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EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Addictive Platforms 1: Monopoly versus Duopoly — Competition Raises Addictiveness and Hurts the Consumer When Attention Is Scarce, and Lowers Addictiveness When It Is AbundantResearch Paper

Motivation

Digital services are paid for with attention: an ad-financed platform earns more the longer its users stay. Policy reports on digital markets (Crémer, de Montjoye and Schweitzer, 2019; the U.K. Digital Competition Expert Panel, 2019; Scott Morton et al., 2019) worry that such firms degrade their services with features that capture attention at the user's expense, and they usually recommend more competition. Ichihashi and Kim, Addictive Platforms (Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper 2022-16; Management Science, 2023), ask whether competition actually helps. Their answer depends on how scarce attention is. When attention is scarce, platforms compete by making their services more addictive rather than better, and a monopoly serves the consumer better than a duopoly. This mission formalizes that comparison, the paper's headline result, together with the two equilibrium characterizations it rests on.

Setting

There are KKK platforms and a single consumer. Each platform kkk chooses an addictiveness dk≥0d_k \ge 0dk​≥0. The consumer observes d=(d1,…,dK)d = (d_1, \dots, d_K)d=(d1​,…,dK​), joins a set JJJ of platforms and allocates attention ak≥0a_k \ge 0ak​≥0 to each k∈Jk \in Jk∈J. She receives 000 if J=∅J = \emptysetJ=∅, and otherwise

∑k∈Ju(ak,dk)−C(∑k∈Jak),\sum_{k\in J} u(a_k, d_k) - C\Big(\sum_{k\in J} a_k\Big),k∈J∑​u(ak​,dk​)−C(k∈J∑​ak​),

subject to the attention cap ∑k∈Jak≤A‾\sum_{k\in J} a_k \le \overline{A}∑k∈J​ak​≤A, where A‾∈R+∪{∞}\overline{A} \in \mathbb{R}_+ \cup \{\infty\}A∈R+​∪{∞}. Platform kkk earns the attention aka_kak​ if the consumer joins it and 000 otherwise.

The service utility u(a,d)u(a, d)u(a,d) is twice differentiable, strictly increasing and concave in attention aaa, and strictly decreasing in ddd. The marginal utility u1(a,d)=∂u/∂au_1(a, d) = \partial u/\partial au1​(a,d)=∂u/∂a is strictly increasing in ddd, so a more addictive service is worse to join but harder to stop using. There is some ddd at which no amount of attention makes the service worth joining, and u(0,0)≥0u(0,0) \ge 0u(0,0)≥0. The attention cost C:R+→R+C : \mathbb{R}_+ \to \mathbb{R}_+C:R+​→R+​ is strictly increasing, convex and twice differentiable, with lim⁡a→0[u1(a,0)−C′(a)]>0\lim_{a\to0}[u_1(a,0) - C'(a)] > 0lima→0​[u1​(a,0)−C′(a)]>0. These are Assumptions 1 and 2 of the paper.

Platforms choose addictiveness simultaneously, and then the consumer chooses JJJ and aaa. The solution concept is pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium: the consumer chooses optimally at every profile ddd, and no platform gains by changing its own dkd_kdk​. A monopolist (K=1K = 1K=1) breaks ties in the consumer's favour. Consumer surplus is the consumer's payoff in the equilibrium outcome.

The monopoly benchmark uses three quantities. The first is A(d)=arg⁡max⁡A≥0u(A,d)−C(A)A(d) = \arg\max_{A\ge0} u(A,d) - C(A)A(d)=argmaxA≥0​u(A,d)−C(A), the consumer's attention on one platform when there is no cap. The second is dA(A‾)=min⁡{d∈[0,∞]:A(d)≥A‾}d^A(\overline{A}) = \min\{d \in [0,\infty] : A(d) \ge \overline{A}\}dA(A)=min{d∈[0,∞]:A(d)≥A}, the lowest addictiveness at which she exhausts her attention. The third is dP(A‾)d^P(\overline{A})dP(A), the addictiveness at which her best capped payoff from one platform falls to zero. Under competition, AK(d)=arg⁡max⁡A∈[0,A‾]K u(A/K,d)−C(A)A_K(d) = \arg\max_{A\in[0,\overline{A}]} K\,u(A/K, d) - C(A)AK​(d)=argmaxA∈[0,A]​Ku(A/K,d)−C(A) is the total attention she spends on KKK platforms of common addictiveness ddd.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3 (monopoly versus duopoly)

Let A‾M\overline{A}^MAM be the least cap from which on monopoly consumer surplus is zero. For every monopoly equilibrium with addictiveness dMd^MdM and every duopoly equilibrium with (d1,d2)(d_1, d_2)(d1​,d2​):

0<A‾≤A(0)  ⟹  dM<d1, dM<d2, CSduo<CSmono,0 < \overline{A} \le A(0) \;\Longrightarrow\; d^M < d_1,\ d^M < d_2,\ CS^{\mathrm{duo}} < CS^{\mathrm{mono}},0<A≤A(0)⟹dM<d1​, dM<d2​, CSduo<CSmono, A‾≥A‾M  ⟹  d1≤dM, d2≤dM, CSmono≤CSduo.\overline{A} \ge \overline{A}^M \;\Longrightarrow\; d_1 \le d^M,\ d_2 \le d^M,\ CS^{\mathrm{mono}} \le CS^{\mathrm{duo}}.A≥AM⟹d1​≤dM, d2​≤dM, CSmono≤CSduo.

The proposition is silent about intermediate caps, and so is the goal.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 1 (monopoly). The monopolist sets min⁡{dA(A‾),dP(A‾)}\min\{d^A(\overline{A}), d^P(\overline{A})\}min{dA(A),dP(A)}, which is increasing in A‾\overline{A}A. The consumer's payoff rises on [0,A(0)][0, A(0)][0,A(0)], falls on [A(0),A‾M][A(0), \overline{A}^M][A(0),AM] and is zero from some A‾M>A(0)\overline{A}^M > A(0)AM>A(0) on.
  2. Lemmas B.1–B.4. These are comparative statics of the consumer's problem: the tangent intercept u(x)−xu′(x)u(x) - xu'(x)u(x)−xu′(x) is increasing, the value of spreading attention over yyy platforms is concave in yyy, and the incremental gain from one more platform falls with the addictiveness and the number of the platforms already joined.
  3. Step 1 of the proof of Proposition 2. For K≥2K \ge 2K≥2 there is a unique d∗>0d^* > 0d∗>0 solving the indifference condition (3) between joining KKK and K−1K - 1K−1 platforms.
  4. Proposition 2 (competition). For K≥2K \ge 2K≥2, every platform chooses d∗d^*d∗ in the unique equilibrium.

Significance

Proposition 3 separates two effects of competition. Business stealing pushes duopolists to raise addictiveness, because a more addictive service captures a larger share of a fixed attention budget. Competition for participation restrains them, because a consumer can drop a platform and spend her time on its rival. When attention is scarce the first effect dominates and the consumer is strictly worse off under duopoly. When it is abundant the monopolist extracts the whole surplus and duopoly cannot be worse. The result is the basis of the paper's policy discussion: digital curfews and the comparison between the equilibrium and the joint-profit outcome (Propositions 4 and 6). Propositions 1 and 2 are used throughout the paper.

The paper proves these results on paper. No machine-checked proof exists. A formal proof would check several delicate points. One is the role of the monopolist's tie-break, without which every d∈[0,dP]d \in [0, d^P]d∈[0,dP] is a monopoly equilibrium when attention is scarce. Another is that the uniqueness argument for the duopoly needs a consumer who best-responds off the equilibrium path. The appendix also asserts a few claims without argument or slightly too strongly, recorded below. Verifying them is part of the work.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for Proposition 3 compares equilibrium payoffs through the closed forms of Figure 3, and closed forms do not exist in general. Every object is defined by an optimization problem whose maximizer has no formula. The value functions are concave but need not be differentiable, so the envelope-theorem steps of Appendix B cannot be applied as written; they have to be replaced by monotone comparative statics or one-sided derivatives. Proposition 2's uniqueness is the hardest part. It rules out asymmetric equilibria by a deviation argument that controls which platforms the consumer joins after a small change in one platform's addictiveness (Lemma B.4). It also needs the consumer's whole strategy, not only her choice on the path.

Formalization scope

Platforms are Fin K; the paper's platform 1 is the index 0. Addictiveness and attention are real numbers restricted to [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), and only the values of uuu and CCC there matter. The cap A‾\overline{A}A is an extended nonnegative real (ℝ≥0∞), so A‾=∞\overline{A} = \inftyA=∞ is a genuine case and "A‾≥A‾M\overline{A} \ge \overline{A}^MA≥AM" includes it. Derivatives on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) are one-sided at 000.

The definition file states the paper's Assumptions 1–2 as printed and adds disclosed pins:

  • u(⋅,d)u(\cdot, d)u(⋅,d) is strictly concave. The page says "concave", but Lemma B.1 needs strict concavity and Lemma B.2 applies Lemma B.1 to u(⋅,d)u(\cdot,d)u(⋅,d).
  • C(0)=0C(0) = 0C(0)=0. Without it dPd^PdP need not exist.
  • The uncapped consumer problem has an optimal attention profile for every profile and every nonempty JJJ. The page (p. 6) assumes this for A‾=∞\overline{A} = \inftyA=∞, and A(d)A(d)A(d) presupposes it.
  • A‾>0\overline{A} > 0A>0 where the result needs it: Proposition 1's characterization, Step 1, Proposition 2 and the first half of Proposition 3. At A‾=0\overline{A} = 0A=0 every profile is an equilibrium.

"Increasing" and "decreasing" are weak unless the page says "strictly". The one exception is "higher addictiveness" in the first half of Proposition 3, which is stated strictly because the proof gives dM=0<d∗d^M = 0 < d^*dM=0<d∗.

Three statements differ from the printed text. Lemma B.2's "V∗V^*V∗ is strictly concave" is false on the paper's own Figure 3 instance and is stated as concavity. The strict clause of Lemma B.4 fails when CCC is linear and is not posed. The derivative claims of Lemmas B.2–B.4 are stated as decreasing differences of value functions.

Several trivializing formalizations are excluded:

  • An equilibrium requires the consumer to best-respond at every profile, not only at the equilibrium one.
  • The tie-break is part of the monopoly equilibrium.
  • Equilibria exist (Propositions 1 and 2 assert existence), and a sanity file checks the standing hypotheses on u(a,d)=1−e−(a−d)u(a,d) = 1 - e^{-(a-d)}u(a,d)=1−e−(a−d), C(a)=a/2C(a) = a/2C(a)=a/2.
  • No value function is a real supremum; maxima enter through maximizers.

Not posed: Proposition 4 and later results, and the side models of Remarks 2–3. A complete development needs maximizers of concave problems on intervals and simplices, monotone comparative statics (Topkis, Milgrom–Shannon), and envelope arguments for concave value functions. These pieces are reusable well beyond this paper, and contributions of them as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Ichihashi and B.-C. Kim, Addictive Platforms, Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper 2022-16, 2022. https://doi.org/10.34989/swp-2022-16. Published in Management Science, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4392
  • P. Milgrom and I. Segal, Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets, Econometrica 70(2), 583–601, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00296
  • P. Milgrom and C. Shannon, Monotone Comparative Statics, Econometrica 62(1), 157–180, 1994. https://doi.org/10.2307/2951479
  • J. Crémer, Y.-A. de Montjoye and H. Schweitzer, Competition Policy for the Digital Era, report for the European Commission, 2019. https://doi.org/10.2763/407537
9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

A Robust Spectral Clustering Algorithm for Sub-Gaussian Mixture Models with Outliers 1: Robust-LP Inlier Error ≤ Cn²·max{exp(−Δ²min/64σ²max), log nmin/nmin} with Probability ≥ 1 − 2r/nminResearch Paper

Motivation

Clustering points drawn from a mixture of well-separated distributions is a basic problem of unsupervised learning. Practical data sets also contain outliers, points that belong to no cluster and may be placed anywhere. Srivastava, Sarkar and Hanasusanto (arXiv:1912.07546v3; Operations Research 71(1), 2023) propose a robust spectral clustering algorithm. It thresholds a Gaussian kernel matrix through a linear program, then applies spectral clustering to the result, and they prove that its error decays exponentially in the squared signal-to-noise ratio when the outliers, placed arbitrarily, are a small fraction of the points. The authors report that their bound is tighter than those obtained for related semidefinite relaxations, for example by Mixon, Villar and Ward (arXiv:1602.06612), which use a reference matrix in a similar way (pp. 10–11). This mission formalizes the first of the paper's two main results: the estimation error of the thresholded kernel matrix.

Setting

There are N=n+mN = n + mN=n+m points in Rd\mathbb R^dRd: nnn inliers and mmm outliers. Each inlier iii has a label φi∈{1,…,r}\varphi_i \in \{1,\dots,r\}φi​∈{1,…,r}, and the clusters are Ck={i:φi=k}\mathcal C_k = \{i : \varphi_i = k\}Ck​={i:φi​=k} with sizes nkn_knk​ and nmin⁡=min⁡knkn_{\min} = \min_k n_knmin​=mink​nk​. The inlier observation is

yi=μφi+ξi,y_i = \mu_{\varphi_i} + \xi_i ,yi​=μφi​​+ξi​,

where μ1,…,μr\mu_1,\dots,\mu_rμ1​,…,μr​ are the cluster centres and the noise vectors ξi\xi_iξi​ are independent, identically distributed within each cluster, and sub-gaussian with parameter σφi\sigma_{\varphi_i}σφi​​: for every ν∈Rd\nu \in \mathbb R^dν∈Rd, E[eν⊤ξi]≤eσφi2∥ν∥2/2\mathbb E[e^{\nu^\top\xi_i}] \le e^{\sigma_{\varphi_i}^2\|\nu\|^2/2}E[eν⊤ξi​]≤eσφi​2​∥ν∥2/2 (Definition 3). The outliers z1,…,zmz_1,\dots,z_mz1​,…,zm​ are arbitrary random vectors, with no independence or distributional assumption. Write Δkl=∥μk−μl∥\Delta_{kl} = \|\mu_k - \mu_l\|Δkl​=∥μk​−μl​∥, Δmin⁡=min⁡k≠lΔkl\Delta_{\min} = \min_{k\ne l}\Delta_{kl}Δmin​=mink=l​Δkl​ and σmax⁡=max⁡kσk\sigma_{\max} = \max_k\sigma_kσmax​=maxk​σk​.

The algorithm forms the Gaussian kernel Kij=exp⁡(−∥yi−yj∥2/2θ2)K_{ij} = \exp(-\|y_i - y_j\|^2/2\theta^2)Kij​=exp(−∥yi​−yj​∥2/2θ2) over all NNN points and solves the Robust-LP

max⁡X ⟨K−γEN,X⟩subject to0≤Xij≤1,\max_X\ \langle K - \gamma E_N, X\rangle \quad\text{subject to}\quad 0 \le X_{ij} \le 1 ,Xmax​ ⟨K−γEN​,X⟩subject to0≤Xij​≤1,

where ⟨A,B⟩=∑ijAijBij\langle A, B\rangle = \sum_{ij}A_{ij}B_{ij}⟨A,B⟩=∑ij​Aij​Bij​ and ENE_NEN​ is the all-ones matrix. Its solution has the closed form X^ij=1\hat X_{ij} = 1X^ij​=1 if Kij>γK_{ij} > \gammaKij​>γ and 000 otherwise. The true clustering matrix X0X^0X0 has Xij0=1X^0_{ij} = 1Xij0​=1 exactly when iii and jjj are inliers with the same label. The error is measured in the entrywise norm ∥A∥1=∑ij∣Aij∣\|A\|_1 = \sum_{ij}|A_{ij}|∥A∥1​=∑ij​∣Aij​∣, and AIA_{\mathcal I}AI​ denotes the inlier block.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (with corrected thresholds)

Fix κ>0\kappa > 0κ>0 and υ∈(0,1)\upsilon \in (0,1)υ∈(0,1), and set θ=κΔmin⁡\theta = \kappa\Delta_{\min}θ=κΔmin​, τin=e−5Δmin⁡2/64θ2\tau_{\mathrm{in}} = e^{-5\Delta_{\min}^2/64\theta^2}τin​=e−5Δmin2​/64θ2, τout=e−Δmin⁡2/4θ2\tau_{\mathrm{out}} = e^{-\Delta_{\min}^2/4\theta^2}τout​=e−Δmin2​/4θ2 and γ=υτin+(1−υ)τout\gamma = \upsilon\tau_{\mathrm{in}} + (1-\upsilon)\tau_{\mathrm{out}}γ=υτin​+(1−υ)τout​. There are constants C,C′,C′′>0C, C', C'' > 0C,C′,C′′>0, depending only on κ\kappaκ and υ\upsilonυ, such that if nmin⁡>rn_{\min} > rnmin​>r, Δmin⁡≥8σmax⁡d\Delta_{\min} \ge 8\sigma_{\max}\sqrt dΔmin​≥8σmax​d​ and m<nm < nm<n, then with probability at least 1−2r/nmin⁡1 - 2r/n_{\min}1−2r/nmin​,

∥X^I−XI0∥1≤Cn2max⁡{e−Δmin⁡2/64σmax⁡2,log⁡nmin⁡nmin⁡}\|\hat X_{\mathcal I} - X^0_{\mathcal I}\|_1 \le Cn^2\max\Big\{e^{-\Delta^2_{\min}/64\sigma^2_{\max}}, \frac{\log n_{\min}}{n_{\min}}\Big\}∥X^I​−XI0​∥1​≤Cn2max{e−Δmin2​/64σmax2​,nmin​lognmin​​}

and

∥X^−X0∥1∥X0∥1≤C′r e−Δmin⁡2/64σmax⁡2+C′′rmax⁡{log⁡nmin⁡nmin⁡,mn}.\frac{\|\hat X - X^0\|_1}{\|X^0\|_1} \le C'r\,e^{-\Delta^2_{\min}/64\sigma^2_{\max}} + C''r\max\Big\{\frac{\log n_{\min}}{n_{\min}}, \frac{m}{n}\Big\}.∥X0∥1​∥X^−X0∥1​​≤C′re−Δmin2​/64σmax2​+C′′rmax{nmin​lognmin​​,nm​}.

The constants are left existential, as on the page.

Milestones

The milestones follow the structure of the paper's proof:

  • the closed form of X^\hat XX^ (§3);
  • Lemmas 1–3, which compare Robust-LP with a reference problem built from the reference matrix RRR of display (6);
  • the counting bound (E.2);
  • the sub-gaussian tail bounds (E.5), (E.6), (E.7)–(E.8) and (E.9)–(E.10);
  • the Bernstein inequalities for one- and two-sample U-statistics (E.11) and (E.14), and their consequences (E.13) and (E.15);
  • the threshold gap (E.18).

Significance

Theorem 1 is the quantitative core of the paper. It says that thresholding a Gaussian kernel at a level between two explicit values recovers the cluster structure among the inliers up to an error that is exponentially small in Δmin⁡2/σmax⁡2\Delta^2_{\min}/\sigma^2_{\max}Δmin2​/σmax2​, plus a sampling term of order log⁡nmin⁡/nmin⁡\log n_{\min}/n_{\min}lognmin​/nmin​, whatever the outliers do. The paper's Theorem 2 feeds this bound into Davis–Kahan perturbation theory to bound the fraction of misclassified points after spectral rounding, and Proposition 2 uses it to identify the outliers.

Formalizing it produces more than the theorem. As printed, Theorem 1 is false: the kernel uses 2θ22\theta^22θ2 while the thresholds use θ2\theta^2θ2, a factor-two mismatch that the proof silently drops. A mechanically checked statement settles the corrected thresholds. The proof also rests on three cited probabilistic results that are not proved in the paper and are not in Mathlib: the Hsu–Kakade–Zhang tail bound for quadratic forms of sub-gaussian vectors, and Bernstein inequalities for one- and two-sample U-statistics (the two-sample version is asserted "following the arguments" of earlier work, with no proof). None of these results has a machine-checked proof at present.

Difficulty

The deterministic part (Lemmas 1–3, (E.2), (E.18)) is elementary linear algebra on [0,1][0,1][0,1]-matrices. The difficulty is probabilistic. The kernel entries KijK_{ij}Kij​ are not independent: each point appears in n−1n - 1n−1 entries. So the natural first idea, a Chernoff or Hoeffding bound on the number of threshold violations treated as a sum of independent indicators, does not apply. The paper handles the dependence by writing the counts of violations as U-statistics and invoking Bernstein-type bounds for them. Those bounds need Hoeffding's representation of a U-statistic as an average of sums of independent terms, which is not available in Mathlib. A second obstacle is the Hsu–Kakade–Zhang inequality: the norm of a sub-gaussian vector whose coordinates may be dependent concentrates at the scale ddd, not d2d^2d2, and the coordinate-independent Hanson–Wright inequality does not give it.

Formalization scope

  • Points and labels. Points are indexed by Fin n ⊕ Fin m (inliers, then outliers) and vectors live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d). The labels φ\varphiφ are fixed. The paper draws them from a multinomial distribution, but its proof conditions on them, and nmin⁡n_{\min}nmin​ appears in the probability bound.
  • Sub-gaussian parameter. σk\sigma_kσk​ is the Definition 3 parameter, encoded through Mathlib's HasSubgaussianMGF of every projection ν⊤ξ\nu^\top\xiν⊤ξ. The proof uses this parameter, not the "largest eigenvalue of the second moment matrix" mentioned in §2.2.
  • Minima and maxima. Δmin⁡\Delta_{\min}Δmin​, nmin⁡n_{\min}nmin​, σmax⁡\sigma_{\max}σmax​ and τout\tau_{\mathrm{out}}τout​ are finite minima or maxima over nonempty index sets; r≥2r \ge 2r≥2 and d≥1d \ge 1d≥1 are hypotheses.
  • Corrections and additions. The thresholds are corrected from the printed e−5Δmin⁡2/32θ2e^{-5\Delta^2_{\min}/32\theta^2}e−5Δmin2​/32θ2 and e−Δkl2/2θ2e^{-\Delta^2_{kl}/2\theta^2}e−Δkl2​/2θ2 to e−5Δmin⁡2/64θ2e^{-5\Delta^2_{\min}/64\theta^2}e−5Δmin2​/64θ2 and e−Δkl2/4θ2e^{-\Delta^2_{kl}/4\theta^2}e−Δkl2​/4θ2, which are the values for which (E.7)–(E.10) hold. "θ=Θ(Δmin⁡)\theta = \Theta(\Delta_{\min})θ=Θ(Δmin​)" is read as θ=κΔmin⁡\theta = \kappa\Delta_{\min}θ=κΔmin​, as on p. 42. m<nm < nm<n is added for (12), as the proof uses it at (E.20).
  • Probability. The failure event's outer measure is bounded, and outliers need not be measurable.
  • Ruling out trivial statements. The goal does not mention the reference matrix, the corruption counts, U-statistics or ρmin⁡\rho_{\min}ρmin​, and its constants are quantified before every model datum. With CCC fixed, letting nmin⁡n_{\min}nmin​ and the signal-to-noise ratio grow forces ∥X^I−XI0∥1/n2→0\|\hat X_{\mathcal I} - X^0_{\mathcal I}\|_1/n^2 \to 0∥X^I​−XI0​∥1​/n2→0, so (11) is not implied by the trivial bound ∥X^I−XI0∥1≤n2\|\hat X_{\mathcal I} - X^0_{\mathcal I}\|_1 \le n^2∥X^I​−XI0​∥1​≤n2.
  • Reusable work. Proofs of the sub-gaussian tail bounds and the U-statistic Bernstein inequalities are welcome as standalone developments. They are reusable well beyond this mission, for example in kernel methods, random geometric graphs and two-sample testing.

Selected references

  • P. R. Srivastava, P. Sarkar, G. A. Hanasusanto, A Robust Spectral Clustering Algorithm for Sub-Gaussian Mixture Models with Outliers, Operations Research 71(1), 2023; arXiv:1912.07546v3, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.07546
  • D. Hsu, S. Kakade, T. Zhang, A tail inequality for quadratic forms of subgaussian random vectors, Electronic Communications in Probability 17, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1214/ECP.v17-2079
  • W. Hoeffding, Probability inequalities for sums of bounded random variables, Journal of the American Statistical Association 58, 1963. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1963.10500830
  • M. A. Arcones, A Bernstein-type inequality for U-statistics and U-processes, Statistics & Probability Letters 22(3):239–247, 1995 (as cited in arXiv:1912.07546v3, reference list). https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.07546
  • Y. Pitcan, A note on concentration inequalities for U-statistics, arXiv:1712.06160, 2017. https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.06160
  • D. G. Mixon, S. Villar, R. Ward, Clustering subgaussian mixtures by semidefinite programming, Information and Inference 6(4), 2017; arXiv:1602.06612. https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.06612
16 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityRandom Matrix Theory+1·Captain: mikedeng1

The Risk of Expected Utility Under Parameter Uncertainty I: Closed-Form Out-of-Sample Utility Variance of the Shrinkage Mean-Variance PortfolioResearch Paper

Why out-of-sample utility risk matters

A portfolio chosen from historical returns can look attractive in the data used to construct it and deliver a different result when evaluated under the population return distribution. The gap is driven by estimation error in both the mean return and covariance matrix. A mean of future utility values describes average performance, but it does not describe how much that utility varies across possible estimation samples. Lassance, Martín-Utrera and Simaan study this variation for a portfolio that blends an estimated mean-variance choice with an estimated global-minimum-variance choice. Their closed-form variance makes the sampling risk of that blend an explicit function of market and sample parameters. The source for this mission is the authors’ SSRN manuscript, version dated August 18, 2023, including its Internet Appendix; appendix pages are cited as IA pages.

The market and the estimated portfolio

There are NNN risky stocks. Their excess-return vector has population mean μ∈RN\mu\in\mathbb R^Nμ∈RN and positive-definite population covariance Σ∈RN×N\Sigma\in\mathbb R^{N\times N}Σ∈RN×N. The investor has risk aversion γ>0\gamma>0γ>0. A portfolio is a vector of weights www whose entries sum to one. Its population mean-variance utility is

U(w)=w⊤μ−γ2w⊤Σw.U(w)=w^\top\mu-\frac{\gamma}{2}w^\top\Sigma w.U(w)=w⊤μ−2γ​w⊤Σw.

Write eee for the vector of ones. The global-minimum-variance portfolio and its variance are wg=Σ−1e(e⊤Σ−1e)−1w_g=\Sigma^{-1}e(e^\top\Sigma^{-1}e)^{-1}wg​=Σ−1e(e⊤Σ−1e)−1 and σg2=(e⊤Σ−1e)−1\sigma_g^2=(e^\top\Sigma^{-1}e)^{-1}σg2​=(e⊤Σ−1e)−1. Its mean is μg=μ⊤Σ−1e σg2\mu_g=\mu^\top\Sigma^{-1}e\,\sigma_g^2μg​=μ⊤Σ−1eσg2​. The population matrix B=Σ−1(I−ewg⊤)B=\Sigma^{-1}(I-ew_g^\top)B=Σ−1(I−ewg⊤​) maps the mean vector to a zero-cost portfolio. The variance of that portfolio is ψ2=μ⊤Σ−1μ−μg2/σg2\psi^2=\mu^\top\Sigma^{-1}\mu-\mu_g^2/\sigma_g^2ψ2=μ⊤Σ−1μ−μg2​/σg2​. These quantities are computed from μ\muμ and Σ\SigmaΣ; they are not independent inputs. These definitions are equations (3)–(7) of the manuscript.

The investor observes TTT independent return vectors r1,…,rTr_1,\ldots,r_Tr1​,…,rT​, each with multivariate Gaussian law N(μ,Σ)\mathcal N(\mu,\Sigma)N(μ,Σ). The sample mean is μ^=T−1∑trt\hat\mu=T^{-1}\sum_t r_tμ^​=T−1∑t​rt​, and the sample covariance is Σ^=T−1∑t(rt−μ^)(rt−μ^)⊤\hat\Sigma=T^{-1}\sum_t(r_t-\hat\mu)(r_t-\hat\mu)^\topΣ^=T−1∑t​(rt​−μ^​)(rt​−μ^​)⊤. Replacing the population parameters in wgw_gwg​ and BBB by these estimates gives the sample GMV portfolio w^g\hat w_gw^g​ and the sample zero-cost portfolio w^z=B^μ^\hat w_z=\hat B\hat\muw^z​=B^μ^​. The estimated mean-variance portfolio is w^⋆=w^g+γ−1w^z\hat w^\star=\hat w_g+\gamma^{-1}\hat w_zw^⋆=w^g​+γ−1w^z​. At shrinkage intensity κ∈[0,1]\kappa\in[0,1]κ∈[0,1], the portfolio under study is w^⋆(κ)=(1−κ)w^g+κw^⋆\hat w^\star(\kappa)=(1-\kappa)\hat w_g+\kappa\hat w^\starw^⋆(κ)=(1−κ)w^g​+κw^⋆. Its out-of-sample utility, U(w^⋆(κ))U(\hat w^\star(\kappa))U(w^⋆(κ)), is evaluated using population μ\muμ and Σ\SigmaΣ. It is random because the weights depend on the sample. These choices are fixed by equations (9)–(12) and Assumption 2 of the manuscript.

Formalization targets

The goal is Proposition 1, equations (13)–(19). Under N≥2N\ge2N≥2 and T>N+7T>N+7T>N+7, it asserts that the utility has a finite second moment and that

V[U(w^⋆(κ))]=V[U(w^g)]+Δ(κ),Δ(κ)=a1κ4+a2κ3+a3κ2+a4κ.\mathbb V[U(\hat w^\star(\kappa))] =\mathbb V[U(\hat w_g)]+\Delta(\kappa),\qquad \Delta(\kappa)=a_1\kappa^4+a_2\kappa^3+a_3\kappa^2+a_4\kappa.V[U(w^⋆(κ))]=V[U(w^g​)]+Δ(κ),Δ(κ)=a1​κ4+a2​κ3+a3​κ2+a4​κ.

The coefficients a1,…,a4a_1,\ldots,a_4a1​,…,a4​ and V[U(w^g)]\mathbb V[U(\hat w_g)]V[U(w^g​)] are the exact rational expressions in T,N,γ,σg2,ψ2T,N,\gamma,\sigma_g^2,\psi^2T,N,γ,σg2​,ψ2 on pp. 14–15 of the manuscript. In particular, the result covers every κ∈[0,1]\kappa\in[0,1]κ∈[0,1], including the sample GMV portfolio at κ=0\kappa=0κ=0 and the sample mean-variance portfolio at κ=1\kappa=1κ=1.

The milestones follow the quantities named in the authors’ proof, Section IA.10. Equation (IA43) gives the covariance matrix of the random weights, and (IA44) gives the variance of their population mean return. The jointly distributed mean-return and return-variance pair in (IA45)–(IA48) supplies the setting for two auxiliary moment identities, (IA53) and (IA57). Equations (IA49), (IA59), and (IA60) give the first and second moments needed for return variance and mean return; (IA68) gives their covariance. All are statements from the Internet Appendix, pp. IA35–IA39.

What the result supplies

The expression tells an investor how the sampling risk of utility changes with the shrinkage intensity, sample size, stock count, risk aversion, and the two population variance parameters. The later comparison of variance-minimizing, mean-maximizing, and robustness-maximizing intensities uses this formula. Without Proposition 1, those comparisons have no explicit OOSU risk function to analyze. The result is already proved in the paper; this mission asks for its Lean proof and for reusable formal statements of the associated Gaussian portfolio and moment identities. No machine-checked proof of this paper’s proposition is included in the draft.

Where the difficulty lies

The sample covariance is random and its inverse appears in the estimated weights. Taking the variance of utility therefore involves inverse-covariance terms and moments beyond those needed for expected utility. The requirement T>N+7T>N+7T>N+7 is tied to existence of the fourth negative moment of a chi-squared variable in (IA57). A direct calculation that replaces random weights by their population counterparts loses the dependence on the estimation sample. A calculation from separate marginal laws also does not determine the covariance between mean return and return variance; the representation in (IA47)–(IA48) describes them jointly.

Formalization scope

The Lean market uses vectors Fin N → ℝ, matrices indexed by Fin N, and returns in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin N) to use Mathlib’s multivariate Gaussian law. The sample has Fin T observations on a probability space. Its covariance divisor is exactly TTT, as in (9). The standing assumptions are N≥2N\ge2N≥2, T>N+7T>N+7T>N+7, Σ≻0\Sigma\succ0Σ≻0, γ>0\gamma>0γ>0, and independent, identically distributed Gaussian returns. Every theorem about a variance or covariance explicitly asserts finite second moments; expectation statements explicitly assert integrability. The source’s finite-variance convention is thereby represented without Lean’s default value for a nonintegrable variance.

The left side of the goal is the probability-theory variance of utility under the sampling law. It is not defined by the closed formula. Likewise σg2\sigma_g^2σg2​, μg\mu_gμg​, and ψ2\psi^2ψ2 are computed from the market; independence is part of the sampling hypothesis. In the auxiliary representation, the chi-squared law is the squared norm of independent standard normals. The zero-degree cases and footnote 6’s N=2,3N=2,3N=2,3 rules are encoded explicitly. Mathlib’s matrix inverse and real division are total operations; their values on singular sample covariances or zero denominators do not alter the distributions because those events have probability zero under the stated assumptions. Contributions establishing the sample-covariance distribution, the joint representation, the negative moments, and the final variance identity are within scope and can support other Gaussian portfolio results.

Selected references

  • N. Lassance, A. Martín-Utrera, and M. Simaan, The Risk of Expected Utility under Parameter Uncertainty, authors’ SSRN manuscript dated August 18, 2023, subsequently in Management Science (2024). SSRN 3855546; DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2023.00178.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Infinite-Dimensional Fisher Markets and Tractable Fair Division 3: The Quasilinear Eisenberg–Gale Programs Attain Their Optima and Characterize Quasilinear EquilibriaResearch Paper

Motivation

A Fisher market allocates a common supply of items among buyers with separate budgets. When the items form a continuum, such as positions in a measurable interval, a buyer's valuation and the market price are functions rather than finite lists. This is a useful model for divisible resources and for settings in which an allocation can be described as a measurable subset of a continuous item space. Gao and Kroer develop equilibrium and convex-programming results for this setting in Infinite-Dimensional Fisher Markets and Tractable Fair Division. Their Section 6 extends the analysis from linear utility to quasilinear utility, where the buyer subtracts the cost of the allocated bundle from its value.

Quasilinear utility changes the role of money. A buyer can retain an unspent part of the budget and value it outside the market. Consequently, normalizing each buyer's valuation independently, which is harmless for linear demand, changes quasilinear demand. The extension therefore needs its own equilibrium definition and its own pair of optimization programs. This mission concerns the existence and exact equilibrium characterization stated in Theorem 10 of the cited preprint, rather than the numerical algorithms discussed elsewhere in that paper.

Setting

There are nnn buyers and an item space Θ\ThetaΘ, a compact subset of Rd\mathbb R^dRd, with restricted Lebesgue measure μ\muμ. Buyer iii has an integrable, nonnegative valuation density viv_ivi​ with ∫Θvi dμ>0\int_\Theta v_i\,d\mu>0∫Θ​vi​dμ>0, and a strictly positive budget BiB_iBi​. A bundle is an essentially bounded, nonnegative measurable function xix_ixi​ on Θ\ThetaΘ. An allocation x=(xi)x=(x_i)x=(xi​) is feasible when ∑ixi≤1\sum_i x_i\le1∑i​xi​≤1 almost everywhere. A pure allocation assigns almost disjoint measurable sets Θi\Theta_iΘi​ to buyers, so xi=1Θix_i=\mathbf1_{\Theta_i}xi​=1Θi​​ almost everywhere; some items may remain unallocated.

A price density ppp is nonnegative and integrable. The pairing ⟨f,g⟩=∫Θf(θ)g(θ) dμ(θ)\langle f,g\rangle=\int_\Theta f(\theta)g(\theta)\,d\mu(\theta)⟨f,g⟩=∫Θ​f(θ)g(θ)dμ(θ) gives the value of a bundle and its cost. At price ppp, buyer iii chooses an affordable bundle maximizing ⟨vi−p,xi⟩\langle v_i-p,x_i\rangle⟨vi​−p,xi​⟩, with affordability ⟨p,xi⟩≤Bi\langle p,x_i\rangle\le B_i⟨p,xi​⟩≤Bi​. A quasilinear market equilibrium (QLME) is a feasible allocation and price at which every buyer makes such a choice and unsold items have zero total price: ⟨p,1−∑ixi⟩=0\langle p,1-\sum_i x_i\rangle=0⟨p,1−∑i​xi​⟩=0.

The quasilinear Eisenberg–Gale primal program uses a nonnegative variable δi\delta_iδi​ for each buyer and maximizes ∑i(Bilog⁡ui−δi)\sum_i(B_i\log u_i-\delta_i)∑i​(Bi​logui​−δi​), where ui≤⟨vi,xi⟩+δiu_i\le\langle v_i,x_i\rangle+\delta_iui​≤⟨vi​,xi​⟩+δi​. Its dual program minimizes ⟨p,1⟩−∑iBilog⁡βi\langle p,1\rangle-\sum_i B_i\log\beta_i⟨p,1⟩−∑i​Bi​logβi​ subject to p≥βivip\ge\beta_i v_ip≥βi​vi​ and 0≤βi≤10\le\beta_i\le10≤βi​≤1. The primal is represented by (x,δ)(x,\delta)(x,δ) with ui=⟨vi,xi⟩+δiu_i=\langle v_i,x_i\rangle+\delta_iui​=⟨vi​,xi​⟩+δi​ at an optimum. This saturated form has the same optimum as the displayed program and makes the optimality conditions unambiguous.

