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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

Missions

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Operations Research·Captain: iris

The Benefit of the Doubt: Decision Making under Strategic Obfuscation: the sponsor's payoff falls with reviewer resources exactly when pV > c, resources are moderate and induced obfuscation dominatesResearch Paper

Patent offices, grant agencies and journals screen proposals with limited reviewer time. A reviewer who cannot find concrete evidence about a proposal leaves the decision maker with a choice: reject it and possibly lose a good idea, or give it the benefit of the doubt and possibly fund a bad one. Figueroa and Lemus (SSRN 3840423, version of April 4, 2022)…

27 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

When Should Control Be Shared?: with limits on transfers, a better-informed stakeholder raises the surplus of shared control and leaves that of undivided control unchangedResearch Paper

Corporate law and contract design decide who controls a firm's decisions. A manager may hold undivided control, the unfettered right to implement a project, or control may be shared, with a stakeholder (a creditor, an employee group, a minority shareholder) holding a contractual veto. The trade-off is old: veto rights protect stakeholders from…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Solving Strong-Substitutes Product-Mix Auctions: Allocate Splits the Target Bundle into Demanded Bundles within |J|·C(n+1,2) IterationsResearch Paper

The product-mix auction was developed in 2007–8 for the Bank of England (Klemperer 2010) to sell many differentiated goods (loans against different qualities of collateral) in a single round. Each bidder submits a list of simple bids, each naming a price for every good and a quantity, and the auctioneer chooses prices and allocations that respect every bid.…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
Bandit AlgorithmsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Search and Discovery: Always Taking the Action with the Largest Purchase, Search or Discovery Value Is an Optimal PolicyResearch Paper

In the standard model of costly sequential search, a consumer knows from the start which products exist and pays to learn how much each is worth. Weitzman (Econometrica 1979) solved this problem with a single number per product, the reservation value: inspect in decreasing order of reservation values, and stop as soon as the best product found is worth more…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryDynamic Programming·Captain: mikedeng1

Asset Dissemination through Dealer Markets: The Strategies Built from the Collected Demand Function Form a Rank-Free EquilibriumResearch Paper

Many assets, such as corporate and municipal bonds, securitized products and new issues, trade over the counter: there is no central exchange, and an asset reaches its final buyers through a sequence of bilateral trades between dealers. Empirical work on these markets documents intermediation chains, in which a block of securities passes through several…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Liquidity Provision with Adverse Selection and Inventory Costs: The Solution of a Nonlinear ODE for Marginal Prices Is the Unique Symmetric Nash Equilibrium of K Competing DealersResearch Paper

Much of the trading in options, bonds and other over-the-counter products does not go through a limit order book. A client approaches several dealers, each dealer quotes a price schedule (the total price for each trade size), and the client splits the order among them. The dealers face two costs. The first is adverse selection: clients who trade large…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Voluntary Disclosure, Moral Hazard, and Default Risk: Greater Availability of Evidence Raises Firm Value and Lowers the Credit Spread, Strictly Above the First Termination ThresholdResearch Paper

Firms are run by managers who know more about cash flows than investors do. In the dynamic agency literature that started with DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) and DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), a manager can divert cash by under-reporting output, and investors deter diversion with a contract that promises future pay after good reports and threatens liquidation…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Testing, Voluntary Social Distancing, and the Spread of an Infection: Greater Testing Raises the Equilibrium Infection Probability of the Type That Mixes Its Social ActivityResearch Paper

Testing makes an infected person less likely to pass an infection to someone else. In a society whose contacts depend on voluntary social activity, that direct benefit changes behavior: an agent who expects fewer infections may choose more contacts. The central question is whether the added contacts can outweigh the direct benefit of testing in equilibrium.…

14 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategic Inventories under Supply Chain Competition: Under Fierce Chain-to-Chain Competition, Strategic Inventories Leave All Manufacturers and Retailers Strictly Worse OffResearch Paper

A manufacturer that sells through an independent retailer charges a wholesale price above cost, and the retailer then adds its own margin: the double marginalization problem of vertical contracting. Anand, Anupindi and Bassok (Management Science 2008) showed that in a two-period monopoly chain the retailer can blunt this by buying more than it sells in the…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Skill Acquisition and Data Sales: Under Uncertain Skill Acquisition and Accurate Data, Higher Skill-Acquisition Costs Raise Data Clarity, Data Price and Price InformativenessResearch Paper

Asset managers increasingly buy alternative data: satellite images, credit-card panels, web traffic. Raw data of this kind is worthless until someone has the skills to process it, and those skills are costly and uncertain to acquire. A fund can hire data scientists and still find that its models extract little. Huang, Xiong and Yang (Management Science, 2022…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A General Analysis of Sequential Social Learning: Asymptotic Learning Holds for Every Utility Function if and only if Private Signals Are Totally UnboundedResearch Paper

In sequential social learning, agents act one after another. Each agent observes the actions of its predecessors and a private signal about an unknown state of the world. The model explains herd behaviour, information cascades and the adoption of products, technologies and opinions when people imitate one another. The basic question is whether the…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program Does Not Provide the Right Incentives: Issues and Remedies: Under HRRP-I a Symmetric Equilibrium Exists and Every One Over-Invests in Readmission ReductionResearch Paper

The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), created by the US Affordable Care Act and run by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services since 2012, cuts the Medicare payments of hospitals whose 30-day readmission rates exceed a benchmark computed from other hospitals. It is a form of yardstick competition in the sense of Shleifer (1985): a…

14 thms2 active users
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Persuading Customers to Buy Early: The Value of Personalized Information Provisioning: The Personalized Buy/Wait/No Mechanism Is Optimal and Strictly Beats Public SignalingResearch Paper

