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Operations ResearchProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Subset Selection with Shrinkage: Sparse Linear Modeling When the SNR Is Low II: Four Gaussian Noise Events Behind the Error Bounds Hold with High ProbabilityResearch Paper

Motivation

Best subset selection fits a linear model using at most kkk of ppp candidate predictors. When the noise level is high relative to the signal, it overfits. Mazumder, Radchenko and Dedieu (arXiv:1708.03288v4; Operations Research, 2023) add a shrinkage penalty λ∥β∥q\lambda\|\beta\|_qλ∥β∥q​, q∈{1,2}q\in\{1,2\}q∈{1,2}, to the best-subsets problem and prove oracle inequalities for the resulting estimators. Their main error bounds (Theorems 2–5) are proved in the same way: a deterministic argument shows the bound holds whenever the noise vector lies in one of four explicit sets, and a separate probabilistic result shows that each set has probability close to one. This mission formalizes that probabilistic result, Theorem 1 of the paper (p. 13, proof in Supplement B.1, pp. 38–39).

The four events combine several tools of high-dimensional statistics. The event F\mathcal FF controls the noise through a sorted-ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ (SLOPE-type) norm; its probability bound is Theorem 4.1 of Bellec, Lecué and Tsybakov, Slope meets Lasso (Ann. Statist. 2018). The event Gs\mathcal G_sGs​ is a sparse version of a χ2\chi^2χ2 deviation bound, adapted from Lemma 8 of Raskutti, Wainwright and Yu (IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 2011). The event H\mathcal HH is the classical Gaussian maximal inequality behind Lasso and Dantzig-selector analyses.

Setting

Observations follow the model

y=f∗+ϵ(15)y = f^* + \epsilon \qquad (15)y=f∗+ϵ(15)

in Rn\mathbb R^nRn. The mean f∗f^*f∗ is deterministic and unknown. The noise ϵ\epsilonϵ has independent N(0,σ2)N(0,\sigma^2)N(0,σ2) coordinates, with σ>0\sigma>0σ>0. The design X∈Rn×pX\in\mathbb R^{n\times p}X∈Rn×p is deterministic, and its columns have unit Euclidean norm.

For u∈Rpu\in\mathbb R^pu∈Rp, ∥u∥\|u\|∥u∥ is the Euclidean norm, ∥u∥1\|u\|_1∥u∥1​ the ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ norm, ∥u∥∞\|u\|_\infty∥u∥∞​ the largest absolute coordinate, and ∥u∥0\|u\|_0∥u∥0​ the number of non-zero coordinates. For an integer s∈[p]={1,…,p}s\in[p]=\{1,\dots,p\}s∈[p]={1,…,p}, B0(s)={u∈Rp:∥u∥0≤s}B_0(s)=\{u\in\mathbb R^p:\|u\|_0\le s\}B0​(s)={u∈Rp:∥u∥0​≤s}. The non-increasing rearrangement u1♯≥⋯≥up♯u^\sharp_1\ge\dots\ge u^\sharp_pu1♯​≥⋯≥up♯​ lists ∣u1∣,…,∣up∣|u_1|,\dots,|u_p|∣u1​∣,…,∣up​∣ in non-increasing order. Logarithms are natural, and δ0∈(0,1]\delta_0\in(0,1]δ0​∈(0,1] is a confidence parameter.

The four events (p. 13) are sets of noise vectors:

Es={ϵ⊤Xu≤[4+2] σslog⁡(2ep/s) ∥u∥, ∀u∈B0(s)},\mathcal E_s=\bigl\{\epsilon^\top Xu\le[4+\sqrt2]\,\sigma\sqrt{s\log(2ep/s)}\,\|u\|,\ \forall u\in B_0(s)\bigr\},Es​={ϵ⊤Xu≤[4+2​]σslog(2ep/s)​∥u∥, ∀u∈B0​(s)}, F={ϵ⊤Xu≤[4+2] σmax⁡(∑j=1puj♯log⁡(2p/j), log⁡(1/δ0) ∥Xu∥), ∀u∈Rp},\mathcal F=\Bigl\{\epsilon^\top Xu\le[4+\sqrt2]\,\sigma\max\Bigl(\sum_{j=1}^p u^\sharp_j\sqrt{\log(2p/j)},\ \sqrt{\log(1/\delta_0)}\,\|Xu\|\Bigr),\ \forall u\in\mathbb R^p\Bigr\},F={ϵ⊤Xu≤[4+2​]σmax(j=1∑p​uj♯​log(2p/j)​, log(1/δ0​)​∥Xu∥), ∀u∈Rp}, Gs={ϵ⊤Xu≤σ5slog⁡(ep/s)+log⁡(1/δ0) ∥Xu∥, ∀u∈B0(s)},\mathcal G_s=\bigl\{\epsilon^\top Xu\le\sigma\sqrt{5s\log(ep/s)+\log(1/\delta_0)}\,\|Xu\|,\ \forall u\in B_0(s)\bigr\},Gs​={ϵ⊤Xu≤σ5slog(ep/s)+log(1/δ0​)​∥Xu∥, ∀u∈B0​(s)}, H={∥X⊤ϵ∥∞≤σ2log⁡(2p)+σ2log⁡(1/δ0)}.\mathcal H=\bigl\{\|X^\top\epsilon\|_\infty\le\sigma\sqrt{2\log(2p)}+\sigma\sqrt{2\log(1/\delta_0)}\bigr\}.H={∥X⊤ϵ∥∞​≤σ2log(2p)​+σ2log(1/δ0​)​}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (with the Gs\mathcal G_sGs​ part corrected)

For s∈[p]s\in[p]s∈[p] and δ0∈(0,1]\delta_0\in(0,1]δ0​∈(0,1]:

P(Es)≥1−s4ep,P(F)≥1−δ02,P(Gs′)≥1−δ0,P(H)≥1−δ0,\mathbb P(\mathcal E_s)\ge1-\frac{s}{4ep},\qquad\mathbb P(\mathcal F)\ge1-\frac{\delta_0}2,\qquad\mathbb P(\mathcal G'_s)\ge1-\delta_0,\qquad\mathbb P(\mathcal H)\ge1-\delta_0,P(Es​)≥1−4eps​,P(F)≥1−2δ0​​,P(Gs′​)≥1−δ0​,P(H)≥1−δ0​,

where Gs′\mathcal G'_sGs′​ is Gs\mathcal G_sGs​ with 3log⁡(1/δ0)3\log(1/\delta_0)3log(1/δ0​) in place of log⁡(1/δ0)\log(1/\delta_0)log(1/δ0​) under the root. Each event is also asserted to be measurable.

The printed claim P(Gs)≥1−δ0\mathbb P(\mathcal G_s)\ge1-\delta_0P(Gs​)≥1−δ0​ is false. Take n=p=s=1n=p=s=1n=p=s=1 and X=[1]X=[1]X=[1]. Then Gs={∣ϵ∣≤σ5+L}\mathcal G_s=\{|\epsilon|\le\sigma\sqrt{5+L}\}Gs​={∣ϵ∣≤σ5+L​} with L=log⁡(1/δ0)L=\log(1/\delta_0)L=log(1/δ0​), and P(Gsc)=2Φˉ(5+L)\mathbb P(\mathcal G_s^c)=2\bar\Phi(\sqrt{5+L})P(Gsc​)=2Φˉ(5+L​), which exceeds e−L=δ0e^{-L}=\delta_0e−L=δ0​ once L≥9L\ge9L≥9. The corrected constant 333 is what the argument the paper cites actually gives. Downstream, the paper uses P(Gs)\mathbb P(\mathcal G_s)P(Gs​) only inside inequalities that hold up to universal constants, so the correction does not affect its other results.

Milestones

The proof in B.1 is followed step by step:

  1. (27): ∥Xu∥≤∥u∥1≤s∥u∥\|Xu\|\le\|u\|_1\le\sqrt s\|u\|∥Xu∥≤∥u∥1​≤s​∥u∥ on B0(s)B_0(s)B0​(s), and at δ0=s/(2ep)\delta_0=s/(2ep)δ0​=s/(2ep), log⁡(1/δ0)∥Xu∥≤slog⁡(2ep/s)∥u∥\sqrt{\log(1/\delta_0)}\|Xu\|\le\sqrt{s\log(2ep/s)}\|u\|log(1/δ0​)​∥Xu∥≤slog(2ep/s)​∥u∥;
  2. log⁡(s!)≥slog⁡(s/e)\log(s!)\ge s\log(s/e)log(s!)≥slog(s/e), referenced from the platform as (s/e)s≤s!(s/e)^s\le s!(s/e)s≤s!;
  3. ∑j=1slog⁡(2p/j)=slog⁡(2p)−log⁡(s!)≤slog⁡(2ep/s)\sum_{j=1}^s\log(2p/j)=s\log(2p)-\log(s!)\le s\log(2ep/s)∑j=1s​log(2p/j)=slog(2p)−log(s!)≤slog(2ep/s);
  4. (28): ∑juj♯log⁡(2p/j)≤∥u∥∑j≤slog⁡(2p/j)≤slog⁡(2ep/s)∥u∥\sum_j u^\sharp_j\sqrt{\log(2p/j)}\le\|u\|\sqrt{\sum_{j\le s}\log(2p/j)}\le\sqrt{s\log(2ep/s)}\|u\|∑j​uj♯​log(2p/j)​≤∥u∥∑j≤s​log(2p/j)​≤slog(2ep/s)​∥u∥ on B0(s)B_0(s)B0​(s);
  5. F⊆Es\mathcal F\subseteq\mathcal E_sF⊆Es​ when δ0=s/(2ep)\delta_0=s/(2ep)δ0​=s/(2ep);
  6. P(F)≥1−δ0/2\mathbb P(\mathcal F)\ge1-\delta_0/2P(F)≥1−δ0​/2;
  7. P(H)≥1−δ0\mathbb P(\mathcal H)\ge1-\delta_0P(H)≥1−δ0​;
  8. P(Gs′)≥1−δ0\mathbb P(\mathcal G'_s)\ge1-\delta_0P(Gs′​)≥1−δ0​.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 is the only probabilistic input to the paper's statistical theory. Theorem 2 (ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​ shrinkage) is proved on E2k\mathcal E_{2k}E2k​, F\mathcal FF and G2k\mathcal G_{2k}G2k​. Theorem 3 (ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ shrinkage) uses H\mathcal HH as well. The lower bound for best subsets (Theorem 4) and the BIC-type choice of kkk (Theorem 5) also rely on Gs\mathcal G_sGs​. Every high-probability bound and every expected-error bound in §3 is obtained by combining a deterministic inequality with this theorem. The event F\mathcal FF is also of independent use: it gives the sorted-ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ control of Gaussian noise used in SLOPE and Lasso analyses.

Formalizing it. All four bounds are known results; the mission formalizes them. The deterministic reduction F⊆Es\mathcal F\subseteq\mathcal E_sF⊆Es​ is elementary. The three probability bounds need Gaussian machinery: a sorted-ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ deviation bound (the hardest part), a χ2\chi^2χ2 tail bound with a union over supports, and a Gaussian maximal inequality. None of these has a machine-checked proof in Mathlib for this setting. The formal statement of the Gs\mathcal G_sGs​ bound with its corrected constant is a contribution of its own, because the printed form is false.

Difficulty

The Es\mathcal E_sEs​ and H\mathcal HH parts are routine once the Gaussian tools exist. The Gs′\mathcal G'_sGs′​ part is a uniform statement over all (ps)\binom ps(sp​) supports at once, and the explicit constants 555 and 333 leave no room for a lossy tail bound: a generic sub-Gaussian estimate does not reach them.

The F\mathcal FF part is the hardest. It is uniform over all of Rp\mathbb R^pRp, not over a sparse set. A union bound over the coordinates of X⊤ϵX^\top\epsilonX⊤ϵ gives the flat weight log⁡p\sqrt{\log p}logp​ on every coordinate, not the decreasing weights log⁡(2p/j)\sqrt{\log(2p/j)}log(2p/j)​, and it does not produce the explicit constant 4+24+\sqrt24+2​. The bound of Bellec, Lecué and Tsybakov has to be formalized in full, under this paper's normalization (unit columns rather than columns of norm n\sqrt nn​).

Formalization scope

  • Model. Vectors are functions Fin n → ℝ, and XXX is Matrix (Fin n) (Fin p) ℝ with unit columns (∑iXij2=1\sum_i X_{ij}^2=1∑i​Xij2​=1). Mathlib's default norm on Fin m → ℝ is the sup norm, so the Euclidean, ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​, ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​ and ℓ0\ell_0ℓ0​ norms are explicit definitions. Indices are 0-based: j : Fin p stands for the paper's j+1j+1j+1.
  • Probability space. The probability space is Rn\mathbb R^nRn with the product law N(0,σ2)⊗nN(0,\sigma^2)^{\otimes n}N(0,σ2)⊗n of ϵ\epsilonϵ (the model (15)). Events are sets of noise vectors defined by the printed inequalities, quantified over all uuu in the stated range. Probabilities are taken as real numbers, and measurability of each event is part of each conclusion, not a hypothesis.
  • Sorted sum. ∑juj♯log⁡(2p/j)\sum_j u^\sharp_j\sqrt{\log(2p/j)}∑j​uj♯​log(2p/j)​ is encoded as the maximum over all permutations π\piπ of ∑j∣uπ(j)∣log⁡(2p/j)\sum_j|u_{\pi(j)}|\sqrt{\log(2p/j)}∑j​∣uπ(j)​∣log(2p/j)​. The weights are non-negative and non-increasing for j≤pj\le pj≤p, so by the rearrangement inequality this equals the paper's sum. Summing ∣uj∣|u_j|∣uj​∣ in index order would be a different, smaller quantity.
  • Constants. Every constant is the printed one (4+24+\sqrt24+2​, 2ep2ep2ep, 5slog⁡(ep/s)5s\log(ep/s)5slog(ep/s), 2log⁡(2p)\sqrt{2\log(2p)}2log(2p)​, s/(4ep)s/(4ep)s/(4ep), δ0/2\delta_0/2δ0​/2), except the disclosed 333 in Gs′\mathcal G'_sGs′​.
  • Hypotheses. The theorem assumes 1≤s≤p1\le s\le p1≤s≤p, 0<δ0≤10<\delta_0\le10<δ0​≤1, σ>0\sigma>0σ>0 and unit columns. The Es\mathcal E_sEs​ bound has no free δ0\delta_0δ0​: it is the F\mathcal FF bound at δ0=s/(2ep)\delta_0=s/(2ep)δ0​=s/(2ep).
  • Ruled-out trivializations. None of the following is a faithful formalization: replacing the max in F\mathcal FF by a sum, dropping "∀u∈B0(s)\forall u\in B_0(s)∀u∈B0​(s)", replacing u♯u^\sharpu♯ by ∣u∣|u|∣u∣ in index order, or taking the probability of a set not proved measurable.
  • Not formalized. The oracle inequalities (Theorems 2–5, the other missions of this series), Corollaries 1–6, Propositions 1–4 and the numerics.
  • Infrastructure needed and reusable. A complete development needs Gaussian rotation invariance, χ2\chi^2χ2 tails, Gaussian concentration for Lipschitz functions, and a sorted-ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ deviation bound. All of these are reusable well beyond this mission, and proofs of any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. Mazumder, P. Radchenko, A. Dedieu, Subset Selection with Shrinkage: Sparse Linear Modeling When the SNR Is Low, Operations Research, 2023; arXiv:1708.03288v4 (the version formalized). https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.03288
  • P. C. Bellec, G. Lecué, A. B. Tsybakov, Slope meets Lasso: improved oracle bounds and optimality, Annals of Statistics 46(6B), 2018. https://doi.org/10.1214/17-AOS1670
  • G. Raskutti, M. J. Wainwright, B. Yu, Minimax rates of estimation for high-dimensional linear regression over ℓq-balls, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 57(10), 2011. https://doi.org/10.1109/TIT.2011.2165799
  • B. Laurent, P. Massart, Adaptive estimation of a quadratic functional by model selection, Annals of Statistics 28(5), 2000. https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1015957395
11 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsComplexity Theory·Captain: marwahaha

Block Sensitivity vs. Sensitivity: Depth-20 ImprovementResearch Paper

Certify α≥2.006470828\alpha\ge2.006470828α≥2.006470828 by specializing OpenAI's general seed theorem to d=20d=20d=20 and M=921M=9^{21}M=921.

The construction gives

s(f)≤A=44M21,bs(f,0)≥B=M2(2M2+1)20.s(f)\le A=44M^{21},\qquad bs(f,0)\ge B=M^2(2M^2+1)^{20}.s(f)≤A=44M21,bs(f,0)≥B=M2(2M2+1)20.

Here bs(f,0)bs(f,0)bs(f,0) is block sensitivity at the all-zero input. The ratio log⁡B/log⁡A\log B/\log AlogB/logA is approximately 2.006470828227379…2.006470828227379\ldots2.006470828227379…. Prove the exact inequality A2.006470828≤BA^{2.006470828}\le BA2.006470828≤B, then reuse the foundation's finite-certificate theorem.

The goal uses the campaign's shared definitions and requires arbitrarily large sensitivity. This is a stronger specialization of the existing construction, not a claim of a new construction or global parameter optimality.

39 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryAnalysisOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

A Sensitivity Analysis of the Price of Anarchy in Nonatomic Congestion Games 1: The Price of Anarchy Is Hölder Continuous with Exponent 1/2 at Every Game with Costs Lipschitz on [0, T(d)]Research Paper

Motivation

The price of anarchy (PoA) of a nonatomic congestion game is the ratio of the total cost of a Wardrop equilibrium to the minimum possible total cost. It quantifies how much selfish routing loses compared with central coordination, and it has been studied intensively since Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999) and Roughgarden and Tardos (2002), mostly through worst-case bounds over classes of cost functions.

Worst-case bounds say nothing about how the PoA of one particular network behaves when its data change. In transport applications both the cost functions (capacities, tolls, travel-time models) and the demands are estimated, so the PoA is only useful if small errors in the data cause small errors in the PoA. Wu and Möhring (arXiv:2007.13979, published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023) study this sensitivity question in a setting where cost functions and demands change simultaneously. Earlier sensitivity results changed only the demands, with the cost functions fixed: Englert, Franke and Olbrich (2010) bounded the growth of the PoA of a single-O/D network with polynomial costs of degree at most β\betaβ by a factor (1+ϵ)β(1+\epsilon)^\beta(1+ϵ)β when the demand grows by a factor 1+ϵ1+\epsilon1+ϵ; Takalloo and Kwon (2020) extended this to several O/D pairs whose demands are scaled together; and Cominetti, Dose and Scarsini (arXiv:1907.10101) studied differentiability of the PoA as a function of the demand of a single O/D pair. The main theorem of the paper, Theorem 9, is the subject of this mission.

Setting

A network consists of a finite set AAA of arcs, a finite non-empty set K\mathcal KK of origin–destination (O/D) pairs, and for every k∈Kk \in \mathcal Kk∈K a non-empty set Sk\mathcal S_kSk​ of paths; each path is a non-empty set of arcs. From §3.1 onward the paper also assumes every arc lies on some path and every Sk\mathcal S_kSk​ has at least two paths (Condition 1).

A game Γ=(τ,d)\Gamma = (\tau, d)Γ=(τ,d) on the network consists of cost functions τa:[0,∞)→[0,∞)\tau_a : [0,\infty) \to [0,\infty)τa​:[0,∞)→[0,∞), one per arc, that are continuous and non-decreasing, and demands dk≥0d_k \ge 0dk​≥0, one per O/D pair. The total demand is T(d)=∑kdkT(d) = \sum_k d_kT(d)=∑k​dk​. The game space G(G,K,S)\mathcal G(G,\mathcal K,\mathcal S)G(G,K,S) consists of the games with T(d)>0T(d) > 0T(d)>0 and τa(x)>0\tau_a(x) > 0τa​(x)>0 for all x∈(0,T(d)]x \in (0, T(d)]x∈(0,T(d)].

A flow f=(fs)f = (f_s)f=(fs​) assigns a non-negative amount to every path, with ∑s∈Skfs=dk\sum_{s\in\mathcal S_k} f_s = d_k∑s∈Sk​​fs​=dk​. Its arc flows are fa=∑s∋afsf_a = \sum_{s \ni a} f_sfa​=∑s∋a​fs​, its path costs τs(f)=∑a∈sτa(fa)\tau_s(f) = \sum_{a\in s}\tau_a(f_a)τs​(f)=∑a∈s​τa​(fa​), and its total cost

C(Γ,f)=∑a∈Afa τa(fa).C(\Gamma, f) = \sum_{a\in A} f_a\,\tau_a(f_a).C(Γ,f)=a∈A∑​fa​τa​(fa​).

A Wardrop equilibrium (WE) is a flow in which every used path of a pair is a cheapest path of that pair. The SO cost C∗(Γ)\mathcal C^*(\Gamma)C∗(Γ) is the minimum total cost over all flows, the WE cost C~(Γ)\tilde{\mathcal C}(\Gamma)C~(Γ) is the total cost of a WE flow (all WE flows have the same cost), and

ρ(Γ)=C~(Γ)C∗(Γ).\rho(\Gamma) = \frac{\tilde{\mathcal C}(\Gamma)}{\mathcal C^*(\Gamma)}.ρ(Γ)=C∗(Γ)C~(Γ)​.

Games are compared by the distance

∥Γ−Γ′∥=max⁡{∥d−d′∥∞, max⁡a∈Amax⁡x∈[0,min⁡{T(d),T(d′)}]∣τa(x)−σa(x)∣, ∥τ(T(d))−σ(T(d′))∥∞}\|\Gamma - \Gamma'\| = \max\Big\{\|d-d'\|_\infty,\ \max_{a\in A}\max_{x\in[0,\min\{T(d),T(d')\}]}|\tau_a(x) - \sigma_a(x)|,\ \|\tau(T(d)) - \sigma(T(d'))\|_\infty\Big\}∥Γ−Γ′∥=max{∥d−d′∥∞​, a∈Amax​x∈[0,min{T(d),T(d′)}]max​∣τa​(x)−σa​(x)∣, ∥τ(T(d))−σ(T(d′))∥∞​}

for Γ=(τ,d)\Gamma = (\tau, d)Γ=(τ,d) and Γ′=(σ,d′)\Gamma' = (\sigma, d')Γ′=(σ,d′). It compares cost functions only on the range of flow values both games can produce, plus the values at the respective total demands. A function hhh is Lipschitz continuous on [0,T][0,T][0,T] with constant MMM if ∣h(x)−h(y)∣≤M∣x−y∣|h(x) - h(y)| \le M|x-y|∣h(x)−h(y)∣≤M∣x−y∣ for all x,y∈[0,T]x, y \in [0,T]x,y∈[0,T].

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 9 (p. 26)

Let Γ=(τ,d)\Gamma = (\tau, d)Γ=(τ,d) be a game of the game space whose cost functions are Lipschitz continuous on [0,T(d)][0, T(d)][0,T(d)]. Then there are ϵΓ>0\epsilon_\Gamma > 0ϵΓ​>0 and κΓ>0\kappa_\Gamma > 0κΓ​>0, depending only on Γ\GammaΓ, such that

∣ρ(Γ)−ρ(Γ′)∣≤κΓ ∥Γ−Γ′∥1/2for every game Γ′ of the game space with ∥Γ−Γ′∥<ϵΓ.|\rho(\Gamma) - \rho(\Gamma')| \le \kappa_\Gamma\,\|\Gamma - \Gamma'\|^{1/2}\quad\text{for every game } \Gamma' \text{ of the game space with } \|\Gamma - \Gamma'\| < \epsilon_\Gamma.∣ρ(Γ)−ρ(Γ′)∣≤κΓ​∥Γ−Γ′∥1/2for every game Γ′ of the game space with ∥Γ−Γ′∥<ϵΓ​.

The goal fixes the exponent 1/21/21/2 and leaves the radius and the constant existential, which is the form the paper claims.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1a)–c) (p. 13): properties of ϵ\epsilonϵ-approximate WE flows, ending with
∣C(Γ,f)−C(Γ,f~)∣≤∣A∣Mϵ T(d)+ϵ|C(\Gamma, f) - C(\Gamma, \tilde f)| \le |A|\sqrt{M\epsilon}\,T(d) + \epsilon∣C(Γ,f)−C(Γ,f~​)∣≤∣A∣Mϵ​T(d)+ϵ

for an ϵ\epsilonϵ-approximate WE flow fff and a WE flow f~\tilde ff~​ when all costs are MMM-Lipschitz on [0,T(d)][0,T(d)][0,T(d)]. 2. Lemma 10a)–d) (p. 27): on a demand slice (games with a common demand vector www), C∗\mathcal C^*C∗ is Lipschitz, WE flows of one game are ∣A∣ T(w) ∥Γ1−Γ2∥|A|\,T(w)\,\|\Gamma_1-\Gamma_2\|∣A∣T(w)∥Γ1​−Γ2​∥-approximate WE flows of the other, and C~\tilde{\mathcal C}C~ and ρ\rhoρ are Hölder with exponent 1/21/21/2 with explicit constants. 3. Lemma 11a)–c) (p. 31): on a cost slice (games with a common cost vector and T(w′)≤T(w)T(w') \le T(w)T(w′)≤T(w)), explicit Hölder bounds of exponent 1/21/21/2 for C~\tilde{\mathcal C}C~ and ρ\rhoρ and a Lipschitz bound for C∗\mathcal C^*C∗.

Significance

Theorem 9 is the first pointwise Hölder continuity result for the PoA on the whole game space, with demands and costs perturbed together. Its hypothesis is mild (Lipschitz costs on a compact interval, which covers polynomial, BPR-type and piecewise linear costs), and such games are dense in the game space. Together with Theorem 8 of the same paper, which shows that no uniform Hölder bound exists, it describes exactly what kind of stability the PoA has: local, with a constant depending on the game, and exponent 1/21/21/2 in general. The explicit constants of Lemmas 10 and 11 give computable error bounds for the PoA of a network whose data are known only approximately.

The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked proof exists. This mission formalizes the statement and the explicit slice estimates the proof rests on. Lemma 1 is a self-contained statement about approximate Wardrop equilibria that is useful well beyond this paper, for instance for analysing iterative traffic-assignment algorithms, which only ever produce approximate equilibria.

Difficulty

The obvious approach compares an equilibrium of Γ\GammaΓ with an equilibrium of Γ′\Gamma'Γ′ directly. This fails because the two games have different demand vectors, so their flows live in different polytopes: an equilibrium of one game is not even a flow of the other. The paper separates the perturbation into a change of costs at fixed demand and a change of demand at fixed costs, through an auxiliary game, and each half needs its own argument. On a demand slice an equilibrium of one game is only an approximate equilibrium of the other, and the passage from an approximate equilibrium to its cost loses a square root (Lemma 1c), which is tight by Example 2). On a cost slice the demand has to be removed path by path from an equilibrium while keeping it an equilibrium of a shifted game. Finally, the constants of the slice estimates depend on the auxiliary game, and they must be controlled uniformly near Γ\GammaΓ.

Formalization scope

The Lean development fixes the following conventions.

  • The network is a structure with ∣A∣|A|∣A∣ arcs, ∣S∣|\mathcal S|∣S∣ paths and ∣K∣|\mathcal K|∣K∣ O/D pairs, a 0/1 arc–path incidence matrix and the map sending a path to its pair. Lemma 1 uses the §2 model assumptions: 0/1 incidence, non-empty paths, K≠∅\mathcal K \neq \emptysetK=∅, and ∣Sk∣≥1|\mathcal S_k| \ge 1∣Sk​∣≥1. The later results add Condition 1 (every arc on a path, ∣Sk∣≥2|\mathcal S_k| \ge 2∣Sk​∣≥2), as assumed from §3.1. Paths are arbitrary non-empty 0/1 columns, not necessarily loop-free paths of a digraph; the results do not use loop-freeness.
  • Cost functions are maps R→R\mathbb R \to \mathbb RR→R required to be continuous, non-decreasing and non-negative on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) only.
  • Arc flows, Wardrop equilibria (2.1) and the potential (2.6) come from the published definition KellyStochasticNetworks_Wardrop. ϵ\epsilonϵ-approximate WE flows follow (2.7) in arc form. The total cost uses the arc form, which equals the path form for 0/1 incidence.
  • C∗\mathcal C^*C∗ is the infimum of costs over flows, C~\tilde{\mathcal C}C~ the supremum of costs over WE flows, ρ\rhoρ their quotient. The middle term of the distance is the supremum of the image of the compact set A×[0,min⁡{T(d),T(d′)}]A\times[0,\min\{T(d),T(d')\}]A×[0,min{T(d),T(d′)}], and ∥⋅∥∞\|\cdot\|_\infty∥⋅∥∞​ is the sup norm.
  • Every statement about ρ\rhoρ, C∗\mathcal C^*C∗ or C~\tilde{\mathcal C}C~ quantifies over games of the game space, where ρ\rhoρ is a genuine ratio of positive numbers. Off the game space Lean's division by zero would give ρ=0\rho = 0ρ=0, so quantifying over all pairs (τ,d)(\tau, d)(τ,d) would trivialize the statements; this is ruled out. In the goal, ϵΓ\epsilon_\GammaϵΓ​ and κΓ\kappa_\GammaκΓ​ are chosen before Γ′\Gamma'Γ′.
  • Several printed strict inequalities are posed as non-strict, because they fail at Γ′=Γ\Gamma' = \GammaΓ′=Γ or are attained in the paper's own Example 2. In Lemma 11 the printed constants are corrected by a factor ∣K∣|\mathcal K|∣K∣ that the paper's own argument needs; each item's Formalization Note quotes the printed form.

A complete development needs: existence of Wardrop equilibria and uniqueness of their cost on the game space, existence of social optima, the integral inequality (2.9) for monotone costs, positivity of C∗\mathcal C^*C∗ on the game space, and the path-by-path demand-reduction construction of Lemma 11. The existence and uniqueness results and Lemma 1 are reusable in any formalization of selfish routing. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are the supporting lemmas above.

The source is the arXiv preprint arXiv:2007.13979v3 (23 Aug 2021); all page and theorem numbers refer to it, not to the published version.

Selected references

  • Z. Wu, R. H. Möhring, A sensitivity analysis of the price of anarchy in non-atomic congestion games, arXiv:2007.13979v3, 2021; Mathematics of Operations Research 48(3), 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.13979, https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2022.1292
  • T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, How bad is selfish routing?, Journal of the ACM 49(2), 2002. https://doi.org/10.1145/506147.506153
  • E. Koutsoupias, C. Papadimitriou, Worst-case equilibria, STACS 1999. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-49116-3_38
  • J. G. Wardrop, Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research, Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers 1(3), 1952. https://doi.org/10.1680/ipeds.1952.11259
  • M. Englert, T. Franke, L. Olbrich, Sensitivity of Wardrop equilibria, Theory of Computing Systems 47(1):3–14, 2010.
  • M. Takalloo, C. Kwon, Sensitivity of Wardrop equilibria: revisited, Optimization Letters 14(3):781–796, 2020.
  • R. Cominetti, V. Dose, M. Scarsini, The price of anarchy in routing games as a function of the demand, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.10101
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Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov ChainOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

A First-Order Approach to Accelerated Value Iteration 2: For a Reversible Policy Chain, Momentum Value Computation Converges at Rate (1 − √(1/κ))/(1 + √(1/κ)) + η for Every η > 0Research Paper

Why accelerate value computation

Value iteration and its policy-evaluation special case, value computation, are the basic algorithms of dynamic programming for Markov decision processes (MDPs). Both are fixed-point iterations of a λ\lambdaλ-contraction, so they converge at the geometric rate λ\lambdaλ, the discount factor. When λ\lambdaλ is close to 111, which is the regime of long effective horizons in reinforcement learning (λ=0.99\lambda = 0.99λ=0.99 or 0.9990.9990.999) and in healthcare and operations applications, the number of iterations grows like 1/(1−λ)1/(1-\lambda)1/(1−λ).

Goyal and Grand-Clément (arXiv:1905.09963, Operations Research 2023) observe that v↦v−T(v)v \mapsto v - T(v)v↦v−T(v) behaves like the gradient of a function with smoothness constant 1+λ1+\lambda1+λ and strong-convexity constant 1−λ1-\lambda1−λ. This suggests importing the accelerated schemes of convex optimization: Nesterov's acceleration and Polyak's momentum (heavy-ball) method (Polyak 1964; Ghadimi, Feyzmahdavian, Johansson 2015). For the affine operator TπT_\piTπ​ of a fixed policy, they prove that both schemes converge at a rate governed by κ\sqrt{\kappa}κ​ rather than κ\kappaκ, with κ=(1+λ)/(1−λ)\kappa = (1+\lambda)/(1-\lambda)κ=(1+λ)/(1−λ), provided the Markov chain of the policy is irreducible and reversible. This mission poses the momentum result, Theorem 5.5.

Setting

A finite MDP has a state set SSS with ∣S∣=n|S| = n∣S∣=n, a finite action set AAA, transition probabilities PiajP_{iaj}Piaj​ (from state iii to state jjj under action aaa; each PiaP_{ia}Pia​ is a probability vector), rewards ria∈Rr_{ia} \in \mathbb{R}ria​∈R, and a discount factor λ∈(0,1)\lambda \in (0,1)λ∈(0,1). A policy π=(πia)\pi = (\pi_{ia})π=(πia​) is a matrix with nonnegative rows summing to 111; it induces

rπ,i=∑aπiaria,Lπ,ij=∑aπiaPiaj,Tπ(v)=rπ+λLπv.r_{\pi,i} = \sum_a \pi_{ia} r_{ia}, \qquad L_{\pi,ij} = \sum_a \pi_{ia} P_{iaj}, \qquad T_\pi(v) = r_\pi + \lambda L_\pi v .rπ,i​=a∑​πia​ria​,Lπ,ij​=a∑​πia​Piaj​,Tπ​(v)=rπ​+λLπ​v.

The value function of π\piπ is vπ=∑t≥0λtLπtrπv^\pi = \sum_{t \ge 0} \lambda^t L_\pi^t r_\pivπ=∑t≥0​λtLπt​rπ​, the expected discounted reward from each starting state; it is the unique fixed point of TπT_\piTπ​.

Reversibility (Definition 2.1): the chain with transition matrix LLL is irreducible, and it has a stationary probability distribution ν\nuν with νiLij=νjLji\nu_i L_{ij} = \nu_j L_{ji}νi​Lij​=νj​Lji​ for all i,ji,ji,j.

Momentum Value Computation (M-VC) starts from arbitrary v0,v1∈Rnv_0, v_1 \in \mathbb{R}^nv0​,v1​∈Rn and iterates

vs+1=vs−α (vs−Tπ(vs))+β (vs−vs−1),s≥1,v_{s+1} = v_s - \alpha\,(v_s - T_\pi(v_s)) + \beta\,(v_s - v_{s-1}), \qquad s \ge 1,vs+1​=vs​−α(vs​−Tπ​(vs​))+β(vs​−vs−1​),s≥1,

with the constant step sizes (4.2)

α=21+1−λ2,β=1−1−λ21+1−λ2.\alpha = \frac{2}{1+\sqrt{1-\lambda^2}}, \qquad \beta = \frac{1-\sqrt{1-\lambda^2}}{1+\sqrt{1-\lambda^2}} .α=1+1−λ2​2​,β=1+1−λ2​1−1−λ2​​.

The analysis runs through the 2n×2n2n \times 2n2n×2n matrix

Bπ=(λ(β+1)Lπ−βII0),B_\pi = \begin{pmatrix} \lambda(\beta+1)L_\pi & -\beta I \\ I & 0 \end{pmatrix},Bπ​=(λ(β+1)Lπ​I​−βI0​),

which propagates the error of the pair xs=(vs,vs−1)x_s = (v_s, v_{s-1})xs​=(vs​,vs−1​), and its spectral radius ρ(Bπ)\rho(B_\pi)ρ(Bπ​), the largest modulus of a complex eigenvalue.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.5

For a valid MDP and a policy π\piπ whose chain LπL_\piLπ​ is irreducible and reversible, the M-VC iterates with step sizes (4.2) converge to vπv^\pivπ, and for every η>0\eta > 0η>0

vs=vπ+o ⁣((1−1/κ1+1/κ+η)s),0<1−1/κ1+1/κ<λ.v_s = v^\pi + o\!\left(\left(\frac{1-\sqrt{1/\kappa}}{1+\sqrt{1/\kappa}} + \eta\right)^{s}\right), \qquad 0 < \frac{1-\sqrt{1/\kappa}}{1+\sqrt{1/\kappa}} < \lambda .vs​=vπ+o((1+1/κ​1−1/κ​​+η)s),0<1+1/κ​1−1/κ​​<λ.

The goal states the paper's three clauses as printed: convergence, the little-o rate for every η>0\eta > 0η>0, and the comparison with λ\lambdaλ.