Formalization targets

Theorem 10: attainment and equilibrium

The goal is the full four-part statement. The primal attains its maximum at a pure allocation. The dual attains its minimum with a unique vector β∗\beta^*β∗ and price density p∗=max⁡iβi∗vip^*=\max_i\beta_i^*v_ip∗=maxi​βi∗​vi​ almost everywhere. For feasible primal and dual points, simultaneous optimality is equivalent to market clearance and

βi(⟨vi,xi⟩+δi)=Bi,δi(1−βi)=0,⟨p−βivi,xi⟩=0for every i.\beta_i(\langle v_i,x_i\rangle+\delta_i)=B_i,\qquad \delta_i(1-\beta_i)=0,\qquad \langle p-\beta_i v_i,x_i\rangle=0 \quad\text{for every }i.βi​(⟨vi​,xi​⟩+δi​)=Bi​,δi​(1−βi​)=0,⟨p−βi​vi​,xi​⟩=0for every i.

Finally, (x,p)(x,p)(x,p) is a QLME exactly when there are δ\deltaδ and β\betaβ for which (x,δ)(x,\delta)(x,δ) and (p,β)(p,\beta)(p,β) are optimal in the two programs. The same given ppp must appear on both sides of this equivalence.

Milestone results

The milestones follow the statements in the proof of Theorem 10: attainment of the utility-space program (A.14), uniqueness of the minimizer in the reduced dual program, weak duality (A.15) with its additive constant ∑iBi(log⁡Bi−1)\sum_iB_i(\log B_i-1)∑i​Bi​(logBi​−1), the KKT characterization, and each direction of the QLME equivalence. The earlier paper's Lemma 1 identifies the feasible utility set with utilities of pure allocations and supplies the compactness used here. It belongs to the first mission of this series and is not duplicated as a target in this one.

Significance

The theorem establishes that the two infinite-dimensional programs describe the quasilinear market exactly. Attainment guarantees actual optimal allocation and price objects rather than only approximating sequences. Pure attainment gives a measurable partition-type allocation. The unique β∗\beta^*β∗ pins down each buyer's utility price, while p∗=max⁡iβi∗vip^*=\max_i\beta_i^*v_ip∗=maxi​βi∗​vi​ identifies the price density almost everywhere. The KKT equations give precise tests for a candidate optimal pair, and the final equivalence translates between optimization solutions and buyer-level equilibrium behavior. These are the claims made by Theorem 10 and its appendix proof.

The result is proved in the paper; the work here is to formalize its statement and, in later solver contributions, its proof in Lean. A complete development will also provide reusable infrastructure for integrating valuation densities against essentially bounded bundles, representing continuum-item allocations, and relating a finite buyer-indexed vector to pointwise price maxima. No machine-checked proof of this mission's goal is supplied with this draft.

Difficulty

The optimization variables include functions in L∞L^\inftyL∞ and L1L^1L1, and the positive cone of L1L^1L1 has no useful interior for a direct appeal to standard infinite-dimensional convex-duality theorems. The finite-dimensional utility vector is easier to optimize over, but recovering a pure allocation from it requires the measurable-allocation result established earlier in the paper. The dual price is a pointwise maximum of integrable densities, and equality of prices is meaningful almost everywhere. Equilibrium demand compares a buyer's assigned bundle with every affordable essentially bounded bundle, so an optimality statement about program variables must account for that full comparison.

Formalization scope

Lean represents densities and bundles as functions on the ambient Euclidean space, with the measure restricted to Θ\ThetaΘ; values outside Θ\ThetaΘ do not matter. The standing hypotheses are compactness of Θ\ThetaΘ, integrability and almost-everywhere nonnegativity of every viv_ivi​, strictly positive total valuation, and strictly positive budgets. There is no assumption that total budgets or total item measure equal one. The buyer type Fin n is zero-based; the paper numbers buyers from one. The empty-buyer case is allowed and has the expected trivial finite-vector interpretation.

The equilibrium predicate includes supply feasibility. The printed QLME definition on page 29 omits it, although the linear-market definition includes it and Theorem 10(d) requires it. Without it, a buyer can receive more than unit supply on part of the item space while buyer optimality and market clearance still hold. The primal uses the saturated value ui=⟨vi,xi⟩+δiu_i=\langle v_i,x_i\rangle+\delta_iui​=⟨vi​,xi​⟩+δi​; leaving uuu free below that value makes the printed KKT converse false. These two choices are disclosed in the item descriptions and moderation notes, with concrete counterexamples there.

The paper treats log⁡0\log0log0 as a limiting infinite cost. Lean's real logarithm is total, so optimality compares only points whose logarithm arguments are positive. The utility KKT equation is multiplied by βi\beta_iβi​ to avoid division by zero. Valuation and price densities are integrable, and bundles are essentially bounded, so pairings are genuine finite integrals. The pointwise maximum over buyers is an indexed supremum; feasibility and uniqueness use almost-everywhere equality for price functions and exact equality for the finite vector β\betaβ. These conventions prevent degenerate total-function values from deciding the theorem.

Contributions can address the measurable utility-set and pure-allocation infrastructure, finite-dimensional attainment, weak duality, the equality conditions, or the demand comparison. The intermediate milestones are stated at the strength used in the paper; the goal contains the entire four-part result.

Selected references

  • Yuan Gao and Christian Kroer, Infinite-Dimensional Fisher Markets and Tractable Fair Division, preprint arXiv:2010.03025v5, 2021; published in Operations Research, 2023. arXiv preprint.
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Information TheoryProbabilityQuantum Error Correction·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantum Tanner Codes 2: A Random Dual Tensor Code Is Δ^{3/2−ε}-Robust with Δ^γ-Resistance to Puncturing with Probability Tending to 1Research Paper

Motivation

Quantum error correction needs families of codes that protect a growing number of logical qubits while using checks that touch few physical qubits. In a quantum Tanner code, the local constraints come from two smaller binary codes. The distance analysis requires those local codes to satisfy a geometric condition called robustness: a low-weight word in a certain sum code must occupy only a controlled number of complete rows and columns. The deterministic distance theorem in Leverrier and Zémor's Quantum Tanner codes assumes this condition; their Theorem 9 supplies it for randomly chosen component codes. Establishing that random codes satisfy the assumption makes the later existence result meaningful rather than conditional on a property with no known examples.

The appendix follows the approach of Panteleev and Kalachev, Asymptotically good quantum and locally testable classical LDPC codes, with a separate treatment of puncturing. The historical relation here is limited: this mission formalizes Leverrier and Zémor's Theorem 9 and its own numbered supporting results, with their hypotheses and constants.

Setting

Fix two coordinate sets AAA and BBB, each of cardinality Δ\DeltaΔ. A binary linear code CA⊆F2AC_A\subseteq\mathbb F_2^ACA​⊆F2A​ is a vector subspace; similarly CB⊆F2BC_B\subseteq\mathbb F_2^BCB​⊆F2B​. Regard a word on A×BA\times BA×B as a matrix x=(xab)x=(x_{ab})x=(xab​). The column code contains matrices whose column at every b∈Bb\in Bb∈B belongs to CAC_ACA​. The row code contains matrices whose row at every a∈Aa\in Aa∈A belongs to CBC_BCB​. Their intersection is the tensor code CA⊗CBC_A\otimes C_BCA​⊗CB​; their sum is the dual tensor code CA⊗F2B+F2A⊗CBC_A\otimes\mathbb F_2^B+\mathbb F_2^A\otimes C_BCA​⊗F2B​+F2A​⊗CB​. The Hamming weight ∣x∣|x|∣x∣ counts its nonzero entries. These conventions are those of §3.5 of the source paper.

Write dA,dBd_A,d_BdA​,dB​ for the actual minimum distances of the two component codes. The dual tensor code is www-robust if every codeword xxx with ∣x∣≤w|x|\le w∣x∣≤w vanishes outside the union of some set of at most ∣x∣/dB|x|/d_B∣x∣/dB​ rows and some set of at most ∣x∣/dA|x|/d_A∣x∣/dA​ columns. Thus a low-weight word cannot be spread thinly across many rows and columns. For retained coordinate sets A′⊆AA'\subseteq AA′⊆A and B′⊆BB'\subseteq BB′⊆B, the punctured codes CA′C_{A'}CA′​ and CB′C_{B'}CB′​ are the images under restriction. Robustness has ppp-resistance to puncturing when the corresponding dual tensor code remains www-robust for every pair A′,B′A',B'A′,B′ of equal size obtained by removing at most ppp coordinates from each side. These are Definitions 5 and 8 on pp. 15–16 of the paper.

A uniform generator matrix with rrr rows and Δ\DeltaΔ columns is sampled uniformly from all binary matrices of that shape. Its row span is CAC_ACA​. Independently, a uniform parity-check matrix with sss rows and Δ\DeltaΔ columns defines CBC_BCB​ as its kernel. Probability is the fraction of matrices, or matrix pairs, satisfying an event. In the asymptotic statement, Δ\DeltaΔ tends through natural numbers to infinity.

Formalization targets

Random robustness and resistance

For 0<ρA,ρB<10<\rho_A,\rho_B<10<ρA​,ρB​<1, 0<ε<1/20<\varepsilon<1/20<ε<1/2, and 1/2+ε<γ<11/2+\varepsilon<\gamma<11/2+ε<γ<1, sample CAC_ACA​ and CBC_BCB​ from the matrix models above, using ⌊ρAΔ⌋\lfloor\rho_A\Delta\rfloor⌊ρA​Δ⌋ generator rows and ⌈(1−ρB)Δ⌉\lceil(1-\rho_B)\Delta\rceil⌈(1−ρB​)Δ⌉ parity-check rows. The goal, Theorem 9, is

Pr⁡ ⁣[CA⊗F2B+F2A⊗CB is Δ3/2−ε-robust with Δγ-resistance]⟶1.\Pr\!\left[C_A\otimes\mathbb F_2^B+\mathbb F_2^A\otimes C_B\text{ is }\Delta^{3/2-\varepsilon}\text{-robust with }\Delta^\gamma\text{-resistance}\right]\longrightarrow 1.Pr[CA​⊗F2B​+F2A​⊗CB​ is Δ3/2−ε-robust with Δγ-resistance]⟶1.

The milestones are the paper's numbered appendix statements: Lemma 31 converts concentration on few rows and columns into Definition 5's sharper weight-based bounds; Lemmas 24–29 address ranks and probabilities for random kernels and punctured kernels; Theorem 30 gives the quantitative high-probability alternative used before the final limit. The goal fixes the exponents and quantifies over the whole uniform matrix experiment.

Significance

Theorem 9 certifies that the robustness hypothesis needed by the paper's distance construction occurs with asymptotic probability one. It covers all allowed puncturings at once, which matters because a later distance argument deletes coordinates selected by the codeword under study. A statement about one fixed puncturing would not provide that guarantee. The result is proved in the 2022 paper; this mission poses its statements for machine-checked proofs and does not claim that those proofs already exist.

Formalizing the result produces reusable finite probability statements for random linear codes, a parity-check treatment of puncturing, and rank bounds for sparse binary matrices. Those ingredients are independent of the group complex used in the paper's other mission. They can support later formalizations of random coding arguments where a union over many coordinate restrictions is necessary.

Difficulty

The evident first check is that one fixed low-weight matrix probably does not belong to a random dual tensor code. That alone does not establish robustness: the statement ranges over all such matrices and, for resistance, over every pair of large retained coordinate sets. The paper's intermediate results control this whole collection using rank information about sparse matrices and the exact probability that independent vectors lie in a random kernel. A further issue is that puncturing a parity-check code does not simply delete columns from its defining matrix; the discarded columns contribute a random subspace. The quantitative event in Theorem 30 and the simultaneous limit in Theorem 9 both have to survive these ranges.

Formalization scope

Lean uses ZMod 2 for F2\mathbb F_2F2​, Fin \Delta for each coordinate set, and functions on A×BA\times BA×B for matrices. Rows are indexed by AAA and belong to CBC_BCB​; columns are indexed by BBB and belong to CAC_ACA​. The published TillichZemor.HGP.Setting supplies the parity-check kernel and the extended-natural minimum distance, whose value is infinity for the zero code. CodingTheory is a published prerequisite. Local definitions give the row and column codes, their sum, puncturing, robustness, uniform finite probability, generator row span, and binary entropy in bits.

The printed matrix sizes ρAΔ\rho_A\DeltaρA​Δ and (1−ρB)Δ(1-\rho_B)\Delta(1−ρB​)Δ need integer values. The chosen floor and ceiling keep their respective dimensions within the bounds used in the appendix. Every logarithm in the formalized appendix bounds means log⁡2\log_2log2​, including occurrences printed simply as log⁡\loglog. Theorem 30 includes an explicit sufficiently-large-Δ\DeltaΔ threshold, as its proof's asymptotic count requires, and carries the appendix's preceding entropy condition δ<h−1(1−ρ)\delta<h^{-1}(1-\rho)δ<h−1(1−ρ) as δ<1/2\delta<1/2δ<1/2 and h2(δ)<1−ρh_2(\delta)<1-\rhoh2​(δ)<1−ρ. Lemmas 25, 26, and 29 use the preceding condition d>2αΔd>2\alpha\Deltad>2αΔ; the symbol beside Δ\DeltaΔ in the scan is ambiguous, and the argument on p. 29 determines this reading. These choices are recorded for audit in MODERATION_NOTES.md.

The probability space is all matrices of each stated size, with the two matrices in Theorem 9 sampled independently. There is no conditioning on a favorable code or an assumed version of Theorem 30 in the goal. The mission does not formalize the later quantum Tanner code construction or the cited Gilbert–Varshamov result as an additional item. Contributions proving the goal, the numbered milestones, or reusable rank and finite-probability facts are within scope.

Selected references

  • Anthony Leverrier and Gilles Zémor, Quantum Tanner codes, arXiv:2202.13641v3, 2022. Preprint.
  • Pavel Panteleev and Gleb Kalachev, Asymptotically good quantum and locally testable classical LDPC codes, arXiv:2111.03654, 2021. Preprint.
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Graph TheoryQuantum Error CorrectionQuantum Information·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantum Tanner Codes 1: On a Ramanujan Left-Right Cayley Complex with Robust Dual Tensor Codes, the Quantum Tanner Code Has Rate at Least (1−2ρ)² and Distance at Least δn/(4Δ^{3/2+ε})Research Paper

Why quantum Tanner codes matter

An error-correcting code protects information by adding redundancy. A quantum code must also account for two kinds of errors, commonly called XXX and ZZZ errors. Quantum low-density parity-check codes use checks that each touch only a bounded number of qubits, while each qubit participates in only a bounded number of checks. Such locality matters when the number of qubits grows. For years it was difficult to make both the number of encoded qubits and the minimum distance proportional to the block length while retaining bounded-weight checks. Leverrier and Zémor's quantum Tanner construction gives a route through local codes placed on an expanding square complex; its main distance theorem is the target of this mission Leverrier and Zémor, 2022.

The construction combines two earlier ingredients. Left-right Cayley complexes provide the squares and expansion properties used by the code Dinur, Evra, Livne, Lubotzky, and Mozes, 2021. Robustness of a dual tensor code, including after puncturing coordinates, controls local words Panteleev and Kalachev, 2021. The paper states the local reduction property as Theorem 1 and derives the rate and distance bounds as Theorem 17. This mission formalizes that implication under the paper's stated component-code and expansion conditions; the separate random-code result that supplies robust examples belongs to the second mission of this series.

The square complex and its codes

Let GGG be a finite group and let A,B⊆GA,B\subseteq GA,B⊆G be inverse-closed sets, each of size Δ\DeltaΔ. The total no-conjugacy condition says ag≠gbag\ne gbag=gb for every a∈Aa\in Aa∈A, b∈Bb\in Bb∈B, and g∈Gg\in Gg∈G. Vertices are two copies of the group, V=G×{0,1}V=G\times\{0,1\}V=G×{0,1}. A square associated with v=(g,i)v=(g,i)v=(g,i) and (a,b)∈A×B(a,b)\in A\times B(a,b)∈A×B has vertices vvv, (ag,1−i)(ag,1-i)(ag,1−i), (gb,1−i)(gb,1-i)(gb,1−i), and (agb,i)(agb,i)(agb,i). The set of squares is QQQ, and a binary word on QQQ has length n=∣Q∣n=|Q|n=∣Q∣. At a vertex vvv, the incident squares are indexed by A×BA\times BA×B; this indexing makes the local view xvx_vxv​ of a word x∈F2Qx\in\mathbb F_2^Qx∈F2Q​ an A×BA\times BA×B matrix Leverrier and Zémor, §§3.2 and 4.1.

A binary linear code CAC_ACA​ has coordinates indexed by AAA, and CBC_BCB​ has coordinates indexed by BBB. Their tensor code CA⊗CBC_A\otimes C_BCA​⊗CB​ consists of matrices whose columns lie in CAC_ACA​ and whose rows lie in CBC_BCB​. The dual tensor code CA⊗F2B+F2A⊗CBC_A\otimes\mathbb F_2^B+\mathbb F_2^A\otimes C_BCA​⊗F2B​+F2A​⊗CB​ is the sum of the column and row codes. In Definition 5, it is www-robust when every member of weight at most www is supported on a union of few rows and columns, with the bounds determined by the two component minimum distances. Definition 8 requires this property after deleting up to ppp coordinates from each side. These are conditions on all relevant codewords and all permitted puncturings, including the unpunctured pair Leverrier and Zémor, pp. 15–16.

The two Tanner codes are C0=T(G0□,(CA⊗CB)⊥)\mathcal C_0=T(\mathcal G^\square_0,(C_A\otimes C_B)^\perp)C0​=T(G0□​,(CA​⊗CB​)⊥) and C1=T(G1□,(CA⊥⊗CB⊥)⊥)\mathcal C_1=T(\mathcal G^\square_1,(C_A^\perp\otimes C_B^\perp)^\perp)C1​=T(G1□​,(CA⊥​⊗CB⊥​)⊥). Here Gi□\mathcal G^\square_iGi□​ is the square-adjacency graph on the vertices in copy iii. Together they define the quantum CSS code Q=(C0,C1)\mathcal Q=(\mathcal C_0,\mathcal C_1)Q=(C0​,C1​). Its dimension counts encoded qubits. Its distance is the smaller of the minimum weights in C0∖C1⊥\mathcal C_0\setminus\mathcal C_1^\perpC0​∖C1⊥​ and C1∖C0⊥\mathcal C_1\setminus\mathcal C_0^\perpC1​∖C0⊥​ Leverrier and Zémor, pp. 14, 18.

Formalization targets

The goal is Theorem 17. Fix 0<ρ<1/20<\rho<1/20<ρ<1/2, 0<ε<1/20<\varepsilon<1/20<ε<1/2, 1/2+ε<γ<11/2+\varepsilon<\gamma<11/2+ε<γ<1, and δ>0\delta>0δ>0. For sufficiently large Δ\DeltaΔ, take a left-right Cayley complex satisfying total no-conjugacy and the paper's Ramanujan conditions. Require 0<dim⁡CA≤ρΔ0<\dim C_A\le\rho\Delta0<dimCA​≤ρΔ, dim⁡CB=Δ−dim⁡CA\dim C_B=\Delta-\dim C_AdimCB​=Δ−dimCA​, minimum distance at least δΔ\delta\DeltaδΔ for CA,CBC_A,C_BCA​,CB​ and both duals, and Δ3/2−ε/2\Delta^{3/2-\varepsilon/2}Δ3/2−ε/2 robustness with Δγ\Delta^\gammaΔγ resistance to puncturing for both relevant dual tensor codes. The target is

k≥(1−2ρ)2n,d≥δn4Δ3/2+ε.k\ge (1-2\rho)^2 n,\qquad d\ge \frac{\delta n}{4\Delta^{3/2+\varepsilon}}.k≥(1−2ρ)2n,d≥4Δ3/2+εδn​.

The milestones mirror the paper's route to this result. Lemma 4 bounds the nontrivial eigenvalues of the union and square graphs. Propositions 6 and 7 turn dual-tensor robustness into a decomposition and a 3/23/23/2 closeness bound. Theorem 1 supplies a weight-reducing local codeword for every sufficiently light nonzero Tanner-code word. Display (5) supplies the dimension lower bound. Theorem 17 combines the two distance directions with that rate estimate Leverrier and Zémor, pp. 12, 15–16, 18–23.

What the result supplies

The lower bound on kkk ensures a positive fraction of qubits can carry logical information when ρ<1/2\rho<1/2ρ<1/2. The lower bound on ddd rules out small undetectable logical errors. For a fixed allowable degree Δ\DeltaΔ, both bounds scale linearly with nnn. The paper also shows that random component codes can satisfy the robustness assumptions; that probabilistic result is a separate formalization target Leverrier and Zémor, Theorems 9 and 17.

A checked development would make explicit how the square indexing, duals, punctured codes, and CSS quotient fit together. The source proves the mathematical result; the statements here remain open Lean theorems. Reusable contributions include the tensor-code interface, spectral bounds for the graph construction, and lemmas connecting local views to the global Tanner codes. A proof of the existence of infinite Ramanujan complex families is outside this mission's stated target.

Where the proof is difficult

A light global codeword need not have a local view that is itself close to a tensor-code word. Some square-graph vertices have unusually large local weight, and puncturing is needed to isolate coordinates shared with those exceptional vertices. The paper's small-set expansion estimates and robustness conditions control those interactions. Simply averaging local weights does not yield the weight-reducing local codeword asserted by Theorem 1 Leverrier and Zémor, §4.2.

Formalization scope

Words are functions into ZMod 2, codes are submodules, and a matrix is a function on A×BA\times BA×B with AAA indexing rows. The square coordinates are four-element vertex sets. The construction uses V=G×Fin⁡(2)V=G\times\operatorname{Fin}(2)V=G×Fin(2) and counts nnn as the number of squares rather than building n=Δ2∣G∣/2n=\Delta^2|G|/2n=Δ2∣G∣/2 into a definition. The minimum distance of the zero code is infinity, and robustness uses inequalities involving that extended value. Powers of Δ\DeltaΔ and the parameters w,pw,pw,p are real; the paper uses integer w,pw,pw,p in Definition 8, while the theorem's power thresholds need real comparisons. The formal robustness predicate includes Definition 5's range 0≤w≤Δ20\le w\le\Delta^20≤w≤Δ2; the theorem thresholds satisfy it for sufficiently large Δ\DeltaΔ. These conventions are recorded with each item.

The goal quantifies over every finite complex satisfying inverse closure, total no-conjugacy, and Ramanujan conditions, with a uniform threshold Δ0\Delta_0Δ0​ chosen before the group and codes. This pins the complexes in the cited infinite family without formalizing their existence. In particular, the goal contains no auxiliary set or local reduction assumption that could make the distance bound immediate. The published CodingTheory and TillichZemor.HGP.Setting definitions supply dual codes and CSS dimension; the paper-specific setting supplies the square complex, local views, Tanner codes, and robustness. Contributions that keep these conventions and close any milestone theorem are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Leverrier and G. Zémor, Quantum Tanner codes, arXiv preprint, 2022. arXiv:2202.13641v3.
  • I. Dinur, S. Evra, R. Livne, A. Lubotzky, and S. Mozes, Locally Testable Codes with constant rate, distance, and locality, arXiv preprint, 2021. arXiv:2111.04808.
  • P. Panteleev and G. Kalachev, Asymptotically good quantum and locally testable classical LDPC codes, arXiv preprint, 2021. arXiv:2111.03654.
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Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Real-Time Spatial–Intertemporal Pricing and Relocation in a Ride-Hailing Network: Near-Optimal Policies and the Value of Dynamic Pricing 1: Arc Balancing Control Has Loss O(log(1+n)^{3/2}/n^{2/3})Research Paper

Why spatial pricing needs a dynamic control

A ride-hailing firm chooses prices while drivers move through a city. A trip from one region uses a driver immediately and returns that driver at another region only after a travel delay. Prices affect which trips are requested, but the actual requests fluctuate. A plan that ignores these fluctuations can run out of available drivers at a busy origin even when its average flows fit the fleet. Chen, Lei, and Jasin study how closely a feasible pricing control can approach a deterministic revenue benchmark in this setting (accepted manuscript, published article).

Their Arc Balancing Control (ABC) responds to realized trips. It groups each directed arc's periods into batches and adjusts the next batch's demand rates according to the previous batch's cumulative surplus or deficit. The paper proves a loss rate for ABC that is smaller than the rate established there for its Static Price Control. The target here is the paper's Theorem 3, with the model and parameters of its authors' accepted manuscript. Its e-companion contains the paper's proofs.

The pricing network and benchmark

The network has N≥1N\ge1N≥1 regions and a horizon of T≥1T\ge1T≥1 periods. Every ordered pair i→ji\to ji→j, including i=ji=ji=j, is an arc. At most one customer can request an arc's trip in a period. A served trip takes one server from region iii for τij≥1\tau_{ij}\ge1τij​≥1 periods, then returns it at jjj. Region iii starts with Ci≥NC_i\ge NCi​≥N servers. A control must respect the available server count before it serves each period's realized requests.

The decision is a demand rate λt,ij∈[0,1]\lambda_{t,ij}\in[0,1]λt,ij​∈[0,1] rather than its inverse price. The expected revenue from that arc and period is rt,ij(λt,ij)r_{t,ij}(\lambda_{t,ij})rt,ij​(λt,ij​). The revenue functions are nonnegative and strongly concave, vanish at zero, and have bounded first and second derivatives. The bound on those derivatives is Ψ3>0\Psi_3>0Ψ3​>0. The paper's price-side assumptions imply these rate-side conditions; the Lean model states the conditions directly.

The deterministic convex program DCP(ζ)\mathrm{DCP}(\zeta)DCP(ζ) chooses rates to maximize the sum of expected revenues. Its flow constraints replace realized trips with their rates, while its cushion requires ζ≤λt,ij≤1−ζ\zeta\le\lambda_{t,ij}\le1-\zetaζ≤λt,ij​≤1−ζ. Write J(ζ)J(\zeta)J(ζ) for its value and λζ,D\lambda^{\zeta,D}λζ,D for an optimal schedule. In the nnnth system, the fleet, horizon, and travel times are multiplied by nnn; each original period's revenue curve is used for nnn consecutive scaled periods. Thus Tn=nTT^n=nTTn=nT and τ‾n=nmin⁡i,jτij\underline\tau^n=n\min_{i,j}\tau_{ij}τ​n=nmini,j​τij​. For a control π\piπ, the per-period benchmark loss is

Lπ(n)=J(n,0)−Eπ[Rπ(n)]Tn.L^\pi(n)=\frac{J(n,0)-\mathbb E^\pi[R^\pi(n)]}{T^n}.Lπ(n)=TnJ(n,0)−Eπ[Rπ(n)]​.

ABC uses λn,ζ,D\lambda^{n,\zeta,D}λn,ζ,D as its baseline. Its batches have a target sum bbb of the baseline variance weights λt,ijn,ζ,D(1−λt,ijn,ζ,D)\lambda^{n,\zeta,D}_{t,ij}(1-\lambda^{n,\zeta,D}_{t,ij})λt,ijn,ζ,D​(1−λt,ijn,ζ,D​). Within a batch, the control subtracts a weighted share of the preceding batch's realized surplus δˉijk=∑t∈Tijk(Dt,ij−λt,ijABC)\bar\delta^k_{ij}=\sum_{t\in\mathcal T^k_{ij}}(D_{t,ij}-\lambda^{ABC}_{t,ij})δˉijk​=∑t∈Tijk​​(Dt,ij​−λt,ijABC​). A rate is projected to [0,1][0,1][0,1], and an origin with too few available servers is turned off. The finite path law uses the rates posted along each path.

Formalization targets

The principal target is Theorem 3. With bn=(τ‾n)2/3b_n=(\underline\tau^n)^{2/3}bn​=(τ​n)2/3 and

ϵn=(τ‾n)−1(1+162(bn+1)log⁡Tn),ζn=2ϵn,\epsilon_n=(\underline\tau^n)^{-1}\left(1+16\sqrt{2(b_n+1)\log T^n}\right),\qquad \zeta_n=2\epsilon_n,ϵn​=(τ​n)−1(1+162(bn​+1)logTn​),ζn​=2ϵn​,

there is a constant Ψ~2\widetilde\Psi_2Ψ2​, independent of nnn, for which every integer n≥1n\ge1n≥1 satisfies

LABC(n)≤Ψ~2log⁡(1+n)3/2n2/3.L^{ABC}(n)\le\widetilde\Psi_2\frac{\log(1+n)^{3/2}}{n^{2/3}}.LABC(n)≤Ψ2​n2/3log(1+n)3/2​.

The milestone list follows the source results used in the analysis: Lemma 2 bounds the deterministic cost of a small cushion and gives feasibility; Lemma EC.1 bounds a maximal cumulative Bernoulli deviation; and the two parts of Lemma 4 characterize ABC on a batchwise good event A\mathcal AA and bound that event's probability. Theorem 3 fixes the complete control and these exact parameters; its constant may depend on the fixed network instance and Ψ3\Psi_3Ψ3​.

What the result establishes

The theorem gives a finite-nnn loss bound relative to J(n,0)J(n,0)J(n,0), with the stated n−2/3n^{-2/3}n−2/3 rate and logarithmic factor. In the paper, Lemma 1 shows that J(n,0)J(n,0)J(n,0) bounds the optimal admissible policy's revenue. Theorem 3 therefore bounds ABC's distance from a benchmark that is at least as high as the unknown stochastic optimum. The paper compares this rate with its n−1/2n^{-1/2}n−1/2 result for Static Price Control and explains the resulting value of adapting prices to realized demand (Theorems 2–3).

The published mathematical result and its manuscript proof are known; the statements in this mission are Lean targets with proofs still to be formalized. A complete development would also make reusable definitions for finite controlled path laws, delayed network flow balance, and cushioned deterministic relaxations. The batch and feedback definitions isolate the paper-specific control from that general infrastructure.

Main difficulty

The deterministic program controls expected flows, while ABC must keep every realized path feasible. An unadjusted baseline can accumulate demand fluctuations over the whole horizon; bounding those fluctuations alone does not describe the effect of ABC's feedback. The control's posted rate in a period depends on earlier realized requests, which changes the distribution of later requests. The manuscript's proof of Lemma 4 bounds a variance proxy from its deterministic baseline when treating the adaptive posted rates; that step needs separate justification in a formal proof. Lemma EC.1, as posed here, covers deterministic Bernoulli rates and does not by itself close that gap. The finite-horizon claim, including small scaling factors for which the cushioned DCP may be infeasible, must still be established.

Formalization scope

Lean represents regions by Fin N, periods by natural numbers 1,…,T1,\ldots,T1,…,T, travel times and server counts by naturals, demand by Boolean paths, and revenue and rates by real numbers. The DCP(n,ζ)\mathrm{DCP}(n,\zeta)DCP(n,ζ) program uses a real supremum; statements involving positive ζ\zetaζ assert feasibility, and J(n,0)J(n,0)J(n,0) has the zero schedule as a feasible point. ABC's path law is the product of sequential Bernoulli factors at its own posted rates. Its rate history is built by structural recursion, and the event A\mathcal AA checks every nonempty batch and all its partial sums.

The accepted manuscript leaves the final incomplete batch unspecified, so the last short batch is merged with its predecessor. The printed ABC box turns an origin off at Ct,i≤NC_{t,i}\le NCt,i​≤N, while Lemma 4 and its base case require service when Ct,i=NC_{t,i}=NCt,i​=N; the formal control uses Ct,i≥NC_{t,i}\ge NCt,i​≥N. If the cushioned DCP has no optimum, the baseline is zero. The sample-path part of Lemma 4 adds the hypothesis τ‾≤T\underline\tau\le Tτ​≤T, which the manuscript does not print. Without it the part is false: when the horizon is shorter than every travel time, no server returns, and a single realized trip can leave a region below NNN servers on the good event. These conventions are recorded with the source discrepancies in the moderation notes. The rate model drops assumptions A1 and A3(i), which concern only the price parametrization, and writes A2, A3(ii), r≥0r\ge0r≥0, and r(0)=0r(0)=0r(0)=0 directly. It assumes a twice continuously differentiable extension of revenue to R\mathbb RR. No statement substitutes expected demand for the realized batch surplus or lets the theorem's parameters depend on nnn by existential choice. Contributions toward the source milestones, the adaptive concentration step, and the reusable model definitions are all within scope.

Selected references

  • Q. Chen, Y. Lei, and S. Jasin, Real-Time Spatial-Intertemporal Pricing and Relocation in a Ride-Hailing Network: Near Optimal Heuristics and The Value of Dynamic Pricing, authors' accepted manuscript, LBS Research Online eprint 2845, pp. 7–25 and ec2–ec6; published as Real-Time Spatial–Intertemporal Pricing and Relocation in a Ride-Hailing Network: Near-Optimal Policies and the Value of Dynamic Pricing, Operations Research 72(5):2097–2118, 2024. Manuscript, DOI.
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Numerical AnalysisOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A First-Order Primal-Dual Method for Nonconvex Constrained Optimization Based on the Augmented Lagrangian 4: Metric Subregularity of ∂L_γ Implies the VP-EB Error BoundResearch Paper

Motivation

Many problems in signal processing, statistics and engineering design have the form of a nonconvex, possibly nonsmooth objective subject to nonlinear equality constraints. Zhu, Zhao and Zhang (arXiv:2007.12219v1, 2020; published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024) propose NAPP-AL, a first-order primal-dual method that takes one linearized step on the augmented Lagrangian per iteration. Their analysis has three layers: subsequential convergence with an o(1/k)o(1/\sqrt k)o(1/k​) stationarity rate (§4), linear convergence under a new value proximity error bound (VP-EB, §5), and sufficient conditions for VP-EB (§6).

This mission formalizes the second sufficient condition: metric subregularity of the stationarity map, together with a local value condition on nearby stationary points, implies VP-EB. Metric subregularity is a standard regularity notion of variational analysis (Dontchev–Rockafellar), and error bounds of this kind are the classical route to linear convergence (Luo–Tseng). The paper attributes the cost-to-go inequality it relies on to Tseng and Yun [18]. A companion mission treats the KL-property route (Proposition 6.1); a third proves linear convergence from VP-EB (Theorem 5.1).

Setting

Write w=(u,v,p)∈Rn×Rd×Rmw=(u,v,p)\in\mathbb R^n\times\mathbb R^d\times\mathbb R^mw=(u,v,p)∈Rn×Rd×Rm with the Euclidean norm of the stacked vector, ∥w∥=∥u∥2+∥v∥2+∥p∥2\|w\|=\sqrt{\|u\|^2+\|v\|^2+\|p\|^2}∥w∥=∥u∥2+∥v∥2+∥p∥2​, and B(wˉ;η)\mathbb B(\bar w;\eta)B(wˉ;η) the open ball. The problem (P) is

min⁡u∈U, v∈Rd F(u,v)=G(u,v)+J(u)+H(v)s.t.Θ(u)+Bv=0,Θ=Ω+Φ,\min_{u\in U,\,v\in\mathbb R^d}\ F(u,v)=G(u,v)+J(u)+H(v)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad \Theta(u)+Bv=0,\qquad \Theta=\Omega+\Phi,u∈U,v∈Rdmin​ F(u,v)=G(u,v)+J(u)+H(v)s.t.Θ(u)+Bv=0,Θ=Ω+Φ,

with G,HG,HG,H smooth with Lipschitz gradients, JJJ lower semicontinuous and locally Lipschitz near UUU, UUU closed and convex, Θ\ThetaΘ Lipschitz, each component of Ω\OmegaΩ with Lipschitz gradient, and BBB an m×dm\times dm×d matrix of full column rank with Im Θ⊆Im B\mathrm{Im}\,\Theta\subseteq\mathrm{Im}\,BImΘ⊆ImB; FFF is bounded below and coercive on the feasible set (Assumption 1).

The augmented Lagrangian is Lγ(w)=F(u,v)+⟨p,Θ(u)+Bv⟩+γ2∥Θ(u)+Bv∥2\mathcal L_\gamma(w)=F(u,v)+\langle p,\Theta(u)+Bv\rangle+\tfrac\gamma2\|\Theta(u)+Bv\|^2Lγ​(w)=F(u,v)+⟨p,Θ(u)+Bv⟩+2γ​∥Θ(u)+Bv∥2. The set ∂Lγ(w)\partial\mathcal L_\gamma(w)∂Lγ​(w) is the KKT display of p. 6: with r=Θ(u)+Bvr=\Theta(u)+Bvr=Θ(u)+Bv, it collects the triples

(∇uG+∂J(u)+NU(u)+(∇Θ(u))⊤[p+γr],  ∇vG+∇H(v)+B⊤[p+γr],  r),\big(\nabla_uG+\partial J(u)+N_U(u)+(\nabla\Theta(u))^\top[p+\gamma r],\ \ \nabla_vG+\nabla H(v)+B^\top[p+\gamma r],\ \ r\big),(∇u​G+∂J(u)+NU​(u)+(∇Θ(u))⊤[p+γr],  ∇v​G+∇H(v)+B⊤[p+γr],  r),

with ∂J\partial J∂J the limiting subdifferential and NUN_UNU​ the normal cone. A point is stationary if 0∈∂Lγ(w)0\in\partial\mathcal L_\gamma(w)0∈∂Lγ​(w); Wˉ\bar{\mathbf W}Wˉ is the set of stationary points. Distances follow the paper's convention: dist(x,C)=inf⁡z∈C∥x−z∥\mathrm{dist}(x,C)=\inf_{z\in C}\|x-z\|dist(x,C)=infz∈C​∥x−z∥, and dist(x,∅)=+∞\mathrm{dist}(x,\emptyset)=+\inftydist(x,∅)=+∞.

