A coordinated effort to formalize the mathematics of operations research in Lean 4.
Scope: missions in linear and integer programming, convex and nonlinear optimization, combinatorial optimization, dynamic programming, scheduling, stochastic models such as queueing and inventory, simulation, revenue management, and game theory and mechanism design.
Selection and Ordering Policies for Hiring Pipelines via Linear Programming 3: In Simultaneous Offering With Values at Least τ, a Truncated-LP Value-Ordered Policy Earns ≥ α^τ_k Times the LP BoundResearch Paper
A firm that fills a fixed number of positions from a pool of applicants faces uncertainty at every stage: applicants differ in value, and an offer may be declined. When offers must go out at once, as in a recruiting season with a common deadline, the firm decides a single offer set and lives with however many candidates accept. Sending too few offers leaves…
Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 4: The Threshold Equilibrium Investment in New Mining Hardware, with Entry Decreasing in the Fixed CostResearch Paper
Proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin pay a block reward to the miner that first solves a computational puzzle. The chance of winning is proportional to a miner's share of the total computing power (hash rate), so mining is a contest in which every miner pays for hash rate and the reward is split in proportion to it. Over time mining moved from…
Sample-Driven Optimal Stopping: From the Secretary Problem to the i.i.d. Prophet Inequality III: The Explicit Lower Bound on the Competitive Ratio Is at Least α* Times pResearch Paper
Optimal stopping with partial information sits between two classical problems. In the secretary problem a decision maker sees values in random order, knows nothing about how they are generated, and must stop on the best one; the optimal guarantee is 1/e. In the i.i.d. prophet inequality the values are independent draws from a known distribution, and the…
Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue 1: Random Sampling Vickrey Is Ex-Post IC-IR and a 2(d+1)-Approximation to Welfare for d-SOS ValuationsResearch Paper
In an auction with interdependent values, a bidder's value can depend on information held by other bidders. An estimate of a shared resource's usefulness, for example, may improve when another participant reports a stronger signal. The auctioneer must decide whom to serve using reported signals, while each participant has an incentive to report a signal…
Scaling Blockchains: Can Committee-Based Consensus Help? II: With a Single Voter, Voting for the k Candidates Most Likely to Be Honest Is OptimalResearch Paper
Many proof-of-stake blockchains do not let every token holder take part in consensus. Instead, token holders elect a small committee of block producers, and the committee runs a Byzantine agreement protocol. EOS, for instance, elects 21 producers by an up-to-30-vote approval ballot (paper, p. 9, citing EOS voting guide 2018). Byzantine agreement protocols…
Climate Impact Investing 1: With an Average-Emissions Interaction Effect the Unique Equilibrium Emission Schedule Is ψ* − ε/(2n+ε)·(ψ* + 2n²ψ̄*/(2n+(n+1)ε)), Below the Schedule Without InteractionResearch Paper
Green investors hold a growing share of financial wealth, and the stated purpose of much of this capital is to change how companies behave, not only to avoid exposure to climate risk. Whether exclusionary or impact-oriented portfolios actually move corporate emissions is an equilibrium question: investors' preferences shift the cost of capital, and…
Load Balancing Under Strict Compatibility Constraints 1: On Proportionally Sparse Subcritical Compatibility Graphs, JSQ(d) Has the Fully Flexible Mean-Field Limit and Steady StateResearch Paper
In large server farms and cloud platforms, not every server can process every task. Data locality, licences, hardware and security rules restrict each task type to a subset of servers. Such compatibility constraints are modelled by a bipartite compatibility graph between task types (dispatchers) and servers. Classical mean-field results for load balancing,…
Revenue Management in Crowdfunding 1: Optimal Pledge Level and Campaign Duration Under Triangular Valuations When Independent or Herding Backers DominateResearch Paper
Reward-based crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter let a project creator collect pledges from the public for a fixed period. Two numbers are fixed before launch and cannot be changed afterwards: the pledge levelp each backer pays, and the campaign durationT. A high pledge level earns more per backer but deters backers with low valuations; a long…
