Motivation
Job offers, purchase offers and admission offers usually come as a package: a size (salary, price, bonus) and a deadline after which the offer lapses. An exploding offer is one with a zero deadline: it must be accepted on the spot. Exploding offers are common in practice, in law-clerk hiring, in real-estate contracts, in flash sales, and they are often criticised. Z. Hu and W. Tang ask when an organisation that is competing with a market of alternatives should make an exploding offer and when it should give the candidate time, and how the answer changes when the candidate's alternatives get better (Hu and Tang, Management Science, 2021; SSRN 3143414).
The model sits in the tradition of sequential search with recall-free offers (Lippman and McCall, 1976; Van den Berg, 1990) and of offer deadlines in search (W. Tang, Bearden and Tsetlin, 2009; Zorc and Tsetlin, 2020). The paper's contribution is to optimise the size and the deadline jointly and to show that the two interact. This mission formalizes the paper's comparative-statics result: how the optimal package moves when the distribution of alternative offers increases in the mean residual life order.
Setting
Time runs over a finite horizon [0,T], T>0. At time 0 the proposer makes an offer of size s with deadline tD∈[0,T] to the responder. Meanwhile alternative offers reach the responder by a Poisson process of rate λ>0; each alternative offer is exploding, and its size is an independent copy of a nonnegative continuous random variable X with support [a,b], 0≤a≤b, b=0, where b=+∞ is allowed, and with finite mean xˉ. The proposer receives utility u>0 minus s if her offer is accepted, and 0 otherwise.
Two functions of the law of X drive the analysis:
L(v)=E[(X−v)+],T(V)=∫0VL(v)dv.
T is the value-to-time operator: T(V)/λ is the search time a responder needs to expect a value V. It maps [0,b) onto [0,∞), and T−1 denotes its inverse.
The responder's value-to-go V(t;s,tD), his expected payoff from continuing the search at time t, solves the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman system V′(t)=−λL(V(t)) on [0,tD)∪(tD,T) with V(tD)=s and V(T)=0; Lemma 1 of the paper gives the closed form V(t;s,tD)=T−1(T(s)+λ(tD−t)) before the deadline and T−1(λ(T−t)) after it. The responder accepts the proposer's offer at the deadline when s≥v(tD)=T−1(λ(T−tD)).
The proposer's expected surplus is
Π(s,tD)=(u−s)exp[−λ∫0tDP(X≥V(t;s,tD))dt],
the second factor being the probability that the responder accepts no alternative offer before the deadline. Problem (7) maximises Π(s,tD) over v(tD)≤s≤u, 0≤tD≤T. Two quantities describe its solution: the shortest acceptable deadline tD∗(s)=(T−T(s)/λ)+, and the size s^ defined by (10): s^=b if u≥b, s^ solves E[X∣X≥s]=u on [a,b) if xˉ≤u<b, and s^=0 if u<xˉ.
The mean residual life of X at t is m(t)=E[X−t∣X>t] (and 0 once P(X>t)=0); X1≤mrlX2 means m1(t)≤m2(t) for every t.
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 18)
Let X1≤mrlX2 and let (si∗,tD,i∗) be an optimal package against Xi. Then
- if (s1∗,tD,1∗)=(s^1,T−T1(s^1)/λ) with s^1<T1−1(λT), then (s2∗,tD,2∗)=(s^2,T−T2(s^2)/λ) with s^2<T2−1(λT), and
s1∗≥s2∗,0<tD,1∗≤tD,2∗;
- if (s2∗,tD,2∗)=(T2−1(λT),0), then (s1∗,tD,1∗)=(T1−1(λT),0) and s1∗≤s2∗.
Each part excludes the boundary case u=xˉi, ai>0 for the distribution whose package it concludes about (see Formalization scope).
Milestones
In attack order: L>0 below b and T:[0,b)→[0,∞) is a strictly increasing bijection (proof of Lemma 8); Lemma 1 (the closed form solves the HJB system and is its only solution, v(tD)<b); the identity Π(s,tD)=(u−s)L(V(0;s,tD))/L(s) of eqs. (5)–(6); Proposition 1 (the deadline tD∗(s) is optimal for a fixed size); well-posedness of s^ and s^≤u; Theorem 2 (quasi-concavity, and s∗=min{T−1(λT),s^}, tD∗=tD∗(s∗) is the optimal package); Lemma 4 (i)–(ii) (the mrl order gives xˉ1≤xˉ2, b1≤b2 and L1≤L2); and the two order steps of the proof of Theorem 3 (T1≥T2, T1−1(λT)≤T2−1(λT), s^1≥s^2).