NAPP-AL keeps qk=pk+γ(Θ(uk)+Bvk)q^k=p^k+\gamma(\Theta(u^k)+Bv^k)qk=pk+γ(Θ(uk)+Bvk), takes uk+1u^{k+1}uk+1 as a global minimizer over UUU of a linearized model with a Bregman term D(u,uk)/ϵkD(u,u^k)/\epsilon^kD(u,uk)/ϵk, vk+1v^{k+1}vk+1 as the minimizer of a strongly convex quadratic, and sets pk+1=pk+γ(Θ(uk+1)+Bvk+1)p^{k+1}=p^k+\gamma(\Theta(u^{k+1})+Bv^{k+1})pk+1=pk+γ(Θ(uk+1)+Bvk+1). The step ϵk\epsilon^kϵk lies in [σδk,δk][\sigma\delta_k,\delta_k][σδk​,δk​] with δk\delta_kδk​ given explicitly by (8), and γ>(57+1)(LG+LH)/(2λmin⁡(B⊤B))\gamma>(\sqrt{57}+1)(L_G+L_H)/(2\lambda_{\min}(B^\top B))γ>(57​+1)(LG​+LH​)/(2λmin​(B⊤B)) (Assumption 2).

VP-EB at wˉ\bar wwˉ (Definition 5.1): there are κ1,η,ν>0\kappa_1,\eta,\nu>0κ1​,η,ν>0 such that Lγ(wk+1)−Lγ(wˉ)≤κ1∥wk−wk+1∥2\mathcal L_\gamma(w^{k+1})-\mathcal L_\gamma(\bar w)\le\kappa_1\|w^k-w^{k+1}\|^2Lγ​(wk+1)−Lγ​(wˉ)≤κ1​∥wk−wk+1∥2 whenever wk+1∈B(wˉ;η)w^{k+1}\in\mathbb B(\bar w;\eta)wk+1∈B(wˉ;η) and Lγ(wk+1)<Lγ(wˉ)+ν\mathcal L_\gamma(w^{k+1})<\mathcal L_\gamma(\bar w)+\nuLγ​(wk+1)<Lγ​(wˉ)+ν.

Metric subregularity (Definition 6.2): ∂Lγ\partial\mathcal L_\gamma∂Lγ​ is metrically subregular around (wˉ,0)(\bar w,0)(wˉ,0) if, for some η,κ3>0\eta,\kappa_3>0η,κ3​>0, dist(w,Wˉ)≤κ3 dist(0,∂Lγ(w))\mathrm{dist}(w,\bar{\mathbf W})\le\kappa_3\,\mathrm{dist}(0,\partial\mathcal L_\gamma(w))dist(w,Wˉ)≤κ3​dist(0,∂Lγ​(w)) for all w∈B(wˉ;η)w\in\mathbb B(\bar w;\eta)w∈B(wˉ;η). Assumption 3 at a stationary wˉ∈Wˉ\bar w\in\bar{\mathbf W}wˉ∈Wˉ: for some δ>0\delta>0δ>0, Lγ(w)≤Lγ(wˉ)\mathcal L_\gamma(w)\le\mathcal L_\gamma(\bar w)Lγ​(w)≤Lγ​(wˉ) for all w∈Wˉw\in\bar{\mathbf W}w∈Wˉ with ∥w−wˉ∥≤δ\|w-\bar w\|\le\delta∥w−wˉ∥≤δ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 6.2 (p. 26)

Let {wk}\{w^k\}{wk} be generated by NAPP-AL in the standing setting and let wˉ\bar wwˉ be a cluster point. If Assumption 3 holds at wˉ\bar wwˉ with δ\deltaδ, and ∂Lγ\partial\mathcal L_\gamma∂Lγ​ is metrically subregular around (wˉ,0)(\bar w,0)(wˉ,0) with κ3>0\kappa_3>0κ3​>0 and η>0\eta>0η>0, η<δ\eta<\deltaη<δ, then

∃ κ1,η′,ν>0:wk+1∈B(wˉ;η′), Lγ(wk+1)<Lγ(wˉ)+ν ⟹ Lγ(wk+1)−Lγ(wˉ)≤κ1∥wk−wk+1∥2.\exists\,\kappa_1,\eta',\nu>0:\quad w^{k+1}\in\mathbb B(\bar w;\eta'),\ \mathcal L_\gamma(w^{k+1})<\mathcal L_\gamma(\bar w)+\nu\ \Longrightarrow\ \mathcal L_\gamma(w^{k+1})-\mathcal L_\gamma(\bar w)\le\kappa_1\|w^k-w^{k+1}\|^2 .∃κ1​,η′,ν>0:wk+1∈B(wˉ;η′), Lγ​(wk+1)<Lγ​(wˉ)+ν ⟹ Lγ​(wk+1)−Lγ​(wˉ)≤κ1​∥wk−wk+1∥2.

The constants are existential, as in Definition 5.1, so the statement survives any improvement of them.

Milestone: Lemma 6.1 (p. 23), the cost-to-go inequality

∀wˉ∈Wˉ  ∃ c6>0  ∀k:Lγ(wk+1)−Lγ(wˉ)≤c6(∥wˉ−wk+1∥2+∥wk−wk+1∥2).\forall\bar w\in\bar{\mathbf W}\ \ \exists\,c_6>0\ \ \forall k:\quad \mathcal L_\gamma(w^{k+1})-\mathcal L_\gamma(\bar w)\le c_6\big(\|\bar w-w^{k+1}\|^2+\|w^k-w^{k+1}\|^2\big).∀wˉ∈Wˉ  ∃c6​>0  ∀k:Lγ​(wk+1)−Lγ​(wˉ)≤c6​(∥wˉ−wk+1∥2+∥wk−wk+1∥2).

Significance

The result. Combined with Theorem 5.1 of the paper, Proposition 6.2 gives finite length, convergence of the whole sequence, Q-linear convergence of the potential and R-linear convergence of the iterates whenever the stationarity map is metrically subregular at the limit and Assumption 3 holds there. Metric subregularity is known for broad classes, such as piecewise linear-quadratic problems and polyhedral multifunctions, so the proposition turns a structural property of the problem into a rate for this algorithm.

Formalizing it. The proposition is proved on paper; nothing about NAPP-AL has a machine-checked proof. The formalization makes two things exact that the paper leaves loose. First, the proposition’s proof needs a cost-to-go constant independent of the stationary point, and the proof of Lemma 6.1 supplies one even though the lemma’s printed statement fixes the point first. Second, the proposition's proof places the nearest stationary point wpk+1w_p^{k+1}wpk+1​ in B(wˉ;η)\mathbb B(\bar w;\eta)B(wˉ;η), while only ∥wpk+1−wˉ∥≤2η\|w_p^{k+1}-\bar w\|\le 2\eta∥wpk+1​−wˉ∥≤2η follows from its steps; the existential conclusion leaves room to shrink the radius. A formal proof settles both, and the general facts it needs (metric subregularity in [0,+∞][0,+\infty][0,+∞], closedness of limiting-subdifferential graphs) are reusable.

Difficulty

The obvious route is to combine subregularity with the residual bound of Theorem 4.1(iv), dist(0,∂Lγ(wk+1))≤c5∥wk−wk+1∥\mathrm{dist}(0,\partial\mathcal L_\gamma(w^{k+1}))\le c_5\|w^k-w^{k+1}\|dist(0,∂Lγ​(wk+1))≤c5​∥wk−wk+1∥, which bounds the distance from wk+1w^{k+1}wk+1 to Wˉ\bar{\mathbf W}Wˉ by the step. The difficulty is transferring a distance bound into a value bound of second order: local Lipschitz continuity of Lγ\mathcal L_\gammaLγ​ would bound Lγ(wk+1)−Lγ(wp)\mathcal L_\gamma(w^{k+1})-\mathcal L_\gamma(w_p)Lγ​(wk+1)−Lγ​(wp​) only by a multiple of ∥wk+1−wp∥\|w^{k+1}-w_p\|∥wk+1−wp​∥, which is first order in the step, while VP-EB asks for the square; and JJJ is nonsmooth and nonconvex, so no Taylor expansion at the stationary point is available. Moreover, the stationary point closest to wk+1w^{k+1}wk+1 changes with kkk. The proposition’s proof needs a cost-to-go inequality with a constant uniform over stationary points, which in turn rests on the boundedness of the iterates and on the lower bound for ϵk\epsilon^kϵk coming from (8). The radius bookkeeping between the subregularity ball, Assumption 3's radius and the VP-EB ball is a second, smaller obstacle.

Formalization scope

Rk\mathbb R^kRk is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin k) and points are triples E n × E d × E m; every norm and ball uses the stacked Euclidean norm tnorm, never Lean's product (sup) norm. BBB is a continuous linear map with its operator norm (the spectral norm), never a Matrix with the entrywise norm; λmin⁡(B⊤B)\lambda_{\min}(B^\top B)λmin​(B⊤B) is the Rayleigh minimum over the unit sphere. Distances dist(0,S)\mathrm{dist}(0,S)dist(0,S) and dist(w,S)\mathrm{dist}(w,S)dist(w,S) are infima in [0,+∞][0,+\infty][0,+∞], equal to +∞+\infty+∞ on the empty set; Metric.infDist, which returns 000 on ∅\emptyset∅ and would make subregularity and the residual bounds trivial, is not used. The normal cone NU(u)N_U(u)NU​(u) is empty for u∉Uu\notin Uu∈/U, so a nonempty normal cone off UUU cannot manufacture stationary points. (H3)'s local Lipschitz continuity is read on neighbourhoods in Rn\mathbb R^nRn of points of UUU, not Mathlib's relative LocallyLipschitzOn.

Disclosed readings of the arXiv v1 text: G,J,HG,J,HG,J,H are real-valued with globally Lipschitz gradients; λmin⁡(B⊤B)>0\lambda_{\min}(B^\top B)>0λmin​(B⊤B)>0; NAPP-AL is a relation on given sequences (any global minimizer may be selected; existence is not asserted); VP-EB is the inequality alone, without Definition 5.1's presupposition that the sequence converges to wˉ\bar wwˉ; "generated by NAPP-AL" in Lemma 6.1 and Proposition 6.2 carries the standing setting of Theorem 4.1 (Assumptions 1–2 and rule (8)); Lemma 6.1 follows the printed quantifier order; its proof supplies the uniform constant needed by Proposition 6.2. The radius of Assumption 3 is δ3 in Lean, distinct from the step sequence δk\delta_kδk​.

Welcome contributions: a proof of Lemma 6.1 from the optimality of (5)–(6), Lipschitz estimates and the bounds of Theorem 4.1(ii); the boundedness and residual results of Theorem 4.1 (formalized in the companion mission on the o(1/k)o(1/\sqrt k)o(1/k​) rate); closedness of Wˉ\bar{\mathbf W}Wˉ; and the radius argument of Proposition 6.2. The source is arXiv:2007.12219v1; numbering and constants of the published version are not used.

Selected references

  • D. Zhu, L. Zhao, S. Zhang, A First-Order Primal-Dual Method for Nonconvex Constrained Optimization Based on the Augmented Lagrangian, arXiv:2007.12219v1, 2020; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.12219v1
  • P. Tseng, S. Yun, A coordinate gradient descent method for nonsmooth separable minimization, Mathematical Programming 117, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-007-0170-0
  • Z.-Q. Luo, P. Tseng, Error bounds and convergence analysis of feasible descent methods: a general approach, Annals of Operations Research 46, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02096261
  • A. L. Dontchev, R. T. Rockafellar, Implicit Functions and Solution Mappings, 2nd ed., Springer, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-1037-3
  • R. T. Rockafellar, R. J.-B. Wets, Variational Analysis, Springer, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02431-3
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Machine LearningOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Subset Selection with Shrinkage: Sparse Linear Modeling When the SNR Is Low V: When the SNR Is Low, Best Subset Selection Has Prediction Error at Least of Order σ²γ²k log(ep/k)Research Paper

Why a lower bound for best subsets

Best subset selection fits a linear model by least squares using at most kkk of ppp available predictors. It is the classical ℓ0\ell_0ℓ0​-constrained estimator of sparse regression. Mixed-integer optimization now computes it for problems with thousands of variables (Bertsimas, King & Mazumder 2016), so its statistical behaviour matters in practice. Simulations in Hastie, Tibshirani & Tibshirani 2020 found that it predicts worse than shrinkage methods such as the Lasso when the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is low.

Mazumder, Radchenko and Dedieu (arXiv:1708.03288v4; Operations Research, 2023) add an ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ or ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​ shrinkage penalty to best subsets. They prove upper bounds of two kinds: slow rates, linear in the tuning parameter λ\lambdaλ, and fast rates, quadratic in λ\lambdaλ. Theorems 2 and 3 of the paper give them for the shrunken estimators. For best subsets, the paper only has a fast-rate bound, of order σ2klog⁡(ep/k)\sigma^2 k\log(ep/k)σ2klog(ep/k). When ∥β∗∥/σ\|\beta^*\|/\sigma∥β∗∥/σ is small, the shrunken estimators' slow rate beats that bound. Theorem 4, the goal of this mission, shows that the comparison is meaningful: in that regime best subsets really does incur an error of the order of its upper bound.

Setting

The data follow the linear model

y=Xβ∗+ϵ,y,ϵ∈Rn, β∗∈Rp,y = X\beta^* + \epsilon ,\qquad y,\epsilon\in\mathbb R^n,\ \beta^*\in\mathbb R^p ,y=Xβ∗+ϵ,y,ϵ∈Rn, β∗∈Rp,

where the design XXX is a deterministic real n×pn\times pn×p matrix whose columns have unit Euclidean norm. The noise ϵ\epsilonϵ has independent N(0,σ2)N(0,\sigma^2)N(0,σ2) entries, with σ>0\sigma>0σ>0. Write ∥v∥\|v\|∥v∥ for the Euclidean norm, ∥v∥1=∑i∣vi∣\|v\|_1=\sum_i|v_i|∥v∥1​=∑i​∣vi​∣, supp⁡(v)={i:vi≠0}\operatorname{supp}(v)=\{i:v_i\ne0\}supp(v)={i:vi​=0} and ∥v∥0=∣supp⁡(v)∣\|v\|_0=|\operatorname{supp}(v)|∥v∥0​=∣supp(v)∣. The ℓ0\ell_0ℓ0​ ball is B0(s)={u∈Rp:∥u∥0≤s}B_0(s)=\{u\in\mathbb R^p:\|u\|_0\le s\}B0​(s)={u∈Rp:∥u∥0​≤s}. The minimal sss-sparse eigenvalue of XXX is

γs=min⁡u≠0, u∈B0(s)∥Xu∥∥u∥.\gamma_s=\min_{u\ne0,\ u\in B_0(s)}\frac{\|Xu\|}{\|u\|} .γs​=u=0, u∈B0​(s)min​∥u∥∥Xu∥​.

A best-subsets solution of size kkk is any minimizer

β^ℓ0∈arg⁡min⁡ ∥y−Xβ∥2s.t.∥β∥0≤k.(1)\hat\beta_{\ell_0}\in\arg\min\ \|y-X\beta\|^2\quad\text{s.t.}\quad\|\beta\|_0\le k .\tag{1}β^​ℓ0​​∈argmin ∥y−Xβ∥2s.t.∥β∥0​≤k.(1)

A constant is universal if it does not depend on n,p,k,X,σ,β∗n,p,k,X,\sigma,\beta^*n,p,k,X,σ,β∗. The symbols ≲\lesssim≲ and ≳\gtrsim≳ mean ≤\le≤ and ≥\ge≥ up to positive universal factors. Logarithms are natural, and e=exp⁡(1)e=\exp(1)e=exp(1).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (p. 18)

There are universal constants c0,c,C>0c_0,c,C>0c0​,c,C>0 such that the following holds. Suppose 2≤k≤p2\le k\le p2≤k≤p, ∥β∗∥0≤k\|\beta^*\|_0\le k∥β∗∥0​≤k and ∥β∗∥≤c0σγkklog⁡(ep/k)\|\beta^*\|\le c_0\sigma\gamma_k\sqrt{k\log(ep/k)}∥β∗∥≤c0​σγk​klog(ep/k)​. Then, with probability at least 1−2(ep/k)−cγk2k−(ep/k)−k1-2(ep/k)^{-c\gamma_k^2k}-(ep/k)^{-k}1−2(ep/k)−cγk2​k−(ep/k)−k, every best-subsets solution satisfies

∥Xβ^ℓ0−Xβ∗∥2 ≥ C σ2γk2 klog⁡(ep/k).\|X\hat\beta_{\ell_0}-X\beta^*\|^2\ \ge\ C\,\sigma^2\gamma_k^2\,k\log(ep/k).∥Xβ^​ℓ0​​−Xβ∗∥2 ≥ Cσ2γk2​klog(ep/k).

The constants are left unfixed, as in the paper. The statement asserts the order of the error, which is what the comparison with the upper bounds needs.

Milestones

  1. Maurey approximation (p. 44). For unit columns and every β∗\beta^*β∗, some β~∗\tilde\beta^*β~​∗ with ∥β~∗∥0≤k/2\|\tilde\beta^*\|_0\le k/2∥β~​∗∥0​≤k/2 has ∥Xβ∗−Xβ~∗∥2≤2∥β∗∥12/k\|X\beta^*-X\tilde\beta^*\|^2\le2\|\beta^*\|_1^2/k∥Xβ∗−Xβ~​∗∥2≤2∥β∗∥12​/k.
  2. (39) (p. 44). With Δ∗=Xβ∗−Xβ~∗\Delta^*=X\beta^*-X\tilde\beta^*Δ∗=Xβ∗−Xβ~​∗, define G(β)=∥y−Xβ∥2−∥y−Xβ~∗∥2G(\beta)=\|y-X\beta\|^2-\|y-X\tilde\beta^*\|^2G(β)=∥y−Xβ∥2−∥y−Xβ~​∗∥2 and H(u)=∥Xu∥2−2(Δ∗+ϵ)⊤XuH(u)=\|Xu\|^2-2(\Delta^*+\epsilon)^\top XuH(u)=∥Xu∥2−2(Δ∗+ϵ)⊤Xu. Then G(β)G(\beta)G(β) equals ∥Xβ−Xβ~∗∥2+2(Δ∗+ϵ)⊤(Xβ~∗−Xβ)\|X\beta-X\tilde\beta^*\|^2+2(\Delta^*+\epsilon)^\top(X\tilde\beta^*-X\beta)∥Xβ−Xβ~​∗∥2+2(Δ∗+ϵ)⊤(Xβ~​∗−Xβ), and min⁡∥β∥0≤kG≤min⁡H(u)\min_{\|\beta\|_0\le k}G\le\min H(u)min∥β∥0​≤k​G≤minH(u) over uuu supported off supp⁡(β~∗)\operatorname{supp}(\tilde\beta^*)supp(β~​∗) with ∥u∥0≤k/2\|u\|_0\le k/2∥u∥0​≤k/2.
  3. (40) (p. 45). min⁡∥β∥0≤kG(β)≤−max⁡v∈Vk∣(Δ∗+ϵ)⊤Xv∣2\min_{\|\beta\|_0\le k}G(\beta)\le-\max_{v\in\mathcal V_k}|(\Delta^*+\epsilon)^\top Xv|^2min∥β∥0​≤k​G(β)≤−maxv∈Vk​​∣(Δ∗+ϵ)⊤Xv∣2, where Vk\mathcal V_kVk​ is the set of vvv supported off supp⁡(β~∗)\operatorname{supp}(\tilde\beta^*)supp(β~​∗) with ∥v∥0≤k/2\|v\|_0\le k/2∥v∥0​≤k/2 and ∥Xv∥=1\|Xv\|=1∥Xv∥=1.
  4. Lemma 1 (p. 44). Let SSS have qqq elements and let s∈[1,q]s\in[1,q]s∈[1,q] be an integer. Then max⁡∣ϵ⊤Xv∣≳σγ2sslog⁡(eq/s)\max|\epsilon^\top Xv|\gtrsim\sigma\gamma_{2s}\sqrt{s\log(eq/s)}max∣ϵ⊤Xv∣≳σγ2s​slog(eq/s)​ over supp⁡(v)⊆S\operatorname{supp}(v)\subseteq Ssupp(v)⊆S, ∥v∥0≤s\|v\|_0\le s∥v∥0​≤s, ∥Xv∥=1\|Xv\|=1∥Xv∥=1, with probability at least 1−2(eq/s)−c~γ2s2s1-2(eq/s)^{-\tilde c\gamma_{2s}^2s}1−2(eq/s)−c~γ2s2​s.

Significance

Theorem 4 matches the fast-rate upper bound for best subsets from Corollary 1 of the paper. When γk\gamma_kγk​ is bounded below, the prediction error of best subsets is of exact order σ2klog⁡(ep/k)\sigma^2k\log(ep/k)σ2klog(ep/k) in the low-SNR regime (Remark 10). This is the theoretical counterpart of the empirical observation that best subsets overfits at low SNR. It is also what makes the paper's case for shrinkage a theorem rather than a comparison of upper bounds. The paper's Proposition 4 applies it to a concrete correlated design, where it gives a ratio of prediction errors between best subsets and its ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​-shrunken version that grows with kkk.

The result is proved in the paper; this mission formalizes it. No formalization of this result exists on the platform. The mission also produces a reusable Gaussian lower bound on sparse correlations (Lemma 1) and a deterministic reduction of the best-subsets objective, (39)–(40), which are of independent use for ℓ0\ell_0ℓ0​ estimators.

Difficulty

An upper bound on best subsets follows from comparing β^ℓ0\hat\beta_{\ell_0}β^​ℓ0​​ with β∗\beta^*β∗ in a basic inequality. A lower bound must hold for every minimizer, and β∗\beta^*β∗ itself gives no lower bound. The first idea is to compare with the noiseless fit. It fails because the noise can be fitted by sparse directions, which is exactly the effect to be quantified. The difficult step is Lemma 1. It requires a large set of sparse directions that remain separated after multiplication by XXX, a lower bound on the expected maximum of a Gaussian process over that set, and concentration of that maximum around its mean, with all constants universal. A second subtlety is that the statement is about every minimizer of a nonconvex problem, so the proof has to bound the objective rather than the estimator.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ and Fin p → ℝ, with indices starting at 0. The design is X : Matrix (Fin n) (Fin p) ℝ. The Euclidean norm, ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ norm, support and ∥⋅∥0\|\cdot\|_0∥⋅∥0​ are explicit definitions, since Mathlib's norm on Fin m → ℝ is the sup norm. γs\gamma_sγs​ is an infimum over the nonzero vectors with ∥u∥0≤s\|u\|_0\le s∥u∥0​≤s; this set is nonempty when p,s≥1p,s\ge1p,s≥1, and every ratio is ≥0\ge0≥0. The noise law is the product of nnn centred Gaussians of variance σ2\sigma^2σ2 on Rn\mathbb R^nRn. "With probability at least 1−η1-\eta1−η" means that a measurable set of noise vectors of probability at least 1−η1-\eta1−η exists on which the conclusion holds. Best subsets is an argmin predicate: Theorem 4 quantifies over every minimizer, and existence is neither assumed nor needed. Universal constants are quantified before every other parameter. "∥⋅∥0≤k/2\|\cdot\|_0\le k/2∥⋅∥0​≤k/2" is a comparison of real numbers.

The model consists of XXX, β∗\beta^*β∗ (with f∗=Xβ∗f^*=X\beta^*f∗=Xβ∗), ϵ\epsilonϵ and its Gaussian law, the estimator (1), and the minimal sparse eigenvalue γs\gamma_sγs​.

Two hypotheses are pinned relative to the printed theorem:

  • k≥2k\ge2k≥2, because the statement is false for k=1k=1k=1. Take every column equal to e1e_1e1​ and β∗=0\beta^*=0β∗=0: the error is ϵ12\epsilon_1^2ϵ12​, while the bound demands order σ2log⁡(ep)\sigma^2\log(ep)σ2log(ep) with probability tending to one.
  • ∥β∗∥0≤k\|\beta^*\|_0\le k∥β∗∥0​≤k, because the proof uses ∥β∗∥1\|\beta^*\|_1∥β∗∥1​, which the printed ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​ hypothesis controls only for sparse β∗\beta^*β∗, and §3.4 places the theorem in Corollary 1's setting β∗∈B0(k)\beta^*\in B_0(k)β∗∈B0​(k).

The milestones carry neither pin. Because the constants are existential, a formalization in which c0c_0c0​, ccc or CCC may depend on ppp, kkk or XXX would be trivial, and is ruled out by quantifying them first. A version asserting the bound for some minimizer would be weaker than the theorem.

Not formalized here: the upper bounds (Theorems 2, 3, 5), the noise events of Theorem 1, Corollaries 1–6, Propositions 3–4, and the numerical experiments. The proof of the goal also uses Theorem 1's event G2k\mathcal G_{2k}G2k​, which belongs to a separate mission of this series. Proved platform results that a proof of Lemma 1 can use include Sudakov minoration for separated Gaussian families (HighDimProb.RandomProcesses.sudakov_minoration_finite_separated), Gaussian Lipschitz concentration (HighDimStat.TailBounds.lipschitz_gaussian_concentration) and a lower bound on Gaussian maxima (HighDimProb.RandomProcesses.standard_gaussian_max_lower_bound). Contributions are welcome on any milestone, and on supporting lemmas: a packing of sparse sign vectors (Gilbert–Varshamov type), and the approximation of ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​-bounded vectors by sparse ones.

Selected references

  • R. Mazumder, P. Radchenko, A. Dedieu, Subset Selection with Shrinkage: Sparse Linear Modeling When the SNR Is Low, Operations Research, 2023; preprint arXiv:1708.03288v4, 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.03288v4
  • D. Bertsimas, A. King, R. Mazumder, Best subset selection via a modern optimization lens, Annals of Statistics 44(2), 2016. https://doi.org/10.1214/15-AOS1388
  • T. Hastie, R. Tibshirani, R. Tibshirani, Best Subset, Forward Stepwise or Lasso? Analysis and Recommendations Based on Extensive Comparisons, Statistical Science 35(4), 2020. https://doi.org/10.1214/19-STS733
  • P. C. Bellec, G. Lecué, A. B. Tsybakov, Slope meets Lasso: improved oracle bounds and optimality, Annals of Statistics 46(6B), 2018. https://doi.org/10.1214/17-AOS1670
  • R. Vershynin, High-Dimensional Probability, Cambridge University Press, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108231596
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Harmonic AnalysisQuantum Information·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Hamiltonian Simulation by Quantum Signal Processing: Phases Realizing e^{ih(θ)} to Error 8ε With Success Probability at Least 1 − 16εResearch Paper

Motivation

Simulating the time evolution of a quantum system is a standard task in quantum algorithms: given a Hamiltonian, the algorithm must reproduce the phase acquired by each of its energy eigenstates. The cost is often measured by how many times the algorithm queries an operator describing that system. Low and Chuang's 2016 preprint connects this task to quantum signal processing, a method that programs a sequence of rotations of one ancillary qubit. Its Theorem 2 gives the quantitative link: a finite Fourier approximation of a desired phase function determines a phase sequence whose induced eigenvalue transformation has error at most 8ε8\varepsilon8ε and success probability at least 1−16ε1-16\varepsilon1−16ε.

The paper uses this link in a later Hamiltonian-simulation result with an optimal asymptotic query count (Theorem 3, p. 4). The present mission targets the finite, explicitly quantified signal-processing theorem that makes that application possible. The criterion for which response functions can be produced by the rotation sequence was established in earlier work by Low, Yoder and Chuang and is quoted as Theorem 1 in this paper.

Setting

An ancilla qubit has basis states ∣0⟩|0\rangle∣0⟩ and ∣1⟩|1\rangle∣1⟩. Let σx,σy,σz\sigma_x,\sigma_y,\sigma_zσx​,σy​,σz​ be its Pauli matrices. For real angles θ\thetaθ and ϕ\phiϕ, a signal rotation is

Rϕ(θ)=exp⁡ ⁣[−iθ2(σxcos⁡ϕ+σysin⁡ϕ)].R_\phi(\theta)=\exp\!\left[-i\frac{\theta}{2} (\sigma_x\cos\phi+\sigma_y\sin\phi)\right].Rϕ​(θ)=exp[−i2θ​(σx​cosϕ+σy​sinϕ)].

The signal θ\thetaθ fixes the rotation angle; ϕ\phiϕ chooses its axis in the qubit's xyxyxy plane. A list of NNN phases ϕ⃗=(ϕ1,…,ϕN)\vec\phi=(\phi_1,\ldots,\phi_N)ϕ​=(ϕ1​,…,ϕN​) gives the response sequence Vϕ⃗(θ)=RϕN(θ)⋯Rϕ1(θ)V_{\vec\phi}(\theta)=R_{\phi_N}(\theta)\cdots R_{\phi_1}(\theta)Vϕ​​(θ)=RϕN​​(θ)⋯Rϕ1​​(θ), with Rϕ1R_{\phi_1}Rϕ1​​ acting first. Its four real Pauli coefficients are defined by

Vϕ⃗(θ)=A(θ)I+iB(θ)σz+iC(θ)σx+iD(θ)σy.V_{\vec\phi}(\theta)=A(\theta)I+iB(\theta)\sigma_z +iC(\theta)\sigma_x+iD(\theta)\sigma_y.Vϕ​​(θ)=A(θ)I+iB(θ)σz​+iC(θ)σx​+iD(θ)σy​.

The ancilla state ∣+⟩=(∣0⟩+∣1⟩)/2|+\rangle=(|0\rangle+|1\rangle)/\sqrt2∣+⟩=(∣0⟩+∣1⟩)/2​ selects the scalar response ⟨+∣Vϕ⃗(θ)∣+⟩=A(θ)+iC(θ)\langle+|V_{\vec\phi}(\theta)|+\rangle=A(\theta)+iC(\theta)⟨+∣Vϕ​​(θ)∣+⟩=A(θ)+iC(θ). The realizability theorem characterizes these pairs when NNN is positive and even: AAA is a cosine series with frequencies 000 through N/2N/2N/2, CCC is a sine series with frequencies 111 through N/2N/2N/2, A(0)=1A(0)=1A(0)=1, and A(θ)2+C(θ)2≤1A(\theta)^2+C(\theta)^2\le1A(θ)2+C(θ)2≤1 for every θ\thetaθ (Theorem 1, p. 3).

For a finite-dimensional unitary WWW, choose an orthonormal eigenbasis ∣ul⟩|u_l\rangle∣ul​⟩ and real eigenphases θl\theta_lθl​, so W=∑leiθl∣ul⟩⟨ul∣W=\sum_l e^{i\theta_l}|u_l\rangle\langle u_l|W=∑l​eiθl​∣ul​⟩⟨ul​∣. The signal operator applies Rϕ(θl)R_\phi(\theta_l)Rϕ​(θl​) to the ancilla in each eigenspace: Uϕ=∑lRϕ(θl)⊗∣ul⟩⟨ul∣U_\phi=\sum_l R_\phi(\theta_l)\otimes|u_l\rangle\langle u_l|Uϕ​=∑l​Rϕ​(θl​)⊗∣ul​⟩⟨ul​∣. The ordered product V=UϕN⋯Uϕ1V=U_{\phi_N}\cdots U_{\phi_1}V=UϕN​​⋯Uϕ1​​ therefore uses one common phase list on all eigenspaces. After preparing and projecting the ancilla on ∣+⟩|+\rangle∣+⟩, the effective system operator is its block ⟨+∣V∣+⟩\langle+|V|+\rangle⟨+∣V∣+⟩. The desired operator for a real phase function hhh is Videal=∑leih(θl)∣ul⟩⟨ul∣V_{\mathrm{ideal}}=\sum_l e^{ih(\theta_l)}|u_l\rangle\langle u_l|Videal​=∑l​eih(θl​)∣ul​⟩⟨ul​∣ (Eqs. (2)–(6), pp. 2–3).

Formalization targets

Quantum signal processing

Let hhh be 2π2\pi2π-periodic, valued in (−π,π](-\pi,\pi](−π,π], and odd on the interior (−π,π)(-\pi,\pi)(−π,π), and let A,CA,CA,C be respectively a cosine and a sine series of degree at most N/2N/2N/2 for positive even NNN. If ∣A(θ)+iC(θ)−eih(θ)∣≤ε|A(\theta)+iC(\theta)-e^{ih(\theta)}|\le\varepsilon∣A(θ)+iC(θ)−eih(θ)∣≤ε at every real angle, the goal is one phase list ϕ⃗\vec\phiϕ​ for which, uniformly over angles and input unitaries,

∣⟨+∣Vϕ⃗(θ)∣+⟩∣2≥1−16ε,∥(⟨+∣V∣+⟩−Videal)ψ∥≤8ε∥ψ∥.|\langle+|V_{\vec\phi}(\theta)|+\rangle|^2\ge1-16\varepsilon, \qquad \|(\langle+|V|+\rangle-V_{\mathrm{ideal}})\psi\| \le8\varepsilon\|\psi\|.∣⟨+∣Vϕ​​(θ)∣+⟩∣2≥1−16ε,∥(⟨+∣V∣+⟩−Videal​)ψ∥≤8ε∥ψ∥.

The milestones state the exact realizability criterion, the paper's displayed scalar bounds, and the eigenspace identity that carries those bounds to the operator statement. The constants 888 and 161616 are fixed because the mission formalizes Theorem 2 and Eqs. (7)–(11), pp. 3–4, rather than an unspecified approximation rate.

Significance

The theorem makes a Fourier approximation into a phase transformation of every eigenstate of an arbitrary finite-dimensional input unitary. Its quantified success guarantee means that projecting the ancilla succeeds with probability close to one when the approximation error is small. In the paper, the particular target h(θ)=−τsin⁡θh(\theta)=-\tau\sin\thetah(θ)=−τsinθ connects this mechanism to sparse Hamiltonian simulation (Eq. (14), p. 4).

The result is proved in the cited paper; this mission asks for machine-checked proofs of its statements in the specified matrix model. The quoted characterization of achievable responses is also a proof target. A complete development would add reusable facts about products of qubit rotations, constrained trigonometric series, sum-of-squares completion, and block-diagonal operators. No machine-checked proof of this exact theorem was found in the local Prove2Me index at drafting time.

Difficulty

An arbitrary Fourier approximation is not automatically the response of a unitary rotation sequence. It may violate the squared-magnitude bound or the required value at zero, even though it is uniformly close to the target function. Those restrictions are exactly what the realizability theorem requires. The difficult part is the converse direction of that characterization: the paper quotes it from earlier work, while the present statement asks for all admissible pairs and all positive even sequence lengths. The completion of a nonnegative trigonometric polynomial into the remaining Pauli components is another substantial mathematical target; the needed factorization is not already packaged as the paper uses it in this Mathlib environment.

Formalization scope

The qubit is a 2×22\times22×2 complex matrix indexed by 0,10,10,1. Rotations use the matrix exponential and the factor θ/2\theta/2θ/2 exactly as printed. The signal product has exactly NNN factors in the paper's order. Cosine and sine series use the inclusive frequencies stated in Theorem 1. The operator model takes a finite unitary eigenbasis as data, with the ancilla as the first factor of the tensor product. The success inequality is pointwise in θ\thetaθ; the error inequality is homogeneous in every system vector and represents the paper's maximum over unit vectors. The phases are chosen before the input unitary, so they cannot depend on its eigenspaces.

The paper writes h:(−π,π]→(−π,π]h:(-\pi,\pi]\to(-\pi,\pi]h:(−π,π]→(−π,π]; the Lean target extends its domain periodically to R\mathbb RR and retains that codomain range. Oddness is imposed on the interval's interior, where both θ\thetaθ and −θ-\theta−θ belong to the printed domain. The phrase “real Fourier series in (cos⁡kθ,sin⁡kθ)(\cos k\theta,\sin k\theta)(coskθ,sinkθ)” is represented by the cosine form for AAA and sine form for CCC that its proof applies directly. “Efficiently compute” is represented by existence of phases; no runtime claim is made. The source calls the operator-vector error a trace distance; the formalization uses precisely its displayed vector norm, rather than a distance between density matrices.

Some intermediate squared inequalities need ε≤1\varepsilon\le1ε≤1 or 8ε≤18\varepsilon\le18ε≤1; those conditions appear only on the corresponding milestone clauses. The goal has no separate bound on ε\varepsilonε: its approximation hypothesis already forces ε≥0\varepsilon\ge0ε≥0. A valid formalization must use the concrete matrix product and matrix-entry Pauli components; defining response functions merely to satisfy the target would empty the theorem of its claim. Contributions that establish the realizability criterion, trigonometric completion, the explicit inequalities, and the operator lift are all in scope. The controlled-WWW circuit of Fig. 1 and the asymptotic oracle-complexity claim of Theorem 3 are outside this mission.