Integer Factorization: Why Two-Item Joint Replenishment Is Hard 1: For Odd Composite M, Every Optimal Plan of an Explicit Two-Item Aperiodic JRP Instance Has q₂ = M and 1 < gcd(q₁, M) < MResearch Paper
The joint replenishment problem (JRP) is one of the basic models of multi-item inventory control. Each item follows the economic order quantity (EOQ) model of Harris (1913): ordering costs a fixed amount, holding stock costs a rate proportional to the stock, and the classical trade-off between the two determines how often to reorder. In a JRP, items…
Accelerability vs. Scalability: R&D Investment Under Financial Constraints and Competition I: Comparative Statics of an Unconstrained Monopoly's Optimal R&D IntensityResearch Paper
Firms deciding how much to spend on research and development face two different kinds of return to spending. More money can make the eventual innovation more valuable, or it can make the innovation arrive sooner. Lin (Management Science, 2022, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4503) calls these two properties scalability and accelerability, and shows that they predict…
Quantifying the Impact of Impact Investing I: Mean and Variance of an Impact-Ranked Portfolio's Excess Return under IID Bivariate-Normal Impact Factors and AlphasResearch Paper
Impact investing selects securities by a non-financial characteristic: an ESG rating, a carbon-intensity metric, a "sin stock" flag. A recurring question in finance is whether such a selection costs or earns the investor anything, and by how much. Lo and Zhang (SSRN 3944367; Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.01168) give a closed-form answer in a…
Online Advertising, Data Sharing, and Consumer Control 1: The Ad Exchange Allows Cross-Targeting Exactly When (No Leave) and (No Leave & Snipe) Hold, and Both Advertisers Always Share Data With ItResearch Paper
Display advertising on the open web runs through ad exchanges, intermediaries that sell ad impressions on third-party publisher sites to advertisers. A large share of these ads is retargeting: an advertiser shows ads to consumers who recently visited its own website and so revealed purchase intent. Retargeting needs tracking data (a cookie or pixel placed…
Sharing Sequentially Triggered Losses: Automated Conflict Resolution Through Smart Contracts 4: On Loss Trees the Same Four Axioms Characterize the Fixed-Fraction RulesResearch Paper
When one agent breaches a contract, the breach often forces its counterparty to breach its own contracts in turn, and the losses propagate. Supply chains are the standard example: a supplier that fails to deliver makes its customer fail to deliver to its own customers. Gudmundsson, Hougaard and Ko (Management Science 70(3), 2024) ask how the total loss of…
A Strongly Polynomial Algorithm for Linear Exchange Markets II: A Z₊-Matrix Polyhedron P_M Lies Between an M2VPI Polyhedron and Its Scaling by B²Research Paper
In a linear exchange market every agent owns one divisible good and has linear utilities over all goods; an equilibrium is a price vector at which every agent can spend its budget on goods that maximize utility per unit of money, and all goods are sold. Computing such an equilibrium in strongly polynomial time, with a number of arithmetic operations bounded…
Lightning Network Economics: Channels I: The Expected Discounted Cost of a Bidirectional Payment Channel in Closed FormResearch Paper
Blockchains such as Bitcoin settle every transaction on a public ledger. Each on-chain transaction pays a fee and waits for confirmation, so frequent small payments are expensive. The Lightning Network moves such payments off-chain: two parties lock funds in a shared payment channel and pay each other by updating the channel's balance, touching the…
Sample-Driven Optimal Stopping: From the Secretary Problem to the i.i.d. Prophet Inequality II: The Optimal Competitive Ratio Tends to the i.i.d. Prophet Constant as p Tends to 1Research Paper
Optimal stopping with samples sits between two classical problems. In the secretary problem a decision maker sees items in random order, knows nothing about their values, and must stop on one; the best guarantee is 1/e. In the i.i.d. prophet inequality the values are independent draws from a known distribution, and the best guarantee against the expected…
Selection and Ordering Policies for Hiring Pipelines via Linear Programming 1: A Non-Adaptive, Committed LP-Rounding Policy for ProbeTop-k Earns at Least (1 − e^{−k}k^k/k!) Times the LP BoundResearch Paper