Milestones

  1. The step-size identity α=1+β\alpha = 1 + \betaα=1+β (proof of Lemma B.1).
  2. Lemma B.1: xs=xπ+Bπs−1(x1−xπ)x_s = x^\pi + B_\pi^{s-1}(x_1 - x^\pi)xs​=xπ+Bπs−1​(x1​−xπ) for all s≥1s \ge 1s≥1, with xπ=(vπ,vπ)x^\pi = (v^\pi, v^\pi)xπ=(vπ,vπ).
  3. The eigenvalues of an irreducible, reversible transition matrix are real (§2).
  4. (B.1): every eigenvalue ω\omegaω of BπB_\piBπ​ satisfies ω2−2λμ1+1−λ2ω+1−1−λ21+1−λ2=0\omega^2 - \frac{2\lambda\mu}{1+\sqrt{1-\lambda^2}}\omega + \frac{1-\sqrt{1-\lambda^2}}{1+\sqrt{1-\lambda^2}} = 0ω2−1+1−λ2​2λμ​ω+1+1−λ2​1−1−λ2​​=0 for an eigenvalue μ\muμ of LπL_\piLπ​.
  5. For μ∈[−1,1]\mu \in [-1,1]μ∈[−1,1], the roots ω±(μ)\omega^\pm(\mu)ω±(μ) of (B.1) have modulus λ/(1+1−λ2)\lambda/(1+\sqrt{1-\lambda^2})λ/(1+1−λ2​).
  6. The identity λ1+1−λ2=1+λ−1−λ1+λ+1−λ=1−1/κ1+1/κ\frac{\lambda}{1+\sqrt{1-\lambda^2}} = \frac{\sqrt{1+\lambda}-\sqrt{1-\lambda}}{\sqrt{1+\lambda}+\sqrt{1-\lambda}} = \frac{1-\sqrt{1/\kappa}}{1+\sqrt{1/\kappa}}1+1−λ2​λ​=1+λ​+1−λ​1+λ​−1−λ​​=1+1/κ​1−1/κ​​.
  7. Lemma B.2: for a reversible chain, ρ(Bπ)=1−1/κ1+1/κ\rho(B_\pi) = \frac{1-\sqrt{1/\kappa}}{1+\sqrt{1/\kappa}}ρ(Bπ​)=1+1/κ​1−1/κ​​.
  8. 0<1−1/κ1+1/κ<λ0 < \frac{1-\sqrt{1/\kappa}}{1+\sqrt{1/\kappa}} < \lambda0<1+1/κ​1−1/κ​​<λ for λ∈(0,1)\lambda \in (0,1)λ∈(0,1).

Significance

The rate (1−1/κ)/(1+1/κ)(1-\sqrt{1/\kappa})/(1+\sqrt{1/\kappa})(1−1/κ​)/(1+1/κ​) is the optimal rate of the heavy-ball method on strongly convex quadratics with condition number κ\kappaκ. Theorem 5.5 shows that policy evaluation for reversible chains enjoys the same improvement over λ\lambdaλ, so that an ϵ\epsilonϵ-approximation of vπv^\pivπ needs a number of iterations scaling like 1/1−λ1/\sqrt{1-\lambda}1/1−λ​ rather than 1/(1−λ)1/(1-\lambda)1/(1−λ). The paper also shows that the reversibility assumption cannot simply be dropped: on a cyclic chain both accelerated schemes may diverge. Lemma B.2 is an exact spectral computation for a structured block matrix that reappears in any heavy-ball analysis driven by a matrix with real spectrum in [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1].

The paper is a sibling series of four missions. This one poses Theorem 5.5; the others pose Theorem 5.1 (Accelerated Value Computation), Theorem 6.3 (a lower bound for first-order methods on a chain MDP) and Theorem 7.1 (Safe Accelerated Value Iteration). The results are proved on paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof. The work here is to formalize the known argument: the linear-recursion representation, the spectrum of BπB_\piBπ​, and the passage from spectral radius to a little-o rate.

Difficulty

The obvious argument bounds ∥Bπ∥\|B_\pi\|∥Bπ​∥ in some norm and iterates. No such bound by the rate holds in general: BπB_\piBπ​ is not normal, and for eigenvalues μ=±1\mu = \pm 1μ=±1 of LπL_\piLπ​ the two roots of (B.1) coincide, producing Jordan blocks. The rate must come from the spectral radius, and the gap between ρ(Bπ)\rho(B_\pi)ρ(Bπ​) and ∥Bπs∥1/s\|B_\pi^s\|^{1/s}∥Bπs​∥1/s is exactly what the +η+\eta+η absorbs. Computing ρ(Bπ)\rho(B_\pi)ρ(Bπ​) needs two separate facts: the eigenvalues of BπB_\piBπ​ are tied to those of LπL_\piLπ​ through the quadratic (B.1), which needs a determinant identity for block matrices with commuting blocks; and the eigenvalues of LπL_\piLπ​ are real and lie in [−1,1][-1,1][−1,1], which needs reversibility together with irreducibility, used to make the stationary distribution positive. For non-real μ\muμ the modulus computation fails, which is why the hypothesis cannot be dropped.

Formalization scope

States and actions are finite types. The MDP data (P,r,λ)(P, r, \lambda)(P,r,λ) is a plain structure, with validity (stochastic PiaP_{ia}Pia​, 0<λ<10 < \lambda < 10<λ<1) a separate hypothesis; the paper's initial distribution p0p_0p0​ plays no role and is omitted. The value function is the Neumann series ∑tλtLπtrπ\sum_t \lambda^t L_\pi^t r_\pi∑t​λtLπt​rπ​. The norm on Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn is the sup norm, and o(⋅)o(\cdot)o(⋅) is with respect to it as s→∞s \to \inftys→∞. Spectra and spectral radii are those of the complexified matrices, so that the non-real eigenvalues of BπB_\piBπ​ are seen. Reversibility uses the published mm_basic notions: irreducibility, a stationary probability distribution, and detailed balance with respect to it; detailed balance alone would be trivially satisfied by ν=0\nu = 0ν=0 and is not used.

Three printed slips are corrected, and each milestone keeps the printed text verbatim. Lemma B.1 is printed with x0−xπx_0 - x^\pix0​−xπ, but x0=(v0,v−1)x_0 = (v_0, v_{-1})x0​=(v0​,v−1​) is undefined; the statement uses x1=(v1,v0)x_1 = (v_1, v_0)x1​=(v1​,v0​). Lemma B.2 prints ρ(Bπ)=(1−κ)/(1+κ)\rho(B_\pi) = (1-\sqrt\kappa)/(1+\sqrt\kappa)ρ(Bπ​)=(1−κ​)/(1+κ​), a negative number; its proof computes (1−1/κ)/(1+1/κ)(1-\sqrt{1/\kappa})/(1+\sqrt{1/\kappa})(1−1/κ​)/(1+1/κ​), the rate of Theorem 5.5, which is stated. On p. 22 the constant λ/(1+1−λ2)\lambda/(1+\sqrt{1-\lambda^2})λ/(1+1−λ2​) is printed as λ/(1+1−λ)2\lambda/(1+\sqrt{1-\lambda})^2λ/(1+1−λ​)2. The second step size, printed γ\gammaγ in (4.2), is the β\betaβ of (M-VC) and App. B.

A statement that holds only vacuously, for example one in which reversibility is replaced by detailed balance with an arbitrary vector or in which λ\lambdaλ is unconstrained, is ruled out by the hypotheses above. Lemma B.2 is an equality and must not be weakened to an upper bound.

A complete development needs the determinant of a 2×22\times 22×2 block matrix with commuting blocks, the reality of the spectrum of a reversible chain (implied by the published MarkovMixing.spectral_representation once the stationary distribution is shown positive), Gelfand's formula for matrices, and the convergence of the Neumann series. The spectral facts about reversible chains and the block-matrix spectrum are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • V. Goyal and J. Grand-Clément, A First-Order Approach to Accelerated Value Iteration, Operations Research, 2023; arXiv:1905.09963v7 (2021). https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.09963
  • B. T. Polyak, Some methods of speeding up the convergence of iteration methods, USSR Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics 4(5), 1964. https://doi.org/10.1016/0041-5553(64)90137-5
  • E. Ghadimi, H. R. Feyzmahdavian, M. Johansson, Global convergence of the Heavy-ball method for convex optimization, European Control Conference, 2015. https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.7457
  • P. Brémaud, Markov Chains: Gibbs Fields, Monte Carlo Simulation, and Queues, Springer, 2nd ed. 2020 (cited in the paper as 2013), Chapter 6. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45982-6
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
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Information TheoryLinear algebraQuantum Information·Captain: mikedeng1

Reversing quantum dynamics with near-optimal quantum and classical fidelity II: The Pretty Good Measurement Errs at Most the Weighted Sum of Bures–Uhlmann FidelitiesResearch Paper

Motivation

Quantum communication and computation often require a receiver to infer which preparation was sent after it has passed through a noisy quantum process. When possible preparations are mixed states, their overlap makes exact identification impossible. A measurement is then judged by its average probability of a correct label. The pretty good measurement gives a concrete measurement from the ensemble itself, without first solving the optimization over all measurements. Barnum and Knill related it to a general reversal operation for noisy dynamics and bounded its error through pairwise state fidelities in their preprint, §V–VI. The bound is useful when the overlaps are easier to estimate than the measurement's success probability.

The present mission addresses the preprint's second main result. The source is arXiv:quant-ph/0004088v2, not the later journal pagination. The preprint also strengthens its Theorem 3 relative to the published text, as its acknowledgment explains; this mission concerns Theorem 5 and the calculation around it.

Setting

An ensemble is a finite family of output density matrices ρ^j\hat\rho_jρ^​j​ with probabilities pj≥0p_j\geq0pj​≥0 satisfying ∑jpj=1\sum_jp_j=1∑j​pj​=1. A density matrix is a positive semidefinite complex matrix with trace one. For each label jjj, fix an orthonormal eigenbasis vijv_{ij}vij​ and nonnegative eigenvalues λij\lambda_{ij}λij​ such that

ρ^j=∑iλij∣vij⟩⟨vij∣,∑iλij=1.\hat\rho_j=\sum_i\lambda_{ij}|v_{ij}\rangle\langle v_{ij}|, \qquad \sum_i\lambda_{ij}=1.ρ^​j​=i∑​λij​∣vij​⟩⟨vij​∣,i∑​λij​=1.

The eigenpair index iii runs over a finite output basis OOO; zero eigenvalues are allowed. The input labels form a finite basis JJJ. A label distribution is represented by ρ=∑jpj∣j⟩⟨j∣\rho=\sum_jp_j|j\rangle\langle j|ρ=∑j​pj​∣j⟩⟨j∣.

The paper's classicizing channel AAA has Kraus operators Aij=λij∣vij⟩⟨j∣A_{ij}=\sqrt{\lambda_{ij}}|v_{ij}\rangle\langle j|Aij​=λij​​∣vij​⟩⟨j∣. Acting on an input matrix XXX, its value is A(X)=∑i,jAijXAij†A(X)=\sum_{i,j}A_{ij}X A_{ij}^{\dagger}A(X)=∑i,j​Aij​XAij†​. In particular, its output on ρ\rhoρ is ρout=∑jpjρ^j\rho_{\mathrm{out}}=\sum_jp_j\hat\rho_jρout​=∑j​pj​ρ^​j​. The paper assumes ρout\rho_{\mathrm{out}}ρout​ has full support when it writes its reversal operation. For a general Kraus family AaA_aAa​, that operation has operators

(RA,ρ)a=ρ1/2Aa†A(ρ)−1/2.(R_{A,\rho})_a=\rho^{1/2}A_a^\dagger A(\rho)^{-1/2}.(RA,ρ​)a​=ρ1/2Aa†​A(ρ)−1/2.

The inverse square root is spectral: invert nonzero eigenvalues and leave zero eigenvalues at zero. With full support, it is the usual inverse square root.

For an input label jjj, classical fidelity is the chance that the composite operation returns the same label. Averaging gives

Fcl(ρ,K)=∑jpj⟨j∣K(∣j⟩⟨j∣)∣j⟩.F_{\mathrm{cl}}(\rho,K)= \sum_jp_j\langle j|K(|j\rangle\langle j|)|j\rangle.Fcl​(ρ,K)=j∑​pj​⟨j∣K(∣j⟩⟨j∣)∣j⟩.

The Bures–Uhlmann fidelity used here is the unsquared quantity FBU(σ,τ)=tr⁡σ τ σF_{\mathrm{BU}}(\sigma,\tau)=\operatorname{tr}\sqrt{\sqrt\sigma\,\tau\,\sqrt\sigma}FBU​(σ,τ)=trσ​τσ​​. For the classicizing channel, the reversal operation realizes the pretty good measurement, as shown by equation (36) and the discussion after equation (37) in the preprint, p. 10.

Formalization targets

Recovery error

The goal, in the reading established by the paper's proof, is

Fcl(ρ,RA,ρA)≥1−∑i,j∈Ji≠jpipj FBU(ρ^i,ρ^j).F_{\mathrm{cl}}(\rho,R_{A,\rho}A) \geq 1-\sum_{\substack{i,j\in J\\i\ne j}} \sqrt{p_ip_j}\,F_{\mathrm{BU}}(\hat\rho_i,\hat\rho_j).Fcl​(ρ,RA,ρ​A)≥1−i,j∈Ji=j​∑​pi​pj​​FBU​(ρ^​i​,ρ^​j​).

The sum is over ordered pairs; each unordered pair of distinct labels is counted twice. The coefficient is exactly one. The goal applies to every finite ensemble with the spectral data above and a full-support output. It does not fix the number of labels or the dimension of the output.

The milestones are the reversal formula (36), the classical-fidelity identities in (38), the unit squared Frobenius norm (40), the diagonal-block expression (41), the off-diagonal trace-norm identity following (42), and the two-block estimate of Lemma 6. They record the paper's mathematical statements and keep the attack path tied to the authors' displayed results.

Significance

The result bounds a measurement's probability of error using only pairwise similarities of the possible output states and their prior probabilities. For nearly distinguishable states, the weighted fidelity sum is small, so this particular measurement succeeds with high probability. The theorem therefore gives a usable guarantee for a specified recovery procedure, rather than only asserting that some procedure exists. In the preprint, §VII, Barnum and Knill describe quantum-information applications of such recovery bounds.

The mathematical result is already proved in the paper, subject to the correction explained below. The formalization work is to make the mixed-state channel, its recovery, the finite-dimensional spectral conventions, and the block-matrix norm estimate precise in Lean. The published Prove2Me definitions for Kraus updates and trace norm supply reusable starting points. A complete proof of this mission would add a checked mixed-state pretty-good-measurement bound; the local statements here compile as open theorems, and no proof is claimed.

Difficulty

The obvious pairwise-overlap estimate does not by itself express the error of the recovery channel. The recovery's classical fidelity is initially a channel evaluation on basis states, while the bound uses trace norms of blocks of a Gram matrix. The key obstacle is controlling the off-diagonal Frobenius mass of the positive square root of that Gram matrix by the trace norms of the corresponding blocks of the Gram matrix itself. Lemma 6 states the needed two-block comparison, including rectangular blocks. The matrix dimension and block labels must remain consistent when it is applied across a larger array.

Formalization scope

All systems and index sets are finite, with matrices over C\mathbb CC and real probabilities. A general completely positive map is represented by an unbundled finite family of Kraus matrices. The classicizing family has rectangular matrices from the input-label space to the output space; the reversal has matrices in the opposite direction. Composite Kraus families are indexed by pairs. The classical fidelity is defined from the channel action in equation (10); the goal does not define it using the desired overlap bound. The reversal is defined by equation (12) for a general family, so its specialized formula remains a theorem.

The spectral hypotheses include nonnegative probabilities and eigenvalues, unit sums, and orthonormal eigenvectors. Full support of ρout\rho_{\mathrm{out}}ρout​ is an explicit hypothesis wherever the reversal appears, following page 7. Empty input or output types cannot satisfy the normalized data together with these hypotheses. The Bures–Uhlmann expression is the unsquared trace of a positive square root; using the squared fidelity would change the constant and is outside this mission. Lemma 6 is independent of the ensemble and can be reused for finite block-matrix estimates. Contributions to the spectral identities, the array equalities, and the block-norm argument are welcome.

Equation (39) prints the square of the optimal success probability on its left. The first line of (38) compares that quantity with the recovery fidelity in the opposite direction to Corollary 4. The proof on pages 12–13 concludes the displayed bound for Fcl(ρ,RA,ρA)F_{\mathrm{cl}}(\rho,R_{A,\rho}A)Fcl​(ρ,RA,ρ​A). This mission states that proved conclusion and records the printed discrepancy in its item and audit notes.

Selected references

  • Howard Barnum and Emanuel Knill, Reversing quantum dynamics with near-optimal quantum and classical fidelity, arXiv:quant-ph/0004088v2, 2000/2026 version. arXiv
  • Howard Barnum and Emanuel Knill, Reversing quantum dynamics with near-optimal quantum and classical fidelity, Journal of Mathematical Physics 43 (2002), 2097–2106. DOI
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Markov ChainOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Lightning Network Economics: Channels IV: The Long-Run Number of Channel Transactions per On-Chain Transaction in Closed FormResearch Paper

Payment channels and blockchain congestion

A blockchain such as Bitcoin settles a limited number of transactions per unit of time, and every on-chain transaction pays a fee that rises with congestion. The Lightning Network moves payments off the chain. Two parties lock funds in a payment channel with one on-chain transaction, and they can then pay each other any number of times by updating the channel balance privately. A new on-chain transaction is needed only when one side of the channel runs out of funds and the channel must be reset.

Guasoni, Huberman and Shikhelman (Management Science, 2023) model a channel between two nodes that pay each other at Poisson rates. They compute its cost and its optimal size, and in §3.3 they quantify how much a channel relieves the chain. The relief is the long-run number of channel transactions carried per on-chain transaction (Proposition 2). A related quantity is the probability that the payee side of the channel, not the payer side, is exhausted first (Proposition 1). This mission formalizes both results, which are statements about two finite random walks.

Setting

Node 1 commits l1≥1l_1\ge1l1​≥1 units to the channel and node 2 commits l2≥1l_2\ge1l2​≥1 units. Node 1 pays node 2 one unit at the jumps of a Poisson process with rate λ1\lambda_1λ1​, and node 2 pays node 1 at rate λ2\lambda_2λ2​, independently. Write q=λ2/λ1q=\lambda_2/\lambda_1q=λ2​/λ1​. The balance XXX starts at 000. It moves up by one when node 2 pays and down by one when node 1 pays. Node 2 has exhausted its side when X=l2X=l_2X=l2​, and node 1 when X=−l1X=-l_1X=−l1​.

Only the sequence of payments matters here, not their timing or discounting. Observed at its jumps, the balance is a random walk that steps up with probability p=λ2/(λ1+λ2)p=\lambda_2/(\lambda_1+\lambda_2)p=λ2​/(λ1​+λ2​) and down with probability 1−p=λ1/(λ1+λ2)1-p=\lambda_1/(\lambda_1+\lambda_2)1−p=λ1​/(λ1​+λ2​). Two versions of this walk appear.

  1. The absorbed walk on {−l1,…,l2}\{-l_1,\dots,l_2\}{−l1​,…,l2​} stops at −l1-l_1−l1​ and at l2l_2l2​. Write P0{τl2<τ−l1}\mathbb P_0\{\tau_{l_2}<\tau_{-l_1}\}P0​{τl2​​<τ−l1​​} for the probability that, from the balance 000, it reaches l2l_2l2​ before −l1-l_1−l1​.
  2. The reset walk returns the balance to 000 as soon as it reaches l2l_2l2​ or −l1-l_1−l1​, which models an on-chain reset of the channel. It lives on the interior balances {−l1+1,…,l2−1}\{-l_1+1,\dots,l_2-1\}{−l1​+1,…,l2​−1}. For a stationary distribution mmm of this walk, m(n)m(n)m(n) is the long-run fraction of transactions the balance spends at nnn, with m(l2)=m(−l1)=0m(l_2)=m(-l_1)=0m(l2​)=m(−l1​)=0.

The transactions that trigger an on-chain reset are the up-moves from l2−1l_2-1l2​−1 and the down-moves from −l1+1-l_1+1−l1​+1. Their stationary fraction is

f(m)=m(l2−1) λ2λ1+λ2+m(−l1+1) λ1λ1+λ2,f(m)=m(l_2-1)\,\frac{\lambda_2}{\lambda_1+\lambda_2}+m(-l_1+1)\,\frac{\lambda_1}{\lambda_1+\lambda_2},f(m)=m(l2​−1)λ1​+λ2​λ2​​+m(−l1​+1)λ1​+λ2​λ1​​,

and the long-term ratio of channel to on-chain transactions is 1/f(m)1/f(m)1/f(m).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (Congestion Reduction)

For λ1,λ2>0\lambda_1,\lambda_2>0λ1​,λ2​>0 with λ1≠λ2\lambda_1\neq\lambda_2λ1​=λ2​ and l1,l2≥1l_1,l_2\ge1l1​,l2​≥1, the reset walk has a stationary distribution, and every stationary distribution mmm satisfies

1f(m)=(q+1)((l2(ql1−1)−l1)ql2+l1)(q−1)(ql1+l2−1).\frac1{f(m)}=\frac{(q+1)\Bigl(\bigl(l_2(q^{l_1}-1)-l_1\bigr)q^{l_2}+l_1\Bigr)}{(q-1)(q^{l_1+l_2}-1)}.f(m)1​=(q−1)(ql1​+l2​−1)(q+1)((l2​(ql1​−1)−l1​)ql2​+l1​)​.

Milestones

  • (28) and (29): m(n)=m(0) ql2−qnql2−1m(n)=m(0)\,\dfrac{q^{l_2}-q^n}{q^{l_2}-1}m(n)=m(0)ql2​−1ql2​−qn​ for 0≤n≤l20\le n\le l_20≤n≤l2​, and m(n)=m(0) ql1+n−1ql1−1m(n)=m(0)\,\dfrac{q^{l_1+n}-1}{q^{l_1}-1}m(n)=m(0)ql1​−1ql1​+n−1​ for −l1≤n≤0-l_1\le n\le0−l1​≤n≤0.
  • (30): m(0)=(ql1−1)(ql2−1)(l2(ql1−1)−l1)ql2+l1m(0)=\dfrac{(q^{l_1}-1)(q^{l_2}-1)}{\bigl(l_2(q^{l_1}-1)-l_1\bigr)q^{l_2}+l_1}m(0)=(l2​(ql1​−1)−l1​)ql2​+l1​(ql1​−1)(ql2​−1)​.
  • The on-chain fraction f(m)f(m)f(m) is the reciprocal of the goal's closed form.
  • Proposition 2 (i)–(ii): the closed form tends to l1l_1l1​ as q↓0q\downarrow0q↓0 and to l1l2l_1l_2l1​l2​ as q→1q\to1q→1.
  • Proposition 1 (i)(a),(c): P0{τl2<τ−l1}=1−q−l11−q−l1−l2\mathbb P_0\{\tau_{l_2}<\tau_{-l_1}\}=\dfrac{1-q^{-l_1}}{1-q^{-l_1-l_2}}P0​{τl2​​<τ−l1​​}=1−q−l1​−l2​1−q−l1​​ if λ2>λ1>0\lambda_2>\lambda_1>0λ2​>λ1​>0, and =1=1=1 if λ2>λ1=0\lambda_2>\lambda_1=0λ2​>λ1​=0.
  • Proposition 1 (i)(b), corrected: for λ1=λ2>0\lambda_1=\lambda_2>0λ1​=λ2​>0 the probability is l1/(l1+l2)l_1/(l_1+l_2)l1​/(l1​+l2​), which is the published gambler's ruin theorem.

Significance

Proposition 2 measures how much a channel relieves the chain. A unidirectional channel of size l1l_1l1​ carries l1l_1l1​ payments per on-chain transaction. A symmetric bidirectional channel carries l1l2l_1l_2l1​l2​, which grows with the product of the two sizes rather than their sum. For a fixed total commitment, the relief is therefore largest when the flows are balanced. This is the paper's quantitative case that bidirectional channels reduce congestion far more than one-way ones. The probabilities of Proposition 1 tell each node how likely it is to be the one whose funds run out.

Both results are proved in the paper by elementary difference-equation arguments. Neither has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them gives a verified closed form for the stationary law of a biased walk with resets at both ends. It also gives a biased gambler's-ruin probability on top of the platform's Markov chain library, which so far has only the fair case. The formalization also corrects case (b) of Proposition 1, which as printed claims 1/21/21/2 for every l1,l2l_1,l_2l1​,l2​; the paper's own proof gives l1/(l1+l2)l_1/(l_1+l_2)l1​/(l1​+l2​).

Difficulty

The reset walk is not a birth–death chain: the balance 000 receives the reset flow from both ends, so the walk is in general not reversible, and the detailed-balance shortcut that gives the stationary law of a reflected walk in one line fails. The balance equation (27) holds only away from 000 and from the two reset points. In Lean, the abstract equation mP=mmP=mmP=m on Fin (l₁ + l₂ - 1) must be related to recurrences indexed by integer balances, and the edge cases l1=1l_1=1l1​=1 and l2=1l_2=1l2​=1, where the bottom or top balance is 000 itself, have to be handled. For Proposition 1, the hitting probability is defined as an infinite series of first-passage probabilities over trajectories, and the closed form is a statement about the value of that series.

Formalization scope

  • The walks are transition matrices in the platform's MarkovMixing vocabulary (mm_basic, mm_path). Stationarity is MarkovMixing.IsStationary (nonnegative, sums to one, mP=mmP=mmP=m), and hitting probabilities are MarkovMixing.hitBeforeProb, a series that sums to 000 when it is not summable. The absorbed walk is absorbed almost surely, so this convention is never triggered.
  • The absorbed walk has states Fin (l₁ + l₂ + 1), with index iii for the balance i−l1i-l_1i−l1​. The reset walk has states Fin (l₁ + l₂ - 1), with index jjj for the balance j+1−l1j+1-l_1j+1−l1​. massAt reads m(n)m(n)m(n) at an integer balance and returns 000 outside the interior, which is the paper's convention m(l2)=m(−l1)=0m(l_2)=m(-l_1)=0m(l2​)=m(−l1​)=0.
  • Rates are real with λ1,λ2>0\lambda_1,\lambda_2>0λ1​,λ2​>0, and sizes are natural numbers l1,l2≥1l_1,l_2\ge1l1​,l2​≥1.
  • The hypothesis λ1≠λ2\lambda_1\neq\lambda_2λ1​=λ2​ (q≠1q\neq1q=1) is added to Proposition 2 and to (28)–(30). The formulas divide by q−1q-1q−1, and the paper treats q=1q=1q=1 only as a limit.
  • The "long-term ratio" is read as 1/f(m)1/f(m)1/f(m) for a stationary mmm, as in the paper's proof. Its identification with a pathwise long-run average is an ergodic theorem that the paper does not state and the mission does not ask for.
  • Proposition 2 (i)–(ii) are limits of the closed form along q↓0q\downarrow0q↓0 and q→1q\to1q→1, q≠1q\neq1q=1.
  • The following would trivialize the problem and are excluded: fixing the sizes or the rates, setting λ1=λ2\lambda_1=\lambda_2λ1​=λ2​, defining the long-term ratio or the stationary distribution by the closed form, or quantifying over stationary distributions without proving that one exists.
  • The platform has the Proved results MarkovMixing.exists_stationary_pos and MarkovMixing.stationary_unique for irreducible chains, and the fair gambler's ruin. Lemmas on stationary laws of chains with resets, and biased gambler's-ruin results on the MarkovMixing chains, would be reusable beyond this mission and are welcome.

Selected references

  • P. Guasoni, G. Huberman, C. Shikhelman, Lightning Network Economics: Channels, Management Science, Articles in Advance, published online November 6, 2023, pp. 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01664
  • J. Poon, T. Dryja, The Bitcoin Lightning Network: Scalable Off-Chain Instant Payments, white paper, 2016. https://lightning.network/lightning-network-paper.pdf
  • D. A. Levin, Y. Peres, E. L. Wilmer, Markov Chains and Mixing Times, American Mathematical Society, 2009 (§1.5, §2.1). https://doi.org/10.1090/mbk/058
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Machine LearningOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Contextual Inverse Optimization: Offline and Online Learning 3: EllipsoidalCones Has Worst-Case Regret O(d² ln(T tan α(C₀))) from a Pointed Initial Knowledge SetResearch Paper

Motivation

In inverse optimization one observes the decisions of an expert who solves an optimization problem and tries to recover the expert's objective. The contextual version of Besbes, Fonseca and Lobel (arXiv:2106.14015; Operations Research, 2025) asks a sharper question: not how well the cost can be estimated, but how well a decision-maker who imitates the expert performs, measured by regret against the expert. Settings of this kind arise whenever a firm wants to reproduce the routine choices of an experienced planner, for example routing, assortment or scheduling decisions, without being told the planner's cost trade-offs.

The online setting is adversarial. Nature fixes an unknown cost vector and then presents a sequence of problems; after each decision it reveals the expert's optimal action, which cuts the set of costs still consistent with the observations. A companion mission of this series shows that the natural greedy policy, which plays the center of this consistent set, can incur regret linear in the horizon. This mission formalizes the paper's first positive answer: an algorithm, EllipsoidalCones, with regret logarithmic in the horizon when the initial set of costs lies inside a pointed cone.

Setting

Costs lie on the unit sphere SdS^dSd of Rd\mathbb R^dRd, d=m+1≥2d=m+1\ge2d=m+1≥2. In period ttt nature presents a feasible set Xt⊆Rn\mathcal X_t\subseteq\mathbb R^nXt​⊆Rn, compact, nonempty and of diameter at most 111, and a 111-Lipschitz context ft:Rn→Rdf_t:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb R^dft​:Rn→Rd. The forward problem with cost ccc has solution set ψ(c,Xt,ft)=argmin⁡x∈Xtft(x)′c\psi(c,\mathcal X_t,f_t)=\operatorname{argmin}_{x\in\mathcal X_t}f_t(x)'cψ(c,Xt​,ft​)=argminx∈Xt​​ft​(x)′c. The decision-maker plays some xtπx^\pi_txtπ​, nature reveals an expert action xt⋆∈ψ(c⋆,Xt,ft)x^\star_t\in\psi(c^\star,\mathcal X_t,f_t)xt⋆​∈ψ(c⋆,Xt​,ft​) for the true cost c⋆c^\starc⋆, and the regret over TTT periods is

RTπ=∑t=1T(ft(xtπ)−ft(xt⋆))′c⋆.\mathcal R^\pi_T=\sum_{t=1}^T\big(f_t(x^\pi_t)-f_t(x^\star_t)\big)'c^\star .RTπ​=t=1∑T​(ft​(xtπ​)−ft​(xt⋆​))′c⋆.

The knowledge set C(It)C(\mathcal I_t)C(It​) is the set of costs in the initial set C0⊆SdC_0\subseteq S^dC0​⊆Sd under which every expert action seen so far was optimal.

The angle between nonzero vectors is θ(c,c^)=arccos⁡(c′c^/∥c∥∥c^∥)\theta(c,\hat c)=\arccos(c'\hat c/\|c\|\|\hat c\|)θ(c,c^)=arccos(c′c^/∥c∥∥c^∥), and the uncertainty angle of a set CCC is α(C)=inf⁡c^∈Sdsup⁡c∈Cθ(c,c^)\alpha(C)=\inf_{\hat c\in S^d}\sup_{c\in C}\theta(c,\hat c)α(C)=infc^∈Sd​supc∈C​θ(c,c^); a minimizing c^\hat cc^ is a circumcenter. The initial set is pointed when α(C0)<π/2\alpha(C_0)<\pi/2α(C0​)<π/2.

For a positive diagonal W=diag⁡(w1,…,wm)W=\operatorname{diag}(w_1,\dots,w_m)W=diag(w1​,…,wm​) and an orthonormal UUU, the ellipsoidal cone is

E(W,U)={c: c~[1]≥0, c~[2:d]′W−1c~[2:d]≤c~[1]2},c~=U−1c,E(W,U)=\{c:\ \tilde c_{[1]}\ge0,\ \tilde c_{[2:d]}'W^{-1}\tilde c_{[2:d]}\le\tilde c_{[1]}^2\},\qquad \tilde c=U^{-1}c ,E(W,U)={c: c~[1]​≥0, c~[2:d]′​W−1c~[2:d]​≤c~[1]2​},c~=U−1c,

a cone with axis Ue1Ue_1Ue1​ and elliptical cross-section. The effective difference of period ttt is δtπ=(ft(xtπ)−ft(xt⋆))/∥ft(xtπ)−ft(xt⋆)∥\delta^\pi_t=(f_t(x^\pi_t)-f_t(x^\star_t))/\|f_t(x^\pi_t)-f_t(x^\star_t)\|δtπ​=(ft​(xtπ​)−ft​(xt⋆​))/∥ft​(xtπ​)−ft​(xt⋆​)∥ (and 000 if the difference vanishes).

EllipsoidalCones with parameter ϵ\epsilonϵ starts from the circular cone W1=tan⁡2α(C0)IW_1=\tan^2\alpha(C_0)IW1​=tan2α(C0​)I, U1e1U_1e_1U1​e1​ a circumcenter of C0C_0C0​, and plays the axis Ute1U_te_1Ut​e1​ as proxy cost. With δˉ=Ut−1δtπ\bar\delta=U_t^{-1}\delta^\pi_tδˉ=Ut−1​δtπ​ it keeps the cone if

δˉ[2:d]′Wtδˉ[2:d]≤ϵ2(12)\bar\delta_{[2:d]}'W_t\bar\delta_{[2:d]}\le\epsilon^2 \qquad (12)δˉ[2:d]′​Wt​δˉ[2:d]​≤ϵ2(12)

and otherwise replaces it by the output of ConeUpdate, which performs one central-cut step of the ellipsoid method on the cone's cross-section and re-centres the result by a spectral decomposition.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 20)

With ϵ=d/T\epsilon=d/Tϵ=d/T there is an absolute constant KKK such that for every d≥2d\ge2d≥2, T≥1T\ge1T≥1, closed pointed C0C_0C0​ with α(C0)>0\alpha(C_0)>0α(C0​)>0, c⋆∈C0c^\star\in C_0c⋆∈C0​, admissible instances and run,

RTπ≤K d2ln⁡(Ttan⁡α(C0))  if α(C0)>arctan⁡(d/T),RTπ≤K d  otherwise.\mathcal R^\pi_T\le K\,d^2\ln\big(T\tan\alpha(C_0)\big)\ \text{ if }\alpha(C_0)>\arctan(d/T),\qquad \mathcal R^\pi_T\le K\,d\ \text{ otherwise.}RTπ​≤Kd2ln(Ttanα(C0​))  if α(C0​)>arctan(d/T),RTπ​≤Kd  otherwise.

The constant is left unfixed: the shape d2ln⁡(Ttan⁡α(C0))d^2\ln(T\tan\alpha(C_0))d2ln(Ttanα(C0​)) is the claim, and the proof's explicit constant rests on a step that fails at d=2d=2d=2.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 1: α(E(W,U))=arctan⁡λmax⁡(W)\alpha(E(W,U))=\arctan\sqrt{\lambda_{\max}(W)}α(E(W,U))=arctanλmax​(W)​.
  2. Lemma 4: if C(It)⊆E(Wt,Ut)C(\mathcal I_t)\subseteq E(W_t,U_t)C(It​)⊆E(Wt​,Ut​) and (12) holds, the period's regret is at most ϵ\epsilonϵ.
  3. Lemma B-1 (η=0\eta=0η=0): ConeUpdate's output contains E(W,U)∩{δ′c≥0}E(W,U)\cap\{\delta'c\ge0\}E(W,U)∩{δ′c≥0} and ∏λi\prod\lambda_i∏λi​ shrinks by e−1/(2(d−1))e^{-1/(2(d-1))}e−1/(2(d−1)).
  4. Lemma 3: C(It+1)⊆E(Wt,Ut)∩{δtπ′c≥0}⊆E(Wt+1,Ut+1)C(\mathcal I_{t+1})\subseteq E(W_t,U_t)\cap\{\delta^{\pi\prime}_tc\ge0\}\subseteq E(W_{t+1},U_{t+1})C(It+1​)⊆E(Wt​,Ut​)∩{δtπ′​c≥0}⊆E(Wt+1​,Ut+1​), and for d≥3d\ge3d≥3 ∏λi\prod\lambda_i∏λi​ shrinks by e−1/(d−1)e^{-1/(d-1)}e−1/(d−1).
  5. Cohen et al. (2020), Lemmas 3 and 4 (already posed on the platform, referenced): an ellipsoid-method step shrinks the smallest eigenvalue by at most (d−1)2/d2(d-1)^2/d^2(d−1)2/d2, and does not shrink it at all below the threshold (ϵ/(10(d−1)))2(\epsilon/(10(d-1)))^2(ϵ/(10(d−1)))2 when the cut is long.
  6. Lemma 5: for d≥3d\ge3d≥3, λmax⁡(Wt)≤(10d/ϵ)2(d−2)λmax⁡(W1)d−1e−Itπ/(d−1)\lambda_{\max}(W_t)\le(10d/\epsilon)^{2(d-2)}\lambda_{\max}(W_1)^{d-1}e^{-I^\pi_t/(d-1)}λmax​(Wt​)≤(10d/ϵ)2(d−2)λmax​(W1​)d−1e−Itπ​/(d−1), or no update ever happens.

Significance

The theorem shows that in contextual inverse optimization the decision-maker can force nature to reveal information: a cone update happens only after a large mistake, and each such mistake shrinks the cone geometrically, so large mistakes are logarithmically rare. It is the building block of the paper's general-case algorithm, which restarts the same construction in growing subspaces, and it isolates why the greedy policy fails: it never trades instantaneous regret for information.