Significance
Theorem 3 answers the managerial question the paper poses. When the candidate's market improves in the mean residual life order, a proposer who was giving time keeps giving time, with a smaller offer and a longer deadline; a proposer who makes an exploding offer against the better market also makes one, of smaller size, against the worse market. In this model, therefore, exploding offers are the response to weak outside options, not to strong ones. Theorem 2, a milestone here, is the paper's other main result: the optimum is either an exploding offer matching the responder's value-to-go or an offer of size s^ with a positive deadline, and size and deadline cannot be chosen separately.
The results are proved in the paper; none is formalized. The formal development produces a reusable layer: the value-to-time operator of a continuous offer law and its inverse, existence and uniqueness for the search HJB equation, and the comparison E[(X1−s)+]≤E[(X2−s)+] under the mrl order (the stop-loss part of Shaked and Shanthikumar's Theorem 4.A.26), which the platform's stochastic-orders library does not yet have. Formalization also exposes an unstated boundary case of Theorem 2 (below).
Difficulty
The value-to-go is defined by an ODE whose right-hand side −λL(V) vanishes at V=b; showing that solutions stay below b and that T is onto [0,∞) is a statement about the behaviour of L near b, which differs between bounded and unbounded X. The surplus is defined through a time integral of P(X≥V(t)); its closed form L(V(0))/L(s) holds only along the solution of the ODE. The proposer's problem is not concave, and the optimal package is pinned down only through the quasi-concavity of the reduced surplus Π(s,tD∗(s)). Finally, the comparative statics need the mrl order to transfer to the stop-loss transforms Li on all of R, which is a genuine stochastic-ordering theorem, not a pointwise comparison of the defining ratios.
Formalization scope
All values are real, except the upper end of the support, which is an extended real b : EReal; it is only compared with real numbers, never used in arithmetic. The offer law is a measure μ on ℝ with the bundled predicate OfferDist μ a b: a probability measure without atoms, no mass below a or above b, positive mass on every open subinterval of [a,b] (this is what support [a,b] means), 0≤a, a≤b, b=0, and finite mean. The hypotheses λ>0, T>0 and the finite mean are added to the page's model; u>0 is the paper's. "Increasing" and "decreasing" are weak (footnote 3, p. 8).
Conventions: T−1(y) is the supremum of the V∈[0,b) with T(V)≤y, shown to be the inverse by a milestone; T is evaluated only below b or through tD∗, which is 0 for s≥b. The HJB terminal condition V(T)=0 is imposed only when tD<T, because the printed system is contradictory at tD=T. In (10) the case u=b is put with u>b; both give s^=b. The mrl order is the platform's MrlOrder applied to the identity random variables, which agrees with the paper's definition on this class of laws. Lemma 2 and Lemma 4 (iii) are not formalized.
The surplus is defined by the no-acceptance probability, not by the ratio (6), and the goal quantifies over arbitrary optimal solutions of problem (7). Substituting the closed form (min{T−1(λT),s^},tD∗(⋅)) of Theorem 2 for the optimal packages would reduce the goal to the order steps plus min algebra; that formalization is ruled out.
One correction is made. Theorem 2 reads as uniqueness of the optimal package, but when u=xˉ and a>0 the reduced surplus is constant on [0,min{a,T−1(λT)}] and every size there is optimal; for X1=X2 uniform on [1,2] and u=3/2, Theorem 3 (i) fails as printed. Uniqueness in Theorem 2, and each part of Theorem 3, therefore assume u=xˉi or ai=0 for the relevant distribution.
A complete development needs uniqueness for the search HJB equation, integration along its solution, and the mrl-to-stop-loss comparison. That comparison is reusable beyond this mission, and contributions of it, as a standalone stochastic-orders theorem, are welcome.
Selected references
- Z. Hu and W. Tang, Size Matters, So Does Duration: The Interplay Between Offer Size and Offer Deadline, Management Science, 2021. Preprint SSRN 3143414 (version of 2020-05-16), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3143414; journal version https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3731
- M. Shaked and J. G. Shanthikumar, Stochastic Orders, Springer, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-34675-5
- S. A. Lippman and J. J. McCall, The Economics of Job Search: A Survey, Economic Inquiry 14(2), 1976. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1976.tb00386.x
- G. J. Van den Berg, Nonstationarity in Job Search Theory, Review of Economic Studies 57(2), 1990. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297378
- W. Tang, J. N. Bearden and I. Tsetlin, Ultimatum Deadlines, Management Science 55(8), 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1090.1035
- S. Zorc and I. Tsetlin, Deadlines, Offer Timing, and the Search for Alternatives, Operations Research 68(3), 2020. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1914