Selected references

  • Guang Hao Low and Isaac L. Chuang, Optimal Hamiltonian Simulation by Quantum Signal Processing, arXiv:1606.02685v2, 2016; published in Physical Review Letters 118, 010501 (2017). Preprint.
  • Guang Hao Low, Theodore J. Yoder and Isaac L. Chuang, Methodology of Resonant Equiangular Composite Quantum Gates, arXiv:1603.03996, 2016. Preprint.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees 3: Pacing-Based Equilibria Have Liquid Welfare Price of Anarchy at Least 1/2Research Paper

Motivation

Advertising platforms repeatedly sell opportunities to show an advertisement. The opportunity's features, such as audience and placement, affect each advertiser differently, while advertisers limit their average spending. This makes the efficiency of an auction a question about both heterogeneous values and budgets. The paper by Balseiro, Kroer, and Kumar studies this setting with a continuum of buyer types and context-dependent values. It constructs equilibria by value pacing, in which a buyer scales values before bidding. This mission asks how much attainable value those equilibria preserve when budgets cap useful value.

Earlier efficiency bounds for second-price auctions concern a different, non-Bayesian multi-item model. In particular, the half guarantee discussed by Azar and coauthors, as discussed in §5 of the paper uses a no-overbudgeting condition that the present pacing equilibria need not satisfy. Balseiro, Kroer, and Kumar prove their bound under their own contextual and in-expectation budget model; the distinction matters when interpreting the constant. Their existence and revenue-equivalence results also make it possible to speak about the same pacing-based allocation across standard auction payment rules. These claims and the limitation of the earlier assumption are explained in §5 of the paper.

Setting

An item has a context α∈A⊂Rd\alpha\in A\subset\mathbb R^dα∈A⊂Rd, with d≥2d\ge2d≥2. There are n≥2n\ge2n≥2 buyers. Each buyer has a private type θ=(w,B)\theta=(w,B)θ=(w,B): the vector w∈(0,U)dw\in(0,U)^dw∈(0,U)d assigns a positive weight to every context feature, and B∈(Bmin⁡,U)B\in(B_{\min},U)B∈(Bmin​,U) is the buyer's budget, where 0<Bmin⁡<U0<B_{\min}<U0<Bmin​<U. The buyer's value for the item is w⊤αw^\top\alphaw⊤α. A context is drawn from a distribution FFF and buyers' types are drawn independently from a distribution GGG; both distributions have densities. The context and type ranges are the spaces AAA and Θ=(0,U)d×(Bmin⁡,U)\Theta=(0,U)^d\times(B_{\min},U)Θ=(0,U)d×(Bmin​,U) of §2. The reserve price is zero throughout the efficiency section.

A pacing function μ:Θ→R≥0\mu:\Theta\to\mathbb R_{\ge0}μ:Θ→R≥0​ scales type θ\thetaθ's value to w⊤α/(1+μ(θ))w^\top\alpha/(1+\mu(\theta))w⊤α/(1+μ(θ)). Let Hαμ(x)H^\mu_\alpha(x)Hαμ​(x) be the probability that the maximum paced value among n−1n-1n−1 independent competitors is at most xxx. The first-price bid βμ(θ,α)\beta^\mu(\theta,\alpha)βμ(θ,α) applies the paper's bid function σαμ\sigma^\mu_\alphaσαμ​ to the paced value. A buyer may choose a context-dependent bid, subject to an in-expectation budget: expected payment over contexts and competitors must not exceed BBB. The buyer's dual function qμ(θ,t)q^\mu(\theta,t)qμ(θ,t) is the supremum of its Lagrangian over such bids at multiplier t≥0t\ge0t≥0.

The relevant pacing equilibria are fixed points of the correspondence C0∗C_0^*C0∗​. Its domain X0X_0X0​ consists of measurable, integrable pacing functions in [0,ω/Bmin⁡][0,\omega/B_{\min}][0,ω/Bmin​] with total variation at most V0=(d+1)Ud+1ω/Bmin⁡V_0=(d+1)U^{d+1}\omega/B_{\min}V0​=(d+1)Ud+1ω/Bmin​, where ω\omegaω is the supremum of possible values. For a given μ∈X0\mu\in X_0μ∈X0​, C0∗(μ)C_0^*(\mu)C0∗​(μ) minimizes the average dual objective Eθ∼G[qμ(θ,μ^(θ))]\mathbb E_{\theta\sim G}[q^\mu(\theta,\widehat\mu(\theta))]Eθ∼G​[qμ(θ,μ​(θ))] over μ^∈X0\widehat\mu\in X_0μ​∈X0​. These are the objects of §3.3, including its multivariate definition of total variation.

An allocation xxx assigns nonnegative shares xi(α,θ1,…,θn)x_i(\alpha,\theta_1,\ldots,\theta_n)xi​(α,θ1​,…,θn​) summing to one. For buyer iii, keep θi=(wi,Bi)\theta_i=(w_i,B_i)θi​=(wi​,Bi​) fixed while averaging wi⊤α xiw_i^\top\alpha\,x_iwi⊤​αxi​ over the context and the other types. The buyer's liquid welfare is the smaller of this interim value and BiB_iBi​; total liquid welfare LW(x)\mathrm{LW}(x)LW(x) sums its expectation over each buyer's own type. For an equilibrium pacing function μ∈C0∗(μ)\mu\in C_0^*(\mu)μ∈C0∗​(μ), xμx^\muxμ allocates to a highest paced bidder. Definitions 5 and 6 use this allocation to define the worst equilibrium liquid welfare relative to the optimal allocation.

Formalization targets

The main target is the Theorem 3 guarantee, stated for every measurable allocation xxx and every equilibrium pacing function μ\muμ:

LW(xμ)≥12 LW(x).\mathrm{LW}(x^\mu)\ge\tfrac12\,\mathrm{LW}(x).LW(xμ)≥21​LW(x).

The universal comparison expresses the paper's price-of-anarchy bound PoA≥1/2\mathrm{PoA}\ge1/2PoA≥1/2. It leaves no optimum or worst equilibrium as an arbitrary variable. The two milestones are the dual derivative identity and the first-order budget and complementary-slackness conditions stated in §3.2:

∂tqμ(θ,t)=B−payment(bt),payment(bt∗)≤B,t∗(B−payment(bt∗))=0.\partial_t q^\mu(\theta,t)=B-\mathrm{payment}(b_t),\qquad \mathrm{payment}(b_{t^*})\le B,\quad t^*(B-\mathrm{payment}(b_{t^*}))=0.∂t​qμ(θ,t)=B−payment(bt​),payment(bt∗​)≤B,t∗(B−payment(bt∗​))=0.

Here bt(α)=σαμ(w⊤α/(1+t))b_t(\alpha)=\sigma^\mu_\alpha(w^\top\alpha/(1+t))bt​(α)=σαμ​(w⊤α/(1+t)) and t∗t^*t∗ minimizes qμ(θ,⋅)q^\mu(\theta,\cdot)qμ(θ,⋅) over nonnegative multipliers. The milestones are posed in the zero-reserve setting used by the main target.

Significance

The theorem gives an explicit welfare guarantee despite private budgets, correlated values across buyers through a shared context, and equilibrium bidding that depends on those budgets. It applies to the allocation induced by pacing in every standard auction covered by the paper, since those auctions have the same equilibrium allocation even when payment rules differ Balseiro, Kroer, and Kumar, §4–5. Without an efficiency bound, existence of a pacing equilibrium alone would give no quantitative assurance about the allocation it produces.

The result has a mathematical proof in the paper's online appendix; it is an open formalization target here. A complete development would connect measurable Bayesian auctions, the buyer's nonconvex dual problem, the bounded-variation fixed-point domain, and interim liquid welfare. The definitions of interim welfare, dual expenditure, and multivariate variation can support other budgeted auction results. The source PDF held for this mission contains the published main article but not its online appendix, where the proofs and auxiliary lemmas appear.

Difficulty

The expected budget applies to each buyer type after averaging over contexts and opponents, while liquid welfare caps that same type's interim value before averaging over types. Moving the budget cap across the expectation changes the quantity. The natural first-price tie convention also awards the good to every highest bidder for the buyer optimization problem, while a welfare allocation must give total share one. The proof must reconcile the dual account of expenditure with a feasible allocation and preserve these different orders of expectation. The dual objective is a supremum over bids, so its derivative cannot be obtained merely by differentiating a chosen closed formula without justifying that formula and the maximizing bid.

Formalization scope

Lean represents a context by Fin d → ℝ and a buyer type by its weight vector and real budget. Value is the explicit finite sum ∑iwiαi\sum_i w_i\alpha_i∑i​wi​αi​. The model requires a nonempty bounded measurable context set in the positive orthant, absolutely continuous probability laws FFF and GGG supported on their stated domains, measurable reserves and pacing, n≥2n\ge2n≥2, and 0<Bmin⁡<U0<B_{\min}<U0<Bmin​<U. Boundedness of AAA makes ω\omegaω finite; these conditions make the domain and integrals implicit in the article well posed. The welfare target assumes zero reserves as §5 does.

Admissible bids are measurable and nonnegative on AAA, with integrable expected payment. The dual is defined by its supremum over bids. Total variation is extended-real-valued and uses Euclidean lengths of test fields; thus infinite variation cannot satisfy the X0X_0X0​ bound through a real supremum's default value. Allocations are measurable and simplex-valued on the model domain. At a tied highest bid, xμx^\muxμ splits the item equally; ties have probability zero under these equilibria, as the paper states by its appendix Lemma 6(d). The closed simplex permits zero shares, correcting the paper's notation R+\mathbb R_+R+​ in Definition 5, which §2.1 otherwise calls strictly positive. The universal welfare inequality avoids default real infimum and supremum values on pathological sets. Contributions to the measurable bidding, variation, duality, and welfare infrastructure are all useful within this scope.

Selected references

  • Santiago R. Balseiro, Christian Kroer, and Rachitesh Kumar, Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees, Management Science, Articles in Advance, 2023. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.4719.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees 2: Value Pacing Is an Equilibrium of Every Standard Auction with the Same Expected PaymentsResearch Paper

Motivation

Online advertising sells billions of impressions a day through auctions, and most advertisers do not bid by hand: they hand a budget to the platform, which paces their bids so that spending over a campaign matches the budget. Over the last decade the major ad exchanges moved from second price to first price auctions. An advertiser who has tuned a pacing policy for one format wants to know whether it still works after the switch, and a platform wants to know whether its revenue changes.

Classical revenue equivalence (Myerson 1981; Riley and Samuelson 1981) says that, with independent private values, risk-neutral buyers and no budgets, every standard auction yields the same expected revenue. Che and Gale (1998) showed that this fails when budgets are hard: first price auctions then raise more revenue than second price auctions. Balseiro, Kroer and Kumar (2023) study budgets that bind in expectation over many auctions, with values driven by item features, and show that equivalence is restored. This mission formalizes that result, their Theorem 2.

Setting

An item has a context α∈A⊂R+d\alpha\in A\subset\mathbb R^d_+α∈A⊂R+d​ drawn from a law FFF with a density. Each of nnn buyers has a type θ=(w,B)\theta=(w,B)θ=(w,B) drawn independently from a law GGG with a density on Θ=(0,U)d×(Bmin⁡,U)\Theta=(0,U)^d\times(B_{\min},U)Θ=(0,U)d×(Bmin​,U). Here www are feature weights and BBB is a budget. The buyer's value for the item is wTαw^T\alphawTα, and ω\omegaω is the supremum of all values. The seller discloses α\alphaα, then runs an auction with reserve price r(α)r(\alpha)r(α). A buyer must keep its expected payment, over contexts and competitors' types, at most BBB.

A pacing function μ:Θ→R≥0\mu:\Theta\to\mathbb R_{\ge0}μ:Θ→R≥0​ shades every value to the paced value wTα/(1+μ(w,B))w^T\alpha/(1+\mu(w,B))wTα/(1+μ(w,B)). Let λαμ\lambda^\mu_\alphaλαμ​ be the law of the paced value when (w,B)∼G(w,B)\sim G(w,B)∼G, and Hαμ(x)=λαμ((−∞,x])n−1H^\mu_\alpha(x)=\lambda^\mu_\alpha((-\infty,x])^{n-1}Hαμ​(x)=λαμ​((−∞,x])n−1 the c.d.f. of the highest of n−1n-1n−1 independent paced values. In first price auctions the paper's candidate strategy is βμ(w,B,α)=σαμ(wTα/(1+μ(w,B)))\beta^\mu(w,B,\alpha)=\sigma^\mu_\alpha(w^T\alpha/(1+\mu(w,B)))βμ(w,B,α)=σαμ​(wTα/(1+μ(w,B))), where σαμ\sigma^\mu_\alphaσαμ​ is the first-price equilibrium bid against paced competitors.

The buyer's dual function qμ(w,B,t)q^\mu(w,B,t)qμ(w,B,t) is the supremum over bid functions b(⋅)b(\cdot)b(⋅) of the Lagrangian E[(wTα−(1+t)b(α))1{win}]+tB\mathbb E[(w^T\alpha-(1+t)b(\alpha))\mathbb 1\{\text{win}\}]+tBE[(wTα−(1+t)b(α))1{win}]+tB, with competitors bidding βμ\beta^\muβμ. The set X0\mathcal X_0X0​ collects pacing functions with values in [0,ω/Bmin⁡][0,\omega/B_{\min}][0,ω/Bmin​] and total variation at most V0=(d+1)Ud+1ω/Bmin⁡V_0=(d+1)U^{d+1}\omega/B_{\min}V0​=(d+1)Ud+1ω/Bmin​. The correspondence C0∗(μ)C^*_0(\mu)C0∗​(μ) is the set of minimizers over X0\mathcal X_0X0​ of μ^↦EG[qμ(w,B,μ^(w,B))]\hat\mu\mapsto\mathbb E_G[q^\mu(w,B,\hat\mu(w,B))]μ^​↦EG​[qμ(w,B,μ^​(w,B))]. A fixed point μ∈C0∗(μ)\mu\in C^*_0(\mu)μ∈C0∗​(μ) is an equilibrium pacing function for first price auctions.

An anonymous standard auction Aα=(r(α),Mα)\mathcal A_\alpha=(r(\alpha),M_\alpha)Aα​=(r(α),Mα​) gives the item to the highest bid at or above the reserve. Its payment Mα(b,{bi})M_\alpha(b,\{b_i\})Mα​(b,{bi​}) for a bid bbb against competing bids bib_ibi​ does not depend on the buyers' identities. An oracle returns, for each atomless value law H\mathcal HH on [0,ω][0,\omega][0,ω], a single-auction equilibrium bid ψαH\psi^{\mathcal H}_\alphaψαH​ that is nondecreasing, meets the reserve exactly for values above it, gives a zero-value bidder zero payoff, and has an atomless bid law. The candidate strategy is

Ψμ(w,B,α)=ψαλαμ(wTα1+μ(w,B)).\Psi^\mu(w,B,\alpha)=\psi^{\lambda^\mu_\alpha}_\alpha\Big(\frac{w^T\alpha}{1+\mu(w,B)}\Big).Ψμ(w,B,α)=ψαλαμ​​(1+μ(w,B)wTα​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (Revenue and Pacing Equivalence)

For every family {Aα}\{\mathcal A_\alpha\}{Aα​} of anonymous standard auctions with such an oracle and every μ∈X0\mu\in\mathcal X_0μ∈X0​ with μ∈C0∗(μ)\mu\in C^*_0(\mu)μ∈C0∗​(μ):

  1. Ψμ\Psi^\muΨμ is a symmetric equilibrium of the family (Definition 4): almost every buyer type maximizes expected utility subject to its expected budget by bidding Ψμ\Psi^\muΨμ when everyone else does;
  2. for every θ∈Θ\theta\in\Thetaθ∈Θ,
E[Mα(Ψμ(θ,α),{Ψμ(θi,α)}i)]=E[βμ(θ,α) 1{βμ(θ,α)≥max⁡(r(α),{βμ(θi,α)}i)}].\mathbb E\big[M_\alpha(\Psi^\mu(\theta,\alpha),\{\Psi^\mu(\theta_i,\alpha)\}_i)\big]=\mathbb E\big[\beta^\mu(\theta,\alpha)\,\mathbb 1\{\beta^\mu(\theta,\alpha)\ge\max(r(\alpha),\{\beta^\mu(\theta_i,\alpha)\}_i)\}\big].E[Mα​(Ψμ(θ,α),{Ψμ(θi​,α)}i​)]=E[βμ(θ,α)1{βμ(θ,α)≥max(r(α),{βμ(θi​,α)}i​)}].

Milestones

  • §3.2, p. 8, last display. For t≥0t\ge0t≥0 and xα=wTα/(1+t)x_\alpha=w^T\alpha/(1+t)xα​=wTα/(1+t),
qμ(w,B,t)=(1+t) Eα[1{xα≥r(α)}∫r(α)xαHαμ(s) ds]+tB.q^\mu(w,B,t)=(1+t)\,\mathbb E_\alpha\Big[\mathbb 1\{x_\alpha\ge r(\alpha)\}\int_{r(\alpha)}^{x_\alpha}H^\mu_\alpha(s)\,ds\Big]+tB.qμ(w,B,t)=(1+t)Eα​[1{xα​≥r(α)}∫r(α)xα​​Hαμ​(s)ds]+tB.
  • §4, p. 12, key step. When the competitors bid Ψμ\Psi^\muΨμ, the dual function of the buyer's problem in any standard auction family equals qμ(w,B,t)q^\mu(w,B,t)qμ(w,B,t).

Significance

Theorem 2 says that pacing is portable: an equilibrium pacing function computed for first price auctions is an equilibrium pacing function for second price auctions, all-pay auctions, or any context-dependent mixture of standard formats. Each buyer's expected spend is the same in all of them, so the seller's expected revenue is too. This explains why budget-management systems built for second price auctions keep working after a move to first price. It also separates in-expectation budgets, where equivalence holds, from the hard budgets of Che and Gale, where it fails. Theorem 3 of the same paper, a liquid-welfare price of anarchy of 1/21/21/2, uses Theorem 2 to argue in the second price auction.

The paper's proofs are in its online appendix, which is not part of the source this mission cites. To our knowledge no part of the argument has been machine-checked. Classical revenue equivalence for incentive-compatible direct mechanisms without budgets exists on the platform as other items, but none has pacing, budgets or contexts. The mission asks for a machine-checked proof of Theorem 2 and of the two steps the authors name.

Difficulty

The classical argument pins payments by the allocation rule and the envelope formula, value by value. Here a buyer's decision is a whole bid function of the context, coupled across contexts by one budget constraint, and the budget-constrained problem is not convex. So the envelope argument cannot be applied to the constrained problem directly. The obvious move, Lagrangian relaxation, needs strong duality for a non-convex problem, and it needs the dual of each standard auction to agree with the first-price dual for every multiplier, not only at the optimum. The paced value laws λαμ\lambda^\mu_\alphaλαμ​ need not have densities, so the textbook single-auction results, which assume a positive density, do not apply verbatim. Finally, the fixed-point hypothesis ties all buyer types together, and optimality must be recovered almost surely in the type.

Formalization scope

Everything is defined in the namespace ContextualAuctions.RevEquiv. Contexts are Fin d → ℝ, types are (Fin d → ℝ) × ℝ, and wTαw^T\alphawTα is an explicit sum. The joint law of the context and the n−1n-1n−1 competitor types is F.prod (Measure.pi fun _ => G). Ties win, as in the paper's tie-breaking rule. The standing assumptions are d≥2d\ge2d≥2, FFF and GGG probability measures with densities concentrated on AAA and Θ\ThetaΘ, AAA in the open positive orthant, and rrr measurable. Disclosed additions, implicit in the paper:

  • n≥2n\ge2n≥2 and 0<Bmin⁡<U0<B_{\min}<U0<Bmin​<U;
  • AAA measurable, nonempty and bounded, so that ω<∞\omega<\inftyω<∞;
  • pacing functions and bids are measurable; first-price bids are nonnegative on AAA, and standard-auction bids are nonnegative for almost every context, because the oracle constrains Ψμ\Psi^\muΨμ only where λαμ\lambda^\mu_\alphaλαμ​ is atomless;
  • the payment rule is measurable along measurable bid maps on any measurable space;
  • the strategy Ψμ\Psi^\muΨμ is jointly measurable, since the oracle is a black box.

The dual function is the supremum over admissible bids, which are measurable with integrable payment. Its closed form is a milestone and never its definition. Total variation (Definition 3) is extended-real valued and uses the Euclidean norm of the test field. In oracle property 1, expected payments are taken in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], so a bid with infinite expected payment can never look free. The payment identity of Theorem 2 is stated in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], so it also asserts that the left side is finite. This rules out the trivializing readings: a closed-form definition of qμq^\muqμ that makes the first milestone hold by definition, Bochner junk zeros for non-integrable payments, and a vacuous variation bound.

A complete development needs single-auction revenue equivalence for i.i.d. atomless value laws without densities. It also needs the measure-theoretic interchange of a supremum over bid functions with the expectation over contexts, and strong duality for the budget-constrained problem. These pieces, notably the single-auction equivalence for general atomless laws, are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions toward any of them are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Balseiro, C. Kroer, R. Kumar, Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees, Management Science, Articles in Advance, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4719
  • Y.-K. Che, I. Gale, Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders, Review of Economic Studies 65(1), 1998. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00041
  • R. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • J. Riley, W. Samuelson, Optimal Auctions, American Economic Review 71(3), 1981. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1802779
  • V. Krishna, Auction Theory, 2nd ed., Academic Press, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1016/C2009-0-22474-3
  • S. Balseiro, Y. Gur, Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium, Management Science 65(9), 2019. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3174
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Differential GeometryMachine LearningOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Zeroth-Order Riemannian Derivative Estimation and Optimization 2: ZO-RSGD Has Average Expected Squared Riemannian Gradient Norm at Most 4L(f(x₀) − f(x*))/(N+1) + 2μ²L²(d+6)³ + 16(d+4)σ²/mResearch Paper

Motivation

Many optimization problems are posed over a manifold rather than a vector space: orthogonality constraints (the Stiefel manifold), unit-norm constraints (the sphere), fixed-rank matrices. In some of them the objective can only be evaluated, not differentiated. Black-box adversarial attacks on a neural network with a norm-constrained perturbation, hyperparameter tuning and simulation-based objectives are examples, and in all of them each function value is also noisy. Zeroth-order (derivative-free) methods replace the gradient by a random finite-difference estimate built from function values alone.

In Euclidean space the analysis of such methods is well developed. Nesterov and Spokoiny (2017) analysed Gaussian-smoothing estimators for deterministic objectives, and Ghadimi and Lan (2013) gave the first non-asymptotic stationarity rates for stochastic nonconvex objectives (the RSGF method). Li, Balasubramanian and Ma (arXiv:2003.11238, published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023) carried this programme to embedded submanifolds. They estimate the Riemannian gradient by projecting a Gaussian vector onto the tangent space and moving along a retraction, and they prove convergence rates for the resulting methods. This mission formalizes their rate for the stochastic method, ZO-RSGD (Theorem 3.2).

Setting

Let EEE be a finite-dimensional real inner product space (the paper's Rn\mathbb R^nRn), and let M⊆E\mathcal M \subseteq EM⊆E be a C1C^1C1 embedded submanifold of dimension ddd. The tangent space TxMT_x\mathcal MTx​M at x∈Mx \in \mathcal Mx∈M is the linear span of the tangent cone of M\mathcal MM at xxx. For a submanifold this is the set of velocities γ′(0)\gamma'(0)γ′(0) of curves in M\mathcal MM through xxx, and it is a subspace of dimension ddd. M\mathcal MM carries the metric induced by the inner product of EEE, and PxP_xPx​ denotes the orthogonal projection of EEE onto TxMT_x\mathcal MTx​M.

A retraction is a map RRR, (x,η)↦Rx(η)(x, \eta) \mapsto R_x(\eta)(x,η)↦Rx​(η). For every x∈Mx \in \mathcal Mx∈M it sends all of TxMT_x\mathcal MTx​M into M\mathcal MM and is smooth on TxMT_x\mathcal MTx​M, with Rx(0)=xR_x(0) = xRx​(0)=x and differential the identity at 000. The Riemannian gradient of a differentiable fff is grad⁡f(x)=Px∇f(x)\operatorname{grad} f(x) = P_x \nabla f(x)gradf(x)=Px​∇f(x).

The objective is stochastic, f(x)=EξF(x,ξ)f(x) = \mathbb E_\xi F(x, \xi)f(x)=Eξ​F(x,ξ), with noise ξ\xiξ distributed according to a probability measure PξP_\xiPξ​. Two assumptions are imposed:

  • Assumption 2.1 (LLL-retraction-smoothness). For almost every ξ\xiξ, ∣F(Rx(η),ξ)−F(x,ξ)−⟨grad⁡F(x,ξ),η⟩∣≤L2∥η∥2|F(R_x(\eta),\xi) - F(x,\xi) - \langle \operatorname{grad}F(x,\xi), \eta\rangle| \le \frac L2\|\eta\|^2∣F(Rx​(η),ξ)−F(x,ξ)−⟨gradF(x,ξ),η⟩∣≤2L​∥η∥2 for all x∈Mx \in \mathcal Mx∈M and η∈TxM\eta \in T_x\mathcal Mη∈Tx​M.
  • Assumption 2.3 (unbiased oracle, bounded variance). For every x∈Mx \in \mathcal Mx∈M, EξF(x,ξ)=f(x)\mathbb E_\xi F(x,\xi) = f(x)Eξ​F(x,ξ)=f(x), Eξgrad⁡F(x,ξ)=grad⁡f(x)\mathbb E_\xi \operatorname{grad}F(x,\xi) = \operatorname{grad}f(x)Eξ​gradF(x,ξ)=gradf(x) and Eξ∥grad⁡F(x,ξ)−grad⁡f(x)∥2≤σ2\mathbb E_\xi\|\operatorname{grad}F(x,\xi) - \operatorname{grad}f(x)\|^2 \le \sigma^2Eξ​∥gradF(x,ξ)−gradf(x)∥2≤σ2.

Given a smoothing parameter μ>0\mu > 0μ>0 and a batch size mmm, draw mmm independent pairs (u0,i,ξi)(u_{0,i}, \xi_i)(u0,i​,ξi​), each with u0,i∼N(0,I)u_{0,i} \sim \mathcal N(0, I)u0,i​∼N(0,I) independent of ξi∼Pξ\xi_i \sim P_\xiξi​∼Pξ​, and put ui=Pxu0,iu_i = P_x u_{0,i}ui​=Px​u0,i​. The mini-batch zeroth-order Riemannian gradient is

gˉμ,ξ(x)=1m∑i=1mF(Rx(μui),ξi)−F(x,ξi)μ ui.\bar g_{\mu,\xi}(x) = \frac1m\sum_{i=1}^m \frac{F(R_x(\mu u_i), \xi_i) - F(x, \xi_i)}{\mu}\,u_i .gˉ​μ,ξ​(x)=m1​i=1∑m​μF(Rx​(μui​),ξi​)−F(x,ξi​)​ui​.

ZO-RSGD (Algorithm 2) starts at x0∈Mx_0 \in \mathcal Mx0​∈M and iterates xk+1=Rxk(−η^ gˉμ,ξ(xk))x_{k+1} = R_{x_k}(-\hat\eta\,\bar g_{\mu,\xi}(x_k))xk+1​=Rxk​​(−η^​gˉ​μ,ξ​(xk​)) with step η^=1/L\hat\eta = 1/Lη^​=1/L and a fresh batch at every step. x∗x^*x∗ denotes a minimizer of fff over M\mathcal MM.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.2

If m≥16(d+4)m \ge 16(d+4)m≥16(d+4), then for every NNN

1N+1∑k=0NE ∥grad⁡f(xk)∥2≤4L f(x0)−f(x∗)N+1+2μ2L2(d+6)3+16(d+4)mσ2.\frac{1}{N+1}\sum_{k=0}^{N}\mathbb E\,\|\operatorname{grad} f(x_k)\|^2 \le 4L\,\frac{f(x_0) - f(x^*)}{N+1} + 2\mu^2L^2(d+6)^3 + \frac{16(d+4)}{m}\sigma^2 .N+11​k=0∑N​E∥gradf(xk​)∥2≤4LN+1f(x0​)−f(x∗)​+2μ2L2(d+6)3+m16(d+4)​σ2.

The constants are the paper's own. The goal states the rate for every μ\muμ, mmm and NNN. It does not state the parameter choices μ=O(ϵ/d3/2)\mu = O(\epsilon/d^{3/2})μ=O(ϵ/d3/2), m=O(dσ2/ϵ2)m = O(d\sigma^2/\epsilon^2)m=O(dσ2/ϵ2), N=O(1/ϵ2)N = O(1/\epsilon^2)N=O(1/ϵ2) that follow from it.

Milestones

  • Lemma 2.1. For a ddd-dimensional subspace X\mathcal XX with projection PPP, u=Pu0u = Pu_0u=Pu0​ and x∈Xx \in \mathcal Xx∈X: E⟨x,u⟩u=x\mathbb E\langle x,u\rangle u = xE⟨x,u⟩u=x and E⟨x,u⟩2=∥x∥2\mathbb E\langle x,u\rangle^2 = \|x\|^2E⟨x,u⟩2=∥x∥2.
  • Lemma 2.2 (Nesterov–Spokoiny). E∥u∥p≤(n+p)p/2\mathbb E\|u\|^p \le (n+p)^{p/2}E∥u∥p≤(n+p)p/2 for a standard Gaussian uuu on Rn\mathbb R^nRn and p≥2p \ge 2p≥2. This is already proved on the platform and is reused.
  • Corollary 2.1. E∥Pu0∥p≤(d+p)p/2\mathbb E\|Pu_0\|^p \le (d+p)^{p/2}E∥Pu0​∥p≤(d+p)p/2.
  • Proposition 2.1(a). ∥E gμ(x)−grad⁡f(x)∥≤μL2(d+3)3/2\|\mathbb E\,g_\mu(x) - \operatorname{grad}f(x)\| \le \frac{\mu L}{2}(d+3)^{3/2}∥Egμ​(x)−gradf(x)∥≤2μL​(d+3)3/2 for the single-sample estimator gμg_\mugμ​.
  • Lemma 3.1. E∥gˉμ,ξ(x)−grad⁡f(x)∥2≤μ2L2(d+6)3+8(d+4)mσ2+8(d+4)m∥grad⁡f(x)∥2\mathbb E\|\bar g_{\mu,\xi}(x) - \operatorname{grad}f(x)\|^2 \le \mu^2L^2(d+6)^3 + \frac{8(d+4)}{m}\sigma^2 + \frac{8(d+4)}{m}\|\operatorname{grad}f(x)\|^2E∥gˉ​μ,ξ​(x)−gradf(x)∥2≤μ2L2(d+6)3+m8(d+4)​σ2+m8(d+4)​∥gradf(x)∥2.

Significance

Theorem 3.2 is the basic complexity result for derivative-free stochastic optimization on manifolds. With the parameter choices of (3.10) it gives an ϵ\epsilonϵ-stationary point in expectation after O(d/ϵ4)O(d/\epsilon^4)O(d/ϵ4) noisy function evaluations. The dependence is on the manifold dimension ddd, not on the ambient dimension nnn. This matches the Euclidean rate of Ghadimi and Lan with nnn replaced by ddd, and it is what makes projected-Gaussian estimators attractive when d≪nd \ll nd≪n (for example, low-dimensional Stiefel manifolds embedded in large matrix spaces).

The results are proved in the paper (main text, p. 17, and Appendix C) but, to our knowledge, none of them has been machine-checked. The Euclidean Gaussian moment bound (Lemma 2.2) is formalized on the platform. The Euclidean RSGF results of Ghadimi and Lan are stated on the platform, and they are different statements: they use x+μux + \mu ux+μu instead of a retraction, the full space instead of a tangent space, and a random output index. A complete formalization would also produce reusable infrastructure: Gaussian identities for orthogonal projections, the projected-Gaussian moment bound, and a template for proving stationarity rates of random iterates on a product probability space.

Difficulty

The Euclidean argument relies on a smoothed function fμ(x)=Ef(x+μu)f_\mu(x) = \mathbb E f(x + \mu u)fμ​(x)=Ef(x+μu) whose gradient is exactly the mean of the estimator. That identity has no Riemannian analogue: Rx(μu)R_x(\mu u)Rx​(μu) is not a translate, so E gμ(x)\mathbb E\,g_\mu(x)Egμ​(x) is not the gradient of any smoothed function. The bias in Proposition 2.1(a) has to be bounded directly from Assumption 2.1, and this is why the estimator is only approximately unbiased.

The convergence proof needs a one-step descent inequality conditioned on the past. The direction at step kkk is projected onto TxkMT_{x_k}\mathcal MTxk​​M, which depends on all earlier draws, so the conditional bound of Lemma 3.1 must be integrated against the product law of the batches. A naive reading that samples every direction from one fixed subspace, or that treats the iterates as deterministic, does not describe the algorithm. A further subtlety is that the gradient term of Lemma 3.1 must be absorbed by the descent of one step. This requires the batch to be large compared with the dimension, m≥16(d+4)m \ge 16(d+4)m≥16(d+4).

Formalization scope

  • EEE is any finite-dimensional real inner product space with its Borel σ-algebra. The Gaussian is Mathlib's stdGaussian E.
  • M\mathcal MM and its dimension are given by the published ProjLikeRetr.Retractor.IsSubmanifold 1 d M (a C1C^1C1 coordinate-slice submanifold), so ddd is tied to M\mathcal MM and is never a free number. TxMT_x\mathcal MTx​M is the published ProjLikeRetr.Retractor.tangentSpace M x, never an arbitrary subspace.
  • The retraction is defined on all of each tangent space, as the paper requires (Assumption 2.1 holds "for all η∈TxM\eta \in T_x\mathcal Mη∈Tx​M, i.e., ρx=∞\rho_x = \inftyρx​=∞"). The objective fff and the samples F(⋅,ξ)F(\cdot,\xi)F(⋅,ξ) are assumed differentiable rather than smooth, which is all the gradient formula (2.3) uses.
  • Added hypotheses. The goal assumes m≥16(d+4)m \ge 16(d+4)m≥16(d+4). The paper's proof assumes it explicitly, but the theorem statement omits it. The goal also assumes that (x,η)↦Rx(η)(x,\eta) \mapsto R_x(\eta)(x,η)↦Rx​(η) and x↦Pxx \mapsto P_xx↦Px​ are measurable, so that the iterates are random variables; this holds for closed M\mathcal MM such as spheres and Stiefel manifolds. Lemma 3.1 is stated for every m≥1m \ge 1m≥1. The paper's last proof step uses m≥2m \ge 2m≥2, but the bound holds for m=1m = 1m=1 as well.
  • The iterates are defined for every kkk on the sequence space of i.i.d. batches (the algorithm without a stopping index), so xN+1x_{N+1}xN+1​ exists.
  • No junk expectations. Every expectation of a nonnegative quantity is a lower Lebesgue integral compared with ENNReal.ofReal of the bound. Every vector-valued expectation comes with an integrability conclusion, and Assumption 2.3 carries the integrability of F(x,⋅)F(x,\cdot)F(x,⋅) and grad⁡F(x,⋅)\operatorname{grad}F(x,\cdot)gradF(x,⋅). So no statement can hold because a Bochner integral defaulted to 000.
  • The O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) parameter choices (3.10) and the oracle complexity mN=O(d/ϵ4)mN = O(d/\epsilon^4)mN=O(d/ϵ4) are not formalized.
  • The development needs projections of Gaussian measures onto subspaces, moments of Gaussian norms, conditional expectation along an i.i.d. sequence of batches, and telescoping. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are general lemmas about the push-forward of stdGaussian under an orthogonal projection.

Selected references

  • J. Li, K. Balasubramanian, S. Ma, Stochastic Zeroth-Order Riemannian Derivative Estimation and Optimization, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023. Preprint arXiv:2003.11238v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.11238
  • Y. Nesterov, V. Spokoiny, Random Gradient-Free Minimization of Convex Functions, Foundations of Computational Mathematics 17, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10208-015-9296-2
  • S. Ghadimi, G. Lan, Stochastic First- and Zeroth-Order Methods for Nonconvex Stochastic Programming, SIAM Journal on Optimization 23(4), 2013. https://arxiv.org/abs/1309.5549
  • K. Balasubramanian, S. Ghadimi, Zeroth-Order Nonconvex Stochastic Optimization: Handling Constraints, High Dimensionality, and Saddle Points, Foundations of Computational Mathematics, 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.06474
  • N. Boumal, P.-A. Absil, C. Cartis, Global Rates of Convergence for Nonconvex Optimization on Manifolds, IMA Journal of Numerical Analysis, 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.08101
  • P.-A. Absil, R. Mahony, R. Sepulchre, Optimization Algorithms on Matrix Manifolds, Princeton University Press, 2008.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithms for Competitive Division of Chores 2: Indivisible Chores Always Admit a Pareto Optimal Allocation That Is Both Weighted-EF^1_1 and Weighted-Prop1Research Paper

Motivation

Many allocation problems distribute chores: tasks, shifts, teaching duties or cleaning rotas that every recipient would rather avoid. Agents often have unequal obligations, for example a full-time and a part-time worker, and a fair division should respect these entitlements. When the tasks can be split (time shares, probabilities), the competitive rule of Bogomolnaia, Moulin, Sandomirskiy and Yanovskaya (Econometrica 2017) is the standard answer: chores are priced, each agent must "earn" a prescribed amount by taking on chores, and each takes the least unpleasant bundle that earns it. The resulting allocation is efficient and envy-free with respect to the entitlements.