The paper proves the result; nothing in it is machine-checked. The mission produces a checked version of the pointed-case analysis, an ellipsoidal-cone layer on top of the platform's ellipsoid-method definitions, and corrected statements where the printed ones are imprecise: the dimension restriction d≥3d\ge3d≥3 for the rate of Lemma 3 and the first part of Lemma 5, the column order of the spectral decomposition in ConeUpdate, and the η=0\eta=0η=0 case of Lemma B-1.

Difficulty

Two steps resist the obvious argument. First, ConeUpdate is not the ellipsoid method: the minimum-volume ellipsoid of the cut cross-section has the right volume but its cone is no longer centred, and the new cone's axis is an eigenvector of an indefinite bordered matrix. Showing that this re-centred cone still contains the cut cone requires matching the eigenvalues of the bordered matrix with those of the ellipsoid matrix in the right order. Second, a volume decrease alone does not bound the regret: by Proposition 1 the uncertainty angle is governed by the largest eigenvalue, and the ellipsoid method can make that eigenvalue grow. The lazy test (12) and the smallest-eigenvalue lemmas of Cohen et al. are what keep the cones from becoming long and thin; without them the product of eigenvalues falls while the angle does not.

Formalization scope

Costs live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin (m+1)) with d=m+1d=m+1d=m+1, actions in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n), so all norms are Euclidean. WWW is stored as its diagonal www, UUU as a real orthogonal matrix, and U−1U^{-1}U−1 is written U⊤U^\topU⊤. Lean periods are 000-based: Lean period ttt is the paper's period t+1t+1t+1. This text is the arXiv v3 preprint (1 July 2023), not the published 2025 article; all numbering is the preprint's.

Standing assumptions carried by the statements: d≥2d\ge2d≥2, n≥1n\ge1n≥1, feasible sets nonempty, compact and of diameter at most 111, contexts 111-Lipschitz, C0C_0C0​ a closed subset of SdS^dSd, ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0. Pinned and disclosed choices:

  • ConeUpdate is a relation, not a function. The printed U−1Bδ[2:p]U^{-1}B\delta_{[2:p]}U−1Bδ[2:p]​ is read as (U−1δ)[2:p](U^{-1}\delta)_{[2:p]}(U−1δ)[2:p]​. The first column of VVV is the eigenvector of the positive eigenvalue of MMM with positive first entry, and larger ∣μ∣|\mu|∣μ∣ is paired with larger eigenvalues of NNN. The page leaves this order open, and Algorithm 1 and Lemma B-1 disagree on it.
  • The printed "U1←Id−1U_1\leftarrow I_{d-1}U1​←Id−1​" is read as: U1U_1U1​ orthonormal with a circumcenter of C0C_0C0​ as its first column.
  • α(C0)>0\alpha(C_0)>0α(C0​)>0 on the goal. At α(C0)=0\alpha(C_0)=0α(C0​)=0 the algorithm's W1=0W_1=0W1​=0 is not positive definite.
  • The rate of Lemma 3 and the first part of Lemma 5 are stated for d≥3d\ge3d≥3 only; the rest of both lemmas for every d≥2d\ge2d≥2. At d=2d=2d=2 ConeUpdate halves WWW, and 1/2>e−11/2>e^{-1}1/2>e−1.
  • Lemma B-1 is stated only for η=0\eta=0η=0. Its η>0\eta>0η>0 inclusion is false as printed.
  • The worst-case regret is stated as a bound for every true cost, every adaptive instance sequence and every run, not as a real supremum. The polynomial running-time claim is not formalized.

The run predicate is satisfiable: a circumcenter of a closed nonempty C0C_0C0​ exists, the bordered matrix has exactly one positive eigenvalue, and a cone update is required only when the tail of δˉ\bar\deltaδˉ is nonzero. A formalization in which no run exists, or in which KKK may depend on ddd or TTT, does not state Theorem 3.

A complete development needs the angle and uncertainty-angle layer, ellipsoidal cones and their cross-sections, the published ellipsoid-method update (LinearOptimization_EllipsoidMethod) with its volume and eigenvalue facts, Cauchy–Schwarz over ellipsoids, and eigenvalue interlacing for bordered matrices. The ellipsoidal-cone layer and the cone-update lemma can be reused in the paper's general case and in other cone-based learning algorithms. Proofs of any milestone, and of the referenced Cohen et al. lemmas, are welcome.

Selected references

  • O. Besbes, Y. Fonseca, I. Lobel, Contextual Inverse Optimization: Offline and Online Learning, arXiv:2106.14015v3, 2023; Operations Research, 2025. https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.14015
  • M. C. Cohen, I. Lobel, R. Paes Leme, Feature-Based Dynamic Pricing, Management Science 66(11), 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3485
  • M. Grötschel, L. Lovász, A. Schrijver, Geometric Algorithms and Combinatorial Optimization, 2nd ed., Springer, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-78240-4
  • D. Bertsimas, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Introduction to Linear Optimization, Athena Scientific, 1997, Chapter 8.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsEconomics+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Endogenous Risk Exposure and Systemic Instability II: Banks Take More Risk in the Least Equilibrium of a Complete Network than of a Ring NetworkResearch Paper

Motivation

Banks lend to one another, and the shape of the resulting network decides how a loss at one bank reaches the others. A long line of work, starting with Allen and Gale (2000) and continued by Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015), compares the ring network, where each bank is owed money by one neighbour, with the complete network, where every bank holds an equal share of every other bank's debt. That literature studies contagion after shocks hit and finds that the complete network spreads losses thinly and can absorb small shocks better.

Shu's paper (Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.01519) asks the ex-ante question: when banks choose how much risk to take, knowing the network they sit in, which network makes them take more? A successful bank subsidizes its failed counterparties through the clearing of interbank debt, and anticipating that subsidy pushes it toward riskier projects. Proposition 4 of the paper says that this effect is stronger in the complete network. This mission formalizes that proposition and the computation behind it.

Setting

There are N≥2N\ge2N≥2 banks. In a regular network with share matrix Θ=[θij]\Theta=[\theta_{ij}]Θ=[θij​], bank jjj owes bank iii the face value θijdˉ\theta_{ij}\bar dθij​dˉ, every bank has total interbank liability dˉ>0\bar d>0dˉ>0, and every bank also owes a senior deposit v>0v>0v>0. The two networks of Definition 3 are

ΘR: θij=1 iff j≡i−1(modN),ΘC=1N−1(1N,N−IN).\Theta^R:\ \theta_{ij}=1 \text{ iff } j\equiv i-1 \pmod N,\qquad \Theta^C=\tfrac{1}{N-1}\big(\mathbb 1_{N,N}-I_N\big).ΘR: θij​=1 iff j≡i−1(modN),ΘC=N−11​(1N,N​−IN​).

Each bank iii chooses a project ZiZ_iZi​ in a common interval [Z‾,Z‾][\underline Z,\overline Z][Z​,Z]. The project pays ZiZ_iZi​ with probability P(Zi)P(Z_i)P(Zi​) and 000 otherwise, independently across banks. Assumption 1 requires P(Z)∈(0,1)P(Z)\in(0,1)P(Z)∈(0,1), PPP decreasing, and P(Z) ZP(Z)\,ZP(Z)Z concave. The standing assumption Z‾≥v+dˉ\underline Z\ge v+\bar dZ​≥v+dˉ says a successful bank never defaults.

After the state ω∈{s,f}N\omega\in\{s,f\}^Nω∈{s,f}N is realized, interbank payments clear. A payment equilibrium is a vector ddd with

di={min⁡[∑jθijdj+ei−v, dˉ]}+,d_i=\Big\{\min\Big[\textstyle\sum_j\theta_{ij}d_j+e_i-v,\ \bar d\Big]\Big\}^+,di​={min[∑j​θij​dj​+ei​−v, dˉ]}+,

where ei=Zie_i=Z_iei​=Zi​ if bank iii succeeds and 000 if it fails. Bank iii's profit is (∑jθijdj∗+ei−v−di∗)+\big(\sum_j\theta_{ij}d^*_j+e_i-v-d^*_i\big)^+(∑j​θij​dj∗​+ei​−v−di∗​)+. A risk-taking equilibrium is a profile Z∗Z^*Z∗ in which each Zi∗Z^*_iZi∗​ maximizes bank iii's expected profit given Z−i∗Z^*_{-i}Z−i∗​. Equilibria need not be unique, and the paper selects the least one.

The key quantity is the network risk-taking distortion

Di(Z−i)=∑ω−i(dˉ−∑jθijdj∗(ωi=s))Pr⁡(ω−i),\mathcal D_i(Z_{-i})=\sum_{\omega_{-i}}\Big(\bar d-\sum_j\theta_{ij}d^*_j(\omega^{i=s})\Big)\Pr(\omega_{-i}),Di​(Z−i​)=ω−i​∑​(dˉ−j∑​θij​dj∗​(ωi=s))Pr(ω−i​),

which is bank iii's expected net interbank payment to the other banks when its own project succeeds. In a regular network, expected profit equals P(Zi)(Zi−v)−P(Zi) Di(Z−i)P(Z_i)(Z_i-v)-P(Z_i)\,\mathcal D_i(Z_{-i})P(Zi​)(Zi​−v)−P(Zi​)Di​(Z−i​), so Di\mathcal D_iDi​ acts like extra debt that the bank repays only when it succeeds. Superscripts CCC and RRR mark the complete and ring networks.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4

With ZCZ^CZC the least equilibrium of the complete network and ZRZ^RZR the least equilibrium of the ring,

ZiR≤ZiCfor every bank i.Z^R_i\le Z^C_i\qquad\text{for every bank } i.ZiR​≤ZiC​for every bank i.

Milestones

  1. Clearing in the complete network (IA p. 15): a failed bank pays (dˉ−N−1Sv)+\big(\bar d-\frac{N-1}{S}v\big)^+(dˉ−SN−1​v)+, where SSS is the number of successful banks.
  2. (I.13): with qqq the common success probability of the other banks and Pr⁡(m)=(N−1m)(1−q)mqN−1−m\Pr(m)=\binom{N-1}{m}(1-q)^mq^{N-1-m}Pr(m)=(mN−1​)(1−q)mqN−1−m,
DiC=∑m=1N−1min⁡(mvN−m,mdˉN−1)Pr⁡(m).\mathcal D^C_i=\sum_{m=1}^{N-1}\min\Big(\frac{mv}{N-m},\frac{m\bar d}{N-1}\Big)\Pr(m).DiC​=m=1∑N−1​min(N−mmv​,N−1mdˉ​)Pr(m).
  1. (I.14): in the ring, a failed bank pays (dˉ−Kiv)+(\bar d-K_iv)^+(dˉ−Ki​v)+, where KiK_iKi​ counts the consecutive failed banks upstream of iii, starting with iii itself.
  2. (I.15): the conditional distribution, given mmm failures, of what a successful bank receives in the ring.
  3. Closed form of DiR\mathcal D^R_iDiR​ (IA p. 16, also p. 14).
  4. Lemma I.A (ii): ∑l=rn(lr)(n−l)=(n+1r+1)n−rr+2\sum_{l=r}^n\binom lr(n-l)=\binom{n+1}{r+1}\frac{n-r}{r+2}∑l=rn​(rl​)(n−l)=(r+1n+1​)r+2n−r​. Part (i), the classical hockey-stick identity, is already published and proved on the platform and is included by reference.
  5. Lemma I.B: ∑iAi+≥(∑iAi−B)++B\sum_i A_i^+\ge(\sum_iA_i-B)^++B∑i​Ai+​≥(∑i​Ai​−B)++B whenever B<max⁡iAiB<\max_iA_iB<maxi​Ai​.
  6. DiR≤DiC\mathcal D^R_i\le\mathcal D^C_iDiR​≤DiC​ when all other banks choose the same project.

Significance

The result. Proposition 4 reverses the conventional reading of the complete network as the safer structure. The co-insurance that makes it resilient after a shock is the same cross-subsidy that weakens incentives before the shock. Two networks with the same face-value liabilities dˉ+v\bar d+vdˉ+v therefore induce different equilibrium risk-taking. Liabilities alone are not a sufficient statistic for risk incentives, and the network topology matters in its own right. The same comparison is the template for the paper's later results on the number of banks and on central clearing.

Formalizing it. The proposition is proved in the paper, not open, and none of it is machine-checked yet. A formal proof must establish the two clearing vectors, the counting identity behind (I.15), and the two closed forms of the distortion. The printed argument also leaves a step to be supplied: its final appeal to "the monotone selection theorem" needs the distortion comparison at every profile of the other banks. It is proved only when they all choose the same project, and it is false in general. The goal is nevertheless stated for least equilibria exactly as in the paper, and its formal proof has to bridge that gap. The milestones are true as stated.

Difficulty

The distortion of the ring is not a function of the number of failures alone. What a successful bank receives depends on the length of the run of failed banks immediately upstream of it, so the closed form needs an exact count of the binary strings with a given number of failures and a given initial run length. The comparison of the two distortions is not termwise either: the positive part sits inside a sum on the ring side and outside it on the complete side.

The obvious final step is to say that the distortion is larger in the complete network, and that a larger distortion raises the optimal risk exposure. That step does not go through as stated. The equilibrium comparison needs control of the best-response maps at every profile, while the distortion comparison holds only on the diagonal, where all other banks choose the same project. Some further structure of the two games is needed to restrict attention to that diagonal.

Formalization scope

Banks are Fin N with N≥2N\ge2N≥2, and states are Fin N → Bool with true meaning success. The paper's general model is specialized to a regular network given by (Θ,dˉ,v)(\Theta,\bar d,v)(Θ,dˉ,v), which covers both networks of Definition 3. Every expectation is a finite sum over the 2N2^N2N states, so no measure theory is involved. The payment equilibrium d∗d^*d∗ is the greatest solution of the clearing system, because the paper asserts only generic uniqueness. Every bank's project lies in [Z‾,Z‾][\underline Z,\overline Z][Z​,Z], and Z‾≥v+dˉ\underline Z\ge v+\bar dZ​≥v+dˉ is a hypothesis of every statement.

The distortion milestones (2, 5 and 8) are stated at the constant profile in which every bank chooses the same zzz, which is how the page's single P(Z−i)P(Z_{-i})P(Z−i​) reads. At m=N−1m=N-1m=N−1, where every other bank fails, the printed ring binomial has lower index −1-1−1, and the weight is fixed explicitly to 111 at l=N−1l=N-1l=N−1. Proposition 4 is stated for least equilibria and weak inequality. It adds one hypothesis the page does not state, continuity of PPP on [Z‾,Z‾][\underline Z,\overline Z][Z​,Z], so that best responses and least equilibria exist. Without it the IsLeast hypotheses could be unsatisfiable and the goal vacuous.

Trivializing encodings are ruled out: d∗d^*d∗ is an actual solution of the clearing system, not a junk supremum, and the run length KiK_iKi​ is only used in states where some bank succeeds.

A complete development needs Knaster–Tarski on the box [0,dˉ]N[0,\bar d]^N[0,dˉ]N, the clearing computations for the two networks, binomial identities, and a monotone comparative statics argument for the equilibria. Published Topkis results on supermodular games (existence of least equilibria, and monotonicity of least fixed points in a parameter) are included by reference as tools. The clearing and counting lemmas are reusable for the paper's other results on ring and complete networks. Proofs of any milestone, and of the goal, are welcome.

Not posed here: Proposition 1 (strategic complementarity in any network, a separate mission), Proposition 2 (existence), and the later comparative statics in the number of banks, central clearing and bailouts.

Selected references

  • C. Shu, Endogenous Risk Exposure and Systemic Instability, Management Science (accepted manuscript, 17 Sep 2024). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01519
  • F. Allen and D. Gale, Financial Contagion, Journal of Political Economy 108(1), 2000. https://doi.org/10.1086/262109
  • D. Acemoglu, A. Ozdaglar and A. Tahbaz-Salehi, Systemic Risk and Stability in Financial Networks, American Economic Review 105(2), 2015. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130456
  • L. Eisenberg and T. H. Noe, Systemic Risk in Financial Systems, Management Science 47(2), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.47.2.236.9835
  • D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and Complementarity, Princeton University Press, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822539
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Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimality Conditions in Control Problems with Random State Constraints in Probabilistic or Almost Sure Form I: Necessary and Sufficient Optimality Conditions for a Gaussian Probabilistic ConstraintResearch Paper

Motivation

Probabilistic (chance) constraints require that a decision keeps a random constraint satisfied with probability at least ppp. They are the standard way to model reliability requirements in engineering design, energy networks and the control of systems driven by uncertain data, and they are increasingly imposed on infinite-dimensional decisions such as the control of a partial differential equation. Geiersbach and Henrion (arXiv:2306.03965v2) derive first-order optimality conditions for such problems. This mission formalizes the general part of their paper (§2.1): a necessary and sufficient multiplier rule for a convex objective under a Gaussian probabilistic constraint on a Banach space.

The difficulty with chance constraints is that the probability function φ(u)=P(g(u,ξ)≤0)\varphi(u)=\mathbb P(g(u,\xi)\le0)φ(u)=P(g(u,ξ)≤0) is given only implicitly and is in general neither smooth nor convex. Prékopa's theory of log-concave measures (Prékopa 1995) shows that log⁡φ\log\varphilogφ is concave under joint convexity, and Farshbaf-Shaker, Henrion and Hömberg (2018) carried this to infinite dimensions. For Gaussian data, van Ackooij and Henrion (2014) gave gradient formulae via the spherical-radial decomposition, and Hantoute, Henrion and Pérez-Aros (2019) proved local Lipschitz continuity of φ\varphiφ and an estimate of its Clarke subdifferential under a moderate growth condition. The paper combines the two lines into an optimality system.

Setting

Let UUU be a reflexive separable Banach space with dual U∗U^*U∗, let F:U→RF:U\to\mathbb RF:U→R be convex and Fréchet differentiable with derivative DF(u)∈U∗DF(u)\in U^*DF(u)∈U∗, and let ξ\xiξ be an mmm-dimensional centered Gaussian random vector with nondegenerate covariance matrix Σ\SigmaΣ. A constraint function g:U×Rm→Rg:U\times\mathbb R^m\to\mathbb Rg:U×Rm→R is locally Lipschitzian with g(u,⋅)g(u,\cdot)g(u,⋅) convex for every uuu (Assumption 2.1). For p∈(0,1]p\in(0,1]p∈(0,1] the problem is

min⁡u∈UF(u)s.t.φ(u):=P(ω∣g(u,ξ(ω))≤0)≥p.(9)\min_{u\in U}F(u)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad\varphi(u):=\mathbb P(\omega\mid g(u,\xi(\omega))\le0)\ge p. \tag{9}u∈Umin​F(u)s.t.φ(u):=P(ω∣g(u,ξ(ω))≤0)≥p.(9)

The Clarke directional derivative of a locally Lipschitzian f:U→Rf:U\to\mathbb Rf:U→R is f∘(u;h)=lim sup⁡u′→u, t↓0(f(u′+th)−f(u′))/tf^\circ(u;h)=\limsup_{u'\to u,\,t\downarrow0}(f(u'+th)-f(u'))/tf∘(u;h)=limsupu′→u,t↓0​(f(u′+th)−f(u′))/t, and its Clarke subdifferential is ∂Cf(u)={x∗∈U∗∣⟨x∗,h⟩≤f∘(u;h) ∀h}\partial^Cf(u)=\{x^*\in U^*\mid\langle x^*,h\rangle\le f^\circ(u;h)\ \forall h\}∂Cf(u)={x∗∈U∗∣⟨x∗,h⟩≤f∘(u;h) ∀h}. At a point u∗u^*u∗ the paper assumes g(u∗,0)<0g(u^*,0)<0g(u∗,0)<0 (10) and either the moderate growth condition (12) or boundedness of M={z∣g(u∗,z)≤0}M=\{z\mid g(u^*,z)\le0\}M={z∣g(u∗,z)≤0} (11).

The radial probability function is e(u,v)=μη{r≥0∣g(u,rΣ1/2v)≤0}e(u,v)=\mu_\eta\{r\ge0\mid g(u,r\Sigma^{1/2}v)\le0\}e(u,v)=μη​{r≥0∣g(u,rΣ1/2v)≤0} for vvv on the unit sphere Sm−1\mathbb S^{m-1}Sm−1, where μη\mu_\etaμη​ is the chi distribution with mmm degrees of freedom; with μζ\mu_\zetaμζ​ the uniform distribution on Sm−1\mathbb S^{m-1}Sm−1, φ(u)=∫Sm−1e(u,v) dμζ(v)\varphi(u)=\int_{\mathbb S^{m-1}}e(u,v)\,d\mu_\zeta(v)φ(u)=∫Sm−1​e(u,v)dμζ​(v) (14). Integrals of set-valued maps are taken in the sense of Aumann.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2.6, statement (21)

If ggg is jointly convex, there is a generalized Slater point u^\hat uu^ with φ(u^)>p\varphi(\hat u)>pφ(u^)>p, and u∗u^*u∗ is feasible with (10) and either (12) or MMM bounded, then u∗u^*u∗ is a global minimizer of (9) if and only if, for some λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0,

DF(u∗)∈λ ∂Cφ(u∗),φ(u∗)≥p,λ(φ(u∗)−p)=0.(21)DF(u^*)\in\lambda\,\partial^C\varphi(u^*),\qquad\varphi(u^*)\ge p,\qquad\lambda(\varphi(u^*)-p)=0. \tag{21}DF(u∗)∈λ∂Cφ(u∗),φ(u∗)≥p,λ(φ(u∗)−p)=0.(21)

Milestones

  1. Theorem 2.2, Lipschitz part: e(⋅,v)e(\cdot,v)e(⋅,v) is uniformly locally Lipschitzian and φ\varphiφ is locally Lipschitzian around uˉ\bar uuˉ.
  2. Prékopa's statement (p. 7): joint quasi-convexity of ggg and a log-concave density give a log-concave φ\varphiφ.
  3. Lemma 2.5: φ~=−log⁡φ+log⁡p\tilde\varphi=-\log\varphi+\log pφ~​=−logφ+logp is convex and lower semicontinuous, and (9) is equivalent to min⁡{F∣φ~≤0}\min\{F\mid\tilde\varphi\le0\}min{F∣φ~​≤0} (20).
  4. The convex multiplier rule for (20): −DF(u∗)∈λ∂φ~(u∗)-DF(u^*)\in\lambda\partial\tilde\varphi(u^*)−DF(u∗)∈λ∂φ~​(u∗), λφ~(u∗)=0\lambda\tilde\varphi(u^*)=0λφ~​(u∗)=0.
  5. Convex and Clarke subdifferentials agree for locally Lipschitz convex functions.
  6. The chain rule ∂Cφ~(u∗)=−φ(u∗)−1∂Cφ(u∗)\partial^C\tilde\varphi(u^*)=-\varphi(u^*)^{-1}\partial^C\varphi(u^*)∂Cφ~​(u∗)=−φ(u∗)−1∂Cφ(u∗).

Companion targets

The spherical-radial representation (14); the inclusion (15) ∂Cφ(uˉ)⊆∫Sm−1∂uCe(uˉ,v) dμζ(v)\partial^C\varphi(\bar u)\subseteq\int_{\mathbb S^{m-1}}\partial^C_ue(\bar u,v)\,d\mu_\zeta(v)∂Cφ(uˉ)⊆∫Sm−1​∂uC​e(uˉ,v)dμζ​(v) with equality under (16); the radius representation (17)–(19); Lemma 2.3 (Clarke regularity of −e(⋅,v)-e(\cdot,v)−e(⋅,v)); Theorem 2.4 (equality in (15) when MMM is bounded); and Proposition 2.6's second statement (22), where ∂Cφ(u∗)\partial^C\varphi(u^*)∂Cφ(u∗) is replaced by the spherical integral.

Significance

Statement (21) is a complete first-order characterization of optimality for a nonconvex, nonsmooth constraint in infinite dimensions: the constraint function is neither differentiable nor convex in general, yet the multiplier rule is both necessary and sufficient. The companion formula (22), with the exact subdifferential of Theorem 2.4, makes the system computable from the explicit radial function eee; the paper's later sections evaluate it for an elliptic PDE with a random source and derive explicit optimality conditions for a probabilistic state constraint.

The results of §2.1 are proved on paper, partly by citation. None of them has a machine-checked proof in Mathlib or on Prove2Me. Formalizing them requires a Clarke calculus on Banach spaces, Prékopa-type log-concavity for Gaussian measures, the spherical-radial decomposition of a Gaussian vector, and a convex multiplier rule with an extended-valued constraint. Each of these is reusable well beyond chance constraints.

Difficulty

The direct route fails because φ\varphiφ is not convex: probability functions bounded between 0 and 1 are essentially never concave, and the Clarke subdifferential of a nonconvex function supports only necessary conditions. The paper's argument needs the convex reformulation through −log⁡φ-\log\varphi−logφ, which is extended-valued where φ=0\varphi=0φ=0. It then needs three facts that do not come for free in a Banach space: local Lipschitz continuity of φ\varphiφ (which fails for merely locally Lipschitz ggg without (12) or a bounded MMM), the identification of the convex and Clarke subdifferentials, and a chain rule through the logarithm. The companion formula (22) needs Clarke's theorem on subdifferentials of integral functionals, whose equality case requires a regularity that the radial function only has after a sign change (Lemma 2.3).

Formalization scope

Rm\mathbb R^mRm is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin m) with m≥1m\ge1m≥1. The law of ξ\xiξ is Mathlib's multivariateGaussian 0 Sigma with Sigma.PosDef, and Σ1/2\Sigma^{1/2}Σ1/2 is the positive semidefinite square root used there. φ(u)\varphi(u)φ(u) is the real number P({g(u,ξ)≤0})\mathbb P(\{g(u,\xi)\le0\})P({g(u,ξ)≤0}). Reflexivity is surjectivity of the canonical map into the bidual. The Clarke directional derivative is the limsup over u′→uu'\to uu′→u, t↓0t\downarrow0t↓0 with denominator ttt (the page prints hhh, a misprint). Clarke regularity includes local Lipschitz continuity. φ~\tilde\varphiφ~​ is valued in EReal with −log⁡0=+∞-\log0=+\infty−log0=+∞, and its convexity is convexity of its epigraph. A solution is a global minimizer over the feasible set. "DF(u∗)∈λSDF(u^*)\in\lambda SDF(u∗)∈λS" is encoded as "DF(u∗)=λx∗DF(u^*)=\lambda x^*DF(u∗)=λx∗ for some x∗∈Sx^*\in Sx∗∈S", which is unambiguous at λ=0\lambda=0λ=0. The ball in (12) is open. The Aumann integral uses selections whose scalar components v↦⟨x^v∗,h⟩v\mapsto\langle\hat x^*_v,h\ranglev↦⟨x^v∗​,h⟩ are integrable.

The convex multiplier rule (milestone 4) carries one disclosed addition: the extended-valued constraint is finite and continuous near u∗u^*u∗. The paper cites [39, Theorem 3.66] without spelling out a qualification condition, and in the application this property follows from milestone 1. Prékopa's statement is formalized with log⁡0=−∞\log0=-\inftylog0=−∞ (the page prints +∞+\infty+∞), as the multiplicative inequality φ(u)tφ(w)1−t≤φ(tu+(1−t)w)\varphi(u)^t\varphi(w)^{1-t}\le\varphi(tu+(1-t)w)φ(u)tφ(w)1−t≤φ(tu+(1−t)w).

A formalization that makes any of these statements trivial is ruled out: the Clarke limsup is only used with a local Lipschitz hypothesis, so the junk value of an unbounded limsup never enters; the Aumann integral demands integrable selections; the multiplier carries its sign and complementarity condition; and optimality is global, not stationarity.

Contributions are welcome at every level: a Clarke calculus on normed spaces (subdifferential nonemptiness, sum and chain rules), log-concavity of Gaussian measures and Prékopa's theorem, polar coordinates for Gaussian vectors, and a Slater-type multiplier rule for extended-valued convex constraints.

Selected references

  • C. Geiersbach and R. Henrion, Optimality conditions in control problems with random state constraints in probabilistic or almost-sure form, arXiv:2306.03965v2, 2024 (Math. Oper. Res., 2025). https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.03965
  • A. Hantoute, R. Henrion and P. Pérez-Aros, Subdifferential characterization of probability functions under Gaussian distribution, Math. Program. 174, 167–194, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-018-1237-9
  • W. van Ackooij and R. Henrion, Gradient formulae for nonlinear probabilistic constraints with Gaussian and Gaussian-like distributions, SIAM J. Optim. 24(4), 1864–1889, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1137/130922689
  • M. H. Farshbaf-Shaker, R. Henrion and D. Hömberg, Properties of chance constraints in infinite dimensions with an application to PDE constrained optimization, Set-Valued Var. Anal. 26, 821–841, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11228-017-0452-5
  • A. Prékopa, Stochastic Programming, Kluwer, 1995. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3087-7
  • F. H. Clarke, Optimization and Nonsmooth Analysis, Wiley, 1983. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611971309
  • J. Peypouquet, Convex Optimization in Normed Spaces: Theory, Methods and Examples, SpringerBriefs in Optimization, Springer, 2015.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationMachine Learning+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games II: If Every Player Runs Optimistic FTRL with Step Size (n−1)^{−1/2}T^{−1/4}, Each Player's Regret Is at Most (R+4)√(n−1)·T^{1/4}Research Paper

Motivation

When every participant in a repeated game runs a no-regret learning algorithm, the time-averaged play converges to a coarse correlated equilibrium, and in smooth games the average welfare approaches the price-of-anarchy guarantee. These facts are a standard justification for equilibrium predictions in auctions, routing and markets, where agents learn rather than solve for equilibria. Against an adversary, the regret of any learning algorithm can grow like T\sqrt TT​, which gives average regret of order T−1/2T^{-1/2}T−1/2. Syrgkanis, Agarwal, Luo and Schapire (arXiv:1507.00407, NIPS 2015) asked whether learning is faster when the opponents are themselves learning, and so their play changes slowly.

Timeline. Daskalakis, Deckelbaum and Kim (2011) gave a decentralized algorithm with O(log⁡T)O(\log T)O(logT) regret in two-player zero-sum games. Rakhlin and Sridharan (2013) obtained the same rate in zero-sum games with optimistic mirror descent, which uses the last observed utility as a prediction of the next one. Syrgkanis et al. (2015) extended recency-biased learning to general multi-player normal-form games. They isolated the RVU property, proved that it gives constant total regret (Theorem 4, Corollary 8), and proved that each individual player's regret is O(T1/4)O(T^{1/4})O(T1/4) (Theorem 11, Corollary 12). This mission formalizes the second result. Later work by Chen and Peng (2020) and by Daskalakis, Fishelson and Golowich (2021) improved the individual rate to polylogarithmic in TTT.

Setting

A static game has nnn players. Each player iii has a finite strategy set SiS_iSi​ with ∣Si∣=d|S_i|=d∣Si​∣=d, and a utility function ui:S1×⋯×Sn→[0,1]u_i:S_1\times\cdots\times S_n\to[0,1]ui​:S1​×⋯×Sn​→[0,1]. A mixed strategy is a point wiw_iwi​ of the probability simplex Δ(Si)⊂Rd\Delta(S_i)\subset\mathbb R^dΔ(Si​)⊂Rd, and the players randomize independently. The game is played at times t=1,…,Tt=1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T. At time ttt each player picks wit∈Δ(Si)w_i^t\in\Delta(S_i)wit​∈Δ(Si​) and then observes its utility vector

uit=(Es−i∼w−it[ui(x,s−i)])x∈Si,u_i^t=\big(\mathbb E_{s_{-i}\sim w_{-i}^t}[u_i(x,s_{-i})]\big)_{x\in S_i},uit​=(Es−i​∼w−it​​[ui​(x,s−i​)])x∈Si​​,

so its expected utility is ⟨wit,uit⟩\langle w_i^t,u_i^t\rangle⟨wit​,uit​⟩. The regret of player iii after TTT steps is

ri(T)=sup⁡wi∗∈Δ(Si)∑t=1T⟨wi∗−wit,uit⟩.r_i(T)=\sup_{w_i^*\in\Delta(S_i)}\sum_{t=1}^T\langle w_i^*-w_i^t,u_i^t\rangle .ri​(T)=wi∗​∈Δ(Si​)sup​t=1∑T​⟨wi∗​−wit​,uit​⟩.

Strategies are measured in the norm ∥⋅∥=∥⋅∥1\|\cdot\|=\|\cdot\|_1∥⋅∥=∥⋅∥1​. Utilities are measured in its dual, ∥v∥∗=∥v∥∞\|v\|_*=\|v\|_\infty∥v∥∗​=∥v∥∞​. A regularizer R\mathcal RR is 1-strongly convex if R(a+b2)≤R(a)+R(b)2−∥a−b∥128\mathcal R(\frac{a+b}2)\le\frac{\mathcal R(a)+\mathcal R(b)}2-\frac{\|a-b\|_1^2}8R(2a+b​)≤2R(a)+R(b)​−8∥a−b∥12​​. The range RRR is max⁡i(sup⁡ΔRi−inf⁡ΔRi)\max_i(\sup_{\Delta}\mathcal R_i-\inf_\Delta\mathcal R_i)maxi​(supΔ​Ri​−infΔ​Ri​).

Optimistic follow the regularized leader (OFTRL) with step size η>0\eta>0η>0 and predictor sequence MitM_i^tMit​ plays wi0=argmin⁡ΔRw_i^0=\operatorname{argmin}_\Delta\mathcal Rwi0​=argminΔ​R and

wiT=argmax⁡w∈Δ(Si)⟨w, ∑t=1T−1uit+MiT⟩−R(w)η.w_i^T=\operatorname*{argmax}_{w\in\Delta(S_i)}\Big\langle w,\ \sum_{t=1}^{T-1}u_i^t+M_i^T\Big\rangle-\frac{\mathcal R(w)}{\eta}.wiT​=w∈Δ(Si​)argmax​⟨w, t=1∑T−1​uit​+MiT​⟩−ηR(w)​.

With one-step recency bias, MiT=uiT−1M_i^T=u_i^{T-1}MiT​=uiT−1​. An algorithm has the RVU property (Regret bounded by Variation in Utilities) with parameters α,β,γ\alpha,\beta,\gammaα,β,γ if its regret against every w∗w^*w∗ is at most α+β∑t∥ut−ut−1∥∗2−γ∑t∥wt−wt−1∥2\alpha+\beta\sum_t\|u^t-u^{t-1}\|_*^2-\gamma\sum_t\|w^t-w^{t-1}\|^2α+β∑t​∥ut−ut−1∥∗2​−γ∑t​∥wt−wt−1∥2. It has the stability property with constant κ\kappaκ if ∥wit−wit+1∥≤κ\|w_i^t-w_i^{t+1}\|\le\kappa∥wit​−wit+1​∥≤κ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 12 (p. 5)

If n≥2n\ge2n≥2, every player runs OFTRL with Mit=uit−1M_i^t=u_i^{t-1}Mit​=uit−1​ and η=(n−1)−1/2T−1/4\eta=(n-1)^{-1/2}T^{-1/4}η=(n−1)−1/2T−1/4, then for every player iii and every wi∗∈Δ(Si)w_i^*\in\Delta(S_i)wi∗​∈Δ(Si​),

∑t=1T⟨wi∗−wit,uit⟩≤(R+4)n−1⋅T1/4.\sum_{t=1}^T\langle w_i^*-w_i^t,u_i^t\rangle\le(R+4)\sqrt{n-1}\cdot T^{1/4}.t=1∑T​⟨wi∗​−wit​,uit​⟩≤(R+4)n−1​⋅T1/4.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 20 (supp. p. 4): ∥wt−gt∥≤η∥Mt−ut∥∗\|w^t-g^t\|\le\eta\|M^t-u^t\|_*∥wt−gt∥≤η∥Mt−ut∥∗​ and ∥gt−wt+1∥≤η∥Mt+1∥∗\|g^t-w^{t+1}\|\le\eta\|M^{t+1}\|_*∥gt−wt+1∥≤η∥Mt+1∥∗​, where gT=argmax⁡Δ⟨g,∑t≤Tut⟩−R(g)/ηg^T=\operatorname{argmax}_\Delta\langle g,\sum_{t\le T}u^t\rangle-\mathcal R(g)/\etagT=argmaxΔ​⟨g,∑t≤T​ut⟩−R(g)/η is the leader sequence.
  2. Stability with κ=2η\kappa=2\etaκ=2η (p. 5, before Corollary 12): OFTRL with Mt=ut−1M^t=u^{t-1}Mt=ut−1 and utilities in [0,1][0,1][0,1] moves by at most 2η2\eta2η per step.
  3. Proposition 7 (p. 5): OFTRL with Mt=ut−1M^t=u^{t-1}Mt=ut−1 has the RVU property with α=R/η\alpha=R/\etaα=R/η, β=η\beta=\etaβ=η, γ=1/(4η)\gamma=1/(4\eta)γ=1/(4η).
  4. The display in the proof of Theorem 11 (p. 5): ∥uit−uit−1∥∗2≤(n−1)∑j≠i∥wjt−wjt−1∥2≤(n−1)2κ2\|u_i^t-u_i^{t-1}\|_*^2\le(n-1)\sum_{j\ne i}\|w_j^t-w_j^{t-1}\|^2\le(n-1)^2\kappa^2∥uit​−uit−1​∥∗2​≤(n−1)∑j=i​∥wjt​−wjt−1​∥2≤(n−1)2κ2.
  5. Theorem 11 (p. 5): RVU with α>0,β>0,γ≥0\alpha>0,\beta>0,\gamma\ge0α>0,β>0,γ≥0 plus stability κ\kappaκ give each player regret at most α+βκ2(n−1)2T\alpha+\beta\kappa^2(n-1)^2Tα+βκ2(n−1)2T.

