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Convex OptimizationInformation TheoryProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

I-Divergence Geometry of Probability Distributions and Minimization Problems 2: Under Moment Constraints the I-Projection Exists at Every Interior Point and Has Exponential-Family DensityResearch Paper

Minimum discrimination information under moment constraints

Given a reference probability distribution RRR and a set E\mathcal EE of probability distributions, the minimum discrimination information problem asks for the member of E\mathcal EE closest to RRR in Kullback–Leibler divergence. It is the basis of Kullback's information-theoretic approach to statistics (Kullback 1959), of the maximum-entropy principle of statistical physics (Jaynes 1957), and of large-deviation theory, where Sanov's theorem identifies the rate function of an empirical distribution with exactly this minimum. The most common constraint sets are defined by prescribed expectations ∫fi dP=ai\int f_i\,dP = a_i∫fi​dP=ai​, and the classical answer is that the minimizer is an exponential family member, with density cexp⁡∑itific\exp\sum_i t_i f_icexp∑i​ti​fi​ with respect to RRR.

That answer was usually justified by Lagrange multipliers, which presuppose that a minimizer exists. Csiszár's paper (Ann. Probab. 1975) treats the problem geometrically, with I-divergence in the role of squared Euclidean distance, and its last result, Theorem 3.3, proves existence and the exponential form at once for unbounded constraint functions, under a hypothesis on the exponential moments of the fif_ifi​.

Timeline:

  • 1959: Kullback formulates the minimum discrimination information theorem: an element of E\mathcal EE of exponential form is the minimizer (a sufficient condition).
  • 1966: Kullback and Khairat (Ann. Math. Statist. 37, 1966) refine the sufficient condition.
  • 1972: Čencov proves existence of exponential-form minimizers under general conditions (Statistical Decision Rules and Optimal Inference, Theorem 23.1).
  • 1975: Csiszár proves Theorem 3.3 by the minimizing-sequence method of his Theorem 2.1; a first version of the paper assumed TR=EkT_R = E^kTR​=Ek, weakened to "TRT_RTR​ open" after Čencov's work.

Setting

All distributions (PD's) live on one measurable space (X,X)(X,\mathcal X)(X,X). The I-divergence of PPP from QQQ is

I(P∥Q)=∫log⁡pQ dP  if P≪Q,I(P∥Q)=+∞  otherwise,I(P\|Q)=\int \log p_Q\,dP\ \text{ if } P\ll Q,\qquad I(P\|Q)=+\infty\ \text{ otherwise},I(P∥Q)=∫logpQ​dP  if P≪Q,I(P∥Q)=+∞  otherwise,

where pQp_QpQ​ is the density of PPP with respect to QQQ; it takes values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] and vanishes only for P=QP=QP=Q. The variation distance is ∣P−Q∣=∫∣pR−qR∣ dR|P-Q|=\int|p_R-q_R|\,dR∣P−Q∣=∫∣pR​−qR​∣dR for any PD RRR dominating both. If E\mathcal EE is a convex set of PD's containing some PPP with I(P∥R)<∞I(P\|R)<\inftyI(P∥R)<∞, a Q∈EQ\in\mathcal EQ∈E with

I(Q∥R)=min⁡P∈EI(P∥R)I(Q\|R)=\min_{P\in\mathcal E} I(P\|R)I(Q∥R)=P∈Emin​I(P∥R)

is the I-projection of RRR on E\mathcal EE.

Fix real-valued measurable functions f1,…,fkf_1,\dots,f_kf1​,…,fk​ on XXX. For a=(a1,…,ak)∈Eka=(a_1,\dots,a_k)\in E^ka=(a1​,…,ak​)∈Ek (Euclidean kkk-space) the moment set E(a)\mathcal E(a)E(a) is the set of PD's PPP with ∫fi dP=ai\int f_i\,dP=a_i∫fi​dP=ai​, i=1,…,ki=1,\dots,ki=1,…,k. Further:

  • ARA_RAR​ is the set of a∈Eka\in E^ka∈Ek for which E(a)\mathcal E(a)E(a) contains some PPP with I(P∥R)<∞I(P\|R)<\inftyI(P∥R)<∞;
  • TR={t∈Ek: exp⁡∑itifi is R-integrable}T_R=\{t\in E^k:\ \exp\sum_i t_i f_i \text{ is } R\text{-integrable}\}TR​={t∈Ek: exp∑i​ti​fi​ is R-integrable}, (3.16);
  • F(a)=inf⁡P∈E(a)I(P∥R)F(a)=\inf_{P\in\mathcal E(a)} I(P\|R)F(a)=infP∈E(a)​I(P∥R), (3.18), the optimal value as a function of the constraint levels.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.3

If TRT_RTR​ is open in EkE^kEk, then for every point aaa of the interior of ARA_RAR​ the I-projection QQQ of RRR on E(a)\mathcal E(a)E(a) exists and

qR(x)=cexp⁡∑i=1ktifi(x)R-a.e.,q_R(x)=c\exp\sum_{i=1}^k t_i f_i(x)\qquad R\text{-a.e.},qR​(x)=cexpi=1∑k​ti​fi​(x)R-a.e.,

for some constant ccc and some t∈Ekt\in E^kt∈Ek.

Milestones

  1. (2.2), the parallelogram identity: I(Pm∥R)+I(Pn∥R)=2I(Pm+Pn2∥R)+I(Pm∥Pm+Pn2)+I(Pn∥Pm+Pn2)I(P_m\|R)+I(P_n\|R)=2I(\tfrac{P_m+P_n}2\|R)+I(P_m\|\tfrac{P_m+P_n}2)+I(P_n\|\tfrac{P_m+P_n}2)I(Pm​∥R)+I(Pn​∥R)=2I(2Pm​+Pn​​∥R)+I(Pm​∥2Pm​+Pn​​)+I(Pn​∥2Pm​+Pn​​).
  2. (2.4): a minimizing sequence PnP_nPn​ in a convex set converges in variation to a PD Q≪RQ\ll RQ≪R (closedness of the set is not used).
  3. Lemma 3.1: if etfe^{tf}etf is QQQ-integrable for small ∣t∣|t|∣t∣, then I(Pn∥Q)→0I(P_n\|Q)\to0I(Pn​∥Q)→0 implies ∫f dPn→∫f dQ\int f\,dP_n\to\int f\,dQ∫fdPn​→∫fdQ.
  4. (3.18): ARA_RAR​ is convex and FFF is finite and convex on ARA_RAR​.
  5. (3.19): at an interior point aaa of ARA_RAR​ there is ttt with F(b)≥F(a)+∑iti(bi−ai)F(b)\ge F(a)+\sum_i t_i(b_i-a_i)F(b)≥F(a)+∑i​ti​(bi​−ai​) for all b∈ARb\in A_Rb∈AR​.
  6. Remark, p. 158: FFF is differentiable at interior points of ARA_RAR​, and grad⁡F(a)=t\operatorname{grad}F(a)=tgradF(a)=t, the parameter vector of the I-projection.

Significance

Theorem 3.3 gives existence of maximum-entropy (minimum discrimination information) distributions under finitely many moment constraints with unbounded constraint functions, which covers the usual exponential families of statistics (normal, gamma, Poisson moment constraints) where boundedness fails. It identifies the minimizer's form without assuming a minimizer exists, and the Remark identifies the natural parameters as the gradient of the optimal value, the sensitivity interpretation of Lagrange multipliers. These facts underlie the duality between moment and natural parameters of exponential families and the rate functions of Cramér and Sanov type.

The result is proved, in this paper and (under a slightly weaker hypothesis) by Čencov. None of it is formalized: Mathlib has the Kullback–Leibler divergence of measures (InformationTheory.klDiv) and tilted measures, but no I-projection, no existence theorem for constrained minimizers of KL divergence and no exponential-form characterization. The mission produces a machine-checked version of the existence and form theorem, together with the general steps it uses (the parallelogram identity, convergence of minimizing sequences in variation, continuity of exponential-moment expectations under KL convergence).

Difficulty

The obvious argument fails at the first step: the moment set E(a)\mathcal E(a)E(a) is convex but not closed in variation when the fif_ifi​ are unbounded, since ∫fi dP\int f_i\,dP∫fi​dP is not continuous in variation. A minimizing sequence therefore converges in variation to some QQQ (as in Theorem 2.1), but nothing places QQQ in E(a)\mathcal E(a)E(a): mass can escape to where ∣fi∣|f_i|∣fi​∣ is large. Ruling this out needs quantitative control of I(Pn∥Q)I(P_n\|Q)I(Pn​∥Q), which in turn requires knowing the form of QQQ before knowing QQQ is feasible; the interplay with the convexity of FFF and the openness of TRT_RTR​ is where the work lies. A Lagrange-multiplier argument is not available: it presupposes a minimizer and differentiability that are part of the conclusion.

Formalization scope

  • Probability distributions are Measure X with IsProbabilityMeasure; the I-divergence is Mathlib's klDiv : ℝ≥0∞, which for probability measures equals (1.1) with the conventions log⁡0=−∞\log 0=-\inftylog0=−∞, log⁡a0=+∞\log\frac a0=+\inftylog0a​=+∞, 0⋅(±∞)=00\cdot(\pm\infty)=00⋅(±∞)=0.
  • The variation distance uses P+QP+QP+Q as dominating measure (the page allows any dominating PD; the value is the same).
  • The I-projection carries I(Q∥R)<∞I(Q\|R)<\inftyI(Q∥R)<∞ explicitly: the page defines it only when E\mathcal EE meets {P:I(P∥R)<∞}\{P: I(P\|R)<\infty\}{P:I(P∥R)<∞}.
  • E(a)\mathcal E(a)E(a) requires PPP-integrability of every fif_ifi​, so the constraint integrals are genuine. EkE^kEk is Fin k → ℝ with its product (Euclidean) topology; "inner point" is the topological interior. k=0k=0k=0 is allowed.
  • FFF is an infimum in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] (equal to ∞\infty∞ outside ARA_RAR​); statements use its real value only on ARA_RAR​, where it is finite. (3.18) prints I(P∥Q)I(P\|Q)I(P∥Q); the reference measure is RRR, as the definition of ARA_RAR​ and the proof show. (3.16) prints (t1,…,tn)(t_1,\dots,t_n)(t1​,…,tn​) for (t1,…,tk)(t_1,\dots,t_k)(t1​,…,tk​).
  • Densities are Radon–Nikodym derivatives and the form (3.2) is an RRR-almost-everywhere identity with no exceptional set of positive measure.
  • Lemma 3.1 asserts that fff is PnP_nPn​-integrable for large nnn as well as the convergence, so that ∫f dPn\int f\,dP_n∫fdPn​ is not a default value.
  • Trivializing readings are excluded: the goal asserts existence of the I-projection rather than assuming it, TRT_RTR​ is an integrability set (not a set where a junk integral is finite), and the infimum is never a real sInf over a possibly empty set.

A complete development needs: Radon–Nikodym calculus for klDiv (the identity (2.6) I(P∥R)−I(P∥Q)=∫log⁡qR dPI(P\|R)-I(P\|Q)=\int\log q_R\,dPI(P∥R)−I(P∥Q)=∫logqR​dP), Pinsker's inequality (available on the platform as a reference item), lower semicontinuity of klDiv under convergence in variation, completeness of the space of PD's in variation, and supporting hyperplanes of finite-dimensional convex functions. The KL parallelogram identity, Lemma 3.1 and the variation-distance facts are reusable well beyond this mission. Contributions on any milestone, and on these infrastructure lemmas, are welcome.

Selected references

  • I. Csiszár, I-divergence geometry of probability distributions and minimization problems, Ann. Probab. 3(1), 146–158, 1975. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176996454
  • S. Kullback, Information Theory and Statistics, Wiley, 1959.
  • S. Kullback and M. A. Khairat, A note on minimum discrimination information, Ann. Math. Statist. 37, 279–280, 1966.
  • E. T. Jaynes, Information theory and statistical mechanics, Phys. Rev. 106, 620–630, 1957. https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRev.106.620
  • N. N. Čencov, Statistical Decision Rules and Optimal Inference (Russian), Nauka, 1972; English translation, American Mathematical Society, 1982.
  • I. N. Sanov, On the probability of large deviations of random variables (Russian), Mat. Sbornik 42, 11–44, 1957.
10 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Bimatrix Equilibrium Points and Mathematical Programming: If Z Is Non-Degenerate and uᵀMu ≥ 0, uᵀMu = 0 ⇒ Mu + Mᵀu = 0 for All u ≥ 0, a Non-Empty Z Has an Equilibrium PointResearch Paper

Motivation

The linear complementarity problem asks, for a real square matrix MMM of order nnn and a vector q∈Rnq\in\mathbb R^nq∈Rn, for a vector zzz with

z≥0,w=Mz−q≥0,zTw=0.z\ge 0,\qquad w=Mz-q\ge 0,\qquad z^{\mathsf T}w=0 .z≥0,w=Mz−q≥0,zTw=0.

It is the common form of the Kuhn–Tucker conditions of linear and convex quadratic programs and of the equilibrium conditions of two-person non-zero-sum (bimatrix) games. In 1964 Lemke and Howson gave a constructive existence proof for equilibrium points of bimatrix games by following a path of adjacent extreme points of a polyhedron (Lemke–Howson 1964). In 1965 Lemke adapted that path-following technique to the general problem above, under a condition on MMM that covers the positive semidefinite case treated by Dantzig and Cottle and the case M>0M>0M>0 (Lemke 1965). The resulting procedure, now called Lemke's algorithm or complementary pivoting, became a standard method for linear complementarity problems and a template for later path-following existence proofs (Cottle, Pang, Stone 1992).

Timeline:

  • 1964: Lemke and Howson, adjacent-extreme-point path for bimatrix games.
  • 1965: Lemke, existence for matrices satisfying conditions (i)–(ii) below (the goal of this mission), under a non-degeneracy assumption, by an augmented path with an artificial variable z0z_0z0​.
  • Later literature names matrices with (i)–(ii) copositive-plus, and removes non-degeneracy by lexicographic perturbation.

Setting

Fix a finite index set of size nnn, a real n×nn\times nn×n matrix MMM and q∈Rnq\in\mathbb R^nq∈Rn. Inequalities between vectors are componentwise and eee is the all-ones vector.

  • The set Z={z∈Rn:z≥0, w=Mz−q≥0}Z=\{z\in\mathbb R^n : z\ge 0,\ w=Mz-q\ge 0\}Z={z∈Rn:z≥0, w=Mz−q≥0}; www is always the function Mz−qMz-qMz−q of zzz.
  • An equilibrium point is a point z∈Zz\in Zz∈Z with zTw=0z^{\mathsf T}w=0zTw=0; SSS is the set of them.
  • For any z∈Rnz\in\mathbb R^nz∈Rn, the matrix N(z)N(z)N(z) consists of the columns of (MT,I)(M^{\mathsf T},I)(MT,I) that are kept when one deletes the iii-th column of MTM^{\mathsf T}MT whenever wi≠0w_i\ne 0wi​=0 and the iii-th column of III whenever zi≠0z_i\ne0zi​=0.
  • An extreme point of ZZZ is a point z∈Zz\in Zz∈Z with rank⁡N(z)=n\operatorname{rank}N(z)=nrankN(z)=n; zzz lies on an open edge if z∈Zz\in Zz∈Z and rank⁡N(z)=n−1\operatorname{rank}N(z)=n-1rankN(z)=n−1. An open edge is the set of points of ZZZ sharing the matrix N(z)N(z)N(z) of such a point; a ray is an open edge with exactly one end-point.
  • ZZZ is non-degenerate if for every z∈Rnz\in\mathbb R^nz∈Rn the columns of N(z)N(z)N(z) are linearly independent.
  • For an index sss, Zs={z∈Z:zTw=zsws}Z_s=\{z\in Z : z^{\mathsf T}w=z_sw_s\}Zs​={z∈Z:zTw=zs​ws​}. An adjacency path is a non-empty connected class of closed edges of ZZZ no three of which meet; its end-points are the extreme points lying on exactly one of its edges.
  • The augmented sets: Z∗={(z,z0):z≥0, z0≥0, Mz+z0e−q≥0}Z^*=\{(z,z_0) : z\ge0,\ z_0\ge0,\ Mz+z_0e-q\ge0\}Z∗={(z,z0​):z≥0, z0​≥0, Mz+z0​e−q≥0}, its subset Z0∗Z_0^*Z0∗​ where zTw=0z^{\mathsf T}w=0zTw=0, and, for a number kkk, Z∗∗Z^{**}Z∗∗, the set of the form above for the bordered data (Me−eT0)\begin{pmatrix}M&e\\-e^{\mathsf T}&0\end{pmatrix}(M−eT​e0​), (q−k)\begin{pmatrix}q\\-k\end{pmatrix}(q−k​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (p. 7)

Suppose ZZZ is non-degenerate and that for every u≥0u\ge0u≥0

(i) uTMu≥0,(ii) uTMu=0 ⟹ Mu+MTu=0.\text{(i)}\ u^{\mathsf T}Mu\ge 0,\qquad \text{(ii)}\ u^{\mathsf T}Mu=0\ \Longrightarrow\ Mu+M^{\mathsf T}u=0 .(i) uTMu≥0,(ii) uTMu=0 ⟹ Mu+MTu=0.

Then

Z≠∅ ⟹ ∃z∈Z, zT(Mz−q)=0.Z\ne\emptyset\ \Longrightarrow\ \exists z\in Z,\ z^{\mathsf T}(Mz-q)=0 .Z=∅ ⟹ ∃z∈Z, zT(Mz−q)=0.

Milestones, in the order the paper's proof uses them

  1. Theorem 1 (p. 3): for non-degenerate ZZZ, ZsZ_sZs​ is empty or a disjoint union of adjacency paths whose end-points are exactly the equilibrium points.
  2. Lemma 2 (p. 4): Z=∅Z=\emptysetZ=∅ iff some u≥0u\ge0u≥0 has MTu≤0M^{\mathsf T}u\le0MTu≤0, uTq>0u^{\mathsf T}q>0uTq>0.
  3. Theorem 2 (p. 4): if some ZsZ_sZs​ contains precisely one ray of a non-degenerate ZZZ, the number of equilibrium points is odd.
  4. p. 6: for kkk chosen as in (12), the starting ray E0∗E_0^*E0∗​ (z=0z=0z=0) is a ray of Z∗∗Z^{**}Z∗∗ inside Z0∗∗Z_0^{**}Z0∗∗​, and it is the only one.
  5. Lemma 2 (p. 6): Z∗∗Z^{**}Z∗∗ has an equilibrium point.
  6. Lemma 3 (p. 7): a ray (zˉ+θu,zˉ0+θu0)(\bar z+\theta u,\bar z_0+\theta u_0)(zˉ+θu,zˉ0​+θu0​) of Z∗Z^*Z∗ in Z0∗Z_0^*Z0∗​ with eTu=1e^{\mathsf T}u=1eTu=1 satisfies uTMu+u0=0u^{\mathsf T}Mu+u_0=0uTMu+u0​=0.
  7. (22)–(25) (pp. 7–8): under (i)–(ii) such a ray has zˉ0=0\bar z_0=0zˉ0​=0 and zˉ\bar zzˉ an equilibrium point of ZZZ, or zˉ0>0\bar z_0>0zˉ0​>0 and Z=∅Z=\emptysetZ=∅.

Companion results

The Corollary (p. 5: q=eq=eq=e, M>0M>0M>0 gives an odd number of equilibrium points), Theorem 3 (p. 5: if zTMz≥0z^{\mathsf T}Mz\ge0zTMz≥0 for all zzz, at most one equilibrium point) and Theorem 5 (p. 8: if moreover Z≠∅Z\ne\emptysetZ=∅, ZZZ has at least nnn rays).

Significance

Theorem 4 is an existence theorem for a class of linear complementarity problems that contains convex quadratic programming (the case zTMz≥0z^{\mathsf T}Mz\ge0zTMz≥0 for all zzz) and strictly positive matrices, and its proof is an algorithm: the path followed is the sequence of pivots of Lemke's method. The parity statements (Theorem 2, the Corollary) are an early instance of the path-following parity arguments later abstracted in the complexity class PPAD (Papadimitriou 1994).

The theorem is classical and proved. To our knowledge neither Lemke's theorem nor the polyhedral path machinery of Theorems 1–2 has a machine-checked proof in Lean or Mathlib. This mission produces the vocabulary of non-degenerate complementarity polyhedra (the matrix N(z)N(z)N(z), open edges, rays, adjacency paths), the parity theorem, and the existence theorem itself; the Farkas-type Lemma 2 (p. 4) is already available on the platform.

Difficulty

The algebraic part (Lemma 3 and (22)–(25)) is short. The difficulty is combinatorial-geometric: Theorem 1 requires that, under non-degeneracy, every extreme point of ZZZ has exactly nnn incident edges, that each point of ZsZ_sZs​ is an extreme point or lies on an open edge, and that the edges contained in ZsZ_sZs​ form paths whose end-points are exactly the equilibrium points; the parity of Theorem 2 then needs finiteness of the set of extreme points. None of this polyhedral structure (edges as zero-pattern classes, their closures and end-points) is in Mathlib. Moreover, the printed proof of Theorem 4 applies Theorem 2 to Z∗∗Z^{**}Z∗∗, whose non-degeneracy the paper obtains from an informal perturbation remark, and it sketches the step from the end of the augmented path to a ray of Z∗Z^*Z∗; a complete proof of the goal must supply these steps or take another route.

Formalization scope

  • Vectors are functions from a finite index type ι\iotaι to R\mathbb RR (n=∣ι∣n=|\iota|n=∣ι∣; Fin n\mathrm{Fin}\,nFinn is a special case); the bordered system lives on ι⊕{∗}\iota\oplus\{\ast\}ι⊕{∗}. www is always Mz−qMz-qMz−q, never a free variable.
  • N(z)N(z)N(z) is the indexed family of its columns, rank⁡N(z)\operatorname{rank}N(z)rankN(z) the dimension of their span; "rank⁡N(z)=n−1\operatorname{rank}N(z)=n-1rankN(z)=n−1" is written rank⁡N(z)+1=n\operatorname{rank}N(z)+1=nrankN(z)+1=n.
  • Non-degeneracy (Def. 3) is linear independence of the columns of N(z)N(z)N(z) for every z∈Rnz\in\mathbb R^nz∈Rn. The phrase "(but not all)" is read as excluding only the empty matrix; the other reading differs only when q=0q=0q=0, and the formal definition is then the stronger hypothesis.
  • An open edge is the set of points of ZZZ with the zero pattern of a point z0z_0z0​ with rank⁡N(z0)=n−1\operatorname{rank}N(z_0)=n-1rankN(z0​)=n−1; closed edges are closures; end-points of an open edge EEE are the points of E‾∖E\overline E\setminus EE∖E; a ray has exactly one. Adjacency paths are classes of closed edges.
  • Conditions (i)–(ii) are quantified over u≥0u\ge0u≥0 only. "Non-negative definite" (Theorems 3, 5) is zTMz≥0z^{\mathsf T}Mz\ge0zTMz≥0 for all zzz, with no symmetry assumed.
  • "An odd number" is finiteness plus odd cardinality; "at least nnn rays" counts rays as an extended natural number; "at most one" is a subsingleton.
  • Equilibrium points include membership in ZZZ: zT(Mz−q)=0z^{\mathsf T}(Mz-q)=0zT(Mz−q)=0 alone holds at z=0z=0z=0 and would make the goal trivial. The goal mentions neither Z∗Z^*Z∗, Z∗∗Z^{**}Z∗∗, kkk, rays nor paths; in particular non-degeneracy of Z∗∗Z^{**}Z∗∗ is not a hypothesis of the goal.
  • Deviations: Lemma 2 (p. 6) assumes non-degeneracy of Z∗∗Z^{**}Z∗∗ (Def. 3 does not define it for the non-square Z∗Z^*Z∗); milestone 4 holds for every kkk without non-degeneracy; Lemma 3 and (22)–(25) parametrize the ray as in (15) without requiring zˉ∗\bar z^*zˉ∗ to be an extreme point, which makes them stronger.

Contributions welcome: the polyhedral lemmas for non-degenerate ZZZ (extreme points have nnn edges, finitely many extreme points), the parity argument, and any complete route to Theorem 4.

Selected references

  • C. E. Lemke, Bimatrix Equilibrium Points and Mathematical Programming, Management Science 11(7):681–689, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.11.7.681 (cited from the HAL deposit hal-01885823v1)
  • C. E. Lemke, J. T. Howson, Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games, J. SIAM 12(2):413–423, 1964. https://doi.org/10.1137/0112033
  • R. W. Cottle, J.-S. Pang, R. E. Stone, The Linear Complementarity Problem, Academic Press 1992; SIAM Classics 2009. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9780898719000
  • C. H. Papadimitriou, On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of existence, J. Computer and System Sciences 48(3):498–532, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0000(05)80063-7
10 thms3 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Loss Networks 1: The Primal Problem Has a Unique Optimum x_r = ν_r ∏_j (1 − B_j)^{A_jr}; the Conditions on B Are Solvable, Uniquely if rank A = J, and Biject with Dual OptimaResearch Paper

Motivation

A loss network carries calls that require capacity on one or more links. A call is accepted only when every required link has enough free circuits; otherwise it is lost. This makes the traffic on different links dependent even when calls on different routes arrive independently. Network operators need to know where capacity constraints bind and how offered traffic is converted into carried traffic. Kelly's 1991 survey develops a continuous optimization problem that identifies a characteristic flow vector and gives a linkwise description of blocking in this setting. Kelly, Loss networks (1991), §§1.2 and 2.1.

The paper begins with the equilibrium distribution of the discrete network and uses a continuous relaxation when analyzing its likely state. The resulting primal problem is useful beyond the original probability calculation because it links route flows, capacity constraints, and a convex dual. Theorem 2.8 collects the existence, uniqueness, and correspondence statements for these descriptions. This mission targets that theorem and the intermediate claims Kelly states in §2.1. Kelly (1991), pp. 327–329.

Setting

There are finitely many links jjj and finitely many routes rrr. Link jjj has CjC_jCj​ circuits, and one call on route rrr uses AjrA_{jr}Ajr​ circuits there, with AjrA_{jr}Ajr​ a nonnegative integer. Calls request route rrr at positive offered rate νr\nu_rνr​. The matrix AAA need not be a zero–one incidence matrix: one call may use more than one circuit on a link. Kelly's fixed-routing model and its general integer matrix are described in §1.2. Kelly (1991), p. 321.

A real route-flow vector x=(xr)x=(x_r)x=(xr​) is primal feasible if xr≥0x_r\ge0xr​≥0 for every route and ∑rAjrxr≤Cj\sum_r A_{jr}x_r\le C_j∑r​Ajr​xr​≤Cj​ for every link. The objective is

F(x)=∑r(xrlog⁡νr−xrlog⁡xr+xr),F(x)=\sum_r\bigl(x_r\log\nu_r-x_r\log x_r+x_r\bigr),F(x)=r∑​(xr​logνr​−xr​logxr​+xr​),

with xrlog⁡xr=0x_r\log x_r=0xr​logxr​=0 at xr=0x_r=0xr​=0. The primal optimum maximizes FFF over precisely this feasible set. This is the continuous problem (2.1), rather than an optimization over the integer-valued network state. Kelly (1991), p. 327, (2.1).

A nonnegative vector y=(yj)y=(y_j)y=(yj​) assigns one multiplier to each link. The dual objective is

D(y)=∑rνrexp⁡ ⁣(−∑jyjAjr)+∑jyjCj,yj≥0.D(y)=\sum_r\nu_r\exp\!\left(-\sum_jy_jA_{jr}\right)+\sum_jy_jC_j, \qquad y_j\ge0.D(y)=r∑​νr​exp(−j∑​yj​Ajr​)+j∑​yj​Cj​,yj​≥0.

A blocking vector B=(Bj)B=(B_j)B=(Bj​) has 0≤Bj<10\le B_j<10≤Bj​<1. Its carried route flow is νr∏i(1−Bi)Air\nu_r\prod_i(1-B_i)^{A_{ir}}νr​∏i​(1−Bi​)Air​. The conditions on BBB say that the total carried flow through link jjj equals CjC_jCj​ when Bj>0B_j>0Bj​>0, and is at most CjC_jCj​ when Bj=0B_j=0Bj​=0. The multiplier and blocking coordinates are related by Bj=1−e−yjB_j=1-e^{-y_j}Bj​=1−e−yj​, equivalently yj=−log⁡(1−Bj)y_j=-\log(1-B_j)yj​=−log(1−Bj​). These are equations (2.3), (2.6), and (2.7). Kelly (1991), p. 328.

Formalization targets

Theorem 2.8: primal optimum, blocking solutions, and dual optima

The goal first asserts that the primal problem has exactly one optimizer. Every blocking solution must describe that same optimizer:

xr=νr∏j(1−Bj)Ajrfor every route r.x_r=\nu_r\prod_j(1-B_j)^{A_{jr}}\quad\text{for every route }r.xr​=νr​j∏​(1−Bj​)Ajr​for every route r.

It also asserts that a blocking solution exists, and that it is unique if AAA has rank JJJ, the number of links. Finally, the transformations Bj=1−e−yjB_j=1-e^{-y_j}Bj​=1−e−yj​ and yj=−log⁡(1−Bj)y_j=-\log(1-B_j)yj​=−log(1−Bj​) give a bijection between all blocking solutions and all dual optima. The formal goal includes both directions and both inverse identities, even when the dual optimizer is not unique. Kelly (1991), p. 329, Theorem 2.8.

Claims leading to the theorem

The milestone list follows Kelly's stated progression: unique primal attainment; the Lagrangian maximum and the dual value in (2.2); feasibility and complementary slackness in (2.4)–(2.5); the substitution (2.6); dual attainment; both directions of the blocking–dual correspondence; and strict convexity plus uniqueness under full row rank. One direction of the correspondence is an existing, proved platform theorem, KellyStochasticNetworks.dual_optimum_conditions; it is referenced directly. The other direction remains a new target. Kelly (1991), pp. 327–329.

Significance

The theorem makes the carried flow uniquely determined even when several blocking vectors or dual optimizers describe it. Under full row rank, it also identifies a unique linkwise blocking vector. Its correspondence lets a statement in the flow language be translated to a statement in the multiplier language without selecting a preferred optimizer. The interpretation following Theorem 2.8 explains the linkwise condition: positive blocking occurs only on a saturated link. Kelly (1991), p. 329, discussion after Theorem 2.8.

The mathematical result was proved in the source paper. The work here is to obtain machine-checked proofs of its exact finite-dimensional statements. The published Kelly–Yudovina definition KellyStochasticNetworks.dualObjective already represents the dual formula, and its proved optimum-conditions theorem supplies one direction of the correspondence. The remaining development would give reusable facts about separable entropy objectives, nonnegative linear capacity constraints, complementary slackness, and exponential coordinate changes. Those facts can support later loss-network formalizations without changing this mission's target.

Difficulty

The boundary xr=0x_r=0xr​=0 requires care: the objective has a continuous value there, but its logarithmic derivative does not. Thus a calculation that differentiates the objective throughout the closed nonnegative cone does not justify the printed differentiability sentence on p. 327. Dual existence is another boundary issue. A nonnegative capacity permits Cj=0C_j=0Cj​=0, while the paper's stated growth of the dual objective in every nonnegative coordinate can fail at that input. Any formal argument for the complete theorem must cover these domains accurately. Full row rank controls uniqueness of the dual coordinates; without it, the paper explicitly allows nonunique blocking solutions. Kelly (1991), pp. 327–329.

Formalization scope

Lean represents links by Fin J, routes by Fin R, AjrA_{jr}Ajr​ and CjC_jCj​ by natural numbers, and xrx_rxr​, yjy_jyj​, BjB_jBj​, and νr\nu_rνr​ by real numbers. The primal feasible set includes both coordinatewise nonnegativity and every link-capacity inequality. The dual optimum is minimal over the nonnegative orthant, using the published dual objective. The finite sums and products have their usual empty-index values; no hidden nonemptiness assumption is imposed. Matrix rank is taken over the reals and compared with JJJ, so the rank condition is full row rank.

The goal assumes νr>0\nu_r>0νr​>0 and Cj≥1C_j\ge1Cj​≥1 for every route and link. Positive rates give the logarithm in the primal objective its intended meaning. Positive capacities exclude a degeneracy in the dual-attainment and blocking parts of the theorem. The value at xr=0x_r=0xr​=0 is the continuous extension xrlog⁡xr=0x_r\log x_r=0xr​logxr​=0; no differentiability assertion at that boundary is part of the formal target. Blocking values belong to [0,1)[0,1)[0,1), so the inverse logarithm is evaluated on a positive number. A flow optimum always ranges over the exact primal feasible set, and a blocking solution always ranges over the full conditions (2.7); neither can be replaced by an arbitrary vector with a convenient equation.

A complete proof may require finite-dimensional convex analysis, strict concavity of the entropy term, attainment on a closed feasible set, the dual first-order condition, and facts about exponentials, logarithms, products, and matrix rank. The definitions and theorems are kept separate so work on these pieces can be reused. Contributions proving either a milestone or a reusable supporting lemma are in scope.

Selected references

  • F. P. Kelly, Loss networks, The Annals of Applied Probability 1(3), 319–378, 1991. DOI: 10.1214/aoap/1177005872.
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Optimal Starting Times for End-of-Season Sales and Optimal Stopping Times for Promotional Fares 1: Markdown Is Optimal Once Time-to-Go Falls Below a Strictly Increasing Threshold x_nResearch Paper

Why the timing of a markdown matters

A seller with limited stock can charge a high price while demand is strong and lower the price before the selling season ends. The timing depends on how many units remain: a markdown that is sensible with ample stock may be premature when only one unit is left. Feng and Gallego studied this decision when each price generates a Poisson demand stream and only one price change is allowed. Their 1995 paper proves that the optimal decision has a threshold in remaining time for every inventory level. This mission formalizes their markdown theorem, including its value-function representation, rather than just the existence of a switching rule.

The model is a finite-inventory revenue problem, relevant when an unsold unit loses its value at the end of a season. It is also a continuous-time stopping problem: the seller observes actual sales and may react to them. A fixed calendar date for the markdown cannot describe all of those decisions. The paper treats the markdown case separately from the markup case, because the order of prices, arrival rates and revenue rates reverses the behavior of the switching boundary. The present mission concerns the markdown case alone.

