1, which is where B<p2/(2k)B<p^2/(2k)B<p2/(2k) enters. In both parts no other policy may tie the optimum.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real numbers. The standing assumptions k>0k>0k>0, B>0B>0B>0 and 0<p<10<p<10<p<1 are hypotheses of every theorem. The paper uses them without stating them: with p≥1p\ge1p≥1 and β=0\beta=0β=0 the demand 1−p1-p1−p is not positive and the manufacturer has no best response with e>0e>0e>0; the closed form of αmax⁡\alpha_{\max}αmax​ divides by 8Bk8Bk8Bk. As in the paper, the efficacy eee ranges over all positive reals and is not bounded by 111. Policies satisfy α,β∈[0,1)\alpha,\beta\in[0,1)α,β∈[0,1), a half-open interval.

The added hypothesis B<p2/(2k)B<p^2/(2k)B<p2/(2k) in part 1 is necessary. With α=0\alpha=0α=0 the spending tends to p2/(2k)p^2/(2k)p2/(2k) as β↑1\beta\uparrow1β↑1, so for larger budgets no patient-only policy exhausts the budget. The thresholds 2/(5−αmax⁡)2/(5-\alpha_{\max})2/(5−αmax​) and 2(1−αmax⁡)/52(1-\alpha_{\max})/52(1−αmax​)/5 are posed as printed; replacing them by the sharper values 2/52/52/5 and 2(1−αmax⁡)/(5−αmax⁡)2(1-\alpha_{\max})/(5-\alpha_{\max})2(1−αmax​)/(5−αmax​) would be a different theorem. Part 2 and the printed closed form of part 1 are not posed, because both are false as printed.

The formalization cannot be trivialized by defining the government's problem through the reduced forms (20), because welfare and spending in IsOptimal are evaluated at members of the best-response set BR. "Optimal" means attained and compared against every policy at every best response, not a supremum. αmax⁡\alpha_{\max}αmax​ is defined as the greatest affordable manufacturer-only subsidy, not by its closed form, which is part of the goal.

A complete development needs only real analysis from Mathlib: maximization of a concave quadratic, monotonicity of rational functions, one-variable derivatives for the marginal-rate milestone, and Real.sqrt for the closed form. Proofs of any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • W. Olsder, T. Martagan, C. S. Tang, Improving Access to Rare Disease Treatments: Optimal Subsidies, Pricing, and Payment, SSRN working paper 3481150, version of 2019-11-13. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3481150
  • W. Olsder, T. Martagan, C. S. Tang, Improving Access to Rare Disease Treatments: Subsidy, Pricing, and Payment Schemes, Management Science, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4634
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EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Theory of Liquidity in Private Equity I: Without a Secondary Market, Two Capital-Share Thresholds Characterize Equilibrium, and Liquid LPs Earn Strictly More When Both Fund Types ExistResearch Paper

Why liquidity can explain persistent private equity returns

Private equity funds are organized as limited partnerships. Limited partners (LPs: pension funds, endowments, insurers) commit capital, and a general partner (GP) manages the fund and calls the committed capital over several years. A well-documented empirical regularity is that some LPs earn persistently higher returns than others, and that fund returns persist across a GP's successive funds (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Lerner, Schoar and Wongsunwai, 2007). The usual explanation is differences in skill.

Maurin, Robinson and Strömberg propose a different channel. Because capital is called gradually, an LP hit by a liquidity shock may default on the remaining commitment. GPs who raise money from LPs that tolerate illiquidity can invest efficiently. GPs who raise money from LPs that do not must call capital early to protect themselves against default, which distorts investment. When illiquidity-tolerant capital is scarce, GPs compete for it and pay its owners a premium. This mission formalizes the paper's main equilibrium result without a secondary market: that premium exists exactly when both kinds of funds are raised.

Setting

An investment pays RRR per unit on success and 000 on failure. It succeeds with probability ppp if the GP exerts effort and with probability q<pq<pq<p if the GP shirks, in which case the GP enjoys a private benefit BBB per unit invested. Each GP has wealth AAA and runs one fund of total size I>AI>AI>A. A share x∈[0,1]x\in[0,1]x∈[0,1] of the fund is invested in period 0 and the rest, 1−x1-x1−x, in period 1; both investments succeed or fail independently.

A fee schedule fff pays the GP a fee per unit of investment that depends on which investments succeeded. It must satisfy limited liability, 0≤f≤0\le f\le0≤f≤ the fund's cash flow, and incentive compatibility: effort on both investments must be at least as profitable for the GP as shirking on either or both. Write fˉ\bar ffˉ​ for the expected fee under effort. LPs who receive the promised expected return Rˉ\bar RRˉ per unit contributed supply I−AI-AI−A, which ties the fund size to the fee through

(pR−fˉ) I=Rˉ (I−A).(3)(pR-\bar f)\,I=\bar R\,(I-A).\qquad(3)(pR−fˉ​)I=Rˉ(I−A).(3)

LPs consume in periods 1 and 2. With probability λ∈(0,1)\lambda\in(0,1)λ∈(0,1) an aggregate liquidity shock hits in period 1. After the shock an LP discounts period-2 consumption by δ∈(0,1)\delta\in(0,1)δ∈(0,1). There are two types, LLL and HHH, with δL<δH\delta_L<\delta_HδL​<δH​, holding the shares 1−μH1-\mu_H1−μH​ and μH\mu_HμH​ of the LPs' total capital KKK. Without a secondary market an LP honours the second capital call only if the claim is worth at least its cost:

1−x≤δ Rˉ.(4)1-x\le\delta\,\bar R.\qquad(4)1−x≤δRˉ.(4)

A GP chooses (x,I,f)(x,I,f)(x,I,f) to maximize the profit ΠGP=fˉI\Pi_{GP}=\bar f IΠGP​=fˉ​I subject to (3) and (4). LPs invest in private equity when its value (1−λ)Rˉ+λδRˉ(1-\lambda)\bar R+\lambda\delta\bar R(1−λ)Rˉ+λδRˉ exceeds the value 111 of cash. An equilibrium (Definition 2) consists of the fractions αL,αH\alpha_L,\alpha_HαL​,αH​ of GPs raising each fund type, the returns RˉPE,L∗,RˉPE,H∗\bar R^*_{PE,L},\bar R^*_{PE,H}RˉPE,L∗​,RˉPE,H∗​, and optimal contracts such that GPs raise only profit-maximizing fund types and each primary market clears.

The key quantities are the LPs' break-even return 1+r(λ,δ)=1/(1−λ(1−δ))1+r(\lambda,\delta)=1/(1-\lambda(1-\delta))1+r(λ,δ)=1/(1−λ(1−δ)), the minimal safe early call x^(λ,δ)=1−δ/(1−λ(1−δ))\hat x(\lambda,\delta)=1-\delta/(1-\lambda(1-\delta))x^(λ,δ)=1−δ/(1−λ(1−δ)), and the tolerance threshold δ^(λ)=1−p/(p+(1−λ)q)\hat\delta(\lambda)=1-p/(p+(1-\lambda)q)δ^(λ)=1−p/(p+(1−λ)q). The Lean development uses the namespace PELiquidity.Primary, with grossReturn, xHat, deltaHat, xLow, xBar, IsFeasibleContract, IsOptimalContract, IsCapitalSupply and IsEquilibrium.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2

There are thresholds

0<μ‾H<μˉH<10<\underline\mu_H<\bar\mu_H<10<μ​H​<μˉ​H​<1

such that for every μH∈(0,1)\mu_H\in(0,1)μH​∈(0,1) an equilibrium exists, and every equilibrium satisfies the following:

  • if μH<μ‾H\mu_H<\underline\mu_HμH​<μ​H​, both fund types are raised and RˉPE,H∗>RˉPE,L∗=1+r(λ,δL)\bar R^*_{PE,H}>\bar R^*_{PE,L}=1+r(\lambda,\delta_L)RˉPE,H∗​>RˉPE,L∗​=1+r(λ,δL​);
  • if μH≥μ‾H\mu_H\ge\underline\mu_HμH​≥μ​H​, then αL∗=0\alpha^*_L=0αL∗​=0;
  • RˉPE,H∗\bar R^*_{PE,H}RˉPE,H∗​ is strictly decreasing in μH\mu_HμH​ on [μ‾H,μˉH][\underline\mu_H,\bar\mu_H][μ​H​,μˉ​H​];
  • if μH≥μˉH\mu_H\ge\bar\mu_HμH​≥μˉ​H​, then RˉPE,H∗=1+r(λ,δH)\bar R^*_{PE,H}=1+r(\lambda,\delta_H)RˉPE,H∗​=1+r(λ,δH​).

The thresholds are existential, as in the paper. A variant pinning μˉH\bar\mu_Hμˉ​H​ by (C.3) is a welcome strengthening.

Milestones

  1. (11): the break-even return 1+r(λ,δ)1+r(\lambda,\delta)1+r(λ,δ), decreasing in δ\deltaδ.
  2. Lemma 1 with (12): ΠGP=pRI−Rˉ(I−A)\Pi_{GP}=pRI-\bar R(I-A)ΠGP​=pRI−Rˉ(I−A), so an optimal contract minimizes fˉ\bar ffˉ​.
  3. Lemma 2: the minimal incentive-compatible fee is (15), minimized exactly on x∈[q/(p+q),p/(p+q)]x\in[q/(p+q),p/(p+q)]x∈[q/(p+q),p/(p+q)].
  4. Proposition 1: under (4) the optimal early call is [max⁡{x‾,x^},xˉ][\max\{\underline x,\hat x\},\bar x][max{x​,x^},xˉ] if δ≥δ^(λ)\delta\ge\hat\delta(\lambda)δ≥δ^(λ), and x^(λ,δ)\hat x(\lambda,\delta)x^(λ,δ) with a strictly higher fee if δ<δ^(λ)\delta<\hat\delta(\lambda)δ<δ^(λ).
  5. (C.4): when only H-funds are raised above the H-LPs' break-even rate, μHK=IH−A=(pR−fˉH)A/(RˉH−(pR−fˉH))\mu_HK=I_H-A=(pR-\bar f_H)A/(\bar R_H-(pR-\bar f_H))μH​K=IH​−A=(pR−fˉ​H​)A/(RˉH​−(pR−fˉ​H​)); for fixed fee, the contribution decreases with RˉH\bar R_HRˉH​.
  6. (18): the indifference rate RˉPE,Hmax∈(1+r(λ,δL),pR)\bar R^{max}_{PE,H}\in(1+r(\lambda,\delta_L),pR)RˉPE,Hmax​∈(1+r(λ,δL​),pR).
  7. Lemma C.1: αL∗>0\alpha^*_L>0αL∗​>0 implies RˉPE,L∗=1+r(λ,δL)\bar R^*_{PE,L}=1+r(\lambda,\delta_L)RˉPE,L∗​=1+r(λ,δL​).

Significance

The result shows that heterogeneous liquidity needs alone, without any difference in skill, produce a cross-section of LP returns: when capital from liquidity-tolerant LPs is scarce, those LPs earn strictly more than other LPs investing in otherwise identical funds. When it is abundant, they earn only their fair liquidity premium. This separates a liquidity explanation of return persistence from a skill explanation, and it is the benchmark against which the paper's second main result, the effect of a secondary market (Proposition 3, a separate mission), is measured.

The paper proves the result by hand. No part of it has a machine-checked proof. A formalization would check the three-case equilibrium argument, including uniqueness, which the paper treats briefly. It would also fix the readings of Definition 2 that the printed statement leaves open (see below) and record the hypotheses the proofs use without stating. The fee-design lemma (Lemma 2) is a small linear program of independent interest for moral-hazard models with several projects.

Difficulty

The equilibrium statements quantify over every equilibrium, and an equilibrium includes an optimal contract for each fund type, optimal against all fee schedules, call shares and fund sizes. The obvious approach, substituting the closed-form fee (15) and the optimal call (17) into the profit function, does not suffice. Uniqueness requires showing that no other combination of returns, fund fractions and contracts clears both markets. That includes returns at which a fund type is not raised. It also includes returns above the break-even rate, where the no-default constraint loosens and the fee falls. Ruling these out needs the GP's optimal profit to be decreasing in the promised return even when the no-default constraint binds. The boundary at μ‾H\underline\mu_Hμ​H​, where the HHH-market just clears with every GP raising an HHH-fund, has to be placed correctly.

Formalization scope

  • Parameters. The parameter structure records 0<q<p≤10<q<p\le 10<q<p≤1, B,A,K>0B,A,K>0B,A,K>0, λ,δL,δH∈(0,1)\lambda,\delta_L,\delta_H\in(0,1)λ,δL​,δH​∈(0,1), and Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 6 as printed. Two hypotheses are added and disclosed:
    • Assumption 5 is required strictly for δL\delta_LδL​, 1+r(λ,δL)<pR1+r(\lambda,\delta_L)<pR1+r(λ,δL​)<pR. With equality the GP's profit does not depend on the fee, and the strict ranking of returns fails.
    • B≤p(p−q)RB\le p(p-q)RB≤p(p−q)R makes limited liability compatible with incentive compatibility at every call share. The paper's Claim A.1 assumes the stronger R≥B/(p−q)2R\ge B/(p-q)^2R≥B/(p−q)2.
  • Fee schedules are indexed by the four success outcomes rather than the four cash-flow values. These differ only at x=1/2x=1/2x=1/2, and the minimal fee is the same.
  • Equation (3) is stated multiplied out with I>AI>AI>A, never as a quotient. A return at which the GP's profit is unbounded therefore admits no optimal contract and cannot be an equilibrium price. Contract optimality is global over (x,I,f)(x,I,f)(x,I,f).
  • Definition 2 is read with αL+αH=1\alpha_L+\alpha_H=1αL​+αH​=1, which the proof uses. GP fund choice is read as "a raised fund type is profit-maximizing", the only-if direction of the printed biconditional. The literal biconditional admits no equilibrium at μH=μ‾H\mu_H=\underline\mu_HμH​=μ​H​.
  • Two printed boundaries are corrected. Proposition 2 i) is stated for μH<μ‾H\mu_H<\underline\mu_HμH​<μ​H​, which resolves the overlap of its two cases as the proof does. "Decreasing" is read as strict.
  • Out of scope. Assumption 4 and capital-call relief (Appendix C.1) are not formalized, since the no-default constraint (4) is imposed directly. The GP takes Rˉ\bar RRˉ as given, so raising the promised return (C.2) is not modelled. Appendix A's alternative contracts and the "no fund" option are also out of scope.
  • Trivializations ruled out. The goal asserts existence of an equilibrium for every μH∈(0,1)\mu_H\in(0,1)μH​∈(0,1), so its "every equilibrium" clauses are not vacuous. The strict chain 0<μ‾H<μˉH<10<\underline\mu_H<\bar\mu_H<10<μ​H​<μˉ​H​<1 excludes degenerate thresholds.

Everything is built from Mathlib's real numbers and finite sums. The fee-schedule linear program (Lemma 2), the contract problem (Proposition 1) and the equilibrium predicate are reusable for the secondary-market mission of the same paper. Proofs of any milestone, and the pinned-threshold variant of the goal, are welcome.

Selected references

  • V. Maurin, D. T. Robinson and P. Strömberg, A Theory of Liquidity in Private Equity, working paper, draft of December 2020; published in Management Science 69(10), 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4612
  • S. N. Kaplan and A. Schoar, Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, and Capital Flows, Journal of Finance 60(4), 1791–1823, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00775.x
  • J. Lerner, A. Schoar and W. Wongsunwai, Smart Institutions, Foolish Choices: The Limited Partner Performance Puzzle, Journal of Finance 62(2), 731–764, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01220.x
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Precommitments in Two-Sided Market Competition 2: Commission Precommitment Beats No Commitment When γ ≥ β or γ ≪ β, and Loses to It When γ Is Just Below βResearch Paper

Motivation

Many service platforms set a price paid by customers and a wage paid to the providers who serve them. A platform may instead announce how much of each transaction's price it will pass to providers, then choose prices after both platforms have announced their shares. These are different games: a price change in the second game changes both customer demand and provider pay. Hu and Liu's study of precommitments in two-sided competition asks which timing gives platforms a more favorable equilibrium. This mission isolates their comparison between a commission precommitment and no commitment, Proposition 3(b) of the submitted manuscript. The authors' Online Appendix, included in that manuscript, contains the proofs.

The comparison is useful where a platform must choose a contract with providers before it can adjust customer prices. It is not enough to know that either side of the market is competitive: the answer changes as demand-side and supply-side competition intensities move relative to each other. The mission makes the claimed parameter regions precise and ties them to equilibria of the two games.

Setting

There are two platforms, indexed by i=1,2i=1,2i=1,2, with rival j≠ij\ne ij=i. Platform iii posts a consumer price pip_ipi​ and a provider wage wiw_iwi​. Fix a potential market size Ω>0\Omega>0Ω>0. The demand substitution factor γ∈[0,1)\gamma\in[0,1)γ∈[0,1) measures how a rival's price raises demand for platform iii. The supply substitution factor β∈[0,1)\beta\in[0,1)β∈[0,1) measures how a rival's wage draws providers away. The paper uses the positive part [x]+=max⁡{x,0}[x]^+=\max\{x,0\}[x]+=max{x,0}:

di(p)=[Ω−pi+γpj]+,si(w)=[wi−βwj]+.d_i(p)=[\Omega-p_i+\gamma p_j]^+,\qquad s_i(w)=[w_i-\beta w_j]^+.di​(p)=[Ω−pi​+γpj​]+,si​(w)=[wi​−βwj​]+.