Significance

The result. Corollary 12 shows that recency-biased regularized learning in a game guarantees each player average regret O(T−3/4)O(T^{-3/4})O(T−3/4). The adversarial optimum is O(T−1/2)O(T^{-1/2})O(T−1/2). The bound covers every player separately and needs no coordination beyond a common step size. Corollary 8, by contrast, bounds only the sum of the regrets. Theorem 11 isolates the two algorithmic properties responsible, RVU and stability. Any algorithm with both, including optimistic mirror descent and the other recency biases of the paper, inherits the bound.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper, with the proofs of Proposition 7 and Lemma 20 in its supplementary material. No machine-checked version of optimistic FTRL, of the RVU property or of fast rates in games appears to exist. A formalization makes the following explicit: the strong-convexity form the proofs actually use, the convention for the first utility vector u0u^0u0, and the exact range of times on which stability is needed. A later mission of this series formalizes the companion bound on total regret (Corollary 8) on the same objects.

Difficulty

The game-theoretic part is short. Once Proposition 7 and the stability bound are available, Theorem 11 is a summation and Corollary 12 is arithmetic with real powers. The weight lies in the single-player analysis of optimistic FTRL. The first idea, to compare consecutive argmax points through first-order optimality conditions, fails because the regularizer need not be differentiable and the maximizers can lie on the boundary of the simplex. The arguments must work with the optimality of argmax points over Δ\DeltaΔ and with a quadratic-growth consequence of strong convexity. That consequence is not immediate from the midpoint condition in footnote 3. It needs continuity of the regularizer to pass from midpoints to the whole segment. Bounding the variation of utility vectors by the movement of the other players needs a total-variation estimate for product distributions.

Formalization scope

Players are Fin n and strategies Fin d, both indexed from 000. Time keeps the paper's indices: w0w^0w0 is the initial play and sums run over t∈{1,…,T}t\in\{1,\dots,T\}t∈{1,…,T}. The vector ui0u_i^0ui0​ is the utility vector against w0w^0w0; the paper never defines it. Mixed profiles and expectations use the published agt_games definitions. ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ is ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ and ∥⋅∥∗\|\cdot\|_*∥⋅∥∗​ is Mathlib's sup norm. Optimistic FTRL and the leader sequence are predicates on trajectories, so every maximizer is a valid run. The goal quantifies over every run of the dynamics.

Standing assumptions and disclosed additions:

  • utilities lie in [0,1][0,1][0,1] (§2);
  • each player may have its own regularizer (footnote 2);
  • strong convexity is footnote 3's midpoint condition on Δ\DeltaΔ plus continuity on Δ\DeltaΔ;
  • RRR is any common upper bound on the ranges, which includes the exact range;
  • n≥2n\ge2n≥2 and T≥1T\ge1T≥1, since otherwise the step size is undefined;
  • the regret's supremum is expressed as a bound for every comparator w∗∈Δw^*\in\Deltaw∗∈Δ;
  • Theorem 11 assumes RVU only on the realized play, which strengthens the theorem, and stability only for the steps t=0,…,T−1t=0,\dots,T-1t=0,…,T−1.

Trivializations are ruled out. The regularizer class is nonempty: (d/2)∑xwx2(d/2)\sum_x w_x^2(d/2)∑x​wx2​ satisfies it. Removing the [0,1][0,1][0,1] bound on utilities would make the stability claim false. The goal fixes the paper's step size and constant, so it is not a statement about a chosen run, an unbounded supremum or a vacuous parameter range.

A complete development needs the following:

  • quadratic growth of strongly convex functions at constrained maximizers, for ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ on the simplex;
  • the be-the-leader induction of Theorem 19;
  • a total-variation bound for product measures on finite sets.

These are reusable well beyond this mission, for online learning and for learning in games, and contributions of each are welcome.

Selected references

  • V. Syrgkanis, A. Agarwal, H. Luo, R. E. Schapire, Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games, NIPS 2015; arXiv:1507.00407v5. https://arxiv.org/abs/1507.00407
  • A. Rakhlin, K. Sridharan, Optimization, Learning, and Games with Predictable Sequences, NIPS 2013. https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.1869
  • C. Daskalakis, A. Deckelbaum, A. Kim, Near-Optimal No-Regret Algorithms for Zero-Sum Games, SODA 2011. https://arxiv.org/abs/1011.1489
  • X. Chen, B. Peng, Hedging in Games: Faster Convergence of External and Swap Regrets, NeurIPS 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.04953
  • C. Daskalakis, M. Fishelson, N. Golowich, Near-Optimal No-Regret Learning in General Games, NeurIPS 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.06924
  • T. Roughgarden, Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy, J. ACM 62(5), 2015. https://doi.org/10.1145/2806883
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AlgebraNumber Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

On Ideal Lattices and Learning with Errors over Rings: Multiplication by t ∈ I with tI⁻¹ Coprime to J Induces an R-Module Isomorphism M/JM ≅ IM/IJMResearch Paper

Background and motivation

Ring learning with errors (ring-LWE) is the algebraic variant of the learning-with-errors problem on which most practical lattice-based cryptography is built, including the key-encapsulation scheme ML-KEM standardized by NIST in 2024. Its hardness rests on the paper of Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev, On ideal lattices and learning with errors over rings (J. ACM 60(6), 2013, doi:10.1145/2535925; conference version at EUROCRYPT 2010). The paper's main theorem (Theorem 3.6, p. 19) is a polynomial-time quantum reduction from worst-case approximate shortest-vector problems on ideal lattices to the ring-LWE decision problem. Statements about reductions, running times and negligible probabilities are outside the scope of this mission.

What this mission formalizes is the algebraic tool both of the paper's reductions rest on, which the authors list among their main technical contributions (p. 7): a Chinese-remainder technique for clearing an ideal. An arbitrary ideal I\mathcal{I}I of the ring of integers RRR need not be principal, so a reduction that receives samples from a lattice I\mathcal{I}I cannot simply divide by a generator. Lemmas 2.14 and 2.15 show that, modulo an ideal J\mathcal{J}J such as ⟨q⟩\langle q\rangle⟨q⟩, multiplication by a well-chosen t∈It\in\mathcal{I}t∈I identifies R/qRR/qRR/qR with I/qI\mathcal{I}/q\mathcal{I}I/qI, and more generally M/JM\mathcal{M}/\mathcal{J}\mathcal{M}M/JM with IM/IJM\mathcal{I}\mathcal{M}/\mathcal{I}\mathcal{J}\mathcal{M}IM/IJM for every fractional ideal M\mathcal{M}M. Steps 1–3 of the BDD-to-LWE reduction of §4.2 consist of exactly these identifications. The authors note that the lemmas are "probably standard for experts in computational number theory" (p. 16); the formulation used in lattice cryptography is theirs, and it is reused throughout the later literature on algebraic lattices.

Setting

Let KKK be a number field of degree nnn and R=OKR = \mathcal{O}_KR=OK​ its ring of integers. An integral ideal is a nonzero ideal I⊆R\mathcal{I}\subseteq RI⊆R (the paper excludes {0}\{0\}{0}, footnote 2, p. 13). A fractional ideal is a set I⊂K\mathcal{I}\subset KI⊂K such that dId\mathcal{I}dI is an integral ideal for some nonzero d∈Rd\in Rd∈R; the nonzero fractional ideals form a group under multiplication, and I−1\mathcal{I}^{-1}I−1 denotes the inverse. Two integral ideals are coprime when I+J=R\mathcal{I}+\mathcal{J} = RI+J=R.

For t∈Rt\in Rt∈R the cleared ideal is t⋅I−1=⟨t⟩ I−1t\cdot\mathcal{I}^{-1} = \langle t\rangle\,\mathcal{I}^{-1}t⋅I−1=⟨t⟩I−1. When t∈It\in\mathcal{I}t∈I it is an integral ideal, and "t⋅I−1t\cdot\mathcal{I}^{-1}t⋅I−1 is coprime to J\mathcal{J}J" means

t⋅I−1⊆Randt⋅I−1+J=R.t\cdot\mathcal{I}^{-1}\subseteq R \quad\text{and}\quad t\cdot\mathcal{I}^{-1}+\mathcal{J}=R .t⋅I−1⊆Randt⋅I−1+J=R.

For a fractional ideal M\mathcal{M}M and t∈It\in\mathcal{I}t∈I, the map θt(u)=t⋅u\theta_t(u) = t\cdot uθt​(u)=t⋅u sends M\mathcal{M}M into IM\mathcal{I}\mathcal{M}IM, and therefore induces an RRR-linear map

θt: M⟶IM/IJM,u↦tu mod IJM.\theta_t:\ \mathcal{M}\longrightarrow \mathcal{I}\mathcal{M}/\mathcal{I}\mathcal{J}\mathcal{M},\qquad u\mapsto t u \bmod \mathcal{I}\mathcal{J}\mathcal{M}.θt​: M⟶IM/IJM,u↦tumodIJM.

The dual of a fractional ideal L\mathcal{L}L is L∨={x∈K:Tr⁡(xL)⊆Z}\mathcal{L}^\vee = \{x\in K:\operatorname{Tr}(x\mathcal{L})\subseteq\mathbb{Z}\}L∨={x∈K:Tr(xL)⊆Z}; R∨R^\veeR∨ is the codifferent, and I∨=I−1R∨\mathcal{I}^\vee = \mathcal{I}^{-1}R^\veeI∨=I−1R∨. For the cyclotomic field K=Q(ζ)K=\mathbb{Q}(\zeta)K=Q(ζ), ζ\zetaζ a primitive mmm-th root of unity, τk\tau_kτk​ (k∈Zm∗k\in\mathbb{Z}_m^*k∈Zm∗​) is the automorphism with τk(ζ)=ζk\tau_k(\zeta)=\zeta^kτk​(ζ)=ζk, and for a prime q≡1(modm)q\equiv 1\pmod mq≡1(modm) with a primitive mmm-th root of unity ω∈Zq\omega\in\mathbb{Z}_qω∈Zq​ the primes above qqq are qi=⟨q,ζ−ωi⟩\mathfrak{q}_i = \langle q,\zeta-\omega^i\rangleqi​=⟨q,ζ−ωi⟩, i∈Zm∗i\in\mathbb{Z}_m^*i∈Zm∗​. Calligraphic I,J,M\mathcal{I},\mathcal{J},\mathcal{M}I,J,M of the paper are written I, J, M in the milestone texts.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 2.15 (p. 17)

For nonzero ideals I,J⊆R\mathcal{I},\mathcal{J}\subseteq RI,J⊆R, t∈It\in\mathcal{I}t∈I with t⋅I−1t\cdot\mathcal{I}^{-1}t⋅I−1 coprime to J\mathcal{J}J, and a nonzero fractional ideal M\mathcal{M}M,

θt: M→IM/IJM is surjective with kernel JM,soM/JM  ≅  IM/IJM\theta_t:\ \mathcal{M}\to\mathcal{I}\mathcal{M}/\mathcal{I}\mathcal{J}\mathcal{M}\ \text{is surjective with kernel}\ \mathcal{J}\mathcal{M},\quad\text{so}\quad \mathcal{M}/\mathcal{J}\mathcal{M}\;\cong\;\mathcal{I}\mathcal{M}/\mathcal{I}\mathcal{J}\mathcal{M}θt​: M→IM/IJM is surjective with kernel JM,soM/JM≅IM/IJM

as RRR-modules, via u mod JM↦tu mod IJMu\bmod\mathcal{J}\mathcal{M}\mapsto tu\bmod\mathcal{I}\mathcal{J}\mathcal{M}umodJM↦tumodIJM.

Milestones

  1. The existence content of Lemma 2.13 (a coprime pair has c∈Jc\in\mathcal{J}c∈J with c≡1 mod Ic\equiv 1\bmod\mathcal{I}c≡1modI), already proved on the platform and entered as a reference. Lemma 2.12 (Chinese Remainder Theorem) is also included as a reference item, without being a milestone.
  2. Lemma 2.14 (p. 16): for nonzero I,J\mathcal{I},\mathcal{J}I,J there exists a nonzero t∈It\in\mathcal{I}t∈I with t⋅I−1t\cdot\mathcal{I}^{-1}t⋅I−1 coprime to J\mathcal{J}J.
  3. The kernel claim of the proof of Lemma 2.15: u∈Mu\in\mathcal{M}u∈M and tu∈IJMtu\in\mathcal{I}\mathcal{J}\mathcal{M}tu∈IJM imply u∈JMu\in\mathcal{J}\mathcal{M}u∈JM.
  4. The surjectivity claim of the proof: if c∈t⋅I−1c\in t\cdot\mathcal{I}^{-1}c∈t⋅I−1 and c≡1 mod Jc\equiv1\bmod\mathcal{J}c≡1modJ, then for v∈IMv\in\mathcal{I}\mathcal{M}v∈IM, cv∈tMcv\in t\mathcal{M}cv∈tM and cv−v∈IJMcv-v\in\mathcal{I}\mathcal{J}\mathcal{M}cv−v∈IJM.

Companion statements

  • §4.2 step 2 (p. 23) and step 3 (p. 24): multiplication by ttt is a bijection R/qR→I/qIR/qR\to\mathcal{I}/q\mathcal{I}R/qR→I/qI and I∨/qI∨→R∨/qR∨\mathcal{I}^\vee/q\mathcal{I}^\vee\to R^\vee/qR^\veeI∨/qI∨→R∨/qR∨ for every integer q≥2q\ge2q≥2, the two instances of Lemma 2.15 the reduction uses.
  • Lemma 2.16 (p. 17): τj(qi)=qi/j\tau_j(\mathfrak{q}_i)=\mathfrak{q}_{i/j}τj​(qi​)=qi/j​ for all i,j∈Zm∗i,j\in\mathbb{Z}_m^*i,j∈Zm∗​.
  • Lemma 2.9 (p. 14): n1/pN(I)1/n≤λ1(I)≤n1/pN(I)1/nΔK1/nn^{1/p}N(\mathcal{I})^{1/n}\le\lambda_1(\mathcal{I})\le n^{1/p}N(\mathcal{I})^{1/n}\sqrt{\Delta_K^{1/n}}n1/pN(I)1/n≤λ1​(I)≤n1/pN(I)1/nΔK1/n​​ in every ℓp\ell_pℓp​ norm, p∈[1,∞]p\in[1,\infty]p∈[1,∞], stated as two items.

Significance

The isomorphism of Lemma 2.15 is what makes ideal lattices usable in worst-case to average-case reductions: it turns a discrete Gaussian sample from an arbitrary ideal I\mathcal{I}I into a uniform element of the fixed ring RqR_qRq​, and turns the ring-LWE secret in Rq∨R^\vee_qRq∨​ back into a coset of qI∨q\mathcal{I}^\veeqI∨. Lemma 2.16 is the corresponding tool for the search-to-decision reductions of §5, which move between the CRT components R/qiR/\mathfrak{q}_iR/qi​ of a completely split qqq. Lemma 2.9 gives the scale of the lattices involved.

On the formal side, none of Lemmas 2.14–2.16 is stated on the platform or in Mathlib in this form. Mathlib has the Chinese remainder theorem for ideals, inverses of fractional ideals in Dedekind domains, trace duals with I∨=I−1R∨\mathcal{I}^\vee=\mathcal{I}^{-1}R^\veeI∨=I−1R∨, and the isomorphism Gal(Q(ζm)/Q)≅(Z/mZ)∗\mathrm{Gal}(\mathbb{Q}(\zeta_m)/\mathbb{Q})\cong(\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z})^*Gal(Q(ζm​)/Q)≅(Z/mZ)∗; the mission connects these to the quotient modules and explicit primes that lattice cryptography works with. All statements are proved in the paper; what remains is the formal proof.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for Lemma 2.15 — both quotients have cardinality N(J)N(\mathcal{J})N(J), so an injective map is bijective — needs the multiplicativity of the norm on fractional ideals and finiteness of the quotients, and still needs the kernel computation, which uses unique factorization: from tu∈IJMtu\in\mathcal{I}\mathcal{J}\mathcal{M}tu∈IJM one has to cancel I\mathcal{I}I and M\mathcal{M}M inside the group of fractional ideals and then use coprimality of tI−1t\mathcal{I}^{-1}tI−1 and J\mathcal{J}J. Lemma 2.14 needs the factorization of I\mathcal{I}I along the primes of J\mathcal{J}J and a CRT choice of ttt; for J=0\mathcal{J}=0J=0 it would assert that I\mathcal{I}I is principal, which is why the nonzero convention matters. In Lemma 2.16 the delicate point is the direction of the action: τj\tau_jτj​ sends qi\mathfrak{q}_iqi​ to qi/j\mathfrak{q}_{i/j}qi/j​, not qij\mathfrak{q}_{ij}qij​.

Formalization scope

  • KKK is a NumberField, RRR is 𝓞 K, fractional ideals are FractionalIdeal (𝓞 K)⁰ K, and integral ideals are coerced into them. Ideals are nonzero, per footnote 2: every statement carries I ≠ ⊥ (and J ≠ ⊥, M ≠ 0 where the paper's convention applies); I ≠ ⊥ is essential because Lean defines 0−1=00^{-1}=00−1=0. Two kernel/surjectivity milestones drop the nonzero hypotheses on J\mathcal{J}J and M\mathcal{M}M, which only strengthens them.
  • "tI−1t\mathcal{I}^{-1}tI−1 coprime to J\mathcal{J}J" is the predicate ClearedCoprime: tI−1≤1t\mathcal{I}^{-1}\le 1tI−1≤1 and tI−1+J=1t\mathcal{I}^{-1}+\mathcal{J}=1tI−1+J=1 in the semiring of fractional ideals.
  • M/N\mathcal{M}/\mathcal{N}M/N is the quotient of the RRR-module M\mathcal{M}M by N∩M\mathcal{N}\cap\mathcal{M}N∩M; θt\theta_tθt​ is the given RRR-linear map M→IM/IJM\mathcal{M}\to\mathcal{I}\mathcal{M}/\mathcal{I}\mathcal{J}\mathcal{M}M→IM/IJM. The goal states surjectivity and the kernel of this map. A bare statement that some isomorphism M/JM≅IM/IJM\mathcal{M}/\mathcal{J}\mathcal{M}\cong\mathcal{I}\mathcal{M}/\mathcal{I}\mathcal{J}\mathcal{M}M/JM≅IM/IJM exists would be true for unrelated reasons and is not the lemma.
  • Duals are Mathlib's FractionalIdeal.dual ℤ ℚ. τj\tau_jτj​ is the inverse image of jjj under IsCyclotomicExtension.Rat.galEquivZMod, acting on ideals by images; ωi\omega^iωi uses the representative of iii in {0,…,m−1}\{0,\dots,m-1\}{0,…,m−1}. ℓp\ell_pℓp​ norms sum over all nnn complex embeddings; λ1\lambda_1λ1​ bounds are phrased through nonzero elements of I\mathcal{I}I.
  • Dropped algorithmic clauses: "such ttt can be found efficiently" (Lemma 2.14), "this isomorphism may be efficiently inverted" (Lemma 2.15), the "deterministic polynomial-time algorithm" of Lemma 2.13 (only the existence of ccc is referenced), and "which can be efficiently inverted" in §4.2. No complexity notion is encoded.
  • Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, of the goal from them, and of the companion statements; general lemmas on quotients M/JM\mathcal{M}/\mathcal{J}\mathcal{M}M/JM of fractional ideals are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • V. Lyubashevsky, C. Peikert, O. Regev, On ideal lattices and learning with errors over rings, J. ACM 60(6), Article 43, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1145/2535925
  • V. Lyubashevsky, C. Peikert, O. Regev, On ideal lattices and learning with errors over rings, EUROCRYPT 2010, LNCS 6110, pp. 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13190-5_1
  • O. Regev, On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptography, J. ACM 56(6), 2009. https://doi.org/10.1145/1568318.1568324
  • NIST, FIPS 203: Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard, 2024. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.203
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMachine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games III: In a (λ,µ)-Smooth Cost Game, First-Order Regret Bounds Make the Average Cost at Most λ(1+µ)/(µ(1−µ))·OPT′ + A·n log d/TResearch Paper

Motivation

When independent players repeatedly choose actions, a low-regret guarantee controls each player's performance against a fixed alternative. It does not directly control the social cost, the sum of all players' costs. For a class of games satisfying smoothness, however, the individual comparisons can imply a bound on the cost of the joint play. This connection makes learning guarantees useful for studying decentralized systems in which nobody selects the entire outcome. The paper uses the smooth-game framework for this purpose.

Syrgkanis, Agarwal, Luo, and Schapire study regularized learning in games and, in Appendix H, show a separate consequence for first-order regret in cost-minimization games. A first-order bound scales with the comparator's cumulative cost, rather than only with the number of rounds. Their Theorem 23 turns that guarantee into an average-cost estimate whose additive term falls as 1/T1/T1/T. The result is proved in the paper's supplementary material. This mission targets a machine-checked statement and proof of that known result.

Setting

There are nnn players. Each player has ddd pure strategies; a pure profile s=(si)is=(s_i)_is=(si​)i​ chooses one for each player. Player iii incurs a cost ci(s)∈[0,1]c_i(s)\in[0,1]ci​(s)∈[0,1]. The total cost is C(s)=∑ici(s)C(s)=\sum_i c_i(s)C(s)=∑i​ci​(s), and OPT′=min⁡sC(s)\mathrm{OPT}'=\min_s C(s)OPT′=mins​C(s) is the minimum over pure profiles. A mixed profile w=(wi)iw=(w_i)_iw=(wi​)i​ gives each player a probability distribution over its ddd strategies. Players randomize independently, and C(w)=Es∼w[C(s)]C(w)=\mathbb E_{s\sim w}[C(s)]C(w)=Es∼w​[C(s)] is the expected total cost.

In round ttt, player iii uses witw_i^twit​ and sees a vector citc_i^tcit​. Its coordinate ci,xtc_{i,x}^tci,xt​ is the expected cost of playing pure strategy xxx against the other players' round-ttt mixed strategies. Thus ⟨wit,cit⟩\langle w_i^t,c_i^t\rangle⟨wit​,cit​⟩ is that player's actual expected cost. Equation (21) assumes that, for every fixed pure strategy xxx,

∑t=1T⟨wit,cit⟩−∑t=1Tci,xt≤A1log⁡d∑t=1Tci,xt+A2log⁡d.\sum_{t=1}^T\langle w_i^t,c_i^t\rangle-\sum_{t=1}^T c_{i,x}^t \le A_1\sqrt{\log d\sum_{t=1}^T c_{i,x}^t}+A_2\log d.t=1∑T​⟨wit​,cit​⟩−t=1∑T​ci,xt​≤A1​logdt=1∑T​ci,xt​​+A2​logd.

The constants A1,A2A_1,A_2A1​,A2​ are the constants of the learning guarantee. The logarithm is natural.

A game is (λ,μ)(\lambda,\mu)(λ,μ)-smooth when one pure profile s∗s^*s∗ works against every pure profile sss:

∑ici(si∗,s−i)≤λOPT′+μC(s).\sum_i c_i(s_i^*,s_{-i})\le\lambda\mathrm{OPT}'+\mu C(s).i∑​ci​(si∗​,s−i​)≤λOPT′+μC(s).

Here (si∗,s−i)(s_i^*,s_{-i})(si∗​,s−i​) replaces only player iii's strategy in sss. This is the paper's cost-game smoothness condition (20). It concerns a single witness s∗s^*s∗, rather than a different witness chosen for each sss.

Formalization targets

The goal is Appendix H's Theorem 23. For 0<μ<10<\mu<10<μ<1 and T≥1T\ge1T≥1, if the game is (λ,μ)(\lambda,\mu)(λ,μ)-smooth and every player's realized play obeys (21), then

1T∑t=1TC(wt)≤λ(1+μ)μ(1−μ) OPT′+Anlog⁡dT,A=A12μ(1−μ)2+2A21−μ.\frac1T\sum_{t=1}^T C(w^t) \le \frac{\lambda(1+\mu)}{\mu(1-\mu)}\,\mathrm{OPT}' +\frac{A n\log d}{T}, \qquad A=\frac{A_1^2\mu}{(1-\mu)^2}+\frac{2A_2}{1-\mu}.T1​t=1∑T​C(wt)≤μ(1−μ)λ(1+μ)​OPT′+TAnlogd​,A=(1−μ)2A12​μ​+1−μ2A2​​.

The constants are exactly those printed in the paper. The milestone list follows the displayed statements in its proof: the identity expressing social cost through cost-vector inner products, the aggregate first-order inequality (22), the expected smoothness inequality, the quadratic inequality for the auxiliary quantity xxx, and the final root bound. Together they describe the intermediate claims available to solvers without changing the theorem's target.

Significance

The theorem says that the joint play of agents with individual first-order regret guarantees approaches an explicit benchmark in average social cost. The 1/T1/T1/T term separates the learning transient from the benchmark determined by λ\lambdaλ, μ\muμ, and OPT′\mathrm{OPT}'OPT′. It is a statement about arbitrary realized trajectories that meet the regret condition; the players need not coordinate on a common learning rule.

The paper already proves Theorem 23. The remaining work here is to formalize its cost model, the product-distribution expectations, the first-order bound, the smoothness transfer, and the real inequality behind the exact constants. A proof of this mission would give reusable finite-game definitions and a checked route from player-level cost comparisons to a social-cost statement. Its intermediate claims may also be useful when an alternative algorithm supplies the same first-order guarantee.

Difficulty

Summing the individual regret bounds leaves a sum of square roots of comparator costs. The cost benchmark in the conclusion is a single quantity, so the player-level terms cannot simply be replaced one at a time by OPT′\mathrm{OPT}'OPT′. The cost-vector identity and smoothness condition must also agree on the same independent product distribution: changing only one player's pure action while keeping the opponents mixed is easy to encode with a different, unintended distribution. After those choices, the exact coefficient AAA depends on the signs and domains in a quadratic bound. In particular, the intermediate Cauchy–Schwarz inequality uses A1≥0A_1\ge0A1​≥0, while the final theorem has no sign restriction on A1A_1A1​.

Formalization scope

Players are Fin n, and each player's strategies are Fin d. The condition d≥1d\ge1d≥1 makes the pure optimum a minimum over a nonempty finite set. Mixed profiles are probability weights on each strategy set, with the players' choices independent. The published agt_games definition supplies product-profile probabilities and finite expectations; its expectedPayoff operation is used as an expectation of costs. The paper-specific layer defines pure and expected social cost, the pure optimum, cost vectors, smoothness, and the realized first-order regret condition.

Time has the paper's indices: every round sum runs from t=1t=1t=1 through TTT, without shifting the sequence. The goal uses T≥1T\ge1T≥1 and 0<μ<10<\mu<10<μ<1 so its divisions represent the paper's formula. Every cost is in [0,1][0,1][0,1]; every played profile is mixed; (21) is required for every player and every fixed pure comparator. The formulation does not restrict the game to a chosen example, assume the goal inequality, replace OPT′\mathrm{OPT}'OPT′ with a default-valued infimum, or allow an empty strategy set. The first-order condition is stated on the realized sequence, which follows from any algorithm that guarantees (21) for all sequences.

The intermediate inequality (22) and the quadratic milestone explicitly require A1≥0A_1\ge0A1​≥0, the sign used in their Cauchy–Schwarz step. Theorem 23 itself allows any real A1,A2,λA_1,A_2,\lambdaA1​,A2​,λ, as the paper's stated formula does. The source prints ∑T=1T\sum_{T=1}^T∑T=1T​ in (22); the Lean statement uses the intended round index ttt. The source also switches between log⁡d\log dlogd and ln⁡d\ln dlnd; both denote the natural logarithm. Contributions on finite product expectations, the mixed smoothness consequence, and the final real inequalities are all within scope.

Selected references

  • Vasilis Syrgkanis, Alekh Agarwal, Haipeng Luo, and Robert E. Schapire, Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games, Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 28, 2015. arXiv:1507.00407v5, Appendix H, supplementary pp. 10–11.
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Recovering Best Statistical Guarantees via the Empirical Divergence-Based Distributionally Robust Optimization 2: Empirical Burg-Ball DRO Bounds Converge Almost Surely to E[h(x;ξ)]Research Paper

Motivation

Many stochastic optimization models contain an expected-value constraint

Z0(x)=E0[h(x;ξ)]≤0,Z_0(x)=E_0[h(x;\xi)]\le 0,Z0​(x)=E0​[h(x;ξ)]≤0,

where ξ\xiξ is a random object with unknown law P0P_0P0​, xxx is a decision and hhh is a known loss. When P0P_0P0​ is known only through an i.i.d. sample ξ1,…,ξn\xi_1,\dots,\xi_nξ1​,…,ξn​, data-driven distributionally robust optimization (DRO) replaces E0E_0E0​ by the worst case over a ball of distributions around the data. H. Lam, Recovering Best Statistical Guarantees via the Empirical Divergence-Based Distributionally Robust Optimization (arXiv:1605.09349v1, 2016; Operations Research 67(4), 2019), studies a ball of reweightings of the sample itself, measured by the Burg entropy, and links its radius to empirical likelihood (Owen 2001).

Lam's Theorem 2 shows that, for a fixed decision xxx, the minimum and maximum of Ew[h(x;ξ)]E_w[h(x;\xi)]Ew​[h(x;ξ)] over this ball bracket Z0(x)Z_0(x)Z0​(x) with probability tending to 1−α1-\alpha1−α when the radius is χ1,1−α2/(2n)\chi^2_{1,1-\alpha}/(2n)χ1,1−α2​/(2n). Theorem 3, the goal of this mission, complements it: the two bounds also converge almost surely to Z0(x)Z_0(x)Z0​(x). A confidence statement says the robust bounds are rarely wrong; consistency says they are eventually tight, so that the robust constraint does not stay conservative as data accumulate.

This mission is the second of a three-mission series on the pointwise theory of the paper (1: coverage, Theorem 2; 3: reduction to a Burg ball on a finite support, Proposition 1).

Setting

Let ξ1,ξ2,…\xi_1,\xi_2,\dotsξ1​,ξ2​,… be i.i.d. random elements of a measurable space Ξ\XiΞ with law P0P_0P0​. Fix a decision x∈Rmx\in\mathbb R^mx∈Rm and write Z0(x)=E0[h(x;ξ)]Z_0(x)=E_0[h(x;\xi)]Z0​(x)=E0​[h(x;ξ)].

The Burg generator is ϕ(t)=−log⁡t+t−1\phi(t)=-\log t+t-1ϕ(t)=−logt+t−1 for t>0t>0t>0 and ϕ(t)=+∞\phi(t)=+\inftyϕ(t)=+∞ for t≤0t\le0t≤0. The empirical Burg-entropy divergence ball of radius η\etaη is the set of weight vectors

Un(η)={w∈Rn: −1n∑i=1nlog⁡(nwi)≤η, ∑i=1nwi=1, wi≥0}.\mathcal U_n(\eta)=\Big\{w\in\mathbb R^n:\ -\frac1n\sum_{i=1}^n\log(nw_i)\le\eta,\ \sum_{i=1}^nw_i=1,\ w_i\ge0\Big\}.Un​(η)={w∈Rn: −n1​i=1∑n​log(nwi​)≤η, i=1∑n​wi​=1, wi​≥0}.

On the simplex, −1n∑ilog⁡(nwi)=1n∑iϕ(nwi)-\frac1n\sum_i\log(nw_i)=\frac1n\sum_i\phi(nw_i)−n1​∑i​log(nwi​)=n1​∑i​ϕ(nwi​), the ϕ\phiϕ-divergence of www from the uniform weights.

Let 0<α<10<\alpha<10<α<1 and let q=χ1,1−α2q=\chi^2_{1,1-\alpha}q=χ1,1−α2​ be the (1−α)(1-\alpha)(1−α)-quantile of the χ12\chi^2_1χ12​ distribution. The lower and upper empirical DRO values are

Z‾n(x)=min⁡w∈Un(q/(2n))∑i=1nh(x;ξi)wi,Z‾n(x)=max⁡w∈Un(q/(2n))∑i=1nh(x;ξi)wi.\underline Z_n(x)=\min_{w\in\mathcal U_n(q/(2n))}\sum_{i=1}^nh(x;\xi_i)w_i,\qquad \overline Z_n(x)=\max_{w\in\mathcal U_n(q/(2n))}\sum_{i=1}^nh(x;\xi_i)w_i.Z​n​(x)=w∈Un​(q/(2n))min​i=1∑n​h(x;ξi​)wi​,Zn​(x)=w∈Un​(q/(2n))max​i=1∑n​h(x;ξi​)wi​.

The proof works with the centred observations h~i=h(x;ξi)−Z0(x)\tilde h_i=h(x;\xi_i)-Z_0(x)h~i​=h(x;ξi​)−Z0​(x).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 12)

Under the conditions of Theorem 2 (0<Var0(h(x;ξ))<∞0<\mathrm{Var}_0(h(x;\xi))<\infty0<Var0​(h(x;ξ))<∞, Z0(x)Z_0(x)Z0​(x) finite),

Z‾n(x)→a.s.Z0(x)andZ‾n(x)→a.s.Z0(x)(n→∞).\underline Z_n(x)\xrightarrow{a.s.}Z_0(x)\quad\text{and}\quad\overline Z_n(x)\xrightarrow{a.s.}Z_0(x)\qquad(n\to\infty).Z​n​(x)a.s.​Z0​(x)andZn​(x)a.s.​Z0​(x)(n→∞).

Milestones (the steps of the printed proof, at a single decision)

  1. Lemma 3 (p. 38, Owen's Lemma 11.2): for i.i.d. YiY_iYi​ with EYi2<∞EY_i^2<\inftyEYi2​<∞, max⁡1≤i≤n∣Yi∣=o(n1/2)\max_{1\le i\le n}|Y_i|=o(n^{1/2})max1≤i≤n​∣Yi​∣=o(n1/2) a.s.
  2. (75)–(76) (p. 33): the Lagrangian dual
Z‾n(x)−Z0(x)=min⁡λ≥0,γ −∑i=1nλnlog⁡(1−h~i+γλ)+λq2n−γ,\overline Z_n(x)-Z_0(x)=\min_{\lambda\ge0,\gamma}\ -\sum_{i=1}^n\frac{\lambda}{n}\log\Big(1-\frac{\tilde h_i+\gamma}{\lambda}\Big)+\lambda\frac{q}{2n}-\gamma ,Zn​(x)−Z0​(x)=λ≥0,γmin​ −i=1∑n​nλ​log(1−λh~i​+γ​)+λ2nq​−γ,

with the printed conventions at λ=0\lambda=0λ=0 and for arguments outside the domain of the logarithm. 3. The elementary inequality (p. 34): −log⁡(1−t)≤t+2t2-\log(1-t)\le t+2t^2−log(1−t)≤t+2t2 for ∣t∣≤1/2|t|\le1/2∣t∣≤1/2. 4. (77) (p. 34): if max⁡i∣h~i∣≤λ/2\max_i|\tilde h_i|\le\lambda/2maxi​∣h~i​∣≤λ/2 with λ>0\lambda>0λ>0, then

Z‾n(x)−Z0(x)≤1n∑i=1nh~i+2(1/n)∑ih~i2λ+λq2n.\overline Z_n(x)-Z_0(x)\le\frac1n\sum_{i=1}^n\tilde h_i+2\frac{(1/n)\sum_i\tilde h_i^2}{\lambda}+\lambda\frac{q}{2n}.Zn​(x)−Z0​(x)≤n1​i=1∑n​h~i​+2λ(1/n)∑i​h~i2​​+λ2nq​.
  1. The uniform-weight lower bound (p. 34): Z‾n(x)−Z0(x)≥1n∑ih~i\overline Z_n(x)-Z_0(x)\ge\frac1n\sum_i\tilde h_iZn​(x)−Z0​(x)≥n1​∑i​h~i​.

Milestones 2, 4 and 5 are deterministic statements about an arbitrary data vector; only Lemma 3 and the goal are probabilistic.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3 shows that the empirical DRO with the χ12\chi^2_1χ12​ calibration is a consistent estimator of the constraint function at every fixed decision, not only a confidence bound. Together with Theorem 2 it places the empirical Burg-ball DRO on the same footing as the classical normal-approximation confidence interval: correct asymptotic coverage and shrinkage to the truth. The deterministic bounds (76)–(77) are also reusable on their own: they control the worst-case reweighting of any finite sample by its first two empirical moments.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; no machine-checked proof is known. The mission asks for a formal proof of the printed argument, specialized to one decision. A closely related open target exists on the platform: GenEmpLik.Expansion.lemma_1 (Duchi, Glynn and Namkoong) states the expansion of the robust mean, sample mean plus ρsn2/n+o(n−1/2)\sqrt{\rho s_n^2/n}+o(n^{-1/2})ρsn2​/n​+o(n−1/2), for a smooth generator class under stationary ergodic data. Combined with the strong law it would give the upper half of Theorem 3, but it is a different statement with different hypotheses and is itself unproved, so it is not used as a milestone here.