Most chores cannot be split. Then exact envy-freeness or proportionality may be impossible (for instance with fewer chores than agents), and the literature asks for relaxations "up to one chore". For goods, Barman and Krishnamurthy (AAAI 2019) showed how to round a competitive allocation into an indivisible one that is Pareto efficient and approximately fair. Brânzei and Sandomirskiy (arXiv:1907.01766v2, §7; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024) transfer this rounding to chores with arbitrary weights. This mission formalizes that result, Theorem 34 of the paper.

Setting

There are nnn agents and mmm chores. A bundle is a vector x∈R≥0mx\in\mathbb R^m_{\ge0}x∈R≥0m​; an allocation is a matrix z=(zi,j)≥0z=(z_{i,j})\ge0z=(zi,j​)≥0, agent iii receiving the bundle ziz_izi​; it is feasible if ∑izi,j=1\sum_i z_{i,j}=1∑i​zi,j​=1 for every chore jjj. Values form a matrix v∈R<0n×mv\in\mathbb R^{n\times m}_{<0}v∈R<0n×m​, and agent iii's utility is additive, ui(x)=∑jvi,jxju_i(x)=\sum_j v_{i,j}x_jui​(x)=∑j​vi,j​xj​. The utility profile of zzz is u(z)=(u1(z1),…,un(zn))u(z)=(u_1(z_1),\dots,u_n(z_n))u(z)=(u1​(z1​),…,un​(zn​)), and U(v)\mathcal U(v)U(v) is the set of utility profiles of feasible allocations.

At prices p∈R<0mp\in\mathbb R^m_{<0}p∈R<0m​ a bundle costs p(x)=∑jpjxjp(x)=\sum_j p_jx_jp(x)=∑j​pj​xj​. Given budgets b∈R<0nb\in\mathbb R^n_{<0}b∈R<0n​, a feasible allocation zzz is competitive at ppp (Definition 3) if every agent's bundle satisfies p(zi)≤bip(z_i)\le b_ip(zi​)≤bi​ and maximizes uiu_iui​ among all bundles x≥0x\ge0x≥0 with p(x)≤bip(x)\le b_ip(x)≤bi​. It is Pareto optimal (Definition 5) if no feasible allocation makes every agent weakly and some agent strictly better off; the Pareto frontier U∗(v)\mathcal U^*(v)U∗(v) is the set of their utility profiles. The Nash social welfare of zzz is ∏i∣ui(zi)∣∣bi∣\prod_i|u_i(z_i)|^{|b_i|}∏i​∣ui​(zi​)∣∣bi​∣.

An allocation is indivisible if every zi,j∈{0,1}z_{i,j}\in\{0,1\}zi,j​∈{0,1}; then ziz_izi​ is identified with a set of chores, and ui(S)=∑j∈Svi,ju_i(S)=\sum_{j\in S}v_{i,j}ui​(S)=∑j∈S​vi,j​. Fix weights β∈R>0n\beta\in\mathbb R^n_{>0}β∈R>0n​.

  • Weighted-EF¹₁ (Definition 32): for all agents iii with zi≠∅z_i\neq\emptysetzi​=∅ and i′i'i′ there are j∈zij\in z_ij∈zi​ and j′∈[m]j'\in[m]j′∈[m] with ui(zi∖{j})/βi ≥ ui(zi′∪{j′})/βi′u_i(z_i\setminus\{j\})/\beta_i\ \ge\ u_i(z_{i'}\cup\{j'\})/\beta_{i'}ui​(zi​∖{j})/βi​ ≥ ui​(zi′​∪{j′})/βi′​.
  • Weighted-Prop1 (Definition 33): for each agent iii with zi≠∅z_i\ne\emptysetzi​=∅ there is j∈zij\in z_ij∈zi​ with ui(zi∖{j})/βi ≥ ui([m])/∑i′βi′u_i(z_i\setminus\{j\})/\beta_i\ \ge\ u_i([m])/\sum_{i'}\beta_{i'}ui​(zi​∖{j})/βi​ ≥ ui​([m])/∑i′​βi′​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 34

For every v∈R<0n×mv\in\mathbb R^{n\times m}_{<0}v∈R<0n×m​ and β∈R>0n\beta\in\mathbb R^n_{>0}β∈R>0n​ there is an indivisible allocation zzz with

u(z)∈U∗(v),z weighted-EF11,z weighted-Prop1.u(z)\in\mathcal U^*(v),\qquad z\ \text{weighted-EF}^1_1,\qquad z\ \text{weighted-Prop1}.u(z)∈U∗(v),z weighted-EF11​,z weighted-Prop1.

Pareto optimality is in the divisible problem: zzz is compared with all fractional allocations.

Milestones

  1. Existence (§2.3, p. 14): for v<0v<0v<0, b<0b<0b<0 a competitive allocation exists, and one maximizes the Nash social welfare over all Pareto optimal allocations.
  2. Cycle elimination (proof of Theorem 35, pp. 37–38): a competitive allocation at prices ppp can be replaced by one with the same utility profile and an acyclic consumption graph, competitive at the same ppp and bbb.
  3. Theorem 35 (p. 37): a competitive allocation at prices ppp rounds to an indivisible allocation competitive at the same ppp for budgets b′≤0b'\le0b′≤0 with
bi−∣pj∣≤bi′≤bi+∣pj′∣(j∈zi′)orbi<bi′=0<bi+∣pj′∣  if zi′=∅.b_i-|p_j|\le b'_i\le b_i+|p_{j'}|\quad(j\in z'_i)\qquad\text{or}\qquad b_i<b'_i=0<b_i+|p_{j'}|\ \text{ if } z'_i=\emptyset.bi​−∣pj​∣≤bi′​≤bi​+∣pj′​∣(j∈zi′​)orbi​<bi′​=0<bi​+∣pj′​∣  if zi′​=∅.
  1. The weighted-EF¹₁ step (pp. 38–39): for an indivisible competitive allocation, the price inequalities ∑c∈zi′∖{j}pc≥−βi\sum_{c\in z'_i\setminus\{j\}}p_c\ge-\beta_i∑c∈zi′​∖{j}​pc​≥−βi​ and ∑c∈zi′′∪{j′}pc≤−βi′\sum_{c\in z'_{i'}\cup\{j'\}}p_c\le-\beta_{i'}∑c∈zi′′​∪{j′}​pc​≤−βi′​ imply inequality (10).
  2. The weighted-Prop1 step (p. 39): if in addition all chores together cost −∑iβi-\sum_i\beta_i−∑i​βi​, the first price inequality implies (11).

The proof also uses two results of the paper that are formalized in the companion mission Algorithms for Competitive Division of Chores 1: the First welfare theorem (Theorem 9, item 1, p. 14) and the characterization of competitive allocations by minimum pain-per-buck chores (Lemma 36, p. 50). They will be linked as reference milestones once published.

Significance

Theorem 34 says that weighted envy-freeness up to one chore, weighted proportionality up to one chore and Pareto efficiency are compatible for indivisible chores with arbitrary entitlements. Envy-freeness alone can be achieved by simple procedures, but those allocations are typically inefficient; the theorem shows that efficiency need not be given up. Its proof produces the allocation from a divisible competitive allocation, which makes the competitive rule a single source for both divisible and indivisible fair division of chores. The paper also gives a strongly polynomial algorithm when nnn or mmm is fixed; that part is not in scope here.

The result is proved in the paper, partly by reference to Barman and Krishnamurthy for goods and to Bogomolnaia et al. for existence. No machine-checked version of it, of the competitive rule for chores, or of the rounding procedure is known to exist. The formalization would make all three available, and would make the deduction of Theorem 34 from Theorem 35 precise: as written, that deduction needs a chore j′j'j′ outside agent i′i'i′'s bundle, which the statement of Theorem 35 does not provide.

Difficulty

The main obstacle is existence. For goods, competitive allocations maximize the Nash social welfare over the whole feasible set, a convex program. For chores the set of competitive allocations can be disconnected; their utility profiles lie on the Pareto frontier and are critical points of Nash welfare on the feasible utility set. Maximizing the Nash welfare over the feasible set does not characterize all of them, and the frontier itself has to be handled as a polyhedral surface.

The rounding is combinatorial: it needs an acyclic consumption graph, a forest of agents and chores, which is traversed from roots to leaves. The bounds (12) and (13) come from an invariant of that traversal, not from a local exchange argument.

Formalization scope

Agents are Fin n and chores Fin m, both 0-based. Values v : Fin n → Fin m → ℝ and budgets b : Fin n → ℝ carry the sign hypotheses v i j < 0, b i < 0 in each theorem, not in the definitions, because Theorem 35 applies Definition 3 to budgets b′≤0b'\le0b′≤0. Competitiveness at prices ppp requires p<0p<0p<0, the budget constraint p(zi)≤bip(z_i)\le b_ip(zi​)≤bi​ and optimality among all bundles in R≥0m\mathbb R^m_{\ge0}R≥0m​ within the budget. An indivisible feasible allocation is a map σ : Fin m → Fin n, its 0/1 matrix is indicator σ, and bundles are Finsets. Graphs are edge sets Finset (Fin n × Fin m); acyclic means no simple cycle with at least two agents. Weights are arbitrary positive reals, never normalized.

Added hypotheses: 0<n0<n0<n in the goal (with no agents and m≥1m\ge1m≥1 chores no allocation exists), and 0<n0<n0<n, 0<m0<m0<m in the existence milestone (with m=0m=0m=0 no bundle meets a negative budget). The running-time statements of Theorems 34 and 35 are not formalized.

The trivializing readings are excluded: competitiveness always includes the budget constraint; values and budgets are strictly negative, not non-negative; Pareto optimality of the goal is with respect to all fractional allocations, not only indivisible ones; and (10) ranges over all ordered pairs of agents and all chores j′j'j′.

A complete development needs the existence theorem for chores (via the critical-point characterization of Theorem 7 or a fixed-point argument), the minimum pain-per-buck characterization of competitive allocations, cycle elimination in consumption graphs, and the forest traversal of Algorithm 3. The definitions of competitive allocations, Pareto frontier and weighted EF¹₁/Prop1 are shared with the companion mission and reusable for other fair-division results. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative proofs of the existence theorem, are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Brânzei and F. Sandomirskiy, Algorithms for Competitive Division of Chores, arXiv:1907.01766v2, 2023; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024. https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.01766v2
  • A. Bogomolnaia, H. Moulin, F. Sandomirskiy and E. Yanovskaya, Competitive division of a mixed manna, Econometrica 85(6), 2017. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA14564
  • A. Bogomolnaia, H. Moulin, F. Sandomirskiy and E. Yanovskaya, Dividing bads under additive utilities, Social Choice and Welfare 52, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1157-x
  • S. Barman and S. K. Krishnamurthy, On the proximity of markets with integral equilibria, AAAI 2019. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011748
  • V. Conitzer, R. Freeman and N. Shah, Fair public decision making, ACM EC 2017 (proportionality up to one item). https://doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3085125
11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Managing Outpatient Service with Strategic Walk-ins II: The Triage Model Costs Less When C_L/C_O ≤ α̲ and the Strategic Model Costs Less When C_L/C_O ≥ ᾱResearch Paper

Motivation

Many outpatient clinics offer two ways in: an appointment booked online, and walk-in hours on the day. Some patients have no choice (acute cases arrive as walk-ins), but many can pick either channel, and they pick the one that costs them less: a long appointment delay pushes them into the walk-in room, a crowded walk-in room pushes them to book or to give up. A clinic deciding how to split its daily capacity between the two channels therefore faces a game, not a forecasting problem.

Liu, van Jaarsveld, Wang and Xiao (SSRN 3558209; Management Science 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4676) model this game and compare three operational levers: the capacity split, how much delay information the booking system reveals, and triage, that is, reserving walk-in hours for acute patients only (as some practices do, e.g. Centre Pediatrics 2021). This mission formalizes the triage comparison, Proposition 6 of the paper: closing walk-in hours to patients who could book pays off exactly when lost demand is cheap relative to overtime.

Setting

Patients. Exogenous walk-ins arrive at rate λE\lambda_EλE​ and are always served on the day, possibly in overtime. Strategic patients arrive as a Poisson process of rate λ>0\lambda>0λ>0. A served patient gains R>0R>0R>0.

Capacity. The clinic has total capacity μ>0\mu>0μ>0 per day, split into appointment hours μS\mu_SμS​ and walk-in hours μW=μ−μS\mu_W=\mu-\mu_SμW​=μ−μS​, with μS∈[0,μ)\mu_S\in[0,\mu)μS​∈[0,μ).

The appointment queue. Appointments form a single-server queue with deterministic service time 1/μS1/\mu_S1/μS​. In the observable setting a patient sees the queue: with kkk patients waiting, the delay is (k+u~)/μS(k+\tilde u)/\mu_S(k+u~)/μS​, u~\tilde uu~ uniform on [0,1][0,1][0,1]. A patient schedules when this delay is at most a threshold δ\deltaδ, and scheduling at delay ddd is worth uS2(d)=R−CDdu^2_S(d)=R-C_D duS2​(d)=R−CD​d. The fraction of strategic patients who do not schedule is the blocking probability π(δ,μS)\pi(\delta,\mu_S)π(δ,μS​) of this M/D/1/K−1+p queue, where K=⌈δμS⌉K=\lceil\delta\mu_S\rceilK=⌈δμS​⌉ and p=δμS+1−Kp=\delta\mu_S+1-Kp=δμS​+1−K. With ρ=λ/μS\rho=\lambda/\mu_Sρ=λ/μS​ it has the closed form π(δ,μS)=1−1/(q0+ρ)\pi(\delta,\mu_S)=1-1/(q_0+\rho)π(δ,μS​)=1−1/(q0​+ρ), where q0q_0q0​ is built from the Poisson weights αj=ρje−ρ/j!\alpha_j=\rho^je^{-\rho}/j!αj​=ρje−ρ/j! by the Brun–Garcia recursion (Online Appendix C, (26)–(27), Corollary C.1). With no appointment hours, π(δ,0)=1\pi(\delta,0)=1π(δ,0)=1.

Walking in and balking. A patient who does not schedule walks in with probability proportional to pWp_WpW​ or balks with probability proportional to pBp_BpB​. Walking in is worth uW2(pW)=R−CW w((λE+pWλ)/μW)u^2_W(p_W)=R-C_W\,w\big((\lambda_E+p_W\lambda)/\mu_W\big)uW2​(pW​)=R−CW​w((λE​+pW​λ)/μW​), with www convex, strictly increasing and w(0)=0w(0)=0w(0)=0; balking is worth 000. An observable equilibrium (δ,pW,pB)(\delta,p_W,p_B)(δ,pW​,pB​) is a solution of conditions (6)–(10): the threshold δ\deltaδ makes scheduling at least as good as the walk-in/balk mixture up to δ\deltaδ and worse beyond it, pW+pB=π(δ,μS)p_W+p_B=\pi(\delta,\mu_S)pW​+pB​=π(δ,μS​), and patients walk in (balk) only if walking in is worth at least (at most) zero.

Costs. The provider pays CLC_LCL​ per balking patient and CO o(⋅)C_O\,o(\cdot)CO​o(⋅) for overtime, with ooo convex and strictly increasing. In the strategic model patients choose freely, and the cost at allocation μS\mu_SμS​ and equilibrium (δ,pW,pB)(\delta,p_W,p_B)(δ,pW​,pB​) is

Zs=CL pBλ+CO o(pWλ+λEμW).(Ob.P)Z^s=C_L\,p_B\lambda+C_O\,o\Big(\frac{p_W\lambda+\lambda_E}{\mu_W}\Big). \qquad\text{(Ob.P)}Zs=CL​pB​λ+CO​o(μW​pW​λ+λE​​).(Ob.P)

In the triage model strategic patients may only schedule or balk, so they behave with threshold R/CDR/C_DR/CD​ and

Zt=CL π(R/CD,μS) λ+CO o(λEμW).(T.Ob.P)Z^t=C_L\,\pi(R/C_D,\mu_S)\,\lambda+C_O\,o\Big(\frac{\lambda_E}{\mu_W}\Big). \qquad\text{(T.Ob.P)}Zt=CL​π(R/CD​,μS​)λ+CO​o(μW​λE​​).(T.Ob.P)

Let μ‾W\underline\mu_Wμ​W​ solve R−CW w(λE/μ‾W)=0R-C_W\,w(\lambda_E/\underline\mu_W)=0R−CW​w(λE​/μ​W​)=0 (15): below these walk-in hours the exogenous walk-ins alone make walking in worthless.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 6

Suppose μ>μ‾W\mu>\underline\mu_Wμ>μ​W​ and set

α‾=o′(λE/μ)μ,α‾=o′(λE/μ‾W)μ‾Wmax⁡{λEλ π(R/CD,μ−μ‾W),1}.\underline\alpha=\frac{o'(\lambda_E/\mu)}{\mu},\qquad \overline\alpha=\frac{o'(\lambda_E/\underline\mu_W)}{\underline\mu_W}\max\Big\{\frac{\lambda_E}{\lambda\,\pi(R/C_D,\mu-\underline\mu_W)},1\Big\}.α​=μo′(λE​/μ)​,α=μ​W​o′(λE​/μ​W​)​max{λπ(R/CD​,μ−μ​W​)λE​​,1}.

Then

CLCO≤α‾ ⟹ inf⁡Zt≤inf⁡Zs,CLCO≥α‾ ⟹ inf⁡Zs≤inf⁡Zt,\frac{C_L}{C_O}\le\underline\alpha\ \Longrightarrow\ \inf Z^t\le\inf Z^s,\qquad \frac{C_L}{C_O}\ge\overline\alpha\ \Longrightarrow\ \inf Z^s\le\inf Z^t,CO​CL​​≤α​ ⟹ infZt≤infZs,CO​CL​​≥α ⟹ infZs≤infZt,

where the infima are over allocations μS∈[0,μ)\mu_S\in[0,\mu)μS​∈[0,μ) and, on the strategic side, over the equilibria at each allocation. The Lean statement says this without infima: every strategic configuration is matched by a triage allocation that costs no more, and every triage allocation is matched by a strategic allocation at which an equilibrium exists and every equilibrium costs no more.

Milestones

  1. Proposition C.2 (μS\mu_SμS​-part): μS↦π(δ,μS)\mu_S\mapsto\pi(\delta,\mu_S)μS​↦π(δ,μS​) is continuous and strictly decreasing on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞).
  2. Proposition 1 (observable setting): an observable equilibrium exists at every allocation.
  3. Proposition 2 (1): if μW≤μ‾W\mu_W\le\underline\mu_WμW​≤μ​W​, every equilibrium is schedule-and-balk, pW=0p_W=0pW​=0, δ=R/CD\delta=R/C_Dδ=R/CD​, pB=π(R/CD,μS)p_B=\pi(R/C_D,\mu_S)pB​=π(R/CD​,μS​).
  4. From the proof of part 1: λ (1−π(δ,μS))≤λ (1−π(R/CD,μS))\lambda\,(1-\pi(\delta,\mu_S))\le\lambda\,(1-\pi(R/C_D,\mu_S))λ(1−π(δ,μS​))≤λ(1−π(R/CD​,μS​)) at every equilibrium.
  5. From the proof of part 2: if nobody balks, (λpW+λE)/μW≤λE/μ‾W(\lambda p_W+\lambda_E)/\mu_W\le\lambda_E/\underline\mu_W(λpW​+λE​)/μW​≤λE​/μ​W​.
  6. From the proof of part 2: if patients mix between walking in and balking, (λpW+λE)/μW=λE/μ‾W(\lambda p_W+\lambda_E)/\mu_W=\lambda_E/\underline\mu_W(λpW​+λE​)/μW​=λE​/μ​W​.

Significance

Proposition 6 turns a qualitative trade-off into two explicit thresholds on the ratio of the lost-demand cost to the overtime cost. Free choice reduces balking but lets strategic patients crowd the walk-in hours; triage removes that crowding at the price of more balking. The thresholds α‾\underline\alphaα​ and α‾\overline\alphaα depend only on the overtime function, the capacity and the blocking probability, so a clinic can evaluate them from its own data. The paper also shows (Remark 4, Appendix D.8) that the same insight holds in the unobservable setting, with capacity playing an additional role; that variant is not part of this mission.

The result is proved in the paper (Online Appendix E.3, pp. 35–37) and has no machine-checked proof. The formalization adds three things. It fixes the equilibrium concept precisely, including the mixture weights and the endpoint conventions. It states the comparison of optimal costs without presupposing that the optima are attained; the paper's proof begins "denote the optimal capacity allocations" without proving existence. And it ties the blocking probability to the paper's closed form, so the monotonicity in μS\mu_SμS​ that the proof invokes becomes a statement about an explicit function rather than about a queue described in words.

Difficulty

The comparison itself is a chain of convexity inequalities at a single allocation. The hard part is the blocking probability. The paper proves that π(δ,μS)\pi(\delta,\mu_S)π(δ,μS​) decreases in μS\mu_SμS​ by a sample-path argument on the queue, but a formal development has only the closed form, in which K=⌈δμS⌉K=\lceil\delta\mu_S\rceilK=⌈δμS​⌉ jumps at every μS\mu_SμS​ where δμS\delta\mu_SδμS​ is an integer, ppp jumps from 111 to 000 there, and ρ=λ/μS\rho=\lambda/\mu_Sρ=λ/μS​ moves continuously. Monotonicity and continuity must be shown across these seams, through alternating sums whose terms cancel heavily. The obvious route, differentiating the closed form for fixed KKK, does not give the sign without a further structural argument on the coefficients aja_jaj​.

Existence of an equilibrium (milestone 2) is an intermediate-value argument in δ\deltaδ, which in turn needs continuity of π\piπ in δ\deltaδ and positivity of π\piπ.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace OutpatientWalkIn.Triage. The definition Queue contains the closed-form blocking probability blockProb lam δ μS; the definition Setting contains the model, the standing assumptions, the utilities, the equilibrium IsObsEq, the costs obsCost and triageCost, and the thresholds alphaLow, alphaHigh.

Conventions:

  • Standing assumptions, hypotheses of every theorem: λ>0\lambda>0λ>0, λE≥0\lambda_E\ge0λE​≥0, R,CD,CW>0R,C_D,C_W>0R,CD​,CW​>0, CL,CO≥0C_L,C_O\ge0CL​,CO​≥0, μ>0\mu>0μ>0; www convex and strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with w(0)=0w(0)=0w(0)=0 (Assumption 1); ooo convex and strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) (Assumption 2).
  • Allocations range over μS∈[0,μ)\mu_S\in[0,\mu)μS​∈[0,μ) on both sides, so that μW>0\mu_W>0μW​>0; the paper's μS=μ\mu_S=\muμS​=μ leaves the exogenous walk-ins with no walk-in hours.
  • π(δ,0)=1\pi(\delta,0)=1π(δ,0)=1; the observable setting is defined directly (the paper's CG=0C_G=0CG​=0).
  • The equilibrium carries the guard pW+pB>0p_W+p_B>0pW​+pB​>0, which by (8) is π(δ,μS)>0\pi(\delta,\mu_S)>0π(δ,μS​)>0 and excludes no equilibrium of the paper.
  • Added hypotheses of the goal: CO>0C_O>0CO​>0, λE>0\lambda_E>0λE​>0, μ‾W>0\underline\mu_W>0μ​W​>0 given by (15), and differentiability of ooo at λE/μ\lambda_E/\muλE​/μ and λE/μ‾W\lambda_E/\underline\mu_WλE​/μ​W​ (where o′o'o′ is evaluated). Without them Lean's CL/0=0C_L/0=0CL​/0=0 and the zero derivative of a non-differentiable function would make α‾=0\underline\alpha=0α​=0 and turn part 1 into a different claim.
  • "Costs less" is "costs no more" (p. 26).

A formalization that compares the two models at one fixed allocation only, that lets the prover choose a cheap equilibrium when several might exist, or that replaces π\piπ by an arbitrary decreasing function, is not the paper's theorem; the statements here rule these out.

Contributions welcome: properties of the closed-form π\piπ (positivity, π≤1\pi\le1π≤1, monotonicity and continuity in both arguments), the existence of equilibria, and the convexity estimates of the final comparison. The queue file is reusable for any M/D/1/K model with partial joining.

Selected references

  • N. Liu, W. van Jaarsveld, S. Wang, G. Xiao, Managing Outpatient Service with Strategic Walk-ins, SSRN 3558209 (version of 2022-07-05); Management Science, 2023. https://ssrn.com/abstract=3558209, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4676
  • O. Brun, J.-M. Garcia, Analytical solution of finite capacity M/D/1 queues, Journal of Applied Probability 37(4), 2000 (the source of the aja_jaj​ recursion, cited in the paper's Online Appendix C).
  • P. Naor, The regulation of queue size by levying tolls, Econometrica 37(1), 1969. https://doi.org/10.2307/1909200
15 thms2 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningReinforcement LearningStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Breaking the Sample Size Barrier in Model-Based Reinforcement Learning with a Generative Model 1: The Perturbed Model-Based Planner Is ε-Optimal w.p. 1−δ Once N ≥ c₀log(|S||A|/((1−γ)εδ))/((1−γ)³ε²)Research Paper

Motivation

A generative model lets a planner request independent next-state samples for any state-action pair. This is a useful idealization for studying how many simulator calls are needed before a policy computed from an estimated model performs well in the true environment. Li, Wei, Chi, and Chen show that a small independent perturbation of the rewards lets a model-based planner meet a sample-size bound with cubic dependence on the effective horizon 1/(1−γ)1/(1-\gamma)1/(1−γ), while providing guarantees for both values and action values (Li et al., 2024). This mission isolates their perturbed-planning result and the source lemmas that support it.

Setting

A finite discounted Markov decision process consists of a state set SSS, an action set AAA, a transition probability P(s′∣s,a)P(s'\mid s,a)P(s′∣s,a), an immediate reward r(s,a)∈[0,1]r(s,a)\in[0,1]r(s,a)∈[0,1], and a discount factor γ∈(0,1)\gamma\in(0,1)γ∈(0,1). A deterministic policy π:S→A\pi:S\to Aπ:S→A chooses an action at each state. Its value Vπ(s)V^\pi(s)Vπ(s) is the expected sum of rewards, discounted by γt\gamma^tγt, from state sss. Its action value Qπ(s,a)Q^\pi(s,a)Qπ(s,a) takes action aaa first and follows π\piπ thereafter. The optimal values V⋆V^\starV⋆ and Q⋆Q^\starQ⋆ are those of an optimal deterministic policy; equivalently, Q⋆(s,a)=r(s,a)+γ∑s′P(s′∣s,a)V⋆(s′)Q^\star(s,a)=r(s,a)+\gamma\sum_{s'}P(s'\mid s,a)V^\star(s')Q⋆(s,a)=r(s,a)+γ∑s′​P(s′∣s,a)V⋆(s′).

For each (s,a)(s,a)(s,a), draw NNN independent next states from P(⋅∣s,a)P(\cdot\mid s,a)P(⋅∣s,a), independently across pairs. The empirical kernel P^\widehat PP is their frequency table. Independently draw one reward perturbation ζ(s,a)∼Unif⁡(0,ξ)\zeta(s,a)\sim\operatorname{Unif}(0,\xi)ζ(s,a)∼Unif(0,ξ) per pair and set rp=r+ζr_p=r+\zetarp​=r+ζ. The planner returns an optimal deterministic policy π^p⋆\widehat\pi_p^\starπp⋆​ for the empirical MDP (S,A,P^,rp,γ)(S,A,\widehat P,r_p,\gamma)(S,A,P,rp​,γ). The performance claim evaluates this policy under the original PPP and rrr, so the perturbation changes policy selection but not the evaluation target.

Formalization targets

Perturbed model-based planning

Theorem 1 of Li et al. asserts that absolute constants c0,c1>0c_0,c_1>0c0​,c1​>0 can be chosen before SSS, AAA, PPP, rrr, γ\gammaγ, ε\varepsilonε, and δ\deltaδ. For δ>0\delta>0δ>0, 0<ε≤1/(1−γ)0<\varepsilon\le1/(1-\gamma)0<ε≤1/(1−γ), and ξ=c1(1−γ)ε/(∣S∣5∣A∣5)\xi=c_1(1-\gamma)\varepsilon/(|S|^5|A|^5)ξ=c1​(1−γ)ε/(∣S∣5∣A∣5), the sample-size condition is

N≥c0log⁡ ⁣(∣S∣∣A∣/((1−γ)εδ))(1−γ)3ε2.N\ge\frac{c_0\log\!\bigl(|S||A|/((1-\gamma)\varepsilon\delta)\bigr)}{(1-\gamma)^3\varepsilon^2}.N≥(1−γ)3ε2c0​log(∣S∣∣A∣/((1−γ)εδ))​.

With probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ over both the samples and the perturbation, every optimal policy of the perturbed empirical MDP simultaneously satisfies

Vπ^p⋆(s)≥V⋆(s)−ε,Qπ^p⋆(s,a)≥Q⋆(s,a)−γεfor all (s,a).V^{\widehat\pi_p^\star}(s)\ge V^\star(s)-\varepsilon,\qquad Q^{\widehat\pi_p^\star}(s,a)\ge Q^\star(s,a)-\gamma\varepsilon\quad\text{for all }(s,a).Vπp⋆​(s)≥V⋆(s)−ε,Qπp⋆​(s,a)≥Q⋆(s,a)−γεfor all (s,a).

The milestone list follows the paper's numbered statements: fixed-policy and Bernstein-condition value bounds (Lemmas 1–2), calibrated state-action absorbing models and their finite reward grid (Lemma 3, (88), Lemma 4), planning under a separated optimum (Lemma 5), separation induced by random rewards (Lemma 6), and the reward-change bound before (49). The paper's additional claim about iteration counts for empirical QVI and PI is outside this target.

Significance

The theorem gives a policy guarantee from a finite number of calls to a generative model. It bounds the true value of the selected policy at every state and its true action value at every state-action pair, rather than only the empirical objective used to select the policy. Its NNN is the number of samples per pair; the total number of transitions observed is N∣S∣∣A∣N|S||A|N∣S∣∣A∣. The statement is a theorem proved in the cited paper, not an open mathematical conjecture (Li et al., Theorem 1).

The formalization work is to turn the paper's probability experiment, policy choice, and linked inequalities into machine-checked statements and eventually machine-checked proofs. The published FoundationsML transition kernel and policy-value definitions provide reusable base objects. This mission adds a finite generative-sample law, the reward-perturbation law, and an absorbing-MDP interface. Those objects can support later formalizations of empirical planning and policy evaluation beyond this theorem. The goal and milestone proofs remain open in the present draft.

Difficulty

A fixed policy can be evaluated against an empirical transition kernel using concentration at that policy. The planner's policy depends on the same sampled kernel, so a fixed-policy bound cannot simply be applied to it. Small changes in transition frequencies may also switch the chosen optimal action when actions have nearly equal values. The paper's intermediate results specify the needed value-control and separation properties; a Lean proof must track their constants and their probability events without silently assuming that the data-dependent policy was fixed before sampling (Li et al., §§6.2–6.3).

Formalization scope

The Lean state and action types are finite, and both are nonempty where cardinalities occur in denominators. A transition kernel is a probability vector at each state-action pair. Policies are deterministic functions S→AS\to AS→A, embedded as point-mass stochastic policies for the published value definitions. V⋆V^\starV⋆ is the maximum over the finite set of deterministic policies; Q⋆Q^\starQ⋆ is r+γPV⋆r+\gamma PV^\starr+γPV⋆. Function norms are supremum norms. The empirical kernel is the frequency table of a finite array of samples, with N>0N>0N>0 in the goal because its formula divides by NNN. The independent perturbation is the uniform measure on the cube [0,ξ]S×A[0,\xi]^{S\times A}[0,ξ]S×A.

Probability claims bound the failure event. The data law is a finite product, and the auxiliary continuous draw is measured section by section. This formulation allows an outer measure for a section whose measurability is not already known; it does not let a nonmeasurable success event satisfy the result for free. The main theorem quantifies over every optimal policy of the empirical perturbed model, and its universal constants do not depend on the instance. These choices rule out treating the selected policy as arbitrary, fixing the perturbation in advance, or choosing constants after seeing the MDP.

The absorbing-MDP construction changes one transition row and one reward. The reward at that row may leave [0,1][0,1][0,1], so the underlying value function accepts arbitrary real rewards even though the main MDP has normalized rewards. Lemma 5 is stated with normalized rewards as printed. Reusable contributions include basic properties of the sampling law, optimal-policy existence, the absorbing construction, and quantitative value stability; the milestone statements themselves are the intended proof targets.

Selected references

  • G. Li, Y. Wei, Y. Chi, and Y. Chen, Breaking the Sample Size Barrier in Model-Based Reinforcement Learning with a Generative Model, Operations Research, 2024; arXiv:2005.12900v8.
15 thms2 active usersReviewed
Differential GeometryMachine LearningOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Zeroth-Order Riemannian Derivative Estimation and Optimization 1: ZO-RGD Has Average Expected Squared Riemannian Gradient Norm at Most 8(d+4)L(f(x₀) − f(x*))/(N+1) + 8(d+4)L·C(μ)Research Paper

Motivation

Many optimization problems in statistics and machine learning constrain the variable to a smooth manifold: orthonormal frames in sparse PCA and dictionary learning (the Stiefel manifold), unit vectors in phase retrieval (the sphere), fixed-rank matrices in matrix completion. Riemannian optimization handles these problems directly on the manifold. A step is taken in the tangent space and mapped back to the manifold by a retraction.

In several applications the objective can be evaluated but not differentiated: black-box adversarial attacks, simulation-based models, and hyperparameter or policy tuning. Zeroth-order (derivative-free) methods replace the gradient by an estimator built from function values. In Euclidean space the standard construction is Gaussian smoothing, analysed by Nesterov and Spokoiny (2017) and Ghadimi and Lan (2013). Li, Balasubramanian and Ma (arXiv:2003.11238; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023) carry the construction over to embedded submanifolds. They sample a Gaussian vector, project it onto the tangent space, and use the retraction in place of the straight line x+μux+\mu ux+μu. This mission formalizes their first optimization guarantee: the convergence rate of zeroth-order Riemannian gradient descent (ZO-RGD).

Setting

Let EEE be a finite-dimensional real inner product space (the ambient Rn\mathbb R^nRn). Let M⊆EM\subseteq EM⊆E be a C1C^1C1 embedded submanifold of dimension ddd. At each x∈Mx\in Mx∈M the tangent space TxMT_xMTx​M is a ddd-dimensional linear subspace of EEE; let PxP_xPx​ denote the orthogonal projection onto it. MMM carries the metric induced by the inner product of EEE.

A retraction is a map (x,η)↦Rx(η)(x,\eta)\mapsto R_x(\eta)(x,η)↦Rx​(η) such that, for every x∈Mx\in Mx∈M, RxR_xRx​ is smooth on TxMT_xMTx​M, maps TxMT_xMTx​M into MMM, satisfies Rx(0)=xR_x(0)=xRx​(0)=x, and has the identity as its differential at 000. In this mission RxR_xRx​ is defined on all of TxMT_xMTx​M.

For a differentiable f:E→Rf:E\to\mathbb Rf:E→R the Riemannian gradient is grad⁡f(x)=Px∇f(x)\operatorname{grad} f(x)=P_x\nabla f(x)gradf(x)=Px​∇f(x). Assumption 2.1 (retraction smoothness) asks for a constant L≥0L\ge0L≥0 such that

∣f(Rx(η))−f(x)−⟨grad⁡f(x),η⟩∣≤L2∥η∥2(x∈M, η∈TxM).\big|f(R_x(\eta))-f(x)-\langle \operatorname{grad} f(x),\eta\rangle\big|\le \tfrac L2\|\eta\|^2\qquad(x\in M,\ \eta\in T_xM).​f(Rx​(η))−f(x)−⟨gradf(x),η⟩​≤2L​∥η∥2(x∈M, η∈Tx​M).

Given μ>0\mu>0μ>0 and a standard Gaussian vector u0∼N(0,In)u_0\sim N(0,I_n)u0​∼N(0,In​) of EEE, set u=Pxu0u=P_xu_0u=Px​u0​. The zeroth-order Riemannian gradient estimator is

gμ(x)=f(Rx(μu))−f(x)μ u.g_\mu(x)=\frac{f(R_x(\mu u))-f(x)}{\mu}\,u .gμ​(x)=μf(Rx​(μu))−f(x)​u.

ZO-RGD (Algorithm 1) starts at x0∈Mx_0\in Mx0​∈M, draws independent Gaussian vectors u00,u01,…u_0^0,u_0^1,\dotsu00​,u01​,…, and sets xk+1=Rxk(−η^ gμ(xk))x_{k+1}=R_{x_k}(-\hat\eta\, g_\mu(x_k))xk+1​=Rxk​​(−η^​gμ​(xk​)), where gμ(xk)g_\mu(x_k)gμ​(xk​) uses uk=Pxku0ku_k=P_{x_k}u_0^kuk​=Pxk​​u0k​. The step size is η^=1/(2(d+4)L)\hat\eta=1/(2(d+4)L)η^​=1/(2(d+4)L). Let x∗∈Mx^*\in Mx∗∈M be a minimizer of fff over MMM.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1

For every N≥0N\ge0N≥0,

1N+1∑k=0NE ∥grad⁡f(xk)∥2≤4η^(f(x0)−f(x∗)N+1+C(μ)),\frac1{N+1}\sum_{k=0}^{N}\mathbb E\,\|\operatorname{grad} f(x_k)\|^2\le\frac4{\hat\eta}\left(\frac{f(x_0)-f(x^*)}{N+1}+C(\mu)\right),N+11​k=0∑N​E∥gradf(xk​)∥2≤η^​4​(N+1f(x0​)−f(x∗)​+C(μ)),

where 4/η^=8(d+4)L4/\hat\eta=8(d+4)L4/η^​=8(d+4)L and

C(μ)=μ2L16(d+3)3d+4+μ2L16(d+6)3d+4+μ2L16(d+6)3(d+4)2.C(\mu)=\frac{\mu^2L}{16}\frac{(d+3)^3}{d+4}+\frac{\mu^2L}{16}\frac{(d+6)^3}{d+4}+\frac{\mu^2L}{16}\frac{(d+6)^3}{(d+4)^2}.C(μ)=16μ2L​d+4(d+3)3​+16μ2L​d+4(d+6)3​+16μ2L​(d+4)2(d+6)3​.