Prices, demand, and admissible switches

Let n≥1n\ge1n≥1 be the initial stock and t≥0t\ge0t≥0 the time to go. The seller first charges price p1p_1p1​ and may change once to a lower price p2p_2p2​. Demands at the two prices are independent Poisson counts with positive rates λ1\lambda_1λ1​ and λ2\lambda_2λ2​. A lower price produces more arrivals, so p2<p1p_2<p_1p2​<p1​ and λ1<λ2\lambda_1<\lambda_2λ1​<λ2​. Feng and Gallego also assume that lowering the price increases the revenue rate: p1λ1<p2λ2p_1\lambda_1<p_2\lambda_2p1​λ1​<p2​λ2​. There is no salvage payment for inventory left when time expires. These conventions come from §2 and the case split on pp. 1375–1376.

Write N1(s)N_1(s)N1​(s) for the observed sales count at the initial price by time sss. If the price changes at deterministic time s∈[0,t]s\in[0,t]s∈[0,t], let J(n,t;s)J(n,t;s)J(n,t;s) be the expected total revenue. The count after the change is independent of N1(s)N_1(s)N1​(s), and their sum has Poisson mean λ1s+λ2(t−s)\lambda_1s+\lambda_2(t-s)λ1​s+λ2​(t−s). The optimal value J(n,t)J(n,t)J(n,t) allows the switch time τ\tauτ to depend on the counts observed so far. An admissible τ\tauτ lies between zero and ttt, is a stopping time for the history of N1N_1N1​, and occurs before stock is exhausted almost surely. At s=0s=0s=0, J(n,t;0)J(n,t;0)J(n,t;0) is the revenue from charging p2p_2p2​ immediately. The paper defines these quantities in §3, pp. 1377–1379.

Formalization targets

The goal is Theorem 1, p. 1380. It asserts a strictly increasing sequence x1<x2<⋯x_1<x_2<\cdotsx1​<x2​<⋯ of inventory-dependent thresholds. When t≤xnt\le x_nt≤xn​, switching immediately earns the optimal value; when t>xnt>x_nt>xn​, a correction F(n,t)F(n,t)F(n,t) is added:

J(n,t)={J(n,t;0),t≤xn,J(n,t;0)+F(n,t),t>xn.J(n,t)=\begin{cases} J(n,t;0),&t\le x_n,\\ J(n,t;0)+F(n,t),&t>x_n. \end{cases}J(n,t)={J(n,t;0),J(n,t;0)+F(n,t),​t≤xn​,t>xn​.​

The theorem specifies the correction, rather than leaving it as an arbitrary difference of values. It starts with F(0,t)=0F(0,t)=0F(0,t)=0. For n≥1n\ge1n≥1, set L(n,t)=G(n,t)+λ1F(n−1,t)L(n,t)=G(n,t)+\lambda_1F(n-1,t)L(n,t)=G(n,t)+λ1​F(n−1,t), where GGG is the Poisson-tail expression from §4.1. The threshold xnx_nxn​ is the first nonnegative zero of L(n,⋅)L(n,\cdot)L(n,⋅). A function H(n,⋅)H(n,\cdot)H(n,⋅) satisfies ∂tH=−λ1H+L\partial_tH=-\lambda_1H+L∂t​H=−λ1​H+L for positive time and H(n,xn)=0H(n,x_n)=0H(n,xn​)=0; FFF is zero below xnx_nxn​ and equals HHH at and above it. If yny_nyn​ is the first zero of G(n,⋅)G(n,\cdot)G(n,⋅), the theorem also gives x1=y1x_1=y_1x1​=y1​ and xn<ynx_n<y_nxn​<yn​ for n>1n>1n>1.

Three supporting targets match the source's attack path. Equation (17) differentiates immediate-switch revenue. Lemma 2 gives the zeros and one sign change of GGG in the markdown case. Lemma 1 identifies a value function through differential inequalities and its stopping payoff. Each is recorded with its page-level statement in the milestone list.

What the result provides

The threshold sequence turns an adaptive stopping problem into a state rule: inspect remaining inventory and time to go, then compare time with the corresponding threshold. The value representation supplies the expected-revenue quantity on both sides of that comparison. Strict increase means a larger stock requires a larger remaining-time threshold before charging the higher initial price is worthwhile. These are the conclusions of Theorem 1, already proved in the paper.

The work here is a Lean statement and eventual machine-checked proof of that known result. The current theorem items are open proof targets. Formalizing the model gives reusable Poisson-tail revenue expressions and a continuous-time stopping-value interface; Lemma 1 can also serve other Poisson-driven stopping problems once proved. A checked proof would establish that the threshold representation and the optimal stopping value agree under the stated assumptions, including boundary cases that informal notation leaves implicit.

Where the mathematics is difficult

The obvious comparison of two fixed switching times misses the information contained in the sales path. The switch decision can change after each observed arrival, while the threshold for inventory nnn depends on the correction at stock n−1n-1n−1. Showing that every such comparison is organized by one increasing threshold requires more than differentiating the fixed-switch revenue. The paper's appendix handles the interaction between the sign of GGG, the recursive correction, and the stopping-value verification; these are distinct formal targets pp. 1387–1388.

The printed verification lemma and one word of Lemma 2 require care. Lemma 1 omits boundary and regularity conditions needed by its proof. Lemma 2 calls the zero sequence “bounded,” although its thresholds tend to infinity; the usable claim is that they stay above a positive lower bound. The formal statements expose these corrections and retain the rest of the source's conclusions.

Formalization scope

Lean represents the first demand stream by a counting process built from independent exponential interarrival times. The terminal revenue after a switch is expressed using the Poisson law of the sum of the two independent counts. The stopping class records the count-generated history, bounds the stopping time by the horizon, and requires stock to remain at stopping almost surely. Its expected payoff uses the number sold before stopping and the immediate-switch value for the unsold stock. Prices and rates are positive, the markdown ordering and revenue-rate inequality are explicit, and the probability measure is named explicitly even though the exponential-interarrival law already entails it.

The paper uses nonnegative real time, inventories indexed by positive integers, and zero salvage. Lean uses a real supremum for the value and a real infimum for each threshold; the admissible payoff is bounded and measurable, and every threshold-defining zero set is asserted nonempty. The ODE is expressed with an actual derivative at positive time. The auxiliary Poisson-tail definition maps a negative mean to zero, but all model applications have nonnegative means. The threshold construction, its ODE, and the equality with the stopping value are all conclusions of the goal, so none is an assumed solution.

For Lemma 1, the formal target adds the initial-time and zero-stock boundary values, domination of terminal revenue, and local Lipschitz regularity in time. The first three conditions are used in the source's own proof or reformulation; local Lipschitz regularity makes its integral calculation valid. Contributions may establish the Poisson-tail calculus, the sign and threshold results, the verification theorem, or the complete markdown theorem. The referenced arrival-process definition is shared infrastructure; the two-price revenue and stopping model are specific to this paper.

Selected references

  • Y. Feng and G. Gallego, Optimal Starting Times for End-of-Season Sales and Optimal Stopping Times for Promotional Fares, Management Science 41(8), 1995, pp. 1371–1391. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.41.8.1371.
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The Complexity of Markov Decision Processes III: The Optimal Discounted Cost of a Deterministic Process Is the Least Discounted Cost of a SigmaResearch Paper

Motivation

A Markov decision process with finitely many states and decisions, a discount factor β∈(0,1)\beta\in(0,1)β∈(0,1) and the objective of minimizing expected discounted cost is the basic model of sequential decision making in operations research and reinforcement learning. It is solvable in polynomial time by linear programming. Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis (Math. Oper. Res. 12(3), 1987) asked the finer question of whether it can be solved fast in parallel, and showed a sharp split: the general (stochastic) problem is P-complete (their Theorem 1), so it is unlikely to admit a polylogarithmic parallel algorithm, while the deterministic special case, where every transition probability is 0 or 1, is in NC (their Theorem 4).

The deterministic case is a shortest-path problem with a twist. Every policy traces a walk in a graph, and the cost of the walk counts its ttt-th arc with weight βt\beta^tβt. The paper's argument identifies the optimal discounted cost with the cost of a finite combinatorial object, a sigma, and computes it from discounted min-plus matrix products. This mission formalizes that identity.

Setting

A deterministic stationary Markov decision process consists of a finite set SSS of nnn states, an initial state s0∈Ss_0\in Ss0​∈S, and for each state sss a finite nonempty set DsD_sDs​ of decisions. Decision i∈Dsi\in D_si∈Ds​ costs c(s,i)∈Rc(s,i)\in\mathbb Rc(s,i)∈R and leads with certainty to the state next(s,i)\mathrm{next}(s,i)next(s,i). Equivalently, it is a directed graph on SSS with an arc s→next(s,i)s\to\mathrm{next}(s,i)s→next(s,i) of weight c(s,i)c(s,i)c(s,i) for each decision; parallel arcs and loops are allowed.

A policy δ\deltaδ chooses a decision δ(s,t)∈Ds\delta(s,t)\in D_sδ(s,t)∈Ds​ for every state sss and time t=0,1,2,…t=0,1,2,\dotst=0,1,2,…; it is stationary if δ(s,t)\delta(s,t)δ(s,t) does not depend on ttt. From s0s_0s0​ it produces the states st+1=next(st,δ(st,t))s_{t+1}=\mathrm{next}(s_t,\delta(s_t,t))st+1​=next(st​,δ(st​,t)) and the discounted cost

Jβ(δ)=∑t=0∞βtc(st,δ(st,t)).J_\beta(\delta)=\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\beta^t c\bigl(s_t,\delta(s_t,t)\bigr).Jβ​(δ)=t=0∑∞​βtc(st​,δ(st​,t)).

The optimal discounted cost is Jβ∗(s0)=inf⁡δJβ(δ)J^*_\beta(s_0)=\inf_\delta J_\beta(\delta)Jβ∗​(s0​)=infδ​Jβ​(δ), the infimum over all policies δ(s,t)\delta(s,t)δ(s,t).

A sigma is a walk w0=s0,w1,…,wNw_0=s_0,w_1,\dots,w_Nw0​=s0​,w1​,…,wN​ along decisions et∈Dwte_t\in D_{w_t}et​∈Dwt​​ whose nodes w0,…,wN−1w_0,\dots,w_{N-1}w0​,…,wN−1​ are distinct and whose last node repeats an earlier one, wN=wjw_N=w_jwN​=wj​ with j<Nj<Nj<N: the walk from s0s_0s0​ up to the first repetition of a node. It is a prefix of jjj arcs followed by a cycle of l=N−j≥1l=N-j\ge1l=N−j≥1 arcs. Its discounted cost cβ(P)c_\beta(P)cβ​(P) is the discounted cost of the infinite walk that follows it and repeats its cycle forever.

In the min-plus semiring (addition is min⁡\minmin, multiplication is +++, zero is +∞+\infty+∞), let AuvA_{uv}Auv​ be the least cost of a decision from uuu to vvv (+∞+\infty+∞ if none), let rArArA multiply every finite entry by rrr, and let

B0=I,Bk=A⊗βA⊗⋯⊗βk−1A,B_0=I,\qquad B_k=A\otimes\beta A\otimes\cdots\otimes\beta^{k-1}A ,B0​=I,Bk​=A⊗βA⊗⋯⊗βk−1A,

with III the min-plus identity. The entry (Bk)uv(B_k)_{uv}(Bk​)uv​ is the least discounted cost ∑t<kβtct\sum_{t<k}\beta^t c_t∑t<k​βtct​ of a kkk-arc walk from uuu to vvv.

Formalization targets

Goal

For 0<β<10<\beta<10<β<1,

Jβ∗(s0)=min⁡P sigmacβ(P)=min⁡{(Bk)s0u+βk(Bl)uu1−βl  :  u∈S, 0≤k≤n, 1≤l≤n, both entries finite},J^*_\beta(s_0)=\min_{P\text{ sigma}}c_\beta(P)=\min\Bigl\{(B_k)_{s_0u}+\frac{\beta^{k}(B_l)_{uu}}{1-\beta^{l}}\;:\;u\in S,\ 0\le k\le n,\ 1\le l\le n,\ \text{both entries finite}\Bigr\},Jβ∗​(s0​)=P sigmamin​cβ​(P)=min{(Bk​)s0​u​+1−βlβk(Bl​)uu​​:u∈S, 0≤k≤n, 1≤l≤n, both entries finite},

with both minima attained. This is the claim on pp. 446–447 on which Theorem 4 rests. The algebraic expression is the corrected form of the paper's (see Formalization scope).

Milestones

  1. The closed form of the cost of a sigma (p. 446): cβ(P)=∑t<jβtct+βj1−βl∑t<lβtcj+tc_\beta(P)=\sum_{t<j}\beta^tc_t+\frac{\beta^j}{1-\beta^l}\sum_{t<l}\beta^tc_{j+t}cβ​(P)=∑t<j​βtct​+1−βlβj​∑t<l​βtcj+t​.
  2. A stationary optimal policy exists (§2, p. 444; cited on p. 446). The general finite stochastic statement is on the platform as BertsekasDP.discounted_main_theorem (Proved), and the deterministic case is stated in this mission's model.
  3. The path of a stationary policy, cut at its first repeated node, is a sigma with the same discounted cost, and every sigma arises this way (p. 446).
  4. The products BjB_jBj​ are the cheapest discounted jjj-arc walks (p. 447).

Significance

The identity reduces an optimization over infinite objects, the time-dependent policies, to a minimum over finitely many closed-form expressions in matrix entries. Each BkB_kBk​ is a product of kkk min-plus matrices, and matrix products parallelize well; that is the source of the NC algorithm. The same reduction, with the discounting removed, underlies the minimum-mean-cycle characterization of the average-cost problem (mission II of this series), and the sigma structure reappears in the stationary finite-horizon analysis (mission IV).

On the formalization side, the result has been proved in the paper only as a short paragraph, which cites the existence of stationary optimal policies and leaves the algebra to the reader. Its printed formulas contain index slips (below). A machine-checked version fixes the exact constants. To our knowledge none of these statements has a formal proof. The existence of stationary optimal policies for finite discounted problems is formalized on the platform in Bertsekas's general stochastic setting.

Difficulty

The obvious argument says: an optimal policy may be taken stationary, a stationary deterministic policy produces an eventually periodic path, and an eventually periodic path is a sigma. The first step is the substantial one: the optimum is an infimum over all time-dependent policies δ(s,t)\delta(s,t)δ(s,t), and a non-stationary policy can follow any walk at all, so this step is a statement about the whole dynamic program, not a combinatorial fact about a single walk. The second part of the goal adds a matching argument in the other direction: the expression ranges over arbitrary kkk-arc walks and closed lll-walks, which need not be simple, so one must check that none of them beats the best sigma, and that the best sigma has k≤nk\le nk≤n and l≤nl\le nl≤n. Finally, the discount factors must be tracked exactly; the printed formulas are off by one power of β\betaβ in two places.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in the namespace MDPComplexity.Discounted, with one definition file and five theorems. Conventions committed to:

  • The model is stationary and deterministic. A DetMDP S has a finite state type, a nonempty finite decision type at each state (the paper says "a finite set DsD_sDs​"; nonemptiness is implicit since a policy must choose a decision), a successor map and real costs.
  • Policies are maps δ(s,t)\delta(s,t)δ(s,t), time is N\mathbb NN from 000, and the optimum optDisc is the infimum over all such policies. Defining it over stationary policies or over sigmas would make the goal true by definition. That shortcut is ruled out, and the stationarity step is part of the content.
  • Costs are tsums, which are junk (000) for non-summable series; every statement that sums costs assumes 0<β<10<\beta<10<β<1, under which the series converge absolutely.
  • A sigma is encoded as a lasso, wN=wjw_N=w_jwN​=wj​ with j<Nj<Nj<N. This includes j=0j=0j=0, a sigma whose cycle passes through s0s_0s0​, which the printed form (u0,…,uk,v1,…,vl,v1)(u_0,\dots,u_k,v_1,\dots,v_l,v_1)(u0​,…,uk​,v1​,…,vl​,v1​) omits but the definition "a path from u0u_0u0​ until the first repetition of a node" includes. The paper's kkk is j−1j-1j−1.
  • Corrected slips: (i) in the sigma display the cycle sum carries βj−1\beta^{j-1}βj−1, not βj\beta^jβj, for its jjj-th arc, and the indices are made consistent; (ii) the algorithm's expression is λ+βkμ/(1−βl)\lambda+\beta^k\mu/(1-\beta^l)λ+βkμ/(1−βl) with l≥1l\ge1l≥1, not λ+βk+1μ/(1+βl)\lambda+\beta^{k+1}\mu/(1+\beta^l)λ+βk+1μ/(1+βl) (one state with a loop of cost 111 has optimum 1/(1−β)1/(1-\beta)1/(1−β), which the printed form misses); (iii) B0B_0B0​, used but not defined, is the min-plus identity.
  • Matrix entries are in Tropical (WithTop ℝ), so +∞+\infty+∞ is ⊤ and the product is Mathlib's matrix product over the tropical semiring.

Not formalized: membership in NC, the processor count n4n^4n4, the log⁡2n+3log⁡n\log^2 n+3\log nlog2n+3logn parallel time, and the P-completeness of the general problem. Mathlib has no parallel complexity classes. Only the identity that makes the algorithm correct is a target.

Contributions welcome: proofs of any milestone. A bridge from DetMDP to BertsekasSSPModel (taking decisions as controls and 0/1 transition rows) would let milestone 2 be derived from the platform's proved Proposition 7.3.1. A direct proof of the deterministic case is also welcome. The lasso and walk lemmas are reusable for the other missions of the series.

Selected references

  • C. H. Papadimitriou and J. N. Tsitsiklis, The Complexity of Markov Decision Processes, Mathematics of Operations Research 12(3), 441–450, 1987. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.12.3.441
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control, Vol. I, 3rd ed., Athena Scientific, 2005, §7.3 (discounted problems, Proposition 7.3.1).
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994, Ch. 6 (existence of stationary optimal policies for discounted models). https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
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Send-and-Split Method for Minimum-Concave-Cost Network Flows II: Subproblem Minimum Costs Are the Greatest Solution of the Send-and-Split Equations, Unique if Circulations Cost Positively (Theorem 2)Research Paper

Motivation

Many network-design and production-planning problems ask for a cheapest way to route a commodity from supply points to demand points when the cost of an arc grows less than proportionally with the amount sent: setup charges, economies of scale, and fixed-plus-linear costs all give concave arc costs. Minimizing a concave function over the flow polytope is NP-hard in general, and the classical linear-cost machinery (potentials, negative-cycle tests) no longer applies. Erickson, Monma and Veinott (Math. Oper. Res. 12 (1987)) gave the send-and-split method, a dynamic program over subsets of the demand nodes that solves the uncapacitated problem in time polynomial in the number of nodes and arcs and exponential only in the number of demand nodes. It contains as special cases the Dreyfus–Wagner recursion for Steiner trees in graphs (Networks 1 (1971)), and the paper applies it to concave-cost production, inventory and network-design problems (§6).

Timeline. Zangwill (1968) solved minimum-concave-cost flows on special networks by dynamic programming. Dreyfus and Wagner (1971) gave the subset recursion for Steiner trees with positive arc lengths. Erickson, Monma and Veinott (1987) extended the subset recursion to arbitrary uncapacitated networks with additive concave arc costs and arbitrary real demands, proved that the minimum costs of the subproblems form the greatest solution of the resulting equations (Theorem 2), and showed it is the only solution when every simple circulation has positive cost.

Setting

A network consists of a directed graph G=(N,A)G = (N, A)G=(N,A) with nodes N={0,…,n−1}N = \{0, \dots, n-1\}N={0,…,n−1} and arcs AAA, ordered pairs of distinct nodes, together with a real demand vector r=(ri)r = (r_i)r=(ri​). A preflow is a nonnegative matrix x=(xij)x = (x_{ij})x=(xij​) supported on AAA; a flow for rrr is a preflow with inflow minus outflow equal to rir_iri​ at every node. Each arc has a cost function cijc_{ij}cij​, concave on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞) with cij(0)=0c_{ij}(0) = 0cij​(0)=0, and the cost of a preflow is c(x)=∑(i,j)∈Acij(xij)c(x) = \sum_{(i,j)\in A} c_{ij}(x_{ij})c(x)=∑(i,j)∈A​cij​(xij​). A minimum-cost flow is a flow whose cost is at most that of every flow. A simple circulation is a circulation equal to some θ>0\theta > 0θ>0 on the arcs of a simple directed circuit and 000 elsewhere.

The demand nodes are D={i:ri≠0}D = \{ i : r_i \neq 0 \}D={i:ri​=0}. For ∅⊂I⊆D\emptyset \subset I \subseteq D∅⊂I⊆D let rI=∑j∈Irjr_I = \sum_{j \in I} r_jrI​=∑j∈I​rj​. The subproblem i→Ii \to Ii→I keeps the demands of the nodes in III, sets all others to zero, and subtracts rIr_IrI​ at node iii; CiIC_{iI}CiI​ is its minimum cost, +∞+\infty+∞ when it has no flow. Let AI=AA_I = AAI​=A if rI>0r_I > 0rI​>0 and the reversed arcs if rI<0r_I < 0rI​<0, with sending cost cij(rI)c_{ij}(r_I)cij​(rI​), read as cji(−rI)c_{ji}(-r_I)cji​(−rI​) when rI<0r_I < 0rI​<0. The send-and-split equations for an array C′C'C′ are

CiI′=Cj,I∖{j}′ (j∈I)if rI=0,(1)C'_{iI} = C'_{j, I\setminus\{j\}} \ (j \in I) \quad \text{if } r_I = 0, \qquad (1)CiI′​=Cj,I∖{j}′​ (j∈I)if rI​=0,(1) CiI′=min⁡(i,j)∈AI[cij(rI)+CjI′]∧BiI′if rI≠0,(2)C'_{iI} = \min_{(i,j)\in A_I} \bigl[ c_{ij}(r_I) + C'_{jI} \bigr] \wedge B'_{iI} \quad \text{if } r_I \neq 0, \qquad (2)CiI′​=(i,j)∈AI​min​[cij​(rI​)+CjI′​]∧BiI′​if rI​=0,(2)

with BiI′=min⁡∅⊂J⊂I[CiJ′+Ci,I∖J′]B'_{iI} = \min_{\emptyset\subset J\subset I} [C'_{iJ} + C'_{i,I\setminus J}]BiI′​=min∅⊂J⊂I​[CiJ′​+Ci,I∖J′​] for ∣I∣>1|I| > 1∣I∣>1, and BiI′=0B'_{iI} = 0BiI′​=0 if I={i}I = \{i\}I={i}, +∞+\infty+∞ otherwise, for ∣I∣=1|I| = 1∣I∣=1 (3).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (Dynamic-Programming Equations)

If there is a minimum-cost flow for rrr, then

C solves (1)–(3),CjI′≤CjI  for every +∞-or-real solution C′,C \text{ solves (1)–(3)}, \qquad C'_{jI} \le C_{jI} \ \text{ for every } +\infty\text{-or-real solution } C',C solves (1)–(3),CjI′​≤CjI​  for every +∞-or-real solution C′,

for all j∈Nj \in Nj∈N and ∅⊂I⊆D\emptyset \subset I \subseteq D∅⊂I⊆D. If moreover every simple circulation has positive cost, then every +∞+\infty+∞-or-real solution equals CCC.

Milestones

In attack order: the subproblem alternative (a minimum-cost flow or no flow, p. 640); equation (1); inequalities (4), (5), (6) (p. 641); CiI=BiIC_{iI} = B_{iI}CiI​=BiI​ for i∈Ii \in Ii∈I (p. 641); CCC satisfies (1) and (2) (p. 642); and two generic statements about Bellman's equations (2)′ for minimum-cost chains in a graph with nonnegative, respectively positive, simple circuits: the minimum chain costs form the greatest solution and are nondecreasing in the arc costs, and with positive circuits the solution is unique (p. 642).

Significance

Theorem 2 is the correctness theorem of the send-and-split method: it says that solving equations (1)–(3) by increasing ∣I∣|I|∣I∣, with a shortest-chain computation for each III, yields the true subproblem minimum costs, in particular the optimum CiDC_{iD}CiD​ of the original problem. Its uniqueness clause identifies when the equations alone determine the answer, and the counterexample on p. 641 (zero costs on a strongly connected graph) shows that the positivity hypothesis cannot simply be dropped. The same structure underlies the Steiner-tree recursion.

The theorem is proved in the paper; to our knowledge none of it is formalized. This mission supplies Lean definitions of uncapacitated concave-cost flows with extended-real minimum costs and the send-and-split equations, and poses the correctness theorem as a proof goal. The two Bellman milestones are general facts about minimum-cost chains with +∞+\infty+∞-or-real values and are reusable well beyond this paper. Related items on the platform are credited, not reused: the Dreyfus–Wagner Steiner recursion DreyfusWagner.Steiner.steinerLength_recurrence and DreyfusWagner.Steiner.optimal_decomposition (the special case of undirected positive lengths), and BellmanRouting.PolicySpace.routing_equation_unique (uniqueness of the routing equation on a complete graph with positive real times).

Difficulty

The equations (2) mix two minima: sending the whole demand rIr_IrI​ across one arc, and splitting III at the current node. Showing that CCC satisfies them requires that some optimal flow of every subproblem has a tree-like structure, which in turn rests on the existence theory for concave-cost flows (an optimum is attained at an extreme flow whose support is a forest). Showing that CCC is the greatest solution requires an induction on ∣I∣|I|∣I∣ in which, for fixed III, equation (2) is a shortest-chain system whose arc costs to an auxiliary node depend on the solution at smaller sets; comparison then needs monotonicity of minimum chain costs in the arc costs, including arcs whose cost drops from +∞+\infty+∞. The naive attempt to prove uniqueness by iterating (2) fails without the positivity hypothesis, because zero-cost circuits admit spurious solutions.

Formalization scope

Nodes are Fin n; arcs are a Finset (Fin n × Fin n) with no loops; arc costs are functions R→R\mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}R→R assumed concave on Set.Ici 0 with cij(0)=0c_{ij}(0) = 0cij​(0)=0 at arcs (the paper's standing assumption, stated as a hypothesis). Minimum costs, sending costs, splitting terms and solutions take values in EReal; the empty infimum is +∞+\infty+∞, as on the page.

Explicit readings of the paper's phrases:

  • "there is a minimum-cost flow" means a flow for rrr whose cost is at most that of every flow for rrr;
  • "+∞+\infty+∞ or real-valued" means ≠−∞\neq -\infty=−∞, required on every ∅⊂I⊆D\emptyset \subset I \subseteq D∅⊂I⊆D;
  • "greatest solution" is two claims: CCC is a solution, and every solution is ≤C\le C≤C entrywise;
  • "each simple circulation has positive cost" quantifies over every simple circuit and every θ>0\theta > 0θ>0;
  • "CiIC_{iI}CiI​ is finite" is rendered as CiI=c(x)C_{iI} = c(x)CiI​=c(x) for a minimum-cost flow xxx of the subproblem;
  • "minimum-cost chain" is the infimum of walk costs, attained or +∞+\infty+∞; arc costs of +∞+\infty+∞ in (2)′ are missing arcs.

The definition of CiIC_{iI}CiI​ is the infimum over flows, never the equations themselves; a formalization defining CCC by (1)–(3), or omitting the ≠−∞\neq -\infty=−∞ condition on solutions, or dropping the clause that CCC is itself a solution, would make the theorem trivial or false and is ruled out. Arrays are compared only on admissible sets. The graph structure of (2)′ is the platform definition BertsekasSPGraph. Running-time bounds, the planar refinements of §4 (Theorem 3) and the capacitated reduction of §5 are out of scope. Proofs of any milestone, and a formalization of the paper's Theorem 1 that the proofs rely on, are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. E. Erickson, C. L. Monma, A. F. Veinott, Jr., Send-and-Split Method for Minimum-Concave-Cost Network Flows, Mathematics of Operations Research 12(4), 1987, 634–664. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.12.4.634
  • S. E. Dreyfus, R. A. Wagner, The Steiner Problem in Graphs, Networks 1(3), 1971, 195–207. https://doi.org/10.1002/net.3230010302
  • R. Bellman, On a Routing Problem, Quarterly of Applied Mathematics 16(1), 1958, 87–90. https://doi.org/10.1090/qam/102435
  • W. M. Hirsch, A. J. Hoffman, Extreme Varieties, Concave Functions, and the Fixed Charge Problem, Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics 14(3), 1961, 355–369. https://doi.org/10.1002/cpa.3160140312
  • W. I. Zangwill, Minimum Concave Cost Flows in Certain Networks, Management Science 14(7), 1968, 429–450. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.14.7.429
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Convex OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Entropic Barrier: A Simple and Optimal Universal Self-Concordant Barrier: The Entropic Barrier of a Convex Body in ℝⁿ Is a (1 + εₙ)n-Self-Concordant Barrier with εₙ ≤ 100√(log n / n)Research Paper

Motivation

Interior-point methods minimize a linear function x↦⟨c,x⟩x\mapsto\langle c,x\ranglex↦⟨c,x⟩ over a convex set K⊂Rn\mathcal K\subset\mathbb R^nK⊂Rn by following the minimizers of ⟨c,x⟩+1tg(x)\langle c,x\rangle+\frac1t g(x)⟨c,x⟩+t1​g(x) as t→∞t\to\inftyt→∞, where ggg is a self-concordant barrier for K\mathcal KK. Each Newton step of such a method shrinks 1/t1/t1/t by a factor 1−1/ν1-1/\sqrt\nu1−1/ν​, where ν\nuν is the self-concordance parameter of ggg, so ν\nuν controls the iteration count of every interior-point method built on ggg (Nesterov and Nemirovski 1994; Nesterov 2004).

Timeline:

  • 1994. Nesterov and Nemirovski construct the universal barrier for any convex body and show it is a ν\nuν-self-concordant barrier with ν≤Cn\nu\le Cnν≤Cn for a universal constant CCC. They also show that ν≥n\nu\ge nν≥n is necessary for some bodies (the simplex, the cube).
  • 2014–2015. Hildebrand (Math. Oper. Res. 2014) and Fox (Ann. Mat. Pura Appl. 2015) show that the canonical barrier of a convex cone has parameter equal to the dimension, which gives parameter n+1n+1n+1 for convex bodies.
  • 2015. Bubeck and Eldan (arXiv:1412.1587, COLT 2015) show that the Fenchel dual of the log-Laplace transform of the uniform measure on K\mathcal KK, which they call the entropic barrier, is a (1+o(1))n(1+o(1))n(1+o(1))n-self-concordant barrier, with an explicit o(1)o(1)o(1) term.

Beyond optimization, the entropic barrier is the mirror map that pairs naturally with the exponential-family sampling scheme in bandit linear optimization, which the paper discusses in its §3.1.

Setting

Let K⊂Rn\mathcal K\subset\mathbb R^nK⊂Rn be a convex body: compact, convex, with non-empty interior int⁡(K)\operatorname{int}(\mathcal K)int(K). The log-Laplace transform of K\mathcal KK is

f(θ)=log⁡(∫x∈Kexp⁡(⟨θ,x⟩) dx),θ∈Rn,f(\theta)=\log\left(\int_{x\in\mathcal K}\exp(\langle\theta,x\rangle)\,dx\right),\qquad\theta\in\mathbb R^n,f(θ)=log(∫x∈K​exp(⟨θ,x⟩)dx),θ∈Rn,

and the entropic barrier is its Fenchel dual

f∗(x)=sup⁡θ∈Rn ⟨θ,x⟩−f(θ),x∈int⁡(K).f^*(x)=\sup_{\theta\in\mathbb R^n}\ \langle\theta,x\rangle-f(\theta),\qquad x\in\operatorname{int}(\mathcal K).f∗(x)=θ∈Rnsup​ ⟨θ,x⟩−f(θ),x∈int(K).

For a function g:int⁡(K)→Rg:\operatorname{int}(\mathcal K)\to\mathbb Rg:int(K)→R write ∇g(x)[h]\nabla g(x)[h]∇g(x)[h], ∇2g(x)[h,h]\nabla^2g(x)[h,h]∇2g(x)[h,h], ∇3g(x)[h,h,h]\nabla^3g(x)[h,h,h]∇3g(x)[h,h,h] for its directional derivatives. Following Definition 1 of the paper:

  1. ggg is a barrier for K\mathcal KK if g(x)→+∞g(x)\to+\inftyg(x)→+∞ as x→∂Kx\to\partial\mathcal Kx→∂K;
  2. a C3C^3C3 convex ggg is self-concordant if ∇3g(x)[h,h,h]≤2(∇2g(x)[h,h])3/2\nabla^3g(x)[h,h,h]\le2(\nabla^2g(x)[h,h])^{3/2}∇3g(x)[h,h,h]≤2(∇2g(x)[h,h])3/2 for all x∈int⁡(K)x\in\operatorname{int}(\mathcal K)x∈int(K), h∈Rnh\in\mathbb R^nh∈Rn;
  3. it is ν\nuν-self-concordant if moreover ∇g(x)[h]≤ν⋅∇2g(x)[h,h]\nabla g(x)[h]\le\sqrt{\nu\cdot\nabla^2g(x)[h,h]}∇g(x)[h]≤ν⋅∇2g(x)[h,h]​ for all such x,hx,hx,h.