Difficulty

The tempting argument, "the ball shrinks to the empirical distribution and the empirical mean converges", does not close by itself: h(x;ξ)h(x;\xi)h(x;ξ) is only square integrable, not bounded, and the maximizing weight shifts mass towards the largest observations, so the gap Z‾n(x)−1n∑ih(x;ξi)\overline Z_n(x)-\frac1n\sum_ih(x;\xi_i)Zn​(x)−n1​∑i​h(x;ξi​) has to be controlled against the extremes of the sample rather than by the size of the ball alone. The printed proof routes this through the convex dual (76). That step needs a constraint qualification, the conjugate of the Burg generator with its boundary conventions (an infinite value outside the domain of the logarithm, and the degenerate multiplier λ=0\lambda=0λ=0), and a choice of multiplier that dominates every centred observation while still letting all three terms of (77) vanish. The almost-sure statement then combines Lemma 3 with two strong laws on one event of full probability.

Formalization scope

  • Data. The sample ξ1,…,ξn\xi_1,\dots,\xi_nξ1​,…,ξn​ is ξ 0, …, ξ (n-1): a sequence of measurable maps that is independent (iIndepFun) and identically distributed (IdentDistrib with ξ 0). Z0(x)Z_0(x)Z0​(x) is the Bochner integral of h x ∘ ξ 0, and the moment conditions are MemLp (h x ∘ ξ 0) 2 (finite mean and variance) together with positive variance, which makes the integral the true mean.
  • Decision. The paper's x∈Θ⊂Rmx\in\Theta\subset\mathbb R^mx∈Θ⊂Rm is an arbitrary point of EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin m); Θ\ThetaΘ plays no role in a pointwise statement and is dropped.
  • Quantile. qqq is pinned by N(0,1){y:y2≤q}=1−α\mathcal N(0,1)\{y:y^2\le q\}=1-\alphaN(0,1){y:y2≤q}=1−α, which determines it uniquely. The radius q/(2n)q/(2n)q/(2n) is passed as ρ=q/2\rho=q/2ρ=q/2 to the published GenEmpLik.Expansion.robustMean, whose ball has radius ρ/n\rho/nρ/n.
  • Values. Z‾n\overline Z_nZn​ is robustMean burg (q/2); Z‾n\underline Z_nZ​n​ is robustLower burg (q/2) from the frozen shared EmpiricalDRO.Coverage.Setting module, a real infimum over the same published ball (PhiDivRobust.Counterpart.probUncertaintySet). For n≥1n\ge1n≥1 the value sets are nonempty and bounded, so the real sSup/sInf are the attained maximum and minimum.
  • Divergence. burg is valued in EReal with +∞+\infty+∞ for t≤0t\le0t≤0, so a zero weight is excluded from the ball by an infinite divergence and never by a junk value of Real.log. The dual summand dualTerm is EReal-valued with the printed conventions: +∞+\infty+∞ for t≥λ>0t\ge\lambda>0t≥λ>0; 000 or +∞+\infty+∞ at λ=0\lambda=0λ=0.
  • Generalizations, disclosed. The deterministic milestones hold for every data vector; (76) is stated for every q>0q>0q>0 (the Slater point needs q>0q>0q>0), (77) for every λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 satisfying the hypothesis, and the uniform-weight bound for every radius ρ≥0\rho\ge0ρ≥0. In the goal, positive variance and the value of α\alphaα are kept as printed although the conclusion does not need them.
  • Ruled out. Junk logarithms at zero weights, a junk sSup/sInf of an empty value set, a free radius detached from the χ12\chi^2_1χ12​ quantile, and a dropped variance condition are all excluded by the encoding above. The paper's printed (75) writes Z‾n(x)\overline Z_n(x)Zn​(x) where its radius qn/(2n)q_n/(2n)qn​/(2n) makes it Z‾n∗(x)\overline Z^*_n(x)Zn∗​(x); at a single decision the two coincide.
  • Not posed. The paper's headline result, Theorem 4 (uniform coverage over Θ\ThetaΘ with a χ2\chi^2χ2-process quantile qnq_nqn​), and the uniform statements Theorems 5–7 need Donsker and Glivenko–Cantelli classes, weak convergence in ℓ∞(Θ)\ell^\infty(\Theta)ℓ∞(Θ) and conditional quantiles of Gaussian-process suprema, none of which has library support yet; they are left out.
  • Reuse. Lemma 3 for nonnegative variables is the proved platform theorem NumStochOpt.ListScheduling.lemma_8_1_i_max_over_sqrt_ae, included as a reference. Mathlib's ProbabilityTheory.strong_law_ae supplies the laws of large numbers. Contributions welcome: the duality (76) for general ϕ\phiϕ-divergence balls, and the deterministic bound (77).

Selected references

  • H. Lam, Recovering Best Statistical Guarantees via the Empirical Divergence-Based Distributionally Robust Optimization, arXiv:1605.09349v1, 2016; Operations Research 67(4), 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.09349v1 , https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1786
  • A. B. Owen, Empirical Likelihood, Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1201/9781420036152
  • A. Ben-Tal, D. den Hertog, A. De Waegenaere, B. Melenberg, G. Rennen, Robust solutions of optimization problems affected by uncertain probabilities, Management Science 59(2), 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1641
  • J. C. Duchi, P. W. Glynn, H. Namkoong, Statistics of robust optimization: a generalized empirical likelihood approach, Mathematics of Operations Research 46(3), 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.03425
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Stochastic First- and Zeroth-Order Methods for Nonconvex Stochastic Programming 2: The Randomized Stochastic Gradient-Free Method with Gaussian Smoothing Bounds (1/L)E‖∇f(x_R)‖² for Nonconvex fResearch Paper

Motivation

Many optimization problems in simulation-based design, reinforcement learning and machine learning can be evaluated but not differentiated. Their objective is an expectation f(x)=E[F(x,ξ)]f(x) = \mathbb E[F(x,\xi)]f(x)=E[F(x,ξ)] that can only be sampled through noisy function values F(x,ξ)F(x,\xi)F(x,ξ). Gradients may be unavailable because the model is a black box, a simulator, or a legacy code. Methods for this setting are called zeroth-order or derivative-free stochastic methods. The objective fff is often nonconvex, so the realistic target is an approximately stationary point, ∥∇f(x)∥2≤ϵ\|\nabla f(x)\|^2 \le \epsilon∥∇f(x)∥2≤ϵ, not a global minimizer.

Ghadimi and Lan (arXiv:1309.5549; SIAM J. Optim. 23(4), 2013) gave the first complexity bounds for stochastic zeroth-order methods on nonconvex problems. Their randomized stochastic gradient free (RSGF) method combines two ingredients. The first is the Gaussian smoothing and random finite-difference estimator of Nesterov and Spokoiny (Found. Comput. Math. 17, 2017; preprint 2011). The second is a randomized stopping rule that outputs an iterate chosen at random along the trajectory. The resulting bound has become the standard reference point for derivative-free nonconvex stochastic optimization.

Timeline:

  • 1952: Kiefer and Wolfowitz introduce finite-difference stochastic approximation.
  • 2011: Nesterov and Spokoiny analyze Gaussian random gradient-free oracles for convex and deterministic nonconvex problems.
  • 2013: Ghadimi and Lan prove the nonconvex stochastic rate of the RSGF method (Theorem 3.2) and its O(n/ϵ2)O(n/\epsilon^2)O(n/ϵ2) complexity (Corollary 3.3).

Setting

Let Rn\mathbb R^nRn be Euclidean space and let ξ\xiξ be a random vector with distribution PPP on a measurable space Ξ\XiΞ. The problem is

f∗:=inf⁡x∈Rn{f(x):=∫ΞF(x,ξ) dP(ξ)}.(3.1)f^* := \inf_{x\in\mathbb R^n}\Big\{ f(x) := \int_\Xi F(x,\xi)\,dP(\xi) \Big\}. \tag{3.1}f∗:=x∈Rninf​{f(x):=∫Ξ​F(x,ξ)dP(ξ)}.(3.1)

The sample functions F(⋅,ξ)F(\cdot,\xi)F(⋅,ξ) lie in CL1,1(Rn)\mathcal C^{1,1}_L(\mathbb R^n)CL1,1​(Rn) almost surely: they are differentiable, and their gradients are LLL-Lipschitz. Two assumptions describe the noise. Assumption A1 concerns the first-order oracle G(x,ξ)=∇xF(x,ξ)G(x,\xi) = \nabla_x F(x,\xi)G(x,ξ)=∇x​F(x,ξ): it is unbiased, E[G(x,ξ)]=∇f(x)\mathbb E[G(x,\xi)] = \nabla f(x)E[G(x,ξ)]=∇f(x), and has variance at most σ2\sigma^2σ2. Assumption A3 says the zeroth-order oracle is unbiased, E[F(x,ξ)]=f(x)\mathbb E[F(x,\xi)] = f(x)E[F(x,ξ)]=f(x).

For a smoothing parameter μ>0\mu > 0μ>0 and an nnn-dimensional standard Gaussian vector uuu, the Gaussian smoothing of fff is fμ(x)=Eu[f(x+μu)]f_\mu(x) = \mathbb E_u[f(x+\mu u)]fμ​(x)=Eu​[f(x+μu)] (3.3). The RSGF method starts from x1x_1x1​ and uses stepsizes γk\gamma_kγk​. At step kkk it draws a fresh sample ξk\xi_kξk​ and a fresh Gaussian direction uku_kuk​, forms the zeroth-order estimator

Gμ(xk,ξk,uk)=F(xk+μuk,ξk)−F(xk,ξk)μ uk,(3.12)G_\mu(x_k,\xi_k,u_k) = \frac{F(x_k+\mu u_k,\xi_k) - F(x_k,\xi_k)}{\mu}\,u_k, \tag{3.12}Gμ​(xk​,ξk​,uk​)=μF(xk​+μuk​,ξk​)−F(xk​,ξk​)​uk​,(3.12)

and sets xk+1=xk−γkGμ(xk,ξk,uk)x_{k+1} = x_k - \gamma_k G_\mu(x_k,\xi_k,u_k)xk+1​=xk​−γk​Gμ​(xk​,ξk​,uk​) (3.13). The output is xRx_RxR​, where the random iteration count R∈{1,…,N}R \in \{1,\dots,N\}R∈{1,…,N} has the probability mass function

PR(k)=γk−2L(n+4)γk2∑j=1N[γj−2L(n+4)γj2].(3.15)P_R(k) = \frac{\gamma_k - 2L(n+4)\gamma_k^2}{\sum_{j=1}^N[\gamma_j - 2L(n+4)\gamma_j^2]}. \tag{3.15}PR​(k)=∑j=1N​[γj​−2L(n+4)γj2​]γk​−2L(n+4)γk2​​.(3.15)

In the Lean development, fff is objective P F, GμG_\muGμ​ is szoGrad (the published RandomGradFree.Shared.oracle applied to F(⋅,ξ)F(\cdot,\xi)F(⋅,ξ)), and fμf_\mufμ​ is the published RandomGradFree.Shared.smoothing. The smoothing parameter is μs, because μ names the probability measure.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2 a)

Let 0<γk<1/[2(n+4)L]0 < \gamma_k < 1/[2(n+4)L]0<γk​<1/[2(n+4)L] for k=1,…,Nk = 1,\dots,Nk=1,…,N, with N≥1N \ge 1N≥1, and let Df2=2(f(x1)−f∗)/LD_f^2 = 2(f(x_1)-f^*)/LDf2​=2(f(x1​)−f∗)/L. Then

1L E∥∇f(xR)∥2≤Df2+2μ2(n+4)(1+L(n+4)2∑k=1N(γk4+Lγk2))+2(n+4)σ2∑k=1Nγk2∑k=1N[γk−2L(n+4)γk2].(3.16)\frac1L\,\mathbb E\|\nabla f(x_R)\|^2 \le \frac{D_f^2 + 2\mu^2(n+4)\big(1 + L(n+4)^2\sum_{k=1}^N(\frac{\gamma_k}{4} + L\gamma_k^2)\big) + 2(n+4)\sigma^2\sum_{k=1}^N\gamma_k^2}{\sum_{k=1}^N[\gamma_k - 2L(n+4)\gamma_k^2]}. \tag{3.16}L1​E∥∇f(xR​)∥2≤∑k=1N​[γk​−2L(n+4)γk2​]Df2​+2μ2(n+4)(1+L(n+4)2∑k=1N​(4γk​​+Lγk2​))+2(n+4)σ2∑k=1N​γk2​​.(3.16)

The stepsizes are left free, so every stepsize policy specializes the goal.

Companions

  • Theorem 3.2 b), (3.17): for convex fff with a minimizer x∗x^*x∗, the bound on E[f(xR)−f∗]\mathbb E[f(x_R) - f^*]E[f(xR​)−f∗].
  • Corollary 3.3, (3.26): for the constant stepsizes (3.24) and μ≤Df/((n+4)2N)\mu \le D_f/((n+4)\sqrt{2N})μ≤Df​/((n+4)2N​),
1L E∥∇f(xR)∥2≤12(n+4)LDf2N+4σn+4N(D~+Df2D~).\frac1L\,\mathbb E\|\nabla f(x_R)\|^2 \le \frac{12(n+4)LD_f^2}{N} + \frac{4\sigma\sqrt{n+4}}{\sqrt N}\Big(\tilde D + \frac{D_f^2}{\tilde D}\Big).L1​E∥∇f(xR​)∥2≤N12(n+4)LDf2​​+N​4σn+4​​(D~+D~Df2​​).

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's proof.

  • Properties of the smoothing. These are Theorem 3.1 a)–c): fμf_\mufμ​ has an LLL-Lipschitz gradient given by (3.4), ∣fμ−f∣≤μ22Ln|f_\mu - f| \le \frac{\mu^2}{2}Ln∣fμ​−f∣≤2μ2​Ln (3.5), the gradient bound (3.6), and the second-moment bound (3.7). Three of these are already on the platform and are referenced. Two consequences follow, (3.9) and (3.11).
  • Unbiasedness, (3.14): the estimator GμG_\muGμ​ is unbiased for ∇fμ\nabla f_\mu∇fμ​.
  • The proof chain of Theorem 3.2. The pathwise descent inequality (3.19), the martingale identity (3.20) and the conditional second-moment bound (3.21) combine into the weighted bound (3.23). The RRR-weighting identity converts (3.23) into (3.16).

Significance

The theorem shows that function values alone suffice to find approximately stationary points of nonconvex stochastic programs. The price is a factor of the dimension nnn: with constant stepsizes the RSGF method needs O(n/ϵ2)O(n/\epsilon^2)O(n/ϵ2) iterations, against O(1/ϵ2)O(1/\epsilon^2)O(1/ϵ2) for the first-order RSG method. The randomized output rule and the analysis through fμf_\mufμ​ are reused in later zeroth-order methods, including two-phase variants, mirror-descent variants and variance-reduced schemes.

The result is proved in the paper. It is not formalized anywhere known to this mission. The platform already holds parts of the Gaussian-smoothing theory from the Nesterov–Spokoiny series, but only for convex problems with exact function values. This mission adds:

  • the nonconvex form of the second-moment bound (3.7);
  • the gradient-approximation bound (3.6);
  • the stochastic sampling model with conditional expectations;
  • the first machine-checkable statement of a nonconvex stochastic zeroth-order rate.

Difficulty

The first idea is to treat the RSGF method as the first-order RSG method run on fμf_\mufμ​ with the unbiased estimator GμG_\muGμ​, and to quote the RSG bound. This fails, because the variance E∥Gμ−∇fμ∥2\mathbb E\|G_\mu - \nabla f_\mu\|^2E∥Gμ​−∇fμ​∥2 has no uniform bound: by (3.7) it grows with ∥∇f(xk)∥2\|\nabla f(x_k)\|^2∥∇f(xk​)∥2 at the random iterate. The analysis has to carry that term along and absorb it into the left side, which is where the weights γk−2L(n+4)γk2\gamma_k - 2L(n+4)\gamma_k^2γk​−2L(n+4)γk2​ come from. It must also move between ∇fμ\nabla f_\mu∇fμ​ and ∇f\nabla f∇f through (3.6) at a cost polynomial in nnn.

On the formal side, three obstacles stand out.

  • The Gaussian moment estimates behind (3.6) and (3.7) need bounds on E∥u∥p\mathbb E\|u\|^pE∥u∥p up to p=6p = 6p=6 for a standard Gaussian vector.
  • Conditional expectations with respect to σ(ζ[k−1])\sigma(\zeta_{[k-1]})σ(ζ[k−1]​) are taken at random iterates that depend on the past, so independence of the fresh samples must be used carefully.
  • Integrability must be established for every quantity before expectations can be manipulated.

Formalization scope

  • Space. Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n). The constants (n+3)(n+3)(n+3), (n+4)(n+4)(n+4), (n+6)(n+6)(n+6) use the same natural number nnn. The Gaussian is Mathlib's stdGaussian.
  • Iterates. They are indexed from 111, and RRR takes values in {1,…,N}\{1,\dots,N\}{1,…,N}.
  • Optimal values. f∗f^*f∗ is the infimum of fff (IsGLB), with fff bounded below. The paper's fμ∗:=min⁡fμf^*_\mu := \min f_\mufμ∗​:=minfμ​ (3.10) is read as an infimum, since the minimum need not be attained.
  • Smoothness. F(⋅,ξ)∈CL1,1F(\cdot,\xi) \in \mathcal C^{1,1}_LF(⋅,ξ)∈CL1,1​ is required for PPP-almost every ξ\xiξ, as on the page.
  • Assumption A1 is stated at every point xxx for G=∇xFG = \nabla_x FG=∇x​F.
  • Assumption A3 is the definition of fff, with F(x,⋅)F(x,\cdot)F(x,⋅) integrable.

The following are explicit additions; the paper leaves them implicit.

  • Sampling. The samples ξk∼P\xi_k \sim Pξk​∼P and uk∼N(0,In)u_k \sim \mathcal N(0,I_n)uk​∼N(0,In​) are measurable and mutually independent, and RRR is independent of all of them.
  • Measurability and integrability. FFF is jointly measurable, and ∇xF(x,⋅)\nabla_x F(x,\cdot)∇x​F(x,⋅) is integrable.
  • Stepsizes are positive.
  • Corollary 3.3 assumes σ>0\sigma > 0σ>0.

Every conclusion about an expectation also asserts the integrability of its integrand. A non-integrable function has Lean integral 000, so a bound without this conjunct could hold for the wrong reason.

The goal is stated about the objects of the method only: FFF, PPP, fff, the run (3.12)–(3.13), RRR and the constants. It does not mention fμf_\mufμ​, Δk\Delta_kΔk​ or the filtration, so it cannot be discharged by choosing an auxiliary object.

A complete development needs:

  • Gaussian moment bounds and differentiation under the Gaussian integral;
  • conditional expectation with respect to the natural filtration of an independent sequence;
  • the descent lemma for CL1,1\mathcal C^{1,1}_LCL1,1​ functions.

The Gaussian-smoothing lemmas (3.6), (3.7) and (3.9) are reusable by any zeroth-order mission. Contributions of proofs of individual milestones are welcome, as are alternative proofs of (3.7) without Nesterov's bound.

Selected references

  • S. Ghadimi and G. Lan, Stochastic first- and zeroth-order methods for nonconvex stochastic programming, SIAM J. Optim. 23(4):2341–2368, 2013. Preprint arXiv:1309.5549v1, the version cited here. https://arxiv.org/abs/1309.5549
  • Y. Nesterov and V. Spokoiny, Random gradient-free minimization of convex functions, Found. Comput. Math. 17:527–566, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10208-015-9296-2
  • J. Kiefer and J. Wolfowitz, Stochastic estimation of the maximum of a regression function, Ann. Math. Statist. 23(3):462–466, 1952. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177729392
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and Other Fixed Points 3: In Every Nash Equilibrium of Bubelis's Gadget the Primary Player Plays 0 with Probability α, the Unique Root of f in [0, 1]Research Paper

Motivation

For games with three or more players, Nash equilibria can be irrational, so they cannot in general be computed exactly. Bubelis made this precise: any real root of any univariate polynomial arises as the probability of a particular strategy, or the payoff of a particular player, in a Nash equilibrium of a three-player game whose payoffs depend on the coefficients of the polynomial (Bubelis 1979).

Etessami and Yannakakis (SIAM J. Comput. 39 (2010)) restate Bubelis's construction as Lemma 7, in a form that controls the equilibrium probabilities rather than a payoff, and that guarantees the equilibrium is unique. They use it, for linear polynomials, as the single gadget behind every arithmetic operation in their reduction from PosSLP and SQRT-SUM to deciding properties of the unique Nash equilibrium of a three- or four-player game (their Theorem 4). The uniqueness clause is what makes the composed game itself have a unique equilibrium.

  • 1951: Nash proves every finite game has an equilibrium in mixed strategies.
  • 1979: Bubelis shows that every real algebraic number is an equilibrium probability or payoff of some three-player game (Theorem 2 of the cited paper).
  • 2007–2010: Etessami and Yannakakis restate the construction as Lemma 7, with uniqueness and full support of the equilibrium, and use it to prove PosSLP- and SQRT-SUM-hardness of Nash equilibrium problems (FOCS 2007; journal version 2010).

Setting

Fix an integer m≥0m \ge 0m≥0 and real coefficients c0,…,cmc_0, \dots, c_mc0​,…,cm​, and let

f(x)=c0xm+c1xm−1+⋯+cm=∑j=0mcj xm−j,f(x) = c_0 x^m + c_1 x^{m-1} + \dots + c_m = \sum_{j=0}^m c_j\, x^{m-j},f(x)=c0​xm+c1​xm−1+⋯+cm​=j=0∑m​cj​xm−j,

so cjc_jcj​ is the coefficient of xm−jx^{m-j}xm−j; the leading coefficient may vanish.

The gadget GfG_fGf​ is a game with three players. The primary player 1 has the strategies 0,10, 10,1; the auxiliary players 2 and 3 each have the strategies 0,1,…,m0, 1, \dots, m0,1,…,m. For a pure profile s=(s1,s2,s3)s = (s_1, s_2, s_3)s=(s1​,s2​,s3​), and with χ(P)\chi(P)χ(P) the indicator of a predicate PPP, the payoffs are

h1f(s)={cs2s1=10s1=0,h2(s)=χ(s2=s3),h^f_1(s) = \begin{cases} c_{s_2} & s_1 = 1 \\ 0 & s_1 = 0 \end{cases}, \qquad h_2(s) = \chi(s_2 = s_3),h1f​(s)={cs2​​0​s1​=1s1​=0​,h2​(s)=χ(s2​=s3​), h3(s)=χ(s2+1≡s3 mod (m+1))−χ(s1=0) χ(s2=s3)−χ(s1=1) χ(s3=0).h_3(s) = \chi\big(s_2 + 1 \equiv s_3 \bmod (m+1)\big) - \chi(s_1 = 0)\,\chi(s_2 = s_3) - \chi(s_1 = 1)\,\chi(s_3 = 0).h3​(s)=χ(s2​+1≡s3​mod(m+1))−χ(s1​=0)χ(s2​=s3​)−χ(s1​=1)χ(s3​=0).

The auxiliary payoffs do not depend on fff and take values in {0,1,−1}\{0, 1, -1\}{0,1,−1}.

A mixed profile x=(x1,x2,x3)x = (x_1, x_2, x_3)x=(x1​,x2​,x3​) assigns to each player ppp a probability vector xpx_pxp​ on its strategies; the players randomize independently. Player ppp's expected payoff up(x)u_p(x)up​(x) is the expectation of its payoff under the product distribution, and up((p:j);x−p)u_p((p:j); x_{-p})up​((p:j);x−p​) is its expected payoff when it switches to the pure strategy jjj. A Nash equilibrium is a mixed profile in which no player can raise its expected payoff by switching unilaterally to any other mixed strategy. A profile is fully mixed if every pure strategy of every player has positive probability. Throughout, ξ=x1(0)\xi = x_1(0)ξ=x1​(0), and v2v_2v2​, v3v_3v3​ are the equilibrium payoffs of players 2 and 3.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 7

Assume f(0)≤0f(0) \le 0f(0)≤0, f(1)≥0f(1) \ge 0f(1)≥0, and that fff has a unique root α\alphaα in [0,1][0,1][0,1]. Then every Nash equilibrium xxx of GfG_fGf​ satisfies

x1(0)=α,x1(1)=1−α,x_1(0) = \alpha, \qquad x_1(1) = 1 - \alpha,x1​(0)=α,x1​(1)=1−α,

and if α≠0\alpha \ne 0α=0 and α≠1\alpha \ne 1α=1, then GfG_fGf​ has exactly one Nash equilibrium, and it is fully mixed.

Milestones (proof of Lemma 7, p. 26)

  1. In any finite game, at a Nash equilibrium, up((p:j);x−p)≤up(x)u_p((p:j); x_{-p}) \le u_p(x)up​((p:j);x−p​)≤up​(x), with equality when xp(j)>0x_p(j) > 0xp​(j)>0.
  2. In every Nash equilibrium of GfG_fGf​: v2>0v_2 > 0v2​>0 and v3≥0v_3 \ge 0v3​≥0.
  3. In every Nash equilibrium of GfG_fGf​: x2(j)=ξm−j/∑i=0mξix_2(j) = \xi^{m-j} \big/ \sum_{i=0}^m \xi^ix2​(j)=ξm−j/∑i=0m​ξi for all jjj.
  4. In every Nash equilibrium of GfG_fGf​: u1((1:1);x−1)=f(ξ)/∑i=0mξiu_1((1:1); x_{-1}) = f(\xi) \big/ \sum_{i=0}^m \xi^iu1​((1:1);x−1​)=f(ξ)/∑i=0m​ξi.
  5. Under the hypotheses of Lemma 7 and α≠0\alpha \ne 0α=0: x3(j)=1/(m+1)x_3(j) = 1/(m+1)x3​(j)=1/(m+1) for all jjj.

Milestones 2–4 hold for every coefficient vector; only milestone 5 and the goal use the hypotheses on fff.

Significance

The lemma is the arithmetic engine of the hardness results of Etessami and Yannakakis: a polynomial equation in one unknown is solved, exactly and uniquely, by the equilibrium of a fixed-size game whose auxiliary payoffs do not depend on the equation. With fff linear, the gadget implements addition, multiplication and division of probabilities in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1); with higher degree it implements roots and fractional powers. Without the uniqueness clause, the composed games of Theorem 4 could have spurious equilibria, and the reduction would not apply to games promised to have a unique equilibrium.

The result is proved in the paper (pp. 25–26, following Bubelis). As far as is known, no part of it is machine-checked: there is no formal statement of Bubelis's gadget, and the support property of Nash equilibria is not on the platform in this vocabulary. This mission produces the first formal statement and proof of the gadget's equilibrium characterization, including the existence half of "has a unique Nash equilibrium", which the paper takes from Nash's theorem but which here is a concrete profile to check.

Difficulty

The gadget's equilibria are those of a three-player game, so the payoffs are cubic in the probabilities and no linear-programming argument applies. The obvious first idea, writing down the indifference conditions of players 2 and 3 and solving them, presupposes that every strategy of player 2 is played; nothing guarantees that in advance, and the profiles in which some strategies are unplayed have to be excluded. The boundary cases ξ=0\xi = 0ξ=0 and ξ=1\xi = 1ξ=1 are not covered by an indifference argument for the primary player and need the sign conditions f(0)≤0f(0) \le 0f(0)≤0 and f(1)≥0f(1) \ge 0f(1)≥0 separately. The strategy of player 3 is pinned down only when α≠0\alpha \neq 0α=0, which is why the uniqueness part of the lemma excludes the endpoints. Finally, existence of the equilibrium is part of the statement and cannot be delegated to Nash's theorem, which is not available on the platform.

Formalization scope

The game uses the published vocabulary agt_games (mixed profiles as weight functions, AGT.expectedPayoff, AGT.IsMixedNash with mixed deviations) and DGPNash.NashMap.purePayoff for up((p:j);x−p)u_p((p:j); x_{-p})up​((p:j);x−p​). The players are a three-element type primary | aux2 | aux3; strategies are Fin 2 and Fin (m+1), 0-based as on the page. The coefficients are c : Fin (m+1) → ℝ and fff is the explicit sum ∑jcjξm−j\sum_j c_j \xi^{m-j}∑j​cj​ξm−j with natural-number exponent; the congruence s2+1≡s3s_2 + 1 \equiv s_3s2​+1≡s3​ is addition in Fin (m+1); ξ0=1\xi^0 = 1ξ0=1 for every ξ\xiξ, including 000.

Explicit readings committed to:

  • "has a unique root α\alphaα in [0,1][0,1][0,1]" is a named α\alphaα with 0≤α≤10 \le \alpha \le 10≤α≤1, f(α)=0f(\alpha) = 0f(α)=0, and β=α\beta = \alphaβ=α for every root β∈[0,1]\beta \in [0,1]β∈[0,1];
  • "the game has a unique Nash equilibrium" is existence and uniqueness (∃! over mixed profiles);
  • "the NE is fully mixed" applies to all three players;
  • coefficients are real, generalizing the paper's rationals; the degree is at most mmm;
  • the support property is stated for an arbitrary finite game;
  • the last two clauses of Lemma 7 (auxiliary payoffs independent of fff, values in {0,1,−1}\{0,1,-1\}{0,1,−1}; primary payoff cs2c_{s_2}cs2​​ or 000) hold by the definition of the gadget and are not separate theorems.

The goal is not trivialized by a pure-strategy notion of equilibrium (deviations are mixed), by dropping uniqueness of the root (without it x1(0)=αx_1(0) = \alphax1​(0)=α is false), or by reading "unique equilibrium" as uniqueness alone. For m=0m = 0m=0 the hypotheses cannot hold, as on the page.

A complete development needs the support property (reusable for any finite game), the linearity of expected payoff in one player's strategy, and finite-sum manipulations for the geometric weights ξm−j\xi^{m-j}ξm−j. Contributions of general lemmas about AGT.IsMixedNash and purePayoff are welcome and reusable well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • K. Etessami and M. Yannakakis, On the complexity of Nash equilibria and other fixed points, SIAM J. Comput. 39(6) (2010) 2531–2597 (author manuscript; Lemma 7, pp. 25–26). https://doi.org/10.1137/080720826
  • K. Etessami and M. Yannakakis, On the complexity of Nash equilibria and other fixed points (extended abstract), Proc. FOCS 2007. https://doi.org/10.1109/FOCS.2007.48
  • V. Bubelis, On equilibria in finite games, Int. J. Game Theory 8(2) (1979) 65–79. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01768703
  • J. Nash, Non-cooperative games, Ann. of Math. 54(2) (1951) 286–295. https://doi.org/10.2307/1969529
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AnalysisMathematical Physics·Captain: Lucas

Newton's Law of Universal Gravitation: the Shell TheoremTextbook

Motivation

Newton's law of universal gravitation states that any two point masses attract each other with a force proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of their distance. It is the first quantitative law of gravity (Newton, Principia, 1687) and it remains the working model of gravity in celestial mechanics, geophysics and engineering whenever relativistic effects are negligible.

The law is stated for point masses, while planets, moons and apples are extended bodies. Newton delayed publication for about twenty years because he could not prove that the Earth attracts external bodies as if all its mass were concentrated at its centre. The result that closes this gap is the shell theorem: a spherically symmetric distribution of mass exerts, on every external point, the same gravitational attraction as a point mass at its centre carrying the total mass; and mass located at radii larger than that of the test point exerts no net force at all.

Timeline (as described in the source):

  • c. 1666: Newton applies the inverse-square law to the orbit of the Moon, assuming — without proof — that the Earth acts as a point mass.
  • 1687: Principia published, including the proof of the shell theorem (Book I, Proposition 75, Theorem 35).
  • 1798: Cavendish experiment, the first laboratory test of gravitation between masses.

Setting

Space is E3=R3\mathbb{E}^3 = \mathbb{R}^3E3=R3 with the Euclidean norm. The gravitational constant is G=6.67430×10−11G = 6.67430\times10^{-11}G=6.67430×10−11.

  • Point force. A body of mass m1m_1m1​ at r1r_1r1​ exerts on a body of mass m2m_2m2​ at r2r_2r2​ the force
F21=−Gm1m2∥r21∥2 r^21,r21=r2−r1,r^21=r21∥r21∥.F_{21} = -\frac{G m_1 m_2}{\|r_{21}\|^2}\,\hat r_{21},\qquad r_{21}=r_2-r_1,\quad \hat r_{21} = \frac{r_{21}}{\|r_{21}\|}.F21​=−∥r21​∥2Gm1​m2​​r^21​,r21​=r2​−r1​,r^21​=∥r21​∥r21​​.
  • Point field and potential. A point mass MMM at ccc produces the field g(x)=−GM∥x−c∥3(x−c)g(x) = -\frac{GM}{\|x-c\|^3}(x-c)g(x)=−∥x−c∥3GM​(x−c) and the potential V(x)=−GM∥x−c∥V(x) = -\frac{GM}{\|x-c\|}V(x)=−∥x−c∥GM​.
  • Mass distributions. An extended body is a (finite, Borel) measure μ\muμ on E3\mathbb{E}^3E3; μ(A)\mu(A)μ(A) is the mass contained in the region AAA. Its gravitational field is the superposition of the point fields of its elements,
gμ(x)=∫E3−G∥x−y∥3 (x−y) dμ(y).g_\mu(x) = \int_{\mathbb{E}^3} -\frac{G}{\|x-y\|^3}\,(x-y)\,d\mu(y).gμ​(x)=∫E3​−∥x−y∥3G​(x−y)dμ(y).
  • Spherical symmetry. μ\muμ is spherically symmetric (about the origin) if μ\muμ is invariant under every linear isometry of E3\mathbb{E}^3E3 (every rotation and reflection fixing 000).
  • Model bodies. The uniform shell σM,a\sigma_{M,a}σM,a​ of mass MMM and radius aaa (normalised surface measure on the sphere ∥y∥=a\|y\| = a∥y∥=a) and the uniform solid ball βM,R\beta_{M,R}βM,R​ of mass MMM and radius RRR (normalised Lebesgue measure on ∥y∥<R\|y\|<R∥y∥<R).

Formalization targets

Goal: shell theorem, exterior part

If μ\muμ is a finite, spherically symmetric mass distribution carried by the closed ball ∥y∥≤R\|y\|\le R∥y∥≤R, then for every xxx with ∥x∥>R\|x\|>R∥x∥>R,

gμ(x)=−G μ(E3)∥x∥3 x.g_\mu(x) = -\frac{G\,\mu(\mathbb{E}^3)}{\|x\|^3}\,x .gμ​(x)=−∥x∥3Gμ(E3)​x.

Milestones

  1. Vector form: F12=−F21F_{12} = -F_{21}F12​=−F21​, and ∥F21∥=Gm1m2/∥r2−r1∥2\|F_{21}\| = G m_1 m_2/\|r_2-r_1\|^2∥F21​∥=Gm1​m2​/∥r2​−r1​∥2.
  2. Field form: F21=m2 g(r2)F_{21} = m_2\, g(r_2)F21​=m2​g(r2​) where ggg is the field of m1m_1m1​ at r1r_1r1​; the field is conservative, g=−∇Vg = -\nabla Vg=−∇V.
  3. Shell theorem, interior part: mass at radii larger than ∥x∥\|x\|∥x∥ exerts no net field at xxx; more precisely, the field at xxx equals that of the mass enclosed in the ball of radius ∥x∥\|x\|∥x∥, concentrated at the centre.
  4. Hollow sphere: g=0g = 0g=0 inside, g=g = g= point field of MMM outside.
  5. Uniform solid sphere: g(x)=−GMR3xg(x) = -\frac{GM}{R^3}xg(x)=−R3GM​x inside, point field of MMM for ∥x∥≥R\|x\|\ge R∥x∥≥R.

Significance

The shell theorem is what licenses treating the Sun, planets and moons as point masses in the nnn-body problem and in Kepler orbit computations, and it gives the linear growth of the gravitational field inside a uniform planet. The interior statement ("no net force inside a hollow shell") has an exact analogue in electrostatics (Coulomb's law is also inverse-square).

The results are classical and fully proved on paper. This mission asks for machine-checked proofs, together with the reusable infrastructure they require: vector-valued integrals against rotation-invariant measures, the surface measure of the sphere, and the Newtonian kernel x/∥x∥3x/\|x\|^3x/∥x∥3.

Difficulty

Newton's argument (or the modern one via Gauss's law) is geometric: slice the shell into rings, or apply the divergence theorem to a sphere. Neither is directly available: Mathlib has no divergence theorem on spheres in the required form, and the ring-slicing computation requires explicit spherical coordinates for a surface measure that is defined abstractly. Using symmetry alone shows the field is radial, but its magnitude requires an actual computation of a singular integral (for the interior of a solid ball the integrand is unbounded).

Formalization scope

  • Space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin 3). Mass distributions are Measures; the field is a Bochner integral. Because a non-integrable Bochner integral is defined to be 000, statements where integrability is not automatic either carry an explicit integrability hypothesis or are placed where the integrand is bounded (test point strictly outside the support).
  • Spherical symmetry is invariance under all linear isometries (Space ≃ₗᵢ[ℝ] Space), centred at the origin.
  • Masses of model bodies are nonnegative reals (NNReal); radii are assumed strictly positive.
  • The uniform shell uses Mathlib's Measure.toSphere (surface measure on the unit sphere) pushed forward by scaling.
  • Units are not modelled; GGG is the real number 6.67430×10−116.67430\times10^{-11}6.67430×10−11.

Contributions welcome: a general "radial field" lemma from spherical symmetry, the computation of the field of a uniform shell, and the disintegration of a spherically symmetric measure into shells.