Hiring is a pipeline: a firm with k openings and a large pool of applicants cannot interview everyone, so it must decide whom to interview, in what order, and whether to hire on the spot. The ProbeTop-k problem models this. Each applicant has a random value with a known distribution, an interview reveals the value, at most T interviews may be conducted, and…
Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility 2: Under Local α-Power Envelopes, ε-IC Mechanisms Gain at Most Õ(ε^(α/(2α−1))) RevenueResearch Paper
Classical mechanism design assumes that agents optimize exactly: a buyer facing a menu picks the option that maximizes his utility, however small the advantage over the next-best option. In many settings this is implausible. Agents may face cognitive or computational costs, or the designer may only be able to certify incentives approximately, as in…
Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 1: The Mining Game Has a Unique Equilibrium Whose Number of Active Miners Is Fixed by an Explicit Cost ConditionResearch Paper
Proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin keep their ledger secure by a contest: miners spend computing power ("hash rate") to solve a cryptographic puzzle, and the miner who solves it first earns the block reward. The probability of winning is proportional to a miner's share of the total hash rate, so mining is a rent-seeking contest in the sense of…
Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 2: Signs of the Sensitivities of Equilibrium Hash Rates and Hash Rate Shares to Mining CostsResearch Paper
In a proof-of-work cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin, miners spend computing power (hash rate) to win the right to add the next block and collect a reward. Whether this competition stays decentralized depends on how individual hash rates react to differences in mining costs: if a cost advantage translates into an ever larger share of the total hash rate,…
Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility 3: Hard/Soft Floor Mechanisms Are Optimal Among Deterministic ε-IC Mechanisms and Gain Θ(ε)Research Paper
Classical mechanism design assumes that agents best-respond exactly: a buyer who gains even an infinitesimal amount by misreporting will misreport. In practice agents face cognitive and computational costs, and a buyer may ignore a deviation that gains less than some small amount ε. A seller facing such a buyer only needs to satisfy the incentive…
Scaling Blockchains: Can Committee-Based Consensus Help? I: With a Vote-Probability Gap δ, an Honest Committee Is Elected with Probability at Least 1 − 2m²e^{−δ²n/2}Research Paper
Many proof-of-stake blockchains do not let every participant produce blocks. Instead, token holders elect a small committee of block producers, and the committee runs a Byzantine agreement protocol among itself. EOS, for example, elects 21 producers by approval voting: each token holder approves a set of candidates, and the 21 candidates with the most…
Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility 1: Nisan's Rounding Bounds the Revenue Gain of ε-IC Mechanisms by O(ε^(1/2))Research Paper
Classical mechanism design assumes that agents are perfect optimizers: a mechanism is incentive compatible if no buyer gains anything, however small, by misreporting. In practice buyers face cognitive and computational costs, and a buyer may not bother to deviate for a gain below some threshold ε. Balseiro, Besbes and Castro, Mechanism Design…
Dynamic Matching: Characterizing and Achieving Constant Regret II: In (SPP)-Acyclic Networks the Static Planning Solution Is Given by Surplus Vectors in {−1, 0, 1}ⁿResearch Paper
Centralized markets such as kidney exchanges, ride-sharing platforms and online labor markets match agents who arrive over time. Kerimov, Ashlagi and Gurvich (SSRN 3824407; Management Science, 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.01215) study such a market with n agent types and d feasible multi-way matches. Their main result is that, when a fluid linear program…
Offline Multi-Action Policy Learning: Generalization and Optimization 2: Depth-L Decision Trees Satisfy log N_H(ε,Π_L) ≤ (2^L−1)log p + 2^L log d + (2^L−1)log(L/ε+1)Research Paper
Offline policy learning chooses a treatment rule from logged data: given n observations of features Xi, the action Ai taken and the reward obtained, pick a policy π:X→{1,…,d} from a class Π whose expected reward is close to the best in the class. Zhou, Athey and Wager (arXiv:1810.04778v2) bound the regret of their cross-fitted…