The proof works with the canonical exponential family pθp_\thetapθ​, the probability measure with density exp⁡(⟨θ,x⟩−f(θ))1{x∈K}\exp(\langle\theta,x\rangle-f(\theta))\mathbb 1\{x\in\mathcal K\}exp(⟨θ,x⟩−f(θ))1{x∈K}, its mean x(θ)x(\theta)x(θ), covariance Σ(θ)\Sigma(\theta)Σ(θ) and third central moment T(θ)T(\theta)T(θ); with Y=⟨θ/∥θ∥,X⟩Y=\langle\theta/\|\theta\|,X\rangleY=⟨θ/∥θ∥,X⟩ for X∼pθX\sim p_\thetaX∼pθ​ and its density ρ\rhoρ; and with the section marginal λ(y)=Voln−1(K∩{yθ/∥θ∥+θ⊥})/Vol(K)\lambda(y)=\mathrm{Vol}_{n-1}(\mathcal K\cap\{y\theta/\|\theta\|+\theta^\perp\})/\mathrm{Vol}(\mathcal K)λ(y)=Voln−1​(K∩{yθ/∥θ∥+θ⊥})/Vol(K).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

For every n≥80n\ge80n≥80 and every convex body K⊂Rn\mathcal K\subset\mathbb R^nK⊂Rn, f∗f^*f∗ is a ν\nuν-self-concordant barrier for K\mathcal KK with

ν=(1+εn) n,εn=100log⁡nn.\nu=(1+\varepsilon_n)\,n,\qquad\varepsilon_n=100\sqrt{\frac{\log n}{n}}.ν=(1+εn​)n,εn​=100nlogn​​.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Lemma 1 (p. 5): strict convexity of fff, f∗f^*f∗; ∇f∗:int⁡(K)→Rn\nabla f^*:\operatorname{int}(\mathcal K)\to\mathbb R^n∇f∗:int(K)→Rn is a bijection; ∇2f=Σ\nabla^2f=\Sigma∇2f=Σ, ∇3f=T\nabla^3f=T∇3f=T (eqs. (4)–(5)); ∇2f∗(x)=Σ(θ(x))−1\nabla^2f^*(x)=\Sigma(\theta(x))^{-1}∇2f∗(x)=Σ(θ(x))−1 (eq. (6)).
  2. f∗f^*f∗ is a barrier (§4, p. 6).
  3. Lemma 2 (p. 7): EX3≤2(EX2)3/2\mathbb EX^3\le2(\mathbb EX^2)^{3/2}EX3≤2(EX2)3/2 for a real centered log-concave XXX; its consequence Epθ⟨X−x(θ),h⟩3≤2(Epθ⟨X−x(θ),h⟩2)3/2\mathbb E_{p_\theta}\langle X-x(\theta),h\rangle^3\le2(\mathbb E_{p_\theta}\langle X-x(\theta),h\rangle^2)^{3/2}Epθ​​⟨X−x(θ),h⟩3≤2(Epθ​​⟨X−x(θ),h⟩2)3/2; f∗f^*f∗ is self-concordant (§4, pp. 6–7).
  4. Reduction of (3) (p. 7): f∗f^*f∗ satisfies (3) with parameter ν\nuν iff ⟨Σ(θ)θ,θ⟩≤ν\langle\Sigma(\theta)\theta,\theta\rangle\le\nu⟨Σ(θ)θ,θ⟩≤ν for all θ\thetaθ.
  5. λ\lambdaλ is nnn-concave on its support (p. 9) and Lemma 5 (p. 9): φ\varphiφ is nnn-concave iff (log⁡φ)′′≤−1n((log⁡φ)′)2(\log\varphi)''\le-\frac1n((\log\varphi)')^2(logφ)′′≤−n1​((logφ)′)2.
  6. Lemma 3 (p. 8): ρ(y+y0)=ρ(y0)ζ(y)e−y2/(2σ2)\rho(y+y_0)=\rho(y_0)\zeta(y)e^{-y^2/(2\sigma^2)}ρ(y+y0​)=ρ(y0​)ζ(y)e−y2/(2σ2) on [−M,M][-M,M][−M,M], with ζ∈[0,1]\zeta\in[0,1]ζ∈[0,1] unimodal, M=7nlog⁡n/∥θ∥M=\sqrt{7n\log n}/\|\theta\|M=7nlogn​/∥θ∥, σ2=n∥θ∥211−7log⁡(n)/n\sigma^2=\frac{n}{\|\theta\|^2}\frac{1}{1-\sqrt{7\log(n)/n}}σ2=∥θ∥2n​1−7log(n)/n​1​; and its consequence (9): E(∣Y−y0∣2∣∣Y−y0∣≤M)≤σ2\mathbb E(|Y-y_0|^2\mid|Y-y_0|\le M)\le\sigma^2E(∣Y−y0​∣2∣∣Y−y0​∣≤M)≤σ2.
  7. Lemma 4 (p. 8): (1−2c(ε)εlog⁡2(1/ε))Var(X)≤∫x1x2(x−x0)2λ(x)dx≤E(∣X−x0∣2∣X∈[x1,x2])(1-2c(\varepsilon)\varepsilon\log^2(1/\varepsilon))\mathrm{Var}(X)\le\int_{x_1}^{x_2}(x-x_0)^2\lambda(x)dx\le\mathbb E(|X-x_0|^2\mid X\in[x_1,x_2])(1−2c(ε)εlog2(1/ε))Var(X)≤∫x1​x2​​(x−x0​)2λ(x)dx≤E(∣X−x0​∣2∣X∈[x1​,x2​]) for log-concave XXX.
  8. (7) (p. 7): Var(Y)≤n∥θ∥2(1+εn)\mathrm{Var}(Y)\le\frac{n}{\|\theta\|^2}(1+\varepsilon_n)Var(Y)≤∥θ∥2n​(1+εn​).

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 gives, for every convex body, an explicit barrier whose parameter is nnn up to a second-order term, against the CnCnCn of the universal barrier, and it is optimal up to that term because ν≥n\nu\ge nν≥n is necessary for some bodies. The barrier is defined by a single formula, its derivatives are moments of an explicit probability measure, and its parameter bound reduces to a variance bound for one-dimensional log-concave marginals. Lemmas 2 and 4 are self-contained facts about log-concave laws on R\mathbb RR (a sharp third-moment bound and a variance-localization bound) that are usable outside this paper.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper; nothing here is formalized elsewhere. The platform has a definition of self-concordance (reused here) and results for given self-concordant functions, but no universal or entropic barrier, no exponential family over a convex body, and no moment bounds for log-concave laws. A complete development produces machine-checked versions of the duality facts of Lemma 1, of the two log-concave lemmas, and of the Brunn–Minkowski consequence for section volumes. Two steps of the paper are sketched rather than proved in full: the end of the proof of Lemma 2 ("We omit further details of this proof", p. 12) and, in Lemma 4, a normalization step that cites a lemma stated for isotropic densities. A formal proof either fills or replaces them.

Difficulty

Self-concordance of f∗f^*f∗ reduces to self-concordance of fff by a general duality fact, and that reduces to Lemma 2; the difficulty there is the sharp constant 222, since generic moment comparisons for log-concave laws give a worse constant. The parameter bound is the hard part. The obvious bound ⟨Σ(θ)θ,θ⟩≤Cn\langle\Sigma(\theta)\theta,\theta\rangle\le Cn⟨Σ(θ)θ,θ⟩≤Cn follows from standard concentration for log-concave measures, but any argument that loses a constant factor proves only the 1994 result. The 1+o(1)1+o(1)1+o(1) requires the one-dimensional marginal of the tilted measure to be compared with a Gaussian of variance n/∥θ∥2n/\|\theta\|^2n/∥θ∥2 to within a factor 1+O(log⁡n/n)1+O(\sqrt{\log n/n})1+O(logn/n​), using the fact that λ\lambdaλ is nnn-concave and not merely log-concave. The paper does this pointwise near the mode (Lemma 3) and controls the tails separately (Lemma 4). The pointwise argument assumes ρ\rhoρ smooth, which holds for smooth bodies, and an approximation argument passes to general convex bodies.

Formalization scope

  • Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n), so nnn is the dimension, not a separate parameter. A convex body is compact, convex, with non-empty interior; a lower-dimensional set is excluded, which rules out a formalization in which the barrier and self-concordance clauses hold vacuously.

  • f∗f^*f∗ is a real supremum. On int⁡(K)\operatorname{int}(\mathcal K)int(K) it is the true supremum; elsewhere Lean returns a junk value that no statement reads. The barrier property is a limit within int⁡(K)\operatorname{int}(\mathcal K)int(K) at every frontier point.

  • Self-concordance (2) is the published ConvexOptimization.IsSelfConcordantOn on interior K, stated by line restrictions with an absolute value. It is equivalent to (2), because h↦−hh\mapsto-hh↦−h flips the sign of the third derivative.

  • The goal states the parameter as the explicit number ν=(1+100log⁡(n)/n) n\nu=(1+100\sqrt{\log(n)/n})\,nν=(1+100log(n)/n​)n. The page says εn≤100log⁡(n)/n\varepsilon_n\le100\sqrt{\log(n)/n}εn​≤100log(n)/n​, and (3) is monotone in ν\nuν, so this is the same claim. An existential ν\nuν is not used.

  • Corrections and implicit hypotheses:

    • Lemma 4 is stated for 0<ε<10<\varepsilon<10<ε<1. The page says ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, but the statement is false for ε≥1\varepsilon\ge1ε≥1 and the paper applies it only with ε<1\varepsilon<1ε<1.
    • Lemma 5 assumes φ>0\varphi>0φ>0, which is implicit in ζ=log⁡φ\zeta=\log\varphiζ=logφ.
    • The reduction of (3) assumes ν≥0\nu\ge0ν≥0.
    • Lemma 3 and (9) carry the smoothness of ρ\rhoρ (the paper's own without-loss-of-generality step on p. 7) as a hypothesis, and the theorem's range n≥80n\ge80n≥80.
  • Section volumes use Mathlib's unnormalized (n−1)(n-1)(n−1)-dimensional Hausdorff measure. The normalization constant cancels in ρ\rhoρ and does not affect nnn-concavity. λ\lambdaλ and ρ\rhoρ are fixed pointwise functions, because Lemma 3 evaluates ρ\rhoρ at a maximizer.

  • Log-concavity on R\mathbb RR is the published ConvexOptimization.LogConcaveOn on the whole line.

  • Needed infrastructure that is reusable beyond this mission:

    • differentiation under the integral sign for exponential families on compact sets;
    • Fenchel duality for smooth strictly convex functions;
    • Brunn's concavity theorem for sections of convex bodies;
    • moment and tail bounds for log-concave densities on R\mathbb RR.

    Contributions to any of these, or proofs of single milestones, are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Bubeck, R. Eldan, The entropic barrier: a simple and optimal universal self-concordant barrier, COLT 2015; arXiv:1412.1587v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.1587
  • Y. Nesterov, A. Nemirovski, Interior-Point Polynomial Algorithms in Convex Programming, SIAM, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611970791
  • Y. Nesterov, Introductory Lectures on Convex Optimization: A Basic Course, Kluwer, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-8853-9
  • R. Hildebrand, Canonical barriers on convex cones, Mathematics of Operations Research 39:841–850, 2014.
  • D. Fox, A Schwarz lemma for Kähler affine metrics and the canonical potential of a proper convex cone, Annali di Matematica Pura ed Applicata 194:1–42, 2015.
  • B. Klartag, On convex perturbations with a bounded isotropic constant, Geometric and Functional Analysis 16(6):1274–1290, 2006.
  • C. Borell, Convex set functions in d-space, Periodica Mathematica Hungarica 6(2):111–136, 1975.
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Complexity TheoryOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Project Scheduling with Time Windows and Scarce Resources IX: Deciding Feasibility with Cumulative Resources Is NP-Complete Even for Acyclic Project NetworksTextbook

Motivation

Project scheduling with cumulative resources models production and logistics projects in which activities fill and empty storage: an activity withdraws material from an inventory when it starts and deposits its output when it completes, and every inventory must stay between a safety stock and a storage capacity. Neumann, Schwindt and Zimmermann treat this model in §2.12 of Project Scheduling with Time Windows and Scarce Resources (2nd ed., Springer 2003, doi:10.1007/978-3-540-24800-2) and use it in their process-industry applications.

Before any optimization, a scheduler must know whether a feasible schedule exists at all. Theorem 2.12.1 of the book answers the complexity of this question: it is NP-complete, and it stays NP-complete when the project network has no cycles. The contrast with renewable resources (machines, workers) is the point of the theorem: with renewable resources, the feasibility problem is NP-complete as well (Theorem 2.3.13, after Bartusch, Möhring and Radermacher, 1988), but an acyclic network always admits a feasible schedule when every requirement is within capacity.

The mission also collects the two other reductions the book proves in full: Proposition 2.5.4 (recognizing whether an activity lies in some minimal delaying alternative, the branching object of the book's branch-and-bound procedures, is NP-complete) and Proposition 3.4.2 (maximizing weighted start-time deviations, a resource-levelling objective, is NP-hard without any resource constraints).

Setting

A project has activities V={0,1,…,n+1}V=\{0,1,\dots,n+1\}V={0,1,…,n+1} with n≥1n\ge1n≥1; activity 000 is the project beginning and n+1n+1n+1 the project completion. Activity iii has a duration pi∈Np_i\in\mathbb Npi​∈N, with p0=pn+1=0p_0=p_{n+1}=0p0​=pn+1​=0. The project network NNN has arc set EEE; an arc ⟨i,j⟩\langle i,j\rangle⟨i,j⟩ with integer weight δij\delta_{ij}δij​ imposes the temporal constraint Sj−Si≥δijS_j-S_i\ge\delta_{ij}Sj​−Si​≥δij​ on the start times. A schedule is a real vector S=(Si)i∈VS=(S_i)_{i\in V}S=(Si​)i∈V​ with S0=0S_0=0S0​=0 and Si≥0S_i\ge0Si​≥0; it is time-feasible if it meets every temporal constraint.

Cumulative resources k∈Rγk\in\mathcal R^\gammak∈Rγ carry integer demands rikr_{ik}rik​: rik<0r_{ik}<0rik​<0 depletes −rik-r_{ik}−rik​ units at the start SiS_iSi​, rik>0r_{ik}>0rik​>0 replenishes rikr_{ik}rik​ units at the completion Si+piS_i+p_iSi​+pi​, and r0kr_{0k}r0k​ is the initial stock. The inventory at time ttt is

rk(S,t)=∑i: rik<0, Si≤trik+∑i: rik>0, Si+pi≤trik.r_k(S,t)=\sum_{i:\ r_{ik}<0,\ S_i\le t} r_{ik}+\sum_{i:\ r_{ik}>0,\ S_i+p_i\le t} r_{ik}.rk​(S,t)=i: rik​<0, Si​≤t∑​rik​+i: rik​>0, Si​+pi​≤t∑​rik​.

With safety stock R‾k\underline R_kR​k​ and storage capacity R‾k\overline R_kRk​ (integers, R‾k≤∑i∈Vrik≤R‾k\underline R_k\le\sum_{i\in V}r_{ik}\le\overline R_kR​k​≤∑i∈V​rik​≤Rk​ by (2.12.1)), SSS is feasible if it is time-feasible and R‾k≤rk(S,t)≤R‾k\underline R_k\le r_k(S,t)\le\overline R_kR​k​≤rk​(S,t)≤Rk​ for every kkk and every t≥0t\ge0t≥0. The decision problem of PSc∣temp∣Cmax⁡PSc|temp|C_{\max}PSc∣temp∣Cmax​ asks whether a feasible schedule exists.

For renewable resources k∈Rk\in\mathcal Rk∈R with capacities RkR_kRk​ and requirements rik∈Nr_{ik}\in\mathbb Nrik​∈N, a set F⊆VF\subseteq VF⊆V is forbidden if ∑i∈Frik>Rk\sum_{i\in F}r_{ik}>R_k∑i∈F​rik​>Rk​ for some kkk. A delaying alternative for FFF is a set B⊆FB\subseteq FB⊆F such that F∖BF\setminus BF∖B is not forbidden; it is minimal if no proper subset of BBB is one.

In PS∞∣temp,dˉ∣fPS\infty|temp,\bar d|fPS∞∣temp,dˉ∣f there are no resources, schedules must also satisfy Sn+1≤dˉS_{n+1}\le\bar dSn+1​≤dˉ, and the objective here is f(S)=−∑i∈V∑j>iwij∣Sj−Si∣f(S)=-\sum_{i\in V}\sum_{j>i}w_{ij}|S_j-S_i|f(S)=−∑i∈V​∑j>i​wij​∣Sj​−Si​∣ with weights wij≥0w_{ij}\ge0wij​≥0.

NP and NP-completeness are taken in the sense of Cook's Turing-machine formulation, with instances written in binary.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.12.1

Assuming PARTITION is NP-complete,

L={codes of instances of PSc∣temp∣Cmax⁡ with a feasible schedule}  and  Lacyc=L∩{N acyclic}L=\{\text{codes of instances of }PSc|temp|C_{\max}\text{ with a feasible schedule}\}\ \text{ and }\ L_{\mathrm{acyc}}=L\cap\{N\text{ acyclic}\}L={codes of instances of PSc∣temp∣Cmax​ with a feasible schedule}  and  Lacyc​=L∩{N acyclic}

are both NP-complete.

Milestones

  1. Membership (proof of Theorem 2.12.1): L∈NPL\in\mathrm{NP}L∈NP and Lacyc∈NPL_{\mathrm{acyc}}\in\mathrm{NP}Lacyc​∈NP.
  2. Reduction correctness (proof of Theorem 2.12.1): for sizes s(1),…,s(ν)s(1),\dots,s(\nu)s(1),…,s(ν) with even sum, the project with r0=rn+1=−∑s(i)/2r_0=r_{n+1}=-\sum s(i)/2r0​=rn+1​=−∑s(i)/2, ri=s(i)r_i=s(i)ri​=s(i), R‾=R‾=0\underline R=\overline R=0R​=R=0, d0,n+1min⁡=1d^{\min}_{0,n+1}=1d0,n+1min​=1 has an acyclic network, and it has a feasible schedule iff the sizes split into two parts of equal sum.
  3. Polynomial transformation: PARTITION≤pLacyc\mathrm{PARTITION}\le_p L_{\mathrm{acyc}}PARTITION≤p​Lacyc​.
  4. Proof of Proposition 2.5.4, one resource: for j∗∈B⊆Fj^*\in B\subseteq Fj∗∈B⊆F, BBB is a minimal delaying alternative iff R−min⁡j∈Brj<∑i∈F∖Bri≤RR-\min_{j\in B}r_j<\sum_{i\in F\setminus B}r_i\le RR−minj∈B​rj​<∑i∈F∖B​ri​≤R.
  5. Proof of Proposition 2.5.4, with rj∗=1r_{j^*}=1rj∗​=1: a minimal delaying alternative contains j∗j^*j∗ iff some A⊆F∖{j∗}A\subseteq F\setminus\{j^*\}A⊆F∖{j∗} has ∑i∈Ari=R\sum_{i\in A}r_i=R∑i∈A​ri​=R.
  6. Proposition 2.5.4: assuming SUBSET SUM is NP-complete, deciding whether some minimal delaying alternative for a forbidden set FFF contains j∗∈Fj^*\in Fj∗∈F is NP-complete.
  7. Proof of Proposition 3.4.2: a graph has a cut of at least MMM edges iff the constructed instance has a schedule with Si∈{0,1}S_i\in\{0,1\}Si​∈{0,1} and ∑i<jwij∣Sj−Si∣≥M\sum_{i<j}w_{ij}|S_j-S_i|\ge M∑i<j​wij​∣Sj​−Si​∣≥M.
  8. Proposition 3.4.2: assuming SIMPLE MAX CUT is NP-complete, the decision version of PS∞∣temp,dˉ∣−∑∑wij∣Sj−Si∣PS\infty|temp,\bar d|-\sum\sum w_{ij}|S_j-S_i|PS∞∣temp,dˉ∣−∑∑wij​∣Sj​−Si​∣ is NP-hard.

The goal follows from milestones 1 and 3 together with the transfer of NP-completeness along ≤p\le_p≤p​ (on the platform as CookPvsNP.npComplete_of_polyReducible).

Significance

The result. Theorem 2.12.1 explains why the book's methods for cumulative resources enumerate precedence relations between depleting and replenishing activities (minimal surplus and shortage sets, Theorem 2.12.4) instead of relying on a constructive feasibility test: unless P = NP, no polynomial algorithm decides feasibility, even for acyclic networks, where the renewable-resource case is trivial. Proposition 2.5.4 does the same for the branching scheme of §2.5, and Proposition 3.4.2 places the resource-levelling objectives of Chapter 3 among the hard ones.

Formalizing it. The three results are proved in the book, as short reductions whose delicate steps are left implicit: the polynomial size of a certificate for real-valued schedules, the handling of instances outside the construction (odd sums, empty index sets, oversized items), and the passage from an optimization problem to its decision version. None of the three reductions is machine-checked anywhere known. The mission states them against a single Turing-machine model and a single binary encoding, reusing the published definitions CookPvsNP_defs, so that the reductions compose with the Cook–Levin development already on the platform.

Difficulty

The mathematical content of the reductions is short; the difficulty is in the complexity-theoretic layer. Two steps resist the obvious argument.

First, NP membership. The book's certificate is a schedule, and a schedule is a real vector: it is not a string. A verifier needs a finite certificate of polynomial length, and it is not immediate that a feasible instance has a feasible schedule with small rational (or integer) start times, since the inventory constraints involve strict orderings between event times.

Second, polynomial-time computability in a concrete Turing-machine model. The transformation must compute, on a one-tape machine, binary codes of sums and halves of the input sizes, an arc list of quadratic length, and must map malformed strings to fixed no-instances. Informal "clearly polynomial" arguments have to become explicit machine constructions or a reusable library of closure properties.

Formalization scope

The Lean development fixes the following conventions.

  • Activities are Fin (n + 2), with the completion Fin.last (n + 1); resources are Fin m. Start times are real.
  • The inventory constraints hold for every t≥0t\ge0t≥0, not only for 0≤t≤dˉ0\le t\le\bar d0≤t≤dˉ as (2.12.2) is printed; the book's proofs use this reading.
  • Real activities may have duration 000 in PSc∣temp∣Cmax⁡PSc|temp|C_{\max}PSc∣temp∣Cmax​: the reduction of Theorem 2.12.1 uses only such activities.
  • Instances are coded as lists of integers written in binary over the alphabet {0,1,−,#}\{0,1,-,\#\}{0,1,−,#}; arc weights are listed for every ordered pair of activities together with an arc indicator. Well-formedness (standing assumptions such as n≥1n\ge1n≥1, p0=pn+1=0p_0=p_{n+1}=0p0​=pn+1​=0, no loops, (2.12.1), rik≤Rkr_{ik}\le R_krik​≤Rk​) is part of each language.
  • "Acyclic" means the nodes admit a numbering increasing along every arc.
  • The NP-completeness of PARTITION, SUBSET SUM and SIMPLE MAX CUT (Karp, 1972) enters as a hypothesis of the corresponding theorem; these are not results of the book.
  • Proposition 3.4.2 is stated for the decision version of the optimization problem, with natural-number weights and threshold.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the languages contain only codes of well-formed instances, the encoding is injective, and the hypotheses on the source problems are true theorems, so the goal cannot hold vacuously or by a degenerate encoding.

A complete development needs closure properties of polynomial-time computable functions in Cook's model (composition, binary arithmetic, list manipulation), transitivity of ≤p\le_p≤p​, and a small-certificate lemma for systems of difference constraints with strict and non-strict inequalities. These are reusable for every NP-hardness proof stated in the same framework. Contributions to any of them, to the instance-level milestones 2, 4, 5 and 7, or to the NP-completeness of PARTITION, SUBSET SUM and SIMPLE MAX CUT in this model, are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. Neumann, C. Schwindt, J. Zimmermann, Project Scheduling with Time Windows and Scarce Resources, 2nd ed., Springer, 2003. doi:10.1007/978-3-540-24800-2
  • M. Bartusch, R. H. Möhring, F. J. Radermacher, Scheduling project networks with resource constraints and time windows, Annals of Operations Research 16, 1988.
  • M. R. Garey, D. S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness, W. H. Freeman, 1979.
  • R. M. Karp, Reducibility among combinatorial problems, in Complexity of Computer Computations, Plenum, 1972. doi:10.1007/978-1-4684-2001-2_9
  • S. Cook, The P versus NP Problem, Clay Mathematics Institute problem description. claymath.org
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer 2: Under Production Economy the Retailer Earns Weakly More from Sequential Information Contracting and the Manufacturers from ConcurrentResearch Paper

Motivation

Large retailers hold point-of-sale and loyalty-card data that their suppliers cannot observe, and many of them sell access to it through data-sharing programs; others share the same data for free, or with only some suppliers (Shang, Ha & Tong 2016, §1). When two competing manufacturers sell through one common retailer, sharing a demand signal with a manufacturer changes how he sets his wholesale price, which in turn changes the retailer's margins and the rival's demand. Whether the retailer wants to share, with how many manufacturers, and at what price, is therefore a question about a multistage game with incomplete information.

Shang, Ha and Tong answer it for linear demand, a linear-expectation signal and quadratic production costs, under two contracting protocols. This mission covers the production economy case (marginal cost decreasing in volume, §6 of the paper), in which the retailer may have an incentive to share information even without payment. A companion mission covers production diseconomy (§5).

Setting

Two manufacturers i∈{0,1}i \in \{0,1\}i∈{0,1} sell substitutable products through a common retailer. Demand for product iii is

qi=a+θ−(1+ϕ)pi+ϕpj,q_i = a + \theta - (1+\phi)p_i + \phi p_j ,qi​=a+θ−(1+ϕ)pi​+ϕpj​,

where pip_ipi​ is the retail price, ϕ>0\phi > 0ϕ>0 measures competition intensity and θ\thetaθ is a demand shock with mean 000 and variance σ2>0\sigma^2 > 0σ2>0. The retailer observes a demand signal YYY with E[Y∣θ]=θE[Y \mid \theta] = \thetaE[Y∣θ]=θ and a linear-expectation structure E[θ∣Y]=βYE[\theta \mid Y] = \beta YE[θ∣Y]=βY, where β=β(t,σ)\beta = \beta(t,\sigma)β=β(t,σ) is the signal weight. Producing qqq units costs bq−ceq2bq - c_e q^2bq−ce​q2 with ce>0c_e > 0ce​>0; the paper writes c=−cec = -c_ec=−ce​ and assumes ce<2/(1+ϕ)c_e < 2/(1+\phi)ce​<2/(1+ϕ) (the Assumption, p. 251). Retailing is costless.

The game has three stages.

  1. Information contracting. Under concurrent contracting the retailer offers both manufacturers the same payment T≥0T \ge 0T≥0 for the signal; they decide simultaneously and play a Pareto-optimal pure equilibrium. Under sequential contracting she offers a payment TfT_fTf​ to a first manufacturer kkk and, after his decision, a payment TsT_sTs​ to the other; the outcome is a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE). The retailer commits not to share for free after a rejection (§6.2).
  2. Pricing. Given the information statuses Xi∈{I,U}X_i \in \{I, U\}Xi​∈{I,U}, each manufacturer sets a wholesale price wiw_iwi​ (a function of YYY if informed, a constant otherwise), then the retailer sets retail prices; the solution concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
  3. Demand realizes and profits are collected.

The ex ante profits of the pricing equilibrium are denoted πM(0)\pi_M(0)πM​(0), πMU(1)\pi_M^U(1)πMU​(1), πMI(1)\pi_M^I(1)πMI​(1), πM(2)\pi_M(2)πM​(2) for a manufacturer and πR(n)\pi_R(n)πR​(n) for the retailer, nnn the number of informed manufacturers. neNn_e^NneN​, neCn_e^CneC​, neSn_e^SneS​ denote the equilibrium number of informed manufacturers without contracting, under concurrent and under sequential contracting.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 8(d)

For every ϕ>0\phi > 0ϕ>0 and 0<ce<2/(1+ϕ)0 < c_e < 2/(1+\phi)0<ce​<2/(1+ϕ), pricing equilibria exist, concurrent outcomes and sequential SPEs exist, and for every concurrent outcome and every SPE (either first mover)

ΠRC≤ΠRS,ΠMS≤ΠMC,\Pi_R^C \le \Pi_R^S, \qquad \Pi_M^S \le \Pi_M^C ,ΠRC​≤ΠRS​,ΠMS​≤ΠMC​,

where ΠR\Pi_RΠR​ is the retailer's profit after side payments and ΠM\Pi_MΠM​ the manufacturers' total profit net of them. The second inequality is asserted for all cec_ece​ except at most two values depending only on ϕ\phiϕ. The comparisons about every pricing equilibrium family exclude the single value ce∗=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)]c_e^* = (2+3\phi)/[(1+2\phi)(1+\phi)]ce∗​=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)] (see Formalization scope). The paper says "higher"; the inequalities are weak because both sides coincide on intervals of positive length.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1: the pricing equilibrium exists and, for ce≠ce∗c_e \ne c_e^*ce​=ce∗​, is unique and linear in YYY with explicit coefficients.
  2. §4.2: the ex ante profits πM(⋅)\pi_M(\cdot)πM​(⋅) and πR(⋅)\pi_R(\cdot)πR​(⋅) in closed form.
  3. Lemma 5(a)–(c) and Lemma 5(d): sign comparisons of these profits in cec_ece​, with thresholds 1/(1+ϕ)1/(1+\phi)1/(1+ϕ), (4+5ϕ)/[(2+3ϕ)(1+ϕ)](4+5\phi)/[(2+3\phi)(1+\phi)](4+5ϕ)/[(2+3ϕ)(1+ϕ)], ceac_e^acea​ and ceNc_e^NceN​.
  4. Proposition 7: thresholds ceCc_e^CceC​, ceSc_e^SceS​ such that
neZ=0 for ce<11+ϕ,neZ=2 for 11+ϕ≤ce<ceZ,neZ=1 for ceZ≤ce<21+ϕ.n_e^Z = 0 \text{ for } c_e < \tfrac{1}{1+\phi}, \quad n_e^Z = 2 \text{ for } \tfrac{1}{1+\phi} \le c_e < c_e^Z, \quad n_e^Z = 1 \text{ for } c_e^Z \le c_e < \tfrac{2}{1+\phi}.neZ​=0 for ce​<1+ϕ1​,neZ​=2 for 1+ϕ1​≤ce​<ceZ​,neZ​=1 for ceZ​≤ce​<1+ϕ2​.
  1. Proposition 6(b): the same structure for neNn_e^NneN​ with a threshold ceNc_e^NceN​.
  2. Proposition 8(a): ceN<ceS≤ceCc_e^N < c_e^S \le c_e^CceN​<ceS​≤ceC​.

Significance

Proposition 8(d) says that a common retailer who sells information prefers to sell it sequentially, and that the manufacturers bear the cost: sequential offers let her extract a larger payment from the first manufacturer, because his outside option depends on what she will do with the second. Together with Propositions 6 and 7 it explains why retailers under production economy share with only a subset of suppliers once economies of scale or competition are strong, and why a retailer may share data for free, a practice the diseconomy model cannot produce.

The results are proved in the paper, partly by "it is straightforward" arguments (the proofs of Lemmas 2–5 are omitted). No part of the paper is formalized. A formalization adds a machine-checked account of the equilibrium selection at the boundary payments, where the paper's case analysis is informal, and of the points at which the retailer is indifferent between outcomes.

Difficulty

The pricing stage is a Bayesian game with a continuum of strategies: an informed manufacturer's strategy is an arbitrary square-integrable function of the signal. Lemma 1's uniqueness needs the Assumption (without it the manufacturer's problem is not concave) and a conditional-expectation argument, not a finite-dimensional computation. The comparisons of Lemma 5 are sign conditions on rational functions of (ce,ϕ)(c_e, \phi)(ce​,ϕ) whose thresholds ceac_e^acea​, ceNc_e^NceN​ are implicit roots. The contracting stage is where the naive argument fails: at the boundary payments several equilibria give the retailer the same payoff but the manufacturers different payoffs, so "the" outcome is not well defined there, and a direct comparison of closed-form profits at the paper's selected equilibria does not cover every equilibrium.

Formalization scope

Lean represents manufacturers by Fin 2, statuses by an inductive type with informed and uninformed, and a pricing strategy by a function of the signal value. The committed conventions are these.

  1. Admissible strategies are measurable with square-integrable wi(Y)w_i(Y)wi​(Y), and constant for an uninformed manufacturer; ex ante optimality over them is the Bayesian equilibrium condition.
  2. The retailer's rule is a best response for every wholesale price pair and signal value, off path included.
  3. The production cost is the uncapped quadratic bq−ceq2bq - c_e q^2bq−ce​q2. The paper caps the quantity at qˉ=b/(2ce)\bar q = b/(2c_e)qˉ​=b/(2ce​) but assumes the cap is reached with negligible probability (footnote 11, p. 251) and computes every result of §4.2 and §6 without it. The condition b<ab < ab<a of that footnote is not imposed.
  4. Contracting uses pure strategies, nonnegative payments, and no free-sharing move after a rejection.
  5. A concurrent outcome is a payment and a pure equilibrium whose retailer payoff equals the supremum of her payoffs over Pareto-optimal equilibria. The supremum is not always attained: for large cec_ece​ the paper's optimal payment πMI(1)−πM(0)\pi_M^I(1) - \pi_M(0)πMI​(1)−πM​(0) makes (U,U)(U,U)(U,U) an equilibrium that Pareto-dominates the one-informed outcome it selects.
  6. Threshold statements take the two-clause form: the stated value of nnn is attained on each region with its printed endpoints, and is the only value on the region's interior. Thresholds depend only on ϕ\phiϕ and are quantified before all other parameters.
  7. The manufacturers' comparison in the goal excludes at most two values of cec_ece​. At the thresholds ceCc_e^CceC​, ceSc_e^SceS​ outcomes with different manufacturer totals coexist, and the universal comparison fails.
  8. A correction of the paper. At ce∗=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)]c_e^* = (2+3\phi)/[(1+2\phi)(1+\phi)]ce∗​=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)], which lies in (1/(1+ϕ),2/(1+ϕ))(1/(1+\phi), 2/(1+\phi))(1/(1+ϕ),2/(1+ϕ)), the slope of the best-response wholesale price (2) is exactly −1-1−1. The equations wi=w^i(wj)w_i = \hat w_i(w_j)wi​=w^i​(wj​) are then singular, and every status profile has a continuum of pricing equilibria (for n=0n = 0n=0, w1,2=wˉ±tw_{1,2} = \bar w \pm tw1,2​=wˉ±t for every ttt) whose ex ante profits differ. Lemma 1's uniqueness claim fails there, so do the §4.2 identities for every equilibrium family, and so does every statement built on them. Each statement that quantifies over all pricing equilibria therefore assumes ce≠ce∗c_e \ne c_e^*ce​=ce∗​; existence is still asserted at ce∗c_e^*ce∗​.

The ex ante profits in every statement are those of an equilibrium of the pricing game on the signal model, not the §4.2 closed forms; a formalization that defined them by the closed forms would reduce the goal to algebra and a 2×22 \times 22×2 game, and is ruled out. The model layer (signal model, pricing equilibrium, payoff table, both contracting games) is shared, name for name, with the production diseconomy mission. Contributions are welcome on each milestone, and on reusable pieces: linear-expectation signals, and pointwise optimization under conditional expectation.

