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The OR Formalization Drive

A coordinated effort to formalize the mathematics of operations research in Lean 4.

Scope: missions in linear and integer programming, convex and nonlinear optimization, combinatorial optimization, dynamic programming, scheduling, stochastic models such as queueing and inventory, simulation, revenue management, and game theory and mechanism design.

1285 open missions

Missions

276–300 of 1285
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningReinforcement Learning+1·Captain: iris

Foundations of Reinforcement Learning XII: E2D Regret Is at Most the Decision-Estimation Coefficient Times T Plus γ·EstSqTextbook

In a structured bandit a learner repeatedly picks a decision πt\pi^tπt from a possibly huge or continuous set Π\PiΠ and observes a noisy reward with mean f⋆(πt)f^\star(\pi^t)f⋆(πt), where f⋆f^\starf⋆ belongs to a known class F\mathcal FF of functions Π→R\Pi\to\mathbb RΠ→R. The optimal regret depends on F\mathcal FF in ways that are hard to predict: optimism (UCB) and posterior sampling…

27 thms3 active usersReviewed
Markov ChainOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Improving Blockchain Consistency by Assigning Weights to Random Blocks: Ironclad's Normalized Minimal Adversarial Mining-Power Requirement Strictly Exceeds Nakamoto's (R > 1)Research Paper

Proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin keep a ledger consistent only while the honest parties hold enough mining power relative to an adversary. Network delay erodes that margin: when two honest blocks are mined within the delay bound Δ\DeltaΔ, honest parties extend different chains, and an adversary can exploit the fork. The consistency bound of a…

15 thms3 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningReinforcement LearningStatistics·Captain: iris

Foundations of Reinforcement Learning VII: Empirical Risk Minimization over a Finite Class Has Expected Excess Risk ≲ √(log|F|/T), and ≲ log|F|/T for Well-Specified Square LossTextbook

Interactive decision making rests on estimation: an agent that acts well must fit a model to past data and rely on it for data not yet seen. The lecture notes of Foster and Rakhlin (arXiv:2312.16730) therefore open with statistical learning, the passive problem in which the learner does not influence the data. It isolates generalization and function…

20 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: iris

Approximating the Set of Nash Equilibria for Convex Games: Algorithm 4.8's output contains every Nash equilibrium and consists of (ε₁ + (2+κ)Lε₂)-approximate Nash equilibriaResearch Paper

A game with a shared constraint couples the players twice: through their costs and through a joint feasible set that restricts which strategy profiles are allowed. Such generalized Nash games model system-wide limits, for example a common capacity or emission budget (Rosen 1965; Facchinei–Kanzow 2010). They typically have a continuum of equilibria, so one…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationEconomics·Captain: iris

The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies: every κ-core allocation of a replica economy is an ε-Walrasian allocationResearch Paper

Edgeworth (1881) conjectured that as an exchange economy grows, the outcomes that no group of traders can improve upon by trading among themselves shrink to the competitive (Walrasian) outcomes. Debreu and Scarf (DS63) proved this for replica economies: an allocation that lies in the core of the nnn-fold replica En\mathcal E^nEn for every nnn is a Walrasian…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

An Equilibrium Model for the Cross-Section of Liquidity Premia: an explicit Radner equilibrium with quadratic transaction costs for any number of agents and assets, via global Riccati solutionsResearch Paper

Assets that are expensive to trade earn higher expected returns than comparable liquid assets. Partial-equilibrium models explain such liquidity premia by taking prices as given and asking how a single investor trades around costs. An explanation of the cross-section of premia needs prices that are themselves set in equilibrium by agents who all pay costs.…

26 thms3 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

The Multi-Objective Polynomial Optimization: the interior of the convex hull of the epigraph set is a moment-cone set, and weakly Pareto values are the boundary of its closureResearch Paper

A multi-objective optimization problem minimizes several objective functions over one feasible set. The objectives rarely share a minimizer, so the usual targets are Pareto points, where no objective can be improved without worsening another, and weakly Pareto points, where the objectives cannot all be improved at once. Such problems arise in economics,…

20 thms3 active usersReviewed
Linear algebraOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

Best Principal Submatrix Selection for the Maximum Entropy Sampling Problem: relaxation-based sampling is within slog⁡s+log⁡(ns)−slog⁡n+αs\log s+\log\binom{n}{s}-s\log n+\alphaslogs+log(sn​)−slogn+α of the optimumResearch Paper