The number of completed matches is zi=min⁡{di(p),si(w)}z_i=\min\{d_i(p),s_i(w)\}zi​=min{di​(p),si​(w)}. Profit is πi=(pi−wi)zi\pi_i=(p_i-w_i)z_iπi​=(pi​−wi​)zi​. Unmatched consumers or providers generate no revenue. Keeping the positive parts matters when a platform chooses a price or wage that leaves one side of the market empty.

In mode P, both platforms choose their prices and wages simultaneously, and each can change its own price and wage together while its rival's choices stay fixed. In mode C, each platform first commits to a pay-out ratio αi∈(0,1)\alpha_i\in(0,1)αi​∈(0,1). The provider then receives wi=αipiw_i=\alpha_i p_iwi​=αi​pi​ per match and the platform keeps 1−αi1-\alpha_i1−αi​ of its price. After observing both ratios, the platforms choose prices. Their profit in this second stage is

πi(α,p)=(1−αi)pimin⁡{di(p),si(αp)}.\pi_i(\alpha,p)=(1-\alpha_i)p_i\min\{d_i(p),s_i(\alpha p)\}.πi​(α,p)=(1−αi​)pi​min{di​(p),si​(αp)}.

A subgame-perfect equilibrium in mode C specifies a price equilibrium after every admissible pair of ratios and an initial pair of ratios that resists unilateral deviation when prices are chosen again. The mission compares symmetric commission equilibria to the positive-profit equilibrium of mode P. In the paper's platform preference ranking, X⪰YX\succeq YX⪰Y means that mode XXX gives each platform a weakly higher price and profit, and a weakly lower wage and matching quantity, than mode YYY.

Formalization targets

No commitment and commission outcomes

Lemma 1 gives the simultaneous price-and-wage outcome. Writing D=4−3β−3γ+2βγD=4-3\beta-3\gamma+2\beta\gammaD=4−3β−3γ+2βγ, its price, wage, matching quantity, and profit are

pP∗=3−2βDΩ,wP∗=ΩD,zP∗=1−βDΩ,πP∗=2(1−β)2D2Ω2.p_P^*=\frac{3-2\beta}{D}\Omega,\quad w_P^*=\frac{\Omega}{D},\quad z_P^*=\frac{1-\beta}{D}\Omega,\quad \pi_P^*=\frac{2(1-\beta)^2}{D^2}\Omega^2.pP∗​=D3−2β​Ω,wP∗​=DΩ​,zP∗​=D1−β​Ω,πP∗​=D22(1−β)2​Ω2.

Lemma F.2 says that second-stage commission prices equate demand and supply. Lemma 4 characterizes the symmetric commission equilibrium by the radical α∗\alpha^*α∗ in equation (7), its price pC∗=Ω/[1−γ+(1−β)α∗]p_C^*=\Omega/[1-\gamma+(1-\beta)\alpha^*]pC∗​=Ω/[1−γ+(1−β)α∗], and its profit in equation (9). These are the three milestones. The radical is transcribed exactly in the Lean definition associated with equation (7).

Proposition 3(b)

The goal compares the two equilibrium outcomes using all four components of the platform preference ranking:

γ≥β ⟹ C⪰P;γ≪β ⟹ C⪰P;γ≤β and sufficiently close to β ⟹ P⪰C.\gamma\geq\beta\ \Longrightarrow\ C\succeq P;\qquad \gamma\ll\beta\ \Longrightarrow\ C\succeq P;\qquad \gamma\leq\beta\text{ and sufficiently close to }\beta\ \Longrightarrow\ P\succeq C.γ≥β ⟹ C⪰P;γ≪β ⟹ C⪰P;γ≤β and sufficiently close to β ⟹ P⪰C.

The two informal proximity phrases are expressed by the existence of positive thresholds, with the threshold allowed to depend on β\betaβ. At γ=β\gamma=\betaγ=β, both rankings can hold because the outcomes coincide. The goal also asserts that the equilibria being compared exist for every admissible parameter pair.

Significance

The result identifies when committing to a provider share yields a platform outcome that is preferable to choosing price and wage together. Its four-way comparison is stronger than a profit-only ranking: the associated prices, wages, and match counts all move in specified directions. It makes clear that the relative competition intensities on the two sides determine whether the timing of the provider contract helps or hurts platforms. Without the comparison, the closed-form equilibrium results for modes P and C would not say which contract timing platforms prefer.

The result is proved in the cited manuscript, with derivations in Online Appendix §F; it is not an open mathematical conjecture. The remaining work in this mission is a machine-checked Lean proof of the equilibrium statements and the parameter-region comparison. The development will also provide a reusable formal model of simultaneous and two-stage decisions in a two-sided market. No existing machine-checked proof of this particular comparison is identified in the local Prove2Me index.

Difficulty

A change in a commission ratio changes the wage at any given price, while the subsequent price decision changes both demand and the wage again. That coupling makes the comparison more delicate than ordering two prices by inspection. The commission equilibrium ratio contains a square root, and the ranking must establish the directions of four outcome quantities in several parameter regions. The apparent shortcut of comparing profits alone would leave three of Definition 1's required inequalities unresolved. The positive-part demand and supply functions also admit zero-match equilibria that complicate an unqualified uniqueness statement.

Formalization scope

The Lean development uses real-valued prices and wages, two platforms indexed by Fin 2, and all unilateral deviations in the stated strategy sets. Market size is positive, both substitution factors lie in [0,1)[0,1)[0,1), and pay-out ratios lie in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1). The paper does not spell out the strategy sets; these choices preserve the derivations in §3 and Appendix §F. The no-commitment uniqueness statement is restricted to equilibria where both platforms profit, because the literal unrestricted claim has zero-profit counterexamples. A second-stage strategy in mode C selects an equilibrium with positive profits for both platforms whenever one exists. This condition prevents off-path zero-profit punishments from making the printed symmetric SPE claim false.

The goal quantifies over equilibria derived from the demand, supply, match, and profit functions. It does not define an outcome to equal the paper's closed form, and it asserts equilibrium existence so that its universal comparisons have content. The radical for α∗\alpha^*α∗ is a named expression; Lemma 4, rather than its definition, establishes its equilibrium role. A full proof needs reasoning about unilateral deviations, positive-part functions, equilibrium existence and uniqueness, the radical expression, and real inequalities. The general Nash condition and the paper's market primitives are intended for reuse in other two-player platform games. Contributions addressing these foundations and any of the three cited milestones are within scope. Wage- and price-precommitment modes are outside this mission.

Selected references

  • Ming Hu and Yan Liu, Precommitments in Two-Sided Market Competition, submitted manuscript with Online Appendix associated with the 2023 publication, SSRN 3734828. Manuscript.
  • Ming Hu and Yan Liu, Precommitments in Two-Sided Market Competition, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 25(2), 704–718, 2023. DOI.
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Markov ChainOperations ResearchReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Nonstationary Reinforcement Learning: The Blessing of (More) Optimism III: Under Uniform One-Step Reachability ζ, the Un-widened Confidence Region Contains an MDP of Diameter at Most 1/ζResearch Paper

Motivation

Reinforcement learning in a changing environment has a difficulty that is absent from a fixed Markov decision process: transition data gathered earlier may describe a different system from the one the decision maker currently faces. A learning algorithm therefore estimates transitions from a recent window of observations. The estimate comes with a confidence region, a set of transition laws consistent with the data at a chosen statistical radius. In the general nonstationary setting studied by Cheung, Simchi-Levi and Zhu, their algorithm widens this region to ensure that it can contain a model whose states remain readily reachable. Such a model is needed for the paper's dynamic regret analysis. Section 7 isolates a structural condition under which widening is unnecessary: every destination is reachable from every state with a uniformly positive one-step probability under a suitable action. Cheung, Simchi-Levi and Zhu, §7.

This mission formalizes Proposition 4 of that paper, the precise claim that the original, unwidened transition region contains a model with a controlled diameter. It is one of three separate missions for the paper. The result supports the paper's no-widening variant of its learning algorithm; it is not a claim that every model in the confidence region has small diameter. Cheung, Simchi-Levi and Zhu, Proposition 4.

Setting

There are finitely many states S\mathcal SS and, for each state sss, a nonempty finite set As\mathcal A_sAs​ of permitted actions. At each time t∈[T]t\in[T]t∈[T], the system has a reward rt(s,a)∈[0,1]r_t(s,a)\in[0,1]rt​(s,a)∈[0,1] and a probability distribution pt(⋅∣s,a)p_t(\cdot\mid s,a)pt​(⋅∣s,a) for the next state. The distribution may change with ttt. A trajectory records the observed state sqs_qsq​, chosen action aqa_qaq​, and successor state sq+1s_{q+1}sq+1​ at each time qqq. These are the model primitives in §2.2. Cheung, Simchi-Levi and Zhu, pp. 6–7.

An episode begins at τ(m)\tau(m)τ(m) and uses a window of length WWW. At time ttt in that episode, Nt(s,a)N_t(s,a)Nt​(s,a) counts how often the pair (s,a)(s,a)(s,a) appears between (τ(m)−W)∨1(\tau(m)-W)\vee1(τ(m)−W)∨1 and t−1t-1t−1; Nt+(s,a)=max⁡{1,Nt(s,a)}N_t^+(s,a)=\max\{1,N_t(s,a)\}Nt+​(s,a)=max{1,Nt​(s,a)}. The empirical row p^t(⋅∣s,a)\hat p_t(\cdot\mid s,a)p^​t​(⋅∣s,a) counts observed successors and divides by Nt+(s,a)N_t^+(s,a)Nt+​(s,a). The corresponding average true row pˉt\bar p_tpˉ​t​ averages the time-varying transition probabilities over the same visits. Both are zero vectors when there are no visits. Cheung, Simchi-Levi and Zhu, equations (3) and (5).

Write SA=∑s∣As∣SA=\sum_s|\mathcal A_s|SA=∑s​∣As​∣, so this is the number of allowed state-action pairs. At confidence level δ\deltaδ, the transition radius is rad⁡p,t(s,a)=22Slog⁡(SAT/δ)/Nt+(s,a)\operatorname{rad}_{p,t}(s,a)=2\sqrt{2S\log(SAT/\delta)/N_t^+(s,a)}radp,t​(s,a)=22Slog(SAT/δ)/Nt+​(s,a)​. The region Hp,t(s,a;η)H_{p,t}(s,a;\eta)Hp,t​(s,a;η) consists of probability vectors within ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ distance rad⁡p,t(s,a)+η\operatorname{rad}_{p,t}(s,a)+\etaradp,t​(s,a)+η of p^t\hat p_tp^​t​. Here η=0\eta=0η=0 means no widening. The estimation event EpE_pEp​ bounds the ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ distance between pˉt\bar p_tpˉ​t​ and p^t\hat p_tp^​t​ by that radius for each allowed pair. Cheung, Simchi-Levi and Zhu, pp. 12, 14.

For a stationary transition model and policy π\piπ, the hitting time Λ(s′∣π,s)\Lambda(s'\mid\pi,s)Λ(s′∣π,s) counts transitions until the first arrival at s′s's′ after starting at sss. This includes the first return time when s=s′s=s's=s′. Its diameter is D=max⁡s,s′min⁡πE[Λ(s′∣π,s)]D=\max_{s,s'}\min_\pi\mathbb E[\Lambda(s'\mid\pi,s)]D=maxs,s′​minπ​E[Λ(s′∣π,s)]. Infinite expectations are possible in the definition. Cheung, Simchi-Levi and Zhu, Definition 1.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4

Assumption 2 supplies ζ>0\zeta>0ζ>0 and an allowed action a(s,s′)a_{(s,s')}a(s,s′)​ for every ordered pair of states, fixed across time, such that pt(s′∣s,a(s,s′))≥ζp_t(s'\mid s,a_{(s,s')})\ge\zetapt​(s′∣s,a(s,s′)​)≥ζ for all t∈[T]t\in[T]t∈[T]. Conditional on EpE_pEp​, Proposition 4 says that for every time in the horizon there exists a transition model ppp whose every allowed row belongs to Hp,t(s,a;0)H_{p,t}(s,a;0)Hp,t​(s,a;0) and whose diameter obeys

D(S,A,p)≤Dˉ:=1ζ.D(\mathcal S,\mathcal A,p)\le\bar D:=\frac1\zeta.D(S,A,p)≤Dˉ:=ζ1​.

The target is existential: the region need only contain one such model at each time. The milestone list follows the two cases in the proof of Lemma 13, the lemma's model existence claim, and the expected hitting-time bound in the proof of Proposition 4. Cheung, Simchi-Levi and Zhu, pp. 21, 49–50.

Significance

Proposition 4 identifies a condition under which the algorithm can use η=0\eta=0η=0 while retaining a uniform diameter guarantee for at least one plausible transition model. The paper uses this to analyze a no-widening version of its dynamic regret bound, and later applies that viewpoint to inventory control. Without a bounded-diameter model in the region, the diameter-dependent regret argument does not apply in the same form. Cheung, Simchi-Levi and Zhu, §7.

The proposition and its appendix proof are known results of the paper. This mission asks for a machine-checked account of the exact confidence region, its pathwise estimation event, Lemma 13, and the diameter claim. A general finite MDP with probability-valued transition rows is already available as the published FiniteMDPLearning definition; the paper-specific window estimators and its return-time diameter still need formal proofs. The paper's headline Theorems 1–4 are not posed here because their displayed bounds hide constants in O~(⋅)\widetilde O(\cdot)O(⋅) notation. Cheung, Simchi-Levi and Zhu, p. 6 and Theorems 1–4.

Difficulty

The obvious idea that the true transition law belongs to the confidence region can fail under drift: the region is centered on recent observations, while the law at the current time may differ from the laws that generated those observations. Even the average true row has a special case. At an unvisited pair, equation (5) sets it to the zero vector, which is not a probability distribution and therefore is not a member of the simplex-valued confidence region. The existence claim must cover visited and unvisited pairs while preserving one-step reachability for all targets under a single transition law. Cheung, Simchi-Levi and Zhu, pp. 12, 49–50.

The diameter also uses the paper's first-arrival-after-start convention. A library travel time that is zero when source equals target misses the return-time cases and would weaken the stated conclusion. Cheung, Simchi-Levi and Zhu, Definition 1.

Formalization scope

States and actions are Fin S and Fin A; permitted actions are state-dependent finite sets. Extra MDP rows for disallowed actions are never consulted. The finite MDP type supplies valid probability rows and bounded rewards. Hitting times and the diameter use extended nonnegative reals, so infinite values are represented without a default real value. The diameter ranges over allowed deterministic stationary policies and over all ordered state pairs, including equal pairs. Time is zero-based in Lean: paper time t∈[T]t\in[T]t∈[T] is index t−1<Tt-1<Tt−1<T, and the paper's window becomes the half-open interval [τm-W,t). The paper's N+N^+N+ is at least one, so its estimators never divide by zero. A result at arbitrary ttt with τm≤t<T\tau_m\le t<Tτm​≤t<T covers every episode time without assuming any additional episode schedule property.

The Lean statement makes two domain conditions explicit: S>1S>1S>1 and 0<δ<10<\delta<10<δ<1. These ensure the paper's claim that the radius at an unvisited pair is at least one; it can fail when S=1S=1S=1 and the confidence level is close to one. Assumption 2 is required for every time in the horizon, with ζ>0\zeta>0ζ>0. The event EpE_pEp​ is the ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ estimation inequality at the selected time. The paper writes it as membership of pˉt\bar p_tpˉ​t​ in a simplex-valued region for every pair, but that literal wording is false at an unvisited pair because pˉt=0\bar p_t=0pˉ​t​=0 there. At visited pairs, the inequality and membership agree. This convention is disclosed in the definition item and keeps the theorem meaningful on ordinary early trajectories.

The region is centered at the exact empirical p^t\hat p_tp^​t​, uses η=0\eta=0η=0, and constrains every allowed row of the constructed model. The diameter uses its full extended-real value, and ζ\zetaζ is strictly positive; dropping any of these clauses would change the claim. Reusable contributions include finite-state hitting-time estimates and windowed transition estimation identities. Proofs of the four milestones and the goal, as well as small lemmas connecting the published MDP measure to successive transition rows, are welcome.

Selected references

  • W. C. Cheung, D. Simchi-Levi and R. Zhu, Non-Stationary Reinforcement Learning: The Blessing of (More) Optimism, arXiv:1906.02922v4, 2020; published as Nonstationary Reinforcement Learning: The Blessing of (More) Optimism, Management Science, 2023. arXiv
  • T. Jaksch, R. Ortner and P. Auer, Near-optimal Regret Bounds for Reinforcement Learning, Journal of Machine Learning Research 11, 2010. JMLR
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Competition and Collaboration on Fundraising for Short-Term Disaster Response: The Impact on Earmarking and Performance III: Partial-Collaboration Equilibria: KKT Utilities and Free-Riding EffortsResearch Paper

Motivation

After a sudden-onset disaster, humanitarian organizations (HOs) raise most of their response budget from private donors within days. Donors increasingly earmark their gifts, restricting them to a region, a program or a type of expense. Earmarking makes an appeal more attractive to a donor but lowers the share of each dollar that the HO can deploy immediately. Aflaki and Pedraza-Martinez (SSRN 3705595, published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2023, doi:10.1287/msom.2023.1202) model how HOs set earmarking and fundraising effort under three institutional arrangements: competition, full collaboration (a coalition that fundraises and decides as one), and partial collaboration, in which HOs pool the cost of reaching donors on a common platform while each donor still chooses which HO to give to. Joint appeals such as the UK's Disasters Emergency Committee are of the last kind.