Selected references

  • Wikipedia, Newton's law of universal gravitation, revision 1370960529. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Newton%27s_law_of_universal_gravitation&oldid=1370960529
  • I. Newton, The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, transl. I. B. Cohen and A. Whitman, University of California Press, 1999 — Book I, Proposition 75, Theorem 35.
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Operations ResearchOptimal TransportOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Computational Optimal Transport II: For a Distance Matrix D and p ≥ 1, W_p(a, b) = L_{D^p}(a, b)^{1/p} Is a Distance on the Probability SimplexTextbook

Motivation

Comparing histograms is a basic operation in statistics, computer vision and machine learning: a bag of image descriptors, a word-frequency vector, a discretized density. When the bins carry a geometry (colors that are close to one another, words with related meanings), a comparison that ignores the geometry, such as an ℓp\ell^pℓp norm between the histogram vectors, treats a small shift of mass to a neighboring bin as severely as a shift to a distant bin. Optimal transport compares two histograms by the cheapest way to move one onto the other, with costs read off a ground distance between bins. Rubner, Tomasi and Guibas introduced it to image retrieval as the earth mover's distance (Rubner et al. 2000), and it has since been used for document classification (Kusner et al. 2015) and as a training loss (Frogner et al. 2015).

These uses rely on the transport cost being a distance, so that nearest-neighbor search, clustering and the geometry of the space of histograms behave as expected. This mission formalizes the statement that it is one: Proposition 2.2 of Peyré and Cuturi, Computational Optimal Transport (2019), the discrete form of the classical fact that the ppp-Wasserstein distance is a metric (Villani 2003, Theorem 7.3).

Setting

Fix n≥1n\ge1n≥1 and write [ ⁣[n] ⁣]={1,…,n}[\![n]\!]=\{1,\dots,n\}[[n]]={1,…,n}. The probability simplex is

Σn={a∈R+n:∑i=1nai=1};\Sigma_n=\Big\{a\in\mathbb R^n_+ : \textstyle\sum_{i=1}^n a_i=1\Big\};Σn​={a∈R+n​:∑i=1n​ai​=1};

its elements are histograms. For a,b∈Σna,b\in\Sigma_na,b∈Σn​ the set of couplings (2.10) is

U(a,b)={P∈R+n×n:P1n=a, P⊤1n=b},U(a,b)=\{P\in\mathbb R^{n\times n}_+ : P\mathbb 1_n=a,\ P^{\top}\mathbb 1_n=b\},U(a,b)={P∈R+n×n​:P1n​=a, P⊤1n​=b},

the nonnegative matrices with row sums aaa and column sums bbb; Pi,jP_{i,j}Pi,j​ is the mass sent from bin iii to bin jjj. For a cost matrix CCC, the Kantorovich problem (2.11) is

LC(a,b)=min⁡P∈U(a,b)⟨C,P⟩,⟨C,P⟩=∑i,jCi,jPi,j.L_C(a,b)=\min_{P\in U(a,b)}\langle C,P\rangle,\qquad \langle C,P\rangle=\sum_{i,j}C_{i,j}P_{i,j}.LC​(a,b)=P∈U(a,b)min​⟨C,P⟩,⟨C,P⟩=i,j∑​Ci,j​Pi,j​.

A matrix D∈R+n×nD\in\mathbb R^{n\times n}_+D∈R+n×n​ is a distance on [ ⁣[n] ⁣][\![n]\!][[n]] if it is symmetric, Di,j=0D_{i,j}=0Di,j​=0 exactly when i=ji=ji=j, and Di,k≤Di,j+Dj,kD_{i,k}\le D_{i,j}+D_{j,k}Di,k​≤Di,j​+Dj,k​ for all i,j,ki,j,ki,j,k. For p≥1p\ge1p≥1, write Dp=(Di,jp)i,jD^p=(D_{i,j}^p)_{i,j}Dp=(Di,jp​)i,j​ for the entrywise power. The ppp-Wasserstein distance (2.17) is

Wp(a,b)=LDp(a,b)1/p.\mathrm W_p(a,b)=L_{D^p}(a,b)^{1/p}.Wp​(a,b)=LDp​(a,b)1/p.

In the Lean development these are couplings a b, frob C P, otCost C a b, powCost D p and W D p a b in the namespace CompOT.Metric.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2.2 (p. 377)

For a distance matrix DDD and p≥1p\ge1p≥1, for all a,b,c∈Σna,b,c\in\Sigma_na,b,c∈Σn​,

Wp(a,b)=Wp(b,a),Wp(a,b)≥0,Wp(a,b)=0  ⟺  a=b,Wp(a,c)≤Wp(a,b)+Wp(b,c).\mathrm W_p(a,b)=\mathrm W_p(b,a),\quad \mathrm W_p(a,b)\ge0,\quad \mathrm W_p(a,b)=0\iff a=b,\quad \mathrm W_p(a,c)\le\mathrm W_p(a,b)+\mathrm W_p(b,c).Wp​(a,b)=Wp​(b,a),Wp​(a,b)≥0,Wp​(a,b)=0⟺a=b,Wp​(a,c)≤Wp​(a,b)+Wp​(b,c).

Milestones, from the book's proof (pp. 377–379)

  1. diag(a)\mathrm{diag}(a)diag(a) is an optimal coupling in U(a,a)U(a,a)U(a,a) for DpD^pDp and Wp(a,a)=0\mathrm W_p(a,a)=0Wp​(a,a)=0.
  2. If a≠ba\ne ba=b, every P∈U(a,b)P\in U(a,b)P∈U(a,b) has Pi,j≠0P_{i,j}\ne0Pi,j​=0 for some i≠ji\ne ji=j.
  3. If a≠ba\ne ba=b, then Wp(a,b)>0\mathrm W_p(a,b)>0Wp​(a,b)>0.
  4. Wp(a,b)=Wp(b,a)\mathrm W_p(a,b)=\mathrm W_p(b,a)Wp​(a,b)=Wp​(b,a).
  5. Gluing. With b~j=bj\tilde b_j=b_jb~j​=bj​ if bj>0b_j>0bj​>0 and b~j=1\tilde b_j=1b~j​=1 otherwise, for P∈U(a,b)P\in U(a,b)P∈U(a,b) and Q∈U(b,c)Q\in U(b,c)Q∈U(b,c),
S=P diag(1/b~) Q∈U(a,c).S=P\,\mathrm{diag}(1/\tilde b)\,Q\in U(a,c).S=Pdiag(1/b~)Q∈U(a,c).
  1. Minkowski chain. For the same P,Q,SP,Q,SP,Q,S,
⟨S,Dp⟩1/p≤⟨P,Dp⟩1/p+⟨Q,Dp⟩1/p.\langle S,D^p\rangle^{1/p}\le\langle P,D^p\rangle^{1/p}+\langle Q,D^p\rangle^{1/p}.⟨S,Dp⟩1/p≤⟨P,Dp⟩1/p+⟨Q,Dp⟩1/p.

The case p=1p=1p=1 of the goal's attainment and triangle inequality is already proved on the platform, in another encoding (couplings as functions on V×VV\times VV×V for a finite metric space VVV): MarkovMixing.transport_metric, included here as a reference item. The goal for general p≥1p\ge1p≥1 is new.

Significance

The result. Proposition 2.2 makes (Σn,Wp)(\Sigma_n,\mathrm W_p)(Σn​,Wp​) a metric space whose metric depends on the ground distance DDD. This is what entitles later chapters of the book to speak of Wasserstein barycenters, geodesics and Lipschitz properties of the transport cost, and it underlies the use of Wp\mathrm W_pWp​ as a loss or a retrieval distance. Remark 2.15 of the same page records that for 0<p≤10<p\le10<p≤1 it is Wpp\mathrm W_p^pWpp​, not Wp\mathrm W_pWp​, that is a distance, so the restriction p≥1p\ge1p≥1 is substantive.

Formalizing it. The result is classical and fully proved in the book; it has not been machine-checked for general ppp in this discrete matrix form. The platform's p=1p=1p=1 result uses a different encoding of couplings, so this mission supplies the matrix-form transportation polytope U(a,b)U(a,b)U(a,b), the cost LCL_CLC​ and Wp\mathrm W_pWp​ shared with the other missions of this series, plus a discrete gluing lemma and a Minkowski step stated for arbitrary couplings, which are reusable in any finite transport argument.

Difficulty

Symmetry and definiteness are short once the minimum in LDpL_{D^p}LDp​ is known to be attained, which needs compactness of U(a,b)U(a,b)U(a,b); strict positivity for a≠ba\ne ba=b fails for an infimum that is not attained. The triangle inequality is the substantial part. The direct idea of composing the two transport plans as PQPQPQ does not give a coupling: the composition must be renormalized by the middle histogram bbb, and bbb may have zero entries, on which a naive 1/bj1/b_j1/bj​ is undefined. The renormalized matrix must then be shown to have the right marginals, which uses that Pi,j=0P_{i,j}=0Pi,j​=0 wherever bj=0b_j=0bj​=0. The final step needs Minkowski's inequality for weighted ℓp\ell^pℓp sums together with the triangle inequality of DDD and the monotonicity of t↦tpt\mapsto t^pt↦tp; for p<1p<1p<1 it fails.

Formalization scope

Indices [ ⁣[n] ⁣][\![n]\!][[n]] are Fin n (0-based). Histograms are Fin n → ℝ, matrices Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ, and Σn\Sigma_nΣn​ is Mathlib's stdSimplex ℝ (Fin n); histograms may have zero entries. LC(a,b)L_C(a,b)LC​(a,b) is a real infimum over the subtype U(a,b)U(a,b)U(a,b), and every theorem assumes the histograms lie in Σn\Sigma_nΣn​, where U(a,b)U(a,b)U(a,b) is nonempty (it contains ab⊤ab^{\top}ab⊤) and compact. That attainment is part of what a solver proves; it is not a hypothesis. The exponent ppp is a real number with p≥1p\ge1p≥1, and all powers are real powers. The book's "positive" is read as Wp≥0\mathrm W_p\ge0Wp​≥0; strict positivity is the clause Wp(a,b)=0  ⟺  a=b\mathrm W_p(a,b)=0\iff a=bWp​(a,b)=0⟺a=b. The hypotheses of the goal are exactly those of the page: Di,j≥0D_{i,j}\ge0Di,j​≥0, (i)–(iii), and p≥1p\ge1p≥1. The milestones carry the same setting, and milestones 5 and 6 are stated for all couplings instead of only optimal ones, since the proof does not use optimality there.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: without the simplex hypotheses U(a,b)U(a,b)U(a,b) can be empty and the real infimum would be 000, making "Wp(a,b)=0\mathrm W_p(a,b)=0Wp​(a,b)=0" true for unrelated histograms; and the four claims are stated about Wp\mathrm W_pWp​ itself, not about the glued coupling or about a minimum over a set assumed nonempty.

Needed infrastructure: compactness and nonemptiness of U(a,b)U(a,b)U(a,b) and attainment of LCL_CLC​; transposition of couplings; the gluing construction; Minkowski's inequality for finite weighted sums (Mathlib has Real.Lp_add_le and its weighted variants). Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are reusable lemmas on U(a,b)U(a,b)U(a,b).

Selected references

  • G. Peyré and M. Cuturi, Computational Optimal Transport, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 11(5–6):355–607, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1561/2200000073 (Proposition 2.2, p. 377).
  • C. Villani, Topics in Optimal Transportation, Graduate Studies in Mathematics 58, AMS, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1090/gsm/058
  • Y. Rubner, C. Tomasi and L. J. Guibas, The Earth Mover's Distance as a Metric for Image Retrieval, International Journal of Computer Vision 40(2):99–121, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026543900054
  • M. Kusner, Y. Sun, N. Kolkin and K. Weinberger, From Word Embeddings to Document Distances, ICML 2015. https://proceedings.mlr.press/v37/kusnerb15.html
  • C. Frogner, C. Zhang, H. Mobahi, M. Araya-Polo and T. Poggio, Learning with a Wasserstein Loss, NeurIPS 2015. https://arxiv.org/abs/1506.05439
  • D. A. Levin, Y. Peres and E. L. Wilmer, Markov Chains and Mixing Times, AMS, 2009, Lemma 14.3 (the p=1p=1p=1 case on the platform). https://doi.org/10.1090/mbk/058
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Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimal Transport+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Computational Optimal Transport III: Discrete Kantorovich Duality — L_C(a, b) Is the Maximum of ⟨f, a⟩ + ⟨g, b⟩ over Potentials with f ⊕ g ≤ CTextbook

Why discrete Kantorovich duality

Optimal transport between two histograms is a linear program: move mass aia_iai​ out of each source bin iii and deliver mass bjb_jbj​ to each target bin jjj at unit cost Ci,jC_{i,j}Ci,j​, as cheaply as possible. Its dual replaces the transport plan by a pair of price vectors and is the basis of most of the computational methods in G. Peyré and M. Cuturi's Computational Optimal Transport (Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning, 2019, doi:10.1561/2200000073): the dual ascent and Hungarian methods, the auction algorithm, the semi-discrete solvers of Chapter 5, and the dual reading of Sinkhorn's algorithm in Chapter 4. The book states the duality as Proposition 2.4 and derives it from linear programming strong duality (Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis, Introduction to Linear Optimization, 1997, Theorem 4.4). Remark 2.21 gives it an economic reading: a vendor sets a collection price fif_ifi​ at each warehouse and a delivery price gjg_jgj​ at each factory, and the best price the vendor can charge while staying below every shipping cost equals the optimal transport cost.

This is the third mission in a series on the book. It covers §2.5 (Dual Problem, pp. 382–385) and §3.1–3.3 (Kantorovich Linear Programs, C-Transforms, Complementary Slackness, pp. 400–405).

Setting

Indices run over ⟦n⟧={1,…,n}\llbracket n\rrbracket=\{1,\dots,n\}[[n]]={1,…,n} and ⟦m⟧\llbracket m\rrbracket[[m]]. A histogram is a vector in the probability simplex Σn={a∈R+n:∑iai=1}\Sigma_n=\{a\in\mathbb R^n_+ : \sum_i a_i = 1\}Σn​={a∈R+n​:∑i​ai​=1}. Fix a∈Σna\in\Sigma_na∈Σn​, b∈Σmb\in\Sigma_mb∈Σm​ and a cost matrix C∈Rn×mC\in\mathbb R^{n\times m}C∈Rn×m; no sign or metric condition is imposed on CCC.

  • The couplings (2.10) are U(a,b)={P∈R+n×m:P1m=a, PT1n=b}\mathbf U(a,b)=\{P\in\mathbb R_+^{n\times m}: P\mathbb 1_m=a,\ P^{\mathsf T}\mathbb 1_n=b\}U(a,b)={P∈R+n×m​:P1m​=a, PT1n​=b}.
  • The Kantorovich problem (2.11) is LC(a,b)=min⁡P∈U(a,b)⟨C,P⟩L_C(a,b)=\min_{P\in\mathbf U(a,b)}\langle C,P\rangleLC​(a,b)=minP∈U(a,b)​⟨C,P⟩, with ⟨C,P⟩=∑i,jCi,jPi,j\langle C,P\rangle=\sum_{i,j}C_{i,j}P_{i,j}⟨C,P⟩=∑i,j​Ci,j​Pi,j​.
  • The admissible dual variables (2.21) are R(C)={(f,g)∈Rn×Rm:fi+gj≤Ci,j ∀i,j}\mathbf R(C)=\{(f,g)\in\mathbb R^n\times\mathbb R^m : f_i+g_j\le C_{i,j}\ \forall i,j\}R(C)={(f,g)∈Rn×Rm:fi​+gj​≤Ci,j​ ∀i,j}, written f⊕g≤Cf\oplus g\le Cf⊕g≤C.
  • The CCC-transform of f∈Rnf\in\mathbb R^nf∈Rn is (fC)j=min⁡iCi,j−fi(f^C)_j=\min_i C_{i,j}-f_i(fC)j​=mini​Ci,j​−fi​, and the Cˉ\bar CCˉ-transform of g∈Rmg\in\mathbb R^mg∈Rm is (gCˉ)i=min⁡jCi,j−gj(g^{\bar C})_i=\min_j C_{i,j}-g_j(gCˉ)i​=minj​Ci,j​−gj​ (§3.2).
  • PPP and (f,g)(f,g)(f,g) are complementary w.r.t. CCC (Definition 3.1) if Ci,j=fi+gjC_{i,j}=f_i+g_jCi,j​=fi​+gj​ whenever Pi,j>0P_{i,j}>0Pi,j​>0.

In Lean these are couplings, frob, IsOptimalCoupling, dualFeasible, dualObj, IsDualOptimal, cTransform, cbarTransform and Complementary in the namespace CompOT.Duality.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2.4 (p. 382)

LC(a,b)=max⁡(f,g)∈R(C) ⟨f,a⟩+⟨g,b⟩.L_C(a,b)=\max_{(f,g)\in\mathbf R(C)}\ \langle f,a\rangle+\langle g,b\rangle .LC​(a,b)=(f,g)∈R(C)max​ ⟨f,a⟩+⟨g,b⟩.

Stated with both extrema attained: there are an optimal coupling PPP and a dual optimal pair (f,g)(f,g)(f,g) with ⟨C,P⟩=⟨f,a⟩+⟨g,b⟩\langle C,P\rangle=\langle f,a\rangle+\langle g,b\rangle⟨C,P⟩=⟨f,a⟩+⟨g,b⟩.

Milestones

  1. Weak duality (Remark 2.21, p. 385): ⟨C,P⟩≥∑i,jPi,j(fi+gj)=⟨f,a⟩+⟨g,b⟩\langle C,P\rangle\ge\sum_{i,j}P_{i,j}(f_i+g_j)=\langle f,a\rangle+\langle g,b\rangle⟨C,P⟩≥∑i,j​Pi,j​(fi​+gj​)=⟨f,a⟩+⟨g,b⟩ for P∈U(a,b)P\in\mathbf U(a,b)P∈U(a,b) and (f,g)∈R(C)(f,g)\in\mathbf R(C)(f,g)∈R(C).
  2. The CCC-transform is the best second potential (§3.2, p. 403): (f,fC)∈R(C)(f,f^C)\in\mathbf R(C)(f,fC)∈R(C), and g≤fCg\le f^Cg≤fC whenever (f,g)∈R(C)(f,g)\in\mathbf R(C)(f,g)∈R(C).
  3. Semi-dual inequality (§3.2, p. 403): ⟨f,a⟩+⟨g,b⟩≤⟨f,a⟩+⟨fC,b⟩\langle f,a\rangle+\langle g,b\rangle\le\langle f,a\rangle+\langle f^C,b\rangle⟨f,a⟩+⟨g,b⟩≤⟨f,a⟩+⟨fC,b⟩ for (f,g)∈R(C)(f,g)\in\mathbf R(C)(f,g)∈R(C).
  4. Proposition 3.1 (pp. 403–404): f≤f′⇒fC≥f′Cf\le f'\Rightarrow f^C\ge f'^Cf≤f′⇒fC≥f′C; fCCˉ≥ff^{C\bar C}\ge ffCCˉ≥f and gCˉC≥gg^{\bar CC}\ge ggCˉC≥g; fCCˉC=fCf^{C\bar CC}=f^CfCCˉC=fC.
  5. Proposition 3.3 (p. 405): complementary feasible solutions are primal and dual optimal.
  6. Proposition 3.2 (p. 404): for optimal P⋆P^\starP⋆ and (f⋆,g⋆)(f^\star,g^\star)(f⋆,g⋆), Pi,j⋆(Ci,j−fi⋆−gj⋆)=0P^\star_{i,j}(C_{i,j}-f^\star_i-g^\star_j)=0Pi,j⋆​(Ci,j​−fi⋆​−gj⋆​)=0 for all (i,j)(i,j)(i,j).
  7. The semi-dual (3.5) (p. 403): LC(a,b)=max⁡f∈Rn⟨f,a⟩+⟨fC,b⟩L_C(a,b)=\max_{f\in\mathbb R^n}\langle f,a\rangle+\langle f^C,b\rangleLC​(a,b)=maxf∈Rn​⟨f,a⟩+⟨fC,b⟩.

Milestones 6 and 7 are consequences of the goal; milestones 1 and 5 do not need it.

Significance

Proposition 2.4 is the finite-dimensional form of Kantorovich duality. It turns the optimal cost into a maximum over price vectors, so that any admissible pair of prices certifies a lower bound on LC(a,b)L_C(a,b)LC​(a,b) and an optimal pair certifies optimality of a plan through complementary slackness (Propositions 3.2 and 3.3). The CCC-transform reduces the dual to a concave maximization in one vector (3.5), which is the form used for semi-discrete transport and for stochastic dual methods; Proposition 3.1 shows that alternating CCC- and Cˉ\bar CCˉ-transforms stalls after one round.

All of these results are classical and proved in the book or by direct reference to linear programming. General-form LP strong duality, weak duality and complementary slackness are already machine-checked on the platform (LinearOptimization.lp_strong_duality and its siblings, from the Bertsimas–Tsitsiklis series); measure-theoretic weak Kantorovich duality is also on the platform with integrability hypotheses. What this mission adds is the book's own discrete statements in the book's notation, as a base that later missions of the series (dual ascent, auction, entropic duality) can cite, with the CCC-transform calculus of §3.2 formalized for real-valued finite costs.

Difficulty

Weak duality, the CCC-transform facts and Proposition 3.3 are finite computations with sums and minima. The content of the mission is the equality in Proposition 2.4 together with attainment of both the minimum and the maximum. Attainment of the minimum needs compactness and nonemptiness of U(a,b)\mathbf U(a,b)U(a,b); attainment of the maximum is not a compactness argument, since R(C)\mathbf R(C)R(C) is unbounded (it is invariant under (f,g)↦(f+t,g−t)(f,g)\mapsto(f+t,g-t)(f,g)↦(f+t,g−t)). Reducing Proposition 2.4 to the general LP statement requires an explicit translation of U(a,b)\mathbf U(a,b)U(a,b) and R(C)\mathbf R(C)R(C) into the general-form primal–dual pair, including the sign conventions of equality-constrained primal variables and free dual variables. The Lagrangian argument on p. 382–383 exchanges a min and a max without justification beyond "always possible for linear programs", so it does not yield a proof by itself.

Formalization scope

Indices are 0-based (Fin n, Fin m); matrices are Matrix (Fin n) (Fin m) ℝ; all quantities are real. Histograms are encoded as a ∈ stdSimplex ℝ (Fin n), the book's standing convention for (a,b)(a,b)(a,b), and every statement involving aaa or bbb carries it; this also forces n,m≥1n,m\ge1n,m≥1. Zero entries in aaa and bbb are allowed. Optimality of a plan and of a dual pair are predicates quantifying over the whole feasible set, never real ⨅/⨆, so no junk value from an empty or unbounded set can enter. The CCC-transforms are real infima over a finite index set; statements that use them without histograms assume n≥1n\ge1n≥1 (and m≥1m\ge1m≥1 where the Cˉ\bar CCˉ-transform appears), because Lean's infimum over an empty index is 000.

The goal cannot be satisfied trivially: it asserts existence of a plan that is optimal against every coupling and a pair that is optimal against every admissible pair, with equal values; dropping either optimality clause, or the equal-mass hypotheses, changes the theorem.

Two printed slips are corrected and disclosed in the item notes: Proposition 3.2 prints Ci,j−fi⋆+gj⋆C_{i,j}-f^\star_i+g^\star_jCi,j​−fi⋆​+gj⋆​ where its proof uses Ci,j−fi⋆−gj⋆C_{i,j}-f^\star_i-g^\star_jCi,j​−fi⋆​−gj⋆​, and Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 refer to the primal and dual as "(2.24)" and "(2.11)", meaning the discrete primal (2.11) and dual (2.20).

Useful infrastructure: the platform's general-form LP strong duality (included as a reference item), Mathlib's stdSimplex and finite infima. Contributions welcome: proofs of each milestone, a direct proof of Proposition 2.4 by reduction to the LP theorem, and alternative proofs of the goal.

Selected references

  • G. Peyré and M. Cuturi, Computational Optimal Transport, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 11(5–6):355–607, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1561/2200000073
  • D. Bertsimas and J. N. Tsitsiklis, Introduction to Linear Optimization, Athena Scientific, 1997 (Theorem 4.4, strong duality).
  • L. Kantorovich, On the transfer of masses, Doklady Akademii Nauk SSSR 37:199–201, 1942 (English translation: J. Math. Sci. 133:1381–1382, 2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10958-006-0049-2
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Machine LearningOperations ResearchOptimal Transport+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Regularization via Mass Transportation II: Wasserstein-Robust Linear Regression Equals Empirical Loss plus a Dual-Norm PenaltyResearch Paper

Motivation

Ordinary least squares and its robust relatives (least absolute deviations, Huber, ϵ\epsilonϵ-insensitive and quantile regression) fit a linear predictor by minimizing an average loss over the training sample. That average estimates the out-of-sample error poorly when the sample is small, and the usual fix is to add a regularization penalty such as a norm of the weights. Choosing that penalty is often a heuristic. Distributionally robust optimization gives one principled derivation of it: hedge against every data-generating distribution that is close to the empirical one in a Wasserstein distance, and minimize the worst-case expected loss.

S. Shafieezadeh-Abadeh, D. Kuhn and P. Mohajerin Esfahani, Regularization via Mass Transportation (arXiv:1710.10016v3, 2019; JMLR 20, 2019), show that for linear regression with a convex Lipschitz loss this worst-case problem is exactly a regularized empirical risk problem, with an explicit dual-norm penalty. The same identity appears for the logistic loss in Shafieezadeh-Abadeh, Mohajerin Esfahani and Kuhn, Distributionally Robust Logistic Regression (NeurIPS 2015, arXiv:1509.09259). For a general convex loss it is Theorem 10 of the tutorial by Kuhn, Mohajerin Esfahani, Nguyen and Shafieezadeh-Abadeh (arXiv:1908.08729). Blanchet, Kang and Murthy (arXiv:1610.05627) obtain the square-root Lasso from a type-2 transport cost. This mission formalizes the regression theorem of the first paper, Theorem 3.1(ii) on p. 8. The source PDF is the arXiv preprint v3, and every page and label cited here refers to it.

Setting

Data. Inputs are x∈Rnx\in\mathbb R^nx∈Rn and outputs are y∈Ry\in\mathbb Ry∈R. A pair is written ξ=(x,y)∈Rn+1\xi=(x,y)\in\mathbb R^{n+1}ξ=(x,y)∈Rn+1. The training samples are (x^i,y^i)(\hat x_i,\hat y_i)(x^i​,y^​i​) for i=1,…,Ni=1,\dots,Ni=1,…,N, and P^N=1N∑i=1Nδ(x^i,y^i)\hat{\mathbb P}_N=\frac1N\sum_{i=1}^N\delta_{(\hat x_i,\hat y_i)}P^N​=N1​∑i=1N​δ(x^i​,y^​i​)​ is their empirical distribution (§2.1, p. 5).

Hypotheses and loss. A weight vector w∈Rnw\in\mathbb R^nw∈Rn defines the linear hypothesis h(x)=⟨w,x⟩h(x)=\langle w,x\rangleh(x)=⟨w,x⟩. A univariate convex loss L:R→RL:\mathbb R\to\mathbb RL:R→R defines the regression loss ℓ(⟨w,x⟩,y)=L(⟨w,x⟩−y)\ell(\langle w,x\rangle,y)=L(\langle w,x\rangle-y)ℓ(⟨w,x⟩,y)=L(⟨w,x⟩−y) (§3.1, p. 8). The residual ⟨w,x⟩−y\langle w,x\rangle-y⟨w,x⟩−y is the pairing of ξ\xiξ with the vector (w,−1)(w,-1)(w,−1).

Norms. Rn+1\mathbb R^{n+1}Rn+1 carries an arbitrary norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ with dual norm ∥z∥∗=sup⁡{⟨z,ξ⟩:∥ξ∥≤1}\|z\|_*=\sup\{\langle z,\xi\rangle:\|\xi\|\le1\}∥z∥∗​=sup{⟨z,ξ⟩:∥ξ∥≤1} (§1.1, p. 4). The Lipschitz modulus of LLL is lip(L)=sup⁡z≠z′∣L(z)−L(z′)∣/∣z−z′∣\mathrm{lip}(L)=\sup_{z\ne z'}|L(z)-L(z')|/|z-z'|lip(L)=supz=z′​∣L(z)−L(z′)∣/∣z−z′∣, and the convex conjugate is L∗(θ)=sup⁡zθz−L(z)L^*(\theta)=\sup_z\theta z-L(z)L∗(θ)=supz​θz−L(z) (§1.1).

Wasserstein ball. With transport cost d(ξ,ξ′)=∥ξ−ξ′∥d(\xi,\xi')=\|\xi-\xi'\|d(ξ,ξ′)=∥ξ−ξ′∥, the Wasserstein distance (Definition 2.2, p. 7) is

W(Q,Q′)=inf⁡Π∫d(ξ,ξ′) Π(dξ,dξ′),W(\mathbb Q,\mathbb Q')=\inf_\Pi\int d(\xi,\xi')\,\Pi(\mathrm d\xi,\mathrm d\xi'),W(Q,Q′)=Πinf​∫d(ξ,ξ′)Π(dξ,dξ′),

where the infimum runs over couplings Π\PiΠ of Q\mathbb QQ and Q′\mathbb Q'Q′. The ball of radius ρ≥0\rho\ge0ρ≥0 is Bρ(P^N)={Q:Q(Ξ)=1, W(Q,P^N)≤ρ}\mathbb B_\rho(\hat{\mathbb P}_N)=\{\mathbb Q:\mathbb Q(\Xi)=1,\ W(\mathbb Q,\hat{\mathbb P}_N)\le\rho\}Bρ​(P^N​)={Q:Q(Ξ)=1, W(Q,P^N​)≤ρ} (3). The distributionally robust regression problem is

inf⁡w sup⁡Q∈Bρ(P^N)EQ[L(⟨w,x⟩−y)].(4)\inf_w\ \sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\rho(\hat{\mathbb P}_N)}\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}\big[L(\langle w,x\rangle-y)\big].\qquad(4)winf​ Q∈Bρ​(P^N​)sup​EQ[L(⟨w,x⟩−y)].(4)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1(ii), p. 8

Let Ξ=Rn+1\Xi=\mathbb R^{n+1}Ξ=Rn+1, ρ≥0\rho\ge0ρ≥0, N≥1N\ge1N≥1, and let LLL be nonnegative, convex and Lipschitz continuous. Then for every www

sup⁡Q∈Bρ(P^N)EQ[L(⟨w,x⟩−y)]=1N∑i=1NL(⟨w,x^i⟩−y^i)+ρ lip(L) ∥(w,−1)∥∗,\sup_{\mathbb Q\in\mathbb B_\rho(\hat{\mathbb P}_N)}\mathbb E^{\mathbb Q}\big[L(\langle w,x\rangle-y)\big]=\frac1N\sum_{i=1}^NL(\langle w,\hat x_i\rangle-\hat y_i)+\rho\,\mathrm{lip}(L)\,\|(w,-1)\|_*,Q∈Bρ​(P^N​)sup​EQ[L(⟨w,x⟩−y)]=N1​i=1∑N​L(⟨w,x^i​⟩−y^​i​)+ρlip(L)∥(w,−1)∥∗​,

so (4) and the regularized problem (6) have the same optimal value.

Milestones

  1. Lemma A.1 (p. 28). The worst case over the ball equals inf⁡λ≥0λρ+1N∑isup⁡ξ[I(ξ)−λd(ξ,ξ^i)]\inf_{\lambda\ge0}\lambda\rho+\frac1N\sum_i\sup_\xi[I(\xi)-\lambda d(\xi,\hat\xi_i)]infλ≥0​λρ+N1​∑i​supξ​[I(ξ)−λd(ξ,ξ^​i​)]. This milestone is linked to the published, proved WassersteinDRO.Duality.strong_duality_worst_case_risk_v2, which covers it for ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0.
  2. Lemma A.3 (p. 29). For γ>0\gamma>0γ>0, sup⁡ζL(⟨β,ζ⟩)−γ∥ζ−ζ^∥\sup_\zeta L(\langle\beta,\zeta\rangle)-\gamma\|\zeta-\hat\zeta\|supζ​L(⟨β,ζ⟩)−γ∥ζ−ζ^​∥ equals L(⟨β,ζ^⟩)L(\langle\beta,\hat\zeta\rangle)L(⟨β,ζ^​⟩) if lip(L)∥β∥∗≤γ\mathrm{lip}(L)\|\beta\|_*\le\gammalip(L)∥β∥∗​≤γ, and +∞+\infty+∞ otherwise.
  3. End of the proof of Lemma A.3 (p. 30). lip(L)=sup⁡{∣θ∣:L∗(θ)<∞}\mathrm{lip}(L)=\sup\{|\theta|:L^*(\theta)<\infty\}lip(L)=sup{∣θ∣:L∗(θ)<∞}.
  4. The inf-over-λ\lambdaλ display in the proof of Theorem 3.1(ii) (pp. 30–31). The worst case equals inf⁡{λρ+1N∑iL(⟨w,x^i⟩−y^i):λ≥0, lip(L)∥(w,−1)∥∗≤λ}\inf\{\lambda\rho+\frac1N\sum_iL(\langle w,\hat x_i\rangle-\hat y_i):\lambda\ge0,\ \mathrm{lip}(L)\|(w,-1)\|_*\le\lambda\}inf{λρ+N1​∑i​L(⟨w,x^i​⟩−y^​i​):λ≥0, lip(L)∥(w,−1)∥∗​≤λ}.

Significance

The result. The theorem turns an infinite-dimensional min–max problem over distributions into a finite convex program over www: an empirical average plus a norm penalty. The penalty is not ∥w∥∗\|w\|_*∥w∥∗​ but ∥(w,−1)∥∗\|(w,-1)\|_*∥(w,−1)∥∗​, because the transport cost moves outputs as well as inputs. It scales with the radius ρ\rhoρ and with the Lipschitz modulus of the univariate loss. With the Huber, ϵ\epsilonϵ-insensitive and pinball losses it gives Corollaries 3.2–3.4 of the paper. It also gives a statistical reading of the regularization weight as a Wasserstein radius, which the paper's §4 turns into generalization bounds.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; none of its items is formalized yet except Lemma A.1. Lemma A.1 is available in a general form (any p≥1p\ge1p≥1, any closed support set, ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0) as a proved platform theorem from the mission Wasserstein Distributionally Robust Optimization. The per-www identity also follows from the proved WassersteinDRO.Duality.convex_loss_p1_v2 (Theorem 10 of the tutorial, also present as WassersteinDRO.Regularization.convex_loss_p1_v2; the public mission Wasserstein Distributionally Robust Optimization IV has it as goal) once one shows that lip(L∘⟨(w,−1),⋅⟩)=lip(L)∥(w,−1)∥∗\mathrm{lip}(L\circ\langle(w,-1),\cdot\rangle)=\mathrm{lip}(L)\|(w,-1)\|_*lip(L∘⟨(w,−1),⋅⟩)=lip(L)∥(w,−1)∥∗​. No platform item states that factorization. What this mission adds is the paper's explicit form of the penalty, Lemma A.3 (the inner supremum for an arbitrary convex Lipschitz loss and an arbitrary norm), and the conjugate description of the Lipschitz modulus. The last two are reusable in classification (mission I of this series states them again in its own namespace) and in every Wasserstein-regularization result with linear hypotheses.

Difficulty

The obvious argument is to write the worst case as a supremum over perturbations of the samples and bound each perturbed loss by its Lipschitz constant. That gives only the inequality "≤\le≤", and only for one Lipschitz constant. The identity needs two further steps that this bound does not supply. First, the bound must be attained: the supremum over distributions has to be shown to reach ρ lip(L)∥(w,−1)∥∗\rho\,\mathrm{lip}(L)\|(w,-1)\|_*ρlip(L)∥(w,−1)∥∗​, a matching lower bound that a Lipschitz estimate cannot give. Second, lip(L)\mathrm{lip}(L)lip(L) must be the modulus, not any constant: an upper Lipschitz constant K>lip(L)K>\mathrm{lip}(L)K>lip(L) makes the identity false. In Lemma A.3 the case lip(L)∥β∥∗=γ\mathrm{lip}(L)\|\beta\|_*=\gammalip(L)∥β∥∗​=γ sits exactly on the boundary between a finite and an infinite supremum. A further point is that the duality of Lemma A.1 needs ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0, while the theorem includes ρ=0\rho=0ρ=0.

