Addictive Platforms 1: Monopoly versus Duopoly — Competition Raises Addictiveness and Hurts the Consumer When Attention Is Scarce, and Lowers Addictiveness When It Is AbundantResearch Paper
Motivation
Digital services are paid for with attention: an ad-financed platform earns more the longer its users stay. Policy reports on digital markets (Crémer, de Montjoye and Schweitzer, 2019; the U.K. Digital Competition Expert Panel, 2019; Scott Morton et al., 2019) worry that such firms degrade their services with features that capture attention at the user's expense, and they usually recommend more competition. Ichihashi and Kim, Addictive Platforms (Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper 2022-16; Management Science, 2023), ask whether competition actually helps. Their answer depends on how scarce attention is. When attention is scarce, platforms compete by making their services more addictive rather than better, and a monopoly serves the consumer better than a duopoly. This mission formalizes that comparison, the paper's headline result, together with the two equilibrium characterizations it rests on.
Setting
There are platforms and a single consumer. Each platform chooses an addictiveness . The consumer observes , joins a set of platforms and allocates attention to each . She receives if , and otherwise
subject to the attention cap , where . Platform earns the attention if the consumer joins it and otherwise.
The service utility is twice differentiable, strictly increasing and concave in attention , and strictly decreasing in . The marginal utility is strictly increasing in , so a more addictive service is worse to join but harder to stop using. There is some at which no amount of attention makes the service worth joining, and . The attention cost is strictly increasing, convex and twice differentiable, with . These are Assumptions 1 and 2 of the paper.
Platforms choose addictiveness simultaneously, and then the consumer chooses and . The solution concept is pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium: the consumer chooses optimally at every profile , and no platform gains by changing its own . A monopolist () breaks ties in the consumer's favour. Consumer surplus is the consumer's payoff in the equilibrium outcome.
The monopoly benchmark uses three quantities. The first is , the consumer's attention on one platform when there is no cap. The second is , the lowest addictiveness at which she exhausts her attention. The third is , the addictiveness at which her best capped payoff from one platform falls to zero. Under competition, is the total attention she spends on platforms of common addictiveness .
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 3 (monopoly versus duopoly)
Let be the least cap from which on monopoly consumer surplus is zero. For every monopoly equilibrium with addictiveness and every duopoly equilibrium with :
The proposition is silent about intermediate caps, and so is the goal.
Milestones
- Proposition 1 (monopoly). The monopolist sets , which is increasing in . The consumer's payoff rises on , falls on and is zero from some on.
- Lemmas B.1–B.4. These are comparative statics of the consumer's problem: the tangent intercept is increasing, the value of spreading attention over platforms is concave in , and the incremental gain from one more platform falls with the addictiveness and the number of the platforms already joined.
- Step 1 of the proof of Proposition 2. For there is a unique solving the indifference condition (3) between joining and platforms.
- Proposition 2 (competition). For , every platform chooses in the unique equilibrium.
Significance
Proposition 3 separates two effects of competition. Business stealing pushes duopolists to raise addictiveness, because a more addictive service captures a larger share of a fixed attention budget. Competition for participation restrains them, because a consumer can drop a platform and spend her time on its rival. When attention is scarce the first effect dominates and the consumer is strictly worse off under duopoly. When it is abundant the monopolist extracts the whole surplus and duopoly cannot be worse. The result is the basis of the paper's policy discussion: digital curfews and the comparison between the equilibrium and the joint-profit outcome (Propositions 4 and 6). Propositions 1 and 2 are used throughout the paper.
The paper proves these results on paper. No machine-checked proof exists. A formal proof would check several delicate points. One is the role of the monopolist's tie-break, without which every is a monopoly equilibrium when attention is scarce. Another is that the uniqueness argument for the duopoly needs a consumer who best-responds off the equilibrium path. The appendix also asserts a few claims without argument or slightly too strongly, recorded below. Verifying them is part of the work.
Difficulty
The obvious argument for Proposition 3 compares equilibrium payoffs through the closed forms of Figure 3, and closed forms do not exist in general. Every object is defined by an optimization problem whose maximizer has no formula. The value functions are concave but need not be differentiable, so the envelope-theorem steps of Appendix B cannot be applied as written; they have to be replaced by monotone comparative statics or one-sided derivatives. Proposition 2's uniqueness is the hardest part. It rules out asymmetric equilibria by a deviation argument that controls which platforms the consumer joins after a small change in one platform's addictiveness (Lemma B.4). It also needs the consumer's whole strategy, not only her choice on the path.
Formalization scope
Platforms are Fin K; the paper's platform 1 is the index 0. Addictiveness and attention are real numbers restricted to , and only the values of and there matter. The cap is an extended nonnegative real (ℝ≥0∞), so is a genuine case and "" includes it. Derivatives on are one-sided at .
The definition file states the paper's Assumptions 1–2 as printed and adds disclosed pins:
- is strictly concave. The page says "concave", but Lemma B.1 needs strict concavity and Lemma B.2 applies Lemma B.1 to .
- . Without it need not exist.
- The uncapped consumer problem has an optimal attention profile for every profile and every nonempty . The page (p. 6) assumes this for , and presupposes it.
- where the result needs it: Proposition 1's characterization, Step 1, Proposition 2 and the first half of Proposition 3. At every profile is an equilibrium.
"Increasing" and "decreasing" are weak unless the page says "strictly". The one exception is "higher addictiveness" in the first half of Proposition 3, which is stated strictly because the proof gives .
Three statements differ from the printed text. Lemma B.2's " is strictly concave" is false on the paper's own Figure 3 instance and is stated as concavity. The strict clause of Lemma B.4 fails when is linear and is not posed. The derivative claims of Lemmas B.2–B.4 are stated as decreasing differences of value functions.
Several trivializing formalizations are excluded:
- An equilibrium requires the consumer to best-respond at every profile, not only at the equilibrium one.
- The tie-break is part of the monopoly equilibrium.
- Equilibria exist (Propositions 1 and 2 assert existence), and a sanity file checks the standing hypotheses on , .
- No value function is a real supremum; maxima enter through maximizers.
Not posed: Proposition 4 and later results, and the side models of Remarks 2–3. A complete development needs maximizers of concave problems on intervals and simplices, monotone comparative statics (Topkis, Milgrom–Shannon), and envelope arguments for concave value functions. These pieces are reusable well beyond this paper, and contributions of them as separate lemmas are welcome.
Selected references
- S. Ichihashi and B.-C. Kim, Addictive Platforms, Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper 2022-16, 2022. https://doi.org/10.34989/swp-2022-16. Published in Management Science, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4392
- P. Milgrom and I. Segal, Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets, Econometrica 70(2), 583–601, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00296
- P. Milgrom and C. Shannon, Monotone Comparative Statics, Econometrica 62(1), 157–180, 1994. https://doi.org/10.2307/2951479
- J. Crémer, Y.-A. de Montjoye and H. Schweitzer, Competition Policy for the Digital Era, report for the European Commission, 2019. https://doi.org/10.2763/407537