This mission formalizes the paper's equilibrium result for partial collaboration (Proposition 4): equilibria exist, equilibrium earmarking is determined by first-order conditions that do not involve the efforts, and only the HOs with the largest required funding relative to their unit performance pay for the platform, while the others free-ride.

Setting

There are n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 HOs i∈I={1,…,n}i \in I = \{1, \dots, n\}i∈I={1,…,n}. HO iii chooses a base utility si∈[ai,bi]s_i \in [a_i, b_i]si​∈[ai​,bi​], the attractiveness to donors that its earmarking level induces, and an effort xi∈[0,1]x_i \in [0, 1]xi​∈[0,1], the fraction of donors it pays to contact, at cost Ci(xi)C_i(x_i)Ci​(xi​). Its unit performance δi(si)∈(0,1]\delta_i(s_i) \in (0, 1]δi​(si​)∈(0,1] is the fraction of each donated dollar usable now, and Bi>0B_i > 0Bi​>0 is its required funding. The mean donation is normalized to 111.

Pooled effort reaches xˉ=min⁡(∑i∈Ixi,1)\bar x = \min\left(\sum_{i \in I} x_i, 1\right)xˉ=min(∑i∈I​xi​,1) donors. A contacted donor gives to HO iii with the multinomial-logit probability

θip(s)=esi1+∑j∈Iesj,\theta^p_i(s) = \frac{e^{s_i}}{1 + \sum_{j \in I} e^{s_j}},θip​(s)=1+∑j∈I​esj​esi​​,

the 111 being the option of not donating, so HO iii expects donations xˉ θip(s)\bar x\,\theta^p_i(s)xˉθip​(s) and achieves total performance δi(si) xˉ θip(s)\delta_i(s_i)\,\bar x\,\theta^p_i(s)δi​(si​)xˉθip​(s), of which only min⁡(⋅,Bi)\min(\cdot, B_i)min(⋅,Bi​) is useful. HO iii is lexicographic (problem (10)): given the other HOs' strategies, it first minimizes its funding gap (Bi−δi(si)xˉθip(s))+\left(B_i - \delta_i(s_i)\bar x\theta^p_i(s)\right)^+(Bi​−δi​(si​)xˉθip​(s))+ over [ai,bi]×[0,1][a_i, b_i] \times [0,1][ai​,bi​]×[0,1]; among the gap minimizers it maximizes its utility min⁡(δi(si)xˉθip(s),Bi)−Ci(xi)\min\left(\delta_i(s_i)\bar x\theta^p_i(s), B_i\right) - C_i(x_i)min(δi​(si​)xˉθip​(s),Bi​)−Ci​(xi​); and an HO that is still indifferent picks a strategy maximizing its unconstrained total performance δi(si)xˉθip(s)\delta_i(s_i)\bar x\theta^p_i(s)δi​(si​)xˉθip​(s). A Nash equilibrium is a profile (s,x)(s, x)(s,x) in the product of the boxes at which every HO's strategy is such a best response. Finally,

αip(s)=min⁡(Biδi(si) θip(s),1)\alpha^p_i(s) = \min\left(\frac{B_i}{\delta_i(s_i)\,\theta^p_i(s)}, 1\right)αip​(s)=min(δi​(si​)θip​(s)Bi​​,1)

is the reach HO iii needs to close its own gap.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4

A pure Nash equilibrium exists. For every profile (s,x)(s, x)(s,x) in the box, labelled so that α1p(s)≥⋯≥αnp(s)\alpha^p_1(s) \ge \dots \ge \alpha^p_n(s)α1p​(s)≥⋯≥αnp​(s), with kˉ=#{i:αip(s)=α1p(s)}\bar k = \#\{i : \alpha^p_i(s) = \alpha^p_1(s)\}kˉ=#{i:αip​(s)=α1p​(s)}: (s,x)(s, x)(s,x) is an equilibrium if and only if (i) for every iii there are λi1p,λi2p≥0\lambda^p_{i1}, \lambda^p_{i2} \ge 0λi1p​,λi2p​≥0 with

δi′(si)δi(si)+∂θip(s)/∂siθip(s)+λi1p−λi2p=0,λi1p(ai−si)=0,λi2p(si−bi)=0,(11)\frac{\delta_i'(s_i)}{\delta_i(s_i)} + \frac{\partial \theta^p_i(s)/\partial s_i}{\theta^p_i(s)} + \lambda^p_{i1} - \lambda^p_{i2} = 0, \quad \lambda^p_{i1}(a_i - s_i) = 0, \quad \lambda^p_{i2}(s_i - b_i) = 0, \tag{11}δi​(si​)δi′​(si​)​+θip​(s)∂θip​(s)/∂si​​+λi1p​−λi2p​=0,λi1p​(ai​−si​)=0,λi2p​(si​−bi​)=0,(11)

and (ii) ∑i=1kˉxi=α1p(s)\sum_{i=1}^{\bar k} x_i = \alpha^p_1(s)∑i=1kˉ​xi​=α1p​(s) and xkˉ+1=⋯=xn=0x_{\bar k+1} = \dots = x_n = 0xkˉ+1​=⋯=xn​=0.

Milestones

  1. (S11): (s,x)(s, x)(s,x) is an equilibrium iff each sis_isi​ maximizes σ↦δi(σ)θip(σ,s−i)\sigma \mapsto \delta_i(\sigma)\theta^p_i(\sigma, s_{-i})σ↦δi​(σ)θip​(σ,s−i​) on [ai,bi][a_i, b_i][ai​,bi​] and xi=(αip(s)−∑j≠ixj)+x_i = \left(\alpha^p_i(s) - \sum_{j \ne i} x_j\right)^+xi​=(αip​(s)−∑j=i​xj​)+.
  2. Log-concavity: σ↦δi(σ)θip(σ,s−i)\sigma \mapsto \delta_i(\sigma)\theta^p_i(\sigma, s_{-i})σ↦δi​(σ)θip​(σ,s−i​) is log-concave on [ai,bi][a_i, b_i][ai​,bi​].
  3. Total effort: every solution of xi=(αi−∑j≠ixj)+x_i = (\alpha_i - \sum_{j \ne i} x_j)^+xi​=(αi​−∑j=i​xj​)+ with α\alphaα sorted decreasingly has ∑ixi≥α1\sum_i x_i \ge \alpha_1∑i​xi​≥α1​.
  4. Effort system: for 1≥α1≥⋯≥αn≥01 \ge \alpha_1 \ge \dots \ge \alpha_n \ge 01≥α1​≥⋯≥αn​≥0 and x∈[0,1]nx \in [0,1]^nx∈[0,1]n, that system holds iff ∑i≤kˉxi=α1\sum_{i \le \bar k} x_i = \alpha_1∑i≤kˉ​xi​=α1​ and xi=0x_i = 0xi​=0 for i>kˉi > \bar ki>kˉ.

Significance

The proposition separates the two decisions. Equilibrium earmarking solves each HO's own first-order condition (11) and does not depend on anyone's effort, because the pooled reach multiplies every HO's donations by the same factor. Equilibrium effort is a pure coordination outcome: the platform is funded exactly up to the largest required reach α1p\alpha^p_1α1p​, and only the HOs attaining it contribute. The paper uses these facts to compare earmarking and performance across the three arrangements (its Propositions 5 and 7), and the free-riding structure is what drives the comparison of partial collaboration with competition.

The result is proved in the paper's Online Supplement (pp. S13–S14). No machine-checked version exists. The mission asks for a Lean proof of the proposition as stated, with the equilibrium defined from the HOs' lexicographic problem rather than from its characterization; the effort-system milestones are self-contained statements about a piecewise-linear fixed-point system and are reusable for other pooled-contribution games.

Difficulty

The obvious argument, "each HO maximizes δiθip\delta_i\theta^p_iδi​θip​, and the rest is bookkeeping", skips the case analysis behind (S11). Whether HO iii's gap can be closed depends on the others' efforts. When the others' pooled effort already covers HO iii's requirement, HO iii's gap and utility no longer depend on its base utility. Only the third, tie-breaking level of the best response then pins sis_isi​ down, and without it (11) is false. The existence part needs a fixed point of the base-utility best-response map on ∏i[ai,bi]\prod_i [a_i, b_i]∏i​[ai​,bi​]; when HO iii's best response is not unique, that map is not even a function. In part (ii), the effort system xi=(αi−∑j≠ixj)+x_i = (\alpha_i - \sum_{j \ne i} x_j)^+xi​=(αi​−∑j=i​xj​)+ is not a contraction, and the paper's proof by successive elimination of indices is informal.

Formalization scope

HOs are Fin n with 0-based indices, so α1p\alpha^p_1α1p​ is the value at index 0, and [NeZero n] is assumed. Strategies are in base-utility coordinates: δi:R→R\delta_i : \mathbb R \to \mathbb Rδi​:R→R is a primitive function of sis_isi​, as in the paper's problem (10). The earmarking coordinates are not modelled. All definitions live in one Setting structure with a Standing predicate, which every theorem assumes:

  • ai≤bia_i \le b_iai​≤bi​ and Bi>0B_i > 0Bi​>0;
  • CiC_iCi​ is nonnegative and strictly increasing on [0,1][0,1][0,1];
  • on an open interval containing [ai,bi][a_i, b_i][ai​,bi​], δi\delta_iδi​ is positive, differentiable and concave;
  • δi≤1\delta_i \le 1δi​≤1 on [ai,bi][a_i, b_i][ai​,bi​].

Bi>0B_i > 0Bi​>0 is implicit in the paper; with all Bi=0B_i = 0Bi​=0 every base utility is an equilibrium strategy. Concavity of δi\delta_iδi​ is used by the paper's proof. The HO problem (10) is printed with decision (si,xˉ)(s_i, \bar x)(si​,xˉ) and cost Cp(xˉ)C^p(\bar x)Cp(xˉ). It is encoded with HO iii's own effort xix_ixi​ and own cost Ci(xi)C_i(x_i)Ci​(xi​), the reading used by the paper's proof and by part (ii). The paper's "without loss of generality" ordering is the hypothesis that αp(s)\alpha^p(s)αp(s) is antitone in the index, and kˉ\bar kkˉ is the number of entries tied with the first; this gives kˉ=n\bar k = nkˉ=n when all tie. Partial derivatives are Mathlib deriv of t↦θip(s with si:=t)t \mapsto \theta^p_i(s \text{ with } s_i := t)t↦θip​(s with si​:=t). Every function differentiated is differentiable at the point by Standing. The pure-algebra milestones 3–4 use no game objects.

The equilibrium must not be defined by (S11) or (11); that would make the goal a tautology. The Setting defines it as the three-level lexicographic best response over the full strategy box, and (S11) is a milestone to be proved. A sorry-free check that the standing hypotheses hold for the paper's numerical primitives (δi(s)=1−s/4\delta_i(s) = 1 - s/4δi​(s)=1−s/4, Ci(x)=x/10C_i(x) = x/10Ci​(x)=x/10, [ai,bi]=[0,1][a_i, b_i] = [0,1][ai​,bi​]=[0,1], B=(0.2,0.3)B = (0.2, 0.3)B=(0.2,0.3)) accompanies the draft.

A full development needs: KKT conditions for a differentiable concave function on a compact interval (including the degenerate interval ai=bia_i = b_iai​=bi​); log-concavity of the logistic share; a continuous-maximum (Berge-type) argument and Brouwer's fixed-point theorem on a product of intervals; and the algebra of the effort system. Contributions of the interval-KKT lemma and of the effort-system lemmas are welcome as separate theorems.

The source is the authors' SSRN version (abstract 3705595, dated December 2022); all proofs are in its Online Supplement, Section S3.

Selected references

  • A. Aflaki, A. J. Pedraza-Martinez, Competition and Collaboration on Fundraising for Short-Term Disaster Response: The Impact on Earmarking and Performance, SSRN 3705595, version of December 2022. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3705595
  • A. Aflaki, A. J. Pedraza-Martinez, same title, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.1202
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AnalysisEconomicsOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization III: Whether Utility Rises with Session Length Is Decided by Span Versus MoreishnessResearch Paper

Motivation

Platforms that rank content by engagement (time spent, items consumed) implicitly assume revealed preference: a user who stays longer is a user who is better off. Kleinberg, Mullainathan and Raghavan (arXiv:2202.11776, Management Science 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.03683) model a user with inconsistent preferences, a forward-looking system 2 and an impulsive system 1, and show that engagement and utility can come apart. Because utility cannot be read off behavioural data, platforms also run post-session surveys. Section 5.1 of the paper asks what such surveys can reveal: if a survey gives an estimate of the utility SSS of a session, does E[S∣T=t]\mathbb E[S\mid T=t]E[S∣T=t] rise or fall with the session length ttt, and what does that say about the content? Theorem 5.1 answers this in terms of two content parameters, the span qqq and the moreishness ppp.

Setting

A session proceeds in two phases (§2.1, pp. 5–7).

  • Span. After each item, system 2 remains interested with probability qqq. The number of items it enjoys, TqT_qTq​, has the geometric law on {1,2,… }\{1,2,\dots\}{1,2,…}: Pr⁡[Tq=τ]=qτ−1(1−q)\Pr[T_q=\tau]=q^{\tau-1}(1-q)Pr[Tq​=τ]=qτ−1(1−q).
  • Moreishness. Once system 2 is done, system 1 keeps the user on: with probability ppp at each step, the first one included, it consumes one more item. With Tp:=T−Tq+1T_p:=T-T_q+1Tp​:=T−Tq​+1, Pr⁡[Tp=k]=pk−1(1−p)\Pr[T_p=k]=p^{k-1}(1-p)Pr[Tp​=k]=pk−1(1−p) for k≥1k\ge1k≥1.
  • TqT_qTq​ and TpT_pTp​ are independent, and the session length is T=Tq+Tp−1∈{1,2,… }T=T_q+T_p-1\in\{1,2,\dots\}T=Tq​+Tp​−1∈{1,2,…}. For 1≤τ≤t1\le\tau\le t1≤τ≤t,
Pr⁡[Tq=τ∩Tp=t−τ+1]=qτ−1(1−q) pt−τ(1−p).\Pr[T_q=\tau\cap T_p=t-\tau+1]=q^{\tau-1}(1-q)\,p^{t-\tau}(1-p).Pr[Tq​=τ∩Tp​=t−τ+1]=qτ−1(1−q)pt−τ(1−p).
  • Utility. Each item system 2 enjoys has value of mean vˉ\bar vvˉ; every step costs the outside option WWW. The paper's equations (8)–(9) give
E[S∣T=t]=vˉ E[Tq∣T=t]−Wt,E[Tq∣T=t]=∑τ=1tτPr⁡[Tq=τ∩Tp=t−τ+1]∑τ′=1tPr⁡[Tq=τ′∩Tp=t−τ′+1].\mathbb E[S\mid T=t]=\bar v\,\mathbb E[T_q\mid T=t]-Wt,\qquad \mathbb E[T_q\mid T=t]=\frac{\sum_{\tau=1}^{t}\tau\Pr[T_q=\tau\cap T_p=t-\tau+1]}{\sum_{\tau'=1}^{t}\Pr[T_q=\tau'\cap T_p=t-\tau'+1]}.E[S∣T=t]=vˉE[Tq​∣T=t]−Wt,E[Tq​∣T=t]=∑τ′=1t​Pr[Tq​=τ′∩Tp​=t−τ′+1]∑τ=1t​τPr[Tq​=τ∩Tp​=t−τ+1]​.

The Lean development names these objects geomLaw (the law gr(k)=rk−1(1−r)g_r(k)=r^{k-1}(1-r)gr​(k)=rk−1(1−r), k≥1k\ge1k≥1), jointMass, condMeanTq (9) and condUtility (8), all in the namespace EngagementOpt.Survey. Write f(t)=E[S∣T=t]f(t)=\mathbb E[S\mid T=t]f(t)=E[S∣T=t] and

φ(x)=x+1x(1−ln⁡(x+1)x)\varphi(x)=\frac{x+1}{x}\left(1-\frac{\ln(x+1)}{x}\right)φ(x)=xx+1​(1−xln(x+1)​)

(phi), the function of the paper's (11) and Lemma D.1.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1 (p. 19)

Assume 0<p<10<p<10<p<1, 0<q<10<q<10<q<1, vˉ≥0\bar v\ge0vˉ≥0 and W>0W>0W>0. For integer session lengths t≥1t\ge1t≥1:

  1. q=pq=pq=p:   (∀t≥1, f(t)<f(t+1))  ⟺  vˉ>2W\;\bigl(\forall t\ge1,\ f(t)<f(t+1)\bigr)\iff \bar v>2W(∀t≥1, f(t)<f(t+1))⟺vˉ>2W.
  2. q>pq>pq>p: (a) if vˉ>2W\bar v>2Wvˉ>2W then f(t)<f(t+1)f(t)<f(t+1)f(t)<f(t+1) for all t≥1t\ge1t≥1; (b) if vˉ>W\bar v>Wvˉ>W there is t∗t^*t∗ with f(t)<f(t+1)f(t)<f(t+1)f(t)<f(t+1) for all t>t∗t>t^*t>t∗.
  3. q<pq<pq<p: (a) if vˉ<2W\bar v<2Wvˉ<2W then f(t+1)<f(t)f(t+1)<f(t)f(t+1)<f(t) for all t≥1t\ge1t≥1; (b) there is t∗t^*t∗ with f(t+1)<f(t)f(t+1)<f(t)f(t+1)<f(t) for all t>t∗t>t^*t>t∗.

The goal is the conjunction of the five claims.