Formalization scope

  • Space. Rn+1\mathbb R^{n+1}Rn+1 with an arbitrary norm is an abstract finite-dimensional real normed space E with its Borel σ-algebra. A continuous linear isomorphism e : E ≃L[ℝ] (Fin n → ℝ) × ℝ reads off inputs and outputs. The theorem therefore covers every norm on Rn+1\mathbb R^{n+1}Rn+1; fixing a concrete norm would prove it for that norm only. The functional (w,−1)(w,-1)(w,−1) is pairing e w, and ∥(w,−1)∥∗\|(w,-1)\|_*∥(w,−1)∥∗​ is its operator norm.
  • Published objects. The ball, the worst case, the empirical distribution and the Lipschitz modulus are the published definitions WassersteinDRO_Duality_ambiguitySet, _worstCaseRisk_v2, _empiricalDistribution and _lipschitzModulus. The worst case is taken in the extended reals, and expectations follow the convention of nominalRisk_v2 (no junk value for non-integrable losses). lip(L)\mathrm{lip}(L)lip(L) takes values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞].
  • Standing assumptions. LLL is nonnegative, convex on R\mathbb RR and Lipschitz continuous; N≥1N\ge1N≥1; ρ≥0\rho\ge0ρ≥0; Ξ=Rn+1\Xi=\mathbb R^{n+1}Ξ=Rn+1. The paper's L≥0L\ge0L≥0 (§2.1) is imposed as the standing loss-function assumption.
  • Reading of "equivalent". The paper does not define the word. The goal states the per-www identity that the proof establishes plus equality of optimal values. Attainment of the infimum is not claimed.
  • Corrections. The printed display on p. 30 omits a factor 1N\frac1NN1​ and carries a stray ∣θ∣|\theta|∣θ∣ in the constraint; milestone 4 states the corrected identity. The printed Lemma A.1 omits ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0, which its proof uses; the linked platform theorem has it.
  • Ruled out. The goal is not a restatement of Theorem 10 with Lip(ℓw)\mathrm{Lip}(\ell_w)Lip(ℓw​) of the composite loss: its right-hand side is the explicit average of (6) with lip\mathrm{lip}lip of the univariate LLL and the dual norm of (w,−1)(w,-1)(w,−1).
  • Welcome contributions. The factorization lip(L∘β)=lip(L)∥β∥∗\mathrm{lip}(L\circ\beta)=\mathrm{lip}(L)\|\beta\|_*lip(L∘β)=lip(L)∥β∥∗​ for a linear functional β\betaβ on a finite-dimensional normed space, conjugate calculus for univariate convex functions, and the evaluation of the worst case at ρ=0\rho=0ρ=0.

Selected references

  • S. Shafieezadeh-Abadeh, D. Kuhn, P. Mohajerin Esfahani, Regularization via Mass Transportation, arXiv:1710.10016v3, 2019; J. Mach. Learn. Res. 20(103), 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.10016
  • D. Kuhn, P. Mohajerin Esfahani, V. A. Nguyen, S. Shafieezadeh-Abadeh, Wasserstein Distributionally Robust Optimization: Theory and Applications in Machine Learning, INFORMS TutORials, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.08729
  • P. Mohajerin Esfahani, D. Kuhn, Data-driven distributionally robust optimization using the Wasserstein metric, Math. Program. 171, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1505.05116
  • S. Shafieezadeh-Abadeh, P. Mohajerin Esfahani, D. Kuhn, Distributionally Robust Logistic Regression, NeurIPS, 2015. https://arxiv.org/abs/1509.09259
  • J. Blanchet, Y. Kang, K. Murthy, Robust Wasserstein Profile Inference and Applications to Machine Learning, J. Appl. Probab. 56(3), 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.05627
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Convex Optimization Theory, Athena Scientific, 2009 (cited as [9] in the paper for Propositions 5.3.1 and 5.5.4).
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CombinatoricsMachine Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Learning and Online Convex Optimization 4: Finite Littlestone Dimension Gives Agnostic Online Regret 2√(Ldim·ln(eT/Ldim)·T)Research Paper

Motivation

Online classification is the simplest model of learning from a stream: on every round a learner sees an instance, guesses its binary label, and is then told the truth. Cover's impossibility argument shows that against an adversary no deterministic learner can compete with even two fixed hypotheses, so two relaxations are studied. In the realizable case the labels are generated by some unknown hypothesis of a known class HHH, and the question is how many mistakes a learner must make. In the agnostic (unrealizable) case the labels are arbitrary, the learner may randomize, and it is judged by its regret: its expected number of mistakes minus that of the best hypothesis in HHH in hindsight.

For the realizable case Littlestone (1988) introduced the dimension now named after him and showed that it is exactly the optimal mistake bound. Whether the same quantity also governs the agnostic case was settled by Ben-David, Pál and Shalev-Shwartz (COLT 2009, link): a class is agnostically online learnable if and only if its Littlestone dimension is finite. This mission formalizes the upper-bound half of that result, in the form given by Shalev-Shwartz's survey Online Learning and Online Convex Optimization (Found. Trends Mach. Learn. 4(2), 2011, doi:10.1561/2200000018), Theorem 3.6.

Timeline:

  • 1988 — Littlestone defines the dimension and the Standard Optimal Algorithm (SOA) for the realizable case (doi:10.1007/BF00116827).
  • 1994 — Littlestone and Warmuth publish the Weighted Majority algorithm for prediction with expert advice (doi:10.1006/inco.1994.1009).
  • 2009 — Ben-David, Pál, Shalev-Shwartz: agnostic online learnability is characterized by finite Littlestone dimension, regret O(Ldim(H) Tln⁡T)O(\sqrt{\mathrm{Ldim}(H)\, T \ln T})O(Ldim(H)TlnT​), with a lower bound Ω(Ldim(H) T)\Omega(\sqrt{\mathrm{Ldim}(H)\,T})Ω(Ldim(H)T​).
  • 2011 — the survey presents the expert construction and the upper bound in the form formalized here.

Setting

Let XXX be a set of instances and let a hypothesis class HHH be a set of functions h:X→{0,1}h : X \to \{0,1\}h:X→{0,1}. On round t=1,…,Tt = 1, \dots, Tt=1,…,T the learner receives xtx_txt​, outputs pt∈[0,1]p_t \in [0,1]pt​∈[0,1] (the probability of predicting 111), receives yt∈{0,1}y_t \in \{0,1\}yt​∈{0,1} and pays ∣pt−yt∣|p_t - y_t|∣pt​−yt​∣, the probability of a wrong randomized guess. The prediction ptp_tpt​ may depend on (x1,y1),…,(xt−1,yt−1)(x_1,y_1),\dots,(x_{t-1},y_{t-1})(x1​,y1​),…,(xt−1​,yt−1​) and xtx_txt​, never on yty_tyt​. The regret against h∈Hh \in Hh∈H is

∑t=1T∣pt−yt∣−∑t=1T∣h(xt)−yt∣.\sum_{t=1}^T |p_t - y_t| - \sum_{t=1}^T |h(x_t) - y_t|.t=1∑T​∣pt​−yt​∣−t=1∑T​∣h(xt​)−yt​∣.

A shattered tree of depth ddd assigns an instance to every node of a complete binary tree of depth ddd, so that for every labelling (y1,…,yd)(y_1,\dots,y_d)(y1​,…,yd​) some h∈Hh \in Hh∈H agrees with yty_tyt​ at the ttt-th node of the root-to-leaf path that the labels select. The Littlestone dimension Ldim(H)\mathrm{Ldim}(H)Ldim(H) is the largest depth of a shattered tree.

The Standard Optimal Algorithm keeps the version space VtV_tVt​ of hypotheses consistent so far, splits it as Vt(r)={h∈Vt:h(xt)=r}V_t^{(r)} = \{h \in V_t : h(x_t) = r\}Vt(r)​={h∈Vt​:h(xt​)=r}, and predicts the rrr with the larger Ldim(Vt(r))\mathrm{Ldim}(V_t^{(r)})Ldim(Vt(r)​). For a set I={i1<⋯<iL}I = \{i_1 < \dots < i_L\}I={i1​<⋯<iL​} of rounds, Expert(i1,…,iL)(i_1,\dots,i_L)(i1​,…,iL​) runs the same rule but flips its prediction on the rounds of III and updates Vt+1=Vt(y^t)V_{t+1} = V_t^{(\hat y_t)}Vt+1​=Vt(y^​t​)​ using its own prediction instead of the label. Weighted Majority over ddd experts with costs zt∈[0,1]dz_t \in [0,1]^dzt​∈[0,1]d keeps weights wt[i]∝exp⁡(−η∑s<tzs[i])w_t[i] \propto \exp(-\eta \sum_{s<t} z_s[i])wt​[i]∝exp(−η∑s<t​zs​[i]) and pays ⟨wt,zt⟩\langle w_t, z_t\rangle⟨wt​,zt​⟩.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.6, upper bound

For every class HHH with L=Ldim(H)<∞L = \mathrm{Ldim}(H) < \inftyL=Ldim(H)<∞ and every horizon T≥LT \ge LT≥L there is an online learner with pt∈[0,1]p_t \in [0,1]pt​∈[0,1] such that for every h∈Hh \in Hh∈H and every sequence of TTT examples

∑t=1T∣pt−yt∣−∑t=1T∣h(xt)−yt∣≤2Lln⁡(eT/L) T.\sum_{t=1}^T |p_t - y_t| - \sum_{t=1}^T |h(x_t) - y_t| \le 2\sqrt{L \ln(eT/L)\, T}.t=1∑T​∣pt​−yt​∣−t=1∑T​∣h(xt​)−yt​∣≤2Lln(eT/L)T​.

The paper states O(Ldim(H)ln⁡(T) T)O(\sqrt{\mathrm{Ldim}(H)\ln(T)\,T})O(Ldim(H)ln(T)T​); the constant 222 and the factor ln⁡(eT/L)\ln(eT/L)ln(eT/L) are what its proof gives.

Milestones

  • Lemma 3.3: SOA makes at most Ldim(H)\mathrm{Ldim}(H)Ldim(H) mistakes in the realizable case (already proved on the platform).
  • Lemma 3.7: for every h∈Hh \in Hh∈H and instance sequence some Expert(i1,…,iL)(i_1,\dots,i_L)(i1​,…,iL​) with L≤Ldim(H)L \le \mathrm{Ldim}(H)L≤Ldim(H) predicts h(xt)h(x_t)h(xt​) on every round.
  • Corollary 3.8: some such expert makes at most min⁡h∈H∑t∣h(xt)−yt∣\min_{h \in H}\sum_t |h(x_t) - y_t|minh∈H​∑t​∣h(xt​)−yt​∣ mistakes.
  • Equation (3.1): ∑L=0Ldim(H)(TL)≤(eT/Ldim(H))Ldim(H)\sum_{L=0}^{\mathrm{Ldim}(H)} \binom{T}{L} \le (eT/\mathrm{Ldim}(H))^{\mathrm{Ldim}(H)}∑L=0Ldim(H)​(LT​)≤(eT/Ldim(H))Ldim(H).
  • Theorem 3.1: Weighted Majority has regret at most log⁡(d)/η+ηT\log(d)/\eta + \eta Tlog(d)/η+ηT, and 2log⁡(d) T2\sqrt{\log(d)\,T}2log(d)T​ for η=log⁡(d)/T\eta = \sqrt{\log(d)/T}η=log(d)/T​.

Significance

The theorem shows that finiteness of one combinatorial parameter suffices for sublinear agnostic regret, for classes that may be infinite and need not have any parametric structure. With the lower bound it characterizes agnostic online learnability, parallel to the role of the VC dimension in PAC learning; the gap between the two dimensions (thresholds on [0,1][0,1][0,1] have VC dimension 111 and infinite Littlestone dimension) separates online from batch learnability. The expert construction, which simulates a realizable-case learner on guessed mistake rounds, is a reusable reduction from agnostic to realizable online learning.

On the formal side, the realizable theory (Littlestone dimension, SOA and its mistake bound) is already on the platform as published definitions and theorems from the textbook Understanding Machine Learning; the agnostic step, the expert construction, the bound on the number of experts and the Weighted Majority bound with bounded costs are not. To our knowledge no proof assistant library contains a machine-checked proof of the agnostic upper bound.

Difficulty

The obvious approach, running Weighted Majority with one expert per hypothesis, fails for infinite HHH and gives log⁡∣H∣\log|H|log∣H∣ instead of Ldim(H)\mathrm{Ldim}(H)Ldim(H) for finite HHH. The class must be replaced by a finite family that reproduces every h∈Hh \in Hh∈H on the given instance sequence while having only poly(T)Ldim(H)\mathrm{poly}(T)^{\mathrm{Ldim}(H)}poly(T)Ldim(H) members. The experts in the family never see labels, so the argument that each hhh is reproduced must track two runs, the expert's and SOA's on labels generated by hhh, and show their version spaces coincide round by round. This depends on the tie-breaking rule and on how an empty side Vt(r)V_t^{(r)}Vt(r)​ is ranked, details the informal argument leaves implicit. The bound on the number of experts is a Sauer-type binomial estimate that holds only in the range 1≤Ldim(H)≤T1 \le \mathrm{Ldim}(H) \le T1≤Ldim(H)≤T.

Formalization scope

The development reuses the published definitions UnderstandingML_Online (online algorithms as maps from the history and the current instance to a prediction, history, mistakes, cumLoss, cumLossHyp, ldim, ldimBot, soa, wmWeights) and the proved theorem UnderstandingML.soa_mistake_bound (Lemma 3.3). Sequences are indexed by Fin T and rounds from 000; the paper's indices 1≤i1<⋯<iL≤T1 \le i_1 < \dots < i_L \le T1≤i1​<⋯<iL​≤T become a set I⊆{0,…,T−1}I \subseteq \{0,\dots,T-1\}I⊆{0,…,T−1}. A learner of type OnlineAlgR X cannot read the current label, so the existential goal cannot be satisfied by a learner that peeks at yty_tyt​; the goal also requires pt∈[0,1]p_t \in [0,1]pt​∈[0,1]. Logarithms are natural.

Committed conventions:

  • The O(·) of Theorem 3.6 is instantiated as 2Lln⁡(eT/L) T2\sqrt{L\ln(eT/L)\,T}2Lln(eT/L)T​ under T≥LT \ge LT≥L, where L=Ldim(H)L = \mathrm{Ldim}(H)L=Ldim(H) is a natural number. At L=0L = 0L=0 the bound reads regret ≤0\le 0≤0.
  • Expert(i1,…,iL)(i_1,\dots,i_L)(i1​,…,iL​) breaks ties toward 000, as its box on p. 166 says; the SOA box (p. 163) breaks ties toward 111. Lemma 3.7 holds with the expert's rule. An empty Vt(r)V_t^{(r)}Vt(r)​ ranks below every nonempty class (ldimBot).
  • Theorem 3.1's bound 1 is stated for every η>0\eta > 0η>0, bound 2 for η∈(0,1)\eta \in (0,1)η∈(0,1), the tuned bound for every d≥1d \ge 1d≥1, T≥0T \ge 0T≥0; minima over experts and over HHH are stated as "for every expert", "for every hhh".
  • Equation (3.1) is stated with 1≤L≤T1 \le L \le T1≤L≤T, together with the count of index sets.

Excluded: the lower bound Ω(Ldim(H) T)\Omega(\sqrt{\mathrm{Ldim}(H)\,T})Ω(Ldim(H)T​) (the survey cites it to Ben-David, Pál and Shalev-Shwartz), Theorem 3.5 (VC dimension at most Littlestone dimension), Corollary 3.4. Lemma 3.2 and the Halving bound are already on the platform.

Welcome contributions: proofs of the milestones, a proof of SOA's mistake bound with ties toward 000, and a reusable version of the Weighted Majority bound for general finite expert types.

Selected references

  • S. Shalev-Shwartz, Online Learning and Online Convex Optimization, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 4(2), 2011, 107–194. https://doi.org/10.1561/2200000018
  • S. Ben-David, D. Pál, S. Shalev-Shwartz, Agnostic Online Learning, COLT 2009. https://www.cs.mcgill.ca/~colt2009/papers/032.pdf
  • N. Littlestone, Learning Quickly When Irrelevant Attributes Abound: A New Linear-Threshold Algorithm, Machine Learning 2, 1988, 285–318. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00116827
  • N. Littlestone, M. K. Warmuth, The Weighted Majority Algorithm, Information and Computation 108(2), 1994, 212–261. https://doi.org/10.1006/inco.1994.1009
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CombinatoricsGroup TheoryNumber Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

New Proofs of Plünnecke-type Estimates for Product Sets in Groups 1: In an Abelian Group, |A + B| ≤ α|A| Gives One Nonempty X ⊆ A with |X + hB| ≤ αʰ|X| for Every hResearch Paper

Motivation

A basic question of additive combinatorics asks how a set grows under repeated addition. If a finite set AAA in an abelian group satisfies ∣A+B∣≤α∣A∣|A + B| \le \alpha |A|∣A+B∣≤α∣A∣ for some finite set BBB, how large can the iterated sumsets hB=B+⋯+BhB = B + \cdots + BhB=B+⋯+B be? Plünnecke's inequality gives the answer used throughout the subject: some nonempty part of AAA grows by at most a factor α\alphaα per added copy of BBB. Combined with Ruzsa's triangle inequality it becomes the Plünnecke–Ruzsa inequality ∣mB−nB∣≤αm+n∣A∣|mB - nB| \le \alpha^{m+n}|A|∣mB−nB∣≤αm+n∣A∣, which underlies Freĭman-type structure theorems, sum–product estimates and the polynomial Freĭman–Ruzsa programme.

Timeline.

  • 1970: H. Plünnecke proves the inequality for iterated sumsets in abelian groups with a graph-theoretic method (commutative layered graphs and Menger's theorem).
  • 1989: I. Z. Ruzsa simplifies Plünnecke's argument and combines it with the triangle inequality to bound ∣mB−nB∣|mB - nB|∣mB−nB∣.
  • 2011: G. Petridis gives a short elementary proof, without graphs (arXiv:1101.3507, Combinatorica 32, 2012). His argument also shows that one subset X⊆AX \subseteq AX⊆A works for every number of summands hhh, and it extends to triple products CXBCXBCXB in non-abelian groups.

Setting

Let GGG be a group with finite subsets AAA, BBB, CCC. The product set is AB={ab:a∈A, b∈B}AB = \{ab : a \in A,\ b \in B\}AB={ab:a∈A, b∈B}, and ∣⋅∣|\cdot|∣⋅∣ denotes cardinality. In an abelian group, written additively, the sumset is A+B={a+b:a∈A, b∈B}A + B = \{a + b : a \in A,\ b \in B\}A+B={a+b:a∈A, b∈B}, and for h≥0h \ge 0h≥0 the iterated sumset hBhBhB is B+⋯+BB + \cdots + BB+⋯+B with hhh summands, 0B={0}0B = \{0\}0B={0}. It is not the dilate {hb:b∈B}\{hb : b \in B\}{hb:b∈B}.

A nonempty subset X⊆AX \subseteq AX⊆A has minimal growth under BBB if

∣XB∣∣X∣≤∣ZB∣∣Z∣for every nonempty Z⊆A.\frac{|XB|}{|X|} \le \frac{|ZB|}{|Z|} \quad\text{for every nonempty } Z \subseteq A.∣X∣∣XB∣​≤∣Z∣∣ZB∣​for every nonempty Z⊆A.

Such an XXX exists whenever AAA is nonempty, since AAA has finitely many subsets. In Lean, GGG is a Group or AddCommGroup with decidable equality, the sets are Finset G with the pointwise operations of Mathlib (A * B, A + B, h • B), and cardinalities are #A cast to ℝ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1

For finite AAA, BBB in an abelian group with AAA nonempty and ∣A+B∣≤α∣A∣|A + B| \le \alpha|A|∣A+B∣≤α∣A∣, there is a nonempty X⊆AX \subseteq AX⊆A with

∣X+hB∣≤αh∣X∣for every h≥0.|X + hB| \le \alpha^h |X| \qquad \text{for every } h \ge 0.∣X+hB∣≤αh∣X∣for every h≥0.

The point is the order of quantifiers: one XXX serves all hhh.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 2.1 (p. 5). If ∣XB∣/∣X∣≤∣ZB∣/∣Z∣|XB|/|X| \le |ZB|/|Z|∣XB∣/∣X∣≤∣ZB∣/∣Z∣ for every Z⊆XZ \subseteq XZ⊆X, then ∣CXB∣≤∣XB∣∣X∣ ∣CX∣|CXB| \le \frac{|XB|}{|X|}\,|CX|∣CXB∣≤∣X∣∣XB∣​∣CX∣ for every finite CCC, in any group. This is already on the platform, proved, as FamousTheorems.pluennecke_petridis (additive notation, cross-multiplied), and enters the mission as a reference.
  2. Theorem 1.5 (p. 3). In any group, ∣AB∣≤α∣A∣|AB| \le \alpha|A|∣AB∣≤α∣A∣ with AAA nonempty gives a nonempty X⊆AX \subseteq AX⊆A with
∣CXB∣≤α∣CX∣for every finite C.|CXB| \le \alpha |CX| \quad\text{for every finite } C.∣CXB∣≤α∣CX∣for every finite C.
  1. Inductive step of Theorem 3.1 (p. 7). For X⊆AX \subseteq AX⊆A of minimal growth and ∣A+B∣≤α∣A∣|A+B| \le \alpha|A|∣A+B∣≤α∣A∣:
∣X+hB∣≤α ∣X+(h−1)B∣(h≥1).|X + hB| \le \alpha\,|X + (h-1)B| \quad (h \ge 1).∣X+hB∣≤α∣X+(h−1)B∣(h≥1).

Significance

Theorem 3.1 is the form of Plünnecke's inequality used in applications. Two consequences follow directly. Taking A=BA = BA=B gives ∣hB∣≤αh∣B∣|hB| \le \alpha^h|B|∣hB∣≤αh∣B∣ whenever ∣2B∣≤α∣B∣|2B| \le \alpha|B|∣2B∣≤α∣B∣. Combining one XXX for all hhh with Ruzsa's triangle inequality gives ∣mB−nB∣≤αm+n∣A∣|mB - nB| \le \alpha^{m+n}|A|∣mB−nB∣≤αm+n∣A∣ (Theorem 1.2 of the paper). With a separate XXX for each hhh, the second step would need the same set for mmm and nnn, and that is exactly what Theorem 3.1 provides. Theorem 1.5 is the non-abelian ingredient: missions 2 and 3 of this series apply it to obtain explicit Plünnecke-type bounds for ∣Bh∣|B^h|∣Bh∣ and ∣SBh∣|SB^h|∣SBh∣ in arbitrary groups.

Formalizing it. The results are proved and classical. Mathlib already contains Proposition 2.1 (Finset.pluennecke_petridis_inequality_mul) and the Plünnecke–Ruzsa inequality Finset.pluennecke_ruzsa_inequality_nsmul_sub_nsmul_add. Its proof runs through a private lemma that bounds ∣X+hB∣|X + hB|∣X+hB∣ for one fixed minimiser, but no public statement in Mathlib or on the platform asserts Theorem 3.1 or Theorem 1.5 in the form "there exists a nonempty XXX for all hhh" (respectively "for all CCC"). This mission adds those statements as reusable, citable nodes in the paper's numbering.

Difficulty

A first attempt iterates the hypothesis directly: ∣A+2B∣≤α∣A+B∣|A + 2B| \le \alpha|A + B|∣A+2B∣≤α∣A+B∣ would follow if A+BA + BA+B again grew by a factor α\alphaα under BBB, but nothing controls the growth of A+BA + BA+B. The ratio ∣ZB∣/∣Z∣|ZB|/|Z|∣ZB∣/∣Z∣ is not monotone in ZZZ, and passing to subsets of AAA can only help if the subset is chosen correctly. Choosing a different good subset for each hhh gives Theorem 1.1 but loses the uniformity. The work is to show that one fixed subset controls all the products CXBCXBCXB simultaneously, and in the non-abelian Theorem 1.5 to keep the order of the factors CCC, XXX, BBB throughout.

Formalization scope

  • Theorem 3.1 and the inductive step are stated in an AddCommGroup with DecidableEq. Theorem 1.5 is stated in a Group, with no commutativity, as on the page. The factor order C⋅X⋅BC \cdot X \cdot BC⋅X⋅B is preserved.
  • hBhBhB is h • B (the hhh-fold sumset; 0 • B = {0}), and "for all hhh" ranges over all natural numbers, including the true case h=0h = 0h=0.
  • α\alphaα is an arbitrary real number; cardinalities are cast to ℝ. No hypothesis α≥1\alpha \ge 1α≥1 is added: it follows from the hypotheses once AAA and BBB are nonempty (with BBB empty they force only α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0, and every conclusion is still true).
  • Nonempty witness. The page says "there exists X⊆AX \subseteq AX⊆A". Since ∅+hB=∅\emptyset + hB = \emptyset∅+hB=∅, the empty set would satisfy the printed statements trivially, and that formalization is ruled out: the goal and Theorem 1.5 assume AAA nonempty and assert XXX nonempty, matching the paper's choice of XXX as a minimiser of a ratio defined on nonempty sets.
  • Minimal growth in the step milestone is written cross-multiplied, ∣X+B∣ ∣Z∣≤∣Z+B∣ ∣X∣|X+B|\,|Z| \le |Z+B|\,|X|∣X+B∣∣Z∣≤∣Z+B∣∣X∣, over nonempty Z⊆AZ \subseteq AZ⊆A; the step is stated for h≥1h \ge 1h≥1 with natural-number subtraction guarded by that hypothesis.
  • Ruzsa's covering lemma and Ruzsa's triangle inequality, quoted in §4, are in Mathlib (Finset.ruzsa_covering_mul, Finset.ruzsa_triangle_inequality_mul_mulInv_mul) and are not items of this mission.
  • No new definitions are needed. Welcome contributions: proofs of the three draft statements, and, separately, the deduction of Theorem 1.2 from Theorem 3.1.

Selected references

  • G. Petridis, New proofs of Plünnecke-type estimates for product sets in groups, arXiv:1101.3507v3, 2011; Combinatorica 32 (2012). https://arxiv.org/abs/1101.3507 , https://doi.org/10.1007/s00493-012-2818-5
  • H. Plünnecke, Eine zahlentheoretische Anwendung der Graphentheorie, J. Reine Angew. Math. 243 (1970) 171–183. https://doi.org/10.1515/crll.1970.243.171
  • I. Z. Ruzsa, An application of graph theory to additive number theory, Scientia, Ser. A 3 (1989) 97–109 (no online version).
  • T. Tao, V. Vu, Additive Combinatorics, Cambridge University Press, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511755149
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Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov ChainOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimality of (s, S) Policies in Inventory Models with Markovian Demand I: With Markov-Modulated Demand and Fixed Ordering Costs, a State-Dependent (s, S) Policy Is Optimal over a Finite HorizonResearch Paper

Inventory control when demand follows the state of the world

Single-item inventory theory asks how much stock to order each period when the order carries a fixed cost KKK on top of a per-unit cost and demand is random. With independent, identically distributed demand, Scarf (1960) showed that the optimal finite-horizon policy has the (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) form: when the stock falls below the reorder point sss, order up to the level SSS; otherwise order nothing. His proof introduced KKK-convexity.

In practice demand is rarely i.i.d. It depends on economic conditions, seasons, or the stage of a product's life cycle, which change over time and carry over from one period to the next. Song and Zipkin (1993) modeled this by letting a Markov chain of "world states" modulate the demand distribution. Sethi and Cheng (1997) treat a general discrete-time model of this kind. The demand density, the cost parameters and the surplus cost all depend on the period and on the current demand state. They prove that a state-dependent (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) policy is optimal over a finite horizon. They require no growth condition on the backlog cost, and they allow sss and SSS to be −∞-\infty−∞.

Timeline:

  • 1960: Scarf proves (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) optimality for i.i.d. demand using KKK-convexity, assuming a backlog cost that grows faster than the unit ordering cost.
  • 1966: Veinott gives an alternative proof under different assumptions.
  • 1993: Song and Zipkin treat a continuous-time model with Markov-modulated Poisson demand and linear costs, assuming p>αcip > \alpha c^ip>αci.
  • 1997: Sethi and Cheng prove the discrete-time result studied here, with general convex surplus costs.

Setting

There are LLL demand states III and periods 0,1,…,N0, 1, \dots, N0,1,…,N. The state iki_kik​ in period kkk follows a Markov chain with transition matrix P=(pij)P = (p_{ij})P=(pij​). Given ik=ii_k = iik​=i, the demand ξk≥0\xi_k \ge 0ξk​≥0 has density φi,k\varphi_{i,k}φi,k​, with mean at most MMM. At the start of period kkk an order uk≥0u_k \ge 0uk​≥0 is placed and arrives at once. Then demand is subtracted, and unmet demand is backlogged:

xk+1=xk+uk−ξk.x_{k+1} = x_k + u_k - \xi_k .xk+1​=xk​+uk​−ξk​.

Ordering costs ck(i,u)=Kkiδ(u)+ckiuc_k(i,u) = K^i_k\delta(u) + c^i_k uck​(i,u)=Kki​δ(u)+cki​u, with δ(u)=1\delta(u) = 1δ(u)=1 for u>0u > 0u>0 and 000 otherwise, and Kki,cki≥0K^i_k, c^i_k \ge 0Kki​,cki​≥0. A surplus xxx costs fk(i,x)f_k(i,x)fk​(i,x), a convex, nonnegative function with fk(i,0)=0f_k(i,0) = 0fk​(i,0)=0 and fk(i,x)≤C(1+∣x∣)f_k(i,x) \le C(1+|x|)fk​(i,x)≤C(1+∣x∣).

A decision U=(un,…,uN−1)U = (u_n, \dots, u_{N-1})U=(un​,…,uN−1​) may depend on the whole observed history: the states up to the current one and the past demands. The objective and the value function are

Jn(i,x;U)=E{∑k=nN[ck(ik,uk)+fk(ik,xk)]},vn(i,x)=inf⁡UJn(i,x;U).J_n(i,x;U) = E\Big\{\sum_{k=n}^{N} \big[c_k(i_k,u_k) + f_k(i_k,x_k)\big]\Big\}, \qquad v_n(i,x) = \inf_U J_n(i,x;U).Jn​(i,x;U)=E{k=n∑N​[ck​(ik​,uk​)+fk​(ik​,xk​)]},vn​(i,x)=Uinf​Jn​(i,x;U).

With

Fn+1(b)(i,y)=∑jpij∫0∞b(j,y−z)φi,n(z) dz,F_{n+1}(b)(i,y) = \sum_j p_{ij}\int_0^\infty b(j,y-z)\varphi_{i,n}(z)\,dz,Fn+1​(b)(i,y)=j∑​pij​∫0∞​b(j,y−z)φi,n​(z)dz,

the dynamic programming equations are vN=fNv_N = f_NvN​=fN​ and

vn(i,x)=fn(i,x)+inf⁡u≥0{cn(i,u)+Fn+1(vn+1)(i,x+u)}.v_n(i,x) = f_n(i,x) + \inf_{u\ge 0}\big\{c_n(i,u) + F_{n+1}(v_{n+1})(i,x+u)\big\}.vn​(i,x)=fn​(i,x)+u≥0inf​{cn​(i,u)+Fn+1​(vn+1​)(i,x+u)}.

A function ggg is KKK-convex if K+g(z+y)≥g(y)+z (g(y)−g(y−b))/bK + g(z+y) \ge g(y) + z\,(g(y)-g(y-b))/bK+g(z+y)≥g(y)+z(g(y)−g(y−b))/b for all z≥0z \ge 0z≥0, b>0b > 0b>0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.1

Assume, for n∈⟨0,N−1⟩n \in \langle 0, N-1\ranglen∈⟨0,N−1⟩ and all iii,

Kni≥∑jpijKn+1j≥0(4.1),cnix+Fn+1(fn+1)(i,x)→+∞ (x→∞)(4.2).K^i_n \ge \sum_j p_{ij}K^j_{n+1} \ge 0 \quad (4.1), \qquad c^i_n x + F_{n+1}(f_{n+1})(i,x) \to +\infty \ (x\to\infty) \quad (4.2).Kni​≥j∑​pij​Kn+1j​≥0(4.1),cni​x+Fn+1​(fn+1​)(i,x)→+∞ (x→∞)(4.2).

Then there are extended reals sni≤Sni<+∞s^i_n \le S^i_n < +\inftysni​≤Sni​<+∞ such that the rule

u^n(i,x)=(Sni−x) δ(sni−x)\hat u_n(i,x) = (S^i_n - x)\,\delta(s^i_n - x)u^n​(i,x)=(Sni​−x)δ(sni​−x)

(a) attains the infimum in the dynamic programming equation at every nnn, iii, xxx, and (b) generates a policy whose expected cost equals v0(i,x)v_0(i,x)v0​(i,x), the infimum over all admissible history-dependent policies.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 3.1: the DP functions lie in C1C_1C1​ (nonnegative, linear growth, uniformly continuous), and a measurable minimizer exists.
  2. Theorem 3.2: the verification theorem.
  3. Proposition 4.1(i)–(iv): calculus of KKK-convex functions.
  4. Proposition 4.2(i)–(vi): the one-period (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) structure of a KKK-convex, lower semicontinuous function on an interval [A,B][A,B][A,B] with extended-real endpoints.
  5. From the proof of Theorem 4.1: vn≥fnv_n \ge f_nvn​≥fn​; zn(i,y)=cniy+Fn+1(vn+1)(i,y)z_n(i,y) = c^i_n y + F_{n+1}(v_{n+1})(i,y)zn​(i,y)=cni​y+Fn+1​(vn+1​)(i,y) is coercive at +∞+\infty+∞ and uniformly continuous; vn(i,⋅)v_n(i,\cdot)vn​(i,⋅) and zn(i,⋅)z_n(i,\cdot)zn​(i,⋅) are KniK^i_nKni​-convex.

Significance

The theorem shows that the (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) form survives when demand is driven by a Markov environment, with fixed costs that may vary by state and period. The only coupling condition is (4.1), under which today's fixed cost is at least the expected fixed cost of the next period. It needs no assumption on the backlog side, such as p>cp > cp>c. When ordering never pays, the levels are −∞-\infty−∞. The result is the base case of the paper's later extensions: no-ordering periods, capacity limits, and the discounted infinite horizon (a separate mission in this series). Policies of this kind are what practitioners compute.

The result is proved in print. The paper delegates Theorems 3.1–3.2 to Beyer, Sethi and Taksar (1998). It contains gaps, which this mission records and repairs:

  1. Theorem 3.1's minimizer needs a coercivity condition.
  2. Proposition 4.2(v) fails for a merely lower semicontinuous ggg.
  3. Proposition 4.2's hypothesis g∗>−∞g^* > -\inftyg∗>−∞ is not checked for znz_nzn​, which can be unbounded below.

A machine-checked proof settles these points. No formalization of the theorem or of its verification step exists. Published platform results cover the narrower Lemma 4.2.1 of Bertsekas, for continuous functions coercive at both ends.

Difficulty

The KKK-convexity calculus is elementary. The difficulty lies elsewhere:

  1. Verification. Theorem 3.2 compares a feedback rule against every history-dependent, measurable policy. This needs a measurable-selection and dynamic-programming argument with integrals over paths of a Markov-modulated process. The natural induction must also control integrability at every step.
  2. Proposition 4.2 at its generality. ggg is only lower semicontinuous, [A,B][A,B][A,B] may be unbounded, and SSS or sss may equal −∞-\infty−∞. The case analysis behind (ii)–(iv) is delicate at the boundary.
  3. The unbounded-below case. When znz_nzn​ is unbounded below, Proposition 4.2 does not apply. One must show directly that never ordering is optimal, using KKK-convexity at a "record low" far to the left.

Formalization scope

Conventions committed to in Lean, namespace SethiChengSS.Finite:

  • Demand states are Fin L; periods are natural numbers with the paper's base.
  • A policy is a function of (t, states i_n…i_{n+t}, demands ξ_n…ξ_{n+t−1}). It is admissible if it is nonnegative and measurable in the demands. So it cannot see the current or future demand, and nothing restricts it to Markov rules.
  • Expectations use the joint density ∏pitit+1φit,t(ξt)\prod p_{i_t i_{t+1}}\varphi_{i_t,t}(\xi_t)∏pit​it+1​​φit​,t​(ξt​) with respect to counting measure times Lebesgue measure. This is the conditional-independence reading of "ξ_k dependent on i_k" under which (3.1) is the conditional expectation in (3.2).
  • JJJ and vvv are lintegral/⨅ in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞].
  • No order is placed in period NNN (uN=0u_N = 0uN​=0; (2.3) prints cNc_NcN​).
  • The DP is real-valued, with Bochner integrals and real infima. Theorem 3.1 shows they are genuine.
  • s,Ss, Ss,S are EReal, with S≠+∞S \ne +\inftyS=+∞ and S=−∞S = -\inftyS=−∞ only if s=−∞s = -\inftys=−∞.
  • Pins: (4.2) is added to the minimizer part of Theorem 3.1; continuity of ggg is added to Proposition 4.2(v).

Trivializations excluded:

  • The value is the infimum over all history-dependent measurable policies, never the DP solution itself.
  • Policies are neither restricted to Markov rules nor allowed to be non-measurable.
  • The densities are genuine probability densities and PPP is stochastic.
  • Real-valued s,Ss, Ss,S, which would make the goal false, are not required. Unbounded S=+∞S = +\inftyS=+∞, which would make the rule meaningless, is excluded.

K-convexity is the published definition BertsekasKConvex. The published Bertsekas lemmas (BertsekasDP.kconvex_of_convex, kconvex_combination, kconvex_expectation, kconvex_sS_structure) are included as references. Each is narrower than its counterpart here: positive coefficients only, finite support only, continuity and coercivity at both ends. The posed SongZipkinFluct.FixedCost.theorem3 concerns a different, continuous-time model with integer levels and linear costs and is not used.

Welcome contributions: reusable infrastructure for path-space expectations of Markov-modulated processes; verification theorems for finite-horizon DPs with history-dependent policies; the extended-real KKK-convexity lemmas of Proposition 4.2.