Selected references

  • Shang W., Ha A. Y., Tong S., Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer, Management Science 62(1):245–263, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2127
  • Ericson W. A., A note on the posterior mean of a population mean, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B 31(2):332–334, 1969 (cited for the formula of β(t,σ)\beta(t,\sigma)β(t,σ), which this mission does not use).
  • Vives X., Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools, MIT Press, 1999, §2.7.2.
  • Li L., Information sharing in a supply chain with horizontal competition, Management Science 48(9):1196–1212, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.9.1196.177
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Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XXVIII: The Conjugacy TheoremTextbook

Motivation

Chapter 8 is where discrete convex analysis explains why it needed two separate notions — M-convexity (exchangeability) and L-convexity (submodularity) — rather than one. The answer is conjugacy: under the classical Legendre-Fenchel transform, the two classes turn out to be exactly dual to each other, the discrete analogue of the fact that convex analysis's transform is self-dual within a single class of convex functions. Mission 10-conjugacy-i proved the integer-lattice version of this fact (Theorem 8.12) but explicitly deferred the polyhedral version — Theorem 8.4, the chapter's own headline "Conjugacy theorem" — noting it needed a real-variable M-/L-convex-function layer the series had not yet built. That layer now exists, built across missions 23-24-ch06*-mconvexfunctions and 26-27-ch07*-lconvexfunctions. This mission proves Theorem 8.4 and its companions: the polar-cone correspondence it induces, its nonpolyhedral generalization, the separation and Fenchel-duality theorems for M♮-/L♮-convex functions, and the basic theory of M2-convex functions (sums of M-convex functions), which the Edmonds intersection theorem's own combinatorics is built from.

Setting

Fix a finite ground set VVV. For f:RV→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb R^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}f:RV→R∪{+∞}, the Legendre-Fenchel transform is f∙(p)=sup⁡x[⟨p,x⟩−f(x)]f^\bullet(p) = \sup_x [\langle p,x\rangle - f(x)]f∙(p)=supx​[⟨p,x⟩−f(x)]. A polyhedral convex function fff is M-convex (f∈M[R→R]f \in M[\mathbb R \to \mathbb R]f∈M[R→R]) if it satisfies (M-EXC[R]); ggg is L-convex (g∈L[R→R]g \in L[\mathbb R \to \mathbb R]g∈L[R→R]) if it satisfies (SBF[R]) and (TRF[R]). A concave function hhh is always represented via h2=−hh_2 = -hh2​=−h, an ordinary convex function, so every "f≥hf \ge hf≥h" hypothesis is restated as "f+h2≥0f + h_2 \ge 0f+h2​≥0" — an equivalent formulation avoiding any need to represent −∞-\infty−∞ in the codomain. A polyhedral cone's polar is C∘={y:⟨y,x⟩≤0 ∀x∈C}C^\circ = \{y : \langle y,x\rangle \le 0\ \forall x \in C\}C∘={y:⟨y,x⟩≤0 ∀x∈C}. A function is M2-convex if it is the sum of two M-convex functions.

Formalization targets

Goal: the conjugacy theorem (Theorem 8.4)

The classes of polyhedral M-convex functions and polyhedral L-convex functions are in one-to-one correspondence under the Legendre-Fenchel transform: f∈M⇒f∙∈Lf \in M \Rightarrow f^\bullet \in Lf∈M⇒f∙∈L, g∈L⇒g∙∈Mg \in L \Rightarrow g^\bullet \in Mg∈L⇒g∙∈M, and the transform is an involution (f∙∙=ff^{\bullet\bullet}=ff∙∙=f, g∙∙=gg^{\bullet\bullet}=gg∙∙=g) on each class, with the identical statement for the M♮^\natural♮/L♮^\natural♮ variants. This is the theorem mission 10-conjugacy-i deferred, citing exactly the missing infrastructure this series has since built.

Supporting structural targets

Twelve further results build the surrounding theory. Proposition 8.2 gives the easy two-variable case of the general submodularity-preservation fact (Theorem 8.1, already a milestone of mission 10-conjugacy-i); Proposition 8.3 is the technical minimizer-difference lemma the goal's harder direction is built from. Theorem 8.5 derives the M-convex/L-convex cone polarity from the goal, and Theorem 8.6 extends the correspondence beyond the polyhedral case to general closed proper convex functions. Proposition 8.14 and Theorems 8.15-8.16 build the separation theory for M♮-/L♮-convex and concave function pairs, with integral witnesses when the functions are integer valued; Theorem 8.21 (parts 1-2) derives the Fenchel-type strong-duality equality these separation theorems make possible. Propositions 8.29-8.30 and Theorem 8.31 (plus Theorem 8.32, found by direct reading immediately after 8.31) build the basic theory of M2-convex functions: their domains and minimizer sets are M2-convex, they are integrally convex, and their global optimality reduces to a finite local check.

Significance

The goal is the theorem that retroactively explains this entire series' two-track structure: missions 20-25 (M-convex sets and functions) and 08/21/26-28 (L-convex sets and functions) are not two independent theories that happen to share techniques — they are conjugate images of each other, so every theorem proved on one side has a dual counterpart automatically available on the other via Theorem 8.4. This is made concrete immediately: Theorem 8.5's cone polarity and the diagram the book draws connecting M0[R]M_0[\mathbb R]M0​[R], 0L[R→R]0L[\mathbb R\to\mathbb R]0L[R→R], and submodular set functions S[R]S[\mathbb R]S[R] (already correspondences this series proved independently, in missions 24-ch06d-mconvexfunctions and 28-ch07d-lconvexfunctions) are shown to be facets of one single conjugacy fact rather than three separate coincidences. The separation and Fenchel duality theorems (8.15, 8.16, 8.21) are the discrete analogues of the two theorems every convex optimization course opens with, and the book is explicit that they are not corollaries of the classical versions plus convex extensibility — they carry genuinely combinatorial content, specializing to Frank's discrete separation theorem and Edmonds's intersection theorem as examples the book itself gives.

None of these results are open — they are Murota's account of the duality at the heart of discrete convex analysis, the reason the theory needed two dual notions rather than one. What this mission contributes is a faithful, machine-checked formal statement of each, completing a theorem mission 10-conjugacy-i explicitly left for a future session once the necessary polyhedral apparatus existed, and including one result (Theorem 8.32) the platform's own automated extractor missed; no comparable formalization exists on the platform (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The naive approach to the goal's harder direction (L⇒M) would try to verify the exchange inequality for g∙g^\bulletg∙ directly from the definition of the transform; the book's actual proof instead identifies the exchange inequality with a statement about weighted minimizers of ggg itself via Proposition 8.3 (the minimizer-difference bound), converting a claim about the conjugate function into a claim about ggg's own combinatorial structure — a genuine change of perspective, not a direct calculation. Proposition 8.3's own proof is the hardest single argument in this block: it derives the minimizer-difference bound by a contradiction argument that constructs an explicit pair of "worse" minimizers via a join/meet perturbation and derives a strict inequality from Theorem 7.29's translation inequality — a multi-step combinatorial argument with no direct shortcut.

Formalization scope

Ground-set elements are a Fintype V with DecidableEq; convex functions are WithTop ℝ valued throughout (never EReal, except for the Legendre-Fenchel transform itself, whose defining supremum/infimum can genuinely be infinite). All thirteen numbered results found in this chunk's page range — the twelve in BRIEF.md's own table plus Theorem 8.32 — are placed, with one documented scope reduction: Theorem 8.21 states only its real-attainment parts (1)-(2), not the integer-attainment refinement of parts (3)-(4), which needs a separate argument no other result in this chunk requires — see HARD.md. Concave functions hhh are always represented via h2=−hh_2 = -hh2​=−h and every inequality f≥hf \ge hf≥h restated as f+h2≥0f + h_2 \ge 0f+h2​≥0, avoiding WithTop ℝ negation entirely. This chunk's own BRIEF.md inherited the chapters-4-7 page-offset boilerplate (printed = PDF −-− 19); chapter 8 uses offset 18, confirmed against the PDF's own footers — every citation here uses the corrected offset. This mission's base vocabulary is redeclared from missions 10-conjugacy-i, 20-ch04b-mconvexsets, 21-ch05b-lconvexsets, 23-24-ch06*-mconvexfunctions, and 26-27-ch07*-lconvexfunctions rather than imported, since sibling drafts in this series cannot yet reference one another. Contributions completing any of the thirteen sorrys are welcome; the goal and Proposition 8.3 carry the most independent proof content.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • K. Murota and A. Shioura, "M-convex function on generalized polymatroid," Mathematics of Operations Research, 24 (1999), pp. 95-105 [152] (the polyhedral M-/L-convex conjugacy theory this mission's real-variable results are drawn from).
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Discrete Convex Analysis VI: Quasi M-Convex Functions and the Quasi-Proximity TheoremTextbook

Motivation

Convexity is normally defined additively — a function's value at a mixture is bounded by the mixture of its values — but many of the properties that make convexity useful in optimization (a local minimum is global, level sets are well-behaved) survive under a much weaker, purely ordinal notion: quasi-convexity, which compares function values rather than adding them. A nondecreasing rescaling of a convex function is generally not convex, but it is always quasi-convex — so a theory built only on ordinal comparisons automatically covers every such rescaling for free, at the cost of a more delicate proof architecture (since the algebraic cancellations available to additive convexity are no longer available).

Chapter 6's second half asks exactly how far this idea extends in the discrete setting: does the M-convexity exchange axiom have an ordinal, quasi-convex relaxation that still supports the same strong minimization theory — an optimality criterion, a minimizer-cut lemma, and, most significantly, a proximity theorem with the same explicit distance bound? This mission formalizes the chapter's answer: yes, and the relevant relaxed class, functions satisfying condition (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​), is large enough to include every strictly increasing rescaling of an M-convex function, a class the M-convex theory of chunk 06 alone says nothing about.

Setting

Let VVV be a finite ground set and f:ZV→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb Z^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}f:ZV→R∪{+∞} with nonempty effective domain. Building on chunk 06's M-convex exchange axiom (M-EXC[Z]), this chapter introduces several ordinal relaxations. fff is weakly quasi M-convex, satisfying (QMw), if for every pair of distinct points x,y∈dom⁡fx, y \in \operatorname{dom} fx,y∈domf there exist uuu in the positive support and vvv in the negative support of x−yx - yx−y with f(x−χu+χv)≤f(x)f(x - \chi_u + \chi_v) \le f(x)f(x−χu​+χv​)≤f(x) or f(y+χu−χv)≤f(y)f(y + \chi_u - \chi_v) \le f(y)f(y+χu​−χv​)≤f(y) — an "or" where (M-EXC[Z]) demands an additive inequality. Two further conditions restrict attention to points of different function value and sharpen the conclusion to a three-way trichotomy (strictly better on one side, or exactly tied on both): (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​) quantifies universally over uuu (as in (M-EXC[Z])), while (SSQM≠,w_{\ne,w}=,w​) quantifies existentially over both uuu and vvv (as in (QMw)). The linear perturbation of fff by p:V→Rp : V \to \mathbb Rp:V→R is f[p](x)=f(x)−⟨p,x⟩f[p](x) = f(x) - \langle p, x \ranglef[p](x)=f(x)−⟨p,x⟩.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.78 (the quasi M-proximity theorem)

Let fff satisfy (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​), n=∣V∣n = |V|n=∣V∣, α\alphaα a positive integer. If xα∈dom⁡fx_\alpha \in \operatorname{dom} fxα​∈domf satisfies f(xα)≤f(xα+α(χv−χu))f(x_\alpha) \le f(x_\alpha + \alpha(\chi_v - \chi_u))f(xα​)≤f(xα​+α(χv​−χu​)) for all u,v∈Vu, v \in Vu,v∈V, then arg⁡min⁡f≠∅\arg\min f \ne \emptysetargminf=∅ and there is x∗∈arg⁡min⁡fx^* \in \arg\min fx∗∈argminf with ∥xα−x∗∥∞≤(n−1)(α−1)\|x_\alpha - x^*\|_\infty \le (n-1)(\alpha - 1)∥xα​−x∗∥∞​≤(n−1)(α−1) — verbatim the same conclusion, and the same exact bound, as chunk 06's Theorem 6.37(1), now established for the strictly larger class satisfying (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​) rather than the M-convex exchange axiom itself.

Milestones: Theorems 6.68(2), 6.76, 6.77

Theorem 6.68(2): fff satisfies (M-EXC[Z]) if and only if every linear perturbation f[p]f[p]f[p] satisfies (QMw) — quantifying exactly how much weaker (QMw) is pointwise, and how the gap closes once quantified over every perturbation. Theorem 6.76 (the quasi M-optimality criterion): the direct analogue of chunk 06's Theorem 6.26 for the quasi-convexity classes — a purely pairwise local check still characterizes global (or, in the (QMw) case, strict unique) optimality. Theorem 6.77 (the quasi M-minimizer cut): chunk 06's Theorem 6.28 continues to hold verbatim when its M-convexity hypothesis is replaced by (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​) — the structural fact the proximity theorem's proof is built from survives the relaxation intact.

Significance

The result itself. The proximity theorem is the result algorithms actually use: a scaling algorithm for minimizing quasi-convex functions of this kind inherits exactly the same correctness guarantee, with exactly the same distance bound, as the M-convex case — this is a genuine broadening of chapter 10's algorithmic reach, not a restatement dressed in weaker hypotheses. Every strictly increasing scalar transformation of an M-convex objective (a common modeling device — re-expressing a cost in utility units, or applying a monotone risk measure) now falls under a proximity theorem, whereas prior to this chapter's relaxation such a transformation would generally destroy M-convexity itself and leave optimization theory silent on the transformed problem.

Formalizing it. No matching item exists on the platform for quasi M-convexity in any of its forms. Formalizing Theorem 6.78 requires first pinning down (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​) exactly (there are six closely related axiom variants in this section of the book, only three of which — (QMw), (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​), (SSQM≠,w_{\ne,w}=,w​) — are needed for this mission's chosen results), and this mission also captures, via Theorem 6.68(2), the precise sense in which these relaxed conditions are strictly weaker than plain M-convexity while remaining tightly connected to it.

Difficulty

The natural first instinct, given how close the quasi-convexity axioms look to (M-EXC[Z]), is to try to prove Theorem 6.78 by directly imitating chunk 06's proof of Theorem 6.37 line by line. This mostly works — the proof structure (fix a target coordinate, build a chain of strictly decreasing values via repeated exchange steps, bound the chain's length using the scaled hypothesis) survives verbatim — but every step that chunk 06's proof took by adding two instances of the exchange inequality together must be replaced by an ordinal argument, since (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​) only ever asserts a disjunction of value comparisons, never an additive inequality relating four function values simultaneously the way (M-EXC[Z])'s f(x)+f(y)≥f(x−χu+χv)+f(y+χu−χv)f(x)+f(y) \ge f(x-\chi_u+\chi_v)+f(y+\chi_u-\chi_v)f(x)+f(y)≥f(x−χu​+χv​)+f(y+χu​−χv​) does. The book's proof handles this by working with strict inequalities and the trichotomy structure of (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​) directly rather than algebraic cancellation — the same overall architecture, but every arithmetic step rebuilt as a case analysis on which disjunct of (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​) fires.

Formalization scope

This mission builds directly on chunk 06's published items (CharVec, SuppPos, SuppNeg, DomZ, MExchangeAxiom, ArgMin), per the platform's textbook convention that a later chapter of the same book imports an earlier one's definitions rather than redrafting them; its own namespace DiscreteConvex.MConvexFunctions.Quasi nests under chunk 06's DiscreteConvex.MConvexFunctions accordingly. Δf(z;v,u) (Eq. (6.2)) is never reified as a separate object; every occurrence is unfolded directly into an f-value comparison, avoiding WithTop ℝ subtraction throughout, consistent with chunk 06's own convention.

A trivializing formalization of the goal would silently strengthen (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​) back to plain M-convexity (making this mission redundant with chunk 06's Theorem 6.37) or loosen the exact bound (n−1)(α−1)(n-1)(\alpha-1)(n−1)(α−1) to an unspecified function of n,αn, \alphan,α; neither is done. Six axiom variants appear in this section of the book ((QM), (SSQM), (QMw), (SSQMw_ww​), (SSQM≠_{\ne}=​), (SSQM≠,w_{\ne,w}=,w​)); only the three actually needed by this mission's four items are drafted, and Theorem 6.68's first part (an implication chain among the other three) is left out — see MODERATION_NOTES.md. Contributions building the polyhedral M-convex-function bridge (§6.11–6.12, Theorems 6.59–6.64), the level-set characterizations (Theorems 6.72, 6.74), or the scaled quasi M-minimizer cut (Theorem 6.79, the direct generalization of Theorem 6.77 drafted here) are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • M. Avriel, W. E. Diewert, S. Schaible, I. Zang, Generalized Concavity, Plenum Press, 1988.
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Markov Decision Processes II: Existence of Optimal Policies under Compactness and ContinuityTextbook

Motivation

The finite-horizon theory of chunk 02a-model-bellman-equation (Bäuerle and Rieder's Theorem 2.3.8, the Structure Theorem) reduces the existence of an optimal policy and the validity of the Bellman equation to a single abstract hypothesis: the Structure Assumption (SAN), the existence of function classes IMn\mathrm{IM}_nIMn​ and decision-rule classes Δn\Delta_nΔn​ closed under the one-step optimality operator TnT_nTn​. That theorem does not say when (SAN) actually holds for a given Markov Decision Model — checking it directly from the definition would require exhibiting, for every value function that could arise, both its regularity and a measurable action attaining its supremum, an infinite regress. This mission formalizes the classical resolution: sufficient conditions on the primitive data of the model (the admissible-action correspondence, the transition kernel, the one-stage reward) under which (SAN) is guaranteed, so that Theorem 2.3.8 becomes usable in practice rather than merely an existence statement.

Setting

Fix a Markov Decision Model (E,A,Dn,Qn,rn,gN)n=0,…,N−1(E, A, D_n, Q_n, r_n, g_N)_{n=0,\dots,N-1}(E,A,Dn​,Qn​,rn​,gN​)n=0,…,N−1​ (chunk 02a's Definition 2.1.1), now with EEE, AAA Borel spaces. A measurable b:E→R+b : E \to \mathbb{R}_+b:E→R+​ is an upper bounding function (Definition 2.4.1) if rn+(x,a)≤crb(x)r_n^+(x,a) \le c_r b(x)rn+​(x,a)≤cr​b(x), gN+(x)≤cgb(x)g_N^+(x) \le c_g b(x)gN+​(x)≤cg​b(x), and ∫b(x′) Qn(dx′∣x,a)≤αbb(x)\int b(x')\, Q_n(dx' \mid x,a) \le \alpha_b b(x)∫b(x′)Qn​(dx′∣x,a)≤αb​b(x) for constants cr,cg,αb≥0c_r, c_g, \alpha_b \ge 0cr​,cg​,αb​≥0; write IBb+\mathrm{IB}_b^+IBb+​ for the value functions of weighted growth at most c bc\, bcb for some ccc. A set-valued map x↦D(x)x \mapsto D(x)x↦D(x) is upper semicontinuous if xn→xx_n \to xxn​→x and an∈D(xn)a_n \in D(x_n)an​∈D(xn​) force (an)(a_n)(an​) to have an accumulation point in D(x)D(x)D(x) (Definition A.2.1); it is continuous if also every point of D(x)D(x)D(x) is approximated by a sequence from the D(xn)D(x_n)D(xn​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.4.13

Suppose the model has an upper bounding function bbb, and for every n<Nn < Nn<N: (i) Dn(x)D_n(x)Dn​(x) is compact for every xxx; (ii) a↦∫v(x′) Qn(dx′∣x,a)a \mapsto \int v(x')\, Q_n(dx' \mid x,a)a↦∫v(x′)Qn​(dx′∣x,a) is upper semicontinuous on Dn(x)D_n(x)Dn​(x) for every v∈IBb+v \in \mathrm{IB}_b^+v∈IBb+​ and every xxx; (iii) a↦rn(x,a)a \mapsto r_n(x,a)a↦rn​(x,a) is upper semicontinuous on Dn(x)D_n(x)Dn​(x) for every xxx. Then IMn:=IBb+\mathrm{IM}_n := \mathrm{IB}_b^+IMn​:=IBb+​, Δn:=Fn\Delta_n := F_nΔn​:=Fn​ satisfy (SAN). Unlike the two milestone theorems that precede it in the chapter (Theorem 2.4.6 and Theorem 2.4.10, both of which also assume the correspondence x↦Dn(x)x \mapsto D_n(x)x↦Dn​(x) varies semicontinuously or continuously with xxx), Theorem 2.4.13 assumes nothing about Dn(⋅)D_n(\cdot)Dn​(⋅) as a set-valued map beyond pointwise compactness of each fiber Dn(x)D_n(x)Dn​(x); correspondingly it needs semicontinuity of the objective only in the action variable, at each state separately, and it recovers all of IBb+\mathrm{IB}_b^+IBb+​ as the regularity class rather than a semicontinuous or continuous sub-class of it.

Milestones

Proposition 2.4.3 and Proposition 2.4.8 show, respectively, that TnT_nTn​ preserves upper semicontinuity (resp. continuity) of vvv and that a maximizer exists, when Dn(x)D_n(x)Dn​(x) is compact and x↦Dn(x)x \mapsto D_n(x)x↦Dn​(x) is upper semicontinuous (resp. continuous); Theorem 2.4.6 and Theorem 2.4.10 package these into concrete instances of (SAN). Lemma 2.4.7 gives a checkable criterion — weak continuity of the kernel QnQ_nQn​ — for Theorem 2.4.6's integral-semicontinuity hypothesis. Proposition 2.4.11 drops all topological structure on Dn(⋅)D_n(\cdot)Dn​(⋅) itself, keeping only pointwise compactness of Dn(x)D_n(x)Dn​(x) plus semicontinuity of the objective in the action alone, and is what the goal theorem invokes directly, via a projection theorem of Kunugui and Novikov in place of the sequential compactness argument used for Proposition 2.4.3.

Significance

Compactness of the action set together with semicontinuity of the reward is the textbook Weierstrass mechanism for the existence of a maximizer in ordinary optimization; the content of this chapter is doing the same thing correctly when the maximization varies measurably over an uncountable state space EEE, so that the resulting maximizer is not just pointwise-optimal but a genuine decision rule (a measurable function of the state). No formalized version of this theory exists on the platform: BertsekasDP's existence theorems are for finite state-and-action-space models, where D(x)D(x)D(x) is automatically compact (in the discrete topology) and every real-valued function on it is automatically semicontinuous, so none of this chapter's actual content — choosing a measurable maximizing selection as the state varies continuously — has any analogue there. This chunk earns the generalization rather than restating that finite-state prior art.

Difficulty

The three "compactness implies (SAN)" theorems of this chapter (2.4.6, 2.4.10, 2.4.13) trade regularity of the action correspondence x↦Dn(x)x \mapsto D_n(x)x↦Dn​(x) against regularity of the resulting value-function class: assuming more about how Dn(⋅)D_n(\cdot)Dn​(⋅) varies (continuity, in Theorem 2.4.10) buys a stronger conclusion (continuous, not merely upper semicontinuous, value functions); assuming nothing about Dn(⋅)D_n(\cdot)Dn​(⋅) beyond pointwise compactness (Theorem 2.4.13, the goal) forces the weakest conclusion, that the whole class IBb+\mathrm{IB}_b^+IBb+​ is preserved, via a genuinely different, measure-theoretic argument (a projection theorem) rather than the sequential compactness argument common to Propositions 2.4.3 and 2.4.8. Formalizing all three side by side, rather than only the goal in isolation, is what exposes this trade-off as three logically independent theorems rather than one theorem instantiated three times, and is why every one of the section's numbered results is kept as an item of this mission (per the CAPTAIN's budget instruction to include, not cut, results of genuine independent content) rather than only the smallest set literally required by the goal's own proof tree.

Formalization scope

State and action spaces carry MeasurableSpace, TopologicalSpace, BorelSpace instances throughout (the section's own standing assumption that EEE, AAA are Borel spaces), but no metrizability or separability instance is required beyond what each statement's own topology needs — sequences suffice for every semicontinuity notion used here, matching the book's own Appendix A, which is stated for metric spaces. The Markov Decision Model, its operators (LnL_nLn​, TnT_nTn​, TnfT_n^fTnf​), the notion of a maximizer, and the Structure Assumption are restated from chunk 02a-model-bellman-equation in this mission's own MDPFinance.Semicontinuous namespace (drafts in this series cannot import one another). Set-valued upper/lower semicontinuity (Appendix A.2.1) is formalized with the book's own sequential definition, not Mathlib's neighborhood-filter-based UpperHemicontinuous/LowerHemicontinuous for correspondences — the book explicitly remarks that its own definition is "slightly more restrictive than other definitions appearing in the literature" (p. 351), so identifying the two without proof would silently substitute a different notion. The classes IBb\mathrm{IB}_bIBb​, IBb+\mathrm{IB}_b^+IBb+​ are formalized via the book's own equivalent bound-by-a-constant characterization rather than through the weighted supremum norm ∥⋅∥b\|\cdot\|_b∥⋅∥b​ itself, avoiding EReal division and its 0/0 := 0 convention for no loss of content. Each of Theorem 2.4.6's and Theorem 2.4.10's closing "in particular" sentences — restating chunk 02a's Theorem 2.3.8 applied to the (SAN) instance just constructed — is not repeated in this mission's Lean, since it is a corollary of a different chunk's goal, not new content of this section; only the "(SAN) is satisfied" conclusion that is this section's own contribution is stated. A trivializing formalization of the goal would specialize AAA to a finite type or fix Dn(x)D_n(x)Dn​(x) to a single compact set independent of xxx, making hypotheses (i)-(iii) vacuous; this mission states the theorem for arbitrary Borel AAA and a genuinely state-dependent Dn(x)D_n(x)Dn​(x).

Selected references

  • N. Bäuerle and U. Rieder, Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance, Universitext, Springer, 2011. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-18324-9.
  • D. P. Bertsekas and S. E. Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete Time Case, Academic Press, 1978.
  • C. J. Himmelberg, T. Parthasarathy, and F. S. Van Vleck, "Optimal plans for dynamic programming problems", Mathematics of Operations Research 1 (1976), 390-394.
  • K. Kuratowski and C. Ryll-Nardzewski, "A general theorem on selectors", Bulletin de l'Académie Polonaise des Sciences 13 (1965), 397-403.
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Disjunctive Programming XII: Intersection Cuts, Generalized Intersection Cuts, and Lift-and-Project CutsTextbook

Motivation

Intersection cuts (Balas, 1971) are the founding construction of cutting-plane theory for mixed 0-1 and mixed-integer programs: given a fractional LP solution xˉ\bar xxˉ and a convex region SSS around it known to contain no feasible integer point, the hyperplane through the points where SSS's boundary meets the extreme rays of the LP cone at xˉ\bar xxˉ cuts off xˉ\bar xxˉ without cutting off any feasible solution. What makes intersection cuts foundational rather than merely one technique among many is a completeness question: do intersection cuts, iterated over every choice of cutting region, exhaust the strongest possible cuts — the facets of the integer hull itself — or only some weaker subclass? Balas answered this affirmatively for standard intersection cuts (those derived from convex sets free of feasible integer points, as originally defined), while a narrower, more recently popular variant restricted to lattice-free sets provably falls short of this completeness (E. Balas, Intersection Cuts — A New Type of Cutting Planes for Integer Programming, Operations Research 19 (1971), 19–39, https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.19.1.19). This mission formalizes that completeness theorem, together with a companion pair of results (Balas and Kis, 2016) pinning down exactly when a lift-and-project cut — a strictly more general cutting-plane construction from an arbitrary disjunction — coincides with a standard intersection cut, and what happens when it provably does not (E. Balas and T. Kis, On the relationship between standard intersection cuts, lift-and-project cuts, and generalized intersection cuts, Mathematical Programming A 160 (2016), 85–114, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-015-0975-1).

Setting

Fix a finite index set ι\iotaι (structural and surplus variables of an LP relaxation together), a basic index set I⊆ιI \subseteq \iotaI⊆ι and a nonbasic (cobasis) set JJJ, with optimal simplex-tableau coefficients aˉij\bar a_{ij}aˉij​ for i∈Ii \in Ii∈I, j∈Jj \in Jj∈J. The extreme ray of the LP cone C(J)C(J)C(J) at a basic solution xˉ\bar xxˉ associated with j∈Jj \in Jj∈J has direction rjr^jrj with rij=−aˉijr^j_i = -\bar a_{ij}rij​=−aˉij​ for i∈Ii \in Ii∈I, rjj=1r^j_j = 1rjj​=1, and rij=0r^j_i = 0rij​=0 otherwise; C(J)C(J)C(J) itself is the cone with apex xˉ\bar xxˉ generated by these n=∣J∣n = |J|n=∣J∣ rays. A convex set SSS is PIP_IPI​-free at xˉ\bar xxˉ if xˉ\bar xxˉ lies in int S\mathrm{int}\, SintS and int S\mathrm{int}\, SintS contains no point of the mixed-integer feasible set PIP_IPI​. The standard intersection cut (SIC) derived from such an SSS is ∑j∈J1λjxj≥1\sum_{j\in J} \tfrac{1}{\lambda_j} x_j \ge 1∑j∈J​λj​1​xj​≥1, where λj\lambda_jλj​ is the largest t≥0t \ge 0t≥0 with xˉ−trj∈S\bar x - t r^j \in Sxˉ−trj∈S.

The corner polyhedron corner(J)\mathrm{corner}(J)corner(J) is the convex hull of the integer points contained in C(J)C(J)C(J); it satisfies C(J)⊃corner(J)⊃conv(PI)C(J) \supset \mathrm{corner}(J) \supset \mathrm{conv}(P_I)C(J)⊃corner(J)⊃conv(PI​). A set FFF is a facet of a polyhedron QQQ if it is a proper extreme subset of QQQ of affine dimension exactly dim⁡(Q)−1\dim(Q) - 1dim(Q)−1.

For a lift-and-project cut, fix P:={x:A~x≥b~}P := \{x : \tilde A x \ge \tilde b\}P:={x:A~x≥b~} and a family of inequalities dtx≥d0td^t x \ge d^t_0dtx≥d0t​, t∈Tt \in Tt∈T, presenting a PIP_IPI​-free polyhedron S:={x:dtx≤d0t, t∈T}S := \{x : d^t x \le d^t_0,\ t\in T\}S:={x:dtx≤d0t​, t∈T}. The associated cut-generating LP (CGLP) constraint set (11.6) is

α−utA~−u0tdt=0,−β+utb~+u0td0t=0 (t∈T),∑t∈T(ute+u0t)=1,ut,u0t≥0,\alpha - u^t \tilde A - u^t_0 d^t = 0, \qquad -\beta + u^t \tilde b + u^t_0 d^t_0 = 0 \ (t\in T), \qquad \textstyle\sum_{t\in T}(u^t e + u^t_0) = 1, \qquad u^t, u^t_0 \ge 0,α−utA~−u0t​dt=0,−β+utb~+u0t​d0t​=0 (t∈T),∑t∈T​(ute+u0t​)=1,ut,u0t​≥0,

whose feasible solutions (α,β,{ut,u0t})(\alpha,\beta,\{u^t,u^t_0\})(α,β,{ut,u0t​}) correspond to valid lift-and-project (L&P) cuts αx≥β\alpha x \ge \betaαx≥β for the disjunction built from PPP and the terms dtx≥d0td^t x \ge d^t_0dtx≥d0t​. An inequality γ1x≥γ01\gamma^1 x \ge \gamma^1_0γ1x≥γ01​ dominates γ2x≥γ02\gamma^2 x \ge \gamma^2_0γ2x≥γ02​ on PPP if every x∈Px \in Px∈P satisfying the first also satisfies the second.

Formalization targets

Theorem 11.2 (goal). Every facet FFF of conv(PI)\mathrm{conv}(P_I)conv(PI​), defined by φx≥φ0\varphi x \ge \varphi_0φx≥φ0​ and cutting off some vertex vvv of PPP (i.e. φv<φ0\varphi v < \varphi_0φv<φ0​), is realized exactly by the standard intersection cut derived at vvv from T:={x:φx≤φ0}T := \{x : \varphi x \le \varphi_0\}T:={x:φx≤φ0​}:

T is PI-free at v,{x:1≤∑j∈J1λjxj}={x:φ0≤φx}.T \text{ is } P_I\text{-free at } v, \qquad \Big\{x : 1 \le \textstyle\sum_{j\in J} \tfrac{1}{\lambda_j} x_j\Big\} = \{x : \varphi_0 \le \varphi x\}.T is PI​-free at v,{x:1≤∑j∈J​λj​1​xj​}={x:φ0​≤φx}.

Corollary 11.3. Every vertex of a corner polyhedron not already in conv(PI)\mathrm{conv}(P_I)conv(PI​) is cut off by some standard intersection cut — the same completeness claim restated at the level of individual excluded vertices rather than facets.

Theorem 11.9. A sufficient condition for an L&P cut to reduce to a standard intersection cut: if a basic feasible CGLP solution's multipliers utu^tut are all supported on a single common nonsingular cobasis ι\iotaι, then

{x:β≤αx}={x:1≤∑jπj sj(x)}\{x : \beta \le \alpha x\} = \{x : 1 \le \textstyle\sum_j \pi_j\, s_j(x)\}{x:β≤αx}={x:1≤∑j​πj​sj​(x)}

for the intersection cut with coefficients πj:=max⁡tπjt\pi_j := \max_{t} \pi^t_jπj​:=maxt​πjt​, πjt:=dt(−aˉj)/(d0t−dtaˉ0)\pi^t_j := d^t(-\bar a_j)/(d^t_0 - d^t \bar a_0)πjt​:=dt(−aˉj​)/(d0t​−dtaˉ0​), expressed via the surplus values sjs_jsj​ at ι\iotaι's rows.

Theorem 11.11. When Theorem 11.9's condition fails — even after every positive rescaling of the solution — no intersection cut from SSS is equivalent to the L&P cut; and when the solution additionally uniquely minimizes the CGLP objective, the L&P cut is strictly better than, and dominated by none of, every intersection cut from SSS.

The targets move from the completeness statement itself (11.2, its vertex-level restatement 11.3) to the mechanism explaining why completeness holds in general: a sufficient condition for literal coincidence (11.9), and a proof that failure of that condition is never fatal to completeness because the L&P cut remains at least as strong, in a precise domination sense (11.11).