A seller who sells over two periods, at a full price now and a discount later, loses revenue to strategic customers who wait for the discount. Waiting is costly to the customer only through availability risk: if inventory is scarce, the product may be gone by the second period. Inventory is usually known to the firm and not to its customers, so the firm can…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Addictive Platforms 1: Monopoly versus Duopoly — Competition Raises Addictiveness and Hurts the Consumer When Attention Is Scarce, and Lowers Addictiveness When It Is AbundantResearch Paper

Digital services are paid for with attention: an ad-financed platform earns more the longer its users stay. Policy reports on digital markets (Crémer, de Montjoye and Schweitzer, 2019; the U.K. Digital Competition Expert Panel, 2019; Scott Morton et al., 2019) worry that such firms degrade their services with features that capture attention at the user's…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Infinite-Dimensional Fisher Markets and Tractable Fair Division 3: The Quasilinear Eisenberg–Gale Programs Attain Their Optima and Characterize Quasilinear EquilibriaResearch Paper

A Fisher market allocates a common supply of items among buyers with separate budgets. When the items form a continuum, such as positions in a measurable interval, a buyer's valuation and the market price are functions rather than finite lists. This is a useful model for divisible resources and for settings in which an allocation can be described as a…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithms for Competitive Division of Chores 2: Indivisible Chores Always Admit a Pareto Optimal Allocation That Is Both Weighted-EF^1_1 and Weighted-Prop1Research Paper

Many allocation problems distribute chores: tasks, shifts, teaching duties or cleaning rotas that every recipient would rather avoid. Agents often have unequal obligations, for example a full-time and a part-time worker, and a fair division should respect these entitlements. When the tasks can be split (time shares, probabilities), the competitive rule of…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithms for Competitive Division of Chores 1: At Most min{(2m−1)^{n(n−1)/2}, (2n−1)^{m(m−1)/2}} Competitive Utility Profiles and Pareto-Frontier Faces Meeting the Negative OrthantResearch Paper

Many allocation problems divide work, not goods: shifts among employees, teaching loads among faculty, cleaning duties among housemates, maintenance tasks among the owners of a shared resource. For divisible goods the standard fair and efficient solution is the competitive rule (competitive equilibrium from budgets): give every agent a budget, find prices…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
AnalysisControl TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Punish Underperformance with Suspension: Optimal Dynamic Contracts in the Presence of Switching Cost IV: Low Switching Cost, Control-Band Value Functions Meet the Optimality ConditionsResearch Paper

Many service relationships are dynamic contracts in which the principal cannot observe the agent's effort, only its noisy consequences. Cao, Sun and Tian (Management Science, 2024) study such a relationship when the principal can suspend the agent and must pay a fixed switching cost to restart work. Suspension is a punishment that does not end the…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Retention or Acquisition? Behavior-Based Quality Disclosure II: Behavior-Based Disclosure Raises Total Two-Period Profits Exactly When the Disclosure Cost Exceeds a CutoffResearch Paper

Firms that sell to the same customers over time learn who bought from whom. Behavior-based pricing (BBP) — charging a firm's own past customers one price and the rival's past customers another — has been studied since Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) and Villas-Boas (1999). A second instrument is the disclosure of product quality: free samples, demonstrations…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Contract Design in the Presence of Double Moral Hazard: One of Three Tenure-and-Termination Contracts γⁱ(wⁱ) Is Optimal Among Contracts Inducing Full Effort and Truth-TellingResearch Paper

Many businesses are run by an agent on behalf of an owner who cannot see everything the agent does. Two frictions arise together. The agent may shirk, saving the cost of the effort that brings customers in, and the agent may divert cash, pocketing the fee of a customer the owner never sees: a plumbing franchise whose offline jobs bypass the head office, or…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Social Learning and Strategic Consumers 1: Under Pre-Announced Pricing, Social Learning Raises Optimal Expected Profit When Consumers Are Impatient or PatientResearch Paper

Online reviews let consumers learn about a new product from the experience of earlier buyers. For a firm selling to strategic consumers, who time their purchases, this social learning (SL) cuts two ways. Reviews reveal quality, which can raise second-period demand; but a consumer who expects reviews also has a new reason to wait, and every consumer who…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets 1: Two Additive Agents with Almost Equal but Unequal Budgets Have a Competitive Equilibrium Giving Each Agent Her Truncated ShareResearch Paper

Many allocation problems divide indivisible goods among agents who are entitled to different shares but cannot pay with real money: course seats among students, shifts among workers, inherited items among heirs. A standard mechanism gives each agent a budget of artificial currency and lets a market run. When budgets are equal this is the competitive…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Fair and Efficient Balanced Allocations for Additive ValuationsResearch Paper

Dividing indivisible items among agents with additive valuations is the core model of fair division, with applications from inheritance and divorce settlements to course allocation and shift scheduling. The standard fairness relaxation is envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and the standard efficiency notion is Pareto optimality (PO), strengthened to fraction…

18 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Existence of the Core in Approval-Based Committee ElectionsResearch Paper

In an approval-based committee election, each of nnn voters reports the set of candidates she approves, and a committee of kkk candidates must be chosen. Proportional representation asks that every group of voters large enough to "deserve" some seats, and united enough to agree on candidates, gets them. The strongest standard axiom of this kind is the core: no…

17 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Otter: A Provably MEV-Resilient Automated Market Maker via Surplus RedistributionResearch Paper

An automated market maker (AMM) is a smart contract that holds reserves of two tokens XXX and YYY and trades with anyone along a fixed pricing curve. On a blockchain the trades of one block are sequenced by a builder, who may also insert trades of its own. Ordering power yields maximal extractable value (MEV): in a sandwich attack the builder buys before a…

18 thms1 active userReviewed
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