Milestones, in proof order

  • (9) with p=qp=qp=q (p. 20): E[Tq∣Tq+Tp=t+1]=t+12\mathbb E[T_q\mid T_q+T_p=t+1]=\frac{t+1}{2}E[Tq​∣Tq​+Tp​=t+1]=2t+1​.
  • (10) (p. 21): f(t)=vˉt+12−Wtf(t)=\bar v\frac{t+1}{2}-Wtf(t)=vˉ2t+1​−Wt if p=qp=qp=q, and f(t)=vˉ(tβtβt−1−1β−1)−Wtf(t)=\bar v\bigl(\frac{t\beta^t}{\beta^t-1}-\frac1{\beta-1}\bigr)-Wtf(t)=vˉ(βt−1tβt​−β−11​)−Wt with β=q/p\beta=q/pβ=q/p if p≠qp\ne qp=q.
  • (11) (p. 21): extending (10) to real s>0s>0s>0, its derivative at ttt is vˉ φ(βt−1)−W\bar v\,\varphi(\beta^t-1)-Wvˉφ(βt−1)−W.
  • Proof of Lemma D.1 (pp. 40–41): φ(x)→12\varphi(x)\to\frac12φ(x)→21​ as x→0x\to0x→0; (x+2)ln⁡(x+1)−2x(x+2)\ln(x+1)-2x(x+2)ln(x+1)−2x is ≥0\ge0≥0 for x>0x>0x>0 and ≤0\le0≤0 on (−1,0)(-1,0)(−1,0).
  • Lemma D.1 (p. 40): φ(x)≥12\varphi(x)\ge\frac12φ(x)≥21​ for x>0x>0x>0 and φ(x)≤12\varphi(x)\le\frac12φ(x)≤21​ for −1<x<0-1<x<0−1<x<0.
  • Proof of Theorem 5.1 (p. 22): φ(x)→1\varphi(x)\to1φ(x)→1 as x→∞x\to\inftyx→∞ and φ(x)→0\varphi(x)\to0φ(x)→0 as x→−1+x\to-1^+x→−1+.

Significance

The theorem describes how span and moreishness affect the relation between survey utility and session length. When q>pq>pq>p and vˉ>W\bar v>Wvˉ>W, utility eventually increases; when q<pq<pq<p, it eventually decreases. In the symmetric case q=pq=pq=p, the sign is decided by vˉ\bar vvˉ against 2W2W2W alone. These are conditional predictions for survey data, rather than a converse that identifies qqq and ppp from the sign by itself.

The result is proved in the paper; it has no machine-checked proof. Formalizing it checks the Bayes computation (9)–(10), including an arithmetico-geometric sum and a printed exponent slip on p. 20 (pt+1p^{t+1}pt+1 for pt−1p^{t-1}pt−1, harmless because it cancels), and the real-analytic Lemma D.1. It also makes explicit one hypothesis the printed theorem omits (below).

Difficulty

The closed form (10) needs the sum ∑τ=1tτβτ\sum_{\tau=1}^t\tau\beta^{\tau}∑τ=1t​τβτ and care with βt−1\beta^t-1βt−1 in denominators. The main obstacle is that monotonicity is a statement about integer ttt, while the natural tool, the derivative φ(βt−1)\varphi(\beta^t-1)φ(βt−1) of the real extension, lives on real ttt; the integer statement must be recovered from bounds on φ\varphiφ over whole intervals, not at single points. Lemma D.1 is a two-level sign analysis of a function with a removable singularity at 000, and the two limits at ∞\infty∞ and at −1+-1^+−1+ are of L'Hôpital type. The obvious argument for 2(b), "φ→1>W/vˉ\varphi\to1>W/\bar vφ→1>W/vˉ", silently uses vˉ>W\bar v>Wvˉ>W; without it, since φ<1\varphi<1φ<1 on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), the claim fails.

Formalization scope

  • Explicit discrete model. (8) and (9) are taken as the definitions of E[S∣T=t]\mathbb E[S\mid T=t]E[S∣T=t] and E[Tq∣T=t]\mathbb E[T_q\mid T=t]E[Tq​∣T=t]; no measure-theoretic conditioning is involved. Independence of TqT_qTq​ and TpT_pTp​ is the product form of jointMass.
  • Integer time in the goal. t∈Nt\in\mathbb Nt∈N, t≥1t\ge1t≥1 (the support of TTT). "Increases with ttt" is f(t)<f(t+1)f(t)<f(t+1)f(t)<f(t+1), strictly; "for t>t∗t>t^*t>t∗" is ∃t0∈N, ∀t>t0\exists t_0\in\mathbb N,\ \forall t>t_0∃t0​∈N, ∀t>t0​. Real ttt and the real power βt\beta^tβt appear only in the milestone (11).
  • Hypotheses. 0<p<10<p<10<p<1 and 0<q<10<q<10<q<1 are the paper's standing assumptions; they exclude the degenerate p=q=0p=q=0p=q=0, where T=1T=1T=1 almost surely and Lean's x/0=0x/0=0x/0=0 would make claim 1 false. The paper's parameter space has vˉ≥0\bar v\ge0vˉ≥0 (p. 15). W>0W>0W>0 is implicit (§2.1 normalizes W=1W=1W=1). vˉ>W\bar v>Wvˉ>W in 2(b) is added: the proof uses it on p. 22 ("since vˉ>W\bar v>Wvˉ>W by assumption") and 2(b) is false without it.
  • Domain of φ\varphiφ. Every statement about φ\varphiφ restricts xxx to x>0x>0x>0, −1<x<0-1<x<0−1<x<0, a punctured neighbourhood of 000, the right neighbourhood of −1-1−1, or x→∞x\to\inftyx→∞, so the junk values at x=0x=0x=0 and x≤−1x\le-1x≤−1 never enter.
  • Ruled out. Stating the goal for real ttt, dropping p,q>0p,q>0p,q>0, or reading 1 as a one-way implication all give a different theorem.
  • Infrastructure. Mathlib's Real.log, Real.rpow, HasDerivAt, Filter.Tendsto and finite sums suffice. The inequality ln⁡(1+x)≥2x/(x+2)\ln(1+x)\ge 2x/(x+2)ln(1+x)≥2x/(x+2) for x≥0x\ge0x≥0 is in Mathlib (Real.le_log_one_add_of_nonneg). Contributions of any milestone, of alternative discrete proofs of monotonicity that avoid the real extension, and of the full goal are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Kleinberg, S. Mullainathan, M. Raghavan, The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization, Management Science, 2023. arXiv:2202.11776v3 (cited version): https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.11776 ; https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03683
  • G. S. Becker, K. M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, Journal of Political Economy 96(4), 1988. https://doi.org/10.1086/261558
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Frontiers in Operations: Battery as a Service: Flexible Electric Vehicle Battery Leasing: Win-Win-Win of Flexible Leasing for a Large High-Capacity Range and Battery Cost near a(1−ρ)/2Research Paper

Motivation

Electric-vehicle makers such as NIO sell cars without the battery and lease the battery separately, a business model called Battery as a Service (BaaS). The leased battery can be swapped at a station in minutes, so a customer is not tied to one battery size: a driver who leases a small battery for the daily commute can rent a large one for a long holiday trip, and a driver who leases a large battery can downgrade for a while and pay less. Shi and Hu (M&SOM 2024, doi:10.1287/msom.2022.0587) ask whether such flexible battery leasing is good for all three parties at once: the manufacturer (profit), the customers (total cost) and the environment (total battery capacity that has to be produced). A business-model innovation of this kind is adopted only if it improves profit; it is defensible publicly only if it does not raise customer cost or the number of batteries in circulation. The paper's answer is a "win-win-win" region of parameters, and that result is the goal of this mission.

Setting

A manufacturer serves a unit mass of customers with two batteries. The low-capacity battery has range rl=0r_l=0rl​=0, lease rate pl=0p_l=0pl​=0 and acquisition cost cl=0c_l=0cl​=0 (normalizations). The high-capacity battery has range rhr_hrh​, lease rate php_hph​ and incremental acquisition cost chc_hch​. Driving a distance beyond the battery's range costs the customer the shortfall: a need xxx served by range rrr costs (x−r)+(x-r)^+(x−r)+ plus the lease rate.

Each customer has a regular need d∼U[0,1]d\sim\mathcal U[0,1]d∼U[0,1], known when choosing a primary battery, and a peak need D∼U[0,a]D\sim\mathcal U[0,a]D∼U[0,a] with a>1a>1a>1, independent of ddd and learned later. A fraction ρ\rhoρ of the time is regular usage, 1−ρ1-\rho1−ρ peak usage. The standing assumptions are a>1a>1a>1, a/(2+a)<ρ<1a/(2+a)<\rho<1a/(2+a)<ρ<1, 0<rh≤a0<r_h\le a0<rh​≤a and 0≤ch≤(1−ρ)a0\le c_h\le(1-\rho)a0≤ch​≤(1−ρ)a.

Simple leasing. The manufacturer sets php_hph​; each customer leases low capacity iff ρd+(1−ρ)E[D]≤ph+ρ(d−rh)++(1−ρ)E[(D−rh)+]\rho d+(1-\rho)\mathbb E[D]\le p_h+\rho(d-r_h)^++(1-\rho)\mathbb E[(D-r_h)^+]ρd+(1−ρ)E[D]≤ph​+ρ(d−rh​)++(1−ρ)E[(D−rh​)+]. With τb\tau^bτb the low-capacity volume, the profit is Πb=(1−τb)(ph−ch)\Pi^b=(1-\tau^b)(p_h-c_h)Πb=(1−τb)(ph​−ch​), the total customer cost CTbCT^bCTb is the integral over ddd of the cost each customer bears, and the total battery capacity is BTb=(1−τb)rhBT^b=(1-\tau^b)r_hBTb=(1−τb)rh​.

Flexible leasing. A two-period game. The manufacturer sets php_hph​; customers choose primary batteries anticipating the peak period; the manufacturer then sets an upgrade rate pˉh\bar p_hpˉ​h​ and a downgrade rate pˉl\bar p_lpˉ​l​; customers learn DDD and choose whether to swap according to Table 1 of the paper (a low lessee pays (D−rh)++pˉh(D-r_h)^++\bar p_h(D−rh​)++pˉ​h​ after upgrading, a high lessee pays D+pˉlD+\bar p_lD+pˉ​l​ after downgrading). Upgrades UUU in excess of downgrades VVV must be met by buying Qh=[U−V]+Q_h=[U-V]^+Qh​=[U−V]+ extra high-capacity batteries. The peak-period objective is (1): (1−τ)ph+V(pˉl−ph)+Upˉh−chQh/(1−ρ)(1-\tau)p_h+V(\bar p_l-p_h)+U\bar p_h-c_hQ_h/(1-\rho)(1−τ)ph​+V(pˉ​l​−ph​)+Upˉ​h​−ch​Qh​/(1−ρ), and the total profit is (2): Πf=ρ(1−τ)ph+(1−ρ)⋅(1)−(1−τ)ch\Pi^f=\rho(1-\tau)p_h+(1-\rho)\cdot(1)-(1-\tau)c_hΠf=ρ(1−τ)ph​+(1−ρ)⋅(1)−(1−τ)ch​. A flexible equilibrium is a lease rate php_hph​ with optimal peak rates, a lease volume τ\tauτ that customers rationally expect, and a profit no other lease rate and continuation can beat. CTfCT^fCTf is the total expected cost of the customers' choices, and BTf=(1−τ+Qh)rhBT^f=(1-\tau+Q_h)r_hBTf=(1−τ+Qh​)rh​.

Formalization targets

Write c0=a(1−ρ)/2c_0=a(1-\rho)/2c0​=a(1−ρ)/2; by Proposition 2 this is the cost at which the manufacturer stops buying extra batteries.

Goal: Proposition 6 (win-win-win)

For a>1a>1a>1, a/(2+a)<ρ<1a/(2+a)<\rho<1a/(2+a)<ρ<1:

  1. if ρ<7a/(8+7a)\rho<7a/(8+7a)ρ<7a/(8+7a), there is δ>0\delta>0δ>0 such that for each ch∈(c0−δ,c0)c_h\in(c_0-\delta,c_0)ch​∈(c0​−δ,c0​) there is R<aR<aR<a such that for all rh∈(R,a]r_h\in(R,a]rh​∈(R,a], a benchmark optimum and a flexible equilibrium exist, and every pair of them satisfies
Qhf>0,Πb<Πf,CTf<CTb,BTf<BTb;Q^f_h>0,\qquad \Pi^b<\Pi^f,\qquad CT^f<CT^b,\qquad BT^f<BT^b;Qhf​>0,Πb<Πf,CTf<CTb,BTf<BTb;
  1. there is δ>0\delta>0δ>0 such that for each ch∈(c0,c0+δ)c_h\in(c_0,c_0+\delta)ch​∈(c0​,c0​+δ) there is R<aR<aR<a such that for all rh∈(R,a]r_h\in(R,a]rh​∈(R,a], the same holds with Qhf=0Q^f_h=0Qhf​=0.

Milestones

Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 (the benchmark), Lemma 2 (peak volumes), Lemma 3 (optimal peak rates), Lemma 4 (flexible lease volume), Proposition 2 in its first case (the flexible equilibrium for ch<c0c_h<c_0ch​<c0​), Proposition 4 near the corner (rh,ch)=(a,c0)(r_h,c_h)=(a,c_0)(rh​,ch​)=(a,c0​) (customer cost), and Proposition 5 in its first bullet (capacity is smaller iff ρ<7a/(8+7a)\rho<7a/(8+7a)ρ<7a/(8+7a) and ch≤T(rh)c_h\le T(r_h)ch​≤T(rh​) for an explicit TTT).

Significance

The result identifies conditions under which a pricing innovation helps the firm, its customers and the environment at the same time: a battery cost near a(1−ρ)/2a(1-\rho)/2a(1−ρ)/2 and a high-capacity range close to the largest peak need. Flexible leasing reallocates high-capacity batteries from customers who do not need them in the peak period to customers who do, so fewer batteries have to be produced. But the manufacturer prices the up/downgrade options to extract the efficiency gain and may buy extra batteries, so lower customer cost and lower capacity are not automatic. Proposition 6 states where all three improvements coexist.

The paper proves its results by calculus on closed forms. Nothing here is machine-checked yet. A formalization adds three things. First, it derives the closed forms from the model itself (customer choices from Table 1, volumes as measures of customer sets, equilibria as maximizers), where the paper states them. Second, it settles which reading of "sufficiently close" and "sufficiently large" is true. Third, it records the regimes in which the intermediate lemmas hold, which the printed statements leave implicit.

Difficulty

The closed forms of Lemmas 1–4 are routine integrals of piecewise-linear functions. The difficulty is global optimality and the corner analysis.

  • Equilibrium is global. A flexible equilibrium must beat every lease rate together with every rationally expected continuation, including continuations in the regime where the manufacturer buys no extra batteries and at lease rates where customers all lease one type. A first-order condition on one regime does not establish this.
  • The Qhf=0Q^f_h=0Qhf​=0 side is not the printed one. For chc_hch​ just above c0c_0c0​ the equilibrium is a kink regime that the paper does not describe. The paper's second-case formulas in Proposition 2 are not the equilibrium there, so the goal's second branch cannot be obtained from them.
  • Order of limits. At the corner (rh,ch)=(a,c0)(r_h,c_h)=(a,c_0)(rh​,ch​)=(a,c0​) the two capacities coincide. Profit and customer cost are strictly better under flexible leasing there, but capacity is only weakly better. The capacity comparison holds only when rhr_hrh​ approaches aaa after chc_hch​ is fixed.

Formalization scope

The model is the paper's base model of §3–§4: flexible leasing introduced into an existing BaaS program with independent regular and peak needs. The extensions of §5 (correlated needs, range choice, launching with flexible leasing) and the numerical calibration (§4.1, Figures 2–5) are out of scope.

Representation. All parameters are real numbers. Expectations over D∼U[0,a]D\sim\mathcal U[0,a]D∼U[0,a] are interval integrals divided by aaa; volumes of customers are Lebesgue measures of subsets of [0,1][0,1][0,1]. Every volume, expected cost and equilibrium is defined from the model; the paper's closed forms are theorems, never definitions. Customers lease low when indifferent, upgrade on ≤\le≤ and downgrade on >>>, following the proofs. The lease rate ranges over all of R\mathbb RR; the paper's remark "we require ph<min⁡(1,rh)p_h<\min(1,r_h)ph​<min(1,rh​)" is not imposed, because the benchmark optimum can exceed 1. The peak rates range over the set pˉh≤a\bar p_h\le apˉ​h​≤a, ph−a≤pˉl≤php_h-a\le\bar p_l\le p_hph​−a≤pˉ​l​≤ph​ that the paper requires (p. 13). An equilibrium is optimal against every continuation at every lease rate.

Readings and added hypotheses.