Milestones

These are the paper's own intermediate results (§2.2, p. 8):

  1. Lemma 2.1. For a subspace X\mathcal XX with projection PPP, u=Pu0u=Pu_0u=Pu0​ and x∈Xx\in\mathcal Xx∈X: E⟨x,u⟩u=x\mathbb E\langle x,u\rangle u=xE⟨x,u⟩u=x and E⟨x,u⟩2=∥x∥2\mathbb E\langle x,u\rangle^2=\|x\|^2E⟨x,u⟩2=∥x∥2.
  2. Lemma 2.2 (Nesterov–Spokoiny). E∥u∥p≤(n+p)p/2\mathbb E\|u\|^p\le(n+p)^{p/2}E∥u∥p≤(n+p)p/2 for p≥2p\ge2p≥2. This result is already on the platform as a proved theorem and is referenced.
  3. Corollary 2.1. If dim⁡X=d\dim\mathcal X=ddimX=d, then E∥Pu0∥p≤(d+p)p/2\mathbb E\|Pu_0\|^p\le(d+p)^{p/2}E∥Pu0​∥p≤(d+p)p/2.
  4. Proposition 2.1(a). ∥Egμ(x)−grad⁡f(x)∥≤μL2(d+3)3/2\|\mathbb E g_\mu(x)-\operatorname{grad} f(x)\|\le\frac{\mu L}{2}(d+3)^{3/2}∥Egμ​(x)−gradf(x)∥≤2μL​(d+3)3/2.
  5. Proposition 2.1(b). ∥grad⁡f(x)∥2≤2∥Egμ(x)∥2+μ22L2(d+6)3\|\operatorname{grad} f(x)\|^2\le2\|\mathbb E g_\mu(x)\|^2+\frac{\mu^2}{2}L^2(d+6)^3∥gradf(x)∥2≤2∥Egμ​(x)∥2+2μ2​L2(d+6)3.
  6. Proposition 2.1(c). E∥gμ(x)∥2≤μ22L2(d+6)3+2(d+4)∥grad⁡f(x)∥2\mathbb E\|g_\mu(x)\|^2\le\frac{\mu^2}{2}L^2(d+6)^3+2(d+4)\|\operatorname{grad} f(x)\|^2E∥gμ​(x)∥2≤2μ2​L2(d+6)3+2(d+4)∥gradf(x)∥2.

Significance

Theorem 3.1 shows that ZO-RGD reaches an ϵ\epsilonϵ-stationary point in expectation using O(d/ϵ2)O(d/\epsilon^2)O(d/ϵ2) function evaluations, provided the smoothing parameter is of order ϵ/d3/2\epsilon/d^{3/2}ϵ/d3/2. The dimension that enters is the intrinsic dimension ddd of the manifold, not the ambient dimension nnn. For the Stiefel manifold of n×pn\times pn×p orthonormal frames this is the difference between np−p(p+1)/2np-p(p+1)/2np−p(p+1)/2 and npnpnp, and for the sphere between n−1n-1n−1 and nnn. More importantly, the estimator never explores normal directions. The three estimates of Proposition 2.1 are the toolkit that the paper reuses for its stochastic (ZO-RSGD), proximal (ZO-ManPG) and second-order variants.

The paper proves these results on paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof. The mission adds three things. It gives a precise model of a random iterate sequence on a submanifold, driven by the infinite product of Gaussian draws. It formalizes the projected-Gaussian identities, which are reusable for any method that samples in tangent spaces. And it pins down the constants. In checking the constants, the printed Proposition 2.1(b) turned out to be false for large LLL (its proof yields L2L^2L2, not LLL), and the middle term of the printed C(μ)C(\mu)C(μ) inherits that slip. The statements here carry the constants the proofs actually give.

Difficulty

In Euclidean space, E gμ(x)\mathbb E\,g_\mu(x)Egμ​(x) is exactly the gradient of the Gaussian-smoothed function fμ(x)=Ef(x+μu)f_\mu(x)=\mathbb E f(x+\mu u)fμ​(x)=Ef(x+μu), and the analysis runs on fμf_\mufμ​. Once a retraction replaces x+μux+\mu ux+μu, no smoothed function has Egμ\mathbb E g_\muEgμ​ as its gradient. The bias must be estimated directly from Assumption 2.1, which controls f∘Rxf\circ R_xf∘Rx​ only along the tangent space. The moment bounds must then be taken for a Gaussian projected onto a subspace that changes with xxx.

In the descent argument, the direction uku_kuk​ is sampled in TxkMT_{x_k}MTxk​​M, which depends on all earlier draws. The expectation of step kkk is therefore conditional on the past. Summing the one-step inequality requires conditional expectations on the product space, together with measurability of the iterate map. Finiteness of Ef(xk)\mathbb E f(x_k)Ef(xk​) is not given and must be handled as well.

Formalization scope

  • Space. The ambient space is a finite-dimensional real inner product space EEE. The standard Gaussian is Mathlib's stdGaussian E, so κ−1∫⋯e−∥u0∥2/2du0\kappa^{-1}\int\cdots e^{-\|u_0\|^2/2}du_0κ−1∫⋯e−∥u0​∥2/2du0​ becomes integration against it.
  • Manifold and tangent spaces. The manifold is given by the published coordinate-slice predicate ProjLikeRetr.Retractor.IsSubmanifold 1 d M, which ties ddd to MMM. The tangent space is the published ProjLikeRetr.Retractor.tangentSpace M x, the span of Mathlib's tangent cone. Neither ddd nor the tangent spaces are free parameters.
  • Retraction. The retraction is global: Assumption 2.1 is required for every η∈TxM\eta\in T_xMη∈Tx​M (the paper's "ρx=∞\rho_x=\inftyρx​=∞"). "Smooth" means C∞C^\inftyC∞, not analytic.
  • Regularity of fff. fff is assumed differentiable on EEE, which is what the definition grad⁡f=Px∇f\operatorname{grad} f=P_x\nabla fgradf=Px​∇f needs. This is weaker than the paper's "smooth".
  • Constants. The goal takes L>0L>0L>0, because the step size divides by LLL. The milestones take L≥0L\ge0L≥0 and μ>0\mu>0μ>0.
  • Draws and iterates. The draws live on ENE^{\mathbb N}EN with the infinite product of standard Gaussian measures. The iterates are defined for every kkk: the algorithm runs without a stopping time, so the sum over k=0,…,Nk=0,\dots,Nk=0,…,N is meaningful.
  • Minimizer. x∗x^*x∗ is an attained minimizer over MMM.
  • Measurability. The goal adds two measurability hypotheses that make the iterates random variables: (x,η)↦Rx(η)(x,\eta)\mapsto R_x(\eta)(x,η)↦Rx​(η) is measurable and x↦Pxx\mapsto P_xx↦Px​ is measurable. Both hold for closed manifolds such as spheres and Stiefel manifolds.
  • Corrected constants. Proposition 2.1(b) carries L2L^2L2, and the middle term of C(μ)C(\mu)C(μ) carries LLL. The milestone texts keep the printed forms. Proposition 2.1(a) and (c) are as printed.
  • Not formalized. The parameter choices μ=O(ϵ/d3/2)\mu=O(\epsilon/d^{3/2})μ=O(ϵ/d3/2), N=O(d/ϵ2)N=O(d/\epsilon^2)N=O(d/ϵ2) in the theorem's second sentence are an O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) statement.

Several trivializing formalizations are ruled out. A Bochner integral of a non-integrable function is 000, so every expectation in a conclusion is either a lower Lebesgue integral compared with a finite bound or paired with an integrability conjunct. The dimension ddd comes from the manifold, not from a free natural number. The projection is onto MMM's own tangent space, never onto an arbitrary subspace field.

A complete development needs the following infrastructure:

  • the law of Pu0P u_0Pu0​ (a standard Gaussian on the subspace);
  • Gaussian moment bounds;
  • conditional expectation along the product filtration;
  • measurability of the iterate map.

The projected-Gaussian lemmas and the iterate model are reusable for the stochastic variant (ZO-RSGD) in the companion mission. Contributions of proofs for any milestone, and of general lemmas about Gaussian measures restricted to subspaces, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Li, K. Balasubramanian, S. Ma, Stochastic Zeroth-Order Riemannian Derivative Estimation and Optimization, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023; preprint arXiv:2003.11238v3, 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.11238
  • Y. Nesterov, V. Spokoiny, Random Gradient-Free Minimization of Convex Functions, Foundations of Computational Mathematics 17 (2017) 527–566. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10208-015-9296-2
  • S. Ghadimi, G. Lan, Stochastic First- and Zeroth-Order Methods for Nonconvex Stochastic Programming, SIAM Journal on Optimization 23 (2013) 2341–2368. https://doi.org/10.1137/120880811
  • P.-A. Absil, R. Mahony, R. Sepulchre, Optimization Algorithms on Matrix Manifolds, Princeton University Press, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400830244
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OptimizationQuantum InformationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

A Quantum Approximate Optimization Algorithm Applied to a Bounded Occurrence Constraint Problem I: Level-One QAOA Satisfies (1/2 + 1/(101 D^(1/2) ln D))m Equations of Max E3LIN2 for Large DResearch Paper

Motivation

The Quantum Approximate Optimization Algorithm (QAOA) of Farhi, Goldstone and Gutmann (arXiv:1411.4028) is a family of shallow quantum circuits for combinatorial optimization. At its lowest level, p=1p = 1p=1, the circuit has two real parameters, and its output is a random bit string. The question is how many constraints that string satisfies, compared with the best classical algorithms.

Max E3LIN2 is a natural test problem. Each constraint is a linear equation modulo 222 on exactly three bits, and the task is to satisfy as many of the mmm equations as possible. A uniformly random string satisfies m/2m/2m/2 in expectation, and for general instances no efficient algorithm does better than (1/2+ε)m(1/2 + \varepsilon)m(1/2+ε)m unless P = NP (Håstad 2001). The interesting regime is bounded occurrence: every bit lies in at most D+1D + 1D+1 equations.

Timeline, as recorded on p. 3 of the paper:

  • 2000: Håstad gives a classical algorithm with approximation ratio 1/2+const/D1/2 + \mathrm{const}/D1/2+const/D (doi:10.1016/S0020-0190(00)00032-6).
  • 2001: Trevisan shows that an efficient algorithm with ratio 1/2+const/D1/21/2 + \mathrm{const}/D^{1/2}1/2+const/D1/2, for a sufficiently large constant, would imply P = NP (doi:10.1145/380752.380839).
  • December 2014: the first version of this paper shows that the p=1p = 1p=1 QAOA yields a string satisfying (1/2+1/(22D3/4))m(1/2 + 1/(22D^{3/4}))m(1/2+1/(22D3/4))m equations. That beat every classical algorithm known at the time.
  • 2015: Barak et al. (arXiv:1505.03424) and Håstad give efficient classical algorithms reaching (1/2+const/D1/2)m(1/2 + \mathrm{const}/D^{1/2})m(1/2+const/D1/2)m.
  • June 2015: version 2 of this paper (arXiv:1412.6062v2) improves the QAOA bound to (1/2+1/(101D1/2ln⁡D))m(1/2 + 1/(101D^{1/2}\ln D))m(1/2+1/(101D1/2lnD))m. This mission formalizes that bound.

Setting

An instance on nnn bits consists of mmm equations. Equation iii is

xa+xb+xc≡ri(mod2),x_a + x_b + x_c \equiv r_i \pmod 2,xa​+xb​+xc​≡ri​(mod2),

on a triple of distinct bits a<b<ca < b < ca<b<c, with right-hand side ri∈{0,1}r_i \in \{0, 1\}ri​∈{0,1}, and no triple carries two equations. The instance has occurrence bound DDD if every bit appears in at most D+1D + 1D+1 equations.

Let C(z)C(z)C(z) be the number of equations satisfied by the string zzz, viewed as a diagonal operator on the 2n2^n2n-dimensional space spanned by the basis states ∣z⟩|z\rangle∣z⟩. Let B=X1+⋯+XnB = X_1 + \dots + X_nB=X1​+⋯+Xn​ be the sum of the Pauli XXX operators, and ∣s⟩|s\rangle∣s⟩ the uniform superposition of all basis states. For real angles γ,β\gamma, \betaγ,β the level-one QAOA state is

∣γ,β⟩=e−iβBe−iγC∣s⟩.|\gamma, \beta\rangle = e^{-i\beta B} e^{-i\gamma C} |s\rangle .∣γ,β⟩=e−iβBe−iγC∣s⟩.

Measuring it in the computational basis returns zzz with probability ∣⟨z∣γ,β⟩∣2|\langle z|\gamma,\beta\rangle|^2∣⟨z∣γ,β⟩∣2. The expected satisfied count is

F(γ,β)=∑z∣⟨z∣γ,β⟩∣2 C(z).F(\gamma, \beta) = \sum_z |\langle z|\gamma,\beta\rangle|^2\, C(z).F(γ,β)=z∑​∣⟨z∣γ,β⟩∣2C(z).

The paper writes the objective as m/2+12∑dabcZaZbZcm/2 + \tfrac12\sum d_{abc} Z_a Z_b Z_cm/2+21​∑dabc​Za​Zb​Zc​, with dabc=(−1)rd_{abc} = (-1)^{r}dabc​=(−1)r for the equation on a,b,ca, b, ca,b,c. The analysis is phrased through the shifted quantity ⟨γ,β∣12∑dabcZaZbZc∣γ,β⟩=F(γ,β)−m/2\langle\gamma,\beta|\tfrac12\sum d_{abc}Z_aZ_bZ_c|\gamma,\beta\rangle = F(\gamma,\beta) - m/2⟨γ,β∣21​∑dabc​Za​Zb​Zc​∣γ,β⟩=F(γ,β)−m/2.

The angles used are β=π/4\beta = \pi/4β=π/4 and, for an odd integer kkk,

γr=110D1/2cos⁡πrk,r=0,1,…,k.\gamma_r = \frac{1}{10 D^{1/2}} \cos\frac{\pi r}{k}, \qquad r = 0, 1, \dots, k .γr​=10D1/21​coskπr​,r=0,1,…,k.

Formalization targets

Goal: (44)–(45), pp. 8–9

There is a threshold D0D_0D0​ such that for every D≥D0D \ge D_0D≥D0​ there is an odd kkk with 5ln⁡D≤k≤5ln⁡D+25\ln D \le k \le 5\ln D + 25lnD≤k≤5lnD+2, such that on every instance with occurrence bound DDD some grid angle satisfies

F(γr,π/4) ≥ (12+1101 D1/2ln⁡D) m.F(\gamma_r, \pi/4) \ \ge\ \Big(\frac12 + \frac{1}{101\, D^{1/2} \ln D}\Big)\, m .F(γr​,π/4) ≥ (21​+101D1/2lnD1​)m.

D0D_0D0​ and kkk depend on DDD only, never on the instance. Equivalently, in the paper's form (44), max⁡r⟨γr,π/4∣12∑dabcZaZbZc∣γr,π/4⟩≥m/(101D1/2ln⁡D)\max_r \langle\gamma_r,\pi/4|\tfrac12\sum d_{abc}Z_aZ_bZ_c|\gamma_r,\pi/4\rangle \ge m/(101D^{1/2}\ln D)maxr​⟨γr​,π/4∣21​∑dabc​Za​Zb​Zc​∣γr​,π/4⟩≥m/(101D1/2lnD).

Milestones

The milestones are the displayed claims of Section II, in the order the argument uses them:

  • the sum form of FFF and its oddness in γ\gammaγ (p. 4);
  • the exact single-clause formula (25);
  • the Taylor remainder bound (28);
  • hypercontractivity for degree-2 polynomials (29);
  • the second-moment bounds (31) and (32);
  • the uniform remainder bound (34) and the triangle-inequality step (37);
  • the Chebyshev-node inequality (39), and its consequence (41) on the grid;
  • the numerical threshold (43).

Significance

The theorem shows that a single layer of the QAOA, with fixed β\betaβ and O(ln⁡D)O(\ln D)O(lnD) predetermined angles, beats random guessing by Ω(m/(D1/2ln⁡D))\Omega(m/(D^{1/2}\ln D))Ω(m/(D1/2lnD)) on every bounded-occurrence instance. Up to the ln⁡D\ln DlnD factor this matches the 1/2+Θ(D−1/2)1/2 + \Theta(D^{-1/2})1/2+Θ(D−1/2) threshold that Trevisan's hardness result places on efficient algorithms.

Two ingredients are reusable well beyond this paper. The hypercontractive inequality (29) bounds all moments of a degree-2 polynomial in uniform ±1\pm1±1 variables, at every exponent q=k+2q = k + 2q=k+2. The Chebyshev-node inequality (39) bounds from below the maximum of a polynomial with unit linear coefficient over the points cos⁡(πr/k)\cos(\pi r/k)cos(πr/k). Neither is in Mathlib or on the platform in this generality.

The result is proved on paper, with explicit constants, but none of it has been machine-checked. A complete formalization would also pin down two places where the printed argument is loose (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

The obvious approach is to expand the expected count as a power series in γ\gammaγ and keep the linear term mγ/2m\gamma/2mγ/2. That fails because the higher-order terms are not small: each clause interacts with up to 3D3D3D others, so the coefficient of γj\gamma^jγj can grow like Dj/2D^{j/2}Dj/2, and their signs are uncontrolled. Uniform small-angle estimates therefore lose the linear gain unless ∣γ∣≲D−1/2|\gamma| \lesssim D^{-1/2}∣γ∣≲D−1/2. Even there, the polynomial part of degree up to kkk can cancel the linear term at any single angle. The step that needs a genuinely new input is showing that some angle of a short fixed grid avoids this cancellation for every instance at once. The remaining difficulty is bookkeeping: the threshold where the explicit constants start to work is enormous (ln⁡D\ln DlnD of order several hundred), so it has to be existential.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. Strings are Qubits n = Fin n → Bool, with true the bit 111. An instance is tri : Fin m → Fin n × Fin n × Fin n (strictly increasing coordinates, injective) and rhs : Fin m → Bool. Bounded occurrence counts, for each bit, the equations whose triple contains it.
  • Reused quantum layer. The published QAlgorithms definitions supply act, prob, uniformState, problemHamiltonian, qaoaMixer and qaoaUnitary.
  • Phase operator. The state uses the full count CCC as phase operator, not the paper's C−m/2C - m/2C−m/2. This changes the state by a global phase only, so every probability is the same.
  • Averages. EzE_zEz​ is the uniform average over all 2n2^n2n strings. The paper averages over the bits occurring in c1,c2,c3c_1, c_2, c_3c1​,c2​,c3​ only, which gives the same number.
  • Pinned forms. "For large DDD" is an existential threshold D0D_0D0​, uniform over instances. "k=5ln⁡Dk = 5\ln Dk=5lnD" is an odd kkk with 5ln⁡D≤k≤5ln⁡D+25\ln D \le k \le 5\ln D + 25lnD≤k≤5lnD+2: the Chebyshev-node step requires kkk odd, and 5ln⁡D5\ln D5lnD is not an integer. The grid therefore has at most 5ln⁡D+35\ln D + 35lnD+3 angles rather than the printed "no more than 5ln⁡D5\ln D5lnD".
  • Added hypothesis. The remainder bound (34) and its consumers assume D≥1D \ge 1D≥1. The printed last step e(1+9D)1/2≤9D1/2e(1+9D)^{1/2} \le 9D^{1/2}e(1+9D)1/2≤9D1/2 holds for D≥1D \ge 1D≥1 only, and the printed justification "e<3e < 3e<3" does not by itself give it.
  • Scope. The goal is about the expected satisfied count of the measured p=1p = 1p=1 state, which is what the paper's analysis bounds. Out of scope: the repetition and sampling procedure after (45), running time, circuit size, and the search over angles.
  • No trivialization. The goal cannot be met by a degenerate encoding: D0D_0D0​ and kkk precede the instance, the grid angles are fixed by DDD and kkk, and the hypotheses on the instance (distinct bits, one equation per triple, occurrence at most D+1D + 1D+1) are satisfiable for every DDD.
  • Infrastructure. A complete development needs moments of polynomials on the Boolean cube (hypercontractivity at general qqq), Taylor remainders for sin⁡\sinsin, an extremal inequality for polynomials on Chebyshev extreme points, and exponential-of-Pauli computations on nnn qubits. Hypercontractivity and the Chebyshev-node inequality are stated independently of the QAOA and are the most reusable contributions. Proofs of any milestone are welcome. Platform statements of L4L^4L4–L2L^2L2 Bonami inequalities for bilinear chaos exist, but they cover only q=4q = 4q=4 and do not imply (29).

Selected references

  • E. Farhi, J. Goldstone, S. Gutmann, A Quantum Approximate Optimization Algorithm Applied to a Bounded Occurrence Constraint Problem, arXiv preprint, v2, 2015. https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.6062v2
  • E. Farhi, J. Goldstone, S. Gutmann, A Quantum Approximate Optimization Algorithm, arXiv preprint, 2014. https://arxiv.org/abs/1411.4028
  • I. Dinur, E. Friedgut, G. Kindler, R. O'Donnell, On the Fourier tails of bounded functions over the discrete cube, Israel Journal of Mathematics 160 (2007), 389–412. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11856-007-0068-z
  • J. Håstad, Some optimal inapproximability results, Journal of the ACM 48 (2001), 798–859. https://doi.org/10.1145/502090.502098
  • J. Håstad, On bounded occurrence constraint satisfaction, Information Processing Letters 74 (2000), 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0020-0190(00)00032-6
  • L. Trevisan, Non-approximability results for optimization problems on bounded degree instances, Proc. 33rd ACM STOC (2001), 453–461. https://doi.org/10.1145/380752.380839
  • B. Barak et al., Beating the random assignment on constraint satisfaction problems of bounded degree, ECCC TR15-082 / arXiv preprint, 2015. https://arxiv.org/abs/1505.03424
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithms for Competitive Division of Chores 1: At Most min{(2m−1)^{n(n−1)/2}, (2n−1)^{m(m−1)/2}} Competitive Utility Profiles and Pareto-Frontier Faces Meeting the Negative OrthantResearch Paper

Motivation

Many allocation problems divide work, not goods: shifts among employees, teaching loads among faculty, cleaning duties among housemates, maintenance tasks among the owners of a shared resource. For divisible goods the standard fair and efficient solution is the competitive rule (competitive equilibrium from budgets): give every agent a budget, find prices at which every agent demands what she receives, and the outcome is Pareto optimal and envy-free (weighted by budgets). For goods with additive utilities this rule is single-valued and is the solution of the Eisenberg–Gale convex program, which yields polynomial-time algorithms.

For chores (bads) the competitive rule keeps its fairness and efficiency guarantees but loses the convex structure: Bogomolnaia, Moulin, Sandomirskiy and Yanovskaya (BMSY17) showed it is generally multi-valued, with competitive allocations corresponding to critical points, not maximizers, of the Nash social welfare on the Pareto frontier. Brânzei and Sandomirskiy (arXiv:1907.01766v2, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024) enumerate all competitive utility profiles in strongly polynomial time when the number of agents or the number of chores is fixed. Their counting result is the target of this mission.

Setting

There are nnn agents and mmm divisible chores, one unit of each. Agent iii's value for one unit of chore jjj is vi,j<0v_{i,j}<0vi,j​<0, and her budget is bi<0b_i<0bi​<0. A feasible allocation is z∈R≥0n×mz\in\mathbb R^{n\times m}_{\ge0}z∈R≥0n×m​ with ∑izi,j=1\sum_i z_{i,j}=1∑i​zi,j​=1 for every chore jjj; agent iii's utility is ui(zi)=∑jvi,jzi,ju_i(z_i)=\sum_j v_{i,j}z_{i,j}ui​(zi​)=∑j​vi,j​zi,j​, the utility profile is u(z)=(u1(z1),…,un(zn))u(z)=(u_1(z_1),\dots,u_n(z_n))u(z)=(u1​(z1​),…,un​(zn​)), and U(v)\mathcal U(v)U(v) is the set of utility profiles of feasible allocations.

A feasible allocation zzz is competitive for budgets bbb if there are prices p∈R<0mp\in\mathbb R^m_{<0}p∈R<0m​ such that for every agent iii the bundle ziz_izi​ costs p(zi)=∑jpjzi,j≤bip(z_i)=\sum_j p_jz_{i,j}\le b_ip(zi​)=∑j​pj​zi,j​≤bi​ and maximizes uiu_iui​ among all bundles x≥0x\ge0x≥0 with p(x)≤bip(x)\le b_ip(x)≤bi​. A competitive utility profile is u(z)u(z)u(z) for a competitive zzz.

zzz is Pareto optimal if no feasible allocation makes every agent weakly better off and some agent strictly better off; the Pareto frontier U∗(v)\mathcal U^*(v)U∗(v) consists of their utility profiles. For weights τ∈R>0n\tau\in\mathbb R^n_{>0}τ∈R>0n​ the face fτf_\taufτ​ of the Pareto frontier is the set of maximizers of ⟨τ,u⟩=∑iτiui\langle\tau,u\rangle=\sum_i\tau_iu_i⟨τ,u⟩=∑i​τi​ui​ over u∈U(v)u\in\mathcal U(v)u∈U(v).

The proof runs through graphs. The consumption graph GzG_zGz​ links agent iii and chore jjj when zi,j>0z_{i,j}>0zi,j​>0. The maximal weighted welfare (MWW) graph Gτ(v)G_\tau(v)Gτ​(v) links iii and jjj when τi∣vi,j∣≤τi′∣vi′,j∣\tau_i|v_{i,j}|\le\tau_{i'}|v_{i',j}|τi​∣vi,j​∣≤τi′​∣vi′,j​∣ for every agent i′i'i′. A family of graphs is rich if every Pareto optimal profile in R<0n\mathbb R^n_{<0}R<0n​ is u(z)u(z)u(z) for a feasible zzz whose consumption graph is in the family. Along a path P=(i1,j1,…,iL,jL,iL+1)\mathcal P=(i_1,j_1,\dots,i_L,j_L,i_{L+1})P=(i1​,j1​,…,iL​,jL​,iL+1​) the product of disutilities is π(P)=∏k=1L∣vik,jk∣/∣vik+1,jk∣\pi(\mathcal P)=\prod_{k=1}^L|v_{i_k,j_k}|/|v_{i_{k+1},j_k}|π(P)=∏k=1L​∣vik​,jk​​∣/∣vik+1​,jk​​∣.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 25 (p. 27)

For n,m≥1n,m\ge1n,m≥1, v∈R<0n×mv\in\mathbb R^{n\times m}_{<0}v∈R<0n×m​ and b∈R<0nb\in\mathbb R^n_{<0}b∈R<0n​,

#{f face of the Pareto frontier:f∩R<0n≠∅}≤B,#{competitive utility profiles for b}≤B,\#\{f\text{ face of the Pareto frontier}: f\cap\mathbb R^n_{<0}\ne\emptyset\}\le B,\qquad \#\{\text{competitive utility profiles for } b\}\le B,#{f face of the Pareto frontier:f∩R<0n​=∅}≤B,#{competitive utility profiles for b}≤B, B=min⁡{(2m−1)n(n−1)2, (2n−1)m(m−1)2}.B=\min\Big\{(2m-1)^{\frac{n(n-1)}{2}},\ (2n-1)^{\frac{m(m-1)}{2}}\Big\}.B=min{(2m−1)2n(n−1)​, (2n−1)2m(m−1)​}.

Milestones

  1. Lemmas 36–38 (pp. 50–51): competitive allocations are characterized by the maximal bang-per-buck condition with budget exhaustion; prices satisfy pj=vi,jbi/ui(zi)p_j=v_{i,j}b_i/u_i(z_i)pj​=vi,j​bi​/ui​(zi​) on consumed chores; competitiveness is equivalent to inequalities (14) and to weighted-welfare maximality with weights bi/ui(zi)b_i/u_i(z_i)bi​/ui​(zi​).
  2. Theorem 9 and Corollary 10 (p. 14): the first and second welfare theorems, and Pareto indifference.
  3. Lemma 14 (p. 17): Pareto optimality   ⟺  \iff⟺ no simple profitable trading cycle   ⟺  \iff⟺ Gz⊆Gτ(v)G_z\subseteq G_\tau(v)Gz​⊆Gτ​(v) for some τ>0\tau>0τ>0   ⟺  \iff⟺ weighted-welfare maximality. Corollary 15 is included as a companion statement.
  4. Lemma 18, Lemma 19, Corollary 21 (pp. 21–23): faces correspond to MWW graphs; MWW graphs, and those with no lonely agents, form rich families; the latter correspond to the faces meeting R<0n\mathbb R^n_{<0}R<0n​.
  5. Lemma 22 (p. 23): MWWnon-lonely(v)=MWWnon-lonely(vT)\mathrm{MWW}_{non\text{-}lonely}(v)=\mathrm{MWW}_{non\text{-}lonely}(v^T)MWWnon-lonely​(v)=MWWnon-lonely​(vT).
  6. Lemma 23, first bullet (p. 24): a rich family of at most BBB graphs exists.
  7. Lemma 26 (p. 29): a competitive profile is determined by its consumption graph through formula (4).

Significance

The result. Corollary 25 says that the competitive rule for chores, although multi-valued and non-convex, has at most polynomially many outcomes when nnn or mmm is fixed, and that the Pareto frontier has polynomially many faces meeting the negative orthant. It is the exact mathematical content of the paper's algorithmic Theorem 17: an enumeration that tries every graph of a rich family and recovers at most one candidate profile from each cannot miss a competitive profile and cannot produce more than BBB of them. For n=2n=2n=2 the bound 2m−12m-12m−1 is attained in Example 1 of the paper by the face count.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; nothing is known to be machine-checked. The mission builds a reusable layer for linear Fisher-type economies with bads: the competitive rule with negative prices and budgets, welfare theorems, the trading-cycle and weighted-welfare criteria of Pareto optimality, and the graph-theoretic description of the faces of a polytope of feasible utilities. Lemma 14 and Lemma 18 are of independent use for any linear allocation model.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for goods, uniqueness of the equilibrium utility profile via a strictly concave program, fails: for chores there may be several competitive profiles, even on a single closed face (in Example 1 of the paper, both competitive profiles lie on one edge of the frontier). The count must therefore pass through combinatorics. Two steps carry the weight. First, the faces of the Pareto frontier, a continuous object, must be put in bijection with a finite set of graphs, and the graphs must be chosen so that each competitive profile is realized by an allocation whose consumption graph is exactly an MWW graph, not merely contained in one. Second, the size bound cannot come from counting bipartite graphs, which gives only 2nm2^{nm}2nm; it has to exploit the structure of MWW graphs, and its second term, polynomial in nnn for fixed mmm, requires the agent–chore symmetry of Lemma 22, whose natural route goes through the second welfare theorem.

Formalization scope

Agents are Fin n, chores Fin m (0-based); values, budgets and prices are real functions; graphs are Finset (Fin n × Fin m) of edges; a path is a record of its length LLL, L+1L+1L+1 agents and LLL chores. Faces are the sets of maximizers of ⟨τ,u⟩\langle\tau,u\rangle⟨τ,u⟩ over U(v)\mathcal U(v)U(v) for τ∈R>0n\tau\in\mathbb R^n_{>0}τ∈R>0n​, the dual representation of p. 16. Counts are Set.encard in N∪{∞}\mathbb N\cup\{\infty\}N∪{∞} and the bound BBB is computed in N\mathbb NN. Added relative to the paper: n≥1n\ge1n≥1 and m≥1m\ge1m≥1 (the paper's sets of agents and chores are non-empty) where a statement needs them. Not formalized: the running-time claims (Theorem 17, the second bullet of Lemma 23), item 4 of Lemma 38 (critical points of the Nash social welfare), and the sentence on p. 27 that each face carries at most one competitive profile, which is false for closed faces.

The following formalizations would trivialize the goal and are ruled out: a competitive allocation without the budget constraint p(zi)≤bip(z_i)\le b_ip(zi​)≤bi​; non-negative values, budgets or prices; faces exposed by τ≥0\tau\ge0τ≥0 or by τ\tauτ of arbitrary sign; counts over sets assumed finite; Pareto optimality restricted to a subclass of allocations.

All definitions live in CompetitiveChores.RichFamily; Mathlib supplies only finite sums and products, Finset, and Set.encard. Contributions welcome: proofs of the appendix lemmas (pure linear algebra on finite sums), of Lemma 14 (the cycle-cancelling argument of Appendix B), and of the two-agent splits-and-cuts count inside Lemma 23.

Selected references

  • S. Brânzei and F. Sandomirskiy, Algorithms for Competitive Division of Chores, arXiv:1907.01766v2 (2023); Mathematics of Operations Research (2024). https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.01766v2
  • A. Bogomolnaia, H. Moulin, F. Sandomirskiy and E. Yanovskaya, Competitive division of a mixed manna, Econometrica 85(6), 2017. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA14438
  • A. Bogomolnaia, H. Moulin, F. Sandomirskiy and E. Yanovskaya, Dividing bads under additive utilities, Social Choice and Welfare 52, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1157-x
  • N. Devanur, C. Papadimitriou, A. Saberi and V. Vazirani, Market equilibrium via a primal–dual algorithm for a convex program, Journal of the ACM 55(5), 2008. https://doi.org/10.1145/1411509.1411512
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Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Load Balancing Under Strict Compatibility Constraints 1: On Proportionally Sparse Subcritical Compatibility Graphs, JSQ(d) Has the Fully Flexible Mean-Field Limit and Steady StateResearch Paper

Motivation

In large server farms and cloud platforms, not every server can process every task. Data locality, licences, hardware and security rules restrict each task type to a subset of servers. Such compatibility constraints are modelled by a bipartite compatibility graph between task types (dispatchers) and servers. Classical mean-field results for load balancing, such as Mitzenmacher's analysis of the power of ddd choices (Mitzenmacher 2001) and Vvedenskaya, Dobrushin and Karpelevich's supermarket model (1996), assume full flexibility: every task may join every server. Rutten and Mukherjee (arXiv:2008.07562, Math. Oper. Res. 2023) identify graph conditions under which JSQ(ddd) on a sparse compatibility graph behaves, in the large-system limit, exactly like the fully flexible system. This holds both on finite time intervals and in steady state.

Related work includes Budhiraja, Mukherjee and Wu (2019), on the supermarket model on graphs whose vertices are servers; Mukherjee, Borst, van Leeuwaarden and Whiting (2018), on the universality of power-of-ddd schemes; and Bramson (2011) and Cardinaels, Borst and van Leeuwaarden (2019), on the stability of JSQ-type policies under compatibility constraints.

Setting

There are NNN servers VNV_NVN​ and M(N)≥1M(N)\ge1M(N)≥1 dispatchers WNW_NWN​, with an edge set EN⊆VN×WNE_N\subseteq V_N\times W_NEN​⊆VN​×WN​. Dispatcher www can only send tasks to its neighbourhood Nw={v:(v,w)∈EN}\mathcal N_w=\{v:(v,w)\in E_N\}Nw​={v:(v,w)∈EN​}.

  • Tasks arrive at each dispatcher as independent Poisson streams of rate λN/M(N)\lambda N/M(N)λN/M(N), with 0<λ<10<\lambda<10<λ<1.
  • Each server has its own infinite-buffer queue with unit-mean exponential services.
  • Under JSQ(ddd), d≥2d\ge2d≥2, an arriving task at www samples min⁡(d,∣Nw∣)\min(d,|\mathcal N_w|)min(d,∣Nw​∣) servers of Nw\mathcal N_wNw​ uniformly at random, without replacement, and joins a shortest of their queues. Ties are broken uniformly at random.

The state Φ(GN,t)∈NVN\Phi(G_N,t)\in\mathbb N^{V_N}Φ(GN​,t)∈NVN​ is the vector of queue lengths. Two statistics of a state zzz are used:

  • the occupancy qi(z)=∣{v:zv≥i}∣/Nq_i(z)=|\{v:z_v\ge i\}|/Nqi​(z)=∣{v:zv​≥i}∣/N;
  • the local empirical distribution xiw(z)=∣{v∈Nw:zv=i}∣/∣Nw∣x^w_i(z)=|\{v\in\mathcal N_w:z_v=i\}|/|\mathcal N_w|xiw​(z)=∣{v∈Nw​:zv​=i}∣/∣Nw​∣.

Occupancies live in Y={q∈ℓ1:qi∈[0,1], qi≥qj for i<j}\mathcal Y=\{q\in\ell_1:q_i\in[0,1],\ q_i\ge q_j\text{ for }i<j\}Y={q∈ℓ1​:qi​∈[0,1], qi​≥qj​ for i<j}.

