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Economics

523 missions · 401 completed

Missions

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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

The Price of Anarchy in Markets for LemonsResearch Paper

Trade in a market for lemons can fail even when trade is efficient: when the seller knows more than the buyer about the quality of the good, a price at which the seller is willing to sell signals bad news to the buyer, and adverse selection can unravel the market (Akerlof 1970). Securities markets, used-asset markets and insurance all share this structure.…

19 thms1 active userReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Price Delegation with Learning Agents: a static separable contract implements the fluid first-best policy to within any ε\varepsilonε under limited liability and limited inventoryResearch Paper

Many firms let their salespeople set prices. A salesperson who spends effort talking to a customer can learn what that customer is willing to pay and quote a price close to it; a salesperson who skips that effort can only quote a price that works on average. The firm sees neither the effort nor the customer's value, only the revenue of each sale, and it can…

13 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

Advance Selling to Ease Financial Distress: under moderate distress, a threshold-discount coupon scheme beats pure bank financing exactly above an explicit valuation thresholdResearch Paper

During the COVID-19 closures, restaurants, cafés and other small service businesses asked their regular customers to pay now for service later: gift cards, prepaid meals, "buy now, eat later" campaigns, discount coupons sold for a modest fee, and crowdfunding pages with all-or-nothing targets. Papanastasiou, Xiao and Yang (Management Science 71(4), 2025)…

9 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: iris

A Complementary Pivot Algorithm for Competitive Allocation of a Mixed Manna: Lemke's Algorithm Terminates at a Competitive Equilibrium under SPLC UtilitiesResearch Paper

Fair division of divisible items usually assumes that everything being shared is desirable. Many allocation problems also involve bads (chores): tasks, liabilities or emissions cuts that some or all participants would rather avoid. A mixed manna contains both. The competitive equilibrium is the standard fair and efficient solution concept for goods: it is…

24 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

Optimal Capacity and Price Designs Under Ex Ante and Ex Post Theft: as ex post stealing becomes more efficient, the optimal price stays flat, then falls, then rises, and capacity moves oppositelyResearch Paper

Internal theft is a recurring cost of retail operations: a store manager who handles both the stock and the till can divert inventory or its procurement budget before customers arrive, and can skim cash after sales are made. Survey figures quoted by Chen, Tian and Zuo put internal theft among the leading sources of retail loss, and a common managerial…

9 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

Organizing Data Analytics: optimal data governance audits imperfectly with intensity 1/(2−qH)1/(2 - q_H)1/(2−qH​) and induces a fully informative experimentResearch Paper

Data has become cheap to collect and store, yet firms still rely on people to design tests, analyse the results and report them, and those people often want a particular decision. Alonso and Câmara (Management Science 70(5), 2024) ask how a firm should organize this work. Should the person who designs a test also report it? How often should reports be…

6 thms1 active userReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Optimal Salesforce Compensation with General Demand and Operational Considerations: neither demand censoring nor inventory delegation lowers the firm's optimal profitResearch Paper

Firms that sell through a sales division or a retail store face two frictions at once. The local agent knows the market better than headquarters (adverse selection), and the agent's selling effort is costly and unobserved (moral hazard). Since Laffont and Tirole (1986) and Rao (1990), the standard remedy has been a menu of linear commission contracts (MLC):…

12 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Double Marginalization Because of External Financing: Capacity Investment Under Uncertainty: with no bankruptcy option the lender charges rβ₁/(β₁−1) > r and the firm invests 1/(2η(β₁+1))Research Paper

Most real-options models of capacity investment assume that the firm finances the outlay at the risk-free rate, or that capital comes from a competitive market. Many firms, in particular young and small ones, have no equity and borrow from a lender with market power. Huberts, Wen, Dawid, Huisman and Kort (Management Science, 2025) model this as a dynamic…

9 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

Fast or Slow? Competing on Publication Frequency: ex-ante identical publishers have exactly one pair of asymmetric publication-cycle equilibria, and the faster publisher earns moreResearch Paper

Newspapers, magazines, newsletters and data feeds sell information goods whose value decays with time. A publisher that releases often sells fresher content but pays a fixed publication cost kkk for every issue; a publisher that releases rarely saves on costs but sells staler content. For a monopolist this is an EOQ-type trade-off. With competition, the…

9 thms1 active userReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Scarcity of Ideas and Optimal R&D Policy: When the Arrival Rate of Ideas Is Unknown, the Optimal Reward Increases to v/r With Delay While Social Welfare DecreasesResearch Paper

Prizes and patents reward the first innovator to fill a market niche. How generous the reward should be depends on how often useful ideas arrive, and a policy maker rarely knows that rate. Basov, Erkal, Minehart and Scotchmer (SSRN 4628270, 2024; published in Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.03362) model ideas as scarce: they arrive at the times of…

24 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

How to De-Reserve Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in India: DA-BT is the unique individually rational, meritocratic, non-wasteful, open-first and incentive-compatible mechanismResearch Paper

Admissions to the Indian Institutes of Technology and other centrally funded technical institutions run through a single clearinghouse that allocates tens of thousands of seats each year. Seats at each program are reserved for members of the Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST) and Other Backward Classes (OBC); the rest are open-category seats…

18 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

Sharing Demand Information with Retailer Under Upstream Competition: substitutability thresholds for manufacturers' information sharing, with the exact condition on a2/σa^2/\sigmaa2/σResearch Paper