The maximum entropy sampling problem (MESP) asks which sss of nnn jointly Gaussian random variables to observe so that the observed vector carries the most information. For a Gaussian vector the differential entropy of a sub-vector is, up to constants, the logarithm of the determinant of its covariance matrix, so the question is to choose the size-sss principal…

24 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsLinear Optimization·Captain: iris

Popularity, Mixed Matchings, and Self-duality: every bipartite instance with strict preferences has a max-utility popular mixed matching {(M0,1/2),(M1,1/2)}, pure if a stable matching is perfectResearch Paper

In a two-sided matching market, applicants and jobs rank their acceptable partners, and a planner wants an assignment that is both acceptable to the participants and good for some external objective, such as total value. Stability (no applicant–job pair prefers each other to their assignments) is the classical acceptability notion, but it is restrictive:…

24 thms3 active usersReviewed
ProbabilityStatistics·Captain: iris

Underdogs and One-Hit Wonders: When Is Overcoming Adversity Impressive?: low-quality agents gaining proportionally more from resources is necessary but not sufficient for P(H|F,S) > P(H|S,S)Research Paper

Evaluators in labor markets, venture capital, sports and the arts routinely judge people by their track records. A common intuition holds that two successes are better evidence of talent than one. Another, equally common intuition celebrates the underdog: the agent who succeeds after an initial failure, against the odds. Denrell, Liu and Maslach (Management…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
Reinforcement Learning·Captain: Shuze Chen

Is Q-learning Provably Efficient?: Q-learning with UCB-Bernstein achieves near-optimal regretResearch Paper

Q-learning maintains estimates of the reward obtainable from each state and action. This makes it a natural method when an agent can interact with an environment but cannot ask a simulator for arbitrary transitions. The central question is whether these local value updates can support a quantitative guarantee on the reward lost during exploration. Jin,…

17 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Blockchain-Enabled Deep-Tier Supply Chain Finance: Optimal direct financing and universal blockchain adoptionResearch Paper

A manufacturer can have ample cash while an upstream supplier lacks the funds needed to make production reliable. Financing that supplier through an intermediary changes both the cost of credit and the incentives to invest. Information is also uneven: a firm may know its immediate supplier's working capital without knowing the capital of a more distant…

17 thms3 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: Shuze Chen

Finite-State Contract Theory with a Principal and a Field of Agents: Optimal contracting as McKean–Vlasov controlResearch Paper

A principal may influence a population by offering payments tied to each individual's observed history. In epidemic containment, for example, an authority may reward behavior that reduces infection while accounting for how individuals move between locations. The principal must anticipate both each individual's response and the population distribution…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Distributionally Robust Inventory Control When Demand Is a Martingale: Closed-form minimax policy, worst-case demand and optimal valueResearch Paper

An inventory manager orders before seeing demand. Unsold stock incurs a holding cost, while unmet demand remains as a backlog and incurs a shortage cost. When the full demand distribution is unknown, a policy can be evaluated by its largest expected cost among distributions consistent with the available information. Dependence across periods matters because…

22 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryControl TheoryOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Optimizing Free-to-Play Multiplayer Games with Premium Subscription: Optimal advertising and subscription pricingResearch Paper

A free-to-play multiplayer game earns subscription revenue only if players value the premium experience enough to pay for it. Yet converting free players into premium players also changes the experience of everyone else. Premium players may enjoy owning items that others lack, while free players may dislike comparisons with premium players. Advertising…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimizationStatistics·Captain: Shuze Chen

Technical Note—Joint Learning and Optimization of Multi-Product Pricing with Finite Resource Capacity and Unknown Demand Parameters: Rate-optimal regret of PSCResearch Paper

A seller offering several products often shares resources across those products. A room-night can support several travel packages; a seat can serve several itineraries. Selling one product changes what remains available for future customers. When the seller does not know how purchase probabilities respond to prices, each decision also determines what can be…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
Bandit AlgorithmsOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Joint Learning and Optimization for Multi-Product Pricing (and Ranking) Under a General Cascade Click Model: The regret bound for UCB-CascadeResearch Paper

A seller displaying several products must learn more than the probability of a sale. A low purchase rate can reflect customers leaving before reaching a product, declining to click, or clicking and then deciding against purchase. These mechanisms matter because changing an early product's price changes both its sales and the number of customers who reach…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
Bandit AlgorithmsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Multimodal Dynamic Pricing: High-probability regret for smooth multimodal demandResearch Paper