  • Proposition 6 is posed as "chc_hch​ sufficiently close to c0c_0c0​, then rhr_hrh​ sufficiently large". A single neighbourhood of (a,c0)(a,c_0)(a,c0​) in both variables is false on both sides. On the Qhf>0Q^f_h>0Qhf​>0 side, Proposition 5's threshold T(rh)T(r_h)T(rh​) equals c0c_0c0​ at rh=ar_h=arh​=a and is below it for rh<ar_h<arh​<a. The point ch=c0c_h=c_0ch​=c0​ is excluded.
  • Each branch of the goal asserts existence of a benchmark optimum and a flexible equilibrium, so it is not vacuous. A goal of the form "every equilibrium is win-win-win" without existence would be trivially true where no equilibrium exists, and is ruled out.
  • Lemma 2's interior cases hold with rhr_hrh​ in place of aaa (and pˉh≥0\bar p_h\ge0pˉ​h​≥0). The statement also gives the missing outer cases for rates below zero or beyond rhr_hrh​, covering every real rate.
  • Lemma 3 is posed in the regime τ>ch/(a(1−ρ))\tau>c_h/(a(1-\rho))τ>ch​/(a(1−ρ)), the only one in which its acquisition quantity is nonnegative. Its rates are assumed to lie below rhr_hrh​.
  • Lemmas 1, 4 and Propositions 1, 2, 5 carry the proofs' interior conditions as explicit parameter inequalities: the indifferent customer lies below rhr_hrh​, and Proposition 1's range for chc_hch​ holds.
  • Proposition 5(i) is the ≤\le≤ form, as in its proof. Proposition 4 is posed in its corner-neighbourhood clauses only.
  • Proposition 2's second case, Proposition 3 and the remaining clauses of Propositions 4–5 are not posed: the second case of Proposition 2 is false on part of its range, and Proposition 3's threshold is garbled in the manuscript.

What a complete development needs. Lebesgue measure of intervals, interval integrals of piecewise-linear functions, and maximization of concave quadratics with a kink. It also needs the kink-regime equilibrium on the Qhf=0Q^f_h=0Qhf​=0 side and continuity arguments at the corner. Lemmas 1–4 are reusable for any variant of the model, and proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome.

Selected references

  • L. Shi and B. Hu, Battery as a Service: Flexible Electric Vehicle Battery Leasing, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Frontiers in Operations, 2024. Read as the authors' manuscript of 13 January 2024. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0587
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EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity IV: Under Moral Hazard Every Equity-Financeable Venture Is Token-Financeable and Every Token-Financeable One Is Debt-Financeable, Both StrictlyResearch Paper

Motivation

Start-ups that build a platform or a digital service increasingly raise their set-up capital by pre-selling tokens: claims on the future output of the service, redeemable once it exists. Between 2017 and 2019 such token offerings raised billions of dollars, and corporate finance asked whether a token is anything more than a disguised equity or debt claim. K. Malinova and A. Park (Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity, SSRN 3286825, version of June 1, 2023; Management Science 2023) answer this in a stylized monopoly model. Without frictions, a well-designed token contract is equivalent to equity and to debt: all three leave the entrepreneur the project's full NPV (missions I–III of this series). With moral hazard, when the entrepreneur can influence demand through effort that investors cannot observe, the three instruments separate.

The question goes back to M. C. Jensen and W. H. Meckling (Theory of the firm, J. Financial Economics 3, 1976), who showed that outside equity dilutes the owner's incentive to exert effort, while debt, which leaves the owner the full upside above the repayment, dilutes it less. This mission formalizes where tokens sit in that ranking: strictly between debt and equity.

Setting

An entrepreneur needs a set-up cost C0>0C_0>0C0​>0 and then produces a quantity qqq at marginal cost c>0c>0c>0 against the linear inverse demand p(q)=x−qp(q)=x-qp(q)=x−q. The demand intercept xxx is uniformly distributed on (0,θ)(0,\theta)(0,θ), and the expectation of a payoff ggg is Eθ[g]=1θ∫0θg(x) dx\mathbb E_\theta[g]=\frac1\theta\int_0^\theta g(x)\,dxEθ​[g]=θ1​∫0θ​g(x)dx. Facing the realized xxx, a monopolist produces qm(x)=max⁡{(x−c)/2,0}q^m(x)=\max\{(x-c)/2,0\}qm(x)=max{(x−c)/2,0} and earns πm(x)=max⁡{x−c,0}2/4\pi^m(x)=\max\{x-c,0\}^2/4πm(x)=max{x−c,0}2/4; the project's NPV is NPV(θ)=Eθ[πm]−C0\mathrm{NPV}(\theta)=\mathbb E_\theta[\pi^m]-C_0NPV(θ)=Eθ​[πm]−C0​.

Moral hazard. With effort the intercept is uniform on (0,θh)(0,\theta_h)(0,θh​), without effort on (0,θl)(0,\theta_l)(0,θl​), with c<θl<θhc<\theta_l<\theta_hc<θl​<θh​. Effort costs the entrepreneur CeC_eCe​ in value. It is chosen after the financing contract is signed and cannot be contracted upon. The project has positive NPV only with effort (NPVl≤0<NPVh\mathrm{NPV}_l\le0<\mathrm{NPV}_hNPVl​≤0<NPVh​) and NPVh>Ce\mathrm{NPV}_h>C_eNPVh​>Ce​. Investors break even under effort, so every contract term is fixed by θh\theta_hθh​; a project can be financed by an instrument when the break-even terms make effort the entrepreneur's best choice.

  • Equity. Investors take the share αs=C0/Eθh[πm]\alpha_s=C_0/\mathbb E_{\theta_h}[\pi^m]αs​=C0​/Eθh​​[πm] (17); the incentive constraint is (1−αs)Eθh[πm]−Ce≥(1−αs)Eθl[πm](1-\alpha_s)\mathbb E_{\theta_h}[\pi^m]-C_e\ge(1-\alpha_s)\mathbb E_{\theta_l}[\pi^m](1−αs​)Eθh​​[πm]−Ce​≥(1−αs​)Eθl​​[πm] (18).
  • Debt. A face value D≥0D\ge0D≥0 with Eθh[min⁡{πm,D}]=C0\mathbb E_{\theta_h}[\min\{\pi^m,D\}]=C_0Eθh​​[min{πm,D}]=C0​ (21); the entrepreneur keeps max⁡{πm−D,0}\max\{\pi^m-D,0\}max{πm−D,0}, and the incentive constraint (22) compares its expectations under θh\theta_hθh​ (minus CeC_eCe​) and θl\theta_lθl​.
  • Optimal tokens. The entrepreneur pre-sells ttt tokens and gives token-holders the share αt=t/(t+c)\alpha_t=t/(t+c)αt​=t/(t+c) of all tokens issued later. At demand xxx and output q>tq>tq>t she earns πte(x,q)=(1−αt)(q−t)(x−q)−c(q−t)\pi^e_t(x,q)=(1-\alpha_t)(q-t)(x-q)-c(q-t)πte​(x,q)=(1−αt​)(q−t)(x−q)−c(q−t), and 000 when q≤tq\le tq≤t. The pre-sale solves the break-even condition (16) at θh\theta_hθh​,
cc+t 23θh(θh−c2−t)3=NPVh,0<t<θh−c2,\frac{c}{c+t}\,\frac{2}{3\theta_h}\Big(\frac{\theta_h-c}{2}-t\Big)^3=\mathrm{NPV}_h ,\qquad 0<t<\frac{\theta_h-c}{2},c+tc​3θh​2​(2θh​−c​−t)3=NPVh​,0<t<2θh​−c​,

and the incentive constraint (27) compares E[πte(x,qm(x))]\mathbb E[\pi^e_t(x,q^m(x))]E[πte​(x,qm(x))] under θh\theta_hθh​ (minus CeC_eCe​) and θl\theta_lθl​.

Write λ=(θl−c)/(θh−c)\lambda=(\theta_l-c)/(\theta_h-c)λ=(θl​−c)/(θh​−c) (19), δ=2D/(θh−c)\delta=2\sqrt D/(\theta_h-c)δ=2D​/(θh​−c) (23) and τ=2t/(θh−c)\tau=2t/(\theta_h-c)τ=2t/(θh​−c) (28).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 8

Writing E,T,D\mathcal E,\mathcal T,\mathcal DE,T,D for the sets of parameters (c,C0,Ce,θl,θh)(c,C_0,C_e,\theta_l,\theta_h)(c,C0​,Ce​,θl​,θh​) satisfying the standing assumptions at which equity, optimal tokens and debt can finance the project,

E⊊T⊊D.\mathcal E\subsetneq\mathcal T\subsetneq\mathcal D .E⊊T⊊D.

The two inclusions are universal statements; strictness is posed as the existence of separating parameter values.

Milestones

  • The break-even terms exist and are unique; the token entrepreneur's expected profit is the left side of (26), and 000 under θl\theta_lθl​ when θl≤c+2t\theta_l\le c+2tθl​≤c+2t.
  • Proposition 5: equity finances the project iff NPVh−Ce≥λ3θhθlNPVh\mathrm{NPV}_h-C_e\ge\lambda^3\frac{\theta_h}{\theta_l}\mathrm{NPV}_hNPVh​−Ce​≥λ3θl​θh​​NPVh​ (20).
  • (48) and Proposition 6: NPVh=(θh−c)312θh(1−3δ2+2δ3)\mathrm{NPV}_h=\frac{(\theta_h-c)^3}{12\theta_h}(1-3\delta^2+2\delta^3)NPVh​=12θh​(θh​−c)3​(1−3δ2+2δ3); debt always induces effort when λ≤δ\lambda\le\deltaλ≤δ, and otherwise iff
NPVh−Ce≥(λ−δ)2(1−δ)2 λ+2δ1+2δ θhθl NPVh.\mathrm{NPV}_h-C_e\ge\frac{(\lambda-\delta)^2}{(1-\delta)^2}\,\frac{\lambda+2\delta}{1+2\delta}\,\frac{\theta_h}{\theta_l}\,\mathrm{NPV}_h .NPVh​−Ce​≥(1−δ)2(λ−δ)2​1+2δλ+2δ​θl​θh​​NPVh​.
  • Proposition 7: tokens always induce effort when λ≤τ\lambda\le\tauλ≤τ, and otherwise iff NPVh−Ce≥(λ−τ)3(1−τ)3θhθlNPVh\mathrm{NPV}_h-C_e\ge\frac{(\lambda-\tau)^3}{(1-\tau)^3}\frac{\theta_h}{\theta_l}\mathrm{NPV}_hNPVh​−Ce​≥(1−τ)3(λ−τ)3​θl​θh​​NPVh​ (29).
  • Lemmas 4–5 and Corollaries 2–3: equity's constraint is the strongest.
  • Lemma 6 (0<τ<δ2<δ<10<\tau<\delta^2<\delta<10<τ<δ2<δ<1) and Lemma 7 (for δ<λ<1\delta<\lambda<1δ<λ<1, λ3>(λ−τ)3(1−τ)3>(λ−δ)2(λ+2δ)(1−δ)2(1+2δ)\lambda^3>\frac{(\lambda-\tau)^3}{(1-\tau)^3}>\frac{(\lambda-\delta)^2(\lambda+2\delta)}{(1-\delta)^2(1+2\delta)}λ3>(1−τ)3(λ−τ)3​>(1−δ)2(1+2δ)(λ−δ)2(λ+2δ)​).
  • Appendix B: with C0=110C_0=110C0​=110, c=10c=10c=10, θl=50\theta_l=50θl​=50, Ce=25C_e=25Ce​=25, the case θh=60\theta_h=60θh​=60 is financed by debt and tokens but not by equity, and θh=57\theta_h=57θh​=57 by debt only.

Significance

The result places a new instrument in the classical ranking of financing by incentive strength. Under the optimal token contract the entrepreneur earns only from tokens issued beyond the pre-sale, so, like a debtor, she earns nothing in low-demand states; this makes effort more attractive than under equity. Because the break-even pre-sale is smaller in normalized terms than the break-even debt (τ<δ2\tau<\delta^2τ<δ2), tokens still leave more of the low-demand upside to the entrepreneur than debt does, and debt remains strictly better. The separating instances show that neither inclusion is an artefact of the model's parametrization.

The paper proves the result by hand in Appendix A and illustrates it numerically in Appendix B; none of it has been machine-checked. The mission produces a checked version of the whole chain, including the two points where the printed statements need repair (Lemmas 6 and 7, see below), and a verified treatment of the two Appendix B instances, whose contract terms are roots of cubic equations rather than the rounded values printed.

Difficulty

Each step is elementary real analysis, and there are many of them. Three require care.

  • Token versus debt. Comparing (24) and (29) for arbitrary τ<δ<λ\tau<\delta<\lambdaτ<δ<λ fails: the second inequality of Lemma 7 is false, for example, at δ=0.5\delta=0.5δ=0.5, τ=0.49\tau=0.49τ=0.49, λ=0.8\lambda=0.8λ=0.8. It holds only for the actual contract terms, which are tied to each other through the two break-even conditions, so the comparison cannot be made on the incentive constraints alone.
  • The two regimes of each incentive constraint. When θl≤c+2D\theta_l\le c+2\sqrt Dθl​≤c+2D​ (or ≤c+2t\le c+2t≤c+2t), the printed right-hand sides of (22) and (27) have reversed integration ranges; the no-effort profit is 000 there and the constraint holds trivially. Each inclusion must handle both regimes and their interaction across instruments.
  • The separating instances. DDD and ttt at θh∈{57,60}\theta_h\in\{57,60\}θh​∈{57,60} are roots of cubics and are only known to a few digits; the margins are small (equity at θh=60\theta_h=60θh​=60 fails by 38.6138.6138.61 against 39.0839.0839.08), so the roots must be bracketed tightly and the uniqueness of the break-even terms is needed to rule out other contracts.

Formalization scope

All objects are real functions of real parameters: the shared model (expect, pim, qm, npv, the debt and token payoffs, condition (16)) in TokenFinance.Debt, the financeability predicates and every theorem in TokenFinance.MoralHazard; there is no probability layer. Expectations are expect θ g, the interval integral over [0,θ][0,\theta][0,θ] divided by θ\thetaθ, and every expectation in a definition is of a realized payoff: the closed forms (20), (24), (26), (29), (48) are theorems. This rules out the trivializing formalization in which the incentive constraints are written as their closed forms, which would turn Propositions 5–8 into algebra. Debt and token payoffs carry positive parts, so the paper's case split ("the moral hazard problem does not arise") is a theorem, not a definition.

Conventions committed to:

  • The standing assumptions are 0<c<θl<θh0<c<\theta_l<\theta_h0<c<θl​<θh​, C0>0C_0>0C0​>0, NPVl≤0<NPVh\mathrm{NPV}_l\le0<\mathrm{NPV}_hNPVl​≤0<NPVh​ and Ce<NPVhC_e<\mathrm{NPV}_hCe​<NPVh​. Positive marginal cost is the paper's ("with a positive marginal cost", p. 22). NPVh>0\mathrm{NPV}_h>0NPVh​>0 is written out, reading "positive expected NPV only if the entrepreneur exerts effort" together with "exceeds CeC_eCe​"; without it a negative CeC_eCe​ would put a project with NPVh≤0\mathrm{NPV}_h\le0NPVh​≤0 in E\mathcal EE but not in T\mathcal TT. No sign is imposed on CeC_eCe​.
  • Financeability is existential in the contract terms (equity's share is determined by (17)); the token break-even is condition (16) as printed, which the proof of Proposition 3 derives from the token-holders' break-even (35).
  • Propositions 5–7 are posed as equivalences: (20), (24), (29) are rearrangements of (18), (22), (27).
  • Lemmas 4–5 add 0<δ0<\delta0<δ, 0<τ0<\tau0<τ, which their proofs assume (at 000 they are equalities). Lemma 6 is posed as 0<τ<δ2<δ<10<\tau<\delta^2<\delta<10<τ<δ2<δ<1, what its proof establishes; the printed "δ<λ\delta<\lambdaδ<λ" is not a property of the terms, since Proposition 6 treats λ≤δ\lambda\le\deltaλ≤δ. Lemma 7 carries the contract terms as hypotheses.
  • Out of scope: the secondary token market and redemption mechanics, bankruptcy costs, consumer welfare, and the institutional discussion of §I and §V.

Needed infrastructure: interval integrals of piecewise polynomials, the intermediate value theorem and strict monotonicity for the break-even terms, and polynomial inequalities. A lemma computing Eθ\mathbb E_\thetaEθ​ of truncated quadratics is reusable across all four missions of the series. Proofs of any milestone, and of the Appendix B root bracketing, are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. Malinova, A. Park, Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity, SSRN 3286825, version of June 1, 2023; published in Management Science, 2023. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3286825, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4882
  • M. C. Jensen, W. H. Meckling, Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3(4), 1976, 305–360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
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Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity III: The Break-Even Token Pre-Sale Strictly Increases in the Set-Up Cost and the Marginal Cost and Strictly Decreases in Expected DemandResearch Paper

Motivation

Firms can raise money before production by selling claims on future output. In the model of Malinova and Park, these claims are tokens: a buyer prepays for a quantity of the good, and the final contract also gives token holders a share of tokens issued after demand becomes known. The firm must choose how many tokens to pre-sell. A larger pre-sale brings in more finance but changes the allocation of later sales revenue. The paper identifies contract terms that preserve the firm's monopoly output choice and determines the pre-sale quantity by investors' break-even condition (Proposition 3, p. 24). Proposition 4 asks how that quantity responds when financing need, production cost, or expected demand changes. These comparative statics make the contract's financing response explicit rather than leaving the break-even equation as an isolated root.

Setting

An entrepreneur pays a set-up cost C0>0C_0>0C0​>0 to launch production and then incurs a marginal cost c>0c>0c>0 per unit. After financing, a demand intercept xxx is drawn uniformly from (0,θ)(0,\theta)(0,θ), where c<θc<\thetac<θ. At output qqq, the inverse demand price is x−qx-qx−q. Without financing distortions, the monopoly quantity is qm(x)=max⁡{(x−c)/2,0}q^m(x)=\max\{(x-c)/2,0\}qm(x)=max{(x−c)/2,0} and its profit is πm(x)=max⁡{x−c,0}2/4\pi^m(x)=\max\{x-c,0\}^2/4πm(x)=max{x−c,0}2/4. For a realized payoff g(x)g(x)g(x), expectation means the average Eθ[g]=θ−1∫0θg(x) dxE_\theta[g]=\theta^{-1}\int_0^\theta g(x)\,dxEθ​[g]=θ−1∫0θ​g(x)dx. The venture's net present value is Eθ[πm]−C0E_\theta[\pi^m]-C_0Eθ​[πm]−C0​, equal in this domain to (θ−c)3/(12θ)−C0(\theta-c)^3/(12\theta)-C_0(θ−c)3/(12θ)−C0​ (equation (3), p. 14).