In many consumer-goods channels the party with the best demand information is the manufacturer, which controls promotion, product launches and brand planning, while the retailer places the order. Whether manufacturers should tell retailers what they know is a question of practice as well as theory, and the answer depends on how the manufacturers compete.…

31 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

Is Full Price the Full Story When Consumers Have Time and Budget Constraints?: Gig Workers Are Full-Price Decision-Makers Whose Value of Time Equals Their WageResearch Paper

Since Naor's 1969 model of queue joining, the literature on pricing congestible services has assumed that a customer judges a time-consuming service by its full price: the money price rrr plus a constant multiple η\etaη of the time commitment δ\deltaδ, r+ηδr+\eta\deltar+ηδ. Revenue-maximizing and welfare-maximizing prices for queues, priority schemes and capacity choices…

12 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability: the optimal mix is first best iff the externality is at most a critical level, else liability-free and lenientResearch Paper

New drugs, medical devices and patented technologies reach the market only after a phase of costly testing, and they can be withdrawn later when evidence of harm accumulates. Societies control this process with three instruments: an approval standard (how strong the evidence must be before adoption), a withdrawal standard (how bad the evidence must become…

12 thms1 active userReviewed
Graph TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Impact of Network Structure on New Service Pricing: Balanced Networks Share One Optimal Policy and Revenue, the Lowest Among All Networks of the Same Average DegreeResearch Paper

Many online services (social platforms, question-and-answer sites, collaboration tools) become more valuable to a user the more that user's contacts use them. A firm launching such a service commonly offers it for free at first, to let usage grow through these local network effects, and starts charging later. Alizamir, Chen, Kim and Manshadi (SSRN 3236225;…

22 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions: Weak Interim Rationalizable Monotonicity and the Weak No-Worst-Rule Condition Suffice for Implementation in Interim Rationalizable StrategiesResearch Paper

A mechanism designer chooses a rule for turning agents’ messages into an outcome. When agents know their own types but have only beliefs about the others, the designer cannot assume that they use a single equilibrium strategy. Interim correlated rationalizability instead keeps every message that is a best response to some belief consistent with the agent’s…

12 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Constrained Information Design: The Value of an Information Design Problem with Equality and Inequality Constraints Equals the Concave Hull of the Constraint-Modified Objective at the PriorResearch Paper

In information design (Bayesian persuasion), a designer commits to a signal about an unknown state, and every signal induces a distribution over the receiver's posterior beliefs. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) showed that the distributions a signal can induce are exactly the Bayes-plausible ones, those whose mean posterior is the prior, and that the…

7 thms1 active userReviewed
ProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

The Distortion in Prices Due to Passive Investing: Market Indexing Leaves the Price Efficiency of the Market Portfolio Unchanged and Erodes That of Every Other Portfolio at an Increasing RateResearch Paper

Passive funds hold a market index rather than selecting individual stocks. In the model of Baruch and Zhang (2022), this difference matters for what prices reveal. An investor who studies individual stocks can bring information about their payoffs into trading; an investor restricted to the market portfolio cannot make the same stock-by-stock trades. The…

8 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationFunctional Analysis·Captain: mikedeng1

Infinite-Dimensional Fisher Markets and Tractable Fair Division 1: The Eisenberg–Gale Programs Attain Their Optima, One at a Pure Allocation, and Optimal Pairs Are Exactly the Market EquilibriaResearch Paper

A Fisher market divides a supply of goods among buyers with fixed budgets. In a finite market, each good is a separate coordinate. Fair division can instead involve a continuum of items, such as locations along an interval or points in a region, where a buyer's valuation varies measurably from point to point. Finite dimensional existence and duality…

9 thms1 active userReviewed
ProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantifying the Impact of Impact Investing II: Moments of Impact-Ranked Omitted-Factor Returns under Cross-Sectionally Correlated Gaussian Impact FactorsResearch Paper

Impact investing selects securities by a non-financial score, an ESG rating, a carbon intensity, a measure of social benefit, and asks whether such a selection earns an excess return. A. W. Lo and R. Zhang (SSRN 3944367; published in Management Science, DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2022.01168) model the score as an impact factor XXX and study the returns of securities ran…

6 thms1 active userReviewed
AnalysisControl TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Punish Underperformance with Suspension: Optimal Dynamic Contracts in the Presence of Switching Cost I: Condition 1, High Switching Cost, Not-Hiring Value Functions Meet the Optimality ConditionsResearch Paper

Many service relationships let a firm pause an agent instead of firing them: a sales representative who brings in no customers for a while is suspended, a contractor is laid off for a season and recalled. Pausing is not free. Every restart carries a switching cost KKK (re-training, re-establishing a territory, setting up the work environment), so a principal…

11 thms1 active userReviewed
Control TheoryPartial Differential EquationsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Dynamic Principal Agent Problem with One-sided Commitment: The Principal's Value Function Is the Minimal Continuous Viscosity Solution of the Type-Indexed HJB SystemResearch Paper

In a principal–agent problem with moral hazard, a principal (an employer) pays an agent whose effort she cannot observe; she sees only an output process whose drift the effort controls. Continuous-time versions of the problem, starting with Holmström–Milgrom (1987) and Sannikov (2008), are solved by turning the agent's continuation utility into a state…

17 thms1 active userReviewed
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