Significance

Theorem 11.2 is the theoretical justification for standard intersection cuts as a complete cutting plane paradigm: no facet of the integer hull is out of reach of some choice of PIP_IPI​-free cutting region, in sharp contrast to the restricted (lattice-free) variant that dominates the modern multi-row cut literature but is provably incomplete in this sense. Theorems 11.9 and 11.11 locate lift-and-project cuts precisely relative to this complete family: L&P cuts specialize exactly to intersection cuts under an explicit, checkable structural condition on the CGLP solution, and strictly dominate the intersection-cut family whenever that condition cannot be met — which is what makes lift-and-project the strictly more general (and, on general non-split disjunctions, strictly more powerful) construction.

Both directions are proved in the source (Balas 1971 for Theorem 11.2; Balas and Kis 2016 for Theorems 11.9 and 11.11) but have no counterpart on this platform: nothing existing treats intersection cuts, corner polyhedra, cut-generating LPs, or the correspondence between these two cutting-plane families. This mission produces the first Lean statements of all four.

Difficulty

The obvious shortcut for Theorem 11.2 is to treat "cuts off a vertex" and "is PIP_IPI​-free" as producing merely some valid cut, and stop there — Theorem 1.1 already guarantees that much. The actual content is the equality: the specific intersection cut constructed from the halfspace TTT does not just happen to be valid, it reconstructs φ\varphiφ itself, coefficient for coefficient, because TTT is a single hyperplane so every one of the LP cone's nnn extreme rays exits it through the same boundary. Losing sight of this collapses the theorem into a restatement of Theorem 1.1 with no new content.

For Theorem 11.11, the difficulty is that "no intersection cut from SSS is equivalent" must survive scaling: a naive argument might rule out one specific (α,β)(\alpha,\beta)(α,β)-representative satisfying Theorem 11.9's condition while missing that a positive rescaling of the same cut could still satisfy it under a different multiplier vector. The theorem's hypothesis is deliberately built to close this gap by quantifying over every positive scalar and every feasible solution realizing the rescaled pair, not just the given one.

Formalization scope

The ambient space is a generic finite index type ι for Theorem 11.2/Corollary 11.3 (structural and surplus variables together, matching 01-intro-duality's own convention for the intersection- cut apparatus), and Fin n → ℝ for the CGLP-based Theorems 11.9/11.11, matching the series' default. P_I is left as an abstract parameter throughout (never expanded into an explicit integrality predicate on a specific coordinate subset for Theorem 11.2, matching 01-intro- duality's own treatment), except in the corner-polyhedron definitions, where it is made concrete via a coordinate set Nprime since the corollary's statement depends on it directly. "Facet" and "extreme ray" are restated from 02b-polarity's conventions (affine dimension via Module.finrank of vectorSpan; IsExtreme) rather than reinvented, since Chapter 2 already pins these down precisely for this series. "Basic feasible solution" to the CGLP in Theorem 11.9 is captured entirely by the theorem's own submatrix-support condition, not through a separate, independently-derived basicness predicate — the book's own proof uses no other property of basicness, so adding one would be unused decoration, not additional fidelity. Cut equivalence throughout is formalized as exact set equality of the two halfspaces, matching the series' established convention (e.g. 10-split-closure's Theorem 10.1) for what "equivalent cuts" means.

This mission depends on no other chunk's Lean definitions: the intersection-cut apparatus (extremeRay, PIFree) is restated from 01-intro-duality, the facet apparatus (PolyDim, IsFacet) from 02b-polarity, and the tableau apparatus (Ahat, Bhat, Abar, Abar0, SurplusM) from 08-cut-correspondence/09-simplex-tableau/10-split-closure, per the series convention against importing another draft mission's definitions while chunks are drafted concurrently. A trivializing formalization to rule out explicitly: collapsing Theorem 11.2 to "some intersection cut is valid and cuts off vvv" (already implied by Theorem 1.1 alone) rather than the literal set-equality with the facet's own inequality, which is this theorem's actual content.

Selected references

  • E. Balas, Intersection Cuts — A New Type of Cutting Planes for Integer Programming, Operations Research 19 (1971), 19–39. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.19.1.19
  • E. Balas and T. Kis, On the relationship between standard intersection cuts, lift-and-project cuts, and generalized intersection cuts, Mathematical Programming A 160 (2016), 85–114. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-015-0975-1
  • E. Balas and M. Perregaard, Generalized intersection cuts and a new cut generating paradigm, Mathematical Programming A 137 (2013), 19–35. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-011-0483-x
  • E. Balas, Disjunctive Programming, Springer, 2018, Chapter 11, §11.1–11.5. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00148-3
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CombinatoricsComplexity TheoryOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

A Threshold of ln n for Approximating Set Cover II: The Inapproximability of Max k-CoverResearch Paper

Motivation

Max kkk-cover is the basic coverage problem of combinatorial optimization. The input is a collection of subsets of a finite ground set and a number kkk; the task is to choose kkk subsets that together cover as many points as possible. It models facility and sensor placement, the selection of a small committee or feature set representing a population, and budgeted versions of set cover. It is also the prototype of maximizing a monotone submodular function under a cardinality constraint.

The greedy algorithm covers at least a 1−1/e≈0.6321-1/e\approx 0.6321−1/e≈0.632 fraction of the optimum. This bound goes back to Hochbaum and Pathria and, for general submodular functions, to Nemhauser, Wolsey and Fisher (1978). For two decades it was not known whether a polynomial-time algorithm could do better. Uriel Feige answered the question in A Threshold of ln n for Approximating Set Cover (J. ACM 45(4), 1998, pp. 634–652, doi:10.1145/285055.285059), Section 5. His Theorem 5.3 (p. 648) states: "For any ϵ>0\epsilon > 0ϵ>0, max kkk-cover cannot be approximated in polynomial time within a ratio of (1−1/e+ϵ)(1 - 1/e + \epsilon)(1−1/e+ϵ), unless P=NPP = NPP=NP." Together with the greedy bound, it makes 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e the exact approximation threshold of max kkk-cover.

Timeline:

  • 1978: Nemhauser, Wolsey and Fisher prove the greedy 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e bound for monotone submodular maximization.
  • 1992: Arora, Lund, Motwani, Sudan and Szegedy prove the PCP theorem. With Papadimitriou–Yannakakis (1991) it gives Theorem 2.1.1 of the paper: MAX 3SAT-B has a constant gap unless P = NP.
  • 1994: Lund and Yannakakis introduce partition-system reductions from multi-prover proof systems to set cover.
  • 1995: Raz proves the parallel repetition theorem (Theorem 2.2.2 of the paper).
  • 1998: Feige proves the ln n threshold for set cover (the subject of mission I of this series) and the 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e threshold for max kkk-cover.

Setting

An instance consists of nnn points {0,…,n−1}\{0,\dots,n-1\}{0,…,n−1}, a list of subsets S1,…,SsS_1,\dots,S_sS1​,…,Ss​ of the points, and a number kkk. Its value opt\mathrm{opt}opt is the largest number of points covered by at most kkk of the sets. Instances are written over a three-letter alphabet:

  • nnn in unary;
  • each set as its characteristic bit-vector;
  • kkk in unary.

Following p. 648, a polynomial-time algorithm approximates max kkk-cover within a ratio δ\deltaδ if on every input it outputs a number vvv with

δ⋅opt≤v≤opt.\delta\cdot\mathrm{opt}\le v\le\mathrm{opt}.δ⋅opt≤v≤opt.

The algorithm need not name the sets. This is the non-constructive notion of approximation.

The proof is a reduction from the MAX 3SAT-5 problem. A 3CNF-5 formula has exactly three literals per clause, over three distinct variables, and every variable occurs in exactly five clauses. The reduction goes through a kkk-prover proof system for such a formula φ\varphiφ with MMM clauses:

  • The verifier picks ℓ\ellℓ clauses at random, and a distinguished variable in each; there are R=(3M)ℓR=(3M)^\ellR=(3M)ℓ random strings rrr.
  • Each prover PiP_iPi​ is attached to a code word of length ℓ\ellℓ and weight ℓ/2\ell/2ℓ/2; distinct words are at Hamming distance at least ℓ/3\ell/3ℓ/3.
  • On coordinate jjj, prover PiP_iPi​ receives the clause if its bit is 1, and the distinguished variable if its bit is 0.
  • Answers are satisfying assignments of the received clauses and bits for the received variables.
  • Two provers are consistent if they assign the same values to the distinguished variables. The verifier weakly accepts if some pair of distinct provers is consistent, and strongly accepts if every pair is.

The max k′k'k′-cover instance of §5 attaches to every random string rrr a copy BrB_rBr​ of the explicit partition system. Its points are the vectors in {0,…,k−1}L\{0,\dots,k-1\}^L{0,…,k−1}L with L=2ℓL=2^\ellL=2ℓ, so m=kLm=k^Lm=kL. Its LLL partitions are labelled by the ℓ\ellℓ-bit strings, and each splits the points by the value of one coordinate. There are N=mRN=mRN=mR points in all. For each prover iii, question qqq and answer aaa, the set S(q,a,i)S_{(q,a,i)}S(q,a,i)​ collects, for every rrr on which PiP_iPi​ receives qqq, the iiith part of the partition of BrB_rBr​ labelled by the values that aaa gives to the distinguished variables of rrr. The budget is k′=kQk'=kQk′=kQ, where QQQ is the number of questions a single prover can receive.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.3

∀ε>0:max k-cover is approximable within 1−1e+ε ⟹ P=NP,\forall\varepsilon>0:\quad \text{max } k\text{-cover is approximable within } 1-\tfrac1e+\varepsilon \ \Longrightarrow\ \mathrm{P}=\mathrm{NP},∀ε>0:max k-cover is approximable within 1−e1​+ε ⟹ P=NP,

conditional on the two cited results below. The ratio is left free (any ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0), so the goal records the shape of the threshold and not a particular constant.

Milestones

  • Proposition 2.1.2 (p. 640): for some ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 it is NP-hard to distinguish satisfiable 3CNF-5 formulas from those in which at most a (1−ε)(1-\varepsilon)(1−ε)-fraction of the clauses can be satisfied simultaneously.
  • Lemma 2.3.1 (p. 643): a satisfiable φ\varphiφ admits a strategy that always strongly accepts; on a far-from-satisfiable φ\varphiφ the weak acceptance probability is at most k2 2−cℓk^2\,2^{-c\ell}k22−cℓ.
  • Coverage of the explicit partition system (p. 649): jjj subsets from pairwise different partitions cover exactly (1−(1−1/k)j)m(1-(1-1/k)^j)m(1−(1−1/k)j)m points.
  • Proposition 5.4 (p. 649): if at most kQkQkQ sets cover a (1−1/e+ε)(1-1/e+\varepsilon)(1−1/e+ε)-fraction of the points, then at least an ε/3\varepsilon/3ε/3-fraction of the random strings are good. Here rrr is good if wr≤3k/εw_r\le3k/\varepsilonwr​≤3k/ε sets meet BrB_rBr​ and two of them from different provers lie in the same partition.
  • Decoding (p. 649): such a covering yields a strategy that weakly accepts with probability at least (ε/3)(ε/3k)2(\varepsilon/3)(\varepsilon/3k)^2(ε/3)(ε/3k)2.
  • Gap (p. 649): a satisfiable formula gives a cover of all NNN points by kQkQkQ sets. If at most a (1−ε′)(1-\varepsilon')(1−ε′)-fraction of the clauses are satisfiable, kQkQkQ sets cover at most (1−1/e+g(k))N(1-1/e+g(k))N(1−1/e+g(k))N points, where g(k)→0g(k)\to0g(k)→0, for all large ℓ\ellℓ.
  • Proposition 5.1 (p. 647): every greedy run covers at least (1−1/e) opt(1-1/e)\,\mathrm{opt}(1−1/e)opt points.

Significance

The result closes the approximability of max kkk-cover: the greedy algorithm cannot be beaten by any constant unless P = NP. Consequences:

  • Submodular maximization. Coverage functions are monotone submodular, so the bound transfers to monotone submodular maximization under a cardinality constraint, whenever the function is given in a form that encodes a coverage instance.
  • Other problems. Hardness results for facility location, budgeted allocation, and welfare maximization with coverage valuations reduce from it.
  • The reduction itself. The ℓ\ellℓ-fold kkk-prover system combined with a partition system that is exactly countable is the template for later 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e hardness proofs.

Status: the theorem has been proved since 1998. It has not been formalized; neither the reduction nor the underlying proof systems exist in Mathlib or on this platform. This mission produces:

  • a machine-checked reduction from MAX 3SAT-5 to max kkk-cover;
  • an exact counting lemma for product partition systems;
  • the averaging and concavity argument of Proposition 5.4;
  • a formal statement of the greedy bound for coverage.

The cited PCP-based gap (Theorem 2.1.1) and parallel repetition (Theorem 2.2.2) remain hypotheses. They are separate, much larger formalization projects.

Difficulty

The obvious argument uses the soundness of the proof system directly: a large cover should force consistent answers. It fails because a cover may spend many sets on a few random strings and cover them completely, while covering the rest partially without any two sets from the same partition. What saves the argument is exact counting. For sets from pairwise different partitions, coverage is exactly h(j)=(1−(1−1/k)j)mh(j)=(1-(1-1/k)^j)mh(j)=(1−(1−1/k)j)m, a concave function of the number jjj of sets used. Since the sets meet a random string kkk times on average, Jensen's inequality caps the total coverage of such "unstructured" strings at about (1−(1−1/k)k)(1-(1-1/k)^k)(1−(1−1/k)k), which tends to 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e. A further obstacle is that the reduction must run in polynomial time. The paper therefore takes ℓ\ellℓ and kkk constant (unlike the set-cover reduction, where ℓ=Θ(log⁡log⁡n)\ell=\Theta(\log\log n)ℓ=Θ(loglogn)), and the soundness bound k22−cℓk^2 2^{-c\ell}k22−cℓ must beat (ε/3)(ε/3k)2(\varepsilon/3)(\varepsilon/3k)^2(ε/3)(ε/3k)2 at a constant ℓ\ellℓ. The quantifier order (kkk large first, then ℓ\ellℓ large) is part of the difficulty.

A second obstacle is the machine model. The goal is a statement about polynomial-time Turing machines, so the reduction and the decision procedure built from a hypothetical approximation algorithm must be compiled into Cook's one-tape machines.

Formalization scope

  • Machine model. CookPvsNP_defs (a published platform definition): one-tape Turing machines, P\mathrm{P}P, NP\mathrm{NP}NP, polynomial-time computable functions, CNF formulas and their encoding. "P = NP" is P Bool = NP Bool, the form in which CookPvsNP.P_ne_NP states the open problem.
  • Cited results as hypotheses. Theorem 2.1.1 enters as Thm211. Raz's theorem enters as RazRepetition, its consequence stated on p. 642: the ℓ\ellℓ-fold clause–variable game on a far-from-satisfiable 3CNF-5 formula has acceptance probability at most 2−cℓ2^{-c\ell}2−cℓ. This is weaker than Raz's general theorem, so the conditional statement is stronger. No hypothesis about max kkk-cover is assumed.
  • Approximation. The value form above, with no size threshold. For ε>1/e\varepsilon>1/eε>1/e the ratio exceeds one and the hypothesis is unsatisfiable on any instance with opt>0\mathrm{opt}>0opt>0; those values are vacuous, as in the paper.
  • opt\mathrm{opt}opt. Taken over at most kkk sets. This agrees with the paper's "exactly kkk" whenever k≤sk\le sk≤s.
  • Probability and counting. Probabilities are uniform counts over the (3M)ℓ(3M)^\ell(3M)ℓ random strings. Fractions in lower-bound statements are written as counts compared with multiples of RRR.
  • Canonical answers. The type of answers is restricted to satisfying assignments of the received clauses, following the paper's "without loss of generality" (p. 643). All indices are 0-based.
  • Partition system. The §4 construction is defined for any partition system with ℓ\ellℓ-bit partition labels and instantiated with the explicit product system. Its L=2ℓL=2^\ellL=2ℓ coordinates are the ℓ\ellℓ-bit strings themselves.
  • Not formalized. The running time of the greedy algorithm, and the constructive variant (Proposition 5.2), which belongs to the set-cover mission.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: every cited input is a named, satisfiable proposition about 3CNF formulas or the two-prover game, never about max kkk-cover, and the approximation hypothesis is satisfiable for ratios up to 111.

Needed infrastructure, reusable beyond this mission:

  • composition and simulation lemmas for Cook's machines;
  • the uniformity of the verifier's questions on 3CNF-5 formulas;
  • concavity of j↦1−(1−1/k)jj\mapsto 1-(1-1/k)^jj↦1−(1−1/k)j;
  • (1−1/k)k→1/e(1-1/k)^k\to 1/e(1−1/k)k→1/e bounds.

Contributions to any of these, or to either cited theorem, are welcome.

Selected references

  • U. Feige, A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover, J. ACM 45(4) (1998) 634–652. https://doi.org/10.1145/285055.285059
  • R. Raz, A parallel repetition theorem, SIAM J. Comput. 27(3) (1998) 763–803 (STOC 1995). https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539795280895
  • S. Arora, C. Lund, R. Motwani, M. Sudan, M. Szegedy, Proof verification and the hardness of approximation problems, J. ACM 45(3) (1998) 501–555. https://doi.org/10.1145/278298.278306
  • C. Papadimitriou, M. Yannakakis, Optimization, approximation, and complexity classes, J. Comput. System Sci. 43(3) (1991) 425–440. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0000(91)90023-X
  • C. Lund, M. Yannakakis, On the hardness of approximating minimization problems, J. ACM 41(5) (1994) 960–981. https://doi.org/10.1145/185675.306789
  • G. L. Nemhauser, L. A. Wolsey, M. L. Fisher, An analysis of approximations for maximizing submodular set functions—I, Math. Programming 14 (1978) 265–294. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01588971
  • S. Cook, The P versus NP problem, Clay Mathematics Institute. https://www.claymath.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/pvsnp.pdf
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Convex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Generalized Quasi-Variational Inequality Problem I: Existence for the Generalized Implicit Complementarity Problem under Strong CopositivityResearch Paper

Motivation

Variational inequalities and complementarity problems are the standard formulation of equilibrium in operations research and mathematical economics: traffic equilibria, spatial price equilibria, Nash equilibria of convex games, and the optimality conditions of constrained optimization all take this form. Many applications have two features that the classical theory does not cover. The feasible set of a player or a flow can depend on the current state (a quasi-variational inequality, as in generalized Nash games with shared constraints), and the response map can be set-valued (a subdifferential, or a best-response correspondence). D. Chan and J. S. Pang (Math. Oper. Res. 7 (1982) 211–222) introduced the generalized quasi-variational inequality covering both, proved existence theorems for it, and derived existence for a new generalized implicit complementarity problem.

Timeline of the results this mission builds on:

  • 1966: Hartman and Stampacchia prove existence for the variational inequality on a compact convex set.
  • 1973: Bensoussan, Goursat and Lions introduce quasi-variational inequalities for impulse control.
  • 1976: Saigal extends the complementarity problem to set-valued maps.
  • 1974: Moré gives coercivity conditions for nonlinear complementarity problems; a special version of the lemma of §3 appears there.
  • 1979: Fang and Peterson prove a general existence theorem for generalized variational inequalities (report, University of Maryland Baltimore County); the lemma of §3 and the constant-KKK case of Theorem 3.2 are taken from there.
  • 1982: Chan and Pang prove existence for the generalized quasi-variational inequality using the Eilenberg–Montgomery fixed point theorem, and derive existence for the generalized implicit complementarity problem under strong copositivity (Theorem 4.2), the goal of this mission.

Setting

Throughout, Rn\mathbb R^nRn carries the Euclidean inner product xTyx^T yxTy and norm ∥x∥\|x\|∥x∥. A point-to-set mapping KKK assigns to each x∈Rnx\in\mathbb R^nx∈Rn a set K(x)⊆RnK(x)\subseteq\mathbb R^nK(x)⊆Rn. Given point-to-set mappings KKK and fff, the problem GQVI(K,f)\mathrm{GQVI}(K,f)GQVI(K,f) asks for vectors x,yx,yx,y with

x∈K(x),y∈f(x),(x′−x)Ty≥0  for all x′∈K(x).x\in K(x),\qquad y\in f(x),\qquad (x'-x)^T y\ge 0\ \text{ for all } x'\in K(x).x∈K(x),y∈f(x),(x′−x)Ty≥0  for all x′∈K(x).

A cone is a convex set containing 000 and closed under nonnegative scaling. The dual cone of a set SSS is S∗={y:yTx≥0 for all x∈S}S^*=\{y : y^T x\ge 0 \text{ for all } x\in S\}S∗={y:yTx≥0 for all x∈S}. For a point-to-point map mmm, a cone-valued map LLL and a point-to-set map fff, the problem GICP(L,m,f)\mathrm{GICP}(L,m,f)GICP(L,m,f) asks for x,yx,yx,y with

x∈m(x)+L(x),y∈f(x)∩L(x)∗,yT(x−m(x))=0.x\in m(x)+L(x),\qquad y\in f(x)\cap L(x)^*,\qquad y^T\big(x-m(x)\big)=0 .x∈m(x)+L(x),y∈f(x)∩L(x)∗,yT(x−m(x))=0.

A mapping fff is upper semicontinuous on a set CCC at x∈Cx\in Cx∈C if for each open G⊇f(x)G\supseteq f(x)G⊇f(x) there is a neighbourhood NNN of xxx with f(y)⊆Gf(y)\subseteq Gf(y)⊆G for y∈N∩Cy\in N\cap Cy∈N∩C; lower semicontinuous if for each open GGG meeting f(x)f(x)f(x), f(y)f(y)f(y) meets GGG for all yyy near xxx in CCC; continuous if both. A set SSS is contractible if some point x∈Sx\in Sx∈S and a continuous g:S×[0,1]→Sg:S\times[0,1]\to Sg:S×[0,1]→S satisfy g(x′,0)=x′g(x',0)=x'g(x′,0)=x′, g(x′,1)=xg(x',1)=xg(x′,1)=x. BrB_rBr​ is the closed ball of radius rrr about the origin, CrC_rCr​ its boundary sphere. For point-to-set maps μ\muμ and KKK, the coercivity function is

Cμ,K(r,x0)=inf⁡x∈K(x)∩Cr[inf⁡y∈μ(x)(x−x0)Ty]/(r+∥x0∥),C_{\mu,K}(r,x^0)=\inf_{x\in K(x)\cap C_r}\Big[\inf_{y\in\mu(x)}(x-x^0)^T y\Big]\Big/(r+\|x^0\|),Cμ,K​(r,x0)=x∈K(x)∩Cr​inf​[y∈μ(x)inf​(x−x0)Ty]/(r+∥x0∥),

with inf⁡∅=+∞\inf\emptyset=+\inftyinf∅=+∞. The map μ\muμ is strongly copositive with respect to KKK at x0x^0x0 if x0∈K(x0)x^0\in K(x^0)x0∈K(x0) and for some α>0\alpha>0α>0 and y0∈μ(x0)y^0\in\mu(x^0)y0∈μ(x0), (y−y0)T(x−x0)≥α∥x−x0∥2(y-y^0)^T(x-x^0)\ge\alpha\|x-x^0\|^2(y−y0)T(x−x0)≥α∥x−x0∥2 for all x∈K(x)x\in K(x)x∈K(x) and y∈μ(x)y\in\mu(x)y∈μ(x). For μ\muμ and q∈Rnq\in\mathbb R^nq∈Rn, (μ+q)(x)={y+q:y∈μ(x)}(\mu+q)(x)=\{y+q : y\in\mu(x)\}(μ+q)(x)={y+q:y∈μ(x)}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.2 (p. 218)

Let L~\tilde LL~ be a closed cone with nonempty interior, mmm continuous, K(x)=m(x)+L~K(x)=m(x)+\tilde LK(x)=m(x)+L~, and μ\muμ a mapping with nonempty contractible compact values, upper semicontinuous on Rn\mathbb R^nRn. If some u~\tilde uu~ satisfies u~−m(x)∈L~\tilde u-m(x)\in\tilde Lu~−m(x)∈L~ for all xxx, and μ\muμ is strongly copositive with respect to KKK at u~\tilde uu~, then for every qqq

∃ x,y:x−m(x)∈L~,y∈μ(x)+q,y∈L~∗,yT(x−m(x))=0.\exists\, x,y:\quad x-m(x)\in\tilde L,\quad y\in\mu(x)+q,\quad y\in\tilde L^*,\quad y^T(x-m(x))=0 .∃x,y:x−m(x)∈L~,y∈μ(x)+q,y∈L~∗,yT(x−m(x))=0.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  • Theorem 3.1 (p. 214): for continuous φ\varphiφ quasi-concave in its first argument on a nonempty compact convex CCC, some u∗∈V(u∗)=K(u∗)∩Cu^*\in V(u^*)=K(u^*)\cap Cu∗∈V(u∗)=K(u∗)∩C and w∗∈f(u∗)w^*\in f(u^*)w∗∈f(u∗) satisfy φ(v,u∗,w∗)≤φ(u∗,u∗,w∗)\varphi(v,u^*,w^*)\le\varphi(u^*,u^*,w^*)φ(v,u∗,w∗)≤φ(u∗,u∗,w∗) for all v∈V(u∗)v\in V(u^*)v∈V(u∗).
  • Lemma of §3 (p. 215): a variational inequality on W∩EW\cap EW∩E at a point of W∩E0W\cap E^0W∩E0 extends to WWW.
  • Theorem 3.2 (p. 215): existence for GQVI(K,f)\mathrm{GQVI}(K,f)GQVI(K,f) from a compact truncation C=U∩EC=U\cap EC=U∩E and a boundary condition on ∂E\partial E∂E.
  • Theorem 4.1 (p. 217): if Cμ,K(r,x0)≥0C_{\mu,K}(r,x^0)\ge 0Cμ,K​(r,x0)≥0, then GQVI(K,μ+q)\mathrm{GQVI}(K,\mu+q)GQVI(K,μ+q) has a solution in BrB_rBr​ whenever ∥q∥≤Cμ,K(r,x0)\|q\|\le C_{\mu,K}(r,x^0)∥q∥≤Cμ,K​(r,x0).
  • Corollary 4.1 (pp. 217–218): under the coercivity condition (4), GQVI(K,μ+q)\mathrm{GQVI}(K,\mu+q)GQVI(K,μ+q) is solvable for every qqq, with bounded solution set.
  • Lemma 4.1 (p. 218): strong copositivity at x0x^0x0 implies coercivity (4) at x0x^0x0.
  • Proposition 2.1 (p. 213): GICP(L,m,f)\mathrm{GICP}(L,m,f)GICP(L,m,f) and GQVI(m+L,f)\mathrm{GQVI}(m+L,f)GQVI(m+L,f) have the same solutions.

Significance

Theorem 4.2 gives existence for complementarity problems whose cone is translated by a state-dependent map mmm and whose response map is set-valued. It contains existence for the implicit complementarity problem of Capuzzo-Dolcetta, Mosco and Pang (L~=R+n\tilde L=\mathbb R^n_+L~=R+n​) with strongly monotone data (Corollary 4.2 of the paper), and Saigal's generalized complementarity problem (m≡0m\equiv0m≡0). Theorems 3.2 and 4.1 are general-purpose existence tools for quasi-variational inequalities with set-valued maps; Theorem 3.2 reduces to the Fang–Peterson theorem when KKK is constant, and Corollary 3.1 to the Hartman–Stampacchia theorem when in addition fff is single-valued.

All results of the paper are proved; none is open. To our knowledge none of them has been formalized: no proof assistant library contains quasi-variational inequalities with set-valued maps, and Mathlib has neither Kakutani's nor the Eilenberg–Montgomery fixed point theorem (nor Brouwer's). A formal proof of the goal therefore also produces a reusable library of set-valued existence theory.

Difficulty

The whole chain rests on Theorem 3.1, whose proof applies the Eilenberg–Montgomery fixed point theorem for upper semicontinuous maps with acyclic (here contractible) compact values; this in turn needs either singular homology or an approximation argument, neither of which is available in Mathlib. Replacing "contractible" by "convex" to use Kakutani's theorem would prove a strictly weaker theorem: the paper states contractible values deliberately. The second difficulty is that the fixed point only solves the problem on the truncation V(x)=K(x)∩CV(x)=K(x)\cap CV(x)=K(x)∩C; turning it into a solution over all of K(x)K(x)K(x) needs the boundary argument of Theorem 3.2, and for Theorem 4.2 the continuity of x↦(m(x)+L~)∩Bρx\mapsto (m(x)+\tilde L)\cap B_\rhox↦(m(x)+L~)∩Bρ​, which is where the solidity of L~\tilde LL~ is used. The obvious approach of applying Theorem 3.2 directly with C=RnC=\mathbb R^nC=Rn fails because CCC must be compact.

Formalization scope

The space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n), so all norms and balls are Euclidean (not the sup norm of Fin n → ℝ). Point-to-set mappings are functions into Set; semicontinuity "on CCC" is Mathlib's UpperHemicontinuousOn/LowerHemicontinuousOn with neighbourhoods relative to CCC, and "on Rn\mathbb R^nRn" is UpperHemicontinuous. Cones are PointedCone ℝ _ (convex, containing 000, as footnote 1 of the paper says). Balls are centred at the origin.

Conventions that the Lean statements make explicit:

  • The paper takes its semicontinuity from Berge, whose upper semicontinuous maps have compact values. Theorems 3.1, 3.2, 4.1 and Corollary 4.1 are false without this (K(x)≡(0,1)K(x)\equiv(0,1)K(x)≡(0,1), C=[0,1]C=[0,1]C=[0,1], f≡{1}f\equiv\{1\}f≡{1}), so each one carries an explicit closedness hypothesis on K(x)∩CK(x)\cap CK(x)∩C or K(x)∩BρK(x)\cap B_\rhoK(x)∩Bρ​. Theorem 4.2 needs none, since m(x)+L~m(x)+\tilde Lm(x)+L~ is closed.
  • Every infimum uses inf⁡∅=+∞\inf\emptyset=+\inftyinf∅=+∞. Bounds of the form Cμ,K(r,x0)≥cC_{\mu,K}(r,x^0)\ge cCμ,K​(r,x0)≥c, condition (v) of Theorem 3.2, and the limit (4) are stated in universally quantified form. A real-valued Cμ,KC_{\mu,K}Cμ,K​ would be wrong: it returns 000 on an empty set.
  • Lemma 4.1 is stated at the same point x0x^0x0, which is what its proof gives. In Corollary 4.1 the bound rrr on the solutions is chosen after qqq.
  • Three glyphs are illegible in the scan and are read from the proofs: ≤\le≤ in Theorem 3.1, ≥0\ge 0≥0 in Theorem 3.2(v), and ≥\ge≥ in the Lemma of §3.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the GQVI solution tests over all of K(x)K(x)K(x), not over V(x)=K(x)∩CV(x)=K(x)\cap CV(x)=K(x)∩C, and the GICP solution keeps both the dual-cone condition and the complementarity equation. Dropping any of these would turn the goal into a restatement of Theorem 3.1.

A complete development needs: an Eilenberg–Montgomery (or at least Kakutani plus an acyclicity argument) fixed point theorem for set-valued maps, Berge's maximum theorem, and basic facts on hemicontinuity of intersections and translates of set-valued maps. The fixed point theorems, the maximum theorem and the hemicontinuity lemmas are reusable far beyond this mission. Contributions of any of these as separate theorems are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Chan, J. S. Pang, The generalized quasi-variational inequality problem, Mathematics of Operations Research 7(2) (1982) 211–222. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.7.2.211
  • S. Eilenberg, D. Montgomery, Fixed point theorems for multi-valued transformations, American Journal of Mathematics 68 (1946) 214–222. https://doi.org/10.2307/2371832
  • C. Berge, Topological Spaces, Macmillan, New York, 1963.
  • S. C. Fang, E. L. Peterson, Generalized variational inequalities, Mathematics Research Report 79-10, Department of Mathematics, University of Maryland Baltimore County, 1979 (no public link).
  • J. J. Moré, Coercivity conditions in nonlinear complementarity problems, SIAM Review 16(1) (1974) 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1137/1016001
  • P. Hartman, G. Stampacchia, On some non-linear elliptic differential-functional equations, Acta Mathematica 115 (1966) 271–310. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02392210
  • R. Saigal, Extension of the generalized complementarity problem, Mathematics of Operations Research 1(3) (1976) 260–266. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1.3.260
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CombinatoricsOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Worst-Case Performance Bounds for Simple One-Dimensional Packing Algorithms 3: First-Fit Decreasing and Best-Fit Decreasing Use at Most 11/9 L* + 4 BinsResearch Paper

Motivation

Bin packing asks for the fewest unit-capacity bins that hold a given list of item sizes. It models table formatting, the placement of program segments on pages, and the allocation of files to disc tracks, and it is NP-complete, so exact solutions require search in general. Johnson, Demers, Ullman, Garey and Graham (SIAM J. Comput. 3 (1974)) therefore studied four simple placement heuristics and bounded how far each can be from the optimum in the worst case. Their paper is one of the founding results of the worst-case analysis of approximation algorithms.

This mission concerns the two decreasing heuristics, which sort the items from largest to smallest before placing them. For them the paper proves that at most 119\tfrac{11}{9}911​ of the optimum, plus an additive constant, is ever used, and that the factor 119\tfrac{11}{9}911​ cannot be improved.

Timeline.

  • 1973: D. S. Johnson's MIT thesis proves FFD(L)≤119L∗+4FFD(L)\le \tfrac{11}{9}L^*+4FFD(L)≤911​L∗+4; the argument exceeds 75 pages.
  • 1974: Johnson, Demers, Ullman, Garey and Graham publish the bound for FFD and BFD, with a complete proof of the reduction from BFD to FFD and an outline of the FFD argument.
  • 1985: B. S. Baker gives a shorter proof of FFD(L)≤119L∗+3FFD(L)\le\tfrac{11}{9}L^*+3FFD(L)≤911​L∗+3 (J. Algorithms 6).
  • 1991: M. Yue publishes a proof of FFD(L)≤119L∗+1FFD(L)\le\tfrac{11}{9}L^*+1FFD(L)≤911​L∗+1.
  • 2007: G. Dósa determines the tight additive constant, FFD(L)≤119L∗+69FFD(L)\le\tfrac{11}{9}L^*+\tfrac{6}{9}FFD(L)≤911​L∗+96​ (ESCAPE 2007, LNCS 4614).