Under the optimal token contract of Proposition 3, investors buy ttt tokens at time zero, and token holders receive the fraction αt=t/(t+c)\alpha_t=t/(t+c)αt​=t/(t+c) of new tokens issued when output exceeds the pre-sale. A refund rule applies when output falls below the pre-sale. The resulting positive break-even pre-sale size is determined by equation (16):

cc+t23θ(θ−c2−t)3=(θ−c)312θ−C0.\frac{c}{c+t}\frac{2}{3\theta}\left(\frac{\theta-c}{2}-t\right)^3 =\frac{(\theta-c)^3}{12\theta}-C_0.c+tc​3θ2​(2θ−c​−t)3=12θ(θ−c)3​−C0​.

For a positive-NPV venture, this equation has one positive root, in (0,(θ−c)/2)(0,(\theta-c)/2)(0,(θ−c)/2) (Appendix A, pp. 40–41). The mission treats the root as a solution of the equation, so statements about the optimal quantity apply to every value satisfying it.

Formalization targets

The comparative-statics goal

Proposition 4, p. 25, asserts three strict directions. If t(c,C0,θ)t(c,C_0,\theta)t(c,C0​,θ) denotes the unique positive root of (16), then, while both endpoint ventures have positive NPV,

C0<C0′ ⟹ t(c,C0,θ)<t(c,C0′,θ),C_0<C_0'\ \Longrightarrow\ t(c,C_0,\theta)<t(c,C_0',\theta),C0​<C0′​ ⟹ t(c,C0​,θ)<t(c,C0′​,θ), c<c′ ⟹ t(c,C0,θ)<t(c′,C0,θ),c<c'\ \Longrightarrow\ t(c,C_0,\theta)<t(c',C_0,\theta),c<c′ ⟹ t(c,C0​,θ)<t(c′,C0​,θ), θ<θ′ ⟹ t(c,C0,θ′)<t(c,C0,θ).\theta<\theta'\ \Longrightarrow\ t(c,C_0,\theta')<t(c,C_0,\theta).θ<θ′ ⟹ t(c,C0​,θ′)<t(c,C0​,θ).

Thus a larger set-up cost or marginal cost requires more pre-sold tokens, while a higher demand level requires fewer. The Lean goal compares arbitrary positive roots directly. It places the NPV condition at the higher cost in the second comparison and at the lower demand level in the third; these are the restrictive endpoints. The first comparison places it at the higher set-up cost.

Source milestones

The milestone list follows the Appendix A proof: existence and uniqueness of the root of (41); the negative ttt derivative (42); the positive ccc derivative (45); the negative θ\thetaθ derivative (46); and the derivative in ttt of the expression in (46), equation (47). These are source claims, with their displayed constants retained. Equation (42) and equation (45) contain printing errors in the SSRN copy; the formal statements use the actual derivatives and the milestone quotes retain the printed text.

Significance

Proposition 3 establishes that the chosen token contract can finance a positive-NPV venture while keeping the efficient monopoly output. Proposition 4 then describes the contract's response to the model's three principal parameters. Its strict inequalities distinguish an actual response from a weak monotonicity claim that could allow the pre-sale to remain unchanged. The demand comparative static is economically specific: a higher θ\thetaθ raises the demand intercept on average, but the quantity of tokens needed to finance the same set-up cost falls.

The paper proves these results analytically. This mission seeks machine-checked proofs of the root comparison and its stated derivative milestones. A completed development would provide reusable results about parameter-dependent roots of rational functions, especially when the root is specified by a break-even condition rather than by an explicit formula. The current Lean files are compiled statements with proof placeholders; compilation does not establish the mathematical results.

Difficulty

Equation (16) is cubic in a quantity that also occurs in a denominator, so the root does not offer a convenient closed expression for direct comparison. The endpoint restrictions matter: the meaningful root lies strictly between zero and (θ−c)/2(\theta-c)/2(θ−c)/2, and derivatives that have the desired sign in that interval need not keep the same sign outside it. In particular, the ttt derivative in (42) reaches zero at the upper boundary. The demand derivative in (46) also vanishes at t=0t=0t=0, making its strict sign in the interior a separate claim. A literal transcription of two printed derivatives would give incorrect equalities even though their intended sign conclusions survive. The formal development therefore needs both careful domain control and the corrected expressions.

Formalization scope

The namespace TokenFinance.Statics represents all quantities as real functions. Uniform expectation is the interval integral divided by θ\thetaθ. Monopoly output and profit use max to encode zero production below cost. The common Setting definition file also records the equity and debt payoffs and the token contract's case split, following the series-wide model. The break-even condition is exactly the closed-form equation (16), while NPV remains the integral of realized monopoly profit minus C0C_0C0​. The goal assumes the paper's standing c>0c>0c>0, C0>0C_0>0C0​>0, c<θc<\thetac<θ, and positive NPV, written as C0<(θ−c)3/(12θ)C_0<(\theta-c)^3/(12\theta)C0​<(θ−c)3/(12θ) using equation (3). Derivative statements state their own regions and nonzero-denominator conditions. The token size is quantified over positive roots rather than chosen by an arbitrary selection function.

The root cannot be defined to have the claimed monotonicity, and the derivative signs cannot be inserted as hypotheses of the goal. The missing work includes real-variable derivative calculations, root existence and uniqueness on the economic interval, and the strict parameter comparisons. The secondary token market, redemption mechanics beyond the contract payoffs, bankruptcy costs, consumer welfare, and the paper's institutional discussion are outside this mission's scope.

Selected references

  • Katya Malinova and Andreas Park, Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity, SSRN 3286825, version of June 1, 2023, pp. 14, 24–25, 40–42. SSRN preprint.
  • Katya Malinova and Andreas Park, Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity, Management Science, 2023. DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4882. The mission's equation and page references follow the SSRN version above.
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Machine LearningMarkov ChainOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Nonstationary Reinforcement Learning: The Blessing of (More) Optimism II: Per-Step Dynamic Regret of SWUCRL2-CW When the Widened Confidence Region Contains an MDP of Diameter at Most DResearch Paper

Why changing environments matter

A reinforcement-learning agent chooses actions while learning how those actions affect future states. In a stationary model, observations collected long ago remain relevant to the current transition law. In a nonstationary Markov decision process, rewards and transition probabilities may change at each round. Old observations can then bias an estimate even when the agent has collected many samples. The challenge is to keep learning from recent observations without becoming blind to actions that the agent has not tried recently. Cheung, Simchi-Levi and Zhu study this tension for finite-state average-reward learning and introduce confidence widening in their SWUCRL2-CW algorithm Cheung et al., §4.

The paper's broad regret theorems suppress constants inside asymptotic notation. Proposition 2 gives an explicit one-round inequality that exposes the roles of estimation error, temporal variation, confidence widening, and the diameter of a plausible transition model. This mission targets that proposition and the stated auxiliary results used around it Cheung et al., pp. 14, 38–41.

The finite changing MDP

Let S\mathcal SS be a finite state set. Each state sss has a nonempty finite set As\mathcal A_sAs​ of permitted actions. At round ttt, taking action a∈Asa\in\mathcal A_sa∈As​ in state sss gives expected reward rt(s,a)∈[0,1]r_t(s,a)\in[0,1]rt​(s,a)∈[0,1] and moves to state s′s's′ with probability pt(s′∣s,a)p_t(s'\mid s,a)pt​(s′∣s,a). The one-step variation Br,tB_{r,t}Br,t​ is the greatest change ∣rt+1(s,a)−rt(s,a)∣|r_{t+1}(s,a)-r_t(s,a)|∣rt+1​(s,a)−rt​(s,a)∣ over permitted pairs; Bp,tB_{p,t}Bp,t​ is the corresponding greatest ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ distance between transition rows. These definitions make no stationarity assumption Cheung et al., pp. 6, 33.

At the start τ(m)\tau(m)τ(m) of an episode, the algorithm counts visits to each pair in a recent window of length WWW. It divides empirical sums by N+=max⁡{1,N}N^+=\max\{1,N\}N+=max{1,N}, where NNN is the visit count. Thus an unvisited pair has estimated reward and transition vector equal to zero. Reward confidence sets lie in [0,1][0,1][0,1]; transition confidence sets lie in the probability simplex and use an ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ radius enlarged by a nonnegative parameter η\etaη. Write rad⁡r,τ(m)(s,a)\operatorname{rad}_{r,\tau(m)}(s,a)radr,τ(m)​(s,a) and rad⁡p,τ(m)(s,a)\operatorname{rad}_{p,\tau(m)}(s,a)radp,τ(m)​(s,a) for their respective radii. The algorithm chooses a stationary policy π~τ(m)\tilde\pi_{\tau(m)}π~τ(m)​ and an optimistic model, gain ρ~τ(m)\tilde\rho_{\tau(m)}ρ~​τ(m)​, and bias γ~τ(m)\tilde\gamma_{\tau(m)}γ~​τ(m)​ from extended value iteration Cheung et al., pp. 11–13.

The diameter of a transition model is the largest, over ordered source and target states, of the smallest expected number of transitions needed to reach the target under a stationary policy. Source equal to target means a return time after at least one transition. The round-ttt optimal gain ρt∗\rho_t^*ρt∗​ is the value of the stationary occupancy-measure linear program for (rt,pt)(r_t,p_t)(rt​,pt​) with only permitted actions. From the window's first round through the round before ttt, let var⁡r,t\operatorname{var}_{r,t}varr,t​ and var⁡p,t\operatorname{var}_{p,t}varp,t​ be the sums of the corresponding one-step variations Cheung et al., pp. 8, 14, 33.

Formalization targets

The main target is Proposition 2. Condition on the local reward and transition estimation events at τ(m)\tau(m)τ(m). Assume that the widened transition confidence sets contain every permitted row of an MDP of diameter at most DDD. For a round in which at=π~τ(m)(st)a_t=\tilde\pi_{\tau(m)}(s_t)at​=π~τ(m)​(st​), the target is

ρt∗−rt(st,at)≤∑s′pt(s′∣st,at)γ~τ(m)(s′)−γ~τ(m)(st)+1τ(m)+2var⁡r,t+4D(var⁡p,t+η)+2rad⁡r,τ(m)(st,at)+4Drad⁡p,τ(m)(st,at).\begin{aligned} \rho_t^*-r_t(s_t,a_t)\le{}&\sum_{s'}p_t(s'\mid s_t,a_t)\tilde\gamma_{\tau(m)}(s')-\tilde\gamma_{\tau(m)}(s_t)+\frac1{\sqrt{\tau(m)}}\\ &+2\operatorname{var}_{r,t}+4D(\operatorname{var}_{p,t}+\eta)\\ &+2\operatorname{rad}_{r,\tau(m)}(s_t,a_t)+4D\operatorname{rad}_{p,\tau(m)}(s_t,a_t). \end{aligned}ρt∗​−rt​(st​,at​)≤​s′∑​pt​(s′∣st​,at​)γ~​τ(m)​(s′)−γ~​τ(m)​(st​)+τ(m)​1​+2varr,t​+4D(varp,t​+η)+2radr,τ(m)​(st​,at​)+4Dradp,τ(m)​(st​,at​).​

The five milestones are the paper's Lemmas 2–5 and displayed inequality (32): a dual-bias span bound, a drift estimate for window averages, bounded optimistic bias, optimism under drift, and a transition-value error bound. Their exact constants are part of the targets Cheung et al., pp. 33, 38–39.

What the result supplies

Proposition 2 separates the per-round change in optimal gain from the cost of the current action. Its first term tracks changes in the optimistic bias along transitions; the other terms identify window drift, reward and transition estimation, and widening. This decomposition can be summed across episodes when analyzing the algorithm. The result has a concrete role even though the later horizon-wide theorem is given in asymptotic notation Cheung et al., pp. 14, 41.

The paper proves these claims mathematically. The mission asks for machine-checked proofs of the explicit statements and for reusable definitions of finite nonstationary MDP variation, window estimators, confidence sets, occupancy gain, and hitting-time diameter. The source's Theorems 1–4 are not posed here: their displayed bounds hide constants in O~(⋅)\widetilde O(\cdot)O(⋅) and, in one case, use an unspecified O(δ)O(\delta)O(δ) failure probability Cheung et al., pp. 14–25. This proposal supplies statements for solvers; it does not claim that these new statements already have machine-checked proofs.

Where the difficulty lies

The current model need not resemble the model that generated every observation in the window. A direct stationary confidence argument cannot control the resulting temporal error. The challenge is especially visible at a pair with no recent visits: its comparison transition vector is zero, although a genuine transition row has total mass one. The paper's Lemma 3, read literally for every pair, fails in that case. The mission states its positive-count condition explicitly while keeping the proposition and the later optimism and transition milestones valid at unvisited pairs Cheung et al., pp. 12, 38–40.

There is a separate issue with the printed dual-bias lemma. Feasibility alone permits an arbitrarily large dual gain and does not force the asserted 2D2D2D span bound. The mission adds ρ≤2\rho\le2ρ≤2 to Lemma 2 and records the change for audit. The EVI output is represented by its selected-model membership, bias normalization, optimism, and near-optimality properties; this is the contract stated for the algorithm's output, rather than a formal execution of extended value iteration Cheung et al., pp. 13, 33, 35–36.

Formalization scope

States and ambient actions are Fin S and Fin A; permitted actions are state-dependent finite subsets. The setup has S>1S>1S>1, 0<δ<10<\delta<10<δ<1, η≥0\eta\ge0η≥0, and a nonempty action set at each state. Time is zero-based in Lean, while the paper's rounds are one-based; in particular its 1/τ(m)1/\sqrt{\tau(m)}1/τ(m)​ is represented by 1/τm+11/\sqrt{\tau_m+1}1/τm​+1​. Counts and confidence sets are evaluated at the episode start. Variations continue up to the target round. The estimation events are assumed at the episode start, which is the only time used by these statements.

Hitting times and diameter take values in extended nonnegative reals, so an unreachable target does not acquire a false finite diameter. The diameter includes return times and minimizes over deterministic stationary policies. The confidence-radius product SASASA counts actual permitted pairs. At an unvisited pair, the comparison averages remain zero and N+=1N^+=1N+=1; the large confidence radii under the stated bounds are essential. The local transition event uses the ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ error condition: literal membership of the zero comparison vector in a simplex would make the paper's event fail. The printed coordinatewise maxima in Property 1 imply the standard joint-distribution optimism condition used here. The free (s,a)(s,a)(s,a) printed in the last radius of Proposition 2 means (st,at)(s_t,a_t)(st​,at​), as the proof's context confirms Cheung et al., pp. 12, 14, 36, 40–41.

Two milestones carry a pinned hypothesis because the printed statement is false without it: Lemma 2 assumes the dual gain satisfies ρ≤2\rho\le 2ρ≤2 (an arbitrary feasible ρ\rhoρ can make the bias span exceed 2D2D2D), and Lemma 3 assumes the pair was visited in the episode-start window (at an unvisited pair the comparison averages are zero). Proposition 2 is stated for every round t≥τ(m)t\ge\tau(m)t≥τ(m) before the horizon at which the action is the episode policy's choice, which covers the rounds of episode mmm; the coefficient 4D4D4D of η\etaη is kept as printed.

The witness MDP has genuine probability rows in the widened sets and a diameter bound. The EVI tuple obeys both stated properties, and the chosen action obeys its policy. These conditions prevent an unconstrained bias, a spurious zero diameter, a confidence event at the wrong time, or a reward bound for an unrelated action. The published FiniteMDPLearning model supplies probability rows and rewards in [0,1][0,1][0,1]; its different travel-time convention is not substituted for the paper's diameter. Contributions to the MDP linear program, finite-state hitting times, window-average inequalities, and confidence-region geometry are all useful beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • W. C. Cheung, D. Simchi-Levi and R. Zhu, Non-Stationary Reinforcement Learning: The Blessing of (More) Optimism, arXiv:1906.02922v4, 2020; published as Nonstationary Reinforcement Learning: The Blessing of (More) Optimism, Management Science, 2023. Preprint; journal DOI.
  • T. Jaksch, R. Ortner and P. Auer, Near-optimal regret bounds for reinforcement learning, Journal of Machine Learning Research 11, 2010. Article.
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AnalysisOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Provably Good Region Partitioning for On-Time Last-Mile Delivery I: A Partition Equitable in √f and in the Load Density Is Asymptotically Optimal in Heavy TrafficResearch Paper

Motivation

Same-day and on-demand delivery services (groceries, meals, parcels) must decide how to assign incoming orders to drivers. One option is flexible dispatching: any driver may serve any order in the service region. Another is districting: the region is cut into mmm districts, one per driver, and each driver serves only the orders from their own district. Districting is easier to run, since drivers learn their territory, routes are short and responsibility is clear, but it gives up the flexibility of pooling. A basic question is when a districting policy loses nothing against the best flexible policy.

Carlsson, Liu, Salari and Yu (Operations Research 72(1), 2024; accepted manuscript SSRN 3915544) answer this in heavy traffic, the regime where the drivers are almost always busy. Their comparison point is the policy π∗\pi^*π∗ of Bertsimas and van Ryzin (1993), whose expected delivery time has an explicit leading-order formula in heavy traffic. Their Theorem 6 gives two integral conditions on a partition under which districting matches π∗\pi^*π∗ to first order.