Selected references

  • S. P. Sethi and F. Cheng, Optimality of (s, S) policies in inventory models with Markovian demand, Operations Research 45(6), 931–939, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.45.6.931
  • H. Scarf, The optimality of (S, s) policies in the dynamic inventory problem, in Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, Stanford University Press, 1960.
  • A. F. Veinott, On the optimality of (s, S) inventory policies: new conditions and a new proof, SIAM J. Appl. Math. 14(5), 1067–1083, 1966. https://doi.org/10.1137/0114086
  • J.-S. Song and P. Zipkin, Inventory control in a fluctuating demand environment, Operations Research 41(2), 351–370, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.41.2.351
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Dynamic Programming and Stochastic Control, Academic Press, New York (cited by Sethi and Cheng as 1978; Lemma (d), p. 85).
  • D. Beyer, S. P. Sethi and M. Taksar, Inventory models with Markovian demands and cost functions of polynomial growth, J. Optim. Theory Appl. 98(2), 281–323, 1998.
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Machine LearningProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

What Can We Learn Privately? II: Parity Functions Are Privately PAC Learnable from O(d log(1/β)/(εα)) ExamplesResearch Paper

Learning parities under differential privacy

Differential privacy (Dwork, McSherry, Nissim and Smith, 2006) requires a randomized algorithm's output distribution to change little when one individual's record is changed. PAC learning asks an algorithm to output, from i.i.d. labeled examples, a hypothesis whose error is small with high probability. Kasiviswanathan, Lee, Nissim, Raskhodnikova and Smith (arXiv:0803.0924v3; SIAM J. Comput. 40(3) (2011) 793–826, DOI 10.1137/090756090) asked which concept classes can be learned under both requirements at once. All theorem, page and display numbers in this mission are those of the arXiv v3.

Their generic learner (§3, the subject of mission I of this series) learns every finite class privately with a polynomial number of examples, but its running time is exponential in the representation size for classes such as parity. Parity functions are the standard example of a class that is learnable efficiently by linear algebra and not learnable with statistical queries (Kearns, 1998; Blum et al., 1994), a model that was then the main known source of efficient private learners (Blum, Dwork, McSherry and Nissim, 2005). Section 4 of the paper gives an efficient private PAC learner for parity. The result separates efficient private learning from statistical-query learning, and the local (randomized-response) model from the centralized one (missions III–V).

Setting

For d≥1d \ge 1d≥1 and r∈{0,1}dr \in \{0,1\}^dr∈{0,1}d, the parity function cr(x)=r⊙xc_r(x) = r \odot xcr​(x)=r⊙x is the inner product of rrr and xxx modulo 2; PARITY is {cr:r∈{0,1}d}\{c_r : r \in \{0,1\}^d\}{cr​:r∈{0,1}d}. A database is z=(z1,…,zn)z = (z_1,\dots,z_n)z=(z1​,…,zn​) with zi=(xi,yi)∈{0,1}d×{0,1}z_i = (x_i, y_i) \in \{0,1\}^d \times \{0,1\}zi​=(xi​,yi​)∈{0,1}d×{0,1}. Two databases are neighbors if they differ in exactly one entry. A randomized algorithm AAA, identified with the law A(z)A(z)A(z) of its output, is ε\varepsilonε-differentially private if Pr⁡[A(z)∈S]≤eεPr⁡[A(z′)∈S]\Pr[A(z) \in S] \le e^{\varepsilon}\Pr[A(z') \in S]Pr[A(z)∈S]≤eεPr[A(z′)∈S] for all neighbors z,z′z, z'z,z′ and all sets SSS of outputs. Lap(s)\mathrm{Lap}(s)Lap(s) is the Laplace distribution with density 12se−∣x∣/s\frac{1}{2s}e^{-|x|/s}2s1​e−∣x∣/s.

For S⊆[n]S \subseteq [n]S⊆[n], VS⊆Z2dV_S \subseteq \mathbb Z_2^dVS​⊆Z2d​ is the solution space of the linear system {xi⊙r=yi:i∈S}\{x_i \odot r = y_i : i \in S\}{xi​⊙r=yi​:i∈S}. The basic learner A(z,ε)\mathcal A(z,\varepsilon)A(z,ε) outputs ⊥\bot⊥ with probability 1/21/21/2; otherwise it puts each i∈[n]i \in [n]i∈[n] into SSS independently with probability p=ε/4p = \varepsilon/4p=ε/4 and outputs cr∗c_{r^*}cr∗​ for r∗r^*r∗ uniform in VSV_SVS​, or ⊥\bot⊥ if VS=∅V_S = \emptysetVS​=∅.

The amplified learner A∗(z,ε,α,β)\mathcal A^*(z,\varepsilon,\alpha,\beta)A∗(z,ε,α,β) sets β′=β/2\beta' = \beta/2β′=β/2, α′=α/5\alpha' = \alpha/5α′=α/5, k=⌈log⁡4/3(1/β′)⌉k = \lceil\log_{4/3}(1/\beta')\rceilk=⌈log4/3​(1/β′)⌉, n′=⌈cd/(εα′)⌉n' = \lceil cd/(\varepsilon\alpha')\rceiln′=⌈cd/(εα′)⌉, s=⌈(c′k/(α′ε))log⁡2(k/β′)⌉s = \lceil (c'k/(\alpha'\varepsilon))\log_2(k/\beta')\rceils=⌈(c′k/(α′ε))log2​(k/β′)⌉ for constants c,c′c, c'c,c′. If n≤kn′+sn \le kn' + sn≤kn′+s it returns "insufficient samples". Otherwise it runs A\mathcal AA on kkk disjoint blocks of n′n'n′ examples, obtaining h1,…,hkh_1,\dots,h_kh1​,…,hk​. It perturbs each training error on the next sss examples by independent Lap(k/(sε))\mathrm{Lap}(k/(s\varepsilon))Lap(k/(sε)) noise and outputs the hjh_jhj​ with the least perturbed error.

For a distribution X\mathcal XX on {0,1}d\{0,1\}^d{0,1}d and a target crc_rcr​, the error of cr′c_{r'}cr′​ is err(cr′)=Pr⁡x∼X[cr′(x)≠cr(x)]\mathrm{err}(c_{r'}) = \Pr_{x\sim\mathcal X}[c_{r'}(x) \ne c_r(x)]err(cr′​)=Prx∼X​[cr′​(x)=cr​(x)], and probabilities of the learner's success are over x1,…,xn∼Xx_1,\dots,x_n \sim \mathcal Xx1​,…,xn​∼X i.i.d., zi=(xi,cr(xi))z_i = (x_i, c_r(x_i))zi​=(xi​,cr​(xi​)), and the learner's coins.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.4

There are constants c,c′,C>0c, c', C > 0c,c′,C>0 such that for all d≥1d \ge 1d≥1, 0<ε≤1/20 < \varepsilon \le 1/20<ε≤1/2, α,β∈(0,1/2)\alpha, \beta \in (0,1/2)α,β∈(0,1/2): A∗(⋅,ε,α,β)\mathcal A^*(\cdot,\varepsilon,\alpha,\beta)A∗(⋅,ε,α,β) is ε\varepsilonε-differentially private on databases of every size, and

n≥C (d+log⁡2(1/β))log⁡2(1/β)εα  ⟹  Pr⁡[A∗ outputs h∗ with err(h∗)≤α]≥1−βn \ge C\,\frac{(d + \log_2(1/\beta))\log_2(1/\beta)}{\varepsilon\alpha} \implies \Pr\big[\mathcal A^* \text{ outputs } h^* \text{ with } \mathrm{err}(h^*) \le \alpha\big] \ge 1-\betan≥Cεα(d+log2​(1/β))log2​(1/β)​⟹Pr[A∗ outputs h∗ with err(h∗)≤α]≥1−β

for every distribution X\mathcal XX and every target crc_rcr​. When log⁡2(1/β)≤d\log_2(1/\beta) \le dlog2​(1/β)≤d the bound is the paper's O(dlog⁡(1/β)/(εα))O(d\log(1/\beta)/(\varepsilon\alpha))O(dlog(1/β)/(εα)). The constants are fixed before all other parameters. The goal is literally the conjunction of Lemma 4.5 and Lemma 4.6.

Milestones

Thm 2.3 (Laplace mechanism),Claim 2.2 (composition),Thm A.1 (Chernoff),Occam’s razor for ∣H∣=2d,\text{Thm 2.3 (Laplace mechanism)},\quad \text{Claim 2.2 (composition)},\quad \text{Thm A.1 (Chernoff)},\quad \text{Occam's razor for } |H| = 2^d,Thm 2.3 (Laplace mechanism),Claim 2.2 (composition),Thm A.1 (Chernoff),Occam’s razor for ∣H∣=2d, Lemma 4.1: n≥8εα(dln⁡2+ln⁡4)⇒Pr⁡[A(z,ε)=h, err(h)≤α]≥14,\text{Lemma 4.1: } n \ge \tfrac{8}{\varepsilon\alpha}(d\ln 2 + \ln 4) \Rightarrow \Pr[\mathcal A(z,\varepsilon) = h,\ \mathrm{err}(h)\le\alpha] \ge \tfrac14,Lemma 4.1: n≥εα8​(dln2+ln4)⇒Pr[A(z,ε)=h, err(h)≤α]≥41​, ∣VT∣≤2∣VT∪{i}∣ if VT∪{i}≠∅,Claim 4.3,Lemma 4.2 (A private),Lemma 4.5 (A∗ private),Lemma 4.6 (A∗ learns).|V_T| \le 2|V_{T\cup\{i\}}| \text{ if } V_{T\cup\{i\}} \ne \emptyset,\quad \text{Claim 4.3},\quad \text{Lemma 4.2 (}\mathcal A\text{ private)},\quad \text{Lemma 4.5 (}\mathcal A^*\text{ private)},\quad \text{Lemma 4.6 (}\mathcal A^*\text{ learns)}.∣VT​∣≤2∣VT∪{i}​∣ if VT∪{i}​=∅,Claim 4.3,Lemma 4.2 (A private),Lemma 4.5 (A∗ private),Lemma 4.6 (A∗ learns).

Significance

The theorem shows that the restriction to private algorithms does not separate efficient learnability from statistical-query learnability: parity is efficiently and privately PAC learnable, yet not SQ learnable. Its sample complexity exceeds the non-private O((d+ln⁡(1/β))/α)O((d + \ln(1/\beta))/\alpha)O((d+ln(1/β))/α) by a factor O(ln⁡(1/β)/ε)O(\ln(1/\beta)/\varepsilon)O(ln(1/β)/ε) (remark, p. 18). The private amplification step (private model selection with Laplace-perturbed test errors) is a general technique that converts any private learner with constant success probability into a private PAC learner.

The result is proved in the paper; none of it is machine-checked as far as we know. The mission produces a formal library of the basic privacy calculus (Laplace mechanism, composition and post-processing), the Z2\mathbb Z_2Z2​ solution-space estimate behind the privacy of A\mathcal AA, and the analysis of both learners. Formalizing it also repairs the paper's statement: the printed sample bound fails when log⁡(1/β)\log(1/\beta)log(1/β) is large compared with ddd (see the scope section), and the base of the logarithm defining kkk is misprinted.

Difficulty

The obvious private learner, "solve the linear system on all examples and output a random solution", is not private. One changed example can make the system inconsistent and turn every hypothesis output into failure, so the output law on neighboring databases differs by an unbounded factor. Two devices restore privacy: subsampling each example with probability ε/4\varepsilon/4ε/4, and failing with probability 1/21/21/2 unconditionally. The privacy proof then needs a quantitative fact about Z2\mathbb Z_2Z2​: adding one consistent equation at most halves the solution space. The proof must also handle databases labeled by no parity at all, where solution spaces are empty.

Utility has its own difficulty. The amplified learner selects among candidates through noisy test errors, so three failure events (no good candidate, unrepresentative test set, large Laplace noise) must be bounded together. The sizes kkk, n′n'n′, sss must also be shown to fit inside the claimed sample bound.

Formalization scope

  • Bits are ZMod 2; {0,1}d\{0,1\}^d{0,1}d is Fin d → ZMod 2; cr(x)c_r(x)cr​(x) is dotProduct r x. Databases are Fin n → (Fin d → ZMod 2) × ZMod 2, with 0-based indices.
  • An algorithm is the law of its output. A\mathcal AA's output is Option (Fin d → ZMod 2) (none = ⊥\bot⊥). A∗\mathcal A^*A∗'s output is "insufficient samples", ⊥\bot⊥, or a hypothesis crc_rcr​. Every set of outputs is measurable, and differential privacy is required for all measurable sets.
  • The distribution X\mathcal XX is a PMF on the finite set {0,1}d\{0,1\}^d{0,1}d. The probability over the examples is a finite sum weighted by ∏iX(xi)\prod_i \mathcal X(x_i)∏i​X(xi​), and ⊥\bot⊥ has error 1.
  • Corrections and explicit hypotheses. (1) k=⌈log⁡4/3(1/β′)⌉k = \lceil\log_{4/3}(1/\beta')\rceilk=⌈log4/3​(1/β′)⌉: the printed base 3/43/43/4 gives k≤0k \le 0k≤0, and the proof needs (3/4)k≤β′(3/4)^k \le \beta'(3/4)k≤β′. (2) Sizes are ceilings; log⁡\loglog is base 2 and ln⁡\lnln is natural, as on p. 8. (3) Privacy is stated for 0<ε≤1/20 < \varepsilon \le 1/20<ε≤1/2: the proof of Lemma 4.2 uses ε≤1/2\varepsilon \le 1/2ε≤1/2, and its step 2p/(1−p)+1≤ε+12p/(1-p) + 1 \le \varepsilon + 12p/(1−p)+1≤ε+1 fails beyond that. Utility statements need only 0<ε≤40 < \varepsilon \le 40<ε≤4, so that p=ε/4p = \varepsilon/4p=ε/4 is a probability. (4) The printed bound O(dlog⁡(1/β)/(εα))O(d\log(1/\beta)/(\varepsilon\alpha))O(dlog(1/β)/(εα)) is false when log⁡(1/β)≫d\log(1/\beta) \gg dlog(1/β)≫d, because A∗\mathcal A^*A∗ refuses unless n>kn′+sn > kn' + sn>kn′+s and sss grows like log⁡2(1/β)/(εα)\log^2(1/\beta)/(\varepsilon\alpha)log2(1/β)/(εα). Utility is therefore stated with the bound C(d+log⁡2(1/β))log⁡2(1/β)/(εα)C(d + \log_2(1/\beta))\log_2(1/\beta)/(\varepsilon\alpha)C(d+log2​(1/β))log2​(1/β)/(εα), the order of kn′+skn' + skn′+s, which equals the printed order whenever log⁡2(1/β)≤d\log_2(1/\beta) \le dlog2​(1/β)≤d. The privacy conjunct does not depend on the sample bound. (5) A ⊥\bot⊥ candidate does not take part in the argmin, and ties go to the least index. (6) Lemma 4.1 assumes α≤1/2\alpha \le 1/2α≤1/2, which its proof uses. (7) Claim 4.3 is stated in product form (no division). (8) Theorem 2.3 takes any positive bound Δ\DeltaΔ on the global sensitivity.
  • "Efficiently" (polynomial running time) is not modelled.
  • Ruling out trivial readings. The constants c,c′,Cc, c', Cc,c′,C are existentially quantified once, outside every other quantifier. A constant chosen after ddd, ε\varepsilonε, α\alphaα, β\betaβ would make the utility claim trivial. Success requires an actual hypothesis output, so "insufficient samples" and ⊥\bot⊥ are failures. Privacy quantifies over all databases, not only consistently labeled ones.
  • Reused results: ComputationalLearning.chernoff_bounds (Theorem A.1) and ComputationalLearning.occam_cardinality (Occam's razor), both proved on the platform.
  • Contributions welcome: proofs of the privacy calculus (Theorem 2.3, Claim 2.2) for general use, the Z2\mathbb Z_2Z2​ halving lemma, and the utility analysis. The first two are reusable well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • S. P. Kasiviswanathan, H. K. Lee, K. Nissim, S. Raskhodnikova, A. Smith, What Can We Learn Privately?, SIAM J. Comput. 40(3) (2011) 793–826. arXiv:0803.0924v3, DOI 10.1137/090756090
  • C. Dwork, F. McSherry, K. Nissim, A. Smith, Calibrating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis, TCC 2006. DOI 10.1007/11681878_14
  • A. Blum, C. Dwork, F. McSherry, K. Nissim, Practical Privacy: The SuLQ Framework, PODS 2005. DOI 10.1145/1065167.1065184
  • M. Kearns, Efficient Noise-Tolerant Learning from Statistical Queries, J. ACM 45(6) (1998) 983–1006. DOI 10.1145/293347.293351
  • A. Blum, M. Furst, J. Jackson, M. Kearns, Y. Mansour, S. Rudich, Weakly Learning DNF and Characterizing Statistical Query Learning Using Fourier Analysis, STOC 1994. DOI 10.1145/195058.195147
  • M. Kearns, U. Vazirani, An Introduction to Computational Learning Theory, MIT Press, 1994. DOI 10.7551/mitpress/3897.001.0001
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Discrete GeometryProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: wurtle

The Gaussian propeller bound in every dimensionResearch Paper

Motivation

Split Euclidean space into finitely many measurable cells and record, for each cell, its Gaussian first moment, the integral of xxx against the standard Gaussian measure over that cell. How large can the sum of the squared lengths of these vectors be? The propeller conjecture predicts that, with at least three cells in dimension at least two, the answer is 9/(8π)9/(8\pi)9/(8π), attained by three planar sectors of angle 2π/32\pi/32π/3 (a "propeller") times the orthogonal complement. The question arose in Khot and Naor's work on approximate kernel clustering (Mathematika 2009), where this Gaussian partition parameter determines both the approximation ratio of Gaussian rounding and the matching Unique-Games hardness threshold. The surprise is that more cells or more dimensions do not help: the optimum uses only three cells in a plane.

This mission asks for a formal proof of the propeller bound in every dimension, as stated in an OpenAI preprint dated September 24, 2026 (source). The preprint has not been peer reviewed and its claims have not been independently verified; on the platform the Lean goal is open.

Background

  • 1983–2003 — The Gaussian Minkowski (Ehrhard) inequality: Ehrhard for convex sets (Math. Scand. 1983), Latała when one set is convex (Studia Math. 1996), Borell for Borel sets (C. R. Acad. Sci. 2003); later van Handel's game proof (PTRF 2018).
  • 2009 — Khot and Naor introduce the problem, reduce maximizers to conical partitions in the span of their centroids, and compute the three-cell value (Mathematika 2009); see also their sharp kernel-clustering paper (RSA 2013).
  • 2013 — Heilman, Jagannath and Naor prove the conjecture in R3\mathbb R^3R3 with a computer-assisted argument (DCG 2013).
  • 2022 — Heilman gives a conditional route for three or four cells in any dimension, under a stability hypothesis on noise-stability maximizers (arXiv:2209.11216).
  • September 2026 — The OpenAI preprint claims the bound for every dimension and every number of cells (Theorem 1.1, p. 1).

Setting

Let γd\gamma_dγd​ be the standard Gaussian probability measure on Rd\mathbb R^dRd, with density (2π)−d/2e−∥x∥2/2(2\pi)^{-d/2}e^{-\|x\|^2/2}(2π)−d/2e−∥x∥2/2. For a measurable set A⊆RdA\subseteq\mathbb R^dA⊆Rd, its centroid is the unnormalized vector

z(A)=∫Ax dγd(x)∈Rd.z(A)=\int_A x\,d\gamma_d(x)\in\mathbb R^d .z(A)=∫A​xdγd​(x)∈Rd.

A measurable partition (A1,…,Ak)(A_1,\dots,A_k)(A1​,…,Ak​) of Rd\mathbb R^dRd consists of measurable sets such that almost every point (for γd\gamma_dγd​) lies in exactly one of them; empty cells and arbitrary cell probabilities are allowed. Its value is F(A)=∑i=1k∥z(Ai)∥2F(A)=\sum_{i=1}^k\|z(A_i)\|^2F(A)=∑i=1k​∥z(Ai​)∥2. The propeller is the partition of Rd\mathbb R^dRd, d≥2d\ge2d≥2, into the three sets Sj×Rd−2S_j\times\mathbb R^{d-2}Sj​×Rd−2, where S1,S2,S3S_1,S_2,S_3S1​,S2​,S3​ are the planar sectors of opening 2π/32\pi/32π/3 bounded by the rays at angles ±π/3\pm\pi/3±π/3 and π\piπ, with any further cells empty.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1.1 (p. 1)

For all positive integers d,kd,kd,k and every measurable partition (A1,…,Ak)(A_1,\dots,A_k)(A1​,…,Ak​) of Rd\mathbb R^dRd,

∑i=1k∥∫Aix dγd(x)∥2 ≤ 98π,\sum_{i=1}^k\Bigl\|\int_{A_i}x\,d\gamma_d(x)\Bigr\|^2\ \le\ \frac{9}{8\pi},i=1∑k​​∫Ai​​xdγd​(x)​2 ≤ 8π9​,

and for d≥2d\ge2d≥2, k≥3k\ge3k≥3 the propeller is a measurable partition attaining equality.

Significance

The result itself. It settles the propeller conjecture in all dimensions and for all numbers of cells, without constraints on cell masses. Through Khot and Naor's analysis, the constant 9/(8π)9/(8\pi)9/(8π) fixes the loss factor αk=8π9(1−1k)\alpha_k=\frac{8\pi}{9}(1-\frac1k)αk​=98π​(1−k1​) of Gaussian rounding for identity-target kernel clustering; combined with the companion Unique Games preprint, the preprint deduces NP-hardness of any better fixed loss factor (Theorem 6.1, p. 18). The bound also gives a sharp inequality for expected Gaussian maxima (Corollary 5.1, p. 17).

Formalizing it. A formal proof needs Gaussian measures on Euclidean space (available in Mathlib as stdGaussian), a compactness argument for extremal partitions, the convex case of the Ehrhard inequality, and the three-dimensional theorem of Heilman, Jagannath and Naor, which the preprint uses as an established input and which itself relies on a finite computer verification. Each of these is a reusable component; the three-dimensional case alone would be a substantial formalization.

Difficulty

The optimization runs over all measurable partitions, with both shapes and probabilities free. Khot and Naor's reduction gives conical extremizers whose mmm nonzero centroids span an (m−1)(m-1)(m−1)-dimensional space, so the three-dimensional theorem disposes of m≤4m\le4m≤4 active cells. The remaining cases m≥5m\ge5m≥5 cannot be handled by any fixed finite computation. The preprint constrains them in two ways: deleting one score costs a definite amount of expected maximum, via concavity from the Ehrhard inequality (Section 3), and competition against two residual scores constrains a covariance determinant (Section 4, Lemma 4.1 and Corollary 4.2, pp. 11–12). Combining these must rule out every configuration with five or more cells.

Formalization scope

  • Space d is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) and the measure is stdGaussian. IsPartition A asks each cell to be measurable and almost every point to lie in exactly one cell, matching the paper's convention that partitions are taken up to null sets.
  • centroid A is the Bochner integral of the identity over A; value sums squared Euclidean norms. Integrability holds because Gaussian measures have finite first moments.
  • The goal is a conjunction: the bound for all d,k≥1d,k\ge1d,k≥1, and, for d≥2d\ge2d≥2, k≥3k\ge3k≥3, that the explicit three-sector propeller d k (cells ≥3\ge3≥3 empty) is a partition with value exactly 9/(8π)9/(8\pi)9/(8π). The sectors are written with closed inequalities, so they overlap only on null rays.
  • No hypothesis is vacuous: the case k=1k=1k=1 is included (value 000), and the equality clause pins the constant.

Selected references

  • OpenAI, The Gaussian propeller bound in every dimension, OpenAI Math Release preprint, September 24, 2026. https://github.com/openai/math/blob/adc7f1241b42e322a6451854ab7e4b4c146bf78a/preprints/The-Gaussian-Propeller-Bound-in-Every-Dimension-September-24-2026/main.pdf
  • S. Khot, A. Naor, Approximate kernel clustering, Mathematika 55 (2009), 129–165. https://doi.org/10.1112/S002557930000098X
  • S. Khot, A. Naor, Sharp kernel clustering algorithms and their associated Grothendieck inequalities, Random Struct. Algorithms 42 (2013), 269–300. https://doi.org/10.1002/rsa.20398
  • S. Heilman, A. Jagannath, A. Naor, Solution of the Propeller Conjecture in R3\mathbb R^3R3, Discrete Comput. Geom. 50 (2013), 263–305. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00454-013-9530-0
  • S. Heilman, Hyperstable sets with voting and algorithmic hardness applications, arXiv:2209.11216 (2022). https://arxiv.org/abs/2209.11216v1
  • A. Ehrhard, Symétrisation dans l'espace de Gauss, Math. Scand. 53 (1983), 281–301. https://doi.org/10.7146/math.scand.a-12035
  • R. Latała, A note on the Ehrhard inequality, Studia Math. 118 (1996), 169–174. https://doi.org/10.4064/sm-118-2-169-174
  • C. Borell, The Ehrhard inequality, C. R. Acad. Sci. Paris 337 (2003), 663–666. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crma.2003.09.031
  • R. van Handel, The Borell–Ehrhard game, Probab. Theory Relat. Fields 170 (2018), 555–585. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00440-017-0762-4
  • E. Mossel, R. O'Donnell, K. Oleszkiewicz, Noise stability of functions with low influences: invariance and optimality, Ann. of Math. 171 (2010), 295–341. https://doi.org/10.4007/annals.2010.171.295
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Machine LearningProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

What Can We Learn Privately? I: The Exponential Mechanism Privately Agnostically Learns Any Finite Concept Class from O((ln|C| + ln(1/β))·max{1/(εα), 1/α²}) ExamplesResearch Paper

Motivation

Many learning tasks run on data about people: medical records, purchase histories, survey answers. A learner whose output reveals too much about any one training example is unusable on such data, however accurate it is. Differential privacy (Dwork, McSherry, Nissim and Smith, 2006) makes "reveals too much" precise: changing one individual's record may change the probability of any outcome of the algorithm by at most a factor eεe^{\varepsilon}eε.

Kasiviswanathan, Lee, Nissim, Raskhodnikova and Smith asked which concept classes can be learned under this constraint, and at what cost in examples. This mission formalizes their first answer (§3 of the paper): every finite concept class can be learned privately in the agnostic model, with a sample size that grows only logarithmically in the size of the class. The result is the private counterpart of the cardinality version of Occam's razor (Kearns and Vazirani, An Introduction to Computational Learning Theory, 1994, p. 35). The paper appeared in SIAM J. Comput. 40(3) (2011) 793–826, DOI 10.1137/090756090; all indices below are those of arXiv:0803.0924v3.

The learner is an instance of the exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar (FOCS 2007), which selects an output with probability exponentially weighted by a quality score.

Setting

A database of size nnn over a domain DDD is a vector z=(z1,…,zn)∈Dnz=(z_1,\dots,z_n)\in D^nz=(z1​,…,zn​)∈Dn. Databases z,z′z,z'z,z′ are neighbors if they differ in exactly one entry. A randomized algorithm AAA is described by the law A(z)A(z)A(z) of its output on each input. It is ε\varepsilonε-differentially private (Definition 2.1) if

Pr⁡[A(z)∈S]≤eεPr⁡[A(z′)∈S]\Pr[A(z)\in S]\le e^{\varepsilon}\Pr[A(z')\in S]Pr[A(z)∈S]≤eεPr[A(z′)∈S]

for all neighbors z,z′z,z'z,z′ and all measurable sets SSS of outputs.

Learning uses a finite set XXX of examples and labels {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1}. A hypothesis is a map h:X→{0,1}h:X\to\{0,1\}h:X→{0,1}, and HHH is a finite nonempty class of hypotheses; in the theorem H=CdH=C_dH=Cd​, the concept class itself. Data are drawn i.i.d. from an arbitrary probability distribution PPP on X×{0,1}X\times\{0,1\}X×{0,1} (the agnostic setting, Definition 2.5). The error of hhh is err(h)=Pr⁡(x,y)∼P[h(x)≠y]\mathrm{err}(h)=\Pr_{(x,y)\sim P}[h(x)\neq y]err(h)=Pr(x,y)∼P​[h(x)=y], and OPT=min⁡f∈Herr(f)\mathrm{OPT}=\min_{f\in H}\mathrm{err}(f)OPT=minf∈H​err(f). On a database z=((xi,yi))i≤nz=((x_i,y_i))_{i\le n}z=((xi​,yi​))i≤n​ the score is q(z,h)=−∣{i:yi≠h(xi)}∣q(z,h)=-|\{i:y_i\neq h(x_i)\}|q(z,h)=−∣{i:yi​=h(xi​)}∣ and the training error is errT(h)=−q(z,h)/n\mathrm{err}_T(h)=-q(z,h)/nerrT​(h)=−q(z,h)/n.

The exponential mechanism Aqε\mathcal A^{\varepsilon}_qAqε​ outputs h∈Hh\in Hh∈H with probability proportional to exp⁡(εq(z,h)/2)\exp(\varepsilon q(z,h)/2)exp(εq(z,h)/2). In Lean these objects are IsDP, err, OPT, score, errT and expMech in the namespace PrivLearn.Generic.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.4 (generic private learner)

There is an absolute constant C>0C>0C>0 such that for every finite XXX, every finite nonempty HHH, every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 and all α,β∈(0,1/2)\alpha,\beta\in(0,1/2)α,β∈(0,1/2):

  1. Aqε\mathcal A^{\varepsilon}_qAqε​ is ε\varepsilonε-differentially private on databases of every size;
  2. for every distribution PPP on X×{0,1}X\times\{0,1\}X×{0,1} and every
n ≥ C(ln⁡∣H∣+ln⁡1β)max⁡{1εα,1α2},n\ \ge\ C\Big(\ln|H|+\ln\tfrac1\beta\Big)\max\Big\{\tfrac1{\varepsilon\alpha},\tfrac1{\alpha^2}\Big\},n ≥ C(ln∣H∣+lnβ1​)max{εα1​,α21​},

the mechanism run on nnn i.i.d. samples from PPP satisfies

Pr⁡[err(Aqε(z))>OPT+α]≤β.\Pr\big[\mathrm{err}(\mathcal A^{\varepsilon}_q(z))>\mathrm{OPT}+\alpha\big]\le\beta .Pr[err(Aqε​(z))>OPT+α]≤β.

The constant is left unspecified, as the paper's O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) leaves it. The qualitative first sentence of Theorem 3.4 (classes of size exp⁡(poly(d))\exp(\mathrm{poly}(d))exp(poly(d)) are privately agnostically learnable) follows at once, because then ln⁡∣H∣\ln|H|ln∣H∣ is polynomial in ddd.

Milestones

  • Lemma 3.3: Aqε\mathcal A^{\varepsilon}_qAqε​ is ε\varepsilonε-differentially private.
  • Theorem A.2: for i.i.d. Xi∈[a,b]X_i\in[a,b]Xi​∈[a,b] with mean μ\muμ, Pr⁡[∣1n∑iXi−μ∣≥δ]≤2exp⁡(−2δ2n/(b−a)2)\Pr[|\frac1n\sum_iX_i-\mu|\ge\delta]\le2\exp(-2\delta^2n/(b-a)^2)Pr[∣n1​∑i​Xi​−μ∣≥δ]≤2exp(−2δ2n/(b−a)2).
  • Uniform convergence (proof of Theorem 3.4, p. 11): Pr⁡[∃h∈H: ∣err(h)−errT(h)∣≥ρ]≤2∣H∣e−2nρ2\Pr[\exists h\in H:\ |\mathrm{err}(h)-\mathrm{err}_T(h)|\ge\rho]\le2|H|e^{-2n\rho^2}Pr[∃h∈H: ∣err(h)−errT​(h)∣≥ρ]≤2∣H∣e−2nρ2.
  • Exponential weights (proof of Theorem 3.4, p. 12): if ∣err(h)−errT(h)∣<ρ|\mathrm{err}(h)-\mathrm{err}_T(h)|<\rho∣err(h)−errT​(h)∣<ρ for all h∈Hh\in Hh∈H, then Aqε(z)\mathcal A^{\varepsilon}_q(z)Aqε​(z) outputs some hhh with errT(h)≥OPT+2ρ\mathrm{err}_T(h)\ge\mathrm{OPT}+2\rhoerrT​(h)≥OPT+2ρ with probability at most ∣H∣e−εnρ/2|H|e^{-\varepsilon n\rho/2}∣H∣e−εnρ/2.
  • Corollary 3.6: the same guarantee with ln⁡∣H∣\ln|H|ln∣H∣ replaced by VCDIM(Cd)⋅ln⁡∣X∣\mathrm{VCDIM}(C_d)\cdot\ln|X|VCDIM(Cd​)⋅ln∣X∣.

Significance

Theorem 3.4 shows that privacy costs little in sample complexity when computation is unconstrained. Any class that some learner with polynomially long output can learn is learnable privately from polynomially many examples. The non-private agnostic bound is O((log⁡∣Cd∣+log⁡(1/β))/α2)O((\log|C_d|+\log(1/\beta))/\alpha^2)O((log∣Cd​∣+log(1/β))/α2); the private one is larger by a factor O(α/ε)O(\alpha/\varepsilon)O(α/ε) when α>ε\alpha>\varepsilonα>ε, and is the same otherwise (Remark, p. 12). The theorem is the baseline the rest of the paper refines: an efficient private learner for parity (§4) and the equivalence of local privacy with statistical query learning (§5). It also underlies later work on the sample complexity of private learning, such as Beimel, Kasiviswanathan and Nissim (TCC 2010).

The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has not been machine-checked. The mission produces a checked statement of the exponential mechanism's privacy and of its learning guarantee with an explicit dependence on ∣H∣|H|∣H∣, ε\varepsilonε, α\alphaα and β\betaβ. It also provides a reusable bounded i.i.d. Hoeffding inequality (Theorem A.2) in the form learning theory uses. Formalizing the proof with any explicit constant is welcome. The constant 666 printed at the end of the proof does not, by itself, make the last inequality close (the two error terms add to more than β\betaβ), so a correct constant is a genuine contribution.

Difficulty

Privacy and accuracy pull in opposite directions. Empirical risk minimization, the obvious learner, is not private: replacing one example can change which hypothesis minimizes the training error, and the output then changes with probability one. Smoothing the choice must not destroy accuracy, and the accuracy argument must hold simultaneously for every hypothesis in the class, with the mechanism's randomness and the sample's randomness combined into one failure probability. In Lean the measure-theoretic bookkeeping is non-trivial: the output is a measure on a function space, the failure probability integrates the mechanism's law against the product measure PnP^nPn, and the privacy bound must hold for every measurable event, not only for single hypotheses.

Formalization scope

  • Databases are vectors Fin n → X × Bool, indexed from 000; neighbors differ in exactly one coordinate.
  • Algorithms are output laws: Aqε(z)\mathcal A^{\varepsilon}_q(z)Aqε​(z) is the measure ∑h∈Hpz(h) δh\sum_{h\in H}p_z(h)\,\delta_h∑h∈H​pz​(h)δh​ on X → Bool with the product σ-algebra. It is a probability measure because HHH is nonempty and all weights are positive; the theorems assume HHH nonempty, and the definition does not build normalization in.
  • Privacy is required on every measurable set of outputs and for every database size nnn, with no assumption on how the data arise.
  • The example domain is a finite type with the discrete σ-algebra (the paper's XdX_dXd​ has representations of size at most ddd). The goal quantifies it over Type so that the absolute constant can precede it.
  • Labels are Bool, standing for {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1}. Logarithms are natural (Real.log), as in the paper's ln⁡\lnln.
  • Parameters are ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 and α,β∈(0,1/2)\alpha,\beta\in(0,1/2)α,β∈(0,1/2) as in Definitions 2.4 and 3.1. The failure event is the strict err(h)>OPT+α\mathrm{err}(h)>\mathrm{OPT}+\alphaerr(h)>OPT+α, as on p. 11, and OPT is the minimum over H=CdH=C_dH=Cd​.
  • O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) is formalized as one absolute constant C>0C>0C>0 quantified before the domain, the class, the distribution and all parameters. A constant chosen after them would make the statement trivially true.
  • Theorem A.2 assumes measurable, mutually independent, pairwise identically distributed variables with values in [a,b][a,b][a,b] at every point. It makes no assumption n≥1n\ge1n≥1 or a<ba<ba<b; in those cases the right side is 222 by Lean's division conventions.
  • Corollary 3.6 uses the platform's VC dimension ComputationalLearning.vcDim (Kearns–Vazirani's Definition 9, the same notion as the paper's Definition 3.5) and references the platform's proved Sauer lemma.

Contributions welcome: proofs of any milestone, a measurable-structure library for finite output laws, and a general exponential-mechanism privacy theorem from which Lemma 3.3 follows.

Selected references

  • S. P. Kasiviswanathan, H. K. Lee, K. Nissim, S. Raskhodnikova, A. Smith, What Can We Learn Privately?, SIAM J. Comput. 40(3) (2011) 793–826. arXiv:0803.0924v3, DOI 10.1137/090756090
  • C. Dwork, F. McSherry, K. Nissim, A. Smith, Calibrating Noise to Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis, TCC 2006. DOI 10.1007/11681878_14
  • F. McSherry, K. Talwar, Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy, FOCS 2007. DOI 10.1109/FOCS.2007.66
  • W. Hoeffding, Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables, J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 58 (1963) 13–30. DOI 10.1080/01621459.1963.10500830
  • M. Kearns, U. Vazirani, An Introduction to Computational Learning Theory, MIT Press, 1994. DOI 10.7551/mitpress/3897.001.0001
  • A. Beimel, S. P. Kasiviswanathan, K. Nissim, Bounds on the Sample Complexity for Private Learning and Private Data Release, TCC 2010. DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-11799-2_26
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