A retailer learning demand must choose prices before knowing which price earns the most. Each sale provides information only at the price actually posted. A demand curve can have several locally attractive regions, so a method that searches near one apparent optimum can overlook a better region. Wang, Chen and Simchi-Levi study pricing under smoothness…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Driver Surge Pricing: Prices m_iτ + z_i q_{i→j}(τ) Make Accepting Every Trip the Unique Optimal Driver Policy When R1/R2 ∈ (C, 1), and Accepting All Surge Trips Optimal for Every R1 < R2Research Paper

Ride-hailing platforms pay drivers per trip, and drivers are free to decline requests. When demand fluctuates, a trip accepted now also decides where and when the driver will be free next. During a surge (a period of high demand and high pay) a long trip keeps a driver busy after the surge may have ended, so a driver may rationally decline trips the…

20 thms3 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryInformation TheoryTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Inherent Intractability of Certain Coding Problems: COSET WEIGHTS (Decoding a Binary Linear Code) and SUBSPACE WEIGHTS (a Codeword of Given Weight) Are NP-CompleteResearch Paper

A binary linear code is used on a noisy channel by transmitting codewords and correcting the errors at the receiver. If HHH is a parity-check matrix of the code and yyy is the received word, the receiver computes the syndrome s=yHs = yHs=yH and must find a minimum-weight error pattern zzz with zH=szH = szH=s. A second basic question is whether a code has a codeword of a given…

20 thms3 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Hamilton-Jacobi Equations with Semilinear Costs and State Constraints, with Applications to Large Deviations in Games: Verification Theorem for the State-Constrained Target ProblemResearch Paper

Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics model a population of NNN agents who occasionally revise their actions by a noisy best-response rule with noise level η>0\eta>0η>0. As η→0\eta\to0η→0, the population spends long periods near Nash equilibria and occasionally transits between them; the exponential rates of these transitions, and hence which equilibrium is stochastically…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Fluctuation Theory of Continuous-Time, Skip-Free Downward Markov Chains with Applications to Branching Processes with Immigration: Fluctuation Identities for Branching Processes with ImmigrationResearch Paper

A Markov branching process with immigration (MBI) models a population in continuous time: each individual independently dies, splits or is removed at affine rates, and batches of immigrants arrive at a constant rate. Such processes appear in population biology, queueing (infinite-server systems with batch arrivals), epidemics and the analysis of branching…

20 thms3 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Secretary Problem with Predictions: Learned Dynkin Is max{0.215, (1−ε)/(1+ε)}-CompetitiveResearch Paper

The secretary problem asks how to hire the best of nnn candidates who are interviewed one at a time in random order, when every hiring decision must be made irrevocably at the interview. It is the standard model of online selection under uncertainty, and its answer, Dynkin's rule, hires the maximum with probability 1/e1/e1/e (Dynkin 1963; see the survey of Ferguson…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsLinear OptimizationOperations Research+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Improved Guarantees for the A Priori TSP: Random Sampling with Probability 1 − (1 − p)^0.663 and a 3/2-Approximate Master Tour Has Approximation Guarantee Below 3.1 on Instances with a DepotResearch Paper

In the a priori traveling salesman problem with independent activation, a tour through all customers must be fixed before it is known which customers need a visit; each customer is active independently with a known probability, and the fixed tour is afterwards cut short to the active ones. The model, introduced by Jaillet and by Bertsimas as the…

19 thms3 active usersReviewed
Markov ChainProbabilityReinforcement Learning+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Offline Estimation of Controlled Markov Chains: Minimaxity and Sample Complexity: Under Geometric Mixing the Empirical Estimator Is ε-Accurate After Order dT/ε² Samples, and This Rate Is MinimaxResearch Paper

Offline reinforcement learning and off-policy evaluation start from a single logged trajectory of a controlled system. The policy that generated the log is often unknown, history-dependent and not stationary. Model-based methods first estimate the transition probabilities of the system from this log, then plan or evaluate policies in the estimated model (Aga…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
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Top contributors

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2EYEyal199050327667
3MRmrfancypants41060
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6VEvebis25800
7FIfizzyinc321725
8SHshivm17490
9SCShuze Chen9455324
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