Setting

A list is a finite sequence L=(a1,a2,…,an)L=(a_1,a_2,\dots,a_n)L=(a1​,a2​,…,an​) of real numbers in (0,1](0,1](0,1]; values may repeat. A bin has capacity 111; its level is the sum of the numbers placed in it. The optimum L∗L^*L∗ is the least number of bins into which the elements of LLL can be distributed so that no bin has level exceeding 111.

The bins B1,B2,…B_1,B_2,\dotsB1​,B2​,… start empty and the elements are placed one at a time, in list order.

  • First-Fit (FF) places aia_iai​ into the bin BjB_jBj​ of least index whose level β\betaβ satisfies β≤1−ai\beta\le 1-a_iβ≤1−ai​.
  • Best-Fit (BF) places aia_iai​ into a bin whose level β\betaβ satisfies β≤1−ai\beta\le 1-a_iβ≤1−ai​ and is as large as possible, the one of least index among ties.
  • First-Fit Decreasing (FFD) and Best-Fit Decreasing (BFD) first arrange LLL into nonincreasing order and then apply FF, respectively BF.

FFD(L)FFD(L)FFD(L) and BFD(L)BFD(L)BFD(L) are the numbers of bins that receive at least one element.

Two auxiliary notions from the paper's proof also appear among the milestones. The position (j,k)(j,k)(j,k) of an element in a packing means that it is the kkk-th element placed into bin jjj. The weight W(X)W(X)W(X) of a collection of elements is defined through kkk-pieces, the elements in (1k+1,1k](\tfrac1{k+1},\tfrac1k](k+11​,k1​]. Each element has the weight w1(x)=⌊1/x⌋−1w_1(x)=\lfloor 1/x\rfloor^{-1}w1​(x)=⌊1/x⌋−1. A pair (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) with xxx a kkk-piece and kx+y≤1kx+y\le1kx+y≤1 has the discounted weight w2(x,y)=w1(x)+k−1kw1(y)w_2(x,y)=w_1(x)+\tfrac{k-1}{k}w_1(y)w2​(x,y)=w1​(x)+kk−1​w1​(y), and any other pair has w1(x)+w1(y)w_1(x)+w_1(y)w1​(x)+w1​(y). W(X)W(X)W(X) is the least total weight over all ways of grouping XXX into singletons and pairs.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2

For every list LLL,

FFD(L)≤119L∗+4andBFD(L)≤119L∗+4.FFD(L)\le \frac{11}{9}L^*+4\qquad\text{and}\qquad BFD(L)\le\frac{11}{9}L^*+4 .FFD(L)≤911​L∗+4andBFD(L)≤911​L∗+4.

The constants are the paper's. Both halves are part of the goal.

Milestones, in the order the argument uses them

  1. Lemma 3.3. If FFD(L)>rL∗+dFFD(L)>rL^*+dFFD(L)>rL∗+d with r,d≥1r,d\ge1r,d≥1, the list L′L'L′ keeping only the elements exceeding (r−1)/r(r-1)/r(r−1)/r also has FFD(L′)>rL′∗+dFFD(L')>rL'^*+dFFD(L′)>rL′∗+d; the same for BFD. With r=119r=\tfrac{11}{9}r=911​ this reduces the goal to lists in (211,1](\tfrac2{11},1](112​,1].
  2. Claims 3.4.5 and 3.4.6, two steps of the proof of Theorem 3.4 that concern only the FFD packing PFPFPF and the BFD run. On [16,1][\tfrac16,1][61​,1], BFD places every element exceeding 13\tfrac1331​ exactly where FFD does. Among the remaining positions of PFPFPF, the lexicographic order of positions respects the order of the sorted list.
  3. Theorem 3.4. If L⊆[16,1]L\subseteq[\tfrac16,1]L⊆[61​,1], then BFD(L)≤FFD(L)BFD(L)\le FFD(L)BFD(L)≤FFD(L). This transfers the bound from FFD to BFD on (211,1](\tfrac2{11},1](112​,1].
  4. Lemma 4.2. For every integer N≥4N\ge4N≥4 and L⊆(1N,12]L\subseteq(\tfrac1N,\tfrac12]L⊆(N1​,21​],
W(L)≥FFD(L)−N+2.W(L)\ge FFD(L)-N+2 .W(L)≥FFD(L)−N+2.
  1. The reduced assertion (Section 4, p. 314). If L⊆(211,1]L\subseteq(\tfrac2{11},1]L⊆(112​,1], then
FFD(L)≤119L∗+4.FFD(L)\le\frac{11}{9}L^*+4 .FFD(L)≤911​L∗+4.
  1. Theorem 3.1, the matching lower bound: for each k≥1k\ge1k≥1 there is a list with L∗=kL^*=kL∗=k and FFD(L)=BFD(L)>119L∗−2FFD(L)=BFD(L)>\tfrac{11}{9}L^*-2FFD(L)=BFD(L)>911​L∗−2.

Significance

The bound makes FFD and BFD, which run in O(nlog⁡n)O(n\log n)O(nlogn) time, the reference heuristics for off-line bin packing. The 119\tfrac{11}{9}911​ bound and its proof technique of weighting functions were the model for the analysis of many later packing and scheduling heuristics. Theorem 3.1 shows that the factor is exact, so together with the goal it determines lim⁡k→∞RFFD(k)=lim⁡k→∞RBFD(k)=119\lim_{k\to\infty}R_{FFD}(k)=\lim_{k\to\infty}R_{BFD}(k)=\tfrac{11}{9}limk→∞​RFFD​(k)=limk→∞​RBFD​(k)=911​, where RA(k)R_A(k)RA​(k) is the largest ratio A(L)/L∗A(L)/L^*A(L)/L∗ over lists with L∗=kL^*=kL∗=k.

The result is proved, but the source proves it only in part. The paper gives complete proofs of Lemma 3.3, Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 3.1. For the reduced assertion it gives only an outline, whose central inequalities involve maps the paper never defines, and it refers to the thesis for the details. Lemma 4.2 is proved in the paper through two claims. A formal proof of the goal must therefore either formalize one of the later complete proofs (Baker 1985, Yue 1991, Dósa 2007) or reconstruct the thesis argument. No machine-checked proof of the 119\tfrac{11}{9}911​ bound is present in Mathlib or on the platform.

Difficulty

The obvious approach, used for First-Fit in Section 2 of the same paper, assigns each element a weight depending only on its size, so that every bin of the algorithm's packing weighs at least 111 and every bin of an optimal packing weighs at most the target ratio. For FFD no weighting of single elements works at ratio 119\tfrac{11}{9}911​. Summing w1w_1w1​ over the elements overcharges the FFD packing: a set of elements fitting into one bin can carry total w1w_1w1​-weight well above 119\tfrac{11}{9}911​. The paper's remedy is a weight defined on pairs, W(X)W(X)W(X), which discounts elements that could share a bin with a larger one. Even with WWW, the bins of FFD whose largest element exceeds 12\tfrac1221​ do not fit the scheme. Handling them requires a case analysis that the paper only sketches and that runs to more than 75 pages in the thesis.

The BFD half cannot be obtained by bounding BFD by FFD in general: there are lists with BFD(L)=109FFD(L)BFD(L)=\tfrac{10}{9}FFD(L)BFD(L)=910​FFD(L). Theorem 3.4 works only because Lemma 3.3 first removes all elements below 211\tfrac2{11}112​.

Formalization scope

Lists are L : List ℝ with the predicate IsList L (0<a≤10<a\le10<a≤1 for every element), assumed by every statement. L∗L^*L∗ is optBins L, the least b : ℕ admitting a map from the items to Fin b with every bin sum at most 111. A run keeps the nonempty bins as a List (List ℝ) in index order and opens a new bin at the end exactly when no nonempty bin fits, which matches the paper's "least jjj" over infinitely many empty bins. The fit test is non-strict. FFD and BFD are FF and BF applied to sortDesc L, a stable merge sort into nonincreasing order. They are defined for every list, so the goal is stated for arbitrary, unsorted LLL. Positions are 000-based pairs (bin, place in bin) read off the run.

WWW sorts its argument into nonincreasing order, so index is the position in that order. It then minimizes over involutions of the positions, which encode the partitions into one- and two-element sets. Weights are real-valued; the paper's use of rationals is incidental. The range hypotheses are exactly the paper's: [16,1][\tfrac16,1][61​,1] is closed in Theorem 3.4, (211,1](\tfrac2{11},1](112​,1] is open at 211\tfrac2{11}112​, and Lemma 4.2 has 1N<a≤12\tfrac1N<a\le\tfrac12N1​<a≤21​.

A weakened goal, such as FFD(L)≤119L∗+cFFD(L)\le\tfrac{11}{9}L^*+cFFD(L)≤911​L∗+c with a larger ccc, a bound for sorted lists only, or the FFD half alone, is a different theorem and does not close the mission. Claims 3.4.1–3.4.4 and 3.4.7 and the inequalities (∗)(*)(∗), (∗∗)(**)(∗∗) of the outline are not stated: they concern the paper's step-by-step construction and the undefined maps fff, ggg.

A complete development needs basic lemmas about FF and BF runs (levels stay at most 111, a new bin opens only when nothing fits, runs on prefixes). It also needs invariance of FFD and BFD under permutations of equal elements, the monotonicity of L∗L^*L∗ under deletion, and L∗≥∑iaiL^*\ge\sum_i a_iL∗≥∑i​ai​. These are reusable in the other missions of this series. Proofs of individual milestones, alternative complete proofs of the goal, and sharper additive constants are all welcome.

Selected references

  • D. S. Johnson, A. Demers, J. D. Ullman, M. R. Garey, R. L. Graham, Worst-Case Performance Bounds for Simple One-Dimensional Packing Algorithms, SIAM Journal on Computing 3(4):299–325, 1974. https://doi.org/10.1137/0203025
  • D. S. Johnson, Near-Optimal Bin Packing Algorithms, Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1973 (reference [8] of the paper above).
  • B. S. Baker, A new proof for the first-fit decreasing bin-packing algorithm, Journal of Algorithms 6(1):49–70, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1016/0196-6774(85)90018-5
  • M. Yue, A simple proof of the inequality FFD(L) ≤ 11/9 OPT(L) + 1, ∀L, for the FFD bin-packing algorithm, Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica 7(4):321–331, 1991.
  • G. Dósa, The tight bound of first fit decreasing bin-packing algorithm is FFD(I) ≤ 11/9 OPT(I) + 6/9, ESCAPE 2007, LNCS 4614:1–11, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74450-4_1
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Functional AnalysisTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: Lucas

The Grothendieck Constant: New Upper and Lower BoundsOpen Problem

Motivation

Given a real matrix A=(aij)∈Rm×nA=(a_{ij})\in\mathbb R^{m\times n}A=(aij​)∈Rm×n, consider maximizing the bilinear form ∑i,jaijxiyj\sum_{i,j}a_{ij}x_iy_j∑i,j​aij​xi​yj​ over sign vectors x∈{±1}mx\in\{\pm1\}^mx∈{±1}m, y∈{±1}ny\in\{\pm1\}^ny∈{±1}n. This discrete optimum, written OPT(A)\mathrm{OPT}(A)OPT(A), is closely tied to the cut norm of a matrix and is NP-hard to compute. Relaxing each sign to a unit vector and each product to an inner product gives the semidefinite value SDP(A)\mathrm{SDP}(A)SDP(A), computable in polynomial time. Grothendieck's inequality (Grothendieck, 1953) states that the relaxation overshoots by at most a universal factor: there is a finite KKK, independent of AAA, of m,nm,nm,n, and of the dimension of the vectors, with SDP(A)≤K⋅OPT(A)\mathrm{SDP}(A)\le K\cdot\mathrm{OPT}(A)SDP(A)≤K⋅OPT(A) for every AAA. The Grothendieck constant KGK_GKG​ is the least such KKK — equivalently, the worst-case integrality gap of the canonical semidefinite relaxation of this bilinear problem.

The constant is not a curiosity of one optimization problem. It originated in functional analysis, where it is central to the geometry of Banach spaces and to harmonic analysis; it governs the approximation ratio available for cut norms; and, in quantum information, it measures the maximal advantage of quantum over classical correlations in Bell-type experiments. Its exact value has been open since 1953.

A timeline of the bounds:

  • 1953, Grothendieck. Existence of a finite KKK, together with the lower bound KG≥π/2=1.5707…K_G\ge\pi/2=1.5707\ldotsKG​≥π/2=1.5707…
  • 1977, Krivine. KG≤π/(2log⁡(1+2))=1.7822…K_G\le\pi/\bigl(2\log(1+\sqrt2)\bigr)=1.7822\ldotsKG​≤π/(2log(1+2​))=1.7822…, obtained by analyzing hyperplane rounding, and conjectured to be optimal.
  • 1984/1991, Davie and Reeds (independently). KG≥1.6769…K_G\ge1.6769\ldotsKG​≥1.6769…, from an explicit high-dimensional Gaussian hard instance.
  • 2011, Braverman–Makarychev–Makarychev–Naor. Krivine's conjecture is false: KG<π/(2log⁡(1+2))K_G<\pi/(2\log(1+\sqrt2))KG​<π/(2log(1+2​)) strictly, with no quantitative gap.
  • 2014, Naor–Regev. Mixtures of Krivine schemes are asymptotically optimal: rounding schemes of this one family approach the true value of KGK_GKG​.
  • 2026, Heilman; Jones–Malavolta. The first improvements on Davie–Reeds, by 10−2610^{-26}10−26 and 10−1210^{-12}10−12 respectively; and the first explicit numerical improvements on Krivine's bound, of order 10−510^{-5}10−5 (Heilman; Li–Saha–Xue et al.).
  • 2026, Saha–Li–Xue–Chaudhuri–Klivans–Kothari–Meka. The bounds this mission targets:
6π11 ≤ KG ≤ π2log⁡(1+2)−3.47×10−4,\frac{6\pi}{11}\ \le\ K_G\ \le\ \frac{\pi}{2\log(1+\sqrt2)}-3.47\times10^{-4},116π​ ≤ KG​ ≤ 2log(1+2​)π​−3.47×10−4,

i.e. 1.7135…≤KG≤1.7818…1.7135\ldots\le K_G\le1.7818\ldots1.7135…≤KG​≤1.7818…, which fixes the tenths digit of KGK_GKG​ at 777.

Setting

Fix m,n∈Nm,n\in\mathbb Nm,n∈N and A∈Rm×nA\in\mathbb R^{m\times n}A∈Rm×n.

OPT(A):=max⁡x∈{±1}m,  y∈{±1}n∑i,jaijxiyj,SDP(A):=sup⁡d∈N sup⁡ui,vj∈Sd−1∑i,jaij⟨ui,vj⟩.\mathrm{OPT}(A):=\max_{x\in\{\pm1\}^m,\;y\in\{\pm1\}^n}\sum_{i,j}a_{ij}x_iy_j,\qquad \mathrm{SDP}(A):=\sup_{d\in\mathbb N}\ \sup_{u_i,v_j\in S^{d-1}}\sum_{i,j}a_{ij}\langle u_i,v_j\rangle .OPT(A):=x∈{±1}m,y∈{±1}nmax​i,j∑​aij​xi​yj​,SDP(A):=d∈Nsup​ ui​,vj​∈Sd−1sup​i,j∑​aij​⟨ui​,vj​⟩.

Here u1,…,umu_1,\dots,u_mu1​,…,um​ and v1,…,vnv_1,\dots,v_nv1​,…,vn​ are unit vectors of a common but arbitrary finite dimension ddd. Since a sign is a unit vector in dimension one, OPT(A)≤SDP(A)\mathrm{OPT}(A)\le\mathrm{SDP}(A)OPT(A)≤SDP(A). Call KKK a Grothendieck bound if SDP(A)≤K⋅OPT(A)\mathrm{SDP}(A)\le K\cdot\mathrm{OPT}(A)SDP(A)≤K⋅OPT(A) for every mmm, nnn and AAA, and set KG:=inf⁡{K:K is a Grothendieck bound}K_G:=\inf\{K: K\text{ is a Grothendieck bound}\}KG​:=inf{K:K is a Grothendieck bound}.

Upper bounds on KGK_GKG​ come from rounding algorithms. A Krivine scheme of dimension kkk is a pair of partitions of Rk\mathbb R^kRk into a +1+1+1 region and a −1-1−1 region, encoded by measurable odd functions f,g:Rk→{±1}f,g:\mathbb R^k\to\{\pm1\}f,g:Rk→{±1}: the algorithm maps each SDP vector to a Gaussian point in Rk\mathbb R^kRk, correlated according to the inner products, and reads off the label of the region the point lands in. Taking f=g=sgn⁡(z1)f=g=\operatorname{sgn}(z_1)f=g=sgn(z1​) recovers random hyperplane rounding. The quality of a scheme is carried by its normalized correlation function

H(t):=π2 E[f(X)g(Y)],H(t):=\frac{\pi}{2}\,\mathbb E\bigl[f(X)g(Y)\bigr],H(t):=2π​E[f(X)g(Y)],

where X,YX,YX,Y are standard Gaussian vectors in Rk\mathbb R^kRk with E[XiYi]=t\mathbb E[X_iY_i]=tE[Xi​Yi​]=t for every coordinate iii. For the half-space partition H(t)=arcsin⁡tH(t)=\arcsin tH(t)=arcsint, whose analysis gives Krivine's bound. Writing the odd expansion H(t)=b1t+b3t3+⋯H(t)=b_1t+b_3t^3+\cdotsH(t)=b1​t+b3​t3+⋯, the hyperplane scheme sits at (b1,b3)=(1,16)(b_1,b_3)=(1,\tfrac16)(b1​,b3​)=(1,61​).

Formalization targets

Goal

6π11 ≤ KG ≤ π2log⁡(1+2)−3.47×10−4\frac{6\pi}{11}\ \le\ K_G\ \le\ \frac{\pi}{2\log(1+\sqrt2)}-3.47\times10^{-4}116π​ ≤ KG​ ≤ 2log(1+2​)π​−3.47×10−4

This is the two-sided bound the source paper states as the outcome of its Theorems 2.1 and 2.2. It is the weakest statement that carries both of the paper's contributions at once; each side is also a milestone in its own right, so partial progress is recorded even if only one direction closes.

Milestones

The milestone list runs from the classical background to the two new bounds: OPT≤SDP\mathrm{OPT}\le\mathrm{SDP}OPT≤SDP; the existence of a finite Grothendieck bound; KG≥π/2K_G\ge\pi/2KG​≥π/2; Krivine's KG≤π/(2log⁡(1+2))K_G\le\pi/(2\log(1+\sqrt2))KG​≤π/(2log(1+2​)); the affine coefficient constraint b3≥2b1−116b_3\ge2b_1-\tfrac{11}{6}b3​≥2b1​−611​ valid for every Krivine scheme (Theorem 2.2, equation (1)); the transfer of a member of the affine family into a lower bound on KGK_GKG​ (Appendix A); the lower bound KG≥6π/11K_G\ge6\pi/11KG​≥6π/11 (Theorem 2.2); and the cubic–quintic upper bound (Theorem 2.1).

Significance

The two target bounds narrow an interval that had been essentially static for four decades: before 2026 the state of the art was 1.6769…≤KG≤1.7822…1.6769\ldots\le K_G\le1.7822\ldots1.6769…≤KG​≤1.7822…, wide enough that the tenths digit was unknown. The lower bound is also methodologically new. Every previous lower bound was obtained by exhibiting a hard instance; this one instead proves a ceiling on the performance of every rounding scheme in the Krivine family and converts that ceiling, through the Naor–Regev optimality theorem, into a bound on the constant. The affine constraint b3≥2b1−116b_3\ge2b_1-\tfrac{11}{6}b3​≥2b1​−611​ is the transportable core of that argument: being affine in the coefficients, it survives mixing schemes and passing to limits, which is exactly what the reduction to KGK_GKG​ requires.

On the formalization side, nothing here is machine-checked today. The upper bound (Theorem 2.1) is certified by interval arithmetic in the companion paper, and the lower bound's central one-dimensional inequality likewise rests on a computer-assisted certificate; reproducing either inside Lean means building a rigorous numeric layer on top of the analytic argument. Ahead of that, the mission needs a formal definition of KGK_GKG​ itself and of the Krivine-scheme apparatus, neither of which exists in Mathlib — these are reusable well beyond this mission, since Grothendieck's inequality feeds cut-norm approximation and Bell-inequality bounds. Contributions of intermediate lemmas about OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT, SDP\mathrm{SDP}SDP, Gaussian correlation identities, and Hermite expansions are welcome even when the headline bounds stay open.

Difficulty

The obvious route to a lower bound is to write down a matrix and compute. That route is what Davie and Reeds exhausted; improving it has produced gains of order 10−1210^{-12}10−12 at best, because the hard instances are high-dimensional Gaussian objects whose OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is itself hard to bound tightly. The route taken here avoids instances entirely, and its difficulty lies elsewhere: a constraint on a single scheme is worthless unless it survives averaging over schemes and passing to limits of schemes of growing dimension, since only then does the Naor–Regev optimality theorem convert it into a statement about KGK_GKG​. Constraints that are nonlinear in the scheme do not survive that passage, which is why the target inequality is affine in (b1,b3)(b_1,b_3)(b1​,b3​). For the upper bound, the difficulty is that the improvement is genuinely asymptotic: it comes from a limit of schemes of growing dimension rather than any fixed low-dimensional partition, and the final margin of 3.47×10−43.47\times10^{-4}3.47×10−4 is certified numerically rather than in closed form.

Formalization scope

OPT(A)\mathrm{OPT}(A)OPT(A) and SDP(A)\mathrm{SDP}(A)SDP(A) are defined as suprema of explicitly described sets of reals, over matrices indexed by Fin m and Fin n with real entries; the sign vectors are real-valued functions constrained to take the values 111 and −1-1−1, and the relaxation quantifies over unit vectors of EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) for an existentially quantified ddd, so no dimension bound is built in. The empty-index cases m=0m=0m=0 or n=0n=0n=0 are included and give value 000 on both sides. KGK_GKG​ is the infimum of the set of Grothendieck bounds; that set is nonempty precisely by Grothendieck's inequality, which is itself a milestone, and it is bounded below, so the infimum is not a junk value.

A Krivine scheme is a structure carrying two measurable ±1\pm1±1-valued functions on Fin k → ℝ, each odd almost everywhere. Almost-everywhere oddness is forced: no ±1\pm1±1-valued function satisfies f(−0)=−f(0)f(-0)=-f(0)f(−0)=−f(0) at the origin, so a pointwise requirement would make the structure empty and every statement about schemes vacuous. With the null-set relaxation the half-space partition is a scheme in every dimension k≥1k\ge1k≥1, and the definition file constructs it, pinning down non-vacuity; dimension k=0k=0k=0 admits no scheme. The correlation function is the explicit double Gaussian integral against the correlated-pair density, scaled by π/2\pi/2π/2, and the coefficients b1,b3b_1,b_3b1​,b3​ are read off as H′(0)H'(0)H′(0) and H′′′(0)/6H'''(0)/6H′′′(0)/6 — where HHH fails to be three times differentiable at 000 these are the ambient junk value 000, which a solver should keep in mind when reading the coefficient milestones.

No trivializing reading is available for the goal: it pins KGK_GKG​ between two explicit numerical constants, so it can be satisfied neither vacuously nor by a degenerate convention. Solvers should be aware that the source paper states its two theorems in abridged form and refers to its companion paper for the full proofs, and that the further bounds reported there — the stronger lower rungs 27π/4927\pi/4927π/49 and 51π/9251\pi/9251π/92, and the upper values 1.7818018410331.7818018410331.781801841033 and 1.78133198106256391.78133198106256391.7813319810625639 — are explicitly described as system-tested but not author-verified; they are deliberately outside this mission's milestone list.

Selected references

  • A. Grothendieck, Résumé de la théorie métrique des produits tensoriels topologiques, Bol. Soc. Mat. São Paulo 8 (1953), 1–79.
  • J.-L. Krivine, Sur la constante de Grothendieck, C. R. Acad. Sci. Paris (1977).
  • M. Braverman, K. Makarychev, Y. Makarychev, A. Naor, The Grothendieck constant is strictly smaller than Krivine's bound, FOCS 2011, 453–462. https://doi.org/10.1109/FOCS.2011.77
  • A. Naor, O. Regev, Krivine schemes are optimal, Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 142 (2014), 4315–4320. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9939-2014-12145-3
  • N. Alon, A. Naor, Approximating the cut-norm via Grothendieck's inequality, SIAM J. Comput. 35 (2006), 787–803. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539704441629
  • A. Li, R. Saha, A. Xue, S. Chaudhuri, A. Klivans, P. K. Kothari, R. Meka, Long-Horizon AI Research for Grothendieck Constant: A Case Study in Human–AI Mathematical Collaboration, arXiv:2608.11195v3, 2026. https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11195
  • R. Saha, A. Li, A. Xue, S. Chaudhuri, A. Klivans, P. K. Kothari, R. Meka, New upper and lower bounds for the Grothendieck constant, 2026 (companion paper containing the full proofs).
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Resource Allocation and Cross-Layer Control in Wireless Networks IV: The Energy-Constrained Control AlgorithmTextbook

Motivation

Battery-powered and energy-harvesting wireless devices cannot treat transmission power as free: a control algorithm that maximizes throughput without regard to energy will drain a device long before the network's other resources are exhausted. Chapter 6 of Georgiadis, Neely & Tassiulas's survey Resource Allocation and Cross-Layer Control in Wireless Networks (Foundations and Trends in Networking, 2006) extends the drift-plus-penalty framework of Chapter 5 to problems with an explicit average-resource-budget constraint, and works out the Energy Constrained Control Algorithm (ECCA) of Neely [116] as its flagship example: a joint flow-control and power-allocation policy that keeps every data queue and a virtual "excess energy" queue bounded by an explicit, finite constant on every single time slot — not merely in expectation or in the long run.

Setting

A multi-user wireless downlink serves LLL users over LLL channels with a time-varying collective topology state S(t)S(t)S(t) and link rate function Ci(P,S(t))C_i(P,S(t))Ci​(P,S(t)) under power allocation P=(P1,…,PL)P=(P_1,\dots,P_L)P=(P1​,…,PL​), subject to a per-slot power budget ∑iPi(t)≤Pmax\sum_i P_i(t)\le P_{max}∑i​Pi​(t)≤Pmax​ and a target average power constraint Pav<PmaxP_{av}<P_{max}Pav​<Pmax​. Exogenous arrivals Ai(t)≤R^A_i(t)\le\hat RAi​(t)≤R^ are entirely admitted or entirely dropped each slot (no transport-layer storage). The ECCA algorithm runs, every slot: flow control — admit Ai(t)A_i(t)Ai​(t) into queue iii if Ui(t)≤VU_i(t)\le VUi​(t)≤V (a fixed parameter), otherwise drop it entirely; power allocation — choose P(t)P(t)P(t) to maximize ∑i[Ui(t)Ci(P,S(t))−D(t)Pi(t)]\sum_i[U_i(t)C_i(P,S(t))-D(t)P_i(t)]∑i​[Ui​(t)Ci​(P,S(t))−D(t)Pi​(t)] subject to the power budget, where D(t)D(t)D(t) is a virtual power queue tracking accumulated excess energy expenditure, updated by D(t+1)=max⁡[D(t)−Pav,0]+∑iPi(t)D(t{+}1)=\max[D(t)-P_{av},0]+\sum_i P_i(t)D(t+1)=max[D(t)−Pav​,0]+∑i​Pi​(t).

Formalization targets

Goal — Theorem 6.3 (ECCA Performance)

Ui(t)≤Umax:=V+R^  ∀i,t,D(t)≤Dmax:=βV+βR^+Pmax  ∀t,U_i(t)\le U_{max}:=V+\hat R\ \ \forall i,t,\qquad D(t)\le D_{max}:=\beta V+\beta\hat R+P_{max}\ \ \forall t,Ui​(t)≤Umax​:=V+R^  ∀i,t,D(t)≤Dmax​:=βV+βR^+Pmax​  ∀t,

and consequently, for every T-slot interval, ∑τ∑iPi(τ)≤Pav⋅T+Dmax,\text{and consequently, for every $T$-slot interval, } \sum_{\tau} \textstyle\sum_i P_i(\tau) \le P_{av}\cdot T+D_{max},and consequently, for every T-slot interval, ∑τ​∑i​Pi​(τ)≤Pav​⋅T+Dmax​, where β>0\beta>0β>0 is the constant in the rate function's marginal-benefit inequality Ci(P,S)≤Ci(P[i],S)+βPiC_i(P,S)\le C_i(P^{[i]},S)+\beta P_iCi​(P,S)≤Ci​(P[i],S)+βPi​ (P[i]P^{[i]}P[i] being PPP with its iii-th entry zeroed). These bounds hold for every topology state process S(t)S(t)S(t) and every admissible arrival process A(t)A(t)A(t), on every sample path — the weakest, most general level, with no distributional assumption whatsoever on either process.

Significance

Theorem 6.3 gives a hard, deterministic worst-case guarantee — every queue in the system, actual or virtual, is bounded by an explicit closed-form constant on every single slot, not merely on average or asymptotically — which is exactly the kind of guarantee a resource-constrained embedded or battery-powered device needs: a device can be provisioned with buffer and battery-reserve capacity of the theorem's own UmaxU_{max}Umax​, DmaxD_{max}Dmax​ and know, with certainty rather than in expectation, that it will never overflow. The corollary that no TTT-slot interval spends more than Pav⋅T+DmaxP_{av}\cdot T+D_{max}Pav​⋅T+Dmax​ in energy translates directly into a battery-lifetime guarantee. This is also, methodologically, the one point in the whole book's drift-plus-penalty method where an elementary induction — not a probabilistic Lyapunov drift argument — suffices, because ECCA's flow control rule directly caps Ui(t)U_i(t)Ui​(t) regardless of what the channel or arrivals do.

Formalizing it. No result in this mission has a machine-checked proof anywhere; nothing adjacent exists on the platform (searched for virtual queue, energy-constrained control, power allocation — no faithful hits; one unrelated coincidental keyword match in a neural-coding combinatorics item was checked and is not relevant). This mission is the first formalization of the ECCA performance guarantee.

Difficulty

The obvious first idea is to bound Ui(t)U_i(t)Ui​(t) and D(t)D(t)D(t) by unrolling their recursions and applying a probabilistic drift argument, as in every other capstone in this series. This is unnecessary and would in fact obscure the actual mechanism: Ui(t)≤UmaxU_i(t)\le U_{max}Ui​(t)≤Umax​ follows from a two-case induction that needs no probability at all — if Ui(t)≤VU_i(t)\le VUi​(t)≤V, the flow control rule admits at most R^\hat RR^ more, giving Ui(t+1)≤V+R^U_i(t{+}1)\le V+\hat RUi​(t+1)≤V+R^; if Ui(t)>VU_i(t)>VUi​(t)>V, flow control drops everything, so Ui(t+1)≤Ui(t)≤UmaxU_i(t{+}1)\le U_i(t)\le U_{max}Ui​(t+1)≤Ui​(t)≤Umax​ by the induction hypothesis. The harder part is D(t)≤DmaxD(t)\le D_{max}D(t)≤Dmax​: it requires connecting the virtual queue's own accumulation to the fact that the power-allocation optimization (6.14) will stop spending power on link iii once D(t)D(t)D(t) grows past Ui(t)⋅βU_i(t)\cdot\betaUi​(t)⋅β — a consequence of P(t)P(t)P(t)'s optimality for (6.14) together with the β\betaβ-inequality on CiC_iCi​, not a property one can read off the DDD-recursion alone.

Formalization scope

The power-allocation rule is stated as an explicit optimality hypothesis (hPopt): for every competing power vector P′P'P′ respecting the budget, the objective (6.14) at the chosen P(t)P(t)P(t) is at least as large — the faithful rendering of "P(t)P(t)P(t) is chosen to maximize (6.14)" without needing Lean's argmax/IsMaxOn machinery. The rate function's β\betaβ-inequality is stated exactly as the book gives it, using Function.update P i 0 for P[i]P^{[i]}P[i]. Out of scope for this mission: the throughput conclusion under i.i.d. A(t),S(t)A(t), S(t)A(t),S(t) (an expectation/liminf statement, unlike the rest of this theorem, needing the same conditional-expectation machinery as the other chapters' capstones) and Theorem 6.2 (the general GCLC framework this specializes, which needs Assumptions 1-4's four simultaneous existential clauses over an "S-only" policy) — both left for a future mission. A trivializing formalization to rule out: weakening the two sample-path conclusions to a limsup/expectation-style bound (the convention used elsewhere in this series) would misstate this theorem, whose entire distinguishing content is that the bounds hold for every time slot and every sample path, not merely in the long run.

Selected references

  • Georgiadis, Neely & Tassiulas, Resource Allocation and Cross-Layer Control in Wireless Networks, Foundations and Trends in Networking, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2006), pp. 1-144. https://doi.org/10.1561/1300000001
  • Neely, "Energy optimal control for time-varying wireless networks", IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 52(7), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1109/TIT.2006.876219
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Resource Allocation and Cross-Layer Control in Wireless Networks III: Lyapunov Optimization for Utility and FairnessTextbook

Motivation

Chapters 3-4 of Georgiadis, Neely & Tassiulas's survey Resource Allocation and Cross-Layer Control in Wireless Networks (Foundations and Trends in Networking, 2006) answer "can the network stay stable?" — the backpressure algorithm's throughput optimality (Theorem 4.5) says yes, for any arrival rate inside the capacity region. But networks are usually operated with plenty of unused capacity precisely so that they can also serve a second goal: maximizing some concave utility (throughput, fairness, revenue) of the rates actually delivered. Answering "how close to utility-optimal can a stable policy get, and at what congestion cost?" needs a single theorem that treats stability and utility optimization in one drift analysis. Theorem 5.4, adapted from Neely, Modiano & Li [108], Georgiadis, Neely & Tassiulas [115] and Neely [116], is that theorem, and it is the technique — "Lyapunov optimization" or "drift-plus-penalty" — behind a large fraction of the cross-layer control literature that followed this book.