Timeline.

  • 1959. Beardwood, Halton and Hammersley: the shortest tour through nnn random points with density fff has length ∼βn∬f\sim\beta\sqrt n\iint\sqrt{f}∼βn​∬f​.
  • 1991–1993. Bertsimas and van Ryzin: the dynamic traveling repairman and its capacitated, multi-vehicle versions, with heavy-traffic lower bounds and a policy π∗\pi^*π∗ that attains the leading-order formula (Theorem 3 of the paper, p. 8).
  • 2024. Carlsson, Liu, Salari and Yu: a partition that is equitable for two measures gives a districting policy that is asymptotically optimal in heavy traffic (Theorem 6), together with algorithms to compute such partitions.

Setting

A service region R⊆R2\mathscr R\subseteq\mathbb R^2R⊆R2 is compact and convex and contains a depot x0x_0x0​. Orders arrive at rate λ\lambdaλ at random locations drawn from a demand density f≥0f\ge0f≥0 on R\mathscr RR, Lipschitz, with ∬Rf(x) dx=1\iint_{\mathscr R}f(x)\,dx=1∬R​f(x)dx=1. There are m≥1m\ge1m≥1 identical vehicles with speed v>0v>0v>0 and capacity q∈N+q\in\mathbb N_+q∈N+​, and each order needs an on-site service of mean sˉ≥0\bar s\ge0sˉ≥0. The constant β>0\beta>0β>0 comes from the Beardwood–Halton–Hammersley theorem.

The workload factor of the fleet is

ρ+2λ∬R∥x−x0∥f(x) dxmvq,ρ=λsˉm,\rho+\frac{2\lambda\iint_{\mathscr R}\|x-x_0\|f(x)\,dx}{mvq},\qquad \rho=\frac{\lambda\bar s}{m},ρ+mvq2λ∬R​∥x−x0​∥f(x)dx​,ρ=mλsˉ​,

the long-run fraction of time a vehicle spends in on-site service and in travel to and from the depot. The system is stable when it is below 111, and heavy traffic is the limit in which it tends to 111 from below, with only λ\lambdaλ varying.

Theorem 3 of the paper (Bertsimas and van Ryzin) states that π∗\pi^*π∗ achieves

T(π∗)∼β2λ(1−1q)2[∬Rf(x) dx]22m2v2(1−ρ−2λ∬R∥x−x0∥f(x) dxmvq)2T(\pi^*)\sim\frac{\beta^2\lambda(1-\frac1q)^2\left[\iint_{\mathscr R}\sqrt{f(x)}\,dx\right]^2}{2m^2v^2\left(1-\rho-\frac{2\lambda\iint_{\mathscr R}\|x-x_0\|f(x)\,dx}{mvq}\right)^2}T(π∗)∼2m2v2(1−ρ−mvq2λ∬R​∥x−x0​∥f(x)dx​)2β2λ(1−q1​)2[∬R​f(x)​dx]2​

in heavy traffic. A policy π\piπ is asymptotically optimal if T(π)/T(π∗)→1T(\pi)/T(\pi^*)\to1T(π)/T(π∗)→1 in heavy traffic.

A region partitioning policy fixes a partition {R1,…,Rm}\{\mathscr R_1,\dots,\mathscr R_m\}{R1​,…,Rm​} of R\mathscr RR and dedicates one vehicle to each Ri\mathscr R_iRi​. District iii then receives orders at rate λi=λ∬Rif\lambda_i=\lambda\iint_{\mathscr R_i}fλi​=λ∬Ri​​f with conditional density fi=f/∬Riff_i=f/\iint_{\mathscr R_i}ffi​=f/∬Ri​​f. Its vehicle runs the single-vehicle version of π∗\pi^*π∗, so Theorem 3 with m=1m=1m=1 gives its delivery time TiT_iTi​. The policy's overall expected delivery time is T=∑iP(x∈Ri) TiT=\sum_i\mathbb P(x\in\mathscr R_i)\,T_iT=∑i​P(x∈Ri​)Ti​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6 (p. 11)

If for every iii

∬Rif(x) dx=1m∬Rf(x) dx,∬Ri(sˉvq+2∥x−x0∥)f(x) dx=1m∬R(sˉvq+2∥x−x0∥)f(x) dx,\iint_{\mathscr R_i}\sqrt{f(x)}\,dx=\frac1m\iint_{\mathscr R}\sqrt{f(x)}\,dx,\qquad \iint_{\mathscr R_i}(\bar svq+2\|x-x_0\|)f(x)\,dx=\frac1m\iint_{\mathscr R}(\bar svq+2\|x-x_0\|)f(x)\,dx,∬Ri​​f(x)​dx=m1​∬R​f(x)​dx,∬Ri​​(sˉvq+2∥x−x0​∥)f(x)dx=m1​∬R​(sˉvq+2∥x−x0​∥)f(x)dx,

and T(π∗)T(\pi^*)T(π∗) and every TiT_iTi​ obey Theorem 3, then

∑i=1mP(x∈Ri) TiT(π∗)⟶1in heavy traffic.\frac{\sum_{i=1}^m\mathbb P(x\in\mathscr R_i)\,T_i}{T(\pi^*)}\longrightarrow1\quad\text{in heavy traffic.}T(π∗)∑i=1m​P(x∈Ri​)Ti​​⟶1in heavy traffic.

Milestones

These are the displayed steps of the printed proofs of Theorems 5 and 6 (pp. ec5–ec6):

  1. Normalization identities. ∬Rifi=∬Rif/∬Rif\iint_{\mathscr R_i}\sqrt{f_i}=\iint_{\mathscr R_i}\sqrt f/\sqrt{\iint_{\mathscr R_i}f}∬Ri​​fi​​=∬Ri​​f​/∬Ri​​f​ and ∬Ri∥x−x0∥fi=∬Ri∥x−x0∥f/∬Rif\iint_{\mathscr R_i}\|x-x_0\|f_i=\iint_{\mathscr R_i}\|x-x_0\|f/\iint_{\mathscr R_i}f∬Ri​​∥x−x0​∥fi​=∬Ri​​∥x−x0​∥f/∬Ri​​f.
  2. Per-district workload identity. Under the second condition, district iii's workload factor ρi+2λi∬Ri∥x−x0∥fi/vq\rho_i+2\lambda_i\iint_{\mathscr R_i}\|x-x_0\|f_i/vqρi​+2λi​∬Ri​​∥x−x0​∥fi​/vq equals the fleet's for every λ\lambdaλ. The two heavy-traffic limits therefore coincide.
  3. Leading-term chain. Under both conditions, the Theorem 3 term of district iii (one vehicle, data λi,fi\lambda_i,f_iλi​,fi​) equals the fleet's term.
  4. Per-district ratio. Ti/T(π∗)→1T_i/T(\pi^*)\to1Ti​/T(π∗)→1 for every iii.
  5. Total expectation. If Ti/T(π∗)→1T_i/T(\pi^*)\to1Ti​/T(π∗)→1 for every iii, then ∑iP(x∈Ri)Ti/T(π∗)→1\sum_i\mathbb P(x\in\mathscr R_i)T_i/T(\pi^*)\to1∑i​P(x∈Ri​)Ti​/T(π∗)→1.

Significance

The result. Theorem 6 turns a question about stochastic, dynamic routing into a static geometric condition: find a partition that gives every district a 1/m1/m1/m share of two measures, μ1=∬f\mu_1=\iint\sqrt fμ1​=∬f​ (local tour length) and μ2=∬(sˉvq+2∥x−x0∥)f\mu_2=\iint(\bar svq+2\|x-x_0\|)fμ2​=∬(sˉvq+2∥x−x0​∥)f (service plus round-trip load). The rest of the paper builds on this. It computes such partitions with convex pieces, bounds the loss when the shares are only approximately equal (Proposition 3, the subject of the companion mission), and tests the policy in simulation. The theorem also shows that the arrival rates need not be equal across districts. What has to be equal is the combined load.

Formalizing it. The result has a short pen-and-paper proof, and no machine-checked version exists. The mission records exactly which part of the argument is real analysis (integral identities over a partition, and how heavy-traffic limits pass to ratios) and which part is borrowed from Bertsimas and van Ryzin. It also gives the platform a first districting and continuous-approximation development. Its definitions (workload factor, Theorem 3's leading term, heavy-traffic filter, conditional subregion data) can be reused for other results in the continuous-approximation literature.

Difficulty

The algebra in the proof is simple once Theorem 3 is applied to each district with its own rate λi\lambda_iλi​, density fif_ifi​ and one vehicle. The obstacle is in the limits. Theorem 3 for district iii holds along that district's heavy-traffic limit, where its own workload factor tends to 111, while asymptotic optimality is measured along the fleet's limit. These are different limits unless the second equitable condition makes the two workload factors equal as functions of λ\lambdaλ. A tempting shortcut is to state the district hypothesis directly with the fleet's quantities, such as (1/m)∬Rf(1/m)\iint_{\mathscr R}\sqrt f(1/m)∬R​f​ and the fleet's workload factor. That assumes milestones 2 and 3 and empties the theorem. Division also needs care: fif_ifi​ and the ratios Ti/T(π∗)T_i/T(\pi^*)Ti​/T(π∗) have denominators that must be shown nonzero from the hypotheses, not assumed.

Formalization scope

The plane is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin 2) with the Euclidean norm, and integrals are Bochner set integrals for Lebesgue measure. The definition file CarlssonPartition.Equitable.Setting contains:

  • the instance (R,x0,f,m,v,q,sˉ,β)(\mathscr R,x_0,f,m,v,q,\bar s,\beta)(R,x0​,f,m,v,q,sˉ,β);
  • the standing assumptions listed in Setting;
  • the workload factor and Theorem 3's leading term, both generic in (vehicle count, rate, region, density);
  • P(x∈S)\mathbb P(x\in S)P(x∈S), λi\lambda_iλi​ and fif_ifi​;
  • partitions;
  • the heavy-traffic filter.

Conventions:

  • The model is not formalized. The stochastic dynamic routing model (renewal arrivals, TSP batching, queues of tours) has no Mathlib substrate. The paper itself uses it only through Theorem 3 of Bertsimas and van Ryzin. So T(π∗)T(\pi^*)T(π∗) and the TiT_iTi​ are arbitrary real functions of λ\lambdaλ, and Theorem 3 is a hypothesis on them: for the fleet, and for each district with m=1m=1m=1 along the district's own limit.
  • Heavy traffic is Filter.comap (fun λ => workload) (𝓝[<] 1): the arrival rates along which the workload factor tends to 111 from below. Every "∼\sim∼" is a ratio tending to 111.
  • Partitions are read up to null sets: null-measurable pieces, pairwise almost-everywhere disjoint, with union R\mathscr RR.
  • Added hypothesis q≥2q\ge2q≥2. At q=1q=1q=1 the factor (1−1/q)2(1-1/q)^2(1−1/q)2 makes Theorem 3's leading term zero, so its ratio hypotheses could not hold and the theorem would be vacuous.
  • No positivity of ∬Rif\iint_{\mathscr R_i}f∬Ri​​f is assumed in the goal, because it follows from the first equitable condition. The milestones that manipulate fif_ifi​ state it explicitly.
  • The Lipschitz condition is kept as a standing assumption of the paper, although only continuity is needed.

Two formalizations would make the goal trivial and are ruled out: defining T(π∗)T(\pi^*)T(π∗) or TiT_iTi​ as the leading-order formula, and writing the district hypothesis with fleet quantities or the fleet's filter. The verification development checks that the heavy-traffic filter is not the bottom filter whenever sˉ>0\bar s>0sˉ>0.

Welcome contributions: proofs of the milestones; a general lemma on averaging ratio limits under a probability vector; and finite additivity of set integrals over a.e.-disjoint partitions in the form used here.

Selected references

  • J. G. Carlsson, S. Liu, N. Salari, H. Yu, Provably Good Region Partitioning for On-Time Last-Mile Delivery, Operations Research 72(1):91–109, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.0588 (accepted manuscript: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3915544)
  • D. J. Bertsimas, G. van Ryzin, Stochastic and Dynamic Vehicle Routing in the Euclidean Plane with Multiple Capacitated Vehicles, Operations Research 41(1):60–76, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.41.1.60
  • D. J. Bertsimas, G. van Ryzin, A Stochastic and Dynamic Vehicle Routing Problem in the Euclidean Plane, Operations Research 39(4):601–615, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.39.4.601
  • J. Beardwood, J. H. Halton, J. M. Hammersley, The Shortest Path Through Many Points, Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 55(4):299–327, 1959. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305004100034095
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Nonstationary Reinforcement Learning: The Blessing of (More) Optimism I: No Policy Earns More Than the Sum of Per-Step Optimal Gains Plus 4(D_max+1)√((B_r+2D_max B_p)T)Research Paper

Motivation

Reinforcement learning in a changing environment needs a benchmark that remains meaningful when the transition law and rewards vary from round to round. For a stationary Markov decision process (MDP), the optimal long-run average reward is a standard benchmark. In a nonstationary MDP, summing those stationary optima across rounds is convenient, but it need not equal the best expected reward achievable over the whole horizon: today's action changes tomorrow's state. Cheung, Simchi-Levi and Zhu use Proposition 1 to quantify this gap in their analysis of nonstationary reinforcement learning (preprint, pp. 7–8). This mission formalizes that proposition and the explicit estimates in its proof.

The paper develops algorithms for MDPs with drifting rewards and transitions. Its oracle comparison is useful before any algorithm is chosen: it relates a sum of local, stationary benchmarks to the reward of every non-anticipatory policy, including policies that adapt to the observed trajectory. This separates a property of the environment from the performance of a learning rule. The paper was published in Management Science in 2023; this mission follows the numbered statements and pages of the authors' pinned arXiv preprint (Cheung et al., 2020, pp. 6–8).

Setting

A finite nonstationary MDP has a finite state set S\mathcal SS, a nonempty available-action set As\mathcal A_sAs​ at each state sss, and a horizon of TTT rounds. At round ttt, taking action a∈Asa\in\mathcal A_sa∈As​ in state sss gives a stochastic reward with mean rt(s,a)∈[0,1]r_t(s,a)\in[0,1]rt​(s,a)∈[0,1] and moves to a new state according to the probability distribution pt(⋅∣s,a)p_t(\cdot\mid s,a)pt​(⋅∣s,a). A non-anticipatory policy selects an allowed action using the current state and observations from previous rounds. The target concerns expected sums of the mean rewards, so the distributional shape of the reward noise does not enter its formula (preprint, §2.2, pp. 6–7).

The one-step reward variation Br,tB_{r,t}Br,t​ is the largest value of ∣rt+1(s,a)−rt(s,a)∣|r_{t+1}(s,a)-r_t(s,a)|∣rt+1​(s,a)−rt​(s,a)∣ over allowed state–action pairs. The transition variation Bp,tB_{p,t}Bp,t​ is the largest ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ distance between the corresponding transition distributions. Their variation budgets are Br=∑t=1T−1Br,tB_r=\sum_{t=1}^{T-1}B_{r,t}Br​=∑t=1T−1​Br,t​ and Bp=∑t=1T−1Bp,tB_p=\sum_{t=1}^{T-1}B_{p,t}Bp​=∑t=1T−1​Bp,t​, exactly as in equation (1). The budgets are computed from the MDP sequence; they are not independent inputs to the theorem (preprint, p. 6, (1)).

For the stationary MDP at round ttt, ρt∗\rho_t^*ρt∗​ is its optimal long-run average reward. The mission represents it as the optimum of the paper's occupancy linear program (15), whose variables are nonnegative state–action occupancies, satisfy flow balance, and sum to one. A diameter DtD_tDt​ bounds the least expected hitting time between any two states under an allowed stationary policy. The paper's Definition 1 includes equal initial and target states, so this includes a return time. Assumption 1 requires a finite diameter at every round; Dmax⁡D_{\max}Dmax​ is a common bound on those diameters (preprint, pp. 7–8, Definition 1 and Assumption 1; p. 33, (15)).

Formalization targets

Proposition 1: the oracle gap

Write B=Br+2Dmax⁡BpB=B_r+2D_{\max}B_pB=Br​+2Dmax​Bp​. For 0<B≤T0<B\le T0<B≤T and the necessary small-budget condition BT≥1BT\ge1BT≥1, the target is

∑t=1Tρt∗≥EΠ ⁣[∑t=1Trt(st,at)]−4(Dmax⁡+1)BT\sum_{t=1}^{T}\rho_t^*\ge \mathbb E^{\Pi}\!\left[\sum_{t=1}^{T}r_t(s_t,a_t)\right] -4(D_{\max}+1)\sqrt{BT}t=1∑T​ρt∗​≥EΠ[t=1∑T​rt​(st​,at​)]−4(Dmax​+1)BT​

for every initial state and every allowed non-anticipatory policy Π\PiΠ. Quantifying over every policy expresses the paper's maximum over policies without introducing a supremum over an unbounded real-valued function space. The first five targets follow Appendix A.2: a bounded optimal dual potential, the gain-drift inequality (18), the pathwise dual inequality (19), the window inequality (23), and the full-horizon inequality (24). Their constants and index ranges are part of the targets (preprint, pp. 8, 33–34).

Significance

The result gives a finite-horizon comparison between two different benchmarks. The sum of stationary gains is additive over time, while the best expected cumulative reward accounts for how actions alter later states. Proposition 1 says that their difference is controlled by variation and diameter under its hypotheses. This is the paper's justification for using the additive oracle in its dynamic-regret definition; the authors note that the later algorithmic bounds are larger than this comparison term (preprint, p. 8, text after Proposition 1).