The sequence {GN}\{G_N\}{GN​} is proportionally sparse if for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0

sup⁡U⊆VN1M(N)∣{w:∣∣Nw∩U∣∣Nw∣−∣U∣N∣≥ε}∣→0.\sup_{U\subseteq V_N}\frac1{M(N)}\Big|\Big\{w:\Big|\frac{|\mathcal N_w\cap U|}{|\mathcal N_w|}-\frac{|U|}{N}\Big|\ge\varepsilon\Big\}\Big|\to0 .U⊆VN​sup​M(N)1​​{w:​∣Nw​∣∣Nw​∩U∣​−N∣U∣​​≥ε}​→0.

Put kw=min⁡(d,∣Nw∣)k_w=\min(d,|\mathcal N_w|)kw​=min(d,∣Nw​∣). The sequence is subcritical if there are probability distributions γwU\gamma^U_wγwU​ on the sampled sets UUU with

lim sup⁡N→∞max⁡vNM(N)∑w(∣Nw∣kw)−1∑U⊆Nw, ∣U∣=kwγwU(v)≤1.\limsup_{N\to\infty}\max_{v}\frac{N}{M(N)}\sum_w\binom{|\mathcal N_w|}{k_w}^{-1}\sum_{U\subseteq\mathcal N_w,\,|U|=k_w}\gamma^U_w(v)\le1 .N→∞limsup​vmax​M(N)N​w∑​(kw​∣Nw​∣​)−1U⊆Nw​,∣U∣=kw​∑​γwU​(v)≤1.

This bounds the load that a static randomised routing would put on any server.

The fully flexible mean-field limit is the system of ODEs

dqi∗dt=λ((qi−1∗)d−(qi∗)d)−(qi∗−qi+1∗),i≥1,q0∗≡1,(3.3)\frac{dq^*_i}{dt}=\lambda\big((q^*_{i-1})^d-(q^*_i)^d\big)-(q^*_i-q^*_{i+1}),\qquad i\ge1,\quad q^*_0\equiv1,\qquad(3.3)dtdqi∗​​=λ((qi−1∗​)d−(qi∗​)d)−(qi∗​−qi+1∗​),i≥1,q0∗​≡1,(3.3)

whose fixed point is qi∗(∞)=λ(di−1)/(d−1)q^*_i(\infty)=\lambda^{(d^i-1)/(d-1)}qi∗​(∞)=λ(di−1)/(d−1).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.4

Let {GN}\{G_N\}{GN​} be proportionally sparse and connected, and suppose q∗(0)∈Yq^*(0)\in\mathcal Yq∗(0)∈Y with ∥q(Φ(GN,0))−q∗(0)∥1→0\|q(\Phi(G_N,0))-q^*(0)\|_1\to0∥q(Φ(GN​,0))−q∗(0)∥1​→0. Then, for every T≥0T\ge0T≥0 and ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0,

P(sup⁡t≤T∥q(Φ(GN,t))−q∗(t)∥1≥ε)→0.P\Big(\sup_{t\le T}\|q(\Phi(G_N,t))-q^*(t)\|_1\ge\varepsilon\Big)\to0 .P(t≤Tsup​∥q(Φ(GN​,t))−q∗(t)∥1​≥ε)→0.

If moreover {GN}\{G_N\}{GN​} is subcritical, then for all large NNN the chain has a unique stationary distribution πN\pi_NπN​, and πN(∥q−q∗(∞)∥1≥ε)→0\pi_N(\|q-q^*(\infty)\|_1\ge\varepsilon)\to0πN​(∥q−q∗(∞)∥1​≥ε)→0.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  • Lemma 4.2: the JSQ(ddd) assignment function is Lipschitz.
  • Lemma F.1 and Proposition 4.5: on proportionally sparse graphs, local and global empirical distributions agree for almost all dispatchers, uniformly on [0,T][0,T][0,T].
  • Proposition 4.7: under the optimal coupling, the occupancy distance to the fully flexible system is at most twice the number of routing mismatches.
  • Theorem 4.3: the process-level limit for Lipschitz policies.
  • Lemmas H.2, H.4, H.5 and Theorem 4.8(i): Foster–Lyapunov stability for all large NNN.
  • Lemmas 4.9, 4.10 and Theorem 4.8(ii): tightness of the steady states in a weighted ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ space.
  • Theorem 4.11: exponential global stability of (3.3) in that weighted norm.

Significance

The result. The theorem separates two graph properties.

  • Proportional sparsity is an expansion property; it alone makes the transient dynamics universal.
  • Subcriticality is a capacity condition; it alone gives stability and tightness of the stationary distributions.

Together they justify using the fully flexible ODE (3.3) and its fixed point for the stationary performance of a constrained system. Companion results (Theorems 3.5 and 3.6, formalized in missions 2 and 3 of this series) show that random graphs with degrees growing only slightly faster than logarithmically satisfy both conditions, so the flexibility needed for full mean-field performance is far smaller than complete flexibility.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper but has no machine-checked proof. A formalization would produce the following.

  • A reusable model of a continuous-time Markov chain with bounded rates, realised by uniformisation.
  • Foster–Lyapunov and petite-set arguments on a countable state space.
  • A pathwise coupling bound.
  • A tightness criterion in weighted ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​.
  • An interchange-of-limits argument.

The global stability of (3.3) relies on Mitzenmacher's weighted-potential theorem, which is posed separately on the platform (PowerTwoChoices.Limit.theorem_3) and is open.

Difficulty

The obvious argument couples the system on GNG_NGN​ with the fully flexible system server by server. This fails because a task arriving at www can only join Nw\mathcal N_wNw​, so the two systems cannot place it at the same server. The paper instead couples the queue lengths chosen and counts mismatches. That bound is only useful if almost every dispatcher sees a local queue-length distribution close to the global one at all times. The set of good dispatchers changes with the state, and controlling it requires a uniform bound over all subsets of servers.

A second gap concerns the goal itself. Theorem 4.3 covers policies that depend only on the local empirical distribution. JSQ(ddd) without replacement also depends on ∣Nw∣|\mathcal N_w|∣Nw​∣ when neighbourhoods are small, so deducing the goal from Theorem 4.3 needs an approximation step that the paper does not spell out.

For the steady state, subcriticality bounds a lim sup⁡\limsuplimsup only, so stability holds for large NNN and not for every NNN. Tightness in a fixed ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​-ball does not suffice: the limit is identified through a stability result that holds in a weighted norm with geometrically growing weights. The tightness has to be proved in that norm, through moment bounds on stationary tails.

Formalization scope

  • Graphs. Servers are Fin N, dispatchers Fin (M N) with M(N)≥1M(N)\ge1M(N)≥1, and edges a Finset. Connectivity is a separate hypothesis (Definition 3.1 and §2). Proportional sparsity is the limit condition (3.1). In subcriticality the normaliser is (∣Nw∣kw)\binom{|\mathcal N_w|}{k_w}(kw​∣Nw​∣​), and the distributions γwU\gamma^U_wγwU​ are constrained only for nonempty UUU. Both choices agree with the paper whenever ∣Nw∣≥d|\mathcal N_w|\ge d∣Nw​∣≥d.
  • Dynamics. The process is the uniformised chain with kernel lbKernel, run at the epochs of an independent Poisson clock of rate (λ+1)N(\lambda+1)N(λ+1)N. Statements quantify over every realisation on every probability space, for N≥1N\ge1N≥1. JSQ(ddd) samples without replacement; with replacement, Theorem 4.8 is false under Definition 3.3.
  • Occupancy. The occupancy is indexed from 000 with q0=1q_0=1q0​=1, and ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ distances are l1dist in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. "Converges weakly" to a deterministic limit is rendered as convergence in probability. Ergodicity is rendered as existence and uniqueness of a stationary distribution.
  • Repairs to the printed text. The printed (3.4) exponent (di−d)/(d−1)(d^i-d)/(d-1)(di−d)/(d−1) is corrected to (di−1)/(d−1)(d^i-1)/(d-1)(di−1)/(d−1); with the printed value the steady-state claim is false. "For each fixed NNN, ergodic" becomes "for all N≥N0N\ge N_0N≥N0​".
  • Ruled out. A rendering in which the hypotheses cannot all hold would make the statements vacuous. Every routing law here sums to one and every clock rate is positive, so neither the process hypotheses nor the ODE hypothesis are vacuous. The conclusion asserts the existence of the stationary distributions it then speaks about.
  • Reused definitions. PowerTwoChoices.Limit.SupermarketSystem (the ODE, fixed point and potential) and PowerOfDUniversality.Fluid.FluidSpace (l1dist, supDistL1).
  • Generic and reusable. The Markov-chain notions in CountableChain: stationarity, nnn-step kernels, petite sets and uniformisation.

Contributions to any milestone are welcome. Lemma 4.2, Proposition 4.7 and Lemma H.4 are self-contained.

Selected references

  • D. Rutten, D. Mukherjee, Load Balancing Under Strict Compatibility Constraints, Math. Oper. Res. (2023); preprint arXiv:2008.07562v2 (cited version). https://arxiv.org/abs/2008.07562
  • M. Mitzenmacher, The Power of Two Choices in Randomized Load Balancing, IEEE Trans. Parallel Distrib. Syst. 12 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1109/71.963420
  • N. D. Vvedenskaya, R. L. Dobrushin, F. I. Karpelevich, Queueing system with selection of the shortest of two queues: an asymptotic approach, Probl. Inf. Transm. 32 (1996).
  • D. Mukherjee, S. C. Borst, J. S. H. van Leeuwaarden, P. A. Whiting, Universality of power-of-d load balancing in many-server systems, Stochastic Systems 8 (2018). https://arxiv.org/abs/1612.00723
  • M. Bramson, Stability of join the shortest queue networks, Ann. Appl. Probab. 21(4):1568–1625 (2011).
  • A. Budhiraja, D. Mukherjee, R. Wu, Supermarket model on graphs, Ann. Appl. Probab. 29(3):1740–1777 (2019).
  • E. Cardinaels, S. C. Borst, J. S. H. van Leeuwaarden, Job assignment in large-scale service systems with affinity relations, Queueing Syst. 93:227–268 (2019).
  • S. P. Meyn, R. L. Tweedie, Markov Chains and Stochastic Stability, Springer (1993).
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AnalysisNumerical AnalysisOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

A Generalized Newton Method for Subgradient Systems 2: Under Metric Regularity and Semismoothness*, the FBE-Based Newton Algorithm Converges Superlinearly in Quadratic Composite OptimizationResearch Paper

Motivation

Many optimization models in statistics, signal processing and machine learning minimize a smooth loss plus a nonsmooth regularizer, min⁡xf(x)+g(x)\min_x f(x)+g(x)minx​f(x)+g(x). When fff is quadratic this is the quadratic composite problem, which also appears as the subproblem of sequential quadratic programming and of proximal Newton methods. First-order splitting methods (proximal gradient, forward-backward) handle such problems with only the proximal mapping of ggg, but converge at best linearly. Newton-type methods converge superlinearly but classically need either smoothness or convexity of ggg, or strong regularity (uniqueness and Lipschitz stability) of the solution.

Khanh, Mordukhovich and Phat (arXiv:2009.10551v2, 2022; Mathematics of Operations Research 2023) designed a Newton-type method for the stationarity inclusion 0∈∂φ(x)0\in\partial\varphi(x)0∈∂φ(x) of a nonconvex composite cost whose steps use only the proximal mapping and the second-order subdifferential (generalized Hessian) of ggg, and proved local superlinear convergence under metric regularity rather than strong metric regularity. This mission formalizes that result, Theorem 7.8 of the paper, together with the chain of propositions through which it is proved.

Setting

Work in Rn\mathbb R^nRn with the Euclidean inner product. A function g:Rn→(−∞,+∞]g:\mathbb R^n\to(-\infty,+\infty]g:Rn→(−∞,+∞] is proper if it is finite somewhere, and prox-bounded if it is bounded below by a quadratic −a∥x∥2−c-a\|x\|^2-c−a∥x∥2−c. The limiting subdifferential ∂g(x)\partial g(x)∂g(x) collects limits of Fréchet subgradients at nearby points with nearby values.

For a set-valued map G:Rn⇉RmG:\mathbb R^n\rightrightarrows\mathbb R^mG:Rn⇉Rm the limiting coderivative D∗G(x,y)(w)D^*G(x,y)(w)D∗G(x,y)(w) is the set of uuu with (u,−w)(u,-w)(u,−w) a limiting normal to gph⁡G\operatorname{gph}GgphG at (x,y)(x,y)(x,y); the second-order subdifferential is ∂2g(x,v)=D∗(∂g)(x,v)\partial^2g(x,v)=D^*(\partial g)(x,v)∂2g(x,v)=D∗(∂g)(x,v). GGG is metrically regular around (xˉ,yˉ)(\bar x,\bar y)(xˉ,yˉ​) if dist⁡(x;G−1(y))≤μdist⁡(y;G(x))\operatorname{dist}(x;G^{-1}(y))\le\mu\operatorname{dist}(y;G(x))dist(x;G−1(y))≤μdist(y;G(x)) near (xˉ,yˉ)(\bar x,\bar y)(xˉ,yˉ​), and semismooth* at (xˉ,yˉ)(\bar x,\bar y)(xˉ,yˉ​) if ⟨u∗,u⟩=⟨v∗,v⟩\langle u^*,u\rangle=\langle v^*,v\rangle⟨u∗,u⟩=⟨v∗,v⟩ for every u∗u^*u∗ in the directional coderivative D∗G((xˉ,yˉ);(u,v))(v∗)D^*G((\bar x,\bar y);(u,v))(v^*)D∗G((xˉ,yˉ​);(u,v))(v∗).

ggg is prox-regular at xˉ\bar xxˉ for vˉ∈∂g(xˉ)\bar v\in\partial g(\bar x)vˉ∈∂g(xˉ) with modulus r>0r>0r>0 if it is lower semicontinuous near xˉ\bar xxˉ and, for some ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0,

g(x)≥g(u)+⟨v,x−u⟩−r2∥x−u∥2g(x)\ge g(u)+\langle v,x-u\rangle-\tfrac r2\|x-u\|^2g(x)≥g(u)+⟨v,x−u⟩−2r​∥x−u∥2

for x,ux,ux,u within ε\varepsilonε of xˉ\bar xxˉ, ∣g(u)−g(xˉ)∣<ε|g(u)-g(\bar x)|<\varepsilon∣g(u)−g(xˉ)∣<ε and v∈∂g(u)v\in\partial g(u)v∈∂g(u) within ε\varepsilonε of vˉ\bar vvˉ; continuously prox-regular if in addition g(xk)→g(xˉ)g(x_k)\to g(\bar x)g(xk​)→g(xˉ) along subgradient pairs (xk,vk)→(xˉ,vˉ)(x_k,v_k)\to(\bar x,\bar v)(xk​,vk​)→(xˉ,vˉ).

The cost is φ=f+g\varphi=f+gφ=f+g with f(x)=12⟨Ax,x⟩+⟨b,x⟩+αf(x)=\tfrac12\langle Ax,x\rangle+\langle b,x\rangle+\alphaf(x)=21​⟨Ax,x⟩+⟨b,x⟩+α, AAA symmetric. The proximal mapping Prox⁡γg(u)\operatorname{Prox}_{\gamma g}(u)Proxγg​(u) is the argmin set of y↦g(y)+12γ∥y−u∥2y\mapsto g(y)+\frac1{2\gamma}\|y-u\|^2y↦g(y)+2γ1​∥y−u∥2, and the forward-backward envelope (FBE) is

φγ(x)=inf⁡y{f(x)+⟨∇f(x),y−x⟩+g(y)+12γ∥y−x∥2}.\varphi_\gamma(x)=\inf_y\Big\{f(x)+\langle\nabla f(x),y-x\rangle+g(y)+\tfrac1{2\gamma}\|y-x\|^2\Big\}.φγ​(x)=yinf​{f(x)+⟨∇f(x),y−x⟩+g(y)+2γ1​∥y−x∥2}.

Algorithm 7.6 with parameter γ\gammaγ: if 0∈∂φ(xk)0\in\partial\varphi(x^k)0∈∂φ(xk) stop; otherwise set uk=xk−γ(Axk+b)u^k=x^k-\gamma(Ax^k+b)uk=xk−γ(Axk+b), pick vk∈Prox⁡γg(uk)v^k\in\operatorname{Prox}_{\gamma g}(u^k)vk∈Proxγg​(uk), choose dkd^kdk with

−1γ(xk−vk)−Adk∈∂2g(vk,1γ(uk−vk))(xk−vk+dk),-\tfrac1\gamma(x^k-v^k)-Ad^k\in\partial^2g\big(v^k,\tfrac1\gamma(u^k-v^k)\big)(x^k-v^k+d^k),−γ1​(xk−vk)−Adk∈∂2g(vk,γ1​(uk−vk))(xk−vk+dk),

and set xk+1=xk+dkx^{k+1}=x^k+d^kxk+1=xk+dk.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7.8

Let ggg be proper, prox-bounded and continuously prox-regular at a stationary point xˉ\bar xxˉ (0∈∂φ(xˉ)0\in\partial\varphi(\bar x)0∈∂φ(xˉ)) for −Axˉ−b-A\bar x-b−Axˉ−b with modulus rrr, and let ∂φ\partial\varphi∂φ satisfy at (xˉ,0)(\bar x,0)(xˉ,0): (H1) solvability of −v∈∂2φ(x,v)(d)-v\in\partial^2\varphi(x,v)(d)−v∈∂2φ(x,v)(d) near (xˉ,0)(\bar x,0)(xˉ,0), (H2) metric regularity, (H3) semismoothness*. Then

∃γ0∈(0,r−1] ∀γ∈(0,γ0) with I−γA nonsingular ∃U∋xˉ: Algorithm 7.6 is well-defined from U,\exists\gamma_0\in(0,r^{-1}]\ \forall\gamma\in(0,\gamma_0)\ \text{with }I-\gamma A\text{ nonsingular}\ \exists U\ni\bar x:\ \text{Algorithm 7.6 is well-defined from }U,∃γ0​∈(0,r−1] ∀γ∈(0,γ0​) with I−γA nonsingular ∃U∋xˉ: Algorithm 7.6 is well-defined from U,

and every run from x0∈Ux^0\in Ux0∈U converges Q-superlinearly to xˉ\bar xxˉ.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 5.7: the same conclusion for the C1,1C^{1,1}C1,1 Newton method −∇φ(xk)∈∂⟨dk,∇φ⟩(xk)-\nabla\varphi(x^k)\in\partial\langle d^k,\nabla\varphi\rangle(x^k)−∇φ(xk)∈∂⟨dk,∇φ⟩(xk).
  2. Proposition 7.2: near xˉ\bar xxˉ, the prox-gradient map is single-valued and Lipschitz, φγ\varphi_\gammaφγ​ is C1C^1C1 with ∇φγ(x)=γ−1(I−γ∇2f(x))(x−Prox⁡γg(x−γ∇f(x)))\nabla\varphi_\gamma(x)=\gamma^{-1}(I-\gamma\nabla^2f(x))(x-\operatorname{Prox}_{\gamma g}(x-\gamma\nabla f(x)))∇φγ​(x)=γ−1(I−γ∇2f(x))(x−Proxγg​(x−γ∇f(x))), and ∇φγ(x)=0  ⟺  0∈∂φ(x)\nabla\varphi_\gamma(x)=0\iff0\in\partial\varphi(x)∇φγ​(x)=0⟺0∈∂φ(x).
  3. Proposition 7.3: the generalized Hessian of φγ\varphi_\gammaφγ​ in terms of ∂2g\partial^2 g∂2g.
  4. Remark 7.7: a step of Algorithm 7.6 is a step of Algorithm 5.3 for φγ\varphi_\gammaφγ​.
  5. Proposition 7.4(i): ∂φ\partial\varphi∂φ is metrically regular iff ∇φγ\nabla\varphi_\gamma∇φγ​ is.
  6. Proposition 7.5: semismoothness* of ∂g\partial g∂g passes to ∇φγ\nabla\varphi_\gamma∇φγ​.

Significance

The result gives a locally superlinear method for nonconvex composite problems that uses only first- and second-order information of the regularizer, and it replaces strong metric regularity, which forces isolated solutions, by metric regularity. The FBE reduction (Propositions 7.2–7.5) is reusable on its own: it identifies the stationary points, the generalized Hessian, and the regularity of a nonsmooth composite cost with those of a smooth function.

Formalizing it builds the first machine-checked library of coderivative calculus on Prove2Me: normal cones to graphs, limiting and directional coderivatives, second-order subdifferentials, metric regularity and semismoothness*. As far as the platform record shows, none of the paper's results has a machine-checked proof. The paper's proofs lean on second-order sum and chain rules from Mordukhovich's monograph and on Poliquin–Rockafellar's analysis of Moreau envelopes of prox-regular functions; those external results are part of the work.

Difficulty

The FBE of a nonconvex ggg is not globally smooth; its smoothness near xˉ\bar xxˉ comes from the local single-valuedness of Prox⁡γg\operatorname{Prox}_{\gamma g}Proxγg​, which prox-regularity provides only for small γ\gammaγ and only near xˉ−γ∇f(xˉ)\bar x-\gamma\nabla f(\bar x)xˉ−γ∇f(xˉ). The printed parameter range γ∈(0,r−1)\gamma\in(0,r^{-1})γ∈(0,r−1) is too large: a far-away deep well of ggg can capture the proximal point (see the correction below). Transferring (H1)–(H3) from ∂φ\partial\varphi∂φ to ∇φγ\nabla\varphi_\gamma∇φγ​ requires exact second-order calculus (sum and chain rules for coderivatives), not inclusions, and metric regularity is not preserved by the obvious estimates: the paper uses a coderivative characterization. Finally, Theorem 5.7 itself requires an inexact Newton analysis in which the Newton inclusion is solved by an arbitrary element of a coderivative, not by a matrix.

Formalization scope

  • Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n); products carry the sup norm, which does not change any normal cone. A symmetric AAA is a self-adjoint continuous linear operator.
  • ggg and φ\varphiφ take values in EReal; ggg is assumed proper. The envelopes are EReal-valued infima; wherever φγ\varphi_\gammaφγ​ is differentiated, finiteness on a neighbourhood is asserted and the real-valued function is differentiated. ∇2f(x)\nabla^2 f(x)∇2f(x) is the derivative of gradient f.
  • ∂\partial∂ is the published analytic limiting subdifferential NonconvexSplitting.Shared.LimitingSubdiff. It agrees with the paper's geometric definition (2.9) for functions lower semicontinuous around the point, which covers every function the statements apply it to.
  • Metric regularity uses dist⁡(⋅;∅)=+∞\operatorname{dist}(\cdot;\emptyset)=+\inftydist(⋅;∅)=+∞. Directional normals read tk↓0t_k\downarrow0tk​↓0 as tk>0t_k>0tk​>0, tk→0t_k\to0tk​→0. For a C1,1C^{1,1}C1,1 or C1C^1C1 function, ∂2φ(x)\partial^2\varphi(x)∂2φ(x) is the coderivative of the single-valued gradient map.
  • The proximal mapping is the argmin set; runs may select any proximal point and any direction solving the Newton inclusion; conclusions hold for every run. The stop rule is a constant tail. "Well-defined from UUU" means every partial run from UUU can be continued. Q-superlinear convergence is in ε\varepsilonε-form, which avoids the ratio 0/00/00/0.
  • Correction. Propositions 7.2–7.5, Remark 7.7 and Theorem 7.8 are claimed for every γ∈(0,r−1)\gamma\in(0,r^{-1})γ∈(0,r−1); that is false. For n=1n=1n=1, A=0A=0A=0, b=0b=0b=0 and g(y)=12y2g(y)=\tfrac12y^2g(y)=21​y2 on [−5,5][-5,5][−5,5], g(y)=−1000−∣y−10∣g(y)=-1000-|y-10|g(y)=−1000−∣y−10∣ on [9,11][9,11][9,11], +∞+\infty+∞ elsewhere (xˉ=0\bar x=0xˉ=0, r=1r=1r=1, γ=12\gamma=\tfrac12γ=21​), Prox⁡γg={9}\operatorname{Prox}_{\gamma g}=\{9\}Proxγg​={9} near 000 and every run jumps to the stationary point 999. All these items are posed as "there is γ0∈(0,r−1]\gamma_0\in(0,r^{-1}]γ0​∈(0,r−1] such that for every γ∈(0,γ0)\gamma\in(0,\gamma_0)γ∈(0,γ0​)", the range the cited Poliquin–Rockafellar theorem supports. Theorem 5.7 is posed as printed.
  • The goal cannot be trivialized: γ0>0\gamma_0>0γ0​>0 is asserted, the convergence is claimed for every run and every admissible γ\gammaγ below γ0\gamma_0γ0​, and the hypotheses are satisfied, for instance, by g=12∥⋅∥2g=\tfrac12\|\cdot\|^2g=21​∥⋅∥2. Specializing ggg to be convex, A=0A=0A=0, AAA positive definite, or xˉ\bar xxˉ a tilt-stable minimizer would change the theorem and is not accepted.
  • Needed infrastructure: limiting normal cones and coderivatives, their sum and chain rules for a smooth plus a set-valued map, the Mordukhovich criterion, Moreau envelopes of prox-regular functions (Poliquin–Rockafellar). These are reusable well beyond this mission; contributions of any of them as separate theorems are welcome.

Selected references

  • P. D. Khanh, B. S. Mordukhovich, V. T. Phat, A Generalized Newton Method for Subgradient Systems, arXiv:2009.10551v2, 2022; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.10551
  • B. S. Mordukhovich, Variational Analysis and Generalized Differentiation I: Basic Theory, Springer, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-31247-1
  • R. A. Poliquin, R. T. Rockafellar, Prox-regular functions in variational analysis, Transactions of the AMS 348 (1996) 1805–1838. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9947-96-01544-9
  • H. Gfrerer, J. V. Outrata, On a semismooth* Newton method for solving generalized equations, SIAM Journal on Optimization 31 (2021) 489–517. https://doi.org/10.1137/19M1257408
  • P. Patrinos, A. Bemporad, Proximal Newton methods for convex composite optimization, IEEE CDC 2013. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2013.6760233
22 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Sharing Sequentially Triggered Losses: Automated Conflict Resolution Through Smart Contracts 4: On Loss Trees the Same Four Axioms Characterize the Fixed-Fraction RulesResearch Paper

Motivation

When one agent breaches a contract, the breach often forces its counterparty to breach its own contracts in turn, and the losses propagate. Supply chains are the standard example: a supplier that fails to deliver makes its customer fail to deliver to its own customers. Gudmundsson, Hougaard and Ko (Management Science 70(3), 2024) ask how the total loss of such a cascade should be shared among the agents involved. Their aim is a rule simple enough to be written into a smart contract that settles disputes automatically. They first treat a single chain of agents and characterize the fixed-fraction rules by four axioms (Theorem 1). Section 5 then extends the model to loss trees, in which one agent may cause losses to several others, as when a firm supplies several downstream firms. Theorem 4 shows that the same four axioms, suitably extended, characterize the fixed-fraction rules on trees. This mission formalizes Theorem 4 and the steps of its proof in Appendix A.

The tree model follows a line of work on sharing liability and costs along hierarchies and networks; the paper compares its setting with Oishi, van der Laan and van den Brink (2023).

Setting

Agents are natural numbers. An edge ijijij records that agent iii causes a loss to agent jjj. A finite edge set TTT covers the vertices V(T)=⋃ij∈T{i,j}V(T)=\bigcup_{ij\in T}\{i,j\}V(T)=⋃ij∈T​{i,j}. It is a tree if it has a root (a vertex with no incoming edge) and every other vertex has exactly one incoming edge and is reached from the root. The root is the initiator of the cascade. Leaves are victims only. The agents who share the losses are the non-leaf vertices N(T)N(T)N(T). A loss is a function ℓ≥0\ell\ge 0ℓ≥0 on edges, and the total loss is L=∑e∈Tℓ(e)L=\sum_{e\in T}\ell(e)L=∑e∈T​ℓ(e).

A rule φ\varphiφ assigns a liability φi(T,ℓ)\varphi_i(T,\ell)φi​(T,ℓ) to each agent i∈N(T)i\in N(T)i∈N(T). Liabilities are non-negative and sum to LLL. A rule is required to be invariant to agent labels: renaming the agents by a bijection π\piπ of N\mathbb NN renames the liabilities. It is also continuous along aℓ→ℓa\ell\to\ellaℓ→ℓ as a→1a\to 1a→1, the paper's standing assumption.

The fixed-fraction rule with parameter λ∈[0,1]\lambda\in[0,1]λ∈[0,1] makes each agent pay the fraction λ\lambdaλ of the losses it causes directly. The root also pays the remaining fraction of the total:

φiλ(T,ℓ)=λ∑ij∈Tℓ(ij)+[i is the root] (1−λ)L.\varphi^\lambda_i(T,\ell)=\lambda\sum_{ij\in T}\ell(ij)+[i\text{ is the root}]\,(1-\lambda)L .φiλ​(T,ℓ)=λij∈T∑​ℓ(ij)+[i is the root](1−λ)L.

The elementary tree problem en=(Tn,ℓn)e_n=(T_n,\ell_n)en​=(Tn​,ℓn​) is the chain Tn={12,23,…,(n,n+1)}T_n=\{12,23,\dots,(n,n+1)\}Tn​={12,23,…,(n,n+1)} with a unit loss on its last edge. For a vertex vvv, PvP^vPv is the set of edges on the path from the root to vvv, [v][v][v] is the number of vertices on that path, and TvT^vTv is the subtree rooted at vvv.

The four axioms are as follows.

  • Tree additivity: φ(T,ℓ)+φ(T,ℓ′)=φ(T,ℓ+ℓ′)\varphi(T,\ell)+\varphi(T,\ell')=\varphi(T,\ell+\ell')φ(T,ℓ)+φ(T,ℓ′)=φ(T,ℓ+ℓ′).
  • Tree zero truncation: adding a zero-loss edge from a vertex of TTT to a new leaf leaves every liability in N(T)N(T)N(T) unchanged.
  • Population monotonicity: inserting a zero loss into ene_nen​ makes no agent worse off. On elementary problems this reads φi(en)≥φi(en+1)\varphi_i(e_n)\ge\varphi_i(e_{n+1})φi​(en​)≥φi​(en+1​) for 1≤i≤j1\le i\le j1≤i≤j and φk(en)≥φk+1(en+1)\varphi_k(e_n)\ge\varphi_{k+1}(e_{n+1})φk​(en​)≥φk+1​(en+1​) for j<k≤nj<k\le nj<k≤n, for every 1≤j<n1\le j<n1≤j<n.
  • Merging proofness: φi(e3)+φi+1(e3)≤φi(e2)\varphi_i(e_3)+\varphi_{i+1}(e_3)\le\varphi_i(e_2)φi​(e3​)+φi+1​(e3​)≤φi​(e2​) for i∈{1,2}i\in\{1,2\}i∈{1,2}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4

For every rule φ\varphiφ on loss trees,

φ satisfies the four axioms  ⟺  ∃ λ∈[0,1]: φi(T,ℓ)=φiλ(T,ℓ) for all trees T, ℓ≥0, i∈N(T).\varphi \text{ satisfies the four axioms}\iff \exists\,\lambda\in[0,1]:\ \varphi_i(T,\ell)=\varphi^\lambda_i(T,\ell)\ \text{for all trees } T,\ \ell\ge 0,\ i\in N(T).φ satisfies the four axioms⟺∃λ∈[0,1]: φi​(T,ℓ)=φiλ​(T,ℓ) for all trees T, ℓ≥0, i∈N(T).

Milestones

  1. Each φλ\varphi^\lambdaφλ with λ∈[0,1]\lambda\in[0,1]λ∈[0,1] is a rule on trees (p. 16).
  2. Tree additivity and continuity give scale invariance, φ(T,αℓ)=αφ(T,ℓ)\varphi(T,\alpha\ell)=\alpha\varphi(T,\ell)φ(T,αℓ)=αφ(T,ℓ) for α≥0\alpha\ge 0α≥0 (p. 25).
  3. Edge-by-edge decomposition, φ(T,ℓ)=∑jk∈Tℓ(jk) φ(T,ℓk)\varphi(T,\ell)=\sum_{jk\in T}\ell(jk)\,\varphi(T,\ell_k)φ(T,ℓ)=∑jk∈T​ℓ(jk)φ(T,ℓk​) (p. 25).
  4. An agent iii with jk∉Tijk\notin T^ijk∈/Ti is not liable for a unit loss on jkjkjk (p. 25).
  5. Trimming to the path, φi(T,ℓk)=φi(Pk,ℓk)\varphi_i(T,\ell_k)=\varphi_i(P^k,\ell_k)φi​(T,ℓk​)=φi​(Pk,ℓk​) for jk∈Tijk\in T^ijk∈Ti (p. 25).
  6. Relabelling, φi(Pk,ℓk)=φ[i](e[j])\varphi_i(P^k,\ell_k)=\varphi_{[i]}(e_{[j]})φi​(Pk,ℓk​)=φ[i]​(e[j]​) (p. 25).
  7. Proposition 3: tree additivity and tree zero truncation hold if and only if φi(T,ℓ)=∑jk∈Tiℓ(jk) φ[i](e[j])\varphi_i(T,\ell)=\sum_{jk\in T^i}\ell(jk)\,\varphi_{[i]}(e_{[j]})φi​(T,ℓ)=∑jk∈Ti​ℓ(jk)φ[i]​(e[j]​) (p. 25).
  8. Proposition 2 on trees: population monotonicity and merging proofness hold if and only if φ(en)=φλ(en)\varphi(e_n)=\varphi^\lambda(e_n)φ(en​)=φλ(en​) for all nnn and some λ∈[0,1]\lambda\in[0,1]λ∈[0,1] (pp. 12, 17).

Significance

Theorem 4 says that the axioms which single out the fixed-fraction rules on chains still single them out on trees, with nothing added. Because the rule only needs each agent's direct losses and the identity of the initiator, it can be computed locally. This is what the paper uses to implement liability sharing in a smart contract (Section 6, Figure 3). The characterization also justifies applying the rule to supply networks, where firms supply several customers, rather than only to chains.

The paper's proof of Theorem 4 is a short sketch: it reduces trees to chains by trimming and relabelling, then cites the chain argument. No machine-checked version of any part of the paper exists. Formalizing it would check the reduction in full, including the bookkeeping that the printed proof compresses. While preparing this mission, three places where the printed text differs from what the argument establishes were found; they are corrected here (see Formalization scope). The tree machinery built here (paths, depths, subtrees, relabelling of finite rooted trees over N\mathbb NN) is reusable for other liability and cost-sharing models on hierarchies.

Difficulty

The obvious argument works edge by edge: use additivity to isolate one edge, use zero truncation to cut the tree down to the path through that edge, then relabel the path into a chain. The first gap is that additivity yields only rational homogeneity. Continuity, or the monotonicity that additivity and non-negativity give, is needed for real multiples. The second is that zero truncation only adds or removes leaf edges, so trimming must proceed leaf by leaf, keeping a tree at every step. It must also be shown that agents removed from the tree carried no liability, which needs balance and non-negativity. The third is that relabelling requires a bijection of all of N\mathbb NN that maps the path onto 1,…,[k]1,\dots,[k]1,…,[k], together with a loss on the relabelled tree. Label invariance must hold for every such loss, not only one chosen extension. Finally, the chain part (Proposition 2) pins down φ(en)\varphi(e_n)φ(en​) by an induction that chains population-monotonicity inequalities with merging proofness.

Formalization scope

Trees are Finset (ℕ × ℕ) with the root, unique-parent and reachability conditions above. Vertex labels keep the paper's numbering (TnT_nTn​ uses 1,…,n+11,\dots,n+11,…,n+1); Lean's N\mathbb NN also contains 000, which label invariance makes harmless. A rule is a function φ T ℓ i on all edge sets, real functions and naturals. Every axiom and every conclusion is quantified only over trees, non-negative losses and agents i∈N(T)i\in N(T)i∈N(T). The conclusion φ=φλ\varphi=\varphi^\lambdaφ=φλ is equality at those arguments. A function equality would be false, since a rule's other values are arbitrary. The rule conditions (non-negativity, balance, label invariance, continuity) are a hypothesis of every statement. Dropping them makes Theorem 4 false: the parameter λ\lambdaλ need not lie in [0,1][0,1][0,1], and a rule need not respect the tree's labels. The root of φλ\varphi^\lambdaφλ is detected as the vertex with no incoming edge, never hard-coded as label 1.

Three disclosed departures from the printed text:

  1. Axiom 6 adds leaves only. The axiom is stated with the extra condition that the new edge ends at a vertex outside TTT, as the sentence before the axiom says. Read literally, the axiom would allow a zero-loss edge into the old root, which moves the root. The fixed-fraction rules with λ<1\lambda<1λ<1 violate that literal version, and Theorem 4 would be false.
  2. Population monotonicity uses 1≤j<n1\le j<n1≤j<n. The page prints 1<j<n1<j<n1<j<n, under which Theorem 1 already fails.
  3. Proposition 3 and the relabelling step use e[j]e_{[j]}e[j]​. The page prints e[k]e_{[k]}e[k]​ for the edge jkjkjk, but PkP^kPk has [k]−1=[j][k]-1=[j][k]−1=[j] edges. With e[k]e_{[k]}e[k]​, Proposition 3 is false for φλ\varphi^\lambdaφλ.

Continuity is taken from Section 2, where it is standing; the proof of Proposition 3 invokes it. A complete development needs finite rooted trees over N\mathbb NN, reachability (Relation.ReflTransGen), the extension of a finite injection to a permutation of N\mathbb NN, and leaf-by-leaf induction on trees. Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are alternative routes to Theorem 4, for example through monotonicity instead of continuity.