Setting

A network of NNN queues has backlog vector U(t)=(U1(t),…,UN(t))U(t)=(U_1(t),\dots,U_N(t))U(t)=(U1​(t),…,UN​(t)), and a KKK-dimensional control process R(t)=(R1(t),…,RK(t))R(t)=(R_1(t),\dots,R_K(t))R(t)=(R1​(t),…,RK​(t)) influencing the system's dynamics (e.g. admitted data rates). For any nonnegative function LLL of the backlog vector, the one-step Lyapunov drift is Δ(U(t)):=E{L(U(t+1))−L(U(t))∣U(t)}\Delta(U(t)):=\mathbb E\{L(U(t{+}1))-L(U(t))\mid U(t)\}Δ(U(t)):=E{L(U(t+1))−L(U(t))∣U(t)}, the expected one-slot change in LLL conditioned on the current backlog. Given any scalar-valued concave utility function ggg of a KKK-dimensional rate vector and an arbitrary target value g∗g^*g∗, the goal is to stabilize U(t)U(t)U(t) while making the time-average utility of R(t)R(t)R(t) close to g∗g^*g∗. The time-average rate vector is r(t):=1t∑τ=0t−1E{R(τ)}r(t):=\frac1t\sum_{\tau=0}^{t-1}\mathbb E\{R(\tau)\}r(t):=t1​∑τ=0t−1​E{R(τ)} (5.18), and the achieved long-run utility is gˉ:=lim sup⁡t→∞1t∑τ=0t−1E{g(R(τ))}\bar g:=\limsup_{t\to\infty}\frac1t\sum_{\tau=0}^{t-1}\mathbb E\{g(R(\tau))\}gˉ​:=limsupt→∞​t1​∑τ=0t−1​E{g(R(τ))}.

Formalization targets

Milestone — Lemma 5.3 (Lyapunov Drift)

Δ(U(t))≤E{y(t)∣U(t)}−E{x(t)∣U(t)} ∀t ⟹ lim sup⁡(avg x)≤lim sup⁡(avg y), lim inf⁡(avg x)≤lim inf⁡(avg y).\Delta(U(t))\le\mathbb E\{y(t)\mid U(t)\}-\mathbb E\{x(t)\mid U(t)\}\ \forall t \ \Longrightarrow\ \limsup(\text{avg }x)\le\limsup(\text{avg }y),\ \liminf(\text{avg }x) \le\liminf(\text{avg }y).Δ(U(t))≤E{y(t)∣U(t)}−E{x(t)∣U(t)} ∀t ⟹ limsup(avg x)≤limsup(avg y), liminf(avg x)≤liminf(avg y).

The most abstract drift lemma in the whole book: x(t),y(t)x(t),y(t)x(t),y(t) are arbitrary scalar processes, not necessarily linear or even a function of U(t)U(t)U(t).

Goal — Theorem 5.4 (Lyapunov Optimization)

Δ(U(t))−V E{g(R(t))∣U(t)}≤B−ε∑i=1NUi(t)−Vg∗ ∀t\Delta(U(t))-V\,\mathbb E\{g(R(t))\mid U(t)\}\le B-\varepsilon\sum_{i=1}^N U_i(t)-Vg^*\ \forall tΔ(U(t))−VE{g(R(t))∣U(t)}≤B−εi=1∑N​Ui​(t)−Vg∗ ∀t ⟹lim sup⁡t→∞1t∑τ∑iE{Ui(τ)}≤B+V(gˉ−g∗)ε,lim inf⁡t→∞g(r(t))≥g∗−BV.\Longrightarrow\quad \limsup_{t\to\infty}\tfrac1t\sum_\tau\sum_i\mathbb E\{U_i(\tau)\}\le\frac{B+V(\bar g-g^*)}\varepsilon, \qquad \liminf_{t\to\infty}g(r(t))\ge g^*-\frac BV.⟹t→∞limsup​t1​τ∑​i∑​E{Ui​(τ)}≤εB+V(gˉ​−g∗)​,t→∞liminf​g(r(t))≥g∗−VB​.

This is the weakest, most general level — a drift-minus-utility condition, checked against an arbitrary target g∗g^*g∗, with no reference to any specific control policy.

Significance

Theorem 5.4 is the abstract engine that every concrete utility-maximizing algorithm in the rest of the chapter (the CLC1 joint flow-control/routing/scheduling algorithm of Theorem 5.1, and its robustness variant under approximate scheduling, Corollary 5.2) instantiates by exhibiting a control rule whose per-slot decision satisfies (5.19) for some V,ε,BV,\varepsilon,BV,ε,B — the drift condition does the work of turning a per-slot optimization rule into a global performance guarantee. Its [O(1/V),O(V)][O(1/V),O(V)][O(1/V),O(V)] tradeoff (utility gap shrinks like 1/V1/V1/V, congestion grows like VVV) is the quantitative signature of every "Lyapunov optimization"/"drift-plus-penalty" algorithm in the cross-layer control literature that followed this book, making Theorem 5.4 the single result a reader needs to understand that entire family of algorithms at once, independent of which specific control problem it is applied to.

Formalizing it. No result in this mission has a machine-checked proof anywhere; nothing adjacent exists on the platform (searched for Lyapunov optimization, drift-plus-penalty, utility fairness, concave utility — no hits at all, not even an adjacent object). This mission is the first formalization of the book's utility-optimization engine.

Difficulty

The central subtlety, flagged explicitly by the book's own notation, is that (5.20) and (5.21) compare two different kinds of quantity that are easy to conflate: gˉ\bar ggˉ​ is a limsup of an expectation of utility, E{g(R(τ))}\mathbb E\{g(R(\tau))\}E{g(R(τ))}, while g(r(t))g(r(t))g(r(t)) in (5.21) is the utility evaluated at the time-averaged expected rate. Jensen's inequality (using ggg's concavity) is exactly what would relate g(E{R(t)})g(\mathbb E\{R(t)\})g(E{R(t)}) to E{g(R(t))}\mathbb E\{g(R(t))\}E{g(R(t))} — and it is not proved or needed by this theorem's own statement, only by later results that connect the two more tightly. A formalization that silently merges these into one "utility" quantity would be proving something the book does not claim. The second trap is the target g∗g^*g∗: it is a free parameter of the hypothesis, not the true optimal utility — the theorem's strength is exactly that it says nothing special about how g∗g^*g∗ was chosen, so a formalization must not add a hidden side condition forcing g∗g^*g∗ to equal a genuine optimum.

Formalization scope

∆(U(t)) is restated locally in this chunk's own sub-namespace (drafts cannot import chunk 04-backpressure's copy), via Mathlib's condExp on the σ-algebra generated by the current backlog vector, exactly as in Chapter 4. Explicit Measurable/Integrable guards on U, R, g∘R and every drift term prevent condExp/∫ from silently defaulting to 0 (a trivializing formalization this mission rules out: without these guards, a non-integrable process would satisfy the hypotheses vacuously and "prove" a stability/utility conclusion for a process that is not actually controlled). r(t) and \bar g are written inline as their defining Cesàro averages rather than as separate named definitions, since each is used exactly once. Out of scope for this mission: Theorem 5.1 (the CLC1 algorithm's concrete instantiation), Corollary 5.2 (the robustness-to-suboptimal-scheduling variant), and Lemma 5.5 (continuity of near-optimal solutions, which needs the capacity region Λ as a hypothesis object). All three need substantially more setup (a named algorithm, or the capacity-region machinery of Chapter 3) than this session's time budget allowed without approximating either — left for a future mission rather than approximated.

Selected references

  • Georgiadis, Neely & Tassiulas, Resource Allocation and Cross-Layer Control in Wireless Networks, Foundations and Trends in Networking, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2006), pp. 1-144. https://doi.org/10.1561/1300000001
  • Neely, Modiano & Li, "Fairness and optimal stochastic control for heterogeneous networks", IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 16(2), 2008. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2007.900405
  • Neely, "Energy optimal control for time-varying wireless networks", IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 52(7), 2006. https://doi.org/10.1109/TIT.2006.876219
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Control TheoryOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Resource Allocation and Cross-Layer Control in Wireless Networks II: The Dynamic Backpressure AlgorithmTextbook

Motivation

Every stability result in Georgiadis, Neely & Tassiulas's survey Resource Allocation and Cross-Layer Control in Wireless Networks (Foundations and Trends in Networking, 2006) — the throughput optimality of the dynamic backpressure algorithm (Theorem 4.5), the utility-optimal Lyapunov drift bound of Chapter 5, the energy-constrained control algorithm of Chapter 6 — is proved the same way: exhibit a drift condition on a quadratic Lyapunov function of the queue backlog vector, then invoke one fixed abstract lemma to conclude stability and an explicit congestion bound. That fixed lemma, Lyapunov drift stability (Lemma 4.1, adapted from Kingman [67], Loynes [87] and Neely, Modiano & Li [110]), is the engine this mission formalizes — the single result the rest of the book's algorithm-specific theorems are instances of.

Setting

A network of LLL queues has backlog vector process U(t)=(U1(t),…,UL(t))U(t)=(U_1(t),\dots,U_L(t))U(t)=(U1​(t),…,UL​(t)) on slots t=0,1,2,…t=0,1,2,\dotst=0,1,2,…, on a common probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega,P)(Ω,P). The quadratic Lyapunov function is L(U(t)):=∑i=1LUi(t)2L(U(t)):=\sum_{i=1}^L U_i(t)^2L(U(t)):=∑i=1L​Ui​(t)2. A single queue's backlog sequence U:N→RU:\mathbb N\to\mathbb RU:N→R (read as E{U(t)}\mathbb E\{U(t)\}E{U(t)}) is strongly stable if lim sup⁡t→∞1t∑τ=0t−1E{U(τ)}<∞\limsup_{t\to\infty}\frac1t\sum_{\tau=0}^{t-1}\mathbb E\{U(\tau)\}<\inftylimsupt→∞​t1​∑τ=0t−1​E{U(τ)}<∞; a network is strongly stable if every one of its LLL queues is. The conditional drift of LLL given the current backlog vector, E{L(U(t+1))−L(U(t))∣U(t)}\mathbb E\{L(U(t+1))-L(U(t))\mid U(t)\}E{L(U(t+1))−L(U(t))∣U(t)}, measures how the aggregate squared backlog is expected to change over one slot, conditioned on where the network currently is — formalized via Mathlib's conditional expectation on the σ\sigmaσ-algebra generated by U(t)U(t)U(t).

Formalization targets

Goal — Lemma 4.1 (Lyapunov Stability)

if ∃ B>0,ε>0, ∀t, E{L(U(t+1))−L(U(t))∣U(t)}≤B−ε∑i=1LUi(t),\text{if } \exists\, B>0,\varepsilon>0,\ \forall t,\ \mathbb E\{L(U(t{+}1))-L(U(t))\mid U(t)\} \le B-\varepsilon\sum_{i=1}^L U_i(t),if ∃B>0,ε>0, ∀t, E{L(U(t+1))−L(U(t))∣U(t)}≤B−εi=1∑L​Ui​(t), then the network is strongly stable and lim sup⁡t→∞1t∑τ=0t−1∑i=1LE{Ui(τ)}≤B/ε.\text{then the network is strongly stable and } \limsup_{t\to\infty}\tfrac1t\sum_{\tau=0}^{t-1}\sum_{i=1}^L\mathbb E\{U_i(\tau)\}\le B/\varepsilon.then the network is strongly stable and t→∞limsup​t1​τ=0∑t−1​i=1∑L​E{Ui​(τ)}≤B/ε.

This is the weakest, most general level: a bounded-outside-a-compact-region drift condition implies both a qualitative stability conclusion and a quantitative congestion bound, with no mention of any particular algorithm, arrival distribution, or network topology.

Milestones

  • Lemma 4.3 (elementary inequality): V≤max⁡[U−μ,0]+A⇒V2≤U2+μ2+A2−2U(μ−A)V\le\max[U-\mu,0]+A \Rightarrow V^2\le U^2+\mu^2+A^2-2U(\mu-A)V≤max[U−μ,0]+A⇒V2≤U2+μ2+A2−2U(μ−A) for nonnegative reals — the per-slot squared-backlog bound the standard proof of Lemma 4.1 instantiates on the queueing recursion.
  • Lemma 4.2 (T-slot Lyapunov drift): the same conclusion as the goal, with the drift measured over a block of TTT slots rather than one — needed whenever a single slot's expected drift can be positive, and the tool the book itself uses (§4.4.1) to re-derive Chapter 3's single-queue admissibility-based stability condition (Lemma 3.6) as a worked demonstration of the method.

Significance

Lyapunov drift stability is the one lemma every later result in this book's method reduces to: Chapter 4's own Theorem 4.5 (backpressure throughput optimality) applies it directly to the dynamic backpressure algorithm's per-slot optimality property; the book explicitly notes ("This drift inequality is in the exact form for application of the Lyapunov drift lemma... proving the result", p. 57) that once a drift bound of this shape is established, the stability conclusion is free. The T-slot version (Lemma 4.2) extends the reach of the method to settings — Markov-modulated channels, non-i.i.d. arrivals — where no single slot need have negative drift.

Formalizing it. No result in this mission has a machine-checked proof anywhere; nothing adjacent exists on the platform (searched for Lyapunov drift, max-weight, differential backlog, backpressure — the one Lyapunov-drift hit, a Foster-Lyapunov hitting-time bound for a finite-state MDP with an absorbing target state, is a different mathematical object from a vector queue backlog with no absorbing state, and is not reused). This mission is the first formalization of the book's stability engine.

Difficulty

The obvious first idea is to bound E{Ui(t)}\mathbb E\{U_i(t)\}E{Ui​(t)} directly via the one-step queueing recursion and telescope. This fails for the same reason it fails in Chapter 3: expectation does not commute with max⁡(⋅,0)\max(\cdot,0)max(⋅,0). Lemma 4.1's actual content is a genuine Foster–Lyapunov drift argument on the aggregate quadratic quantity L(U(t))L(U(t))L(U(t)), not a per-queue linear one — the quadratic form is what turns a one-sided drift condition into a bound on ∑iUi(t)\sum_i U_i(t)∑i​Ui​(t) itself (via the elementary inequality of Lemma 4.3, which converts the linear queueing recursion into a quadratic one that the drift condition directly controls). A second trap is conditioning: the drift bound is conditioned on the current backlog vector U(t)U(t)U(t), not on the full history — a weaker, memoryless form of conditioning that is exactly what makes the lemma apply uniformly to i.i.d., Markov-modulated, and adversarial channel processes alike, provided the algorithm itself is memoryless in the state.

Formalization scope

The Lyapunov-drift hypothesis conditions on the σ-algebra generated by the current backlog vector, MeasurableSpace.comap (U t) inferInstance, via Mathlib's condExp; explicit Measurable/ Integrable guards on U t and on the drift term prevent condExp/∫ from silently defaulting to 0 for a non-measurable or non-integrable process (a trivializing formalization this mission rules out: without those guards, an arbitrary non-integrable backlog process would satisfy the drift hypothesis vacuously and "prove" the theorem for a process that manifestly is not stable). The limsup ≤ B/ε conclusion is stated as ∀ t, (Cesàro average at t) ≤ B/ε rather than via Mathlib's Filter.limsup, matching the standard telescoping proof (which bounds the average for every t, not merely eventually) and avoiding Filter.limsup's junk value on an unbounded sequence in the non-complete lattice ℝ. Out of scope for this mission: the algorithm-specific Theorem 4.5 (dynamic backpressure throughput optimality) and Lemma 4.4 (the single-queue corollary via admissible processes) — the former needs the book's named algorithm plus Chapter 3's capacity region restated as a local hypothesis and the explicit constant B of Eq. (4.12); the latter needs this chunk's own restatement of Chapter 3's admissibility structures. Both are left for a future mission with a larger time budget rather than approximated.

Selected references

  • Georgiadis, Neely & Tassiulas, Resource Allocation and Cross-Layer Control in Wireless Networks, Foundations and Trends in Networking, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2006), pp. 1-144. https://doi.org/10.1561/1300000001
  • Neely, Modiano & Li, "Fairness and optimal stochastic control for heterogeneous networks", IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 16(2), 2008. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2007.900405
  • Loynes, "The stability of a queue with non-independent inter-arrival and service times", Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, 58(3), 1962. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305004100036781
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Convex OptimizationMachine Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Introduction to Online Convex Optimization VI: Bandit Convex Optimization via Gradient EstimationTextbook

Motivation

Every algorithm in Chapters I–V observes the full cost function ftf_tft​ after playing xtx_txt​. Many applications only reveal the scalar cost ft(xt)f_t(x_t)ft​(xt​) incurred — routing a network and observing total latency, or placing an ad and observing the click-through revenue, without ever seeing the cost of a path or bid not taken. This is the bandit feedback model, and Chapter 6 asks whether sublinear regret survives it. The chapter's answer is a general two-part reduction — turn a first-order full-information algorithm into a bandit algorithm by feeding it an unbiased gradient estimator built from a single scalar observation — instantiated concretely on online gradient descent to produce the first historical bandit convex optimization algorithm, the FKM algorithm (Flaxman–Kalai–McMahan).

Setting

Let K⊆RnK \subseteq \mathbb R^nK⊆Rn be the decision set, containing the unit ball centered at 000, with diameter at most DDD. At each round t=1,…,Tt = 1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T the player picks yt∈Ky_t \in Kyt​∈K, an adversary has fixed a cost function ftf_tft​ (Lipschitz constant GGG, bounded by 111 in absolute value on KKK), and the player observes only the scalar ft(yt)f_t(y_t)ft​(yt​) — never ftf_tft​ itself or its gradient. Regret is ∑t=1Tft(yt)−min⁡x∈K∑t=1Tft(x)\sum_{t=1}^T f_t(y_t) - \min_{x\in K}\sum_{t=1}^T f_t(x)∑t=1T​ft​(yt​)−minx∈K​∑t=1T​ft​(x), exactly as in the full-information setting, but now the algorithm's plays are themselves random (they depend on the sampled gradient estimates), so the guarantee is on expected regret.

The chapter's construction has two independent parts. Part 1 (Lemma 6.5) is a black-box reduction: given any first order full-information algorithm AAA (Definition 6.4 — one that depends on each cost function only through its gradient at the played point) with a full-information regret bound BA(∇f1(x1),…,∇fT(xT))B_A(\nabla f_1(x_1),\dots,\nabla f_T(x_T))BA​(∇f1​(x1​),…,∇fT​(xT​)), feeding AAA an unbiased estimator gtg_tgt​ of ∇ft(xt)\nabla f_t(x_t)∇ft​(xt​) in place of the true gradient preserves the regret bound in expectation, up to BAB_ABA​ evaluated at the estimators instead of the true gradients. Part 2 (Lemma 6.7) supplies such an estimator using only one scalar observation per round: sample uuu uniformly from the unit sphere, play y=x+δuy = x + \delta uy=x+δu for a small radius δ\deltaδ, and g=nδf(y)ug = \frac{n}{\delta} f(y)ug=δn​f(y)u is (for linear fff) an unbiased estimator of ∇f(x)\nabla f(x)∇f(x) — more precisely, an unbiased estimator of the gradient of fff's δ\deltaδ-smoothed version f^δ(x)=Ev∈B[f(x+δv)]\hat f_\delta(x) = \mathbb E_{v\in B}[f(x+\delta v)]f^​δ​(x)=Ev∈B​[f(x+δv)], by a Stokes'-theorem identity relating a ball integral to a sphere integral.

Formalization targets

Lemma 6.5 (the reduction, milestone)

E[∑t=1Tft(xt)]−∑t=1Tft(u)≤E[BA(g1,…,gT)]\mathbb E\Big[\sum_{t=1}^T f_t(x_t)\Big] - \sum_{t=1}^T f_t(u) \le \mathbb E[B_A(g_1,\dots,g_T)]E[t=1∑T​ft​(xt​)]−t=1∑T​ft​(u)≤E[BA​(g1​,…,gT​)]

for any fixed u∈Ku \in Ku∈K, any first order algorithm AAA with full-information bound BAB_ABA​, and any sequence of estimators gtg_tgt​ with E[gt∣history through round t]=∇ft(xt)\mathbb E[g_t \mid \text{history through round } t] = \nabla f_t(x_t)E[gt​∣history through round t]=∇ft​(xt​).

Lemma 6.7 (the spherical estimator identity, milestone)

Eu∈S[f(x+δu) u]=δn∇f^δ(x).\mathbb E_{u\in S}[f(x+\delta u)\,u] = \frac{\delta}{n}\nabla \hat f_\delta(x).Eu∈S​[f(x+δu)u]=nδ​∇f^​δ​(x).

Theorem 6.9 — the mission's goal

The FKM algorithm (Algorithm 23: play yt=xt+δuty_t = x_t + \delta u_tyt​=xt​+δut​, form gt=nδft(yt)utg_t = \frac n\delta f_t(y_t)u_tgt​=δn​ft​(yt​)ut​, update xt+1=ΠKδ[xt−ηgt]x_{t+1} = \Pi_{K_\delta}[x_t - \eta g_t]xt+1​=ΠKδ​​[xt​−ηgt​] on the shrunk set Kδ={z∣(1−δ)−1z∈K}K_\delta = \{z \mid (1-\delta)^{-1}z \in K\}Kδ​={z∣(1−δ)−1z∈K}) with η=D/(nT3/4)\eta = D/(nT^{3/4})η=D/(nT3/4), δ=1/T1/4\delta = 1/T^{1/4}δ=1/T1/4 guarantees

∑t=1TE[ft(yt)]−min⁡x∈K∑t=1Tft(x)≤9nDGT3/4=O(T3/4).\sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb E[f_t(y_t)] - \min_{x\in K}\sum_{t=1}^T f_t(x) \le 9nDGT^{3/4} = O(T^{3/4}).t=1∑T​E[ft​(yt​)]−x∈Kmin​t=1∑T​ft​(x)≤9nDGT3/4=O(T3/4).

Significance

Theorem 6.9's O(T3/4)O(T^{3/4})O(T3/4) rate is strictly worse than the O(T)O(\sqrt T)O(T​) rate of full-information online gradient descent (Chapter III) — this gap, not a shared rate, is the chapter's real content: bandit feedback provably costs regret, and the FKM algorithm is the historically first algorithm to pin down how much, via the clean two-part reduction that later chapters' improved bandit algorithms (§6.5's self-concordant-barrier method, not formalized here) all refine. Lemma 6.5 is independently reusable: it is a template, quantified over an arbitrary first-order algorithm AAA and an arbitrary unbiased-estimator family, not tied to the sphere-sampling construction that instantiates it for Theorem 6.9. No prior art was found on the platform for bandit convex optimization, gradient-free methods, or Frank–Wolfe-style estimators; this mission's three items formalize the standard textbook account fresh.

Difficulty

Lemma 6.5's proof is a martingale-style argument: it introduces auxiliary deterministic functions ht(x)=ft(x)+ξt⊤xh_t(x) = f_t(x) + \xi_t^\top xht​(x)=ft​(x)+ξt⊤​x (where ξt=gt−∇ft(xt)\xi_t = g_t - \nabla f_t(x_t)ξt​=gt​−∇ft​(xt​)) whose gradient at xtx_txt​ is exactly gtg_tgt​, applies AAA's full-information bound to the hth_tht​'s (a genuinely random cost sequence, since ξt\xi_tξt​ is random), and then takes expectations, using unbiasedness (E[ξt∣history]=0\mathbb E[\xi_t \mid \text{history}] = 0E[ξt​∣history]=0) to show E[ht(xt)]=E[ft(xt)]\mathbb E[h_t(x_t)] = \mathbb E[f_t(x_t)]E[ht​(xt​)]=E[ft​(xt​)] and E[ht(u)]=ft(u)\mathbb E[h_t(u)] = f_t(u)E[ht​(u)]=ft​(u) for the fixed comparator uuu. This requires a genuine filtration and conditional expectation, not merely an unconditional expectation, since xtx_txt​ and gtg_tgt​ are themselves random and adapted to different points in the history. Lemma 6.7's proof invokes Stokes' theorem to relate ∇∫Bδf(x+v) dv\nabla \int_{B_\delta} f(x+v)\,dv∇∫Bδ​​f(x+v)dv to ∫Sδf(x+u)u∥u∥ du\int_{S_\delta} f(x+u)\frac{u}{\|u\|}\,du∫Sδ​​f(x+u)∥u∥u​du, then uses the volume ratio voln(Bδ)/voln−1(Sδ)=δ/n\mathrm{vol}_n(B_\delta)/\mathrm{vol}_{n-1}(S_\delta) = \delta/nvoln​(Bδ​)/voln−1​(Sδ​)=δ/n — a calculus fact about Euclidean balls and spheres, not itself re-derived in this mission's Lean (the identity is drafted as the statement Lemma 6.7 asserts, to be proved from Mathlib's own ball/sphere volume and divergence-theorem lemmas).

Formalization scope

IsFirstOrderOnlineAlgorithm formalizes only the substitution property of Definition 6.4 (the book's second bullet); the first bullet, a closure condition on the admissible family of loss functions, is a precondition on AAA's domain rather than a checkable mathematical property and is not formalized — see MODERATION_NOTES.md. SmoothedFunction (Eq. (6.4)) and IsUniformOnUnitSphere are declared once and shared by both milestones and the goal, rather than re-derived inline. Lemma 6.5's history is modeled by an explicit filtration 𝓕 (with x t adapted to 𝓕 t and g t to 𝓕 (t+1)), since Lean's conditional expectation needs a concrete σ-algebra to condition on; the book's informal "history x1,f1,…,xt,ftx_1,f_1,\dots,x_t,f_tx1​,f1​,…,xt​,ft​" is exactly this filtration once the (deterministic) fτf_\taufτ​'s are set aside as carrying no randomness. Kδ, the shrunk decision set Algorithm 23 actually projects onto, is kept a separate object from K throughout (a pitfall the chapter brief flags explicitly), and min⁡x∈K\min_{x\in K}minx∈K​ in Theorem 6.9 is rendered as an infimum, checked non-vacuous since KKK is nonempty and the objective is bounded below on KKK by the chapter's own ∣ft∣≤1|f_t|\le 1∣ft​∣≤1 assumption.

Not formalized: §6.5's self-concordant-barrier bandit linear optimization algorithm (starred, out of the recommended goal's scope) and Corollary 6.8's ellipsoidal-sampling generalization (a routine corollary of Lemma 6.7 the book itself derives, not independently central).

Selected references

  • E. Hazan, Introduction to Online Convex Optimization, 2nd ed., arXiv:1909.05207v3, Chapter 6.
  • A. Flaxman, A. Kalai, H.B. McMahan, "Online convex optimization in the bandit setting: gradient descent without a gradient," SODA 2005.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Cross-licensing in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Manufacturers II: Every Innovation Equilibrium Is a Downstream Duopoly, Boundary or InteriorResearch Paper

Motivation

In industries built on a key component sold by one dominant supplier, such as smartphone chipsets, the supplier's contract terms shape how much its downstream customers innovate. Some suppliers require their customers to cross-license their own patents to each other as a condition of buying the component, so that each manufacturer's innovation also improves its rival's product. Wang, Huang and Lee (SSRN 3053682; published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2023, doi:10.1287/msom.2019.0477) ask when a supplier facing two manufacturers of unequal innovation ability benefits from imposing cross-licensing. Their answer runs through the equilibrium of the manufacturers' innovation game, which is the subject of this mission: Proposition 2 describes how much each manufacturer innovates and shows that the supplier never ends up selling to a single manufacturer.

Setting

A supplier sells a component at wholesale price r≥0r \ge 0r≥0 to manufacturers M1M_1M1​ and M2M_2M2​. Manufacturer MiM_iMi​ chooses a quality improvement Ti≥0T_i \ge 0Ti​≥0 at cost kiTi2k_iT_i^2ki​Ti2​. With cross-licensing of effectiveness β∈[0,1]\beta \in [0, 1]β∈[0,1], the quality improvement of MiM_iMi​ is Ti+βTjT_i + \beta T_jTi​+βTj​ (j≠ij \ne ij=i), and its inverse demand is pi=1+Ti+βTj−qi−qjp_i = 1 + T_i + \beta T_j - q_i - q_jpi​=1+Ti​+βTj​−qi​−qj​. The standing assumptions are

0≤β≤1,49144<k2<k1,0 \le \beta \le 1, \qquad \tfrac{49}{144} < k_2 < k_1,0≤β≤1,14449​<k2​<k1​,

so M2M_2M2​ is the superior manufacturer. The game has three stages.

  1. Quantities. Given (T1,T2)(T_1, T_2)(T1​,T2​) and rrr, each MiM_iMi​ chooses qi≥0q_i \ge 0qi​≥0 to maximize Πi=(1+Ti+βTj−qi−qj−r)qi\Pi_i = (1 + T_i + \beta T_j - q_i - q_j - r)q_iΠi​=(1+Ti​+βTj​−qi​−qj​−r)qi​ (display (1)). The equilibrium quantities, display (2), are a duopoly when rrr is low and a monopoly of the manufacturer with the higher quality when rrr is higher.
  2. Price. The supplier chooses r≥0r \ge 0r≥0 to maximize r(q1+q2)r(q_1 + q_2)r(q1​+q2​). Its price r∗(T1,T2)r^*(T_1, T_2)r∗(T1​,T2​) is the least maximizer. Lemma 1 computes it: the supplier induces a duopoly exactly when β≥3−1\beta \ge \sqrt3 - 1β≥3​−1 or T2≤T^2(T1∣β)T_2 \le \hat T_2(T_1\mid\beta)T2​≤T^2​(T1​∣β), where
T^2(T1∣β)=2−3+T1(1−β(3−1))3−1−β.\hat T_2(T_1\mid\beta) = \frac{2 - \sqrt3 + T_1(1 - \beta(\sqrt3 - 1))}{\sqrt3 - 1 - \beta}.T^2​(T1​∣β)=3​−1−β2−3​+T1​(1−β(3​−1))​.
  1. Innovation. Each MiM_iMi​ chooses Ti≥0T_i \ge 0Ti​≥0 to maximize Πi∗(T1,T2∣β)−kiTi2\Pi^*_i(T_1, T_2\mid\beta) - k_iT_i^2Πi∗​(T1​,T2​∣β)−ki​Ti2​, where Πi∗\Pi^*_iΠi∗​ is its Cournot profit at the supplier's price. An innovation equilibrium is a pure Nash equilibrium of this game.

The proof of Proposition 2 defines two candidate profiles in closed form: the interior candidate TI=(T1I,T2I)T^I = (T^I_1, T^I_2)TI=(T1I​,T2I​), which solves both manufacturers' first-order conditions, and the boundary candidate TB=(T1B,T2B)T^B = (T^B_1, T^B_2)TB=(T1B​,T2B​), where M2M_2M2​ invests exactly up to T^2\hat T_2T^2​. A threshold k^2(k1∣β)\hat k_2(k_1\mid\beta)k^2​(k1​∣β) separates them, and T∗(β)=TBT^*(\beta) = T^BT∗(β)=TB if k2<k^2(k1∣β)k_2 < \hat k_2(k_1\mid\beta)k2​<k^2​(k1​∣β), T∗(β)=TIT^*(\beta) = T^IT∗(β)=TI otherwise.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2 (p. 12)

Under the standing assumptions:

  1. every innovation equilibrium is a duopoly, meaning both manufacturers sell a positive quantity at the supplier's price;
  2. T∗(β)T^*(\beta)T∗(β) is an innovation equilibrium and a duopoly;
  3. if k2<k^2(k1∣β)k_2 < \hat k_2(k_1\mid\beta)k2​<k^2​(k1​∣β), then β<3−1\beta < \sqrt3 - 1β<3​−1 and M2M_2M2​ is on the boundary:
T2∗=T^2(T1∗∣β);T^*_2 = \hat T_2(T^*_1\mid\beta);T2∗​=T^2​(T1∗​∣β);
  1. if k2≥k^2(k1∣β)k_2 \ge \hat k_2(k_1\mid\beta)k2​≥k^2​(k1​∣β), then T∗(β)=TIT^*(\beta) = T^IT∗(β)=TI and both duopoly first-order conditions hold at T∗(β)T^*(\beta)T∗(β).

Milestones

  • display (2): the Cournot quantities are the unique equilibrium of the quantity game;
  • Lemma 1: the supplier's price, the regime, its optimal profit, and the gross profits Π1∗,Π2∗\Pi^*_1, \Pi^*_2Π1∗​,Π2∗​;
  • monopoly infeasibility at T1=0T_1 = 0T1​=0, from the proof (p. A.1): M2M_2M2​'s monopoly optimum 1/(16k2−1)1/(16k_2 - 1)1/(16k2​−1) lies below T^2(0∣β)\hat T_2(0\mid\beta)T^2​(0∣β);
  • TIT^ITI is the unique solution of the two first-order conditions (p. A.1);
  • T2B=T^2(T1B∣β)T^B_2 = \hat T_2(T^B_1\mid\beta)T2B​=T^2​(T1B​∣β), and T1BT^B_1T1B​ is M1M_1M1​'s best response to T2BT^B_2T2B​ (p. A.1);
  • k^2\hat k_2k^2​ is where T2I=T2BT^I_2 = T^B_2T2I​=T2B​, and above it TIT^ITI lies in the duopoly region (p. A.2);
  • k^2(k1∣β)\hat k_2(k_1\mid\beta)k^2​(k1​∣β) is strictly decreasing in β\betaβ with k^2(k1∣1)=0\hat k_2(k_1\mid 1) = 0k^2​(k1​∣1)=0 (p. A.2), so the boundary region shrinks to empty as β\betaβ grows.

Significance

Proposition 2 is the paper's equilibrium characterization. Proposition 3 is its instance β=0\beta = 0β=0 (no cross-licensing), and Proposition 4 compares the supplier's equilibrium profits with and without cross-licensing on the closed forms TBT^BTB, TIT^ITI and k^2\hat k_2k^2​ established here. The economic content is that, under cross-licensing, the supplier always ends up selling to both manufacturers. When the superior manufacturer's cost advantage is large it caps its own innovation exactly where the supplier stops preferring a monopoly.

The paper's proof states the closed forms and asserts the checks ("one can obtain", "we verify"). This mission produces a machine-checked version: a complete definition of the three-stage game, with the supplier's price defined as an optimization rather than by its solution, and the equilibrium claims stated against that game. To our knowledge no part of this result has been formalized before.

Difficulty

The innovation payoff of the superior manufacturer is discontinuous. When T2T_2T2​ moves just above T^2(T1∣β)\hat T_2(T_1\mid\beta)T^2​(T1​∣β), the supplier switches from a duopoly price to a monopoly price, and M2M_2M2​'s gross profit jumps down. A first-order argument therefore does not show that T∗T^*T∗ is an equilibrium. One must also show that M2M_2M2​ never gains by moving into the monopoly region, and that M1M_1M1​ never gains by deviating above T2T_2T2​, where M1M_1M1​ itself becomes the potential monopolist. The boundary candidate is an equilibrium only because the supplier breaks its indifference at the boundary toward the duopoly.