The mathematical result is already claimed in the paper. This mission asks for a machine-checked version with explicit finite-horizon distributions, the occupancy LP, the diameter convention, and the drift sums. The new Lean statements currently have placeholders for their proofs; the imported finite-MDP definitions are already published. A completed development would provide reusable code for time-dependent MDP trajectory laws and for comparing stationary LP values as a model drifts. It would also make the precise domain of the square-root bound reviewable independently of the algorithms in the remainder of the paper.

Difficulty

The stationary gain ρt∗\rho_t^*ρt∗​ is not a per-round reward guarantee. An action can collect reward now and put the process in a state whose future reward is poor, so summing stationary optima does not directly bound a nonstationary trajectory. Conversely, treating each round as an independent stationary experiment discards the state dependence that the policy exploits. The diameter controls the cost of that dependence, and variation controls changes between the stationary problems. The proof must connect these objects while preserving the exact factors 2Dmax⁡2D_{\max}2Dmax​, 2W2W2W, and 4TDmax⁡/W4TD_{\max}/W4TDmax​/W in Appendix A.2 (preprint, pp. 33–35).

There is also a small-budget obstruction in the printed Proposition 1. Its stated 0<B≤T0<B\le T0<B≤T permits BT<1BT<1BT<1, where the displayed inequality is false: a two-state, one-action example with a slowly returning state, T=2T=2T=2, and reward drift 10−1210^{-12}10−12 has an oracle sum near 2/112/112/11 while the proposed lower bound on that sum is near 111. The mission therefore adds BT≥1BT\ge1BT≥1 and records the difference from the page. Inequality (24), posed separately, retains the paper's every-integer-window form and needs no such pin.

Formalization scope

States and actions are Fin S and Fin A; available actions form a nonempty Finset at each state, and S>0S>0S>0. The imported FiniteMDPLearning structure supplies reward rows in [0,1][0,1][0,1] and transition probability rows. It has rows for actions unavailable at a particular state; all mathematical maxima, LP constraints, policy restrictions, and drift formulas use only allowed pairs. The source's time t∈{1,…,T}t\in\{1,\ldots,T\}t∈{1,…,T} is stored at Lean index t−1t-1t−1. No value of the MDP sequence after the horizon enters a stated budget or reward sum.

The occupancy LP has a nonempty bounded feasible-value set under the standing MDP assumptions; its real supremum denotes ρ∗\rho^*ρ∗. Hitting times and diameters use extended nonnegative reals to retain infinity, rather than silently converting an infinite hitting time to zero. The diameter includes same-state return times and minimizes over deterministic stationary policies; such policies attain the hitting-time minimum. The policy used for cumulative reward is a history-dependent randomized kernel on state–action histories. Conditioning an action rule that also observes past rewards on that history yields the same state–action trajectory law. The nonstationary measure samples the next state with the current round's transition law and is a probability measure.

The fixed Dmax⁡D_{\max}Dmax​ is constrained to bound every round's diameter; it is not an unrelated parameter. The stated BT≥1BT\ge1BT≥1 pin rules out the false small-budget case. In (23), the paper's last-window drift sum includes B⋅,TB_{\cdot,T}B⋅,T​, which equation (1) does not define; the formal sum retains all defined terms through T−1T-1T−1. The goal and milestones do not weaken ρt∗\rho_t^*ρt∗​, restrict the policy class to a convenient subclass, or omit a time step. Contributions on LP duality, finite-horizon trajectory expectations, hitting-time bounds, and drift inequalities are useful beyond this proposition. The paper's headline Theorems 1–4 are not posed here because their O~\widetilde OO notation hides constants (preprint, p. 6, §2.1).

Selected references

  • W. C. Cheung, D. Simchi-Levi and R. Zhu, Non-Stationary Reinforcement Learning: The Blessing of (More) Optimism, arXiv:1906.02922v4, 2020; published as Nonstationary Reinforcement Learning: The Blessing of (More) Optimism, Management Science, 2023. Preprint; published article.
  • T. Jaksch, R. Ortner and P. Auer, Near-Optimal Regret Bounds for Reinforcement Learning, Journal of Machine Learning Research 11, 2010. Article. The source paper cites its diameter and bias-span results in Definition 1 and Appendix A.1.
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994. Book. The source paper cites it for the average-reward occupancy LP on p. 33.
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Asymptotic Optimality of Base-Stock Policies for Perishable Inventory Systems 6: Under LIFO Issuance with m ≥ 2 and S^NP > D̲ > 0 the Best Base-Stock Policy Is Not Asymptotically Optimal as θ → ∞Research Paper

Motivation

Blood platelets, fresh produce and many pharmaceuticals have a fixed lifetime: a unit not used within mmm periods of its arrival must be discarded. Optimal ordering for such products depends on the whole age profile of the stock, and the dynamic program that describes it has an (m−1)(m-1)(m−1)-dimensional state. It is intractable beyond small mmm (Nahmias, 1982; Nandakumar & Morton, 1993), so practice relies on base-stock policies, which raise the total stock to a fixed level SSS every period.

Bu, Gong and Chao (SSRN 3724966, accepted by Management Science, 2022) give the first performance guarantees for base-stock policies in this system. Under first-in-first-out (FIFO) issuance a heuristic base-stock level is asymptotically optimal in the lifetime, the demand population, the penalty cost and the outdating cost (missions 1–4 of this series). Under last-in-first-out (LIFO) issuance, which models a customer who picks the freshest unit from the shelf, a simple base-stock level is asymptotically optimal in the penalty cost and, when demand can be arbitrarily small, in the outdating cost (Theorem 5, mission 5). This mission formalizes the complementary negative result: when the demand is bounded away from zero, no base-stock policy is asymptotically optimal under LIFO as the outdating cost grows.

Setting

Demands D1,D2,…D_1, D_2, \dotsD1​,D2​,… are i.i.d. copies of a nonnegative random variable DDD with 0<E[D]<∞0 < \mathbb E[D] < \infty0<E[D]<∞ and distribution function FFF. The lower support is D‾=inf⁡{x:F(x)>0}\underline D = \inf\{x : F(x) > 0\}D​=inf{x:F(x)>0}, and the newsvendor level is SNP=F−1(p/(p+h))S^{NP} = F^{-1}(p/(p+h))SNP=F−1(p/(p+h)) with F−1(x)=inf⁡{y:F(y)≥x}F^{-1}(x) = \inf\{y : F(y) \ge x\}F−1(x)=inf{y:F(y)≥x}.

The product has lifetime m≥1m \ge 1m≥1. At the start of period ttt the state is xt=(xt,1,…,xt,m−1)x_t = (x_{t,1}, \dots, x_{t,m-1})xt​=(xt,1​,…,xt,m−1​), where xt,ix_{t,i}xt,i​ is the stock with remaining lifetime at most iii; the system starts empty. The firm orders qt≥0q_t \ge 0qt​≥0, which arrives at once, raising the total stock to xt,m=xt,m−1+qtx_{t,m} = x_{t,m-1} + q_txt,m​=xt,m−1​+qt​. Demand DtD_tDt​ is served youngest stock first, unmet demand is lost, and stock reaching the end of its lifetime outdates. Under LIFO the outdated amount and the next state are

ot=min⁡{(xt,m−Dt)+,xt,1},xt+1,i=min⁡{(xt,m−Dt)+,xt,i+1}−ot.o_t = \min\{(x_{t,m} - D_t)^+, x_{t,1}\}, \qquad x_{t+1,i} = \min\{(x_{t,m} - D_t)^+, x_{t,i+1}\} - o_t .ot​=min{(xt,m​−Dt​)+,xt,1​},xt+1,i​=min{(xt,m​−Dt​)+,xt,i+1​}−ot​.

Each period costs Ctπ=h(xt,m−Dt)++p(Dt−xt,m)++θotC^\pi_t = h(x_{t,m} - D_t)^+ + p(D_t - x_{t,m})^+ + \theta o_tCtπ​=h(xt,m​−Dt​)++p(Dt​−xt,m​)++θot​ with h,p>0h, p > 0h,p>0 and θ≥0\theta \ge 0θ≥0. A policy is admissible if its order in period ttt is a nonnegative measurable function of the current state. Its long-run average cost is Cπ=lim sup⁡T1T∑t=1TE[Ctπ]C^\pi = \limsup_T \frac1T \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb E[C^\pi_t]Cπ=limsupT​T1​∑t=1T​E[Ctπ​], and OPTLIFO=inf⁡πCπ\mathrm{OPT}^{LIFO} = \inf_\pi C^\piOPTLIFO=infπ​Cπ. The base-stock policy πS\pi_SπS​ orders (S−xt,m−1)+(S - x_{t,m-1})^+(S−xt,m−1​)+, with cost CLIFO(S)C^{LIFO}(S)CLIFO(S). The subscript θ\thetaθ marks the outdating cost; hhh, ppp, mmm and the demand law are fixed.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1 (p. 17)

If m≥2m \ge 2m≥2 and SNP>D‾>0S^{NP} > \underline D > 0SNP>D​>0, then

lim⁡θ→∞(CθLIFO(SθLIFO,∗)−OPTθLIFO)>0,\lim_{\theta\to\infty}\big(C^{LIFO}_\theta(S^{LIFO,*}_\theta) - \mathrm{OPT}^{LIFO}_\theta\big) > 0,θ→∞lim​(CθLIFO​(SθLIFO,∗​)−OPTθLIFO​)>0,

where CθLIFO(SθLIFO,∗)=inf⁡S≥0CθLIFO(S)C^{LIFO}_\theta(S^{LIFO,*}_\theta) = \inf_{S \ge 0} C^{LIFO}_\theta(S)CθLIFO​(SθLIFO,∗​)=infS≥0​CθLIFO​(S) is the best base-stock cost. The goal asserts that both costs are finite, and that the limit exists and is strictly positive.

Milestones (Appendix C.3, pp. ec8–ec9)

  1. Under m≥2m\ge2m≥2 and SNP>D‾>0S^{NP}>\underline D>0SNP>D​>0, lim⁡θ→∞min⁡S≥0C^L,θ(S)=p(E[D]−D‾)\lim_{\theta\to\infty} \min_{S\ge0} \hat C_{L,\theta}(S) = p(\mathbb E[D] - \underline D)limθ→∞​minS≥0​C^L,θ​(S)=p(E[D]−D​), where C^L(S)=hE[(S−D)+]+pE[(D−S)+]+θmE[(S−max⁡{D1,…,Dm})+]\hat C_L(S) = h\mathbb E[(S-D)^+] + p\mathbb E[(D-S)^+] + \frac{\theta}{m}\mathbb E[(S - \max\{D_1,\dots,D_m\})^+]C^L​(S)=hE[(S−D)+]+pE[(D−S)+]+mθ​E[(S−max{D1​,…,Dm​})+] is the lower bound (11).
  2. Under the same hypotheses, lim⁡θ→∞Cθ(SθLIFO,∗)=p(E[D]−D‾)\lim_{\theta\to\infty} C_\theta(S^{LIFO,*}_\theta) = p(\mathbb E[D] - \underline D)limθ→∞​Cθ​(SθLIFO,∗​)=p(E[D]−D​).
  3. Under the same hypotheses, hE[(S−D)+]+pE[(D−S)+]≤p(E[D]−D‾)h\mathbb E[(S-D)^+] + p\mathbb E[(D-S)^+] \le p(\mathbb E[D] - \underline D)hE[(S−D)+]+pE[(D−S)+]≤p(E[D]−D​) for all S∈[D‾,min⁡{SNP,mD‾}]S \in [\underline D, \min\{S^{NP}, m\underline D\}]S∈[D​,min{SNP,mD​}].
  4. The policy that orders min⁡{SNP,mD‾}\min\{S^{NP}, m\underline D\}min{SNP,mD​} units in periods 1,m+1,2m+1,…1, m+1, 2m+1, \dots1,m+1,2m+1,… and uses base-stock level D‾\underline DD​ otherwise is admissible, and its long-run average cost is strictly less than p(E[D]−D‾)p(\mathbb E[D] - \underline D)p(E[D]−D​) and independent of θ\thetaθ.
  5. lim⁡θ→∞OPTθLIFO<p(E[D]−D‾)\lim_{\theta\to\infty} \mathrm{OPT}^{LIFO}_\theta < p(\mathbb E[D] - \underline D)limθ→∞​OPTθLIFO​<p(E[D]−D​).

The proof also uses Lemma 3 (C^L≤CLIFO≤C^U\hat C_L \le C^{LIFO} \le \hat C_UC^L​≤CLIFO≤C^U​, p. 16) and inequality (EC.22) (p. ec8). Both are milestones of mission 5 of this series and are not restated here.

Significance

Proposition 1 marks the boundary of Theorem 5(c). Together they show that under LIFO, with a large outdating cost, base-stock policies are asymptotically optimal exactly in the trivial cases m=1m = 1m=1 or SNP≤D‾S^{NP} \le \underline DSNP≤D​, and when D‾=0\underline D = 0D​=0. In the remaining case some optimality gap persists however large θ\thetaθ is. Under FIFO the heuristic level is asymptotically optimal in θ\thetaθ without conditions (Theorem 4), so the result separates the two issuance rules: a manager facing fresh-first customers and costly waste should look beyond base-stock policies.

The result is proved in the paper; nothing in it is machine-checked. A formal proof would give the first verified statement about the long-run cost of a perishable inventory system. It would also produce reusable pieces: the LIFO recursion, the base-stock cost under LIFO, and a time-dependent policy whose cost can be computed exactly.

Difficulty

The obvious argument compares two limits. The limit of the best base-stock cost needs a lower bound valid for every base-stock level at once, and that bound must be uniform as θ\thetaθ changes. The lower bound C^L\hat C_LC^L​ of Lemma 3 controls the outdating only through E[(S−max⁡iDi)+]\mathbb E[(S - \max_i D_i)^+]E[(S−maxi​Di​)+], so the limit of its minimum has to be computed separately. The upper side cannot use a base-stock policy at all. It needs an explicit policy that is not stationary. That policy must be shown never to outdate along every demand path, and its periodic cost has to be bounded strictly below p(E[D]−D‾)p(\mathbb E[D]-\underline D)p(E[D]−D​). The strictness needs the facts that SNP>D‾S^{NP} > \underline DSNP>D​ and that mD‾>D‾m\underline D > \underline DmD​>D​, which is where m≥2m \ge 2m≥2 and D‾>0\underline D > 0D​>0 enter. A long-run average over a non-stationary policy is a lim sup⁡\limsuplimsup of Cesàro means, and the step from per-period bounds to the average has to be made explicitly.

Formalization scope

  • Demand is the published CappedBaseStock.DemandLaw: a probability law on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with finite positive mean. The demand path carries the i.i.d. product law. The newsvendor cost hE[(S−D)+]+pE[(D−S)+]h\mathbb E[(S-D)^+] + p\mathbb E[(D-S)^+]hE[(S−D)+]+pE[(D−S)+] and SNPS^{NP}SNP are backorderCost and newsvendorLevel of the published LostSalesOrderUpTo.Asymptotic.Backorder.
  • Time is zero-based: Lean period ttt is the paper's period t+1t+1t+1, and the cyclic policy's periods 1,m+1,…1, m+1, \dots1,m+1,… are Lean periods with t mod m=0t \bmod m = 0tmodm=0.
  • The state is a vector of cumulative levels Fin (m - 1) → ℝ with xt,0:=0x_{t,0} := 0xt,0​:=0, so m=1m = 1m=1 is allowed. Levels SSS range over [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).
  • Period costs are in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], and expectations are lower Lebesgue integrals over the path law. CπC^\piCπ is the lim sup⁡\limsuplimsup of Cesàro averages.
  • Π\PiΠ is the paper's class: time-dependent, deterministic, measurable functions of the current state. OPTLIFO\mathrm{OPT}^{LIFO}OPTLIFO is the infimum over all of Π\PiΠ, not over base-stock policies.
  • C(S)C(S)C(S) is the simulated long-run average cost of πS\pi_SπS​, not a formula. The best base-stock cost is inf⁡S≥0C(S)\inf_{S\ge0} C(S)infS≥0​C(S), because existence of a minimizer under LIFO is not shown. "min" in milestone 1 is likewise an infimum of a nonnegative real function.
  • Limits in θ\thetaθ are along θ∈[0,∞)\theta \in [0,\infty)θ∈[0,∞) with the other parameters fixed. The goal subtracts real values only after asserting finiteness, so neither ∞−∞\infty - \infty∞−∞ nor a truncated subtraction can make it true. A formalization that fixes θ\thetaθ, sets m=1m = 1m=1, restricts OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT to base-stock policies or defines C(S)C(S)C(S) by the bound of Lemma 3 would trivialize or falsify the statement, and is ruled out.

The work needs a Cesàro-limit toolkit for [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued sequences, the LIFO sample-path recursion, and convexity facts for the newsvendor cost. Proofs of the milestones, and of the definitional sanity facts (πS∈Π\pi_S \in \PiπS​∈Π, C(S)<∞C(S) < \inftyC(S)<∞), are welcome.

Selected references

  • X. Bu, X. Gong, X. Chao, Asymptotic Optimality of Base-Stock Policies for Perishable Inventory Systems, accepted manuscript, SSRN 3724966, 2022. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3724966 (version of record: Management Science, 2022, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4400).
  • S. Nahmias, Perishable inventory theory: a review, Operations Research 30(4), 680–708, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.30.4.680
  • P. Nandakumar, T. E. Morton, Near myopic heuristics for the fixed-life perishability problem, Management Science 39(12), 1490–1498, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.39.12.1490
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