Selected references

  • J. Gudmundsson, J. L. Hougaard, C. Y. Ko, Sharing Sequentially Triggered Losses: Automated Conflict Resolution Through Smart Contracts, Management Science 70(3), 1773–1786, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4772 (formalized from the authors' accepted manuscript, 2023).
  • T. Oishi, G. van der Laan, R. van den Brink, Axiomatic analysis of liability problems with rooted-tree networks in tort law, Economic Theory 75, 229–258, 2023.
11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Linear algebraLinear OptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

A Strongly Polynomial Algorithm for Linear Exchange Markets II: A Z₊-Matrix Polyhedron P_M Lies Between an M2VPI Polyhedron and Its Scaling by B²Research Paper

Motivation

In a linear exchange market every agent owns one divisible good and has linear utilities over all goods; an equilibrium is a price vector at which every agent can spend its budget on goods that maximize utility per unit of money, and all goods are sold. Computing such an equilibrium in strongly polynomial time, with a number of arithmetic operations bounded by a polynomial in the number of agents alone, was an open question until Garg and Végh (arXiv:1809.06266; Operations Research, 2023). Their algorithm alternates two kinds of phases. One identifies "revealed" edges that appear in every equilibrium (the subject of mission I of this series). The other computes good starting prices for the current set of revealed edges by solving a linear program whose constraint matrix has a special sign structure.

No strongly polynomial algorithm is known for that linear program. Systems in which every inequality has at most one positive and at most one negative coefficient, by contrast, are strongly polynomially solvable (Megiddo, 1983; Hochbaum and Naor, 1994). The paper bridges the gap with Theorem 6.4: a polyhedron given by a Z+Z_+Z+​-matrix is sandwiched between a monotone two-variable-per-inequality polyhedron and its scaling by an explicit factor B2B^2B2. This mission formalizes that theorem and the lemmas of §7 that prove it. It is a statement about matrices and polyhedra only; no market notions enter.

Setting

Matrices are rational. For integers k,t≥0k, t \ge 0k,t≥0 a matrix M∈Qk×tM \in \mathbb{Q}^{k\times t}M∈Qk×t is a Z+Z_+Z+​-matrix, written M∈Z+(k,t)M \in \mathcal{Z}_+(k,t)M∈Z+​(k,t), if every off-diagonal entry is nonpositive and every column sum is nonnegative:

Mij≤0(i≠j),∑i=1kMij≥0(j∈[t]).M_{ij} \le 0 \quad (i \ne j), \qquad \sum_{i=1}^k M_{ij} \ge 0 \quad (j \in [t]).Mij​≤0(i=j),i=1∑k​Mij​≥0(j∈[t]).

For a non-square matrix the diagonal entries are the MiiM_{ii}Mii​ with 1≤i≤min⁡{k,t}1 \le i \le \min\{k,t\}1≤i≤min{k,t}. Square Z+Z_+Z+​-matrices are exactly the transposes of weighted Laplacians of directed graphs, or such transposes with one row and column deleted.

M2(m,t)\mathcal{M}_2(m,t)M2​(m,t) is the set of m×tm\times tm×t rational matrices with at most one positive and at most one negative entry in every row. A system Mˉx≤bˉ\bar M x \le \bar bMˉx≤bˉ with Mˉ∈M2(m,t)\bar M \in \mathcal{M}_2(m,t)Mˉ∈M2​(m,t) is a monotone two-variable-per-inequality system (M2VPI).

For M∈Z+(k,t)M \in \mathcal{Z}_+(k,t)M∈Z+​(k,t) and b∈Qkb \in \mathbb{Q}^kb∈Qk with b>0b > 0b>0, the polyhedron of interest is

PM={x∈Rt:Mx≤b, x≥0}.P_M = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^t : Mx \le b,\ x \ge 0\}.PM​={x∈Rt:Mx≤b, x≥0}.

Write ℓ\ellℓ for the number of nonzero entries of MMM, αP={αx:x∈P}\alpha P = \{\alpha x : x \in P\}αP={αx:x∈P} for α>0\alpha > 0α>0, and

B=∑j=1kbjmin⁡i∈[k]bi.B = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^k b_j}{\min_{i\in[k]} b_i}.B=mini∈[k]​bi​∑j=1k​bj​​.

In §7 the right-hand side is called γ\gammaγ instead of bbb, and λi=∑j≠iγj\lambda_i = \sum_{j\ne i}\gamma_jλi​=∑j=i​γj​.

The proof works with a square M∈Z+(t,t)M \in \mathcal{Z}_+(t,t)M∈Z+​(t,t) with positive diagonal. Its digraph ([t],H)([t],H)([t],H) has an arc ijijij whenever Mij<0M_{ij} < 0Mij​<0. DiD_iDi​ is the set of vertices reachable from iii (including iii), and M(i)M^{(i)}M(i) is the submatrix of the rows MjM_jMj​, j∈Dij \in D_ij∈Di​. The vertices split into T1T_1T1​ (at most one outgoing arc), T2T_2T2​ (at least two arcs and rk⁡M(i)=∣Di∣\operatorname{rk} M^{(i)} = |D_i|rkM(i)=∣Di​∣) and T3T_3T3​ (at least two arcs and rk⁡M(i)<∣Di∣\operatorname{rk} M^{(i)} < |D_i|rkM(i)<∣Di​∣).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.4 (p. 15)

For M∈Z+(k,t)M \in \mathcal{Z}_+(k,t)M∈Z+​(k,t) with k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 and ℓ\ellℓ nonzero entries, and b∈Qkb \in \mathbb{Q}^kb∈Qk with b>0b > 0b>0, there are ℓ′≤ℓ\ell' \le \ellℓ′≤ℓ, Mˉ∈M2(ℓ′,t)\bar M \in \mathcal{M}_2(\ell',t)Mˉ∈M2​(ℓ′,t) and bˉ∈Qℓ′\bar b \in \mathbb{Q}^{\ell'}bˉ∈Qℓ′ with

PM⊆{x∈Rt:Mˉx≤bˉ, x≥0}⊆B2PM.P_M \subseteq \{x \in \mathbb{R}^t : \bar Mx \le \bar b,\ x \ge 0\} \subseteq B^2 P_M.PM​⊆{x∈Rt:Mˉx≤bˉ, x≥0}⊆B2PM​.

Milestones (§7, pp. 16–23)

  • Lemma 7.1: for M∈Z+(t,t)M \in \mathcal{Z}_+(t,t)M∈Z+​(t,t) and pˉ≥0\bar p \ge 0pˉ​≥0 with Mpˉ≤γM\bar p \le \gammaMpˉ​≤γ,  Mpˉ≥−λ≥−(B−1)γ\ M\bar p \ge -\lambda \ge -(B-1)\gamma Mpˉ​≥−λ≥−(B−1)γ.
  • Lemma 7.2: the Gaussian elimination of the proof, run on T∈Z+(ℓ,t)T \in \mathcal{Z}_+(\ell,t)T∈Z+​(ℓ,t), returns T′=YTT' = YTT′=YT with Y≥0Y \ge 0Y≥0, T′T'T′ upper triangular with diagonal entries in {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1} and nonpositive off-diagonal entries, and Tkk′=1T'_{kk} = 1Tkk′​=1 whenever some Tik<0T_{ik} < 0Tik​<0 with i>ki > ki>k.
  • Claim 7.3(iii): for i∈T3i \in T_3i∈T3​, MiM_iMi​ is a linear combination of {Mh:h∈Di∖{i}}\{M_h : h \in D_i \setminus\{i\}\}{Mh​:h∈Di​∖{i}}.
  • Lemma 7.4(i): for i∈T2∪T3i \in T_2\cup T_3i∈T2​∪T3​ there is a unique q(i)∈R+tq^{(i)} \in \mathbb{R}^t_+q(i)∈R+t​ with Mℓq(i)=0M_\ell q^{(i)} = 0Mℓ​q(i)=0 (ℓ∈Di∖{i}\ell \in D_i\setminus\{i\}ℓ∈Di​∖{i}), qi(i)=1q^{(i)}_i = 1qi(i)​=1 and qℓ(i)=0q^{(i)}_\ell = 0qℓ(i)​=0 off DiD_iDi​.
  • Lemma 7.4(iv) and (iii): points r(i)∈PMr^{(i)} \in P_Mr(i)∈PM​ tight on Di∖{i}D_i\setminus\{i\}Di​∖{i} (for i∈T3i \in T_3i∈T3​) and on DiD_iDi​ with ri(i)=κ(i)r^{(i)}_i = \kappa(i)ri(i)​=κ(i) (for i∈T2i \in T_2i∈T2​).
  • Claim 7.5: κ(i) Miq(i)≤Bγi\kappa(i)\,M_i q^{(i)} \le B\gamma_iκ(i)Mi​q(i)≤Bγi​ for i∈T2i \in T_2i∈T2​.
  • The reduced case (§7, p. 16): Theorem 6.4 for square MMM with positive diagonal.

Significance

Theorem 6.4 turns an LP over a Z+Z_+Z+​ constraint matrix, for which no strongly polynomial algorithm is known, into an M2VPI system that is strongly polynomially solvable, at the price of a factor B2B^2B2. In the exchange-market algorithm B≤nB \le nB≤n, so the starting prices of each phase come within a factor n2n^2n2 of optimal (the proof of Theorem 3.7, p. 15). That bound is what lets the potential argument advance in a polynomial number of phases. The construction is not specific to markets: any LP of the form max⁡∑ixi\max \sum_i x_imax∑i​xi​ over PMP_MPM​ with MMM a Z+Z_+Z+​-matrix, which includes LPs over transposed weighted Laplacians of directed graphs, inherits the same approximation.

The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge none of it has been machine-checked. A formalization produces a checked proof of the sandwich. It also produces reusable facts about Gaussian elimination on Z+Z_+Z+​-matrices (Lemma 7.2), which hold for any matrix whose off-diagonal entries are nonpositive and whose column sums are nonnegative.

Difficulty

The obvious approach, deleting all but two variables from each inequality of PMP_MPM​, fails: the dropped negative terms make the resulting system either too weak or invalid. The paper instead derives one new constraint per arc ijijij of HHH, as a nonnegative combination of the inequalities Mpˉ≥−λM\bar p \ge -\lambdaMpˉ​≥−λ. Finding it requires an ordering of DiD_iDi​ in which every vertex but iii has an in-neighbour placed after it, and an elimination on the permuted submatrix whose penultimate row has exactly two nonzero entries. The reverse containment {Mˉpˉ≤bˉ}⊆B2PM\{\bar M\bar p \le \bar b\} \subseteq B^2P_M{Mˉpˉ​≤bˉ}⊆B2PM​ is the hard direction. It splits by whether the rows on DiD_iDi​ are linearly independent (T2T_2T2​) or not (T3T_3T3​), and the T2T_2T2​ case needs the extra constraint pˉi≤κ(i)\bar p_i \le \kappa(i)pˉ​i​≤κ(i) and the comparison of entries of the elimination multipliers Y(ij)Y^{(ij)}Y(ij) in Claim 7.5. Every step relies on a sign invariant of the elimination that Lemma 7.2 proves by induction.

Formalization scope

Indices are 0-based (Fin k, Fin t); the paper's [n]={1,…,n}[n] = \{1,\dots,n\}[n]={1,…,n}. Matrices MMM, Mˉ\bar MMˉ and right-hand sides bbb, bˉ\bar bbˉ, γ\gammaγ are rational (ℚ), as on p. 15, and act on real vectors x∈Rtx \in \mathbb{R}^tx∈Rt through the cast. A diagonal entry of a rectangular matrix is one whose two indices agree as natural numbers. B2PMB^2P_MB2PM​ is the image {B2x:x∈PM}\{B^2x : x \in P_M\}{B2x:x∈PM​}. BBB is defined for k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 only, and every statement using it assumes k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 (resp. t≥1t \ge 1t≥1).

Not formalized: the running time O(ℓ(min⁡{k,t})3)O(\ell(\min\{k,t\})^3)O(ℓ(min{k,t})3) and the polynomial bound on the encoding size of Mˉ\bar MMˉ, bˉ\bar bbˉ in Theorem 6.4. The goal is the existence statement that the construction (13) witnesses. The standing assumptions of §7 (γ>0\gamma > 0γ>0; positive diagonal after the reduction) appear as hypotheses of the milestones that live in that setting.

Lemma 7.2 is stated about the specific elimination of the proof (p. 17), defined explicitly; an existential "there is Y≥0Y \ge 0Y≥0" form would be nearly trivial, since Y=0Y = 0Y=0 satisfies all but one clause. In the goal, Mˉ\bar MMˉ must have at most one positive and at most one negative entry per row, and ℓ′≤ℓ\ell' \le \ellℓ′≤ℓ. Dropping either requirement makes the goal weaker than the paper's theorem.

κ(i)\kappa(i)κ(i), defined in (12) through the elimination for an arbitrarily chosen arc, is restated intrinsically as the iii-th entry of (MDi,Di)−1γDi(M_{D_i,D_i})^{-1}\gamma_{D_i}(MDi​,Di​​)−1γDi​​, a number the paper shows equal (proof of Lemma 7.4(iii)). It is used only for i∈T2i \in T_2i∈T2​, where that block is invertible. Claim 7.3(i)–(ii) and Lemma 7.4(ii), which concern the elimination output for a particular arc, are not milestones.

A complete development needs the elimination and its invariants, reachability in a finite digraph, ranks of row submatrices, and the construction (13). The elimination lemmas are reusable for any Z+Z_+Z+​-matrix. Contributions are welcome on any milestone, on the reduction from rectangular MMM to the square positive-diagonal case, and on the two containments of the reduced case.

Selected references

  • J. Garg and L. A. Végh, A strongly polynomial algorithm for linear exchange markets, arXiv:1809.06266v3, 2022; Operations Research, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.06266
  • N. Megiddo, Towards a genuinely polynomial algorithm for linear programming, SIAM Journal on Computing 12(2), 1983. https://doi.org/10.1137/0212022
  • D. S. Hochbaum and J. Naor, Simple and fast algorithms for linear and integer programs with two variables per inequality, SIAM Journal on Computing 23(6), 1994. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539793251876
  • R. W. Cottle and A. F. Veinott, Jr., Polyhedral sets having a least element, Mathematical Programming 3, 1972. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01584975
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Guarantees in Fair Division: General or Monotone Preferences 1: Kuhn's Divide & Choose Rule Guarantees Every Agent Her minMax Utility for Continuous Non-Atomic PreferencesResearch Paper

Motivation

Fair division asks how to share a resource among nnn agents with different preferences so that each agent can be promised a minimum level of welfare, whatever the preferences of the others. Classical cake cutting treats a good cake, valued additively or at least monotonically. Many real problems mix goods and bads: a plot of land with both fertile and polluted parts, a set of chores some of which are welcome, a workload whose value first rises and then falls with its size. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (arXiv:1911.10009, Mathematics of Operations Research 2023) study the most general non-atomic model, in which a utility is only required to be continuous and bounded, and ask which utility levels can be guaranteed simultaneously to all agents.

Their first main result is that Kuhn's nnn-person Divide & Choose rule (Kuhn 1967) guarantees each agent her minMax utility, in this full generality. The key ingredient is an equipartition theorem of Avvakumov and Karasev ([4]), which lets the current divider cut any piece into equally valued parts even when the utility is neither monotone nor of constant sign.

Setting

The manna Ω\OmegaΩ is a bounded Lebesgue-measurable subset of Rd\mathbb R^dRd, d≥1d\ge1d≥1, with ∣Ω∣>0|\Omega|>0∣Ω∣>0; ∣⋅∣|\cdot|∣⋅∣ is Lebesgue measure. A share is a measurable subset S⊆ΩS\subseteq\OmegaS⊆Ω, possibly empty. For a share SSS, an nnn-partition Π=(Si)i=1n∈Pn(S)\Pi=(S_i)_{i=1}^n\in\mathcal P_n(S)Π=(Si​)i=1n​∈Pn​(S) is an nnn-tuple of shares with ⋃iSi=S\bigcup_i S_i=S⋃i​Si​=S and ∣Si∩Sj∣=0|S_i\cap S_j|=0∣Si​∩Sj​∣=0 for i≠ji\ne ji=j. The pseudo-metric on shares is δ(S,T)=∣S⊗T∣\delta(S,T)=|S\otimes T|δ(S,T)=∣S⊗T∣, the measure of the symmetric difference.

A utility uuu assigns a real number to each share, with u(∅)=0u(\emptyset)=0u(∅)=0, and is bounded and continuous for δ\deltaδ. The set of utilities is D(Ω)\mathcal D(\Omega)D(Ω). Nothing else is assumed: uuu may increase or decrease with the share and may take both signs.

An nnn-equipartition of a share SSS for uuu is a partition Πe∈Pn(S)\Pi^e\in\mathcal P_n(S)Πe∈Pn​(S) whose parts all have the same utility u(Πe)u(\Pi^e)u(Πe); their set is EPn(S;u)\mathcal{EP}_n(S;u)EPn​(S;u). The two benchmarks are

minMax(u;n)=inf⁡Π∈Pn(Ω)max⁡iu(Si),Maxmin(u;n)=sup⁡Π∈Pn(Ω)min⁡iu(Si).\mathrm{minMax}(u;n)=\inf_{\Pi\in\mathcal P_n(\Omega)}\max_i u(S_i),\qquad \mathrm{Maxmin}(u;n)=\sup_{\Pi\in\mathcal P_n(\Omega)}\min_i u(S_i).minMax(u;n)=Π∈Pn​(Ω)inf​imax​u(Si​),Maxmin(u;n)=Π∈Pn​(Ω)sup​imin​u(Si​).

minMax is what an agent gets choosing first from the worst partition for her; Maxmin is what she gets choosing last from the best one.

In the D&Cn_nn​ rule the agents are ordered 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n. At each step the first remaining agent, the Divider, proposes an mmm-partition of the remaining manna SSS among the mmm remaining agents. Every other remaining agent reports which shares she likes (at least one); the Divider likes all of them. A set of agents is properly matched to a set of shares when they are matched one-to-one to liked shares and no other remaining agent likes any of those shares. The largest properly matchable set of agents is served; the other shares return to the manna, and the rule continues with the unserved agents.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 i)

An agent iii with utility u∈D(Ω)u\in\mathcal D(\Omega)u∈D(Ω) follows the minMax strategy when, as Divider, she proposes an equipartition Πe∈EPm(S;u)\Pi^e\in\mathcal{EP}_m(S;u)Πe∈EPm​(S;u), and, as chooser, she likes exactly the shares TTT with u(T)≥minMax(u;n)u(T)\ge\mathrm{minMax}(u;n)u(T)≥minMax(u;n), the level of the initial problem. Then, whatever the other agents do,

  1. the Divider move is always available (an equipartition exists);
  2. the chooser move is always available (some offered share is worth at least minMax(u;n)\mathrm{minMax}(u;n)minMax(u;n));
  3. in every complete play,
u(Si) ≥ minMax(u;n).u(S_i)\ \ge\ \mathrm{minMax}(u;n).u(Si​) ≥ minMax(u;n).

Milestones

The equipartition theorem of [4] on [0,1][0,1][0,1]; Lemma 1, EPn(S;u)≠∅\mathcal{EP}_n(S;u)\ne\emptysetEPn​(S;u)=∅ for every share and every u∈D(Ω)u\in\mathcal D(\Omega)u∈D(Ω); Lemma 2, existence of a largest properly matchable set containing the Divider; and the three steps of the proof of Theorem 1 i): the invariant that previously assigned shares are worth less than minMax to an unserved agent, the chooser step and the Divider step.

Companions

Proposition 1 iii), minMax(u;n)≤u(Πe)≤Maxmin(u;n)\mathrm{minMax}(u;n)\le u(\Pi^e)\le\mathrm{Maxmin}(u;n)minMax(u;n)≤u(Πe)≤Maxmin(u;n) for every Πe∈EPn(Ω;u)\Pi^e\in\mathcal{EP}_n(\Omega;u)Πe∈EPn​(Ω;u), and the statement that minMax(⋅;n)\mathrm{minMax}(\cdot;n)minMax(⋅;n) is a Fair Guarantee in D(Ω)\mathcal D(\Omega)D(Ω): every profile (ui)∈D(Ω)n(u_i)\in\mathcal D(\Omega)^n(ui​)∈D(Ω)n admits Π∈Pn(Ω)\Pi\in\mathcal P_n(\Omega)Π∈Pn​(Ω) with ui(Si)≥minMax(ui;n)u_i(S_i)\ge\mathrm{minMax}(u_i;n)ui​(Si​)≥minMax(ui​;n) for all iii (Definition 3).

Significance

Maxmin is an upper bound on any Fair Guarantee, and in the mixed-manna domain it is not itself a Fair Guarantee. Theorem 1 establishes minMax as a guarantee that holds on the whole domain, is implemented by a simple decentralised protocol, and requires no knowledge of the other agents' preferences. Together with the companion results it brackets what can be promised to every agent in non-atomic division with arbitrary continuous preferences.

The result is proved in the paper; nothing in this mission is open mathematics. None of it is machine-checked. The formalization adds a non-atomic fair-division layer (shares up to null sets, δ\deltaδ-continuous utilities, equipartitions, minMax and Maxmin) and a precise model of a sequential division protocol in which the other agents' behaviour is quantified over, rather than fixed. The goal also makes explicit the step the informal proof passes over quickly: the minMax strategy is always a legal move.

Difficulty

Once the protocol is modelled, the guarantee is an invariant argument over the steps of a play. The difficulty is Lemma 1. For an additive utility, Lyapunov's theorem gives equipartitions; for a utility of constant sign, the Knaster–Kuratowski–Mazurkiewicz lemma does (Remark 1). A utility that takes both signs defeats both arguments, and an obvious intermediate-value argument handles only n=2n=2n=2. The paper reduces Lemma 1, through a moving knife, to the interval theorem of Avvakumov and Karasev, whose proof is topological (mapping degree). Mathlib has neither that theorem nor the degree theory it uses. Lemma 2 needs the Gallai–Edmonds decomposition of a bipartite graph, which Mathlib does not have either; Hall's theorem is available.

Formalization scope

The space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) with volume, and every statement that needs non-atomicity assumes d≥1d\ge1d≥1 (on R0\mathbb R^0R0, a point of measure 111, Lemma 1 fails). A utility is a function on all subsets, but every condition is imposed on shares only. Partitions are indexed by Fin n, have union exactly the share and null pairwise overlaps; disjointness is not required. minMax and Maxmin are real sInf/sSup; every statement using them assumes n≥1n\ge1n≥1, which makes the defining sets nonempty and bounded. Agents are Fin n, the Divider is the least remaining agent, and a play is a list of steps, each recording the remaining agents and manna, the proposed partition, all reports and the assignment. A step is admissible exactly as Definition 4 requires, including that the served set is the largest properly matchable one.

The following formalizations would trivialize the goal and are ruled out: fixing the other agents' behaviour; accepting against the minMax of the remaining manna instead of the initial one; assuming the utility monotone, additive or of constant sign; defining minMax as a minimum over a possibly empty set; and omitting the availability parts 1–2, which would make Lemma 1 irrelevant.

A complete development needs the interval equipartition theorem (a topological result of independent interest), moving knives through a measurable set, a Gallai–Edmonds-type argument for bipartite graphs, and the invariant over plays. The non-atomic model and the equipartition lemmas are reusable for the Moving Knife and Bid & Choose rules of the companion mission. Proofs of any milestone, alternative proofs of Lemma 1 for special classes of utilities, and the run-level lemmas are all welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Bogomolnaia, H. Moulin, Guarantees in Fair Division: General or Monotone Preferences, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2023; arXiv:1911.10009v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.10009
  • S. Avvakumov, R. Karasev, Equipartition of an interval, cited in the paper as [4] (2020, in preparation).
  • H. W. Kuhn, On games of fair division, in Essays in Mathematical Economics in Honour of Oskar Morgenstern, Princeton University Press, 1967, pp. 29–37.
  • L. Lovász, M. D. Plummer, Matching Theory, Annals of Discrete Mathematics 29, North-Holland, 1986 (Gallai–Edmonds decomposition, Chapter 3).
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Control TheoryOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Approximate Analysis of Dynamic Pricing, Outsourcing, and Scheduling Policies for a Multiclass Make-to-Stock Queue in the Heavy Traffic Regime: The Two-Barrier Drift-Rate Control Policy Is OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

A manufacturer that makes several products to stock for price-sensitive customers controls three levers at once: the prices it posts, which shape demand; outsourcing, which clears a large backlog at a cost; and scheduling, which decides which product the single server makes next. Ata and Barjesteh (Operations Research 71(1), 2023) study this multiclass make-to-stock queue in the heavy-traffic regime, where the queue is nearly saturated and the system is approximated by a Brownian control problem. The approximation collapses to a one-dimensional problem in the workload, the total amount of work in the system. Its solution is a two-barrier policy whose state-dependent drift translates back into a dynamic pricing rule, an outsourcing threshold and a scheduling priority (§7 of the paper).

The one-dimensional problem belongs to the family of drift-rate control problems for Brownian motion under a long-run average cost criterion (Ata, Harrison and Shepp, Ann. Appl. Probab. 2005; Rubino and Ata, Oper. Res. 2009). Problems of this kind are solved by a Bellman equation with free boundaries and a verification argument; the present paper adds two-sided singular control (outsourcing at the bottom, idling at the top) to a quadratic drift cost and a piecewise linear state cost.

Setting

There are K≥1K\ge1K≥1 products with mean production times mk>0m_k>0mk​>0 and holding, backorder and outsourcing cost rates hk,bk,rk>0h_k,b_k,r_k>0hk​,bk​,rk​>0. A symmetric positive definite matrix HHH describes the curvature of the revenue rate. Write a=m′H−1ma=m'H^{-1}ma=m′H−1m and

h⋆=min⁡khkmk,b⋆=min⁡kbkmk,κ=min⁡krkmk.h^\star=\min_k\frac{h_k}{m_k},\qquad b^\star=\min_k\frac{b_k}{m_k},\qquad \kappa=\min_k\frac{r_k}{m_k}.h⋆=kmin​mk​hk​​,b⋆=kmin​mk​bk​​,κ=kmin​mk​rk​​.

The drift cost and the effective holding cost are

c(x)=min⁡{ζ′Hζ: m′ζ=x},h(w)=h⋆w (w≥0),h(w)=−b⋆w (w<0).c(x)=\min\{\zeta'H\zeta:\ m'\zeta=x\},\qquad h(w)=h^\star w\ (w\ge0),\quad h(w)=-b^\star w\ (w<0).c(x)=min{ζ′Hζ: m′ζ=x},h(w)=h⋆w (w≥0),h(w)=−b⋆w (w<0).

Let BBB be a Brownian motion with drift μ≥0\mu\ge0μ≥0 and variance σ2>0\sigma^2>0σ2>0, started at 000, with respect to a filtration F\mathbb FF. An admissible control consists of a progressively measurable drift rate θ\thetaθ and nondecreasing, right-continuous, adapted processes LLL (effective outsourcing) and UUU (idleness) with L(0)=U(0)=0L(0)=U(0)=0L(0)=U(0)=0. The workload is

W(t)=B(t)−∫0tθ(s) ds−U(t)+L(t),W(t)=B(t)-\int_0^t\theta(s)\,ds-U(t)+L(t),W(t)=B(t)−∫0t​θ(s)ds−U(t)+L(t),

and admissibility also requires E∣W(t)∣/t→0\mathbb E|W(t)|/t\to0E∣W(t)∣/t→0. The equivalent workload formulation (EWF) is to minimize

lim sup⁡t→∞1t E[∫0tc(θ(s)) ds+∫0th(W(s)) ds+κL(t)].(29)\limsup_{t\to\infty}\frac1t\,\mathbb E\Big[\int_0^tc(\theta(s))\,ds+\int_0^th(W(s))\,ds+\kappa L(t)\Big]. \tag{29}t→∞limsup​t1​E[∫0t​c(θ(s))ds+∫0t​h(W(s))ds+κL(t)].(29)

A barrier policy with barriers l<ul<ul<u keeps WWW in [l,u][l,u][l,u], increases LLL only when W=lW=lW=l and UUU only when W=uW=uW=u.

For γ≥0\gamma\ge0γ≥0 put lγ=−1b⋆(γ+μκ+a4κ2)l_\gamma=-\frac1{b^\star}(\gamma+\mu\kappa+\frac a4\kappa^2)lγ​=−b⋆1​(γ+μκ+4a​κ2) and uγ=γ/h⋆u_\gamma=\gamma/h^\staruγ​=γ/h⋆. Let vγ−v^-_\gammavγ−​ solve the Riccati equation

v′=a2σ2(v2−κ2)−2μσ2(v+κ)+2(h(lγ)−h(w))σ2 on [lγ,0],v(lγ)=−κ,v'=\frac a{2\sigma^2}(v^2-\kappa^2)-\frac{2\mu}{\sigma^2}(v+\kappa)+\frac{2(h(l_\gamma)-h(w))}{\sigma^2}\ \text{on }[l_\gamma,0],\qquad v(l_\gamma)=-\kappa,v′=2σ2a​(v2−κ2)−σ22μ​(v+κ)+σ22(h(lγ​)−h(w))​ on [lγ​,0],v(lγ​)=−κ,

and vγ+v^+_\gammavγ+​ solve v′=a2σ2v2−2μσ2v+2(h(uγ)−h(w))σ2v'=\frac a{2\sigma^2}v^2-\frac{2\mu}{\sigma^2}v+\frac{2(h(u_\gamma)-h(w))}{\sigma^2}v′=2σ2a​v2−σ22μ​v+σ22(h(uγ​)−h(w))​ on [0,uγ][0,u_\gamma][0,uγ​] with v(uγ)=0v(u_\gamma)=0v(uγ​)=0. The paper's γ⋆\gamma^\starγ⋆ is the unique γ\gammaγ with vγ−(0)=vγ+(0)v^-_{\gamma}(0)=v^+_{\gamma}(0)vγ−​(0)=vγ+​(0); vvv pastes vγ⋆−v^-_{\gamma^\star}vγ⋆−​ and vγ⋆+v^+_{\gamma^\star}vγ⋆+​ at 000, and the candidate drift is θ(w)=a2v(w)\theta(w)=\frac a2v(w)θ(w)=2a​v(w).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

For every filtered probability space carrying such a Brownian motion,

lim⁡t→∞Jcand(t)t=γ⋆for every barrier policy at (lγ⋆,uγ⋆) with drift θ(W),lim sup⁡t→∞J(t)t≥γ⋆ for every admissible control,\lim_{t\to\infty}\frac{J_{\text{cand}}(t)}t=\gamma^\star\quad\text{for every barrier policy at }(l_{\gamma^\star},u_{\gamma^\star})\text{ with drift }\theta(W),\qquad \limsup_{t\to\infty}\frac{J(t)}t\ge\gamma^\star\ \text{for every admissible control},t→∞lim​tJcand​(t)​=γ⋆for every barrier policy at (lγ⋆​,uγ⋆​) with drift θ(W),t→∞limsup​tJ(t)​≥γ⋆ for every admissible control,

where JJJ is the expected cumulative cost in (29). The constant γ⋆\gamma^\starγ⋆ is the paper's construction, not a parameter.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1 and Lemma 2: the closed forms c(x)=x2/ac(x)=x^2/ac(x)=x2/a and its conjugate φ(y)=a4y2\varphi(y)=\frac a4y^2φ(y)=4a​y2, maximized at ψ(y)=a2y\psi(y)=\frac a2yψ(y)=2a​y.
  2. Proposition 2: a barrier policy whose (γ,f)(\gamma,f)(γ,f) solves the ODE (35)–(36) has long-run average cost γ\gammaγ.
  3. Lemma 3: any solution of the Riccati-form Bellman equation (43)–(45) has γ>0\gamma>0γ>0, l=lγ<0l=l_\gamma<0l=lγ​<0, u=uγ>0u=u_\gamma>0u=uγ​>0.
  4. Lemmas 18–20 and Corollary 6: sign and monotonicity of the Riccati solutions.
  5. §6.3 well-posedness, Lemma 4(i)–(ii), Corollary 1: uniqueness of vγ±v^\pm_\gammavγ±​, their monotone dependence on γ\gammaγ, and the unique crossing γ⋆\gamma^\starγ⋆.
  6. Proposition 3 and Corollary 2: (lγ⋆,uγ⋆,γ⋆,v)(l_{\gamma^\star},u_{\gamma^\star},\gamma^\star,v)(lγ⋆​,uγ⋆​,γ⋆,v) is the unique solution of (43)–(45), and f=∫vf=\int vf=∫v solves the Bellman equation (37)–(39), uniquely up to a constant.

Significance

The theorem identifies an explicit optimal policy for a two-sided singular drift-control problem: two barriers and a strictly increasing, non-positive drift, all determined by a scalar root γ⋆\gamma^\starγ⋆ of a monotone equation. In the paper it drives the proposed pricing, outsourcing and scheduling policy (§7) and its asymptotic analysis; the Riccati structure is what makes γ⋆\gamma^\starγ⋆ computable by line search.

The result is proved in the paper; none of it has been machine-checked. Formalizing it gives a checked verification theorem for an average-cost Brownian control problem with singular controls, and checked statements of the Riccati comparison lemmas on which it rests. Several printed statements of the paper are corrected here (see the scope section), so the formal versions are the first fully precise ones.

Difficulty

The optimality half of Theorem 1 is a verification argument: apply Itô's formula to f(W(t))f(W(t))f(W(t)) for an arbitrary admissible control with jumps in LLL and UUU, use the Bellman inequality pointwise, and control Ef(W(t))/t\mathbb E f(W(t))/tEf(W(t))/t with the growth condition (32). Mathlib does not yet have Itô's formula for continuous semimartingales with finite-variation, possibly discontinuous parts, and the candidate's average cost (Proposition 2) needs the same tool plus the fact that a reflected diffusion spends zero time at the barriers.

The deterministic half is not routine either. The obvious reading of the paper, solving each Riccati problem for every γ≥0\gamma\ge0γ≥0 and passing γ→∞\gamma\to\inftyγ→∞, fails: the solutions blow up in finite time, so vγ±v^\pm_\gammavγ±​ exist only for γ\gammaγ in a bounded initial interval, and the crossing argument must be run on that interval. The comparison arguments of Lemmas 18–20 also need second derivatives of solutions whose right-hand side has a kink at w=0w=0w=0.

Formalization scope

Time is indexed by R\mathbb RR and only t≥0t\ge0t≥0 matters. The Brownian motion is defined locally (drift, variance, start at 000, independence of increments from the filtration). Expected costs are computed in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], so a control with infinite cost counts as +∞+\infty+∞. The integrals in (34) are Lebesgue–Stieltjes integrals against the paths of LLL and UUU, jumps included. Derivatives at the barriers are one-sided; C1C^1C1 and C2C^2C2 up to the boundary are ContDiffOn on the closed interval. Minima and maxima (in ccc, (37), (40)) are stated as attained.

Standing assumptions added to every statement, all implicit in the paper: K≥1K\ge1K≥1; mk,hk,bk,rk>0m_k,h_k,b_k,r_k>0mk​,hk​,bk​,rk​>0; HHH symmetric positive definite; μ≥0\mu\ge0μ≥0, σ>0\sigma>0σ>0; BBB starts at 000; L,UL,UL,U right-continuous; θ\thetaθ progressively measurable with locally integrable paths; l<ul<ul<u in the Bellman equations.

Corrected statements. Lemmas 18–20 are printed for solutions on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), which do not exist; they are posed on every bounded interval where a solution exists. The §6.3 claim that vγ±v^\pm_\gammavγ±​ exist for every γ≥0\gamma\ge0γ≥0 is replaced by uniqueness, solvability at γ=0\gamma=0γ=0 and order-connectedness of the solvability sets. Lemma 4's limits as γ→∞\gamma\to\inftyγ→∞ become unboundedness on those sets. Theorem 1's comparison class is every admissible control, which the paper's proof treats, and which contains the stationary Markov policies to which §6 restricts attention.

Not posed. The existence of the reflected diffusion realizing the candidate policy is presupposed by the paper and not claimed: the first half of the goal quantifies over all barrier policies with the given data. The second half is a statement about every admissible control and is not vacuous.

γ⋆\gamma^\starγ⋆, vvv, fff and θ\thetaθ are built from the Riccati solutions by choice, exactly as the paper constructs them; taking them as hypotheses-constrained parameters, or defining ccc by its closed form, would trivialize the goal and is ruled out. Contributions are welcome on the Riccati lemmas (pure real analysis, reusable for other drift-control problems), on Itô's formula for semimartingales with finite-variation parts, and on Skorokhod-type existence of reflected diffusions.

Selected references

  • B. Ata and N. Barjesteh, An Approximate Analysis of Dynamic Pricing, Outsourcing, and Scheduling Policies for a Multiclass Make-to-Stock Queue in the Heavy Traffic Regime, Operations Research 71(1):341–357, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2361 (accepted manuscript: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3464763)
  • B. Ata, J. M. Harrison and L. A. Shepp, Drift rate control of a Brownian processing system, Annals of Applied Probability 15(2):1145–1160, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1214/105051604000000855
  • M. Rubino and B. Ata, Dynamic control of a make-to-order, parallel-server system with cancellations, Operations Research 57(1):94–108, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1080.0532
  • J. M. Harrison, Brownian Models of Performance and Control, Cambridge University Press, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139087698
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