Part 1 quantifies over every equilibrium, not only T∗T^*T∗. The paper checks monopoly infeasibility only at T1=0T_1 = 0T1​=0, so the general case needs its own argument. The equilibrium is not unique: for some parameters a mirrored profile with M1M_1M1​ at its own boundary is also an equilibrium. Uniqueness is therefore not claimed. The remaining steps are polynomial and rational inequalities in (k1,k2,β)(k_1, k_2, \beta)(k1​,k2​,β) involving 3\sqrt33​.

Formalization scope

  • Parameters β,k1,k2\beta, k_1, k_2β,k1​,k2​ are real numbers. The standing assumptions 0≤β≤10 \le \beta \le 10≤β≤1 and 49/144<k2<k149/144 < k_2 < k_149/144<k2​<k1​ are bundled as Standing β k1 k2.
  • Quantities and innovation levels range over R≥0\mathbb R_{\ge 0}R≥0​ (NNReal). Equilibria use the published two-player predicate CompetingChains.Cournot.IsPureNash.
  • Wholesale prices range over [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞). The paper leaves this implicit, so it is a disclosed addition.
  • Display (2) is encoded in symmetric form, with the manufacturer of larger quality as the possible monopolist. The paper prints it for T2≥T1T_2 \ge T_1T2​≥T1​, but deviations in the innovation game reach T1>T2T_1 > T_2T1​>T2​.
  • The supplier's price is the least maximizer of r(q1+q2)r(q_1 + q_2)r(q1​+q2​) over r≥0r \ge 0r≥0. This is the tie-break Lemma 1 uses at T2=T^2T_2 = \hat T_2T2​=T^2​.
  • First-order conditions are stated as derivatives (HasDerivAt … 0) of Lemma 1's duopoly polynomials, because the game payoff is not differentiable at the boundary.
  • All closed forms are transcribed as printed, with 3\sqrt33​ as Real.sqrt 3. Every denominator is proved nonzero in its regime, never assumed.

Two trivializing formalizations are ruled out. Equilibria are never defined by first-order conditions or by the closed forms, and the supplier's price is never defined by Lemma 1's case rule. Both are theorems here.

The source is the authors' SSRN manuscript (abstract 3053682, version of 2023-04-27); its proofs are in the appendix, pp. A.1–A.9. The paper's equivalent threshold β^(k1,k2)\hat\beta(k_1, k_2)β^​(k1​,k2​) is not formalized. Proofs of any milestone are welcome. Lemma 1 and display (2) are self-contained, and the closed-form milestones need only real-algebraic inequalities with 3\sqrt33​.

Selected references

  • J. Wang, T. Huang, H. Lee, Cross-licensing in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Manufacturers, SSRN 3053682, version of 2023-04-27. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3053682
  • J. Wang, T. Huang, H. Lee, Cross-licensing in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Manufacturers, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2019.0477
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Improving Access to Rare Disease Treatments: Subsidy, Pricing, and Payment Schemes II: Consortium Price, No Cure No Pay: Subsidize Only Patients When the Price Is High, Only the Manufacturer When LowResearch Paper

Motivation

A rare disease affects few patients, so a drug for it has a small market and its research and development (R&D) cost is spread over few sales. Governments respond with two kinds of subsidy: cost subsidies that pay part of the manufacturer's R&D bill (orphan drug programmes), and price subsidies that pay part of what each patient is charged. At the same time two practices change how drugs are priced and paid for. In some markets an independent consortium negotiates the price instead of the manufacturer, and some manufacturers offer outcome-based payment ("No Cure No Pay", as in a programme of Bristol-Myers Squibb), under which the patient pays only if the drug works.

W. Olsder, T. Martagan and C. S. Tang ask how a government with a fixed budget should divide it between the manufacturer and the patients under each pricing and payment regime. This mission formalizes their analysis of the regime with a consortium price and outcome-based payment, Setting (2B) of the paper, where the answer depends on the price: for a high price only patients should be subsidized, and for a low price only the manufacturer. The source is the SSRN working paper 3481150 (version of 2019-11-13); the article later appeared in Management Science (2023) with possibly different numbering, which is not used here.

Setting

The market has size one. A patient's valuation VVV of an efficacious drug is uniform on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. The model has three positive primitives: the R&D cost scale kkk, the government's budget BBB, and the unit price ppp, which the consortium fixes and which lies in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1).

  • A subsidy policy is a pair (α,β)(\alpha,\beta)(α,β) with α∈[0,1)\alpha\in[0,1)α∈[0,1) and β∈[0,1)\beta\in[0,1)β∈[0,1). The government pays the share α\alphaα of the R&D cost and the share β\betaβ of the unit price.
  • The manufacturer chooses a target efficacy e>0e>0e>0, the probability that the drug works, at R&D cost ke2ke^2ke2. Under outcome-based payment it is paid ppp per patient only when the drug works, and the demand is 1−(1−β)p1-(1-\beta)p1−(1−β)p. Its profit, the bracket of the paper's (9), is
πm(e)=e p [1−(1−β)p]−(1−α)ke2.\pi_m(e)=e\,p\,[1-(1-\beta)p]-(1-\alpha)ke^2 .πm​(e)=ep[1−(1−β)p]−(1−α)ke2.

A best response to (α,β)(\alpha,\beta)(α,β) is a maximizer of πm\pi_mπm​ over e>0e>0e>0.

  • At efficacy eee the patient welfare (7) and the government spending, the left-hand side of the budget constraint in (10), are
W=12 e (1−(1−β)p)2,M=αke2+e βp [1−(1−β)p].W=\tfrac12\,e\,(1-(1-\beta)p)^2,\qquad M=\alpha k e^2+e\,\beta p\,[1-(1-\beta)p].W=21​e(1−(1−β)p)2,M=αke2+eβp[1−(1−β)p].
  • A policy is optimal when it has a best response at which M≤BM\le BM≤B and its welfare there is at least the welfare of every other policy at each of that policy's best responses with M≤BM\le BM≤B.
  • αmax⁡\alpha_{\max}αmax​ is the largest α∈[0,1)\alpha\in[0,1)α∈[0,1) for which the policy (α,0)(\alpha,0)(α,0) is affordable at the manufacturer's best response.

The Lean development names these objects IsPolicy, profit, BR, welfare, spend, IsOptimal and IsAlphaMax, in the namespace RareDisease.ExogOutcome.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3, parts 1 and 3

For k>0k>0k>0, B>0B>0B>0, 0<p<10<p<10<p<1 and αmax⁡\alpha_{\max}αmax​ as above:

  1. At every optimal policy the budget constraint binds: M=BM=BM=B at the best response.
  2. If
p ≥ 25−αmax⁡andB<p22k,p\ \ge\ \frac{2}{5-\alpha_{\max}}\quad\text{and}\quad B<\frac{p^2}{2k},p ≥ 5−αmax​2​andB<2kp2​,

then there is a β1\beta_1β1​ such that (0,β1)(0,\beta_1)(0,β1​) is optimal and every optimal policy equals (0,β1)(0,\beta_1)(0,β1​). Only patients are subsidized. 3. If

p ≤ 2(1−αmax⁡)5,p\ \le\ \frac{2(1-\alpha_{\max})}{5},p ≤ 52(1−αmax​)​,

then (αmax⁡,0)(\alpha_{\max},0)(αmax​,0) is optimal, every optimal policy equals it, and

αmax⁡=8Bk+p4−2p3+p2−(p−p2)16Bk+p4−2p3+p28Bk.\alpha_{\max}=\frac{8Bk+p^4-2p^3+p^2-(p-p^2)\sqrt{16Bk+p^4-2p^3+p^2}}{8Bk}.αmax​=8Bk8Bk+p4−2p3+p2−(p−p2)16Bk+p4−2p3+p2​​.

Only the manufacturer is subsidized.

The thresholds are the printed ones. They are not the sharpest possible (see Formalization scope), but they are what the paper states.

Milestones

In attack order: the best response (19), e∗=p(1−(1−β)p)/(2(1−α)k)e^*=p(1-(1-\beta)p)/(2(1-\alpha)k)e∗=p(1−(1−β)p)/(2(1−α)k); the reduced problem (20), giving welfare and spending at the best response; the fact that both expressions of (20) are increasing in α\alphaα and in β\betaβ; and the marginal-rate identity from the proof of Proposition 3 (Appendix C, p. 37), whose sign is that of (5−α)p−2(1−α)(5-\alpha)p-2(1-\alpha)(5−α)p−2(1−α).

Significance

The result splits the decision between subsidizing patients and subsidizing the manufacturer by a single comparison of the consortium's price with thresholds that depend only on the budget and the cost scale. For a policy maker the consequence is concrete. A high negotiated price already gives the manufacturer enough incentive to develop an efficacious drug, so every unit of budget should lower what patients pay. A low price leaves the manufacturer short of incentive, so every unit should go to R&D. Splitting the budget is never optimal in either regime.

The formalization adds three things. First, it checks a statement whose printed form has errors. Part 2 of the proposition, "subsidize both" for intermediate prices, is false as printed: B=0.05B=0.05B=0.05, k=0.3k=0.3k=0.3, p=0.2p=0.2p=0.2 lies in the printed middle range, yet the unique optimum is manufacturer-only. The printed closed form for the patient subsidy in part 1 does not satisfy the binding budget constraint. Second, the proof in the paper is a marginal argument along the binding curve, and its extremal step takes a maximum over α\alphaα at the wrong end; the parts posed here stay true because their thresholds are stronger than needed, which a machine-checked proof makes explicit. Third, the game is stated as a game: the government's problem is posed over the manufacturer's best-response set, not over the reduced formulas, so the reduction (19)–(20) is itself a theorem. None of these results has a machine-checked proof yet.

Difficulty

The reduced problem (20) is a two-variable optimization with a nonlinear constraint, and its feasible region has no simple shape. The obvious first idea is to solve the first-order conditions of the Lagrangian, but the optimum of parts 1 and 3 is on the boundary of the policy square (α=0\alpha=0α=0 or β=0\beta=0β=0), so stationarity says nothing there. What has to be shown instead is a global sign property along the whole binding curve: trading manufacturer subsidy for patient subsidy changes welfare per unit of spending with the sign of (5−α)p−2(1−α)(5-\alpha)p-2(1-\alpha)(5−α)p−2(1−α), and this sign must be controlled for every α\alphaα the curve passes through. That requires knowing that the curve stays in α≤αmax⁡\alpha\le\alpha_{\max}α≤αmax​, which comes from the monotonicity of spending. Two existence and uniqueness questions also arise. In part 1 a patient-only policy must exhaust the budget with β<1\beta<1β<1, which is where B<p2/(2k)B<p^2/(2k)B<p2/(2k) enters. In both parts no other policy may tie the optimum.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real numbers. The standing assumptions k>0k>0k>0, B>0B>0B>0 and 0<p<10<p<10<p<1 are hypotheses of every theorem. The paper uses them without stating them: with p≥1p\ge1p≥1 and β=0\beta=0β=0 the demand 1−p1-p1−p is not positive and the manufacturer has no best response with e>0e>0e>0; the closed form of αmax⁡\alpha_{\max}αmax​ divides by 8Bk8Bk8Bk. As in the paper, the efficacy eee ranges over all positive reals and is not bounded by 111. Policies satisfy α,β∈[0,1)\alpha,\beta\in[0,1)α,β∈[0,1), a half-open interval.

The added hypothesis B<p2/(2k)B<p^2/(2k)B<p2/(2k) in part 1 is necessary. With α=0\alpha=0α=0 the spending tends to p2/(2k)p^2/(2k)p2/(2k) as β↑1\beta\uparrow1β↑1, so for larger budgets no patient-only policy exhausts the budget. The thresholds 2/(5−αmax⁡)2/(5-\alpha_{\max})2/(5−αmax​) and 2(1−αmax⁡)/52(1-\alpha_{\max})/52(1−αmax​)/5 are posed as printed; replacing them by the sharper values 2/52/52/5 and 2(1−αmax⁡)/(5−αmax⁡)2(1-\alpha_{\max})/(5-\alpha_{\max})2(1−αmax​)/(5−αmax​) would be a different theorem. Part 2 and the printed closed form of part 1 are not posed, because both are false as printed.

The formalization cannot be trivialized by defining the government's problem through the reduced forms (20), because welfare and spending in IsOptimal are evaluated at members of the best-response set BR. "Optimal" means attained and compared against every policy at every best response, not a supremum. αmax⁡\alpha_{\max}αmax​ is defined as the greatest affordable manufacturer-only subsidy, not by its closed form, which is part of the goal.

A complete development needs only real analysis from Mathlib: maximization of a concave quadratic, monotonicity of rational functions, one-variable derivatives for the marginal-rate milestone, and Real.sqrt for the closed form. Proofs of any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • W. Olsder, T. Martagan, C. S. Tang, Improving Access to Rare Disease Treatments: Optimal Subsidies, Pricing, and Payment, SSRN working paper 3481150, version of 2019-11-13. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3481150
  • W. Olsder, T. Martagan, C. S. Tang, Improving Access to Rare Disease Treatments: Subsidy, Pricing, and Payment Schemes, Management Science, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4634
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantum Economic Advantage: A Quantum Computing Firm Can Out-Invest a Cheaper-to-Scale Classical Rival in Subgame-Perfect EquilibriumResearch Paper

Why investment can reverse a cost advantage

Quantum algorithms can reduce the work needed for some computations, but a provider also has to build hardware capable of serving a market. Bova, Goldfarb, and Melko model these two costs separately in Quantum Economic Advantage. Their question is whether a quantum provider can choose more market-creating investment than a classical rival even when building that additional quantum capacity is more expensive. The answer matters to their economic comparison: a lower variable cost does not, by itself, order the firms' investment decisions.

The working paper was circulated as NBER Working Paper No. 29724 in February 2022 and appeared in Management Science in 2023. This mission cites the NBER version throughout. It addresses the paper's Proposition 2, its explicit numerical witness, and the model results used around that proposition. The paper proves these results analytically; the remaining task here is a machine-checked formalization of their statements and proofs.

The two-stage duopoly

There are two firms. Firm 1 supplies quantum computing and has constant unit cost ccc; firm 2 supplies classical computing and has unit cost c2c^2c2. A common demand intercept aaa measures the initial market size. The paper assumes a>c2>c>1a>c^2>c>1a>c2>c>1. The firms sell differentiated computing services, with substitution parameter γ∈[0,1]\gamma\in[0,1]γ∈[0,1]: at γ=0\gamma=0γ=0 their products do not compete through demand, while at γ=1\gamma=1γ=1 they are identical in the model. This is an economic representation of quantum advantage, rather than a formal model of a quantum algorithm. See §2 of the working paper.

In stage 1, firms simultaneously choose investments x1,x2≥0x_1,x_2\ge0x1​,x2​≥0. Firm iii pays Bixi2/2B_i x_i^2/2Bi​xi2​/2, where Bi>0B_i>0Bi​>0, and its investment raises its own demand intercept to a+xia+x_ia+xi​. In stage 2, after observing both investments, firms simultaneously choose quantities q1,q2≥0q_1,q_2\ge0q1​,q2​≥0. Their inverse-demand prices and profits are

p1=a+x1−q1−γq2,p2=a+x2−q2−γq1,p_1=a+x_1-q_1-\gamma q_2,\qquad p_2=a+x_2-q_2-\gamma q_1,p1​=a+x1​−q1​−γq2​,p2​=a+x2​−q2​−γq1​, π1=q1p1−cq1−B1x122,π2=q2p2−c2q2−B2x222.\pi_1=q_1p_1-cq_1-\frac{B_1x_1^2}{2},\qquad \pi_2=q_2p_2-c^2q_2-\frac{B_2x_2^2}{2}.π1​=q1​p1​−cq1​−2B1​x12​​,π2​=q2​p2​−c2q2​−2B2​x22​​.

A subgame-perfect equilibrium consists of an investment pair and a quantity strategy assigning a Cournot Nash equilibrium to every feasible investment pair, including pairs reached after a unilateral deviation. At the chosen investments, neither firm can improve its profit by changing its own investment, anticipating the stage-2 strategy. The stage-2 payoff excludes investment cost because that cost is already sunk when quantities are chosen.

Formalization targets

Proposition 2: investment reversal

The goal is the paper's existence claim, over the game itself:

∃ (a,c,γ,B1,B2) satisfying the model and Lemma 1 conditions,B2<B1,∃ an SPE,∀ SPEs,  x2<x1.\exists\,(a,c,\gamma,B_1,B_2)\text{ satisfying the model and Lemma 1 conditions},\quad B_2<B_1,\quad \exists\,\text{an SPE},\quad \forall\,\text{SPEs},\;x_2<x_1.∃(a,c,γ,B1​,B2​) satisfying the model and Lemma 1 conditions,B2​<B1​,∃an SPE,∀SPEs,x2​<x1​.

The classical firm's cost coefficient is smaller, yet the quantum firm invests more. The proof gives a=20a=20a=20, c=2c=2c=2, γ=1\gamma=1γ=1, B1=10B_1=10B1​=10, B2=8B_2=8B2​=8; its investments are x1∗=102/109x_1^*=102/109x1∗​=102/109 and x2∗=89/109x_2^*=89/109x2∗​=89/109. The goal concerns the actual two-stage equilibrium, so the closed forms are supporting milestones rather than the definition of success. The paper's Proposition 2 and its proof appear on PDF pages 14 and 27–28.

Supporting results

Equations (3)–(4) give the interior Cournot quantities; (14)–(15) give the second derivatives of reduced profit; Lemma 1 gives sufficient parameter thresholds for positive investments and concavity; and (5)–(6) give equilibrium investments. Section 7 derives an exact threshold for the inequality x1∗>x2∗x_1^*>x_2^*x1∗​>x2∗​ and evaluates it at the numerical witness. Additional milestones record the displayed optimal profits, Proposition 1 on positive quantum profit, the no-investment comparative static of (11)–(12), and Corollary 1's monopoly case. These targets follow the working paper's equations and proofs.

What the result establishes

The result separates a firm's marginal cost of supplying computations from its cost of expanding the market. In this model, the quantum firm can justify a larger investment even with a larger coefficient on investment cost. The exact threshold identifies which combination of demand, variable cost, competition, and investment costs creates that ordering. Proposition 1 and the comparative static make related claims about profitability and the value of additional market size.

A complete formalization would connect the printed algebraic formulas to best responses over nonnegative actions, including possible corner outcomes after off-path investments. The reusable component is the published linear differentiated Cournot game; this mission adds the investment stage and source-specific parameters. The working paper supplies proofs on paper, while the Lean theorem files here are open statements awaiting machine-checked proofs.

Where the argument is delicate

Equations (3)–(4) solve interior first-order conditions, but stage-2 deviations can drive one firm's quantity to zero. A proof about a genuine subgame-perfect equilibrium must handle those corners throughout the strategy, not only at the final investment pair. Likewise, the second derivatives of the algebraic interior profit do not automatically settle every stage-1 deviation in the constrained game. The mission's equilibrium milestone must bridge those two readings. Lemma 1's thresholds also contain quotients whose denominators require checking under the stated parameter conditions.

Formalization scope and conventions

All parameters, investments, quantities, profits, and thresholds are real. The formalization requires xi,qi≥0x_i,q_i\ge0xi​,qi​≥0 in the equilibrium predicates. Standing records 0≤γ≤10\le\gamma\le10≤γ≤1, a>c2>c>1a>c^2>c>1a>c2>c>1, and positive BiB_iBi​. Lemma1Cond records the strict thresholds at the end of the proof of Lemma 1, with the paper's Max⁡\operatorname{Max}Max represented by real max. Firm 1 is quantum throughout; firm 2's unit cost is defined as c2c^2c2, not an independent parameter. The closed-form quantities and investments are used in milestones; the main goal quantifies over the subgame-perfect equilibrium predicate.

Several printed or implicit conventions affect the statements. Lemma 1 is phrased loosely on PDF page 11; its proof's exact sufficient conditions on page 26 are the milestone. The proof's strict claims about differences of thresholds become equalities when γ=0\gamma=0γ=0, without changing the final sufficient condition. Corollary 1 uses a different regime, a<c2a<c^2a<c2, and is stated without the main model's Standing condition; c<ac<ac<a ensures the asserted quantum monopoly has positive output. The comparative static concerns the separate model with x1=x2=0x_1=x_2=0x1​=x2​=0. A printed reference to optimal profits in “(11)” in the proof of Proposition 1 points to the unnumbered optimal-profit display on PDF page 12. The repeated x1∗x_1^*x1∗​ in the proof of Proposition 2 is read as x1∗,x2∗x_1^*,x_2^*x1∗​,x2∗​.

Useful contributions include proofs about nonnegative Cournot best responses and their uniqueness, the boundary behavior of stage-1 reduced profits, the exact sign conditions on the paper's denominators, and proofs of the source-indexed statements. The definition layer is meant to be shared by all results in this one paper.

Selected references

  • Francesco Bova, Avi Goldfarb, and Roger G. Melko, Quantum Economic Advantage, NBER Working Paper No. 29724, 2022. Working paper.
  • Francesco Bova, Avi Goldfarb, and Roger G. Melko, Quantum Economic Advantage, Management Science, 2023. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4578. The mission's theorem numbering follows the NBER version above.
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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

A Theory of Liquidity in Private Equity I: Without a Secondary Market, Two Capital-Share Thresholds Characterize Equilibrium, and Liquid LPs Earn Strictly More When Both Fund Types ExistResearch Paper

Why liquidity can explain persistent private equity returns

Private equity funds are organized as limited partnerships. Limited partners (LPs: pension funds, endowments, insurers) commit capital, and a general partner (GP) manages the fund and calls the committed capital over several years. A well-documented empirical regularity is that some LPs earn persistently higher returns than others, and that fund returns persist across a GP's successive funds (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Lerner, Schoar and Wongsunwai, 2007). The usual explanation is differences in skill.

Maurin, Robinson and Strömberg propose a different channel. Because capital is called gradually, an LP hit by a liquidity shock may default on the remaining commitment. GPs who raise money from LPs that tolerate illiquidity can invest efficiently. GPs who raise money from LPs that do not must call capital early to protect themselves against default, which distorts investment. When illiquidity-tolerant capital is scarce, GPs compete for it and pay its owners a premium. This mission formalizes the paper's main equilibrium result without a secondary market: that premium exists exactly when both kinds of funds are raised.

Setting

An investment pays RRR per unit on success and 000 on failure. It succeeds with probability ppp if the GP exerts effort and with probability q<pq<pq<p if the GP shirks, in which case the GP enjoys a private benefit BBB per unit invested. Each GP has wealth AAA and runs one fund of total size I>AI>AI>A. A share x∈[0,1]x\in[0,1]x∈[0,1] of the fund is invested in period 0 and the rest, 1−x1-x1−x, in period 1; both investments succeed or fail independently.

A fee schedule fff pays the GP a fee per unit of investment that depends on which investments succeeded. It must satisfy limited liability, 0≤f≤0\le f\le0≤f≤ the fund's cash flow, and incentive compatibility: effort on both investments must be at least as profitable for the GP as shirking on either or both. Write fˉ\bar ffˉ​ for the expected fee under effort. LPs who receive the promised expected return Rˉ\bar RRˉ per unit contributed supply I−AI-AI−A, which ties the fund size to the fee through

(pR−fˉ) I=Rˉ (I−A).(3)(pR-\bar f)\,I=\bar R\,(I-A).\qquad(3)(pR−fˉ​)I=Rˉ(I−A).(3)

LPs consume in periods 1 and 2. With probability λ∈(0,1)\lambda\in(0,1)λ∈(0,1) an aggregate liquidity shock hits in period 1. After the shock an LP discounts period-2 consumption by δ∈(0,1)\delta\in(0,1)δ∈(0,1). There are two types, LLL and HHH, with δL<δH\delta_L<\delta_HδL​<δH​, holding the shares 1−μH1-\mu_H1−μH​ and μH\mu_HμH​ of the LPs' total capital KKK. Without a secondary market an LP honours the second capital call only if the claim is worth at least its cost:

1−x≤δ Rˉ.(4)1-x\le\delta\,\bar R.\qquad(4)1−x≤δRˉ.(4)

A GP chooses (x,I,f)(x,I,f)(x,I,f) to maximize the profit ΠGP=fˉI\Pi_{GP}=\bar f IΠGP​=fˉ​I subject to (3) and (4). LPs invest in private equity when its value (1−λ)Rˉ+λδRˉ(1-\lambda)\bar R+\lambda\delta\bar R(1−λ)Rˉ+λδRˉ exceeds the value 111 of cash. An equilibrium (Definition 2) consists of the fractions αL,αH\alpha_L,\alpha_HαL​,αH​ of GPs raising each fund type, the returns RˉPE,L∗,RˉPE,H∗\bar R^*_{PE,L},\bar R^*_{PE,H}RˉPE,L∗​,RˉPE,H∗​, and optimal contracts such that GPs raise only profit-maximizing fund types and each primary market clears.

The key quantities are the LPs' break-even return 1+r(λ,δ)=1/(1−λ(1−δ))1+r(\lambda,\delta)=1/(1-\lambda(1-\delta))1+r(λ,δ)=1/(1−λ(1−δ)), the minimal safe early call x^(λ,δ)=1−δ/(1−λ(1−δ))\hat x(\lambda,\delta)=1-\delta/(1-\lambda(1-\delta))x^(λ,δ)=1−δ/(1−λ(1−δ)), and the tolerance threshold δ^(λ)=1−p/(p+(1−λ)q)\hat\delta(\lambda)=1-p/(p+(1-\lambda)q)δ^(λ)=1−p/(p+(1−λ)q). The Lean development uses the namespace PELiquidity.Primary, with grossReturn, xHat, deltaHat, xLow, xBar, IsFeasibleContract, IsOptimalContract, IsCapitalSupply and IsEquilibrium.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2

There are thresholds

0<μ‾H<μˉH<10<\underline\mu_H<\bar\mu_H<10<μ​H​<μˉ​H​<1

such that for every μH∈(0,1)\mu_H\in(0,1)μH​∈(0,1) an equilibrium exists, and every equilibrium satisfies the following:

  • if μH<μ‾H\mu_H<\underline\mu_HμH​<μ​H​, both fund types are raised and RˉPE,H∗>RˉPE,L∗=1+r(λ,δL)\bar R^*_{PE,H}>\bar R^*_{PE,L}=1+r(\lambda,\delta_L)RˉPE,H∗​>RˉPE,L∗​=1+r(λ,δL​);
  • if μH≥μ‾H\mu_H\ge\underline\mu_HμH​≥μ​H​, then αL∗=0\alpha^*_L=0αL∗​=0;
  • RˉPE,H∗\bar R^*_{PE,H}RˉPE,H∗​ is strictly decreasing in μH\mu_HμH​ on [μ‾H,μˉH][\underline\mu_H,\bar\mu_H][μ​H​,μˉ​H​];
  • if μH≥μˉH\mu_H\ge\bar\mu_HμH​≥μˉ​H​, then RˉPE,H∗=1+r(λ,δH)\bar R^*_{PE,H}=1+r(\lambda,\delta_H)RˉPE,H∗​=1+r(λ,δH​).

The thresholds are existential, as in the paper. A variant pinning μˉH\bar\mu_Hμˉ​H​ by (C.3) is a welcome strengthening.

Milestones

  1. (11): the break-even return 1+r(λ,δ)1+r(\lambda,\delta)1+r(λ,δ), decreasing in δ\deltaδ.
  2. Lemma 1 with (12): ΠGP=pRI−Rˉ(I−A)\Pi_{GP}=pRI-\bar R(I-A)ΠGP​=pRI−Rˉ(I−A), so an optimal contract minimizes fˉ\bar ffˉ​.
  3. Lemma 2: the minimal incentive-compatible fee is (15), minimized exactly on x∈[q/(p+q),p/(p+q)]x\in[q/(p+q),p/(p+q)]x∈[q/(p+q),p/(p+q)].
  4. Proposition 1: under (4) the optimal early call is [max⁡{x‾,x^},xˉ][\max\{\underline x,\hat x\},\bar x][max{x​,x^},xˉ] if δ≥δ^(λ)\delta\ge\hat\delta(\lambda)δ≥δ^(λ), and x^(λ,δ)\hat x(\lambda,\delta)x^(λ,δ) with a strictly higher fee if δ<δ^(λ)\delta<\hat\delta(\lambda)δ<δ^(λ).
  5. (C.4): when only H-funds are raised above the H-LPs' break-even rate, μHK=IH−A=(pR−fˉH)A/(RˉH−(pR−fˉH))\mu_HK=I_H-A=(pR-\bar f_H)A/(\bar R_H-(pR-\bar f_H))μH​K=IH​−A=(pR−fˉ​H​)A/(RˉH​−(pR−fˉ​H​)); for fixed fee, the contribution decreases with RˉH\bar R_HRˉH​.
  6. (18): the indifference rate RˉPE,Hmax∈(1+r(λ,δL),pR)\bar R^{max}_{PE,H}\in(1+r(\lambda,\delta_L),pR)RˉPE,Hmax​∈(1+r(λ,δL​),pR).
  7. Lemma C.1: αL∗>0\alpha^*_L>0αL∗​>0 implies RˉPE,L∗=1+r(λ,δL)\bar R^*_{PE,L}=1+r(\lambda,\delta_L)RˉPE,L∗​=1+r(λ,δL​).

Significance

The result shows that heterogeneous liquidity needs alone, without any difference in skill, produce a cross-section of LP returns: when capital from liquidity-tolerant LPs is scarce, those LPs earn strictly more than other LPs investing in otherwise identical funds. When it is abundant, they earn only their fair liquidity premium. This separates a liquidity explanation of return persistence from a skill explanation, and it is the benchmark against which the paper's second main result, the effect of a secondary market (Proposition 3, a separate mission), is measured.

The paper proves the result by hand. No part of it has a machine-checked proof. A formalization would check the three-case equilibrium argument, including uniqueness, which the paper treats briefly. It would also fix the readings of Definition 2 that the printed statement leaves open (see below) and record the hypotheses the proofs use without stating. The fee-design lemma (Lemma 2) is a small linear program of independent interest for moral-hazard models with several projects.

Difficulty

The equilibrium statements quantify over every equilibrium, and an equilibrium includes an optimal contract for each fund type, optimal against all fee schedules, call shares and fund sizes. The obvious approach, substituting the closed-form fee (15) and the optimal call (17) into the profit function, does not suffice. Uniqueness requires showing that no other combination of returns, fund fractions and contracts clears both markets. That includes returns at which a fund type is not raised. It also includes returns above the break-even rate, where the no-default constraint loosens and the fee falls. Ruling these out needs the GP's optimal profit to be decreasing in the promised return even when the no-default constraint binds. The boundary at μ‾H\underline\mu_Hμ​H​, where the HHH-market just clears with every GP raising an HHH-fund, has to be placed correctly.

Formalization scope

  • Parameters. The parameter structure records 0<q<p≤10<q<p\le 10<q<p≤1, B,A,K>0B,A,K>0B,A,K>0, λ,δL,δH∈(0,1)\lambda,\delta_L,\delta_H\in(0,1)λ,δL​,δH​∈(0,1), and Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 6 as printed. Two hypotheses are added and disclosed:
    • Assumption 5 is required strictly for δL\delta_LδL​, 1+r(λ,δL)<pR1+r(\lambda,\delta_L)<pR1+r(λ,δL​)<pR. With equality the GP's profit does not depend on the fee, and the strict ranking of returns fails.
    • B≤p(p−q)RB\le p(p-q)RB≤p(p−q)R makes limited liability compatible with incentive compatibility at every call share. The paper's Claim A.1 assumes the stronger R≥B/(p−q)2R\ge B/(p-q)^2R≥B/(p−q)2.
  • Fee schedules are indexed by the four success outcomes rather than the four cash-flow values. These differ only at x=1/2x=1/2x=1/2, and the minimal fee is the same.
  • Equation (3) is stated multiplied out with I>AI>AI>A, never as a quotient. A return at which the GP's profit is unbounded therefore admits no optimal contract and cannot be an equilibrium price. Contract optimality is global over (x,I,f)(x,I,f)(x,I,f).
  • Definition 2 is read with αL+αH=1\alpha_L+\alpha_H=1αL​+αH​=1, which the proof uses. GP fund choice is read as "a raised fund type is profit-maximizing", the only-if direction of the printed biconditional. The literal biconditional admits no equilibrium at μH=μ‾H\mu_H=\underline\mu_HμH​=μ​H​.
  • Two printed boundaries are corrected. Proposition 2 i) is stated for μH<μ‾H\mu_H<\underline\mu_HμH​<μ​H​, which resolves the overlap of its two cases as the proof does. "Decreasing" is read as strict.
  • Out of scope. Assumption 4 and capital-call relief (Appendix C.1) are not formalized, since the no-default constraint (4) is imposed directly. The GP takes Rˉ\bar RRˉ as given, so raising the promised return (C.2) is not modelled. Appendix A's alternative contracts and the "no fund" option are also out of scope.
  • Trivializations ruled out. The goal asserts existence of an equilibrium for every μH∈(0,1)\mu_H\in(0,1)μH​∈(0,1), so its "every equilibrium" clauses are not vacuous. The strict chain 0<μ‾H<μˉH<10<\underline\mu_H<\bar\mu_H<10<μ​H​<μˉ​H​<1 excludes degenerate thresholds.

Everything is built from Mathlib's real numbers and finite sums. The fee-schedule linear program (Lemma 2), the contract problem (Proposition 1) and the equilibrium predicate are reusable for the secondary-market mission of the same paper. Proofs of any milestone, and the pinned-threshold variant of the goal, are welcome.

Selected references

  • V. Maurin, D. T. Robinson and P. Strömberg, A Theory of Liquidity in Private Equity, working paper, draft of December 2020; published in Management Science 69(10), 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4612
  • S. N. Kaplan and A. Schoar, Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, and Capital Flows, Journal of Finance 60(4), 1791–1823, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00775.x
  • J. Lerner, A. Schoar and W. Wongsunwai, Smart Institutions, Foolish Choices: The Limited Partner Performance Puzzle, Journal of Finance 62(2), 731–